/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT * * Copyright (C) 2017-2023 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved. */ package device import ( "encoding/binary" "errors" "fmt" "net" "net/netip" "sync" "time" "github.com/tailscale/wireguard-go/conn" "golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305" "golang.org/x/net/ipv4" "golang.org/x/net/ipv6" ) type QueueHandshakeElement struct { msgType uint32 packet []byte packetMeta conn.ReceivedPacket buffer *packetBuf } type QueueInboundElement struct { buffer *packetBuf packet []byte packetMeta conn.ReceivedPacket counter uint64 keypair *Keypair } type QueueInboundElementsContainer struct { // filling is a one-shot barrier signaling decryption→receive // handoff. RoutineReceiveIncoming calls Add(1) before sending the // container down the decryption and inbound queues; RoutineDecryption // calls Done after decrypting; RoutineSequentialReceiver calls Wait // before reading the decrypted packets. filling sync.WaitGroup elems []*QueueInboundElement } // clearPointers clears elem fields that contain pointers. // This makes the garbage collector's life easier and // avoids accidentally keeping other objects around unnecessarily. // It also reduces the possible collateral damage from use-after-free bugs. func (elem *QueueInboundElement) clearPointers() { elem.buffer = nil elem.packet = nil elem.packetMeta = conn.ReceivedPacket{} elem.keypair = nil } /* Called when a new authenticated message has been received * * NOTE: Not thread safe, but called by sequential receiver! */ func (peer *Peer) keepKeyFreshReceiving() { if peer.timers.sentLastMinuteHandshake.Load() { return } keypair := peer.keypairs.Current() if keypair != nil && keypair.isInitiator && time.Since(keypair.created) > (RejectAfterTime-KeepaliveTimeout-RekeyTimeout) { peer.timers.sentLastMinuteHandshake.Store(true) peer.SendHandshakeInitiation(false) } } /* Receives incoming datagrams for the device * * Every time the bind is updated a new routine is started for * IPv4 and IPv6 (separately) */ func (device *Device) RoutineReceiveIncoming(maxBatchSize int, recv conn.ReceiveFunc) { recvName := recv.PrettyName() defer func() { device.log.Verbosef("Routine: receive incoming %s - stopped", recvName) device.queue.decryption.wg.Done() device.queue.handshake.wg.Done() device.net.stopping.Done() }() device.log.Verbosef("Routine: receive incoming %s - started", recvName) // receive datagrams until conn is closed var ( packets = make([]conn.ReceivedPacket, maxBatchSize) buf = device.getPacketBuf() // bufDirty tracks whether the current buf has been pushed downstream to // crypto and per-peer/handshake functions, or can be re-used across the // next read cycle bufDirty bool err error count int deathSpiral int elemsByPeer = make(map[*Peer]*QueueInboundElementsContainer, maxBatchSize) ) defer func() { buf.decRef() }() for { if bufDirty { buf.decRef() buf = device.getPacketBuf() bufDirty = false } count, err = recv(buf.slab, packets) if err != nil { if errors.Is(err, net.ErrClosed) { return } device.log.Verbosef("Failed to receive %s packet: %v", recvName, err) if neterr, ok := err.(net.Error); ok && !neterr.Temporary() { return } if deathSpiral < 10 { deathSpiral++ time.Sleep(time.Second / 3) continue } return } deathSpiral = 0 // handle each packet in the batch for _, meta := range packets[:count] { if meta.Size < MinMessageSize { continue } // check size of packet packet := meta.Bytes(buf.slab) msgType := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(packet[:4]) switch msgType { // check if transport case MessageTransportType: // check size if len(packet) < MessageTransportSize { continue } // lookup key pair receiver := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32( packet[MessageTransportOffsetReceiver:MessageTransportOffsetCounter], ) value := device.indexTable.Lookup(receiver) keypair := value.keypair if keypair == nil { continue } // check keypair expiry if keypair.created.Add(RejectAfterTime).Before(time.Now()) { continue } // create work element peer := value.peer elem := device.GetInboundElement() bufDirty = true buf.incRef() elem.buffer = buf elem.packet = packet elem.packetMeta = meta elem.keypair = keypair elem.counter = 0 elemsForPeer, ok := elemsByPeer[peer] if !ok { elemsForPeer = device.GetInboundElementsContainer() elemsByPeer[peer] = elemsForPeer } elemsForPeer.elems = append(elemsForPeer.elems, elem) continue // otherwise it is a fixed size & handshake related packet case MessageInitiationType: if