--- name: clickjacking-testing description: > Clickjacking overlays a target page in a transparent or hidden iframe, tricking victims into clicking UI elements they cannot see. Detect by attempting to load the target in an iframe and checking for `X-Frame-Options` (DENY/SAMEORIGIN) or `Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors` headers. Frame-busting JavaScript can be bypassed via double-framing, `sandbox` attribute, `onBeforeUnload` exploitation, and IE `location` variable redefinition. Tools: Burp Suite (Clickjacking PoC generation). license: MIT compatibility: Designed for Claude Code. Requires Burp Suite or a browser for iframe PoC testing. metadata: category: client-side version: "0.1" source: https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/stable/ source_types: framework wstg: WSTG-CLNT-09 --- # Clickjacking ## What Is Broken and Why Clickjacking (UI redressing) works by embedding a target application inside a transparent or partially-visible iframe on an attacker-controlled page. Victims see decoy UI elements but are actually interacting with the hidden target page underneath. Single-click, single-step actions are the most exploitable (fund transfers, account deletions, permission grants, one-click purchases). The vulnerability exists when a page can be framed, either because framing protection headers are absent or because deployed JavaScript frame-busting code is bypassable. ## Key Signals - Missing `X-Frame-Options` header (`DENY` or `SAMEORIGIN`) - Missing `Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'none'` or `frame-ancestors 'self'` - Target page loads successfully in a test iframe - Frame-busting JavaScript present (`top.location === self.location`) but bypassable - State-changing one-click actions (confirm, approve, authorize, delete) on authenticated pages - Browser developer tools: Network tab shows page loaded as iframe sub-resource ## Methodology 1. Attempt to load the target page in an iframe using the PoC HTML below. 2. Check response headers for `X-Frame-Options` and `Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors`. 3. If the page loads in the iframe, confirm it is the authenticated/functional version. 4. Identify high-impact one-click actions on the framed page. 5. Construct a PoC with overlaid decoy buttons positioned over target action buttons. 6. Test frame-busting bypass techniques if JavaScript protection is detected. 7. Verify across browsers (Chrome, Firefox, Safari) as behavior differs. ## Payloads & Tools ```html Clickjacking detection
Click here to win a prize!
curl -s -I TARGET/ | grep -i "x-frame-options\|frame-ancestors" ``` ## Bypass Techniques - **Double framing**: Nest target within two iframes; `parent.location` assignment fails silently when attacker controls the middle frame - **sandbox attribute**: `sandbox="allow-forms allow-scripts"` without `allow-top-navigation` disables frame-busting navigation - **HTML5 sandbox without allow-top-navigation**: frame-busting `top.location = self.location` throws security exception, ignored - **onBeforeUnload exploitation**: Attacker page fires repeated navigation requests; victim's browser prompts "are you sure?" canceling frame-bust - **Location variable redefinition (IE7/8, Safari 4)**: Override `window.location` as a non-writable property, breaking frame-busting assignment - **XSS filter abuse**: Inject the beginning of the frame-busting script into a URL parameter, inducing a false XSS positive that deactivates the script - **designMode**: Some browsers allow setting document to designMode, preventing frame-bust navigation - **Drag-and-drop clickjacking**: Multipart attack using browser drag-and-drop API instead of clicks ## Exploitation Scenarios **Scenario 1 — Unauthorized Fund Transfer** Setup: Banking transfer form is a single page with pre-filled amounts from URL parameters; no clickjacking protection. Trigger: Attacker crafts `TARGET/transfer?amount=500&to=attacker-acct`, embeds in transparent iframe with opacity 0.0, overlaid with "Confirm your free delivery" button. Impact: Victim clicks decoy button, unknowingly submits transfer; funds moved to attacker account. **Scenario 2 — Social Media Permission Grant** Setup: OAuth permission grant page can be framed; one "Authorize" button present. Trigger: Attacker embeds transparent iframe of permission page over a "Play game" button on their site. Impact: Victim grants application full permission to their social media account without realizing. **Scenario 3 — Account Deletion via Double-Framing** Setup: Account deletion page has frame-busting JavaScript (`if (top != self) top.location = self.location`). Trigger: Attacker uses double-framing to neutralize frame-bust; positions "Delete my account" button under a decoy. Impact: Victim's account deleted; frame-busting protection rendered ineffective. ## False Positives - `X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN` correctly deployed — page loads in iframe from same origin but not cross-origin (not exploitable from attacker site) - `Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self'` properly preventing cross-origin framing - JavaScript frame-busting that actually works in the tested browser (test across all major browsers) - Target page requires form submission or multi-step interaction (single-click requirement not met) ## Fix Patterns - Preferred: `Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'none'` (no framing at all) or `frame-ancestors 'self'` (same-origin only) - Legacy support: `X-Frame-Options: DENY` or `X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN` (supported IE8+, Firefox 3.6.9+, Chrome 4.1+) - `X-Frame-Options: ALLOW-FROM origin` for specific trusted origins (not supported in Chrome/Safari — use CSP instead) - Do not rely solely on JavaScript frame-busting — all known JS techniques are bypassable - For high-value actions: require re-authentication or CSRF tokens that change per-page-load, reducing clickjacking payoff - Apply defense-in-depth: combine CSP frame-ancestors with SameSite=Strict cookies to require direct navigation for sensitive actions ## Related Skills Clickjacking is a user-assisted [[csrf]] variant: rather than forging a request invisibly, it tricks the victim into clicking a UI element that triggers the sensitive action. If the target page lacks `SameSite` protections and also lacks framing protection, both clickjacking and [[csrf]] may be independently exploitable. If the page can be framed and also reflects user input, an [[xss-reflected]] payload can be delivered inside the frame to capture interactions. [[cors-misconfig]] on a parent-framed page can be combined to read responses from the framed origin.