--- schema-version: v1.2.8 id: OASISSAML2KrbSSO-CS01 title: - content: SAML V2.0 Kerberos Web Browser SSO Profile Version 1.0 language: - en script: - Latn format: text/plain type: main link: - content: http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/Post2.0/saml-kerberos-browser-sso/v1.0/cs01/saml-kerberos-browser-sso-v1.0-cs01.html type: src - content: http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/Post2.0/saml-kerberos-browser-sso/v1.0/cs01/saml-kerberos-browser-sso-v1.0-cs01.pdf type: pdf - content: http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/Post2.0/saml-kerberos-browser-sso/v1.0/cs01/saml-kerberos-browser-sso-v1.0-cs01.odt type: odt type: standard docid: - id: OASIS SAML2KrbSSO-CS01 type: OASIS primary: true docnumber: SAML2KrbSSO-CS01 date: - type: issued value: '2012-02-07' contributor: - organization: name: - content: OASIS contact: - uri: https://www.oasis-open.org/ role: - description: - content: Standards Development Organization type: authorizer - type: publisher - organization: name: - content: Security Services (SAML) TC contact: - uri: https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/security/ role: - description: - content: Committee type: authorizer - person: name: given: forename: - content: Thomas language: - en script: - Latn surname: content: Hardjono language: - en script: - Latn affiliation: - organization: name: - content: M.I.T. contact: - uri: http://www.mit.edu/ contact: - email: hardjono@mit.edu role: - description: - content: Chair type: editor - person: name: given: forename: - content: Nathan language: - en script: - Latn surname: content: Klingenstein language: - en script: - Latn affiliation: - organization: name: - content: Internet2 contact: - uri: http://www.internet2.edu/ contact: - email: ndk@internet2.edu role: - description: - content: Chair type: editor language: - en script: - Latn abstract: - content: Allows for transport of assertions using the Kerberos subject confirmation method by standard HTTP user agents with no modification of client software and maximum compatibility with existing deployments. The flow is similar to standard Web Browser SSO, but a Kerberos AP-REQ message is presented by the user agent via the HTTP Negotiate authentication scheme and the Kerberos GSS-API mechanism. The presentation of a valid Kerberos AP-REQ message whose client principal name matches the principal name given in the subject confirmation strengthens the assurance of the resulting authentication context and protects against credential theft. language: - en script: - Latn format: text/plain doctype: type: specification editorialgroup: - name: Security Services (SAML) TC ext: schema-version: v1.0.1 technology_area: - Security