len(packet) != MessageInitiationSize { continue } case MessageResponseType: if len(packet) != MessageResponseSize { continue } case MessageCookieReplyType: if len(packet) != MessageCookieReplySize { continue } default: device.log.Verbosef("Received message with unknown type") continue } buf.incRef() select { case device.queue.handshake.c <- QueueHandshakeElement{ msgType: msgType, buffer: buf, packet: packet, packetMeta: meta, }: bufDirty = true default: buf.decRef() } } for peer, elemsContainer := range elemsByPeer { peer.queueInboundIfRunning(elemsContainer) delete(elemsByPeer, peer) } } } func (device *Device) RoutineDecryption(id int) { var nonce [chacha20poly1305.NonceSize]byte defer device.log.Verbosef("Routine: decryption worker %d - stopped", id) device.log.Verbosef("Routine: decryption worker %d - started", id) for elemsContainer := range device.queue.decryption.c { for _, elem := range elemsContainer.elems { // split message into fields counter := elem.packet[MessageTransportOffsetCounter:MessageTransportOffsetContent] content := elem.packet[MessageTransportOffsetContent:] // decrypt and release to consumer var err error elem.counter = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(counter) // copy counter to nonce binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(nonce[0x4:0xc], elem.counter) elem.packet, err = elem.keypair.receive.Open( content[:0], nonce[:], content, nil, ) if err != nil { elem.packet = nil } } elemsContainer.filling.Done() } } /* Handles incoming packets related to handshake */ func (device *Device) RoutineHandshake(id int) { defer func() { device.log.Verbosef("Routine: handshake worker %d - stopped", id) device.queue.encryption.wg.Done() }() device.log.Verbosef("Routine: handshake worker %d - started", id) for elem := range device.queue.handshake.c { // handle cookie fields and ratelimiting switch elem.msgType { case MessageCookieReplyType: // unmarshal packet var reply MessageCookieReply err := reply.unmarshal(elem.packet) if err != nil { device.log.Verbosef("Failed to decode cookie reply") goto skip } // lookup peer from index entry := device.indexTable.Lookup(reply.Receiver) if entry.peer == nil { goto skip } // consume reply if peer := entry.peer; peer.runningState.isRunning.Load() { device.log.Verbosef("Receiving cookie response from %s", elem.packetMeta.Endpoint.DstToString()) if !peer.cookieGenerator.ConsumeReply(&reply) { device.log.Verbosef("Could not decrypt invalid cookie response") } } goto skip case MessageInitiationType, MessageResponseType: // check mac fields and maybe ratelimit if !device.cookieChecker.CheckMAC1(elem.packet) { device.log.Verbosef("Received packet with invalid mac1") goto skip } // endpoints destination address is the source of the datagram if device.IsUnderLoad() { // verify MAC2 field if !device.cookieChecker.CheckMAC2(elem.packet, elem.packetMeta.Endpoint.DstToBytes()) { device.SendHandshakeCookie(&elem) goto skip } // check ratelimiter if !device.rate.limiter.Allow(elem.packetMeta.Endpoint.DstIP()) { goto skip } } default: device.log.Errorf("Invalid packet ended up in the handshake queue") goto skip } // handle handshake initiation/response content switch elem.msgType { case MessageInitiationType: // unmarshal var msg MessageInitiation err := msg.unmarshal(elem.packet) if err != nil { device.log.Errorf("Failed to decode initiation message") goto skip } // consume initiation peer := device.ConsumeMessageInitiation(&msg, elem.packetMeta.Endpoint) if peer == nil { device.log.Verbosef("Received invalid initiation message from %s", elem.packetMeta.Endpoint.DstToString()) goto skip } // update timers peer.timersAnyAuthenticatedPacketTraversal() peer.timersAnyAuthenticatedPacketReceived() device.log.Verbosef("%v - Received handshake initiation", peer) peer.rxBytes.Add(uint64(len(elem.packet))) peer.SendHandshakeResponse() case MessageResponseType: // unmarshal var msg MessageResponse err := msg.unmarshal(elem.packet) if err != nil { device.log.Errorf("Failed to decode response message") goto skip } // consume response peer := device.ConsumeMessageResponse(&msg) if peer == nil { device.log.Verbosef("Received invalid response message from %s", elem.packetMeta.Endpoint.DstToString()) goto skip } device.log.Verbosef("%v - Received handshake response", peer) peer.rxBytes.Add(uint64(len(elem.packet))) // update timers peer.timersAnyAuthenticatedPacketTraversal() peer.timersAnyAuthenticatedPacketReceived() // derive keypair err = peer.BeginSymmetricSession() if err != nil { device.log.Errorf("%v - Failed to derive keypair: %v", peer, err) goto skip } device.config.metrics.HandshakeInitiatorCompleted.Add(1) peer.timersSessionDerived() peer.timersHandshakeComplete() peer.SendPriorityMessage() peer.SendKeepalive() } skip: elem.buffer.decRef() } } func (peer *Peer) RoutineSequentialReceiver(maxBatchSize int) { device := peer.device defer func() { device.log.Verbosef("%v - Routine: sequential receiver - stopped", peer) peer.runningState.queueReaders.Done() }() device.log.Verbosef("%v - Routine: sequential receiver - started", peer) bufs := make([][]byte, 0, maxBatchSize) for elemsContainer := range peer.queue.inbound { peer.processInboundContainer(elemsContainer, bufs[:0]) } } // processInboundContainer waits for the decryption routine to finish // filling elemsContainer, then writes the valid packets to the TUN // device and returns the container to the pool. // // scratch is a length-0 slice used to assemble the per-packet buffers // passed to tun.device.Write; its backing array is reused across calls. func (peer *Peer) processInboundContainer(elemsContainer *QueueInboundElementsContainer, scratch [][]byte) { // Invariants from RoutineSequentialReceiver; all should be unreachable. if len(scratch) != 0 || cap(scratch) == 0 { panic(fmt.Sprintf("processInboundContainer: scratch must be empty with non-zero cap; got len=%d cap=%d", len(scratch), cap(scratch))) } if cap(scratch) < len(elemsContainer.elems) { panic(fmt.Sprintf("processInboundContainer: scratch cap %d < elems %d", cap(scratch), len(elemsContainer.elems))) } device := peer.device defer device.PutInboundElementsContainer(elemsContainer) // Wait for RoutineDecryption to finish filling the container. After // Wait returns we have happens-before with that goroutine and are the // sole owner of the container until Put hands it back to the pool. elemsContainer.filling.Wait() elems := elemsContainer.elems validTailPacket := -1 dataPacketReceived := false rxBytesLen := uint64(0) for i, elem := range elems { if elem.packet == nil { // decryption failed continue } if !elem.keypair.replayFilter.ValidateCounter(elem.counter, RejectAfterMessages) { device.config.metrics.MessageTransportRXDroppedReplay.Add(1) continue } validTailPacket = i if peer.ReceivedWithKeypair(elem.keypair) { peer.device.config.metrics.HandshakeResponderCompleted.Add(1) peer.timersHandshakeComplete() peer.SendPriorityMessage() peer.SendStagedPackets() } if ep, ok := elem.packetMeta.Endpoint.(conn.PeerAwareEndpoint); ok { ep.FromPeer(peer.handshake.remoteStatic) } rxBytesLen += uint64(len(elem.packet) + MinMessageSize) if len(elem.packet) == 0 { device.log.Verbosef("%v - Receiving keepalive packet", peer) continue } dataPacketReceived = true switch elem.packet[0] >> 4 { case 4: if len(elem.packet) < ipv4.HeaderLen { continue } field := elem.packet[IPv4offsetTotalLength : IPv4offsetTotalLength+2] length := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(field) if int(length) > len(elem.packet) || int(length) < ipv4.HeaderLen { continue } elem.packet = elem.packet[:length] src := elem.packet[IPv4offsetSrc : IPv4offsetSrc+net.IPv4len] srcAddr, _ := netip.AddrFromSlice(src) if !peer.AllowedPeerSourceIP(srcAddr) { device.log.Verbosef("IPv4 packet with disallowed source address from %v", peer) continue } case 6: if len(elem.packet) < ipv6.HeaderLen { continue } field := elem.packet[IPv6offsetPayloadLength : IPv6offsetPayloadLength+2] length := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(field) length += ipv6.HeaderLen if int(length) > len(elem.packet) { continue } elem.packet = elem.packet[:length] src := elem.packet[IPv6offsetSrc : IPv6offsetSrc+net.IPv6len] srcAddr, _ := netip.AddrFromSlice(src) if !peer.AllowedPeerSourceIP(srcAddr) { device.log.Verbosef("IPv6 packet with disallowed source address from %v", peer) continue } default: device.log.Verbosef("Packet with invalid IP version from %v", peer) continue } elem.packetMeta.Size = MessageTransportOffsetContent + len(elem.packet) scratch = append(scratch, elem.packetMeta.Bytes(elem.buffer.slab)) } peer.rxBytes.Add(rxBytesLen) if validTailPacket >= 0 { peer.keepKeyFreshReceiving() peer.timersAnyAuthenticatedPacketTraversal() peer.timersAnyAuthenticatedPacketReceived() } if dataPacketReceived { peer.timersDataReceived() } if len(scratch) > 0 { _, err := peer.writeTUN(scratch, MessageTransportOffsetContent) if err != nil && !device.isClosed() { device.log.Errorf("Failed to write packets to TUN device: %v", err) } } for _, elem := range elems { device.PutInboundElement(elem) } }