This OSCAL version of the CIA2 Assessment Results was importing an nonexisting Assessment Plan.
In this version of the artifact, the content was updated to OSCAL v1.1.3 and the system name was changed. Imported Assessment Plan was corrected. Other enhancements were implemented.
The activity and it steps will be performed by the assessor via their security automation platform to test least privilege design and implementation of the system's elements, specifically the cloud account infrastructure, as part of continuous monitoring.
The CIA2 system engineer will coordinate with the assessor's engineering support staff to configure an IAM role trust. A service account for automation with its own role with the assessor's CIA2Cloud account can assume the role for read-only assessor operations within the CIA2 Product Team's CIA2Cloud account for continuous monitoring of least privilege.
This step is complete.
CIA2 Product Team and SCA Engineering Support configured the latter's cross-account role trust and authentication and authorization in to the former's account on January 29, 2026.
The assessor's security automation platform will create a session from their dedicated will obtain access to the CIA2 Product Team's CIA2Cloud account with their single sign-on credentials to a read-only assessor role.
This step is complete.
CIA2 Product Team and SCA Engineering Support tested scripts from the security automation platform interactively on January 30, 2026, to confirm they work ahead of Feb 2026 continuous monitoring cycle.
Once authenticated and authorized with a cross-account session, the security automation pipeline will execute scripts developed and maintained by the assessor's engineering support staff. It will analyze the permitted actions for the developer and system engineer roles in the CIA2 Product Team's CIA2Cloud account to confirm they are designed and implement to facilitate only least privilege operation. Examples are included below.
Automated monthly continuous monitoring of the CIA2 information system's cloud infrastructure recorded observations below. Additionally, contingent upon the confidence level of the observations and possible risks, confirmed findings may be opened.
The activity and it steps will be performed by the assessor via their security automation platform to test least privilege design and implementation of the system's elements, specifically the cloud account infrastructure, as part of continuous monitoring.
Test CIA2Cloud IAM Roles for least privilege design and implementation.
The assessor's security automation platform analyzed all roles specific to the
CIA2 Product Team, not those managed by the Office of Information
Technology. The CIA2-SystemEngineer role in their respective
CIA2Cloud account permitted use of the following high-risk actions.
Both of these actions are overly permissive and not appropriate for the business function of the staff member assigned this role.
Test CIA2Cloud IAM Roles for least privilege design and implementation.
The assessor's security automation platform detected that the developer's role is permitted to perform only permissible actions in the CIA2 CIA2Cloud account in accordance with the agency's least privilege policy and procedures.
A user in the CIA2 cloud environment with the privileges of a system engineer can exceed the intended privileges for their related business function. They can delete all historical audit records and remove important security monitoring functions for the CIA2 Security Operations Center staff.
An account without proper least privilege design and implementation can be used to surreptitiously add, change, or delete cloud infrastructure to the too managing all links to CIA2's communication to public citizens, potentially causing significant harm with no forensic evidence to recover the system. Regardless of the extent and duration of a potential incident, such a configuration greatly increases the risk of an insider threat if there were likely to a potential insider threat in the CIA2 Product Team.
If such an insider threat existed and acted with this misconfiguration, the resulting event could cause significant financial and reputational risk to CIA2's Administrator, executive staff, and the agency overall.
The assessor's security automation platform detected that the system engineer's role is permitted to perform the following actions in the CIA2 CIA2Cloud account.
The system engineer is not permitted to modify these services and their role was incorrectly configured.
This is a finding.