Game-theoretic
Foundations of Multi-agent Systems

Lecture 4: Computing Solution Concepts of Normal-form Games

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Outline

# Example: Reproduction of Two Paintings

- Painting 1 sells for \$30
- Painting 2 sells for \$20
- We have 16 units of blue, 8 green, 5 red
- Painting 1 requires 4 blue, 1 green, 1 red
- Painting 2 requires 2 blue, 2 green, 1 red

max. $3x + 2y$
s.t. $4x + 2y \leq 16$
$x + 2y \leq 8$
$x + y \leq 5$
$x \geq 0$
$y \geq 0$

Solving Linear Program Graphically

max. $3x + 2y$

s.t. $4x + 2y \leq 16$

$x + 2y \leq 8$

$x + y \leq 5$

$x \geq 0$

$y \geq 0$

Optimal solution: $x = 3$, $y = 2$
(objective 13)

Modified LP

max. $3x + 2y$

s.t. $4x + 2y \leq 16$

s.t. $4x + 2y \leq 15$

$x + 2y \leq 8$

$x + y \leq 5$

$x \geq 0$

$y \geq 0$

- Optimal solution: x = 2.5, y = 2.5

- Objective = 7.5 + 5 = 12.5

- Can we sell half paintings?

# Integer Linear Program

max. $3x + 2y$

s.t. $4x + 2y \leq 15$

$x + 2y \leq 8$

$x + y \leq 5$

$x \in \mathbb{N}_0$

$y \in \mathbb{N}_0$

Optimal ILP solution:
$x = 2$, $y = 3$
(objective 12)

Optimal LP solution:
$x = 2.5$, $y = 2.5$
(objective 12.5)

Mixed Integer Linear Program

max. $3x + 2y$

s.t. $4x + 2y \leq 15$

$x + 2y \leq 8$

$x + y \leq 5$

$x \geq 0$

$y \in \mathbb{N}_0$

Optimal ILP solution:
$x = 2$, $y = 3$
(objective 12)

Optimal LP solution:
$x = 2.5$, $y = 2.5$
(objective 12.5)

Optimal MILP
solution: $x = 2.75$, $y = 2$
(objective 12.25)

Solving Mixed Linear/Integer Programs

- Linear programs can be solved efficiently
  - Simplex, ellipsoid, interior point methods, etc.

- (Mixed) integer programs are NP-hard to solve
  - Many standard NP-complete problems can be modeled as MILP
  - Search type algorithms such as branch and bound

- Standard packages for solving these
  - Gurobi, MOSEK, GNU Linear Programming Kit, CPLEX, CVXOPT, etc.

- LP relaxation of (M)ILP: remove integrality constraints
  - Gives upper bound on MILP ($\sim$ admissible heuristic)

Exercise I: Knapsack-type Problem

- We arrive in room full of precious objects
- Can carry only 30kg out of the room
- Can carry only 20 liters out of the room
- Want to maximize our total value
- Unit of object A: 16kg, 3 liters, sells for $11 (3 units available)
- Unit of object B: 4kg, 4 liters, sells for $4 (4 units available)
- Unit of object C: 6kg, 3 liters, sells for $9 (1 unit available)
- What should we take?

Exercise II: Cellphones (Set Cover)

- We want to have a working phone in every continent (besides Antarctica)
- But we want to have as few phones as possible
- Phone A works in NA, SA, Af
- Phone B works in E, Af, As
- Phone C works in NA, Au, E
- Phone D works in SA, As, E
- Phone E works in Af, As, Au
- Phone F works in NA, E

Exercise III: Hot-dog Stands

- We have two hot-dog stands to be placed in somewhere along beach
- We know where groups of people who like hot dogs are
- We also know how far each group is willing to walk
- Where do we put our stands to maximize # hot dogs sold? (price is fixed)

<u>Group 1</u>
location: 1
size: 2
walk dist.: 4

<u>Group 2</u>
location: 4
size: 1
walk dist.: 2

<u>Group 3</u>
location: 7
size: 3
walk dist.: 3

<u>Group 4</u>
location: 9
size: 4
walk dist.: 3

<u>Group 5</u>
location: 15
size: 3
walk dist.: 2

Outline

Recall: Strict Dominance

a_i strictly dominates s_i if $u_i(a_i, s_{-i}) > u_i(s_i, s_{-i}) \ \forall s_{-i} \in S_{-i}$

Dominance by Pure Strategy

Algorithm 1: Determine whether s_i is strictly dominated by any pure strategy

for all $a_i \in A_i$ where $a_i \neq s_i$ **do**
  $dom \leftarrow true$;
  forall $a_{-i} \in A_{-i}$ **do**
    if $u_i(s_i, a_{-i}) \geq u_i(a_i, a_{-i})$ **then**
      $dom \leftarrow false$;
      break;

  if $dom = true$ **then**
    return $true$;

return $false$;

