---
name: bug-bounty
description: Complete bug bounty workflow
category: security
risk: offensive
source: https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
source_repo: elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
source_type: community
date_added: '2026-09-20'
license: MIT
license_source: https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter/blob/main/LICENSE
compatibility: Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the
  relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands
  not bundled.
sources: community, public_research
---
> **⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY**
> This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.
> You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.
> Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.

> **Mandatory confirmation gate**
> Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:
> 1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.
> 2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.
> 3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.
> 4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.
>
> Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.

# Bug Bounty Master Workflow

Full pipeline: Recon -> Learn -> Hunt -> Validate -> Report. One skill for everything.

## THE ONLY QUESTION THAT MATTERS

> **"Can an attacker do this RIGHT NOW against a real user who has taken NO unusual actions -- and does it cause real harm (stolen money, leaked PII, account takeover, code execution)?"**
>
> If the answer is NO -- **STOP. Do not write. Do not explore further. Move on.**

### Theoretical Bug = Wasted Time. Kill These Immediately:

| Pattern | Kill Reason |
|---|---|
| "Could theoretically allow..." | Not exploitable = not a bug |
| "An attacker with X, Y, Z conditions could..." | Too many preconditions |
| "Wrong implementation but no practical impact" | Wrong but harmless = not a bug |
| Dead code with a bug in it | Not reachable = not a bug |
| Source maps without secrets | No impact |
| SSRF with DNS-only callback | Need data exfil or internal access |
| Open redirect alone | Need ATO or OAuth chain |
| "Could be used in a chain if..." | Build the chain first, THEN report |

**You must demonstrate actual harm. "Could" is not a bug. Prove it works or drop it.**

---

## CRITICAL RULES

1. **READ FULL SCOPE FIRST** -- verify every asset/domain is owned by the target org
2. **NO THEORETICAL BUGS** -- "Can an attacker steal funds, leak PII, takeover account, or execute code RIGHT NOW?" If no, STOP.
3. **KILL WEAK FINDINGS FAST** -- run the 7-Question Gate BEFORE writing any report
4. **Validate before writing** -- check CHANGELOG, design docs, deployment scripts FIRST
5. **One bug class at a time** -- go deep, don't spray
6. **Verify data isn't already public** -- check web UI in incognito before reporting API "leaks"
7. **5-MINUTE RULE** -- if a target shows nothing after 5 min probing (all 401/403/404), MOVE ON
8. **IMPACT-FIRST HUNTING** -- ask "what's the worst thing if auth was broken?" If nothing valuable, skip target
9. **CREDENTIAL LEAKS need exploitation proof** -- finding keys isn't enough, must PROVE what they access
10. **STOP SHALLOW RECON SPIRALS** -- don't probe 403s, don't grep for analytics keys, don't check staging domains that lead nowhere
11. **BUSINESS IMPACT over vuln class** -- severity depends on CONTEXT, not just vuln type
12. **UNDERSTAND THE TARGET DEEPLY** -- before hunting, learn the app like a real user
13. **DON'T OVER-RELY ON AUTOMATION** -- automated scans hit WAFs, trigger rate limits, find the same bugs everyone else finds
14. **HUNT LESS-SATURATED VULN CLASSES** -- XSS/SSRF/XXE have the most competition. Expand into: cache poisoning, Android/mobile vulns, business logic, race conditions, OAuth/OIDC chains, CI/CD pipeline attacks
15. **ONE-HOUR RULE** -- stuck on one target for an hour with no progress? SWITCH CONTEXT
16. **TWO-EYE APPROACH** -- combine systematic testing (checklist) with anomaly detection (watch for unexpected behavior)
17. **T-SHAPED KNOWLEDGE** -- go DEEP in one area and BROAD across everything else

> **For the full hunting methodology** — 5-phase non-linear workflow, developer psychology framework, session discipline, tool routing by phase, and Wide/Deep route selection — see **`skills/bb-methodology/SKILL.md`**.

