# DSH Supreme v1.1 — LAB composition fragment (bundle users). # # Recomposes the seven bundle rows to the LAB composition (Spec §16): the # full suite plus LAB-only overrides — LAB executionClass, paid override # (allowPaid: true), command-capable verifier, capped concurrent agents. # Structurally distinct from production ON PURPOSE: NEVER ship this fragment # in a production profile. # # Patch semantics (vendor/include applyEntryPatches, the exact algorithm boot # uses): rows here are UPDATE patches — they target rows the bundle layer # inserted by `id`, replacing each row's whole `config`. They intentionally # carry NO `name`: an update patch's name must match the installed row's # resolved name verbatim, which is install-location-dependent, so restating # it here would be skipped. # # Apply with ONE of: # 1. overlay (no file edits): # dsh --profile --patch "$DSH_HOME/profiles//node_modules/dsh-supreme/config/compositions/lab.patch.yml" # 2. copy the rows below into your profile's cordis.patch.yml (last write # wins per row id). # # Paths are RELATIVE to the dsh process working directory. Override any row # from your own patch layer — user layers always win. - id: supreme-policy config: executionClass: LAB allowPaid: true # v1.3 ASTRA posture — LAB is the ONLY fragment where the enforcing demo # ships: unsanctioned capability classes are DENIED except the declared # LAB allowlist (additive, binds only because executionClass=LAB). enableEncodingScan: true capabilityClassGate: ENFORCE labCapabilityClassAllowlist: - DESTRUCTIVE_OPS # v1.3 CoT-visibility demo: a route declared `none` never denies on # cot_missing (downgraded to audit), and ENFORCE applies only to # HIGH-risk tools under riskGatedCoT. Both keys are relaxations only — # with reasoningTracePolicy at its OFF default they are inert until you # turn the CoT gate on. cotVisibilityProfiles: astra-demo-route: none riskGatedCoT: true - id: supreme-observability config: dataDir: '.supreme-data/observability' - id: supreme-benchmark config: dataDir: '.supreme-data/benchmark' # v1.3 anti-sandbagging: score claims without verifier-PASS evidence are # flagged `evidenceBacked: false` (flag only — scores are never rewritten). requireEvidenceForScores: true - id: supreme-fake-llm config: provider: synthetic-free - id: supreme-router config: candidates: - provider: synthetic-free credentialMode: config-owned credentialConfigured: true quotaHeadroom: 0.95 models: - model: synthetic-mini costClass: FREE_CONFIRMED capabilities: [chat] contextWindow: 32768 failureDomain: synthetic - provider: synthetic-paid credentialMode: config-owned credentialConfigured: true quotaHeadroom: 0.9 models: - model: synthetic-paid-large costClass: PAID capabilities: [chat] contextWindow: 131072 failureDomain: synthetic-paid # v1.3 anti-sandbagging: candidates whose benchmark scores lack # verifier-PASS evidence are routed with this FIXED downweight factor # (0.5 halves the score). 1 disables. Deterministic, no ML. unscoredEvidenceWeight: 0.5 # v1.3.1 (IMP-R) outcome-routing keys — LAB demo keeps everything at its # behavior-preserving default: the fast path stays OFF (its fanout-0 # direct-routing demo is a production posture, see the supreme fragment), # bounds/circuit/class-aware scoring inherit their documented defaults. fastPath: enabled: false - id: supreme-verifier config: allowCommands: true allowedRoots: - '.supreme-data' - id: supreme-memory-policy config: registerPromptSection: false projectKnowledge: - id: lab-overview text: 'LAB composition: verbose diagnostics and synthetic fixtures are permitted here only.' priority: 70 - id: supreme-workflow-policy config: maxConcurrentAgents: 4 # v1.3 A2A + overreach demo: one DECLARED directed edge; contacts inside # the graph pass. v1.3.1 demo posture: agentContactPolicy DENY — contacts # OUTSIDE the graph are blocked pre-fact at tools/pre-execute (in LOG_ONLY # they are only audited). Registry-first identity (FIX-D): only tools in # the trusted registry (+ this add-only extension) are inspected; the # `desk_pager` entry demonstrates the extension, ordinary tools whose # arguments merely contain `target`/`to` are never touched. Delegations # above the MEDIUM ceiling or touching blocked paths are audited as # `overreach_suspected` (labels/globs only, never path values). agentContactPolicy: DENY allowedContacts: - from: orchestrator to: researcher commsToolNames: - desk_pager maxRiskLevel: MEDIUM approvalRequiredFor: - DESTRUCTIVE_OPS