--- name: mobile-resilience description: > Detects weak reverse engineering and tampering protections in mobile apps (Android/iOS). Trigger on: root detection bypass, jailbreak detection bypass, Frida detection, debugger detection, anti-debugging, ptrace, sysctl, emulator detection, code obfuscation absent, debug symbols present, get-task-allow, ProGuard disabled, R8 disabled, string encryption, integrity check, file tampering, repackaging, dynamic instrumentation, runtime hook, Magisk hide, Magisk, frida-server, objection bypass, signing verification, apk resign. Covers MASVS-RESILIENCE-1/2/3/4. license: MIT compatibility: Designed for Claude Code. Frida, objection, apktool, jadx, Magisk, jadx, apk-mitm recommended. metadata: category: mobile version: "0.1" source: https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/ source_types: framework masvs: MASVS-RESILIENCE-1, MASVS-RESILIENCE-2, MASVS-RESILIENCE-3, MASVS-RESILIENCE-4 --- # Mobile Resilience Against Reverse Engineering ## What Is Broken and Why Resilience controls protect app logic, keys, and business rules from reverse engineering and tampering. Root/jailbreak detection, anti-debugging, and integrity checks create defense-in-depth. Without them, attackers can attach Frida to patch auth checks, repack APKs with modified logic, or extract keys from memory at leisure. Most basic resilience checks are bypassable individually — the value comes from layered controls that raise the cost of attack. Root detection that relies on a single file check (`/system/app/Superuser.apk`) is trivially bypassed; multi-vector detection that checks file system, build properties, and system call behavior is significantly harder. ## Key Signals - `get-task-allow` entitlement present in iOS app (allows debugger attachment) - Debug symbols not stripped in release build: `nm libapp.so | grep "T _"` shows function names - Single-vector root/jailbreak detection: only checks for `/system/xbin/su` or Cydia URL scheme - No anti-debugging: `ptrace(PT_DENY_ATTACH, 0, 0, 0)` / `sysctl` checks absent in iOS binary - Debug build shipped to production: `BuildConfig.DEBUG == true`, `android:debuggable="true"` - No signature/integrity check — APK can be repackaged and re-signed without detection - Frida/objection successfully attaches without app detecting or exiting - ProGuard/R8 not applied: decompiled class names match original Java package structure - Emulator detection absent: app runs on AVD/Simulator with full functionality ## Methodology **Android:** 1. Check `android:debuggable` in manifest — should be `false` in release build 2. Attach debugger: `adb shell jdwp | xargs` → connect Android Studio debugger → if attaches: no anti-debug 3. Run on emulator (AVD) — does the app detect and exit? 4. Root check bypass: run app on Magisk-rooted device, then apply MagiskHide/Shamiko — does app still detect root? 5. Frida attach: `frida -U -f TARGET_PKG` — if no crash/exit: no Frida detection 6. Repack test: `apktool b app/ -o repack.apk` → sign → install — does app accept repackaged build? 7. Check obfuscation: `jadx decompiled/` — are class/method names meaningful (no obfuscation) or mangled? **iOS:** 1. Check `get-task-allow` entitlement: `codesign -d --entitlements :- App.ipa` 2. Attach lldb: `lldb -p TARGET_PID` — does app detect and exit? 3. Jailbreak detection: run on jailbroken device — does app behave normally? 4. Check for ptrace calls: `otool -tV App.app/App | grep ptrace` 5. Frida attach: `frida -U TARGET` — detection if app calls `proc_pidinfo` to scan for suspicious process names 6. Check debug symbols: `dsymutil -s App.app/App | head -50` — are symbols present in production? 7. Integrity check: modify a resource file in IPA → re-sign → install — does app detect modification? ## Payloads & Tools ```bash # Android — check debuggable flag apktool d app.apk && grep "debuggable" app/AndroidManifest.xml # Android — Frida bypass root detection (generic) frida -U -f TARGET_PKG --no-pause -l bypass-root-detection.js # Common scripts: https://github.com/fridayy/frida-scripts # Android — objection root bypass objection --gadget TARGET_PKG explore android root disable # Android — check obfuscation jadx app.apk -d jadx-out/ ls jadx-out/sources/ # readable package names = no obfuscation # iOS — check entitlements codesign -d --entitlements :- Payload/App.app/App | grep "get-task-allow" # iOS — Frida jailbreak bypass frida -U TARGET -l jailbreak-bypass.js # Liberty Lite, Shadow (Cydia tweaks) for persistent bypass # checksec — Android native binary checksec --file=lib/arm64-v8a/libapp.so ``` ```js // Frida — Android: bypass single root check (file existence) Java.perform(function() { var File = Java.use("java.io.File"); File.exists.implementation = function() { var path = this.getAbsolutePath(); if (path.indexOf("su") >= 0 || path.indexOf("magisk") >= 0) { console.log("[+] Blocked file check:", path); return false; } return this.exists(); }; }); ``` ## Bypass Techniques - **MagiskHide / Shamiko** — hides root from app's file system and build property checks - **Frida gadget** — embed Frida gadget into APK instead of attaching server, bypasses process-name-based Frida detection - **objection `android root disable`** — hooks common root detection libraries (RootBeer, SafetyNet check bypass) - **SafetyNet bypass** — on rooted devices with MagiskHide + Universal SafetyNet Fix module - **iOS Liberty Lite / Shadow** — jailbreak tweaks that hide jailbreak artifacts from app queries - **Repackaging with modified entitlements** — add `get-task-allow` to enable debugging on non-jailbroken device - **Anti-anti-debugging** — hook `ptrace` to return 0 always; hook `sysctl` to clear `P_TRACED` flag ## Exploitation Scenarios **Scenario 1 — Frida Attach to Extract Business Logic** Setup: Fintech app has no Frida detection. Logic for calculating fees is in native method `calculateFee()`. → Trigger: `frida -U TARGET -e "Module.findExportByName(null,'calculateFee')"` hooks the method. → Impact: Proprietary fee calculation logic extracted and replicated by competitor. **Scenario 2 — APK Repackage to Remove Feature Flags** Setup: App has premium feature gated by boolean check `if (user.isPremium)`. No integrity verification. → Trigger: Decompile APK, patch smali to always return `true`, repack and re-sign. → Impact: Free users access all premium features without payment. **Scenario 3 — Debug Build in Production** Setup: App shipped with `android:debuggable="true"` in release. → Trigger: Attacker runs `adb shell run-as TARGET_PKG` to access app's private data directory. → Impact: SQLite databases, SharedPreferences, and cached tokens extracted without root. ## False Positives - App correctly detects Frida but exits gracefully (expected behavior) — confirm this is a resilience pass, not a bug - `get-task-allow` present in development provisioning profile only — verify release build entitlements separately - Debug symbols in debug build — only a finding in production/release builds - Weak single-vector root check — technically bypassed but may be acceptable risk for non-high-value apps ## Fix Patterns ```kotlin // Android — multi-vector root detection (raise attack cost) fun isDeviceRooted(): Boolean { return checkSuBinary() || checkBuildTags() || checkDangerousApps() || checkRWPaths() || checkSafetyNetAttestation() } // Use Play Integrity API for cryptographic device attestation (replaces SafetyNet) // Android — prevent debugging in release // In build.gradle: ensure debuggable is false buildTypes { release { debuggable false } } ``` ```swift // iOS — ptrace anti-debug import Darwin func denyDebugger() { var name = [CTL_KERN, KERN_PROC, KERN_PROC_PID, getpid()] var info = kinfo_proc() var infoSize = MemoryLayout.size sysctl(&name, 4, &info, &infoSize, nil, 0) if (info.kp_proc.p_flag & P_TRACED) != 0 { exit(1) } } ``` - Layer multiple detection vectors — file checks, build props, system calls, app store attestation - Use Play Integrity API (Android) / DeviceCheck + App Attest (iOS) for server-side verification - Enable ProGuard/R8 with aggressive obfuscation rules for all release builds - Strip debug symbols from production native libraries (`-s` linker flag) - Implement runtime integrity checks: verify APK signature and file hashes match expected values ## Related Skills [[mobile-auth-bypass]] via Frida hook is the most common exploit that resilience controls defend against — without debugger detection and Frida detection, biometric bypasses are trivially reproducible. [[mobile-insecure-storage]] extraction requires root or jailbreak access that resilience detection is designed to catch. [[mobile-code-quality]] binary hardening (PIE, stack canaries) complements resilience: hardened native code makes memory corruption exploitation harder even when the attacker has successfully bypassed root/jailbreak detection.