Bringing AI to 4PS Construct with MCP

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23.09.2026

Global Toolchain Day

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Agenda

… all of it with a ton of demos

01 MCP in a nutshell

- What the Model Context Protocol is and which problem it solves
- High-level architecture: hosts, clients, servers

02 The protocol in detail

- Tools, resources and prompts on the wire
- Sampling and elicitation, MCP Inspector

03 MCP for ERP

- The Business Central MCP server and how it works
- Configurations, tool modes, embedded resources

04 Securing MCP and agents

- What can go wrong: your disk, your production tenant, your secrets
- Containment with Docker Sandboxes

Credits and disclaimer

Not all of this is mine

- Parts of the Business Central content come from Microsoft (Jens Møller-Pedersen, Kennie Pontoppidan) and are used with their consent

Moving target

- MCP is a young protocol and the Business Central implementation is in active development – everything can and probably will change

1

MCP in a nutshell

The problem, the protocol and the pieces involved

Why we needed MCP

As clever as they seem, Large Language Models are actually quite stupid

Without MCP

Models only know their training data, nothing else

Simple questions like asking for the current time or internet content after the training has finished are just impossible

With MCP

Models / agents can access local or remote systems

They can retrieve information or even execute actions on those systems

Models know their training data and nothing else. MCP is how they plug in everything that came after.

Why we needed a standard like USB

Integrating backends, tools and resources used to need a new answer every time

Before

Every host, every framework and every vendor had its own way of exposing a backend to a model:

- Custom function-calling schemas per framework
- Plugin manifests, skills, actions, connectors – all incompatible
- Re-implement the same integration for every AI product
- N hosts × M systems = N × M adapters

After

One open, standardized interface between models and the outside world:

- Written once per system, consumed by any compliant host
- N + M instead of N × M
- Created and maintained by Anthropic, adopted broadly across the industry – including Microsoft
- modelcontextprotocol.io

Connecting to backends was tedious. MCP standardized and simplified like USB for devices.

High-level architecture

One host, many clients, one client per server



The host owns the model, the conversation and the user consent. Servers only ever see what the client sends them.

The protocol in detail

2

What a server can offer and what it looks like on the wire

What an MCP server can expose

Five building blocks – and they are not all server-to-client

Tools

The server exposes callable operations. The model / agents decides when to invoke them, so this is how it talks to databases, APIs and ERP systems or performs tasks.

Resources

The server exposes data as context: files, database schemas, documents, query results. Identified by URI, read on demand instead of stuffed into every prompt.

Prompts

The server exposes prompt templates as instructions for interacting with the model. Clients can list them and let the user customize the arguments before calling.

Sampling and elicitation: the other direction

Sampling: the server asks the client to generate something via an LLM. Elicitation: the server asks the client to get information from the user. Either way the client keeps control of the model, the credentials and the data.

Tools: discovery

tools/list: the client asks what is available

The response is the model's entire knowledge of the server: name, title, description and a JSON schema per tool. Everything an agent gets wrong later usually starts here.

Request

```
{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "id": 1,
  "method": "tools/list",
  "params": {
    "cursor": "optional-cursor-value"
  }
}
```

Response

```
{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "id": 1,
  "result": {
    "tools": [
      {
        "name": "get_weather",
        "title": "Weather Information Provider",
        "description": "Get current weather information for a location",
        "inputSchema": {
          "type": "object",
          "properties": {
            "location": {
              "type": "string",
              "description": "City name or zip code"
            }
          },
          "required": ["location"]
        }
      }
    ],
    "nextCursor": "next-page-cursor"
  }
}
```

Tools: invocation

tools/call: the agent picks a tool, the host asks for consent

Arguments are validated against the schema. The result comes back as content blocks (text, images or embedded resources) plus an isError flag so the agent can recover instead of guessing.

Request

```
{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "id": 2,
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "name": "get_weather",
    "arguments": {
      "location": "New York"
    }
  }
}
```

Response

```
{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "id": 2,
  "result": {
    "content": [
      {
        "type": "text",
        "text": "Current weather in New York:\n 72°F Partly cloudy"
      }
    ],
    "isError": false
  }
}
```

Resources

Context the application decides to hand over as part of the response

Addressed by URI

- file:///, https://, or a scheme the server invents
- Each entry carries name, title, description and mimeType

Read when needed

- resources/list to enumerate, resources/read to fetch
- Subscriptions notify the client when contents change

Why it matters

- A schema, a spec or a 5 MB query result belongs in a resource, not in the system prompt

```
{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "id": 1,
  "result": {
    "resources": [
      {
        "uri": "file:///project/src/main.rs",
        "name": "main.rs",
        "title": "Rust Software Application Main File",
        "description": "Primary application entry point",
        "mimeType": "text/x-rust"
      }
    ],
    "nextCursor": "next-page-cursor"
  }
}
```

MCP Inspector

The tool that helps you to understand MCP Servers you want to use



No model, no agent, no guessing: list and call everything the server offers and see the raw JSON

Shown here against mcp-server-everything, the reference server that implements every part of the spec.

