Friday, 20 March 1987 The PRESIDENT (Senator the Hon. Kerry Sibraa) took the chair at 9 a.m., and read prayers. The Clerk —Petitions have been lodged for presentation as follows: To the Honourable the President and members of the Senate in Parliament assembled. The Petition of the undersigned shows: That we urge you to oppose the Australian Bill of Rights Bill because: We get no legally enforceable rights under the Bill. The Bill does not guarantee vital rights such as the right not to belong to a trade union, the right to own private property and not be deprived of it without just compensation and the right of choice between Government and non-Government schools. The Bill gives Canberra extra powers to change our Federal System by the back door without a constitutional referendum. The Bill gives dangerous new powers to a Federal Government Commission. Your petitioners ask that the Senate, in Parliament assembled, should vote against the Bill of Rights, support Opposition amendments and seek a genuine public debate and a referendum on the Bill. And your petitioners as in duty bound will ever pray. by Senator Lewis (from 15 citizens). To the Honourable the President and members of the Senate in Parliament assembled. The Petition of the undersigned citizens of Australia respectfully showeth: (1) That we are totally opposed to the introduction of the Labor Government's Australia Card. (2) That this form of national and compulsory identification will be intrusive, costly for taxpayers and businesses and will not be effective in combating the growing problems of tax evasion, illegal immigrants or social security. (3) That we are deeply concerned at the Labor Government's inability to provide effective and efficient methods to combat tax and social security fraud without resorting to expensive, ineffective and authoritarian measures which are alien to the Australian way of life. (4) That we call upon the Labor Government to improve management systems within the Australian Taxation Office and other departments to crack down on tax evasion and fraudulent practices. And your petitioners as in duty bound will ever pray. by Senator Reid (from 39 citizens). To the Honourable the President and the honourable members of the Senate in the Parliament assembled. The humble petition of the undersigned electors of the Commonwealth of Australia respectfully showeth that: 1. Australians are offended by taxation evasion and welfare fraud which has the effect of increasing the taxation burden of honest Australians. 2. The community has shown its overwhelming support for the Government's decision to proceed with a national identification system known as the Australia Card. Your petitioners therefore pray that your honourable Senate will: continue the fight against taxation evasion and welfare fraud and restore fairness and equity to the tax and welfare systems by supporting the Australia Card Bill. by Senator West (from 70 citizens). To the Honourable the President and the members of the Senate in Parliament assembled. The petition of the undersigned respectfully showeth: That we consider the decision to curtail the landsca-ping at the New Parliament House is a false economy. The landscaping is an integral part of the building and environs which together will be one of the world's most exciting examples of architectural design this century. Incomplete it will be a monument to our lack of resolve as a nation. Your petitioners most humbly pray that the Senate in Parliament assembled, should urge the Government to: a. Reconsider the reinstatement of the landscaping according to the present plans. b. Consider savings which may be made in other areas to ensure this may be achieved. And your petitioners as in duty bound will ever pray. by Senators Robertson (from 15 citizens) and Ryan (from 172 citizens). To the Honourable the President and the members of the Senate in Parliament assembled. The humble petition of the undersigned citizens of Australia showeth: 1. That over 67,000 men, women and students enjoy the pursuit of their sport and recreation every year at the Anzac Rifle Range at Malabar and have done so since 1967. 2. The people of Sydney through their membership of 41 clubs headquartered at the Anzac Rifle Range together with a number of other community, school and commercial groups, the police and armed forces will lose this community facility if the Federal Government proceeds to sell the Range to private developers. 3. The Australian Bicentenary Fullbore Rifle Championships are to be conducted at the Anzac Rifle Range in April 1988 as part of the celebration of Australia's Bicentenary. Your petitioners most humbly pray that the Senate in Parliament assembled, should ask the Federal Government to retain the Anzac Rifle Range for the continued use and enjoyment of the people of Australia. And your petitioners as in duty bound will ever pray. by Senator Morris (from 221 citizens). To the honourable the President and members of the Senate in Parliament assembled. The humble petition of the undersigned citizens of Australia respectfully showeth: 1. That the University of Western Australia has had its Student Loans Fund from the Commonwealth Special Assistance for Students Programme cut by 40 per cent for the 1987 Academic Year. Your petitioners therefore pray that: The 40 per cent cut to our Student Loans Fund be restored. And your petitioners as in duty bound will ever pray. by Senator Giles (from 18 citizens). Petitions received. Senator KILGARIFF(Northern Territory) —I give notice that, on the next day of sitting, I shall move: That the Senate calls upon the Federal Government to reject the recommendations of the Cameron Committee of Inquiry into the Distribution of Federal Road Grants, given that, if implemented, they would favour urban areas at the expense of rural areas, where roads have already suffered as a result of this Government's reductions in overall road funding. Senator KILGARIFF(Northern Territory) —I give notice that, on the next day of sitting, I shall move: That the Senate- (a) notes with concern the refusal of the Federal Minister for Education (Senator Ryan) to recognise the University College of the Northern Territory; (b) condemns this blatantly discriminatory action which has resulted in University College students being ineligible to apply for Austudy and Abstudy; (c) rejects as totally inadequate the Minister's offer to the Northern Territory Government of 20 University College places at the Darwin Institute of Technology, given that the University College's enrolment has already exceeded 200; (d) commends the Northern Territory Government for its commitment to providing tertiary education opportunities for Northern Territory students, and South East Asian students, some 30 of whom are enrolled at the new College; (e) congratulates the Northern Territory Government for providing these facilities at a bargain basement price, by converting the old Darwin hospital into a University College Campus at the cost of just $6m, as opposed to the estimated $30m it would have cost to build the facilities from scratch; and (f) calls upon the Federal Minister for Education to immediately reverse her decision to refuse recognition to the University College of the Northern Territory. Bill received from the House of Representatives. Ordered that the Bill may be taken through all its stages without delay. Bill (on motion by Senator Gareth Evans) read a first time. Senator GARETH EVANS(Victoria-Minister for Resources and Energy)(9.04) —I move: That the Bill be now read a second time. I seek leave to have the second reading speech incorporated in Hansard. Leave granted. The speech read as follows- Mr President, the need for an independent body to collect information and evaluate programs in the health and welfare area has been voiced by a number of groups and parliamentary committees over recent years. In 1979, the Senate Standing Committee on Social Welfare reported on the need for evaluation in Australian health and welfare services. The Committee reported that: The essential prerequisites for evaluation-that is, the determination of needs, the setting of goals and objectives, the establishment of standards and the collection of appropriate data-are at present given a low priority . . . It is imperative that proper evaluation occurs in order to provide information essential to the proper planning of the health and welfare system and to the efficient and effective operation of agencies! In the following year, 1980, a Joint Committee of Public Accounts reported on substantial overpayments to chemists under the pharmaceutical benefits scheme, and recommended the establishment of a Bureau of Health Economics to provide independent, objective and publicly available analysis of economic facts and issues relating to the Australian health industry. The Committee identified two major functions for such an organisation; the first being to monitor and analyse the Government's expenditure on health to ensure that moneys are being spent according to priorities. The second function was to examine issues relating not only to central aspects of health care but also those aspects that cross the boundaries between various areas of health operations. In the same year the Commission of Inquiry into the Efficiency and Administration of Hospitals chaired by Mr James Jamison gave support to the recommendation of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Joint Committee of Public Accounts that a Bureau of Health Economics to be established. This Committee envisaged that the Bureau would undertake identification of internal and external factors influencing efficiency in hospitals and other health institutions. It also recommended that the Bureau would collate comparative statistics and financial data on a national basis. The coalition Government, Mr President, failed to respond to any of these recommendations. Unlike our predecessors we acted. The establishment of the Australian Institute of Health within the Commonwealth Department of Health in August 1984, was a first step in response to the recommendations made by those committees. At that time the functions of the Institute were to research a wide range of health issues with a special focus on public health, social medicine, health statistics, and health economics. With the creation of the Institute it became clear that there was a need for additional broad public health expertise in Australia. So just one year after the establishment of the Institute, the Minister for Health, Dr Neal