Dominance by Pure Strategy: Discussion

- Complexity of the Algorithm is $O(|A|)$, linear in the size of normal-form game

- Recall: a_i strictly dominates s_i if $u_i(a_i, s_{-i}) > u_i(s_i, s_{-i}) \; \forall s_{-i} \in S_{-i}$

- This definition refers to mixed-strategy profile of other agents

- In Alg. (1), we do not check every mixed-strategy profile of others, why?
  - Suppose a_i strictly dominates s_i for all a_{-i}
  - Then, there is no s_{-i} for which $u_i(a_i, s_{-i}) \leq u_i(s_i, s_{-i})$
  - This holds because of the linearity of expectation

Weak Dominance by Mixed Strategy

- Checking if strategy s_i is weakly dominated by any mixed strategy

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text{max.} \quad & \sum_{a_{-i} \in A_{-i}} \left[\left(\sum_{a_i \in A_i} p_{a_i} u_i(a_i, a_{-i}) \right) - u_i(s_i, a_{-i}) \right] \\
\text{s.t.} \quad & \sum_{a_i \in A_i} p_{a_i} u_i(a_i, a_{-i}) \geq u_i(s_i, a_{-i}) && \forall a_{-i} \in A_{-i} \\
& \sum_{a_i \in A_i} p_{a_i} = 1 \\
& p_{a_i} \geq 0, && \forall a_i \in A_i
\end{aligned}
$$

- If optimal solution is strictly positive, then s_i is weakly dominated by $\{p_{a_i}\}$

Strict Dominance by Mixed Strategies

- Checking if strategy s_i is strictly dominated by any mixed strategy

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text{max.} \quad & \epsilon \\
\text{s.t.} \quad & \sum_{a_i \in A_i} p_{a_i} u_i(a_i, a_{-i}) \geq u_i(s_i, a_{-i}) + \epsilon \quad \forall a_{-i} \in A_{-i} \\
& \sum_{a_i \in A_i} p_{a_i} = 1 \\
& p_{a_i} \geq 0, \qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad \forall a_i \in A_i
\end{aligned}
$$

- If optimal solution is strictly positive, then s_i is strictly dominated by $\{p_{a_i}\}$

Path Dependency of Iterated Dominance

- Iterated weak dominance is path-dependent:
  - Sequence of eliminations may determine which solution we get (if any)

- Iterated strict dominance is path-independent:
  - Elimination process will always terminate at the same point

Computational Questions for Iterated Dominance

- Is there some elimination path under which s_i is eliminated?

- Is there maximally reduced game where each agent has exactly 1 action?

- For strict dominance, both can be solved in polynomial time
  - Due to path-independence
  - Check if any strategy is dominated, remove it, repeat
  - With or without dominance by mixed strategies

- For weak dominance, both questions are NP-hard[1]
  - Even when all utilities are 0 or 1
  - With or without dominance by mixed strategies

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[1][Conitzer, Sandholm 05] and weaker version proved by [Gilboa, Kalai, Zemel 93]

Outline

Recall: Minmax and Maxmin

- Maxmin strategy for agent i (maxmin value for agent i)

$$\underset{s_i}{\operatorname{argmax}} \min_{s_{-i}} u_i(s_i, s_{-i})$$

- Minmax strategy against agent i (minmax value for agent i)

$$\underset{s_{-i}}{\operatorname{argmin}} \max_{s_i} u_i(s_i, s_{-i})$$

Maxmin Strategy and Value

- Finding maxmin strategy of agent i

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text{max.} \quad & U_i \\
\text{s.t.} \quad & \sum_{a_i \in A_i} p_{a_i} u_i(a_i, a_{-i}) \geq U_i, \quad \forall a_{-i} \in A_{-i} \\
& \sum_{a_i \in A_i} p_{a_i} = 1 \\
& p_{a_i} \geq 0, \qquad\qquad\qquad \forall a_i \in A_i
\end{aligned}
$$

- Given p_{a_i}, first constraint ensures that U_i is less than any achievable expected utility for any pure strategies of opponents
- Objective of this LP, U_i, is maxmin value of agent i

Outline

NE of Two-player, Zero-sum Games

- Maxmin value for agent 1

  max. U_1

  s.t. $\sum_{a_1 \in A_1} p_{a_1} u_1(a_1, a_2) \geq U_1 \quad \forall a_2 \in A_2$