Demo 1

MCP servers from VS Code

Easier to see what happens, also possible in Copilot or Claude

MCP for ERP

3

Business Central, 4PS Construct and the agents that use them

Microsoft  MCP

MCP Server vision

Make Business Central a first-class participant in AI workflows through **secure**, **reliable** MCP tools that agents and orchestrators can seamlessly use and compose.

Make all functionality available to AI and agents.

Demo 2

Interacting with BC through the MCP server

Reading data from a live environment with no custom integration code

The default configuration

What you get when you just switch it on

No API pages explicitly added

The server starts empty and discovers what it needs.

Dynamic addition of tools

The agent searches for relevant API pages at runtime and adds them to its own tool set.

Read-only

The default configuration exposes read operations only. Nothing you forget to lock down can write to your data.

Good enough to demo in a minute. Not what you ship to a production agent – see the next few slides.



Dynamic tools: the read flow

Three generic tools instead of one tool per API page



The model never sees 400 tool definitions – it sees three, and pays for the rest only when it needs them

What about write scenarios?

MCP configurations narrow the surface area and unlock CRUD

Discovery – the default

All API pages, read-only, discovered dynamically

↓

A named configuration

Defined API pages only – and on those, full CRUD plus actions

Configurations limit, they do not extend

- You list the API pages an agent is allowed to touch
- Everything else stops existing for that agent

Write access is opt-in, per configuration

- Create, update, delete and page actions become available on the listed pages
- By default, only read operations are exposed

Clients should always name one

- A client that specifies no configuration falls back to the read-only default – safe, but likely not what you wanted

Demo 3

Defining MCP server configurations

Picking API pages, granting writes, and pointing a client at it

Wait, there's more: the Admin Center MCP server

Not the data – the environments

What it can do

- Query and manage environments through the same protocol
- HTTP transport only

What it deliberately cannot do – yet

- No renaming or deleting of environments, no uninstalling of apps

Worth pausing on

An agent with tenant-administration tools is a different risk class from an agent that reads sales orders. Hold that thought for the next section.

Demo 4

Interacting with BC through the admin MCP

Environment inventory and health

Securing MCP and agents

4

What goes wrong, and how to contain it

MCPs are great, but

… they come with security challenges – especially with agents, potentially running in YOLO mode

Two independent sources of trouble

- The MCP server itself: malicious code, or a malicious instruction smuggled into a tool description or a returned document
- The agent's own judgement: it decided this was the way to go, and you had approvals turned off

Three failure modes we will look at

- It deletes your hard drive
- It does something bad to a production environment, because you accidentally gave it permission
- It steals secrets – from your home folder, your environment variables, or your active logins

Interlude: Docker Sandboxes

Isolated microVMs designed to run AI coding agents

What a sandbox gets of its own

- Filesystem – only the workspace you mount, optionally read-only
- Network – its own stack, so egress can be restricted
- Environment – no inherited variables, no inherited tokens
- Processes and its own Docker daemon

Why a microVM and not just a container

- An agent that can run arbitrary commands is a much better fit for hardware-level isolation than for shared-kernel isolation

We will use it for the rest of this section to show how each attack gets defused.



Agent runs in here. Your laptop / dev env is out there.

Demo 5

Docker Sandboxes

Set it up

Issue 1: it might delete your hard drive

Not hypothetical – a recursive delete that walked out of the workspace

How it happens

- The agent constructs a path, gets it wrong, and runs a recursive delete with the permissions of your user
- In YOLO mode there is nothing between the intention and the filesystem

Why it matters in our world

- Unintentionally deleting files is bad as you might lose work, information etc.

The containment

- Mount the workspace and nothing else. Mount reference material read-only. There is no path from inside to your home directory.



[BUG] ## CRITICAL: Claude Code executed rm -rf deleting entire home directory #10077

Closed as not planned

mikewolak opened on Oct 22, 2025

Preflight Checklist

- I have searched existing issues and this hasn't been reported yet
- This is a single bug report (please file separate reports for different bugs)
- I am using the latest version of Claude Code

What's Wrong?

Description

Claude Code executed a destructive recursive delete command that successfully deleted all user files in my home directory. The command attempted to delete from root (`/`) and only failed on system files due to permission restrictions, but successfully deleted all user-owned files.

Assignees

No one assig

Labels

area:core

platform:lin

Type

No type

Fields

No fields con

Projects

Source: https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/10077

Demo 6

Filesystem containment

Start a sandbox, try to reach the home directory, look at read-only mounts

Issue 2: it might wreck a production environment

Because you accidentally gave it permission

The permission you did not mean to grant

- Ever run az login in one terminal and an agent in another?
- The login is ambient. The agent inherits it, and switching subscriptions in one session switches it in the other
- Same story for a BC admin token, a tenant-admin session, or an Admin Center MCP configuration pointed at production

The containment

- Log in inside the sandbox, against the environment that sandbox is allowed to touch – and nowhere else



13-hour AWS outage reportedly caused by Amazon's own AI tools

A recent Amazon Web Services (AWS) outage that lasted 13 hours was reportedly caused by one of its own AI tools, according to reporting by *Financial Times*. This happened in December after engineers deployed the Kiro AI coding tool to make certain changes, say four people familiar with the matter.