Blewett, supported the establishment of an independent inquiry into research and teaching of public health and tropical medicine to be conducted by an American expert, Dr Kerr White. The report, which was tabled in February 1986, recommended the establishment of two national independent statutory authorities, one for health statistics, and the other for technology and health services assessment. The need for these two centres was based upon the lack of comprehensive Australia-wide information and effective assessment processes in the $16 billion per annum health industry, financed by the Commonwealth and managed by the States. The administrative complexities and high costs which would be incurred to establish two new authorities were considered by the Government to be unnecessary in view of the overlap with the then existing functions of the Australian Institute of Health. After detailed consideration of these issues the Government decided that the Institute of Health could effectively encompass both of these functions. The Better Health Commission in its report last year, `Looking Forward to Better Health' stated that a national health data base was widely recognised as essential for health advancement in countries around the world. It was heavily critical of the collection of health statistics in Australia and used as support for its assertions a comparison by the World Health Organisation of the major health statistical collections of sixteen developed countries. Australia was ranked very low, being last in the collection of hospital statistics. Responsibility for this abysmal state of affairs must rest above all with the Conservative coalition which has governed this country for 31 of the last 40 years. It is simply not possible to remedy such a situation in less than a decade. The Better Health Commission gave support to the recommendation of the Kerr White Report for the establishment by legislation of a National Centre for Health Statistics. The Bill before the Senate will establish the Australian Institute of Health, which will: collect and provide assistance in the production of health related statistics; conduct and promote research into the health of the people of Australia; and undertake studies into the provision and effectiveness of health services and health technology. These functions are fully defined in the Bill and are intended to establish the Australian Institute of Health as an effective independent statistical and research organisation to provide both Commonwealth and State governments with a reliable base for policy formulation. This Bill will allow the Institute to obtain wide support in achieving its objectives through: actual and perceived independence and long-term viability; the co-operation of the States on data provision; legislative guarantees to the States of the confidentiality of statistics; the support of professional bodies; enlisting respected researchers from outside the public service; and the clear definition and maintenance of the role of the Institute. The Government has acted to ensure that the independence of the Institute is recognised by the introduction of this Bill which establishes it as a statutory authority. The Institute will be dealing with highly sensitive information relating to private health related organisations, the health of individuals and the financial position of States and Territories. It is therefore vital that the Institute be independent and be seen to be independent. The composition of the Institute includes three State and Territory representatives and reflects the importance of the State and Territory authorities in collecting and supplying health statistics. In drafting the Bill the proposed policy guidelines for statutory authorities and government business enterprises have been followed closely. The Institute will be subject to the written directions of the Minister, the functions and constitution of the Institute are clearly established, and the reporting requirements of the Institute are defined in the legislation. The financial arrangements are set out including those necessary for trust money and property. The Government believes that to ensure the effective operation of the Institute, it is important that the functions of the Institute do not compete with those of the Australian Bureau of Statistics and that the two bodies are mutually supportive. To ensure close co-operation, the Commonwealth Statistician or his nominee is to be appointed as a member of the Institute. Secondly, the Australian Institute of Health will have an ethics committee. The functions and composition of the ethics committee are to be determined by regulation based upon recommendations from the National Health and Medical Research Council, and it will be responsible for approving persons to whom data may be released. Third, the Director of the Institute is empowered to employ staff other than under the Public Service Act in order to attract pre-eminent researchers to work for the Institute. These measures and the others I have outlined will ensure that the Institute will be grounded on high ethical principles and will attract quality researchers. There will be no financial impact from this Bill. To date the Institute has received administrative support, such as the payment of salaries, from the Department of Health and accounts have been processed through the Department of Finance. There is an administrative infrastructure operating within the Institute responsible for its day to day operations and sufficient expertise exists within this infra-structure to satisfy the additional requirements of a statutory authority given that the Department of Health will continue to provide some services. Mr President, I am confident that the Australian Institute of Health as a statutory authority will be in a strong position to develop a far greater knowledge and understanding of the health of the Australian people, and will contribute significantly to the needs for assessment and evaluation identified by the many inquiries into Federal health. With the public health challenges now faced by this country this Bill is both appropriate and timely. I commend this Bill to the Senate. Debate (on motion by Senator Reid) adjourned. Bill received from the House of Representatives. Ordered that the Bill may be taken through all its stages without delay. Bill (on motion by Senator Gareth Evans) read a first time. Senator GARETH EVANS(Victoria-Minister for Resources and Energy)(9.05) —I move: That the Bill be now read a second time. I seek leave to have the second reading speech incorporated in Hansard. Leave granted. The speech read as follows- The Bill before the Senate contains a number of amendments to the National Health Act which affect the pharmaceutical benefits scheme's net and special patient contribution arrangements. In addition, the Bill includes a provision which will give the Secretary of the Department of Health the authority to make arrangements for advance payments to pharmacists if for any reason it it not possible to meet the accepted period of thirty days for the payment of pharmacists' claims. Honourable senators will recall the significant changes which were made to the pharmaceutical benefits scheme on 1 November 1986. The most important aspect of these changes was the introduction of the safety net for those most in need who have to purchase large numbers of prescription drugs. These changes ensured that no individual or family would have to pay for more than 25 PBS prescription items in any one year. Already 10,500 entitlement cards have been issued which provide free pharmaceutical benefits for more than 25,000 Australians. The introduction of the new PBS arrangements have been widely accepted by the public and pharmacists alike and with the exception of criticisms from a few opposition members, are widely recognised as both cost-efficient and directing resources to those most in need. During the introduction of the new scheme, one or two minor problems have been identified and the Bill now before the Senate proposes a number of amendments, mainly of a machinery nature, to address these issues. The current arrangements only allow a prescription to be counted towards the safety net if the maximum quantity of the drug is prescribed by the doctor and dispensed by the pharmacist. In two cases these arrangements have been found to be unsatisfactory. Both of these are dealt with in clause 4 of the Bill. In the first case, the amendment enables a prescription to be counted towards the safety net threshold when the maximum quantity of the drug changes between the time the prescription is written and when the drug is dispensed. Honourable senators will appreciate that this will occur relatively infrequently but it is a necessary provision to protect those people who, for example, have a number of repeat prescriptions for a particular drug which has its maximum quantity increased on recommendation of the pharmaceutical benefits advisory committee before all those repeats are filled. The second case is to allow prescriptions for less than the maximum quantities of dangerous or addictive drugs to also be counted towards the safety net threshold. I am sure all senators will agree that this is a sensible amendment which is in keeping with the spirit of the government's present drug initiatives. As a result of this amendment patients will not be disadvantaged where, in particular cases, doctors feel it necessary or appropriate to prescribe a smaller quantity of a dangerous or addictive drug. The minister will be empowered to determine the items to which this provision applies and the minister for health will be seeking advice from the appropriate professional bodies as to which drugs should be included on the list. Clause 5 of the Bill removes the requirement for pharmacists and others who issue entitlement cards, to retain the supporting documentation for 12 months. In its place is a requirement that the documentation be sent to the secretary of the Department of Health within one month of issuing the card. This provision will clearly benefit pharmacists as they will no longer have to retain supporting documentation for extended periods and it will of course substantially improve the capacity of the department to audit the issue of entitlement cards in a more timely fashion. At the present time the payment of $3.75 to pharmacists and others who issue entitlement cards on behalf of the Commonwealth is a charge against the administrative vote of the Department of Health. As this