--- layout: default title: "An Open Letter to the Finance Committee: SCOSTA Standards" description: "A CIS blog post presenting an open letter to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance, comparing the SCOSTA smart card standard with the Aadhaar biometric standard for identity authentication." authors: ["Elonnai Hickok"] categories: [Elonnai Hickok] date: 2011-01-06 source: "Centre for Internet and Society" permalink: /elonnai/an-open-letter-to-the-finance-committee-scosta-standards/ created: 2026-08-05 --- **"An Open Letter to the Finance Committee: SCOSTA Standards"** is a blog post by [Elonnai Hickok](/elonnai/) published by the [Centre for Internet and Society](/cis/) on 6 January 2011. It details a civil society submission to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance evaluating identity authentication mechanisms within the Unique Identification (UID) scheme. The piece presents a comparative technical analysis between the Smart Card Operating System for Transport Applications (SCOSTA) standard and the Aadhaar biometric standard, advocating for the adoption of decentralized smart card authentication to enhance security, protect domestic industry, and reduce single points of failure. ## Contents 1. [Article Details](#article-details) 2. [Full Text](#full-text) 3. [Context and Background](#context-and-background) 4. [External Link](#external-link) ## Article Details
The UID Bill has been placed to the Finance Committee for review and approval. Through a series of open letters to the Finance Committee, civil society is asking the committee to take into consideration and change certain aspects of the Bill and the project. The below note compares the SCOSTA standard with the Aadhaar biometric standard, and explains why we believe the SCOSTA standard should replace the Aadhaar biometric standard for the authentication process in the UID scheme.
This note is intended to demonstrate how the Aadhaar biometric standard is weaker than the SCOSTA standard. Through a comparison of the SCOSTA standard-based smart card and the Aadhaar biometric-based identification number, it will show how the SCOSTA standard is a more secure, structurally sound, and cost-effective approach to authentication of identity for India. Though we recognize that Aadhaar biometrics are useful for the de-duplication and identification of individuals, we believe that the SCOSTA standard is more appropriate for the authentication of individuals. Thus, we ask that the Aadhaar biometric-based authentication process be replaced with a SCOSTA standard-based authentication process.
The SCOSTA standard is used in smart cards and was developed by the National Informatics Centre in India. It is:
The biometric standard authenticates the identity of an individual based on his or her physical fingerprints and iris scans (in the case of the UID). The standard:
| Standard | SCOSTA MNIC smart card | Aadhaar Biometric - UID number |
|---|---|---|
| Architecture | Decentralized SCOSTA standards require a pair and key combination with a pin, and thus can be structured in a decentralized manner |
Centralized Aadhaar biometric standards require symmetric authentication factors, and thus must be structured in a centralized manner |
| Standards for Technology | Open standard Creates security through transparency |
Closed standard Creates security through obscurity |
| Points of failure | Multiple points of failure The SCOSTA standard has multiple points of failure, because of decentralized structure, thus if one database is compromised all data is not lost. |
Single point of failure The Aadhaar Biometric standard has one single point of failure, because of centralized structure, thus if the database is compromised all data is lost |
| Impact on local industry | Encourages Open standards allow local industry to compete in manufacturing technology |
Discourages Closed standards allow foreign players to monopolize the manufacturing of technology |
| Cost analysis | Cost-effective Increased competition keeps prices low |
Cost-ineffective Decreased competition keeps prices high |
| Revocation | Revocable If the key pair and pin are stolen, a new set of passwords can be issued |
Permanent If the biometrics of an individual are stolen, they cannot be re-issued |
| Possibility of fraudulent authentication | Lower A thief must steal your smart card and your secret pin to commit fraud |
Higher A thief only needs to collect your fingerprints using a glass tumbler to commit fraud |
| Viability of Technology | Proven effective for large populations | Not proven effective for large populations |