This OSCAL version of the CIA2 - AI Infrastructure Plan of Actions and Milestones was importing an nonexisting SSP.
Examine Django Framework for least privilege design and implementation.
The assessor attempted to access the admin panel while logged into the CIA2 application as a PAO staff user. They were able to see the admin panel and directly edit database records for the application using the Django Framework's admin panel.
Test IAM Roles for least privilege design and implementation.
The assessor's security automation platform analyzed all roles specific to the
CIA2 Product Team, not those managed by the Office of Information Technology.
The CIA2-SystemEngineer role in their respective CIA2Cloud
account permitted use of the following high-risk actions.
Both of these actions are overly permissive and not appropriate for the business function of the staff member assigned this role.
A user with the privileges of a PAO staff user can exceed the intended privileges for their related business function and directly edit the database for the CIA2 application.
An account without proper least privilege design and implementation can be used to significantly damage links created by the tool for use by public citizens, potentially causing a national outage. If an outage were to occur, CIA2 and Government policy will require the CIO of the agency to notify the Department of Homeland Security and the public.
Such an event will cause significant financial and reputational risk to CIA2's Administrator, executive staff, and the agency overall.
The CIA2 application is designed and implemented to only allow access to the administrative functions for those with PAO staff role via the VPN via network configuration between the CIA2 Enterprise Support Systems and the CIA2 CIA2Cloud account. Additionally, the load balancer configuration only allows access to view short links from the public internet.
The CIA2 Product Team does not have sufficient personnel and budget to implement the required changes in their use of the Django Framework and its configuration in this quarter. With the consultation of the ISSO and the assessor, the owner of the CIA2 system has decided to accept this risk until the end of December 2026. From September to December, budget will be available for the CIA2 Team's developer and system engineer to completely disable the functionality that is the source of the risk and its originating finding.
The owner, ISSO, and product team of the CIA2 Project intend to complete the necessary development between September 2026 and December 2026. Whether or not the necessary development for remediation is complete, the product team's project manager will submit the final annual report. They will identify this work item and whether it has been completed.
A user in the CIA2 cloud environment with the privileges of a system engineer can exceed the intended privileges for their related business function. They can delete all historical audit records and remove important security monitoring functions for the CIA2 Security Operations Center staff.
An account without proper least privilege design and implementation can be used to surreptitiously add, change, or delete cloud infrastructure to the too managing all links to CIA2's communication to public citizens, potentially causing significant harm with no forensic evidence to recover the system. Regardless of the extent and duration of a potential incident, such a configuration greatly increases the risk of an insider threat if there were likely to a potential insider threat in the CIA2 Product Team.
If such an insider threat existed and acted with this n, the resulting event could cause significant financial and reputational risk to CIA2's Administrator, executive staff, and the agency overall.
The CIA2 Product Team does not have significant mitigations or compensating controls to counter this risk, even if likelihood is low. The CIA2 CISO has cited ongoing guidance that potential insider threat risks be prioritized above alternative categories of risk for this quarter. Additionally, there is sufficient budget and unallocated time for the CIA2 and Office of Information Technology system engineers to modify CIA2Cloud IAM roles on or before the next continuous monitoring cycle beginning in July 2026. The planned completion data is June 23, 2026.
The owner, ISSO, and product team of the CIA2 Project intend to complete the necessary development by June 23. 2026, the last day of the coinciding sprint. Whether or not the necessary development for mitigation is complete, the product team's project manager will write a brief at the end of the sprint to thw owner and ISSO of this system with the final status and determination of this work item in this sprint.
Budget and technical staff are needed to re-design and re-implement a part of the CIA2 application's use of a web application programming framework to mitigate the risk of low privilege users directly modifying the database of this application. This application is a high-visibility service and integral to future operations of the CIA2 Office of Public Affairs and its staff.
Budget and technical staff allocation are available and designated to fix a misconfiguration of the IAM roles for members of the CIA2 Product Team in their AwesomeCloud account to implement least privilege as designed.