is a cost directly attributable to the pharmaceutical benefits scheme it is considered more appropriate that this cost is allocated under Part VII of the National Health Act. Clause 6 affects this change and also includes the requirement for the Minister to seek agreement with the Pharmacy Guild of Australia in the determination of the level of the fee. Clause 8 of the Bill is a technical amendment relating to the special patient contributions arrangements under the pharmaceutical benefits scheme. There are at present three drugs subject to the special patient contribution provisions which allow for the payment of an additional charge by the patient when the drug's manufacturer disputes the price determined by the Pharmaceutical Pricing Bureau. Under the present arrangements, if prescriptions for any quantity in excess of a maximum were authorised, either the Commonwealth would be required to reimburse the pharmacist at the manufacturer's selling price for all quantities in excess of a maximum or the pharmacist would have to absorb the additional special patient contributions. This clause provides a formula for the calculation of a pro-rata special patient contribution to overcome these problems. Clause 11 provides for the insertion of a new section 99AB into the National Health Act to provide the secretary of the Department of Health with the authority to make advance payments to approved pharmacists, approved medical practitioners and approved hospital authorities. In reimbursing pharmacists for claims lodged under the National Health Scheme, payment can only be made in accordance with section 99 of the Act which requires payments to be calculated on the price of drugs in force at the date that they were dispensed. The only way of correctly determining the relevant drug price is to process all prescriptions fully. During the past two years a number of factors, including repetition strain injury, has resulted in some difficulties processing pharmaceutical claims within the period of thirty days. To minimise the financial impact of these delays in processing claims the department made advance payments based on statistical calculation of the value of a pharmacist's claim. Claims paid in this manner were to be subject to full processing when resources became available in order to determine the correct entitlement due. In examining the methods the department had available to it to reprocess claims paid by the advance payment method, legal advice was sought from the Attorney-General's department. That advice indicated that the department had no power under section 99 of the National Health Act to make such payments and accordingly the system of advance payments ceased immediately. The Auditor-General was immediately advised and he will comment on this aspect of the department's administration in his March report to the Parliament. In addition to the changes to the pharmaceutical benefits scheme, the Bill contains a minor amendment to alter the definition of `basic private table'. Under the current definition, gap benefits are only payable in respect of services which are performed while a person is an in-patient of a hospital. This clearly disadvantages those people who have pathology specimens taken while they are in-patients but not analysed until after they are discharged. Clause 4 of the Bill overcomes this anomaly by making these pathology tests eligible for inclusion in the calculation of gap benefits. I commend the Bill to the Senate. Debate (on motion by Senator Reid) adjourned. Bill received from the House of Representatives. Ordered that the Bill may be taken through all its stages without delay. Bill (on motion by Senator Gareth Evans) read a first time. Senator GARETH EVANS(Victoria-Minister for Resources and Energy)(9.06) —I move: That the Bill be now read a second time. I seek leave to have the second reading speech incorporated in Hansard. Leave granted. The speech read as follows- Section 66 of the Constitution prescribes, subject to the Parliament otherwise providing, a maximum annual sum for the payment of salaries of Ministers. Amendments to the Ministers of State Act which sets this sum are from time to time thus required to cover changes to ministerial salaries. In its 1986 review, the Remuneration Tribunal recommended that ministerial salaries be increased by 11.7% in order to redress the anomaly which has existed since 1984. The anomaly arose as a result of the government's consistent demonstration of wage restraint in rejecting Remuneration Tribunal recommendations. While the government declined to accept the increase recommended by the tribunal, it agreed that national wage case rises apply to ministerial salaries. It is therefore necessary to raise the upper limit on the amount appropriated for ministerial salaries to accommodate the 2.3% national wage case of 1 July 1986. The purpose of this Bill is to amend the Minister of State Act to increase the maximum annual sum from $660,000 to $680,000. I commend the Bill to the Senate. Debate (on motion by Senator Reid) adjourned. Motion (by Senator Gareth Evans)-by leave-agreed to: That, unless otherwise ordered, the Estimates committees consider the proposed expenditure in relation to Departments, as follows: Estimates Committee A Parliament Industry, Technology and Commerce Prime Minister and Cabinet Trade Science Estimates Committee B Resources and Energy Attorney-General Immigration and Ethnic Affairs Foreign Affairs Defence Estimates Committee C Finance Employment and Industrial Relations Treasury Primary Industry Communications Estimates Committee D Education Housing and Construction Sport, Recreation and Tourism Arts, Heritage and Environment Aboriginal Affairs Estimates Committee E Veterans' Affairs Transport Aviation Territories Local Government and Administrative Services Estimates Committee F Special Minister of State Community Services Social Security Health Debate resumed from 19 March, on motion by Senator Gareth Evans: That the Senate take note of the paper. Senator DURACK(Western Australia)(9.08) —The Opposition welcomes with relief-I suppose that is the right way to express it-the White Paper on the defence of Australia, together with the tabling statement of the Minister for Defence (Mr Beazley) which was presented to the Parliament yesterday. Again the Opposition expresses its gratitude for the co-operation of the Government in both chambers in allowing this most important and vital matter to be brought on for discussion promptly and for what appears at this stage to be an adequate time. I am sometimes critical of the Manager of Government Business in the Senate (Senator Gareth Evans). It gives me pleasure to be able to commend him for at least one sensible decision so far. Senator Colston —Can we have it in writing? Senator DURACK —In writing? It will be enshrined forever in Hansard. It may be the only occasion on which I am moved to speak in such warm terms about the management capacities of the Manager of Government Business. This paper will attract enormous public interest, and rightly so because nothing could be more important. There is no higher duty for us in this Parliament than to attend to the defence of our nation. This White Paper does so and the Minister has to be commended also for the great intellectual effort that has obviously gone into this whole exercise. The reason we on this side are able to express such warm praise for this effort is that the policy setting of the White Paper-and now the Minister's policy-is basically consistent with the policies that the Opposition has always followed, either in government or in opposition. These policies were expressed very clearly in the last White Paper on defence which was a product of the Fraser Government in 1976. I would like to quote from that 1976 White Paper. It states: For practical purposes, the requirements and the scope for Australian defence activity are limited essentially to the areas closer to home-areas in which the development of military capabilities by a power potentially unfriendly to Australia could permit that power to attack or harass Australia and its territories, maritime resources zone and near lines of communication. These are our adjacent maritime areas; the South West Pacific countries and territories; Papua New Guinea; Indonesia; and the South East Asian region. It also states: Australia's defence interest is not confined to the presence or absence of military threat itself. We are concerned with developments that could directly or indirectly support Australia's security from military threat, or favour the development of threat sooner or later. Unfavourable developments in mainland South East Asia would not necessarily mean of themselves that threat or direct attack upon Australia was developing, but they could introduce uncertainties into our strategic prospects. That is an approach to the defence policy which was laid down by the Fraser Government. It is one which we have consistently followed both in government and, as I said, in opposition and which we will follow on return to government. One of the reasons why there has been so great a debate on this subject in recent months-indeed years-has been the uncertainty of where this Hawke Government and the Minister for Defence, Mr Beazley, stand in relation to Australia's defence. That is why great interest and widespread concern has been expressed about the subject. We have been giving clear expressions to those concerns in a number of defence debates in this chamber while we have been in opposition. The final concern was fuelled by the report of the Dibb Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities and by the commissioning of Dibb by the Minister for Defence himself. The Dibb report essentially challenged the basic concepts of defence which we have always entertained, which I believe the Services have entertained and which our allies have expected us to entertain. Mr Dibb certainly threw grave doubt on that direction. I am bound to say that many people felt that Mr Dibb was commissioned by a Minister of Defence who also had, in his mind, doubts about those traditional defence settings and who may have been influenced in his thinking by Dibb. When Mr Dibb put down his report I think it gave very clear support for all those doubts that had been raised by so many people. As I have said, this White Paper and the Minister's tabling statement are really a basic rejection of Dibb. Of course, there is quite a bit of Dibb input in it still. I am not saying that Mr Dibb's report was