

Fixing CVEs on Debian

Everything you probably know already

DebConf24
Busan, Korea

Slides available at samueloph.dev/slides

About me

- Samuel Henrique <samueloph>
- Debian Developer since 2018
- Member of the Security Tools Packaging Team
- Maintains curl, rsync, shellcheck...
- Mentorship for newcomers learning packaging
- System Development Engineer for Amazon Linux, security team
- Debian/Linux, Python, Rust, Bash, Security
- [linkedin.com/in/samueloph](https://www.linkedin.com/in/samueloph)
- samueloph.dev

Summary

- CVE introduction
- CVEs for Debian
- How upstream vs how Debian fix CVEs
- Steps to fix a CVE
 - Examples and things I wish I knew before starting

The CVE® Program and the CVE ID

- CVE ID: Global identifier for vulnerabilities
- Format: CVE-YYYY-NNNNN, for example: CVE-2024-3094
- Crowdsourced effort
- Unique per vulnerability
- Main source of vulnerability data worldwide
- Mutable
- Can contain misleading information
- cve.org

A CVE for Debian

- security-tracker.debian.org
- Debian constantly monitor CVE updates
- 80 new CVEs published daily on average for 2023
- Can be fixed by people that are not in the security team
- Might release advisories for fixes; DSA, DLA, BSA (Freexian's ELA)
- Fixed with “backporting”, not to be confused with the backports repository


How upstream developers fix CVEs

- CVE gets reported against version 5.0
- 1) Upstream pushes a fix bundled with other changes in version 6.0; OR
- 2) Upstream pushes a fix as release 5.1, does not say anything about version 4 because it's not supported anymore; OR
- 3) Upstream is extremely nice and kind and points out the exact commits or versions that both introduced and fixed the CVE (even if they don't support it anymore). AFAIK only curl is doing this today

How Debian fix CVEs


- Upstream provided a fix as a new release versioned 6.0
- Debian ships 5.0-1 (testing/unstable) and 4.0-1 (stable)
- For testing and unstable: package the latest release as 6.0-1
- For stable, oldstable and older: backport the fix into the package, example for stable: 4.0-1+deb12u1
- (optional) Release an advisory announcing the update: Debian Security Advisory (DSA), DLA, ELA, BSA


Steps to fix a CVE

- Find a CVE to fix
 - Confirm impact
 - Identify the fix
 - Apply the patches to the Debian packaging
 - Modify the patch as needed, document it
 - Review backporting changes
 - Test the changes
 - Submit the fixed package
 - Follow-up to check for reported regressions
- 

Find a CVE to fix


- security-tracker.debian.org
 - Check CVE notes
- No-DSA for beginners - proposed-updates
- DSA requires security team coordination
 - Consider doing more than one fix for a single DSA
- Contact package maintainer (BTS)
- Is it acknowledged by the upstream developers?
- Not every CVE should be fixed


 Closed **[security] CVE-2022-48565: Avoid plistlib XML vulnerabilities by rejecting entity directives** #86217
vstinner opened this issue on Oct 16, 2020 · 18 comments

 **samueloph** commented on Aug 24, 2023 ⋮


[CVE-2022-48565](#) was assigned to this.


I didn't have any involvement in the assignment, posting here for reference only.

 1

 **sethmlarson** commented on Aug 24, 2023 Contributor ⋮

[@samueloph](#) Thanks for highlighting these to us, if you have a list you want to send we've been ensuring all CVE IDs registered against Python are making their way into the [PSF Advisory Database](#). You could open an issue with all missing CVE IDs there to make it easier to track. Thanks again!

