---
layout: default
title: "Brazil's Experience a Red Flag for WhatsApp in Indian Polls, Say Experts"
description: "A Hindustan Times report examining concerns about WhatsApp misuse ahead of India's 2019 elections following allegations of platform manipulation in Brazil's vote, featuring expert warnings about encryption dilemmas, data protection gaps, and Sunil Abraham's advocacy for fact-checker networks and in-application education."
categories: [Media mentions]
date: 2018-10-21
authors: ["Vidhi Choudhary"]
source: "Hindustan Times"
permalink: /media/brazils-experience-red-flag-whatsapp-indian-polls-experts-hindustan-times/
created: 2026-01-02
---

**Brazil's Experience a Red Flag for WhatsApp in Indian Polls, Say Experts** is a *Hindustan Times* report by Vidhi Choudhary published on 21 October 2018. The article examines anxieties surrounding WhatsApp's role in India's approaching 2019 general election following allegations that the platform enabled anti-leftist propaganda distribution during Brazil's recent vote, with lawyer Rahul Matthan predicting an "imminent" WhatsApp scandal whilst Sunil Abraham proposed fact-checker networks and in-application education as alternatives to encryption-breaking regulatory responses.

## Contents

1. [Article Details](#article-details)  
2. [Full Text](#full-text)  
3. [Context and Background](#context-and-background)  
4. [External Link](#external-link)

## Article Details

<dl class="media-details">
  <dt>📰 Published in:</dt>
  <dd><em>Hindustan Times</em></dd>

  <dt>📅 Date:</dt>
  <dd>21 October 2018</dd>

  <dt>👤 Authors:</dt>
  <dd>Vidhi Choudhary</dd>

  <dt>📄 Type:</dt>
  <dd>News Report</dd>

  <dt>📰 Newspaper Link:</dt>
  <dd>
    <a class="btn" href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/brazil-s-experience-a-red-flag-for-whatsapp-in-indian-polls-say-experts/story-lUpEk5lM4Ns8TQSU9kIe0O.html">
      Read Online
    </a>
  </dd>
</dl>

## Full Text

<div class="highlighted-text" id="fulltext">

<p>Instant messaging service WhatsApp will have to put more safeguards in place to avoid its misuse in the 2019 Lok Sabha elections, experts say. Some point to the experience in the recent elections in Brazil, where the Facebook-owned platform battled allegations on its use to influence the popular vote, with mass-WhatsApp messages pushing anti-leftist propaganda.</p>

<p>"There is no easy way to say this but the likelihood of a WhatsApp scandal in the run-up to the 2019 elections in India is imminent. I won't be surprised if there is already something similar taking place in India. That's because there is no way to control the message that is being shared on the platform. The only way to stop this is by revoking the end-to-end encryption which will impair the privacy WhatsApp users enjoy," said lawyer Rahul Matthan, partner at the law firm Trilegal and author of Privacy 2.0, which traces the historic origin and current debates on privacy.</p>

<p>WhatsApp has over 200 million users in India, its largest market. The absence of a data protection law in India (one is in the works but is unlikely to be passed before the elections) only adds to this problem, although this transcends WhatsApp.</p>

<p>"The large scale sale of phone numbers, and subsequent bombardment of messages, without seeking consent is also a reminder that we urgently need rules to limit the use of personal data for political campaigns. Europe's law, the GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation), for example, puts strict limits on direct marketing, including by political parties and campaigners. Yet India is approaching its own elections without any effective data protection rules in place," said Amba Kak, public policy adviser at web browser Mozilla.</p>

<p>The election commission is aware of the challenge. In an interview to Hindustan Times, chief election commissioner OP Rawat said the biggest challenge for the ECI right now is posed by technology firms that have wherewithal to influence voters.</p>

<p>According to a survey conducted by the Digital Empowerment Foundation (DEF) and reported by the HT earlier this week, 40% of rural users of the messaging platform were part of WhatsApp groups created by members or representatives of political parties. A third of the users spend between one hour and four hours on the app daily, the survey found. "This reflects the level of campaigning and penetration of political parties. Villages are always politically sensitive and also interested in politics," the HT report said, quoting DEF's Osama Manzar.</p>

<p>The survey noted that 63% of the respondents were not on the service in 2014. The share of active WhatsApp users in rural India has doubled since 2017, according to the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies.</p>

<p>A possible solution is to make sure voters are consistently informed about the issue of misinformation and fake news in India, added Matthan. "WhatsApp should continue to build a concerted marketing campaign against fake news to make voters aware, so that they exercise restraint while sending and sharing messages received from other users. The only trouble is if the message is received from a trusted ally, then one is likely to believe it. That's why there is no absolute way to ensure shadow campaigns are not circulated on WhatsApp," he explained.</p>

<p>The Facebook-owned platform has said in an earlier statements that it believes this is a challenge that requires government, civil society and technology companies to work together. "Our strategy has been twofold. First, to give people the controls and information they need to stay safe; and second, to work proactively to prevent misuse on WhatsApp," WhatsApp said in the statement in July.</p>