a bad report or that it was all wrong; I have never said that and the Opposition has never said that. In fact, I think in many ways Mr Dibb, within the confines of dealing with the priorities of defence capability, defence hardware and so on, made a valuable contribution to the debate. Having said that, Mr Dibb's basic defence thinking was, nevertheless, at fault. There was a real concern-I think with justification-that the Dibb thinking may well be the thinking of the Minister and the Government. As I said when I commenced my remarks, it is a great relief to find from these documents that we are now debating-- Senator Watson —Great pressure from public opinion. Senator DURACK —I agree that there was great pressure from public opinion and great pressure from the defence people themselves and, no doubt, very great concerns have been expressed by our allies as a result. Senator Harradine —And the debates in here. Senator DURACK —I have already talked about the debates here and we have expressed those concerns on many occasions in this chamber. There has now been a very considerable reverse in the thinking of the Government and the Minister and that emerges very clearly from this valuable and important paper. Mr Dibb's phrase `strategy of denial' gave justification to the concern that we would just return to a Fortress Australia type of thinking. That whole phrase encapsulated worries about Dibb. The Dibb view that there is no substantial threat to Australia for 10 years and that it would take 10 years to mount such a threat has been dropped in this paper. When I saw the Minister being interviewed this morning he was explaining shortly the basic concept of this policy. He said-he says this in the White Paper-that it is a policy of self-reliance within the context of our alliances. That is a most healthy and welcome point of view. I believe that it is a change in the point of view of the Government. It may well be that some members of the Government have not gone along with his view and I cannot say that the Government has specifically denied that view as being formal Government policy. But all the indications in the world have been coming from this Government for four years that it would be abandoning that traditional view. We also have in this White Paper a very welcome reiteration of the mutual benefits of our defence relationship with our allies and with the United States of America in particular. The paper sets out a detailed program of the new capital equipment which will be required and presumably that program will be laid down for the next 10 years or so. I do not propose to go into the details-the nuts and bolts, so to speak-of the defence White Paper. I want to confine my remarks to the broader questions. The Government has also abandoned, I believe very sensibly, the firm ring that Mr Dibb placed around Australia, not just confined to the Australian mainland. He drew a line to create a zone within which was our direct military defence interest and beyond which was simply a matter of diplomacy. The Government has very properly fudged that line. We cannot draw hard and fast lines, as Dibb tried to do, between the area in which we have a direct military interest and in which we have to concentrate our forces and the broader strategic interests that Australia has in this region of the world-a vast region of growing importance of which we are part. Australia cannot finally divorce itself from the world as a whole. We have a vital interest, the same as every other country has a vital interest, in the arms race and the need to pursue policies of deterrence on which the peace of the world has depended for the past forty-odd years. There is a need to encourage the super-powers to proceed towards nuclear disarmament and disarmament of conventional weapons. The questions of world strategy and how peace is to be preserved are of vital interest to Australia. Those questions are part of our defence and we play a major role in that world strategy because of our alliance with the United States of America and the joint United States facilities on our soil. All of this is very clearly acknowledged in the statement and the Opposition is very relieved about that. It seems almost churlish-if I were not a politician, I might sit down now-but there are criticisms and doubts which have to be expressed. They are more at the point of implementation and financial detail. The basic concern is about defence personnel, which we believe has not been addressed adequately in this statement. On the broad issues of foreign policy, the defence and strategic interests of Australia are properly addressed in this statement. It is very important that that has been achieved. It may be that it has been very hard to get this Government to that point, but these matters are now in the defence White Paper, which is presumably the blueprint for what is left of this Government's days in government. Maybe that is not so important now, because it will not be there for long, but it is important that the Government is getting a consistent and bipartisan approach to defence at last. I commenced my remarks by quoting from the 1976 White Paper. This White Paper on the broad issues is now totally consistent with the 1976 White Paper. It is very important for the future defence of this country that we have this basically bipartisan view of basic defence policies. I regret that the Minister had to engage in a bit of politicking when he tabled the statement yesterday, he made some criticisms of the coalition's defence spending. He said that it was not adequate, was rather erratic and had led to all sorts of doubt as to the willpower of the Government on defence. The Minister has made the statement-I heard him say this on this morning's Today program and he has also said it here and in many other places-that Australia is in a position of strength within our immediate region. He says that we are the major military power within our immediate region, within the area of direct military interest to Australia. If we are the major military power in the region, that position has not been achieved in the four years of this Government. Indeed, the major reasons for our strength in the region, as are mentioned by the Minister in the paper, are the F111 and FA18 aircraft, both of which were initiatives of previous coalition governments. Of course, the FA18 was the major defence initiative of the Fraser Government. Indeed, the purchase of the FA18s was the greatest single military equipment purchase in our history, war time or otherwise. The Fraser Government made an enormous undertaking in this regard. Of course, that initiative was carried forward by this Government. I am not criticising the Government; I am simply criticising Minister Beazley for his snide politicking in what is otherwise a very good statement. Senator Kilgariff —This applied to Jindalee and to the patrol boats. Senator DURACK —There are many more examples. I do not have the time to mention all of them but no doubt Senator Kilgariff and other honourable senators will go into more detail. Then, of course, we have the question of spending. The paper contains a guideline for spending on defence. A similar share of gross domestic product will be allocated to defence as has happened in recent years, namely within a range of 2.6 to 2.9 per cent of GDP. The Fraser Government's guidelines for defence was at the higher end of that scale. We were aiming to achieve a guideline of 3 per cent of GDP. In fact, I think the Fraser Government achieved something like 2.9 per cent in its later years. This White Paper's guideline is no different. In fact, if anything, it is less than that guideline. But the Minister has some ways and means, he says, by which more defence can be provided without more money. Good luck to him if he can do that. He gave some examples of how he hopes to achieve that. Although valuable, they are really peanuts. He says that there should be greater efficiencies. We support efforts to create greater efficiencies within the defence establishment. No doubt there is a great deal of room for that but that in itself will not enable us to achieve significantly greater defence effort. One must wonder whether this Government will in fact, when the crunch comes, be prepared to allocate the money necessary to achieve the actual defence requirements which the Government has set down and committed itself to in this paper. For instance, the five-year defence plan sets the targets for average annual real increases in spending. During the life of this Government the target from 1983 to 1988 was set at 4.5 per cent but the latest figure for the 5-year period 1986 to 1991 is 3 per cent. This Government has never achieved a figure for annual real growth in the defence budget better than 2.7 per cent. So there is the proof of what this Government can achieve in defence. We know that it is about to bring down a mini-Budget in May. Will the Minister give us a guarantee that there will not be further cuts in defence in that May mini-Budget? I think the sorts of things I have mentioned are what people really want to know from this Government. The last matter I want to deal with is the question of personnel. Unfortunately, the White Paper contains no really sound proposals to stop the drain of personnel from the Defence Force. No amount of new initiatives will provide security for our nation without skilled and dedicated personnel. Vague proposals such as those that appear in this White Paper to consider the recommendations of the Hamilton Review of Effect of Service Life on Spouses are hardly good enough. The White Paper certainly acknowledges the problem but it fails to provide an integrated program to tackle that problem. Expenditure on personnel is certainly to be restrained and the spending priorities are obviously the acquisition of new equipment and facilities. We see here that the men and women of the Australian Defence Force are again relegated to the bottom of the pile. The paper does have one silver lining in relation to that problem. It commits the Government to a program of improved defence housing; but, like so many of this Government's solutions to problems, it is setting up a defence housing authority, as though by doing that it is going to solve the problem. The paper does say that the Government will commit $750m over 10 years to improving defence housing. That is not going to be adequate. The Government has got to tackle this problem of defence personnel morale. It has done things which have contributed to