---

## A->B BUG SIGNAL METHOD (Cluster Hunting)

**When you find bug A, systematically hunt for B and C nearby.** This is one of the most powerful methodologies in bug bounty. Single bugs pay. Chains pay 3-10x more.

### Known A->B->C Chains

| Bug A (Signal) | Hunt for Bug B | Escalate to C |
|----------------|---------------|---------------|
| IDOR (read) | PUT/DELETE on same endpoint | Full account data manipulation |
| SSRF (any) | Cloud metadata 169.254.169.254 | IAM credential exfil -> RCE |
| XSS (stored) | Check if HttpOnly is set on session cookie | Session hijack -> ATO |
| Open redirect | OAuth redirect_uri accepts your domain | Auth code theft -> ATO |
| S3 bucket listing | Enumerate JS bundles | Grep for OAuth client_secret -> OAuth chain |
| Rate limit bypass | OTP brute force | Account takeover |
| GraphQL introspection | Missing field-level auth | Mass PII exfil |
| Debug endpoint | Leaked environment variables | Cloud credential -> infrastructure access |
| CORS reflects origin | Test with credentials: include | Credentialed data theft |
| Host header injection | Password reset poisoning | ATO via reset link |

### Cluster Hunt Protocol (6 Steps)

```
1. CONFIRM A     Verify bug A is real with an HTTP request
2. MAP SIBLINGS  Find all endpoints in the same controller/module/API group
3. TEST SIBLINGS Apply the same bug pattern to every sibling
4. CHAIN         If sibling has different bug class, try combining A + B
5. QUANTIFY      "Affects N users" / "exposes $X value" / "N records"
6. REPORT        One report per chain (not per bug). Chains pay more.
```

### Real Examples

**Coinbase S3->Bundle->Secret->OAuth chain:**
```
A: S3 bucket publicly listable (Low alone)
B: JS bundles contain OAuth client credentials
C: OAuth flow missing PKCE enforcement
Result: Full auth code interception chain
```

**Vienna Chatbot chain:**
```
A: Debug parameter active in production (Info alone)
B: Chatbot renders HTML in response (dangerouslySetInnerHTML)
C: Stored XSS via bot response visible to other users
Result: P2 finding with real impact
```

---

# TOP 1% HACKER MINDSET

## How Elite Hackers Think Differently

**Average hunter**: Runs tools, checks checklist, gives up after 30 min.
**Top 1%**: Builds a mental model of the app's internals. Asks "why does this work the way it does?" Not "what does this endpoint do?" but "what business decision led a developer to build it this way, and what shortcut might they have taken?"

## Pre-Hunt Mental Framework

### Step 1: Crown Jewel Thinking
Before touching anything, ask: "If I were the attacker and I could do ONE thing to this app, what causes the most damage?"
- Financial app -> drain funds, transfer to attacker account
- Healthcare -> PII leak, HIPAA violation
- SaaS -> tenant data crossing, admin takeover
- Auth provider -> full SSO chain compromise

### Step 2: Developer Empathy
Think like the developer who built the feature:
- What was the simplest implementation?
- What shortcut would a tired dev take at 2am?
- Where is auth checked -- controller? middleware? DB layer?
- What happens when you call endpoint B without going through endpoint A first?

### Step 3: Trust Boundary Mapping
```
Client -> CDN -> Load Balancer -> App Server -> Database
         ^               ^              ^
    Where does app STOP trusting input?
    Where does it ASSUME input is already validated?
```

### Step 4: Feature Interaction Thinking
- Does this new feature reuse old auth, or does it have its own?
- Does the mobile API share auth logic with the web app?
- Was this feature built by the same team or a third-party?

## The Top 1% Mental Checklist
- [ ] I know the app's core business model
- [ ] I've used the app as a real user for 15+ minutes
- [ ] I know the tech stack (language, framework, auth system, caching)
- [ ] I've read at least 3 disclosed reports for this program
- [ ] I have 2 test accounts ready (attacker + victim)
- [ ] I've defined my primary target: ONE crown jewel I'm hunting for today

## Mindset Rules from Top Hunters

**"Hunt the feature, not the endpoint"** -- Find all endpoints that serve a feature, then test the INTERACTION between them.

