--- layout: default title: "NSA Leaks Helping India Become 'Big Brother' State?" description: "A BBC News investigation into how India responded to Edward Snowden's NSA revelations by expanding its own surveillance capabilities, featuring analysis from Sunil Abraham on governments cherry-picking the worst practices in a 'race to the bottom' on human rights." categories: [Media mentions] date: 2013-10-31 source: "BBC News" authors: ["Andrew North"] permalink: /media/nsa-leaks-helping-india-become-big-brother-state-bbc/ created: 2025-12-19 --- **NSA Leaks Helping India Become 'Big Brother' State?** is an investigative article published by BBC News on 31 October 2013, written by South Asia correspondent Andrew North. The piece examines how the Indian government responded to Edward Snowden's revelations about NSA surveillance not by strengthening privacy protections, but by accelerating its own mass-surveillance infrastructure through the Central Monitoring System. It features commentary from Sunil Abraham on how governments were using the Snowden leaks to justify emulating American surveillance practices rather than curbing them. ## Contents 1. [Article Details](#article-details) 2. [Full Text](#full-text) 3. [Context and Background](#context-and-background) 4. [External Link](#external-link) ## Article Details
đź“° Published in:
BBC News
✍️ Author:
Andrew North
đź“… Date:
31 October 2013
đź“„ Type:
Investigation / Analysis
đź“° Article Link:
Read Online
## Full Text

While the US and Britain fend off accusations of Big Brother-style spying, other countries are learning lessons from fugitive ex-US intelligence contractor Edward Snowden's leaks and, critics say, developing the same kind of mass-surveillance.

India is one of those in the frame.

Its authorities are bringing in new measures against foreign cyber-snooping, including a plan to move internet traffic inside its borders and banning officials from using Gmail and other external email services.

Simultaneously, campaigners say the Indian government is loosening controls on electronic snooping by its own spies.

It is also stepping up efforts to build its own mass-surveillance system, which critics have dubbed "India's PRISM" - a reference to one of the US spy programmes revealed by Mr Snowden.

This is the downside of Mr Snowden's leaks, says Sunil Abraham of the Centre for Internet and Society, an Indian advocacy group.

"Governments like India are now cherry-picking the worst practices, in a race for the bottom in terms of human rights".

Documents released by Mr Snowden to journalist Glenn Greenwald showed America's National Security Agency (NSA) was hoovering up billions of chunks of Indian data, making the country its fifth most important target worldwide.

'Not actually snooping'

But unlike other states that have discovered the US is siphoning off their secrets, India has conspicuously avoided joining the chorus of criticism. That may be because it doesn't want to draw attention to its own activities.

Its foreign minister Salman Khurshid even appeared to excuse American monitoring, saying it "was not actually snooping".

When the German chancellor Angela Merkel erupted over reports the NSA had been bugging her mobile phone, the Indian prime minister's office was untroubled by the possibility he too had been targeted.

"There are no concerns", a spokesman for Manmohan Singh told the BBC, because "he does not use a mobile phone or Gmail".

Many Indian officials do. But from this December the government is planning to bar them from using their private email accounts for any official business — in direct response to evidence of US prying. Instead, they will have to use government email.

The latest reports of even deeper NSA penetration of Google is likely to further spur such moves.

It won't be an easy change to make though, judging from the BBC's own experiences dealing with Indian officials. Many prefer to use Gmail or Yahoo rather than their official accounts because the government email system so often crashes.

More ambitious still is a plan to bring all internal Indian internet traffic inside its borders. Currently, an email sent from say Delhi to Calcutta is more likely to travel via the US or Europe, partly because of the way the internet is designed but also because of a lack of Indian capacity.

But at a summer meeting to assess Mr Snowden's leaks, one of India's security chiefs called for "100%" of emails and files sent between Indians to stay in the country to limit snooping by "foreign elements".

As other governments take similar measures, these changes may not just mean a tougher job for spies but also a more fragmented internet under tighter state control.

Critics say India was already on the road to creating a Big Brother state, long before anyone had heard of Edward Snowden.

Their biggest concern is a secret mass-surveillance project the government has reportedly been building for the past few years. The Central Monitoring System (CMS) is supposed to give security agencies the ability to listen or record all communications nationwide and track individuals, in real time - like some of the US programmes that have been revealed.

If the few details that have emerged are correct, Indian cyber-spies would have even more freedom, bypassing internet and telecom companies and tapping straight into the cables and servers carrying the traffic.

Mirroring America's defence of its spying programmes, the government says the monitoring system is to protect against terrorists and other national security threats. But a lack of concrete information has only heightened fears about its intentions.

A draft privacy bill which was supposed to allay some concerns has been watered down in the light of Mr Snowden's revelations.

According to Sunil Abraham, "India's intelligence agencies argued: Look at what the US can do. Why curtail what we can do?"

In any case, India's spies are not troubled by any parliamentary or judicial oversight. In the world's largest democracy, the intelligence agencies still report straight to the prime minister and the home minister.

India needs to "protect its sovereign rights", says Pavan Duggal, a Supreme Court advocate and cyber-law specialist. But these are "unprecedented powers".

Right now, these are minority concerns in India, which is far more consumed with the early political sparring before next year's elections.

Meanwhile, the Indian government is learning many lessons from the NSA's troubles. But Mr Duggal says, "Sooner or later it will have to address the issue of greater accountability."

{% include back-to-top.html %} ## Context and Background This article appeared during the height of global outrage over Edward Snowden's NSA revelations, yet documented a perverse consequence of those leaks: some governments responded not by constraining surveillance but by accelerating their own programmes, using American capabilities as justification for expanded domestic powers. India's muted reaction to evidence it was the NSA's fifth-largest target contrasted sharply with protests from European allies like Germany. Whilst Angela Merkel condemned surveillance of her communications, India's foreign minister Salman Khurshid dismissed concerns by claiming NSA activities weren't "actually snooping"—a formulation that raised questions about India's own intentions. The Central Monitoring System, which had been in development since 2011, represented a significant escalation in state surveillance capacity. Unlike earlier lawful interception frameworks that required telecom companies to facilitate targeted monitoring, the CMS was designed to allow intelligence agencies direct access to network infrastructure, bypassing intermediaries entirely. This architectural choice removed even the minimal oversight that came from involving private companies in the interception process. Sunil Abraham's warning about a "race to the bottom" captured how the Snowden revelations were being weaponised. Rather than prompting reform, intelligence agencies invoked NSA capabilities to argue against limiting their own powers. When a draft privacy bill threatened to impose constraints, it was diluted precisely because agencies could point to American precedents for mass surveillance. The absence of parliamentary or judicial oversight for Indian intelligence agencies stood in stark contrast to the institutional checks—however imperfect—that existed in Western democracies. Agencies reported directly to political leadership without independent review, creating conditions where surveillance expansion could proceed with minimal public scrutiny or legal challenge. ## External Link - Read on BBC News