that lack of morale. The decision to change the non-taxability of Reserve pay was a stupid decision, which fortunately the Government has now reversed. But it cannot do those sorts of things without creating morale problems. Just restoring what was originally allowed is not good enough. The Government should not do those sorts of things in the first place. The introduction of the tax on lump sum superannuation received by defence personnel on their retirement-- Senator Newman —And the 2 per cent on pensions. Senator DURACK —And the 2 per cent on pensions. These are the sorts of things that this Government has done which have exacerbated this problem, and it is not adequately addressed in this paper by the one or two matters that it refers to and which I have just mentioned. This paper is full of great interest and great detail, and it is a very appropriate matter for detailed consideration by this chamber and this Parliament. I would have liked to raise a large number of other matters-- Senator Watson —It is too full of platitudes. Senator DURACK —Well, there are lots of platitudes; but in fairness, it does contain a lot of very specific matters and statements which I hope are going to be addressed by others in this debate. I am sorry that I have not got the time, and I do not propose to embark upon any further matters now. But in general terms, as I said, we support the paper. We are relieved that it is adopting the defence policies and strategies which we, on our side of politics, have traditionally held and implemented. I very much resent the snide remarks that the Minister made about the Fraser Government's defence efforts, because had it not been for the policies that the Fraser Government implemented, and the equipment which was acquired, it would not have been possible for the Minister to make the claims that he has about Australia's defence preparedness and power today. I think that is an unfortunate feature of the paper and I regret that the Minister raised that question. This paper certainly has a great deal of promise for the future. I doubt whether this Government will have the willpower or the financial commitment to carry it out, given the influence of its left wing and of Senator Walsh on its front wing who wants to cut everything in sight in defence, no doubt. So there are very grave reservations about whether this Government can carry through its own White Paper. That is a matter of concern on which this Opposition will be watching the Government very closely, and we will be pressing the Government to give a full-blooded commitment in every respect to the future defence of the nation. Senator MASON(New South Wales)(9.36) —The Government's White Paper on defence marks significant changes in Australia's attitudes to defence. The Australian Democrats largely support this attitude, the blueprint and the White Paper-with some reservations which I will deal with later. I urge Liberal Party and National Party senators to do the same. I agree substantially with one thing Senator Durack said, that is, that consensus is necessary and desirable. Perhaps one of the worst aspects of Australia's defence planning in the past has been the inability to have a sensible single course of action. We have fallen between two stools-the demands of continental defence and of forward defence. That period has created a situation in which we spent enormous amounts of money on defence without any really adequate return to the taxpayers. It was because of this that the Dibb Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities was undertaken in an attempt to get a proper and rational basis to our defence planning. It was a far-sighted and reasonable view which has resulted in this White Paper. So that is the first point I want to make-that whatever changes of government there might be over the next decade or two the last thing Australia needs is a radically, violently different defence point of view from that which applied beforehand. That is disastrous in all possible respects for the obvious reasons of the necessity to buy materiel and plan well in advance for the sorts of weapon systems we will have. Until the early 1970s Australian governments saw defence planning almost entirely as contingent on the need to provide forces distant from our own shores, and the need to defend Australia's immediate approaches had a secondary role. Now we see that the Hawke Government has accepted, up to a certain point, the view that we should direct our efforts to defend this continent and our northern approaches. The watchword which appears constantly through the Dibb report and the White Paper is self-reliance. The Democrats would agree with that. There has not been a complete break with earlier assumptions about defence, as Senator Durack points out. We all like to see our own point of view in anything and Senator Durack says that this paper represents the Opposition's point of view. I would not have thought that that situation would have applied completely in the past but if it does now, so much the better. That is a good thing. I we can get that sort of consensus it is only to be applauded. Of course, that is one reason why this debate is important. As I said, there has not been a complete break from earlier assumptions about defence and the Government in the White Paper expresses a desire to maintain the potential to deploy forces in the wider South Pacific and South East Asian regions. That worries me. To an extent I do not quite believe it because it is more out of sentiment to placate fears here in Australia and overseas, particularly in the United States, that we are planning to retreat into a Fortress Australia. The Australian newspaper's defence correspondent, Peter Young, recently wrote along those lines. I would agree with that. It also exhibits itself in the more tangible intention to extend Australia's military presence in the South Pacific. This indicates a much more traditional view of Australian defence. I understand that it is a reaction to the perceived Soviet threat in the region. As a member of the Western alliance, and more particularly on the basis of our alliance with the United States, it is considered necessary for Australia to make a contribution to the Western naval, air and military presence in the region. Of course, the question is: To what extent in the years to come will this tendency cut against the principles of self-reliance and effective deterrence of attack on this continent? I completely applaud, and I think most Australians completely applaud, the measures planned to achieve that state of defence. In other words, will we find ourselves again in the dilemma of trying to provide for the defence of Australia effectively while also trying to provide forces that can operate in conjunction with out allies in distant parts of the Pacific and Asian regions? If experience should have shown us one thing, it is this: We cannot do both effectively, and never will be able to, because of the economic constraints on a country of this size. I say here that the Australian Democrats are not proposing that Australia should retreat into an isolationist position. We believe that our interests and obligations in the Asian-Pacific region are best and most effectively met in ways apart from a military presence-particularly the kind of military presence that we can afford, which is minimal. Here I am speaking of diplomatic activities, appropriate foreign aid, trade and cultural ties. Prosperous democratic states through the region which are likely to be friendly with us and strong in their own right are more important than the small amounts of defence that we might throw in there in an emergency. I refer particularly to the initiatives that we ought to be taking to assist the Aquino Government in the Philippines with its very proper attempts at land reform and effective distribution of income in that country where, as honourable senators will know, the situation is becoming much worse, not better, as time goes on. If ever there is a communist insurgency from the New People's Army in the Philippines, it will be for that reason and not from any sinister world plot by communists. It will be because the proper and reasonable concerns of the Filipino people have not been addressed and places such as the slums of Tondo and others in Manila have been allowed to perpetuate. The Government ought to take that on board. The sooner we get back to a Colombo Plan-type aid program and get away from throwing millions of dollars at the World Bank and that kind of nonsense-the sooner we use the initiative and idealism of our young Australians and fund them to assist at a grass roots level in countries such as the Philippines-the better. We would be respected for that but we are not respected for what we are doing now, with the cutback on our aid program that occurred last year. Another aspect of the Government's White Paper that the Democrats question is the assumption that a policy of self-reliance depends on the maintenance of Australia's alliance with the United States in the same unquestioning ways as in the past. We believe that effective defence of Australia on a basis of self-reliance and deterrence should allow Australia to act much more independently of the United States where we see fit as a sovereign country. But this does not seem to be the tone of the Government's White Paper in which there is some fairly hefty soft-pedalling and backtracking in that direction. The Dibb Review developed further the concepts of the 1976 White Paper and offered the Government a blueprint for defence development over the next 10 years. The Dibb review argues that it would take at least 10 years and massive external support for the development of regional capacity to threaten us with substantial assault. It worried me a little to see that. I think it was restated in the tabling of the Minister for Defence (Mr Beazley), in which he said that a situation would not occur in which there could be any major attack by a regional power. Such an attack is defined as one involving the seizure and occupation of a substantial portion of our territory. I agree with that in present circumstances; but unfortunately, politics, especially in South East Asia, moves rather quickly. If Australia has a soft underbelly, it is the Torres Strait. There is no doubt about that whatsoever. While there is a stable and friendly government in Papua New Guinea, and while that area can remain the vital corridor, as it is, for Australia's interests-and probably the one on which