--- name: threat-model description: Structured threat modeling producing threat catalog with STRIDE categorization, DREAD risk scores, and prioritized mitigation roadmap license: MIT metadata: category: compliance locale: en phase: v1 --- ## What this skill does Guides a structured threat modeling exercise for a target system using industry-standard frameworks: STRIDE (threat categorization), DREAD (risk scoring), PASTA (process-driven methodology), and Attack Trees (attack decomposition). Produces a threat catalog with MITRE ATT&CK mappings, a risk matrix, and a prioritized mitigation roadmap. ## When to use - During system design or architecture review to identify security risks before implementation - When preparing for a security audit or compliance assessment that requires documented threat analysis - When onboarding a new system into a security program and baseline threat coverage is needed - When a significant feature or infrastructure change warrants re-evaluation of the attack surface ## Prerequisites - No external tools required (methodology/checklist-based) - Access to system architecture diagrams, data flow diagrams (DFDs), or equivalent documentation - Knowledge of the system's technology stack, trust boundaries, and data sensitivity levels - (Optional) MITRE ATT&CK reference: https://attack.mitre.org ## Inputs | Item | Description | Example | |------|-------------|---------| | `SYSTEM_NAME` | Name of the system under review | `Payment API v3` | | `SYSTEM_TYPE` | Type of system | `web-app` / `api` / `microservice` / `infrastructure` | | `TECH_STACK` | Technology stack | `Node.js, PostgreSQL, Redis, AWS ECS` | | `DATA_SENSITIVITY` | Highest data classification in scope | `PII` / `PCI` / `internal` / `public` | | `REVIEW_SCOPE` | Boundaries of the review | `All external-facing endpoints and auth flows` | ## Workflow ### Step 1: System Decomposition Identify what needs protecting before identifying threats. Collect the following information about the target system. > **Reference**: See [REFERENCE.md](REFERENCE.md) for asset inventory, trust boundaries, and entry points markdown templates. **Data Flow Diagram (DFD) Summary** Describe the primary data flows as a numbered list if a visual DFD is unavailable: ```markdown ## Key Data Flows 1. User submits credentials → Web tier → Auth service → Credentials DB → JWT issued 2. Authenticated user submits payment → Web tier → Payment service → Payment processor (external) → Transaction DB 3. Admin queries reports → Admin UI → Reporting service → Read replica DB ``` ### Step 2: Threat Identification (STRIDE) Apply the STRIDE model to each DFD element (processes, data stores, data flows, external entities) and each trust boundary crossing. For each threat identified, create a catalog entry using the T-NNN format. > **Reference**: See [REFERENCE.md](REFERENCE.md) for the STRIDE categories reference table and threat catalog entry template. Repeat the threat catalog template for every threat identified across all STRIDE categories and DFD elements. ### Step 3: Threat Prioritization (DREAD Scoring) Score each threat in the catalog using the DREAD model. Each dimension is scored 1–10; the total DREAD score is the average, rounded to one decimal place. > **Reference**: See [REFERENCE.md](REFERENCE.md) for DREAD dimensions, scoring table template, and risk level thresholds. **CVSS Mapping (optional)** For threats that require formal CVE-style scoring, calculate a CVSS v3.1 Base Score alongside DREAD using the NVD calculator: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss/v3-calculator ### Step 4: Mitigation Design For each HIGH and CRITICAL threat, design concrete mitigations applying defense-in-depth principles. > **Reference**: See [REFERENCE.md](REFERENCE.md) for the mitigation roadmap template and 5x5 risk matrix template. ## Done when - System decomposition is complete: assets, trust boundaries, entry points, and data flows documented - STRIDE analysis has been applied to every DFD element and trust boundary - Every identified threat has a T-NNN catalog entry with STRIDE category, attack vector, impact, MITRE ATT&CK mapping, and existing/recommended controls - Every threat has a DREAD score and risk level assignment - A mitigation roadmap exists for all HIGH and CRITICAL threats - A risk matrix summarizes the full threat portfolio - Residual risks are explicitly acknowledged ## Failure modes | Issue | Cause | Solution | |-------|-------|----------| | Incomplete asset inventory | System documentation missing or outdated | Interview system owner; reverse-engineer from network diagrams or source code | | STRIDE produces no threats | Analysis too surface-level | Apply STRIDE to each individual data flow, not just the system as a whole | | DREAD scores inconsistent across reviewers | Subjective scoring | Calibrate with a reference threat (e.g., score a known CVE before scoring new threats) | | Mitigation roadmap not actionable | Controls described too abstractly | Each control should name a specific technology, configuration, or code change | | MITRE ATT&CK mapping unclear | Unfamiliarity with the framework | Use the ATT&CK Navigator at https://mitre-attack.github.io/attack-navigator/ to search by technique | ## Notes - This skill covers the four most common threat modeling frameworks. For new systems, start with STRIDE + DREAD. Add PASTA for regulatory-sensitive contexts (PCI DSS, HIPAA) where a full process trace is required. - Threat models are living documents. Re-run this skill after major architecture changes, new external integrations, or changes to data classification. - Attack Trees are best suited for high-value specific threats (e.g., "attacker gains admin access"). Construct a tree by placing the attacker's goal at the root and decomposing it into AND/OR sub-goals until leaf nodes are concrete, testable attack steps. - Pair this skill with `owasp-check` for web applications and `dependency-audit` for supply chain threats to achieve broader coverage. - MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise matrix reference: https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/