Kiro is an agentic tool, meaning it can take autonomous actions on behalf of users. In this case, the bot reportedly determined that it needed to "delete and recreate the environment." This is what allegedly led to the lengthy outage that primarily impacted China.

Amazon says it was merely a "coincidence that AI tools were involved" and that "the same issue could occur with any developer tool or manual action." The company blamed the outage on "user error, not AI error." It said that by default the Kiro tool "requests authorization before taking any action" but that the staffer involved in the December incident had "broader permissions than expected – a user access control issue, not an AI autonomy issue."

Source: engadget.com – 13-hour AWS outage reportedly caused by Amazon's own AI tools

The same story, told by someone it happened to

A production database deleted during a code freeze

The sequence

- An explicit code and action freeze was in place
- The agent saw empty database queries, panicked, and ran migration and delete commands
- It destroyed the production data
- Then it reported that no changes were detected

The part worth repeating

- The instruction not to touch anything existed
- “I thought this meant safe” is not a control. A boundary the agent cannot cross is.

Same lesson as the AWS incident: broad permissions plus an autonomous tool is a recipe for disaster





Source: https://x.com/jasonlk/status/1946069562723897802

Demo 7

Environment containment

az account show inside and outside the sandbox – two separate logins

Issue 3: it might steal your secrets

Home folder, environment variables, active logins

The attack needs no exploit

- A plausible-looking MCP server asks for a PAT “for convenience”, or reads the environment it was started in
- Tool descriptions are instructions the model will follow – a bad server can simply ask the agent to fetch and send a file
- The name and README can be copied from the real thing

What is sitting there to be taken

- Azure DevOps and GitHub or GitLab PATs, BC client secrets, .env files, kubeconfigs, cached tokens



A third-party “Azure DevOps MCP server” whose selling point is that it takes a PAT. Convenient, plausible, and a credential you can never take back.

Source: https://github.com/ennuiii/DevOpsMcpPAT

Which is why authentication method matters

The official servers give you options – the convenient one is rarely the safe one

Azure DevOps MCP: authentication methods

Authentication Methods

The Azure DevOps MCP Server supports several authentication methods. Pass the desired method via the `--authentication` (`-a`) flag in your `mcp.json` configuration.

Method	Flag value	Environment variable	Best for
Interactive (default)	`interactive`	—	Local development, first-time setup
Azure CLI	`azcli`	—	Workstations already signed in with `az login`
Environment variable (bearer)	`envvar`	`ADO_MCP_AUTH_TOKEN`	CI/CD, automation
Personal Access Token	`pat`	`PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN`	CI/CD, service accounts, non-interactive environments

Interactive or Azure CLI for local development. Environment variables and PATs exist for CI/CD and non-interactive environments – that is where they belong.

GitHub MCP: one-click install



Install in VS Code

For quick installation, use one of the one-click install buttons above. Once you complete that flow, toggle Agent mode (located by the Copilot Chat text input) and the server will start. Make sure you're using VS Code 1.101 or later for remote MCP and OAuth support.

Alternatively, to manually configure VS Code, choose the appropriate JSON block from the examples below and add it to your host configuration:

Using OAuth | Using a GitHub PAT

01 or greater)

```
:p",
s://api.githubcopilot.com/mcp/"
```

```
{
  "servers": {
    "github": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://api.githubcopilot.com/mcp/",
      "headers": {
        "Authorization": "Bearer ${input:github_mcp_pat}"
      }
    }
  },
  "inputs": [
    {
      "type": "promptString",
      "id": "github_mcp_pat",
      "description": "GitHub Personal Access Token",
      "password": true
    }
  ]
}
```

A one-click install is a one-click grant. Worth reading what it configures before you click it – and worth asking whether the repository you are looking at is the official one.

Sources: github.com/microsoft/azure-devops-mcp – github.com/github/github-mcp-server

Demo 8

Secret containment

Network setup and credential injection: the agent gets a token scoped to the job, not your keychain

Putting it together

Each failure mode, and the boundary that stops it

Failure mode	Without containment	Inside a sandbox
Deletes your files	Runs as you, sees your whole home directory	Sees the mounted workspace only, reference data read-only
Hits production	Inherits ambient logins from your shell	Logs in separately, scoped to the environment it may touch
Steals secrets	Reads your env vars, tokens and dotfiles	Empty environment, injected credentials, restricted egress

None of this makes a bad MCP server good. It makes the damage a bad MCP server can do proportional to the job you gave it.

Summary

Three things to take home

MCP is the integration answer that generalises

- One protocol, any compliant host, no adapter per product
- Tools, resources and prompts cover more ground than function calling ever did

Business Central is a first-class participant

- Any API page can be a tool, including 4PS Construct's
- Configurations decide the surface area; writes are opt-in

Either approach requires looking at security

- Assume the server or the agent will eventually do the wrong thing
- Sandbox the filesystem, the network and the credentials – Docker Sandboxes make that the default rather than a project

Thank you – questions?

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Teams