# serve — the OpenAI-compatible server ```bash make libwaste.dylib # or libwaste.so on Linux python3 -m serve ~/models/k3.waste --port 8000 ``` ```bash curl localhost:8000/v1/chat/completions \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"model":"k3","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"Why is the sky blue?"}]}' ``` Stdlib only. No package index, no virtualenv, no framework: a server that needs a dependency resolver to start is one more thing between a downloaded model and an answer. ## Why Python, and why ctypes `waste.h` opens by saying the engine is a library first and the CLI is one of its clients. This is the second client. It does not reimplement any inference — every model operation is a call into `libwaste` through ctypes, and `serve/engine.py` mirrors the header struct for struct. What is left for Python is everything that is *not* arithmetic: K3's prompt format, the parser that reads its replies back, request validation, SSE framing. That code changes with the OpenAI API and with each model's chat format, neither of which belongs in a C engine that is trying to stay small and dependency-free. ## What the model actually needs Kimi K3 ships **no Jinja template**. It builds prompts with a Python program, `encoding_k3.py`, which emits a token sequence directly in XTML — an XML-like markup whose angle brackets are reserved tokens: | in this repo | token | role | |---|---|---| | `[open]` | `<\|open\|>` | starts a tag | | `[sep]` | `<\|sep\|>` | ends a tag header | | `[close]` | `<\|close\|>` | starts a closing tag | | `[end_of_msg]` | `<\|end_of_msg\|>` | ends a message | A turn: ``` <|open|>message role="user"<|sep|>What is the weather?<|close|>message<|sep|><|end_of_msg|> ``` and the model is handed the floor with an unclosed assistant message: ``` <|open|>message role="assistant"<|sep|><|open|>think<|sep|> ``` `examples/chat-k3.json` covers the text conversation in four prefix/suffix strings, which is all the C CLI can carry. It explicitly does not cover tool definitions, tool results, JSON schemas, the think channel, or parsing the reply back. Those are what `serve/` adds. ### serve/xtml.py — the prompt A port of `encoding_k3.py`, checked against it. It renders: - **tool declarations** — a system message carrying compact JSON Schema, with a separate lazy-loading variant for tools introduced mid-conversation - **tool calls** — `call` elements with typed `argument` children (`string`, `number`, `boolean`, `null`, `object`, `array`), or a raw `json` element when the model's arguments did not parse - **tool results** — `message role="tool"` numbered by position, with out-of-order OpenAI `tool_call_id` results re-sorted to match the calls - **response_format** — `json_object` and `json_schema`, injected as synthetic system messages, since K3 has no request field for them - **tool_choice** — `required` and `none`, likewise - **the think channel**, and `thinking_effort` - **images** — `<|media_begin|>image WxH<|media_content|><|media_pad|><|media_end|>` It returns **segments**, not a string: ```python Segment('<|open|>', markup=True), Segment('message', markup=False), ... ``` because the two halves go to different tokenizer entry points — `waste_tokenize_markup` for structure, `waste_tokenize` for anything a user, document or tool wrote. That is what stops pasted text from closing a turn or opening a forged system message. Upstream draws the same line with `allowed_special` against `disallowed_special`. Two rules in `tokenize_segments` are load-bearing and easy to "optimize" into bugs: 1. **Never concatenate a prompt and encode it once.** That hands whoever wrote the content the ability to write the structure. 2. **Never merge adjacent same-mode segments either.** Upstream encodes one segment at a time, and BPE is not associative: ` role` + `="` + `user` encoded apart is a different token sequence than ` role="user"` encoded whole. Merging is a cheap win and a wrong prompt. `tests/serve/test_engine.py::test_segments_are_encoded_separately` demonstrates the difference on a real tokenizer. ### serve/regions.py — the reply The half `encoding_k3.py` does not have. It reads the model's XTML back into `reasoning_content`, `content` and OpenAI `tool_calls`, incrementally, so SSE deltas can go out while the model is still talking. There are two ways to feed it, and they are not equally good: - **`feed_token(id, piece)`** — what the server uses. Structure is decided by the token id the engine reports. A model that writes the *characters* `<|sep|>` — because a user asked what the markup looks like — emits ordinary text tokens, and the element stays open. This is the output-side twin of the tokenize/tokenize_markup split. - **`feed(text)`** — for hosts that only have text. It finds markers by scanning, so it cannot tell a real `<|sep|>` from one the model spelled out. Malformed output is expected, not exceptional: an unterminated element, a `<|close|>` for something never opened, a reply cut off mid-marker by the token limit. Every one ends as text or a dropped element. A truncated answer beats no answer. ## HTTP | endpoint | notes | |---|---| | `GET /health` | liveness; never requires the API key | | `GET /v1/models`, `GET /v1/models/{id}` | reports the container's real shape under a `waste` key | | `POST /v1/chat/completions` | streaming and not, tools, images | | `POST /v1/completions` | raw continuation, no chat template | Supported request fields: `messages`, `tools`, `tool_choice`, `response_format`, `temperature`, `top_p`, `top_k`, `seed`, `max_tokens` / `max_completion_tokens`, `stop`, `stream`, `stream_options.include_usage`, `reasoning_effort`. Responses carry an extra `waste` object with the numbers that actually matter for an expert-streaming engine — hit rate, bytes read, whether the page cache was bypassed — because the OpenAI schema has nowhere to put them. ### reasoning_effort K3's encoder accepts `low`, `high`, `max`. Its own system message advertises a fourth value, `medium`, and its assert then rejects it; the port reproduces the refusal rather than the documentation, and the server returns a 400 that says so instead of quietly substituting `high`. `none`, `minimal` and `off` turn the think channel off entirely. **The default is thinking on**, which is what the model was trained for. The technical report measures reasoning at up to 73% of the tokens in a request, and at this engine's speeds that is a long wait before the first word of the answer. `--no-thinking` flips the default; a request can override either way. ### Statelessness Each HTTP request resets the engine's conversation state before it is prefilled. A `waste_ctx` keeps its KDA state and MLA KV across calls — that is what makes `waste chat` a conversation — and carrying that into a stateless server means request N is prefilled on top of request N-1: the same request gets different answers depending on what came before, and one client's turn conditions another's. The lock spans prompt building *and* generation, so the image queue cannot be crossed between requests either. ### Concurrency `waste.h`: a `waste_ctx` is not thread-safe. So generations serialize on one lock, and requests queue. On a model streaming experts off an SSD at a few tokens a second, the wait for the lock is small next to the wait for the answer. Streaming is written straight from the token callback, on the thread holding the lock. A client hanging up propagates back as a return value the engine understands — the callback says stop, `waste_generate` unwinds, the next request starts. A disconnected client stops costing tokens immediately, which on a model this slow is the difference between a wasted minute and a wasted hour. ### Images `--vision` loads the tower (434 MB of weights on K3, and 1.12 GB reserved once the bounded source decode, the tower's activations and the queued image embeddings are counted — out of the same budget the expert cache draws on). Images arrive as base64 `data:` URLs. `http://` and `https://` URLs are **not fetched**. Doing so would make the server issue requests to addresses its clients choose, which is a server-side request forgery in any deployment where the server can reach more of the network than the client can. Local filesystem paths are off by default too, behind `--allow-local-images`, since they let any client read files the server can reach. ## Security - `--host` defaults to `127.0.0.1`. Binding anywhere else without `--api-key` prints a warning. - `--api-key` (or `$WASTE_API_KEY`) requires a bearer token, compared in constant time. - Request bodies are capped at 64 MB, refused on the declared Content-Length before anything is read. - Prompt injection through message content is structurally prevented, not filtered: content never reaches the markup tokenizer. Checked end to end in `test_server.py` and against the real tokenizer in `test_integration.py`. ## Tests ```bash make serve-check # everything K3_DIR=/Volumes/WasteDisk/k3 make serve-check # plus the differential ``` Five suites, in order of what they prove: | file | what it checks | needs | |---|---|---| | `test_xtml.py` | every corpus case rendered **segment for segment against the release's own `encoding_k3.py`**, plus frozen goldens | the release, for the differential | | `test_regions.py` | round trip: anything the encoder can express, the parser reads back; every chunk split; malformed output | — | | `test_engine.py` | the ctypes binding against a **real engine** and a synthetic container | `libwaste` | | `test_server.py` | HTTP over real sockets against a scripted engine | — | | `test_integration.py` | the whole stack, no fakes | `libwaste` | The goldens in `tests/serve/fixtures/` record whether the release was present when they were generated. Goldens produced by our own renderer would lock in whatever it currently does, bugs included, so `test_goldens_were_generated_from_upstream` fails rather than let that pass as evidence. Regenerate them on a machine that has the weights: ```bash K3_DIR=/Volumes/WasteDisk/k3 python3 tools/gen_xtml_goldens.py ``` ## Flags ``` python3 -m serve MODEL [options] --host, --port, --model-id, --api-key --budget SIZE hard RAM ceiling, e.g. 48G (0 = the engine chooses) --ctx N context tokens --threads N compute threads (0 = one per core) --cache {lfru,lru} expert-cache eviction policy --no-direct-io keep the page cache in the way (the bypass is on) --vision load the vision tower --verify check every expert record's crc32 as it is read --usage PATH learned hotlist (default /usage.waste) --max-tokens N default cap when a request does not set one --no-thinking answer without the think channel unless asked --allow-local-images --plan print the memory plan and exit ```