we should concentrate most, rather than spread ourselves out through all the islands of the Pacific-I can agree with that proposition; but we have no guarantee that that will continue to be the case in a very fast changing world. If we sit back complacently and do not allow ourselves the flexibility of feeling that there could be a threat from that direction, we are very mistaken and failing in our duty. Of course, the Government has said in the White Paper that it will strongly increase our defence capacity in northern Australia. From that point of view, the social and economic development of northern Australia is important to the continuing security of the country. Mr Dibb stated: As a result, Australia must gear itself in particular for lower levels of conflict, arising within shorter warning times. Fair enough; that is okay, but that should not be the only measure. Defence planners should be watching very carefully political moves in the countries to our north. Our defence policy ought to have backups which would allow us to adapt weapons, quite quickly if necessary, to an immediate threat which might become much more obvious in a few years time because of events over which we have no control whatsoever and could not have foreseen. Such matters come to mind when one sees in the White Paper the extremely vague description which has been given to the new surface combatant-a strange phrase, I must say-which is a small frigate. Senator Gareth Evans —It is a small `f' frigate. Senator MASON —That is right. The point is that there is no indication that these ships will have missile capability. The Government has very carefully dodged this issue. Perhaps the Minister, when he speaks at the end of the debate, will be able to reassure me on this matter. If we are to have a slightly bigger version of the Fremantle class ship, a first-class small warship, which lamentably we have underarmed by giving it World War II bofors on the foredeck which, I understand reliably from naval officers, cannot even be fired when the ships are cruising at full speed upwind, it will certainly be absolutely useless as any kind of defensive weapon. If we build any more relatively good small warships and underarm them in that way, or at least not make provision for them to be rearmed-in other words, not to provide space in them for missiles, control systems and wiring channels-the Government is making a very serious mistake. I hope the Government has taken this matter into account. If it has it should let us know because many people in Australia would like to be reassured on such points. I do not know how far ahead the Government is thinking about the ships it has now but it should certainly not think: `This is a little ship which we will direct to a low level threat and it will never be any good for anything else'. That is a very wasteful way of looking at things. The other point the Government should look at is the Hawker Siddeley Engineering Ltd program-an extremely good program which is available to us and which worked out pretty well in Britain-of having container ships which can be used in the normal container trade. They have been pre-adapted and at 24 hours notice can be provided with containerised control systems and Sea Harrier aircraft. In other words, it is quite possible to have aircraft carriers, light fleet carriers or ships with that capability and use them at other times as container ships. That is sensible for a country which has a very restricted defence budget. We do not have vast sums of money to spend. Last year when I was in Britain I went to some trouble to go into this matter. I have all the paper work if the Government wants it although I have no doubt it probably has it. All I am asking is that in the interests of security proper emphasis be given to something like these aircraft carriers. There is a benefit, of course, from having an adaptable system. The ships can operate in a convoy-coastal or further-and provide air cover for themselves and other vessels in the convoy. Another advantage is that if a light fleet carrier is extensively clobbered in a war it is out of service. I gather from British Aerospace that if one uses its system or a similar system, provided one can get the ship back into port and its control systems and carrier have not been damaged, they can be taken out and put into another ship quite quickly. So one may have lost the ship but not the capability of defence. To the Australian Democrats it is fairly important that we should have capabilities that can be upgraded quickly if we need them but are not costing us money in the meantime. The Dibb review concluded: Australia must have the military capacity to prevent any enemy from attacking us successfully in our sea and air approaches, gaining a foothold on our soil, or extracting political concessions from us through the use of military force. The Australian Democrats would agree absolutely with that statement; I think every Australian would once he had thought about it. If we cannot provide ourselves with that military capability we are very much putting ourselves in the position of hostages to fortune in a very unfriendly world. The Dibb review further concluded: Through a strategy based on the fundamentals of our geographic location we can maximise the benefits of an essentially defensive posture in our region. Fair enough; I agree with that. It continues: The exercise of authority over our land, territory, territorial sea and airspace is fundamental to our sovereignty and security. We must also be able to protect our resource zones and defend our maritime approaches as far as wider regional considerations are concerned. Dibb says: Australia has a sphere of primary strategic interest encompassing South East Asia and the South Pacific generally. Developments here can affect our national security, but any military threat to Australia would be indirect. Our defence activities and projection of military power in this wider region should not determine our Force structure, as they do in our area of direct military interest. We also agree with that. As far as the South Pacific is concerned, the review says: We must be mindful of the national sensitivities and aspirations of small South Pacific nations. Of course we must. They are independent countries. We must not think that we are there to be a new colonialist or to maintain military dominance of the Pacific. That applies particularly to Papua New Guinea, which is a sovereign country. Nevertheless, such discussions as I have been able to have with people from that country indicate that at very high levels, greater defence co-operation with Australia would be very welcome. I do not think we would have any great difficulty increasing the strength of our ties. I want to deal with that a little later. Dibb goes on to say, and this is the important point I want to make: Australia's support should be predominantly economic and political. Military co-operation should be directed at increasing the self-defence capability of those island states that possess defence forces. The review sees the ANZUS relationship as having practical benefits for Australia's defence effort. Dibb says: We would not have the same access to intelligence information, logistic support arrangements, weapons acquisition programs, and defence science and technology transfer from any other country. Of course that is absolutely true. The review also says: There is no requirement for Australia to become involved in United States contingency planning for a global war. The presence of joint facilities, together with the access that we provide to visits by United States warships and the staging through Australia of B52 bombers, are a sufficient tangible contribution to the alliance. The Australian Democrats say that that is considerably more than we should contribute. We believe absolutely that we should follow the New Zealand line that there ought not to be visits to our cities by United States warships that may be nuclear powered or nuclear armed. No justification for such visits has ever been put forward, and none is possible. They come here only to provide rest and recreation services for their sailors. There is no strategic reason whatsoever why they should come here, and no benefit can be demonstrated. All we get is a lot of hot air on the subject. Time and time again I have asked people in America and in Australia to give reasons in support of these visits, but those reasons have not been forthcoming and they never will be, for the simple reason that they do not exist. We ought to be aware of the operations of the joint facilities. As I recall it, on page 19 of the White Paper the pious point is made that these bases exist primarily for deterrence and that, therefore, they are a good thing. To the extent that they are there for deterrence, the Australian Democrats agree that they are a good thing, but we ask the Australian Government to exert the necessary degree of control to ensure that they are there only for the useful purposes mentioned in the White Paper. This White Paper is a definitive policy information paper which places a certain obligation on the Government in that respect. The Government has told the Australian people and this Parliament that those bases are there for that reason and that they have positive values of that kind. It is up to the Government to ensure that that situation, if it does not already exist, does exist and that it constantly monitors the situation to ensure that we are in effective control of the use of those facilities. In no way should Australia agree to any activity carried on at these bases or which is planned, or at any facility which is likely to be part of the commencement or facilitation of a global or zonal nuclear war. The Government has very largely incorporated the views and recommendations of the Dibb review in its White Paper. If anything, we would prefer the Government to strengthen its views on some of the matters that I have touched on over the last 15 minutes or so where I think Dibb made good positive bottom line points which are beyond doubt and which are not contestable. For the Government to withdraw from them for purely cosmetic or propaganda reasons seems to me rather less than honourable. The Government has a good stance here. It has something to which I think the Australian people can rally. Let us not blur it around the edges with all sorts of rather strange nonsense, because there is quite a bit of that in this report. The basic strategy of the Government, of course, is