**"Authorization inconsistency is your friend"** -- If the app checks auth in 9 places but not the 10th, that's your bug.

**"New == unreviewed"** -- Features launched in the last 30 days have lowest security maturity.

**"Think second-order"** -- Second-order SSRF: URL saved in DB, fetched by cron job. Second-order XSS: stored clean, rendered unsafely in admin panel.

**"Follow the money"** -- Any feature touching payments, billing, credits, refunds is where developers make the most security shortcuts.

**"The API the mobile app uses"** -- Mobile apps often call older/different API versions. Same company, different attack surface, lower maturity.

**"Diffs find bugs"** -- Compare old API docs vs new. Compare mobile API vs web API. Compare what a free user can request vs what a paid user gets in response.

---

# TOOLS

## Go Binaries
| Tool | Use |
|------|-----|
| subfinder | Passive subdomain enum |
| httpx | Probe live hosts |
| dnsx | DNS resolution |
| nuclei | Template scanner |
| katana | Crawl |
| waybackurls | Archive URLs |
| gau | Known URLs |
| dalfox | XSS scanner |
| ffuf | Fuzzer |
| anew | Dedup append |
| qsreplace | Replace param values |
| assetfinder | Subdomain enum |
| gf | Grep patterns (xss, sqli, ssrf, redirect) |
| interactsh-client | OOB callbacks |

## Tools to Install When Needed
| Tool | Use | Install |
|------|-----|---------|
| arjun | Hidden parameter discovery | `pip3 install arjun` |
| paramspider | URL parameter mining | `pip3 install paramspider` |
| kiterunner | API endpoint brute | `go install github.com/assetnote/kiterunner/cmd/kr@latest` |
| cloudenum | Cloud asset enumeration | `pip3 install cloud_enum` |
| trufflehog | Secret scanning | `brew install trufflehog` |
| gitleaks | Secret scanning | `brew install gitleaks` |
| XSStrike | Advanced XSS scanner | `pip3 install xsstrike` |
| SecretFinder | JS secret extraction | `pip3 install secretfinder` |
| sqlmap | SQL injection | `pip3 install sqlmap` |
| subzy | Subdomain takeover | `go install github.com/LukaSikic/subzy@latest` |

## Static Analysis (Semgrep Quick Audit)
```bash
# Install: pip3 install semgrep

# Broad security audit
semgrep --config=p/security-audit ./
semgrep --config=p/owasp-top-ten ./

# Language-specific rulesets
semgrep --config=p/javascript ./src/
semgrep --config=p/python ./
semgrep --config=p/golang ./
semgrep --config=p/php ./
semgrep --config=p/nodejs ./

# Targeted rules
semgrep --config=p/sql-injection ./
semgrep --config=p/jwt ./

# Custom pattern (example: find SQL concat in Python)
semgrep --pattern 'cursor.execute("..." + $X)' --lang python .

# Output to file for analysis
semgrep --config=p/security-audit ./ --json -o semgrep-results.json 2>/dev/null
cat semgrep-results.json | jq '.results[] | select(.extra.severity == "ERROR") | {path:.path, check:.check_id, msg:.extra.message}'
```

## FFUF Advanced Techniques
```bash
# THE ONE RULE: Always use -ac (auto-calibrate filters noise automatically)
ffuf -w wordlist.txt -u https://target.com/FUZZ -ac

# Authenticated raw request file — IDOR testing (save Burp request to req.txt, replace ID with FUZZ)
seq 1 10000 | ffuf --request req.txt -w - -ac

# Authenticated API endpoint brute
ffuf -u https://TARGET/api/FUZZ -w wordlist.txt -H "Cookie: session=TOKEN" -ac

# Parameter discovery
ffuf -w ~/wordlists/burp-parameter-names.txt -u "https://target.com/api/endpoint?FUZZ=test" -ac -mc 200

# Hidden POST parameters
ffuf -w ~/wordlists/burp-parameter-names.txt -X POST -d "FUZZ=test" -u "https://target.com/api/endpoint" -ac

# Subdomain scan
ffuf -w subs.txt -u https://FUZZ.target.com -ac

# Filter strategies:
# -fc 404,403          Filter status codes
# -fs 1234             Filter by response size
# -fw 50               Filter by word count
# -fr "not found"      Filter regex in response body
# -rate 5 -t 10        Rate limit + fewer threads for stealth
# -e .php,.bak,.old    Add extensions
# -o results.json      Save output
```