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CURL AND LIBCURL

CVE-2020-19909 IS EVERYTHING THAT IS WRONG WITH CVES

🕒 AUGUST 26, 2023 👤 DANIEL STENBERG 💬 35 COMMENTS

This is a story consisting of several little building blocks and they occurred spread out in time and in different places. It is a story that shows with clarity how our current system with CVE Ids and lots of power given to NVD is a completely broken system.


```

v lib/auth/rsa.c +0 -10
...    ...    @@ -154,7 +154,6 @@ _gnutls_get_public_rsa_params(gnutls_session_t session,
154    154    static int
155    155    proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data, size_t _data_size)
156    156    {
157    -    const char attack_error[] = "auth_rsa: Possible PKCS #1 attack\n";
158    157    gnutls_datum_t ciphertext;
159    158    int ret, dsize;
160    159    ssize_t data_size = _data_size;
...    ...    @@ -234,15 +233,6 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data, size_t _data_
234    233    ok &= CONSTCHECK_NOT_EQUAL(check_ver_min, 0) &
235    234    CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(session->key.key.data[1], ver_min);
236    235
237    -    if (ok) {
238    -        /* call logging function unconditionally so all branches are
239    -        * indistinguishable for timing and cache access when debug
240    -        * logging is disabled */
241    -        _gnutls_no_log("%s", attack_error);
242    -    } else {
243    -        _gnutls_debug_log("%s", attack_error);
244    -    }
245    -
246    236    /* This is here to avoid the version check attack
247    237    * discussed above.
248    238    */
...    ...

```

Confirm impact

- Understand what's going on
- Read external discussions
 - `Oss-security @ openwall`
- Does it depend on a feature that's not present in the build we ship?
 - Our security-tracker says "affected" even if we don't build the affected code in cases where the vulnerability is in the sources
- Does hardening blocks the exploitation?
- Could the vulnerability have been backported?
- Update security-tracker with findings
- Affected code bundled into another package?
 - `codesearch.debian.net`
- Which Debian releases are affected?
- Don't trust the CVE description, verify




CVE-2024-2955 Detail

AWAITING ANALYSIS

This vulnerability is currently awaiting analysis.

Description

T.38 dissector crash in Wireshark 4.2.0 to 4.0.3 and 4.0.0 to 4.0.13 allows denial of service via packet injection or crafted capture file



CVE-2024-40725 Detail

UNDERGOING ANALYSIS

This vulnerability is currently undergoing analysis and not all information is available. Please check back soon to view the completed vulnerability summary.

Description

A partial fix for CVE-2024-39884 in the core of Apache HTTP Server 2.4.61 ignores some use of the legacy content-type based configuration of handlers. "AddType" and similar configuration, under some circumstances where files are requested indirectly, result in source code disclosure of local content. For example, PHP scripts may be served instead of interpreted. [Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.4.62, which fixes this issue.](#)



Notes

[bookworm] - apache2 <no-dsa> (Minor issue; can be fixed in point release)

[bullseye] - apache2 <no-dsa> (Minor issue; can be fixed in point release)

https://httpd.apache.org/security/vulnerabilities_24.html#CVE-2024-40725

Introduced due to fix for CVE-2024-39884.

Fixed by <https://github.com/apache/httpd/commit/a7d24b4ea9a6ea35878fd33075365328caafc91>

(or svn <https://svn.apache.org/viewvc?view=revision&revision=1919249>)

VULNERABILITY

When saving HSTS data to an excessively long filename, curl could end up removing all contents, making subsequent requests using that file unaware of the HSTS status they should otherwise use.

AFFECTED VERSIONS

- Affected versions: curl [7.84.0](#) to and including [8.4.0](#)
- Not affected versions: curl $< \text{7.84.0}$ and $\geq \text{8.5.0}$
- Introduced-in: <https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/20f9dd6bae50b722>

Identify the fix

- Have any other distro fixed it?
 - repology.org
 - Did they modify the patch?
- Recent fixes have hidden regressions
- Identify unexpected behavior changes
 - Features being removed
 - Introduction of operation limits

cookie: apply limits

- Send no more than 150 cookies per request
- Cap the max length used for a cookie: header to 8K
- Cap the max number of received Set-Cookie: headers to 50

Bug: <https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-32205.html>

[CVE-2022-32205](#)