defence in depth. The Minister for Defence (Mr Beazley) in his statement said: . . . an opponent would flounder on layers of deployed defence assets through and to our north. That is good; that is what we are aiming at. The Minister goes on: The first layer comprises high quality and comprehensive intelligence about military developments in our region, and a variety of surveillance capabilities to detect and track hostile intruders in our maritime and air approaches. That is fine. He continues: The second layer is a naval-air capability to destroy enemy forces in our approaches and to protect focal points and shipping lanes. Of course, that is where the necessity of arming those surface combatants is essential. The lessons of wars-such as the Falklands war and wars in the Middle East in recent years-have shown that it does not matter much on what sort of a platform one puts a missile such as Harpoon, provided one can get it away in sufficient numbers, because it will destroy the opponent regardless of Phalanx or any other quick-firing guns which fire lead or uranium bullets and things of that sort. Such things can stop only a certain number of missiles in flight. Any ship, no matter how well armed with that sort of weapon, is vulnerable to a reasonably persistent and numerous attack by missile. That ought to be the message which is on the wall of every defence planner in Australia and he should read it every day, because that is the basic defence posture we can offer to the world. People can get here in numbers only by sea. We have that very good defence capability, if we have sufficient platforms to carry those missiles and enough missiles. That is a point I want to deal with later because there is something very worrying about that in this report. The Minister further stated: The third layer comprises a flexible ground force with air and naval support able to react to any enemy incursion right across our territory . . . Strong air capability is obviously necessary in that area. An airborne army, well and lightly armed, is essential. It should be trained, of course, in the north-not in such places as Orange or Cobar. All these strange medieval ideas in the military forces hopefully will be got rid of as people retire, but certainly they should be got rid of in the governmental and planning areas as fast as possible. I want to concentrate now on a few areas where I would take issue with the Government or seek more explicit information. I have already mentioned our doubts about the values of initiatives the Government is proposing in the South West Pacific; that is to increase the number of Royal Australian Navy ship visits to the region, to increase Royal Australian Air Force reconnaissance aircraft deployments and other defence co-operation activities. Reading those things, in cold blood, they do not really amount to very much, do they, and they will not have much influence on any events in the South Pacific. I am concerned that this will lead to increased pressure for more distant deployment of more of Australia's limited resources and that we will fall between two stools. That is dangerous; we would be back where we started. We simply cannot do everything and be effective, and when it comes to countering the perceived efforts of Soviet ideology in the Pacific, we are in cloud cuckoo land if we think we are going to do anything about that-if, indeed, it does exist. If we think that by sending in our ships on visits we can counter the influence of Russia, a country which has high speed attack nuclear submarines and nuclear powered aircraft carrier task forces and things of that sort, we are crazy to think along those lines or to believe that that thinking has any value or virtue whatsoever. This suggests again that the diplomatic area and the aid areas, sensibly applied, are the areas in which such things should be addressed. In fact, Mr Hayden made a similar sort of argument on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation Four Corners program on the French in the Pacific. The Minister said, in response to arguments that the French presence in the Pacific protected Western interests because of its military muscle in the French territories, that hard line French attitudes towards the Kanak issue in New Caledonia and its nuclear testing were in fact more damaging to Western interests because of the animosity they created in the islands. We could even offend in that way if we were too insistent on that sort of thing. We should be directing efforts to Papua New Guinea, as I said to the Senate last month. It is a kind of geographic shield right across our northern approaches with a very small area of sea which could easily be crossed by modern weapons. A fleet of small troop-carrying hovercraft could cross those islands and sand bars in a few minutes if indeed Papua New Guinea-I hope this never happens-were to be governed by a government hostile to us or were invaded or attacked by another country. We should consider all kinds of options with respect to and in full discussion with the Government of Papua New Guinea right up to and including something like the American Monroe Doctrine which, as honourable senators know, involves a commitment by the United States of America that an attack on any part of the American continent would be regarded as an attack on the United States itself. The Democrats and I are not putting that forward as a policy; I am saying that it ought to be considered because our communication lines to the north could be guaranteed. We should see Papua New Guinea as an extension of our own northern territory, which it is geographically. One aspect of the Government's documentation with which I am not satisfied is the notion of `our guaranteed access to ready resupply of essential warstocks' from the United States. Reference to that is on page 8 of the Minister's tabling statement: Emergency warstocks of equipment and munitions would be prohibitively expensive to maintain ourselves. However our needs could be relatively easily met from United States stocks. That worries me because there is always a contingency situation before us which is not mentioned in the White Paper and which nobody likes to talk about. But it exists; it is very real. In the event of a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union in which both those countries were extensively damaged but in which the rest of the world was at least able to stay governable and was not too badly damaged-nuclear winter and all other things aside-we would be completely alone. We would not be able to rely on the United States to provide us with those war stocks. We should take that in mind. I ask the Minister: What sort of stockpile of Harpoon missiles will the Government maintain? If we are to have only enough Harpoons to keep one or two on each ship-I know that they are very expensive pieces of machinery; they cost $1m or more each-we are placing ourselves in a very bad and false position. These weapons do not deteriorate markedly or quickly, I understand, and they will probably cost more later than they do now. I notice that the Minister for Resources and Energy, Senator Gareth Evans, who is respons- ible for this paper in the Senate, was quoted on Monday as saying, for the first time, that we are running out of oil in the Bass Strait and it is about time that we considered seriously liquid fuel alternatives. The Democrats have been saying that for the past nine years and pointing out the long lead times involved. I am glad that the Minister is saying it now; it is not before time. From a strategic point of view, the sooner we get on with it, the better. One aspect of that strategic point of view is that consideration should be given to building or retaining in the ground an easily recoverable area of Bass Strait crude oil as a strategic reserve for this country. For economic reasons, we are mad to think that every bit of that must be used up and then we can become dependent on something else. Until we have other resources and other means-perhaps another oilfield or a further effective source of liquid fuel-we should do something effective about it. I think that the Government ought to see-perhaps it does see it; I hope that it does-that the posture which we are assuming now, which is largely one of an effective self-defence of this country, is a very important one because of the foreign policy message it gives to others. If we follow through what is contained in the Dibb report and, to an extent, what is in the White Paper, with some reservations, we will be saying to other countries that we are not in the business of meddling in their affairs; we are not in the business of having disastrous wars such as the war in Vietnam; and we are not going to fiddle around in a long Vietnam-type war on 70 or 80 fronts in the Philippines. We should make it absolutely plain to everybody that that is the way we see things. But-and this is the important `but'-if other countries adopt aggressive policies towards us, it will be to their cost. We will maintain the means-we can do it now with modern materiel, smart missiles, and so on-to give anybody who tries to intrude on or invade this country a very hot time. If that message were given, it would be the most positive disincentive for anybody who might ever have ambitions to attack this country. The spread of such a defence milieu must contribute to an easing of international tensions. That is perhaps one of the most important things one could consider in this context. This must serve to provide the preconditions for real and complete disarmament in the sense of aggression. It ought to be the public duty of all smaller and middle powers to carry out that kind of defence thinking. Australia now has the chance to provide an excellent example. Senator COONEY(Victoria)(10.05) —One great salutation given in the world-I am sure that Senator Tate would agree with this-is: Peace be with you. Senator Tate —And with you. Senator COONEY —And with you. That concept is one that has not only a religious tone, but also a philosophical tone that goes throughout the world. Certainly in the Christian religion it is a phrase, a salutation, which holds centre stage. I think it is proper when we talk about a paper on Australian defence to remember that peace is the great concept that we all strive for. The ideal state would be one in which the lamb laid down with the lion. When we talk about defence it should be remembered that it is to be looked at in the context that peace, where people live together in