  $\quad\quad \sum_{a_1 \in A_1} p_{a_1} = 1$

  $\quad\quad p_{a_1} \geq 0, \quad\quad\quad\quad \forall a_1 \in A_1$

- Minmax value for agent 1

  min. U_1

  s.t. $\sum_{a_2 \in A_2} p_{a_2} u_1(a_1, a_2) \leq U_1 \quad \forall a_1 \in A_1$

  $\quad\quad \sum_{a_2 \in A_2} p_{a_2} = 1$

  $\quad\quad p_{a_2} \geq 0, \quad\quad\quad\quad \forall a_2 \in A_2$

- NE is expressed as LP $\Rightarrow$ NE can be computed in polynomial time

Maxmin Strategy for General-sum Games

- Agents could still play minmax strategy in general-sum games
  - I.e., pretend that the opponent is only trying to hurt you
- But this might not be rational:

Agent 2

		Left	Right
	Up	0, 0	3, 1
Agent 1	Down	1, 0	2, 1

- If A2 was trying to hurt A1, she would play Left, so A1 should play Down
- In reality, A2 will play Right (strictly dominant), so A1 should play Up

Hardness of Computing NE for General-sum Games

- Complexity was open for long time
  - "together with factoring [. . .] the most important concrete open question on the boundary of P today" [Papadimitriou STOC'01]
- Sequence of papers showed that computing any NE is PPAD-complete (even in 2-player games) [Daskalakis, Goldberg, Papadimitriou 2006; Chen, Deng 2006]
- All known algorithms require exponential time (in worst case)

Hardness of Computing NE for General-Sum Games (cont.)

- What about computing NE with specific property?
  - NE that is not Pareto-dominated
  - NE that maximizes expected social welfare (i.e., sum of all agents' utilities)
  - NE that maximizes expected utility of given agent
  - NE that maximizes expected utility of worst-off player
  - NE in which given pure strategy is played with positive probability
  - NE in which given pure strategy is played with zero probability
  - $\cdots$

- All of these are NP-hard (and the optimization questions are inapproximable assuming P != NP), even in 2-player games

  [Gilboa, Zemel 89; Conitzer & Sandholm IJCAI-03/GEB-08]

Search-based Approaches (for Two-player Games)

- We can use LP, if we know support X_i of each player i's mixed strategy

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text{find} \quad & (U_1, U_2) \\
\text{s.t.} \quad & p_{a_i} \geq 0, && \forall i, a_i \in A_i \\
& \sum_{a_i \in A_i} p_{a_i} = 1, && \forall i \\
& p_{a_i} = 0, && \forall i, a_i \in A_i / X_i \\
& \sum_{a_{-i} \in A_{-i}} p_{a_{-i}} u_i(a_i, a_{-i}) = U_i, && \forall i, a_i \in X_i \\
& \sum_{a_{-i} \in A_{-i}} p_{a_{-i}} u_i(a_i, a_{-i}) \leq U_i, && \forall i, a_i \in A_i / X_i
\end{aligned}
$$

- Thus, we can search over possible supports, which is basic idea underlying methods in [Dickhaut & Kaplan 91; Porter, Nudelman, Shoham AAAI04/GEB08]

NE using MILP (for Two-player Games)

[Sandholm, Gilpin, Conitzer AAAI05]

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text{max.} \quad & \text{whatever you like (e.g., social welfare)} \\
\text{s.t.} \quad & p_{a_i} \geq 0, && \forall i, a_i \in A_i \\
& \sum_{a_i \in A_i} p_{a_i} = 1, && \forall i \\
& \sum_{a_{-i} \in A_{-i}} p_{a_{-i}} u_i(a_i, a_{-i}) = u_{a_i}, && \forall i, a_i \in A_i \\
& u_{a_i} \leq u_i, && \forall i, a_i \in A_i \\
& p_{a_i} \leq b_{a_i}, && \forall i, a_i \in A_i \\
& u_i - u_{a_i} \leq M(1 - b_{a_i}), && \forall i, a_i \in A_i \\
& b_{a_i} \in \{0, 1\}, && \forall i, a_i \in A_i
\end{aligned}
$$

- b_{a_i} indicates whether a_i is in support of i's mixed strategy, and M is large number

Outline

Correlated Equilibrium (N-player Games!)

- Variables are now p_a for all action profiles a (i.e., outcome)

$$\text{max.} \quad \text{whatever you like (e.g., social welfare)}$$

$$\text{s.t.} \quad \sum_{a_{-i} \in A_{-i}} p_a u_i(a) \geq \sum_{a_{-i} \in A_{-i}} p_a u_i(t_i, a_{-i}) \quad \forall i, a_i, t_i \in A_i$$

$$\sum_{a \in A} p_a = 1$$

$$p_a \geq 0, \qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad \forall a \in A$$

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