<p>In July, WhatsApp launched a label to identify forwarded messages in a bid to combat fake news and the spread of misinformation globally, including India. It later set a limit to the use of forwarded messages to five chats in India. After that WhatsApp took out full-page advertisements in Indian newspapers offering "easy tips" to distinguish between fact and fiction as it battles rising pressure to curb the spread of misinformation in India after the lynching of at least 30 people in the country since May, with at least some being caused by rumours forwarded over phones.</p>

<p>Sunil Abraham, director at the think tank Centre for Internet and Society said WhatsApp could employ a network of fact checkers and explore "in application education".</p>

<p>Local authorities in various parts of the country have resorted to Internet shutdowns to counter incidents of violence triggered by rumours on WhatsApp. Law firm Software Freedom Law Center (SFLC), based in New Delhi, has tracked down 116 Internet shutdowns across India in 2018 alone. In 2017, India reported 79 shutdowns; in 2016, the number was 31 and in 2012 it was just three. The rise from three shutdowns in 2012 to more than 100 this year marks a 3,766% surge. "State and central government and local authorities might consider this a solution. But a shutdown is completely against freedom of speech and that's our view," said an SFLC spokesperson. WhatsApp users in rural India do not blindly trust messages they receive on the messaging service, according to the DEF survey.</p>

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## Context and Background

This report emerged weeks before India's 2019 general election commenced, drawing parallels with Brazil's October 2018 presidential contest where Jair Bolsonaro's campaign faced accusations of coordinating mass WhatsApp message distribution through bulk purchases of phone numbers—a practice potentially violating electoral regulations and platform terms of service. Brazilian prosecutors investigated allegations that businesses funded coordinated messaging campaigns, raising questions about whether similar tactics might surface in India's considerably larger electoral exercise involving nearly 900 million eligible voters.

Rahul Matthan's prediction of an "imminent" scandal reflected recognition that WhatsApp's end-to-end encryption created fundamental tension between privacy protection and content moderation. His observation that breaking encryption would "impair the privacy WhatsApp users enjoy" articulated a dilemma facing regulators globally: technical measures preventing platform surveillance also prevented platforms from detecting and removing harmful content before distribution. This architectural feature distinguished WhatsApp from Facebook and Twitter, where centralized content storage enabled post-hoc moderation even if real-time intervention remained challenging.

Amba Kak's reference to GDPR's restrictions on direct marketing highlighted India's regulatory vacuum. The European regulation required explicit consent for political communications and granted individuals rights to access, correct and delete their data—protections absent from Indian law despite Justice BN Srikrishna's committee examining data protection frameworks. Her observation about "large scale sale of phone numbers" pointed to unregulated databases enabling micro-targeted political messaging without accountability mechanisms ensuring accuracy or preventing manipulation.

The Digital Empowerment Foundation survey data revealing that 63% of rural WhatsApp users had joined the platform after 2014 documented rapid technological diffusion reshaping India's information environment. That 40% belonged to politically affiliated groups indicated parties had quickly recognized WhatsApp's potential for constituency-level organizing and message distribution, whilst the finding that one-third spent 1-4 hours daily on the application suggested substantial exposure to political content circulating through these networks.

Chief Election Commissioner OP Rawat's acknowledgment that technology firms posed the "biggest challenge" for electoral integrity marked official recognition that traditional campaign finance monitoring and media regulation proved inadequate for digital platforms. The Commission's authority to regulate print and broadcast political advertising offered limited purchase over encrypted messaging applications where content remained invisible to regulators until users chose to report it.

WhatsApp's July 2018 interventions—forwarding labels, five-chat forwarding limits, and newspaper advertisements promoting media literacy—represented incremental responses that addressed message velocity without engaging content veracity. These measures might slow viral spread but couldn't prevent coordinated campaigns using multiple accounts to distribute identical messages through seemingly organic sharing, nor could they help users distinguish accurate information from sophisticated disinformation mimicking credible sources.

Sunil Abraham's proposal for fact-checker networks and "in application education" offered constructive alternatives acknowledging encryption constraints. Partnerships with independent fact-checking organizations could create reference databases against which users might voluntarily check suspicious content, whilst in-application prompts could encourage critical evaluation before forwarding. However, these approaches depended on user cooperation and fact-checker capacity—both potentially overwhelmed during intense campaign periods generating high-volume, rapidly evolving political claims.

The Software Freedom Law Center's documentation of internet shutdowns—rising from three in 2012 to 116 in 2018—revealed state authorities' blunt response to platform governance failures. Disconnecting entire regions from internet access to prevent rumour-driven violence reflected regulatory desperation when platforms proved unable or unwilling to moderate harmful content and law enforcement lacked capacity for targeted intervention. The SFLC spokesperson's characterization of shutdowns as "completely against freedom of speech" highlighted civil liberties costs of this approach, which collectively punished millions for content circulated by small fractions of users.

The concluding reference to DEF survey findings that rural users "do not blindly trust messages" offered modest reassurance that media literacy might provide organic defense against misinformation. However, this aggregated finding obscured variation across contexts—whilst many users exercised skepticism, violence triggered by WhatsApp rumours demonstrated that sufficient minorities believed false content to generate lethal consequences, particularly when messages aligned with existing prejudices or fears.

## External Link

- <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/brazil-s-experience-a-red-flag-for-whatsapp-in-indian-polls-say-experts/story-lUpEk5lM4Ns8TQSU9kIe0O.html">Read on Hindustan Times</a>

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