## AI-Assisted Tools
- **strix** (usestrix.com) -- open-source AI scanner for automated initial sweep

---

# PHASE 1: RECON

## Standard Recon Pipeline
```bash
# Step 1: Subdomains
subfinder -d TARGET -silent | anew /tmp/subs.txt
assetfinder --subs-only TARGET | anew /tmp/subs.txt

# Step 2: Resolve + live hosts
cat /tmp/subs.txt | dnsx -silent | httpx -silent -status-code -title -tech-detect -o /tmp/live.txt

# Step 3: URL collection
cat /tmp/live.txt | awk '{print $1}' | katana -d 3 -silent | anew /tmp/urls.txt
echo TARGET | waybackurls | anew /tmp/urls.txt
gau TARGET | anew /tmp/urls.txt

# Step 4: Nuclei scan
nuclei -l /tmp/live.txt -severity critical,high,medium -silent -o /tmp/nuclei.txt

# Step 5: JS secrets
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep "\.js$" | sort -u > /tmp/jsfiles.txt
# Run SecretFinder on each JS file

# Step 6: GitHub dorking (if target has public repos)
# GitDorker -org TARGET_ORG -d dorks/alldorksv3
```

## Cloud Asset Enumeration
```bash
# Manual S3 brute
for suffix in dev staging test backup api data assets static cdn; do
  code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://${TARGET}-${suffix}.s3.amazonaws.com/")
  [ "$code" != "404" ] && echo "$code ${TARGET}-${suffix}.s3.amazonaws.com"
done
```

## API Endpoint Discovery
```bash
# ffuf API endpoint brute
ffuf -u https://TARGET/api/FUZZ -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/api/api-endpoints.txt -mc 200,201,301,302,403 -ac
```

## HackerOne Scope Retrieval
```bash
curl -s "https://hackerone.com/graphql" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"query":"query { team(handle: \"PROGRAM_HANDLE\") { name url policy_scopes(archived: false) { edges { node { asset_type asset_identifier eligible_for_bounty instruction } } } } }"}' \
  | jq '.data.team.policy_scopes.edges[].node'
```

## Quick Wins Checklist
- [ ] Subdomain takeover (`subjack`, `subzy`)
- [ ] Exposed `.git` (`/.git/config`)
- [ ] Exposed env files (`/.env`, `/.env.local`)
- [ ] Default credentials on admin panels
- [ ] JS secrets (SecretFinder, jsluice)
- [ ] Open redirects (`?redirect=`, `?next=`, `?url=`)
- [ ] CORS misconfig (test `Origin: https://evil.com` + credentials)
- [ ] S3/cloud buckets
- [ ] GraphQL introspection enabled
- [ ] Spring actuators (`/actuator/env`, `/actuator/heapdump`)
- [ ] Firebase open read (`https://TARGET.firebaseio.com/.json`)

## Technology Fingerprinting

| Signal | Technology |
|---|---|
| Cookie: `XSRF-TOKEN` + `*_session` | Laravel |
| Cookie: `PHPSESSID` | PHP |
| Header: `X-Powered-By: Express` | Node.js/Express |
| Response: `wp-json`/`wp-content` | WordPress |
| Response: `{"errors":[{"message":` | GraphQL |
| Header: `X-Powered-By: Next.js` | Next.js |