Reported-by: Harry Sintonen

Closes [#9048](#)

 master

 **tiny-curl-8_4_0** curl-8_8_0 curl-8_7_1 curl-8_7_0 curl-8_6_0 curl-8_5_0 curl-8_4_0 curl-8_3_0 curl-8_2_0 curl-8_1_0 curl-8_0_1 curl-8_0_0 curl-7_88_1 curl-7_88_0 curl-7_87_0 curl-7_86_0 curl-7_85_0



kdb: apply combinatorial logic for ticket flags



Julien Rische • a month ago 🔄 ipa-4-6



validate_principal: Fix python2 issues



Rob Crittenden • 4 months ago



validate_principal: Don't try to verify that the realm is known



Rob Crittenden • 5 months ago



rpcserver: validate Kerberos principal name before running kinit



Alexander Bokovoy • 5 months ago



host: update System: Manage Host Keytab permission



Alexander Bokovoy • 6 months ago

Apply the patches to the Debian packaging

- DEP-3 branch names: `debian/bullseye`, `debian/bookworm`...
- Don't let your code editor format the patch
 - Don't autoremove trailing whitespaces
 - Don't replace tabs with spaces
- 1 commit introducing the upstream patches without backporting changes
- Add patches to `d/series` and check if they apply

Modify the patch as needed

- `$ gbp pq --import --time-machine=N`
 - A different patch might be a dependency
 - Functions or variables might need to be renamed
- Introducing new upstream functions is risky
- List every backporting change in the patch header
- 1 commit exclusive for the backporting changes
- Overall you should have:
 - 1 commit importing the upstream patch (optional: d/p/series)
 - 1 commit performing the backporting changes (optional: d/p/series)
 - 1 commit for d/changelog

```

  ✓ debian/patches/CVE-2024-2398.patch  📄
  1      1      From deca8039991886a559b67bcd6701db800a5cf764 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
  2      2      From: Stefan Eissing <stefan@eissing.org>
  3      3      Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2024 09:36:08 +0100
  4      4      Subject: [PATCH] http2: push headers better cleanup
  5      5
  6      6      - provide common cleanup method for push headers
  7      7
  8      8      Closes #13054
  9      9      +
 10     10     + Backported by: Guilherme Puida Moreira <guilherme@puida.xyz>:
 11     11     + * Changed h2_stream_ctx to HTTP in free_push_headers.
 12     12     ---
 13     13     lib/http2.c | 34 ++++++-----
 14     14     1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
 15     15
 16     16     - diff --git a/lib/http2.c b/lib/http2.c
```





d/changelog: Add new changelog entry.

Guilherme Puida Moreira authored 3 months ago



d/patches/CVE-2024-2398.patch: Backport patch. 

Guilherme Puida Moreira authored 3 months ago

* Changed h2_stream_ctx to HTTP in free_push_headers.



d/patches/CVE-2024-2004.patch: Backport patch. 

Guilherme Puida Moreira authored 3 months ago

* Small change in the Makefile to add a new test.



d/p/series: Add new patches to the series file

Guilherme Puida Moreira authored 3 months ago



Import patches for CVE-2024-2004 and CVE-2024-2398

Guilherme Puida Moreira authored 3 months ago

Review the backporting


- Backporting changes = diff of a diff
- Reviewing backporting commits saves the day
- If we release a broken fix, a new CVE is created to track it
 - Nobody wants to be a CVE author for this type of CVE
- Pay attention to reordering of hunks
- Question everything

VULNERABILITY

When an application tells libcurl it wants to allow HTTP/2 server push, and the amount of received headers for the push surpasses the maximum allowed limit (1000), libcurl aborts the server push. When aborting, libcurl inadvertently does not free all the previously allocated headers and instead leaks the memory.

```
1432 1428      failf(data_s, "Too many PUSH_PROMISE
      headers");
1433      - curl_safefree(stream->push_headers);
1429      + free_push_headers(stream);
1434 1430      return NGHTTP2_ERR_TEMPORAL_CALLBACK_FAILURE;
1435 1431  }
1436 1432      stream->push_headers_alloc *= 2;
```

Test the changes

- Upstream regression tests on a later commit?
 - Other distros' tests?
 - Autopkgtest of a reverse-dependency?
 - Proof-of-concept available?
- 

Submit the fix and watch for regressions

- Mention the CVE ID and a short summary in d/changelog
- Follow the right update submission process
 - Proposed-updates process - NO-DSA
 - Security team process - DSA
- Watch the BTS for user's bug reports

Questions?

I will be around for the whole DebConf, feel free to reach out too



Muito obrigado!

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