## Framework Quick Wins

**Laravel**: `/horizon`, `/telescope`, `/.env`, `/storage/logs/laravel.log`
**WordPress**: `/wp-json/wp/v2/users`, `/xmlrpc.php`, `/?author=1`
**Node.js**: `/.env`, `/graphql` (introspection), `/_debug`
**AWS Cognito**: `/oauth2/userInfo` (leaks Pool ID), CORS reflects arbitrary origins


## Contents

- [Source Code Recon](references/details.md)
- [Read Disclosed Reports](references/details.md)
- ["What Changed" Method](references/details.md)
- [Threat Model Template](references/details.md)
- [6 Key Patterns from Top Reports](references/details.md)
- [Note-Taking System (Never Hunt Without This)](references/details.md)
- [Interesting Leads (not confirmed bugs yet)](references/details.md)
- [Dead Ends (don't revisit)](references/details.md)
- [Anomalies](references/details.md)
- [Rabbit Holes (time-boxed, max 15 min each)](references/details.md)
- [Confirmed Bugs](references/details.md)
- [Subdomain Type -> Hunt Strategy](references/details.md)
- [CVE-Seeded Audit Approach](references/details.md)
- [Rust/Blockchain Source Code (Hard-Won Lessons)](references/details.md)
- [IDOR -- Insecure Direct Object Reference](references/details.md)
- [SSRF -- Server-Side Request Forgery](references/details.md)
- [OAuth / OIDC](references/details.md)
- [File Upload](references/details.md)
- [Race Conditions](references/details.md)
- [Business Logic](references/details.md)
- [XSS -- Cross-Site Scripting](references/details.md)
- [SQL Injection](references/details.md)
- [GraphQL](references/details.md)
- [LLM / AI Features](references/details.md)
- [Cache Poisoning / Web Cache Deception](references/details.md)
- [HTTP Request Smuggling](references/details.md)
- [Android / Mobile Hunting](references/details.md)
- [CI/CD Pipeline — GitHub Actions Security](references/details.md)
- [SSTI -- Server-Side Template Injection](references/details.md)
- [Subdomain Takeover](references/details.md)
- [ATO -- Account Takeover (Complete Taxonomy)](references/details.md)
- [Cloud / Infra Misconfigs](references/details.md)
- [The 7-Question Gate (Run BEFORE Writing ANY Report)](references/details.md)
- [4 Pre-Submission Gates](references/details.md)
- [CVSS 3.1 Quick Guide](references/details.md)
- [Conditionally Valid With Chain](references/details.md)
- [HackerOne Report Template](references/details.md)
- [Summary](references/details.md)
- [Steps To Reproduce](references/details.md)
- [Supporting Material](references/details.md)
- [Impact](references/details.md)
- [Severity Assessment](references/details.md)
- [Bugcrowd Report Template](references/details.md)
- [Human Tone Rules (Avoid AI-Sounding Writing)](references/details.md)
- [Report Title Formula](references/details.md)
- [Impact Statement Formula (First Paragraph)](references/details.md)
- [The 60-Second Pre-Submit Checklist](references/details.md)
- [Severity Escalation Language](references/details.md)
- [Bug Bounty Platforms](references/details.md)
- [Learning](references/details.md)
- [Wordlists](references/details.md)
- [Payload Databases](references/details.md)
- [Related Skills & Chains](references/details.md)
- [Operator Notes (Claude-BugHunter)](references/details.md)

## When to Use

- You have explicit, written authorization to assess the target in scope, and the task matches this skill's vulnerability class or technique within a bug-bounty or penetration-test engagement.
- You need the recon, exploitation, or validation workflow described below — executed strictly inside the approved scope.

## Limitations

- Authorized scope only: the confirmation gate above is mandatory before any probing, exploitation, or credential-access command.
- Docs-only import: upstream helper scripts, commands, engine, and research assets are not bundled; reinstall tooling from the source repo when needed.
- Validate every finding (see `triage-validation`) before reporting; report via `report-writing`. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.

### Example

```bash
# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.
cat scope.txt  # target list from the authorized engagement brief
```

> Adapted from [elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter](https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter) (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use/Limitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.