harmony, is what we ought to achieve. But unfortunately throughout history the lion and lamb have not lain down together and so we are driven to a situation where the various nations around the world must arm and defend themselves against each other, perhaps not a pretty concept but, no doubt, a concept of reality. I think Senator Durack summed the matter up when he said that this White Paper and the information paper that came with it have presented an approach which can be taken as a bipartisan approach. Indeed, he said that if he were not a politician, if he did not have to make remarks as politicians do in Opposition or in government where each attacks the other side's point of view, he may have sat down. He did make a couple of statements in that context when he said that he had to act as a politician which, perhaps, needs some general correction because I think the libel he committed was a gentle libel. He said that everybody would agree with the paper and that everybody would agree that money ought to be spent except, perhaps, Senator Walsh and the Left. I think that is a libel on both. I see Senator Giles in the chamber. I think she would be very proud to be described as taking a left point of view but at the same time she would be a person who had the defence, the good and the welfare of Australia foremost in her mind. If spending were required, she would do it. Senator MacGibbon —Let us see the colour of your money; come on! Senator COONEY —I see Senator MacGibbon is in the chamber now. I must wait and listen-I think he is next on board-and we will have a vigorous and robust speech upon the defence of Australia. I hope Senator MacGibbon will agree with my statement that the foremost thing to achieve, the foremost importance in all this, is peace. It is very much an argument of how that is to be achieved. This paper is a very good paper. It is very much to the credit of the Minister for Defence (Mr Beazley) who has had it produced. He has great expertise in this area and has presented a paper which forms the basis of a debate which has not been seen for many years in Australia. It is a very logical approach. It is an approach that sets out in proper, logical and a very persuasive form what the considerations ought to be. If one goes through the index, one sees that, first of all, it evaluates the threat to Australia, such threat as it exists. It defines that threat with precision and then it develops a strategy to meet that threat based on the realities not only of the threat itself but also of Australia's capabilities. It takes into account the reality of the sort of money we have to play with. Senator MacGibbon has said: `Let us see the colour of your money', but, as this paper properly points out, defence funding must be looked at in terms of the wider economic considerations that come before the Government. That is set out on page 99 of the White Paper. Paragraph 8.4 reads: The provision of resources for the defence of Australia cannot be determined in isolation from other national priorities and our economic circumstances. Cost and purpose must be considered in increa-sing defence expenditure. Australia has to spend its money not only on defence but also on welfare and the quality of life. It must have a sense of economic rationality. Taking economic realities into account, defence must have a finite budget. This matter is taken up in this paper. It is opened up for discussion. No doubt it will be spoken to by speakers hereafter. In this paper defence self-reliance is the goal. This does not mean we should not have alliances. Self-reliance does not mean that we give up the various alliances we have. I am glad to see that in that context there is much said concerning our alliance with New Zealand. There have been some rocky paths to tread in recent times in our defence relationship with New Zealand and it is very heartening to see that this paper reaffirms our commitment to having defence alliances and shows an approach to defence which accommodates the positions of both Australia and New Zealand. That appears in a chapter dealing with Australia and the region. Australia and New Zealand are specifically dealt with in paragraphs 1.27 to 1.33. This paper deals quite consistently with the problems that any defence force must face. Both personnel and equipment are needed to sustain an effective defence force. As time goes by technology becomes vitally important. That is also dealt with in the paper in chapter 5 and chapter 6. Chapter 5 specifically deals with the technology that is needed and chapter 6 deals with our defence industry. Defence technology is becoming more sophisticated and more complex. The personnel dealing with that equipment need to be well trained and readily available to the Australian defence forces. I think there has been too great a tendency in the recent past to buy equipment from overseas. That, firstly, starves Australian industry and, secondly, starves Australia of people with technological abilities. The development of a defence industry in Australia-shipyards, the making of aeroplanes and so on-assures the country that there are people in Australia capable of building the sort of equipment that is needed to defend these shores. There has properly been some concentration on that. The submarine contract has centre stage at the moment. That is the glamour project. Whichever State wins it, a considerable ability to meet the defence needs of this country will be developed in industry. In the paper there is a most helpful and eloquent map, eloquent because Australia is placed in a position in which it is not often placed in world maps-a central position. To the south is the mass of Antarctica, to the north is South East Asia and to the east are New Zealand and the Pacific islands. It is possible to see on the map where threats to Australia may come from. The paper deals with each of those specific areas. The equipment dealt with in the paper is the equipment which will be needed to defend Australia from the various avenues of possible attack. Australia being an island, the only passages of attack would be sea and air. The two types of aeroplane Australia relies on for its air defence are the new FA18 fighter plane-a picture of it flying over Malaysia appears on page 7 of the paper-and the F111 fighter-bomber. The F111 was developed in the United States during the 1950s. Production of it has ceased, which is unfortunate as it is one of the great planes to have been developed. Fortunately Australia has been left with a considerable number of squadrons of the plane, based in Queensland. I think we will hear from Senator MacGibbon about this. Queensland has all the attacking forces in Australia. The F111s are up there and an Army tactical strike force is stationed at Townsville. It is an indication of the thinking of this paper that our northern defence is given much more emphasis now than was previously the case, as is the defence of Senator Giles's side of Australia-I notice she is present-the west. Australia is now a nation which has ready defence on both sides of the continent, towards the Pacific and the Indian oceans. That is very pertinently dealt with in the paper. Paragraph 2.69 of the paper reads as follows: Arising out of the foregoing discussion, Australia's principal national defence interests can be summarised as: the defence of Australian territory and society from threat of military attack; It has already been pointed out in this debate that it is fundamental that any government be able to defend its territory and society from military attack. With that fundamental precept in mind the paper analyses how that can be done. The paragraph continues: the protection of Australian interests in the surrounding maritime areas, our island territories, and our proximate ocean areas and focal points; This aspect is dealt with in the paper's discussion of the aircraft I have already talked about. The protection of our waterways lies in the development of submarines and the frigate fleet. Linked with this is the concept that Australia defend itself on the basis of self-reliance. The continental defence proposition put forward earlier is not proceeded with. Australia's defence is looked at in terms of our being able to carry out that defence not only on-shore but also off-shore. Paragraph 2.69 continues: the avoidance of global conflict; I began my speech on this point. The primary aim of any defence is to protect not only Australia but the globe from conflict. This goes beyond simple military processes. It also includes the processes of negotiation and diplomacy. The overriding interest of everybody is that the globe stay at peace, that there be no conflict anywhere and that, if we can, we all live in harmony. Unfortunately, that is not the case. There are all sorts of problems. In the Middle East there is the conflict between Iran and Iraq. There is more potential trouble in the Lebanon. Any of these encounters could lead to wider conflict. That is a reality that must be faced. The next point in the paragraph is: the maintenance of a strong defence relationship with the United States; With that relationship there comes intelligence, new technology and new equipment, which is where the importance of the relationship lies. There is no doubt that proper defence requires proper intelligence. That intelligence comes with our association with the United States. A proper defence force requires a sophisticated knowledge of developing technology, which also comes from the Australia-United States relationship. Senator Sheil —How will they test their MX missiles? Senator COONEY —I would hate to see concentration placed upon the MX missiles as though it were the be-all and end-all. The honourable senator's question suggests that the only way we can have proper defence is to allow MX missiles to be tested, which seems to me to be a very limited way of looking at this whole area. Is the defence of Australia going to depend upon the testing of MX missiles? It is suggested that if the MX missile is tested somehow Australia will be properly defended, that we do not really need the Jindalee over the horizon radar, the F111, intelligence or defence equipment. It is suggested that somehow our defence will be guaranteed if we let the MX missile float into the ocean. Is it suggested that the MX missile is so important, so essential, that the whole of the defence system will collapse if we do not let it be tested? If that is the proposition being put it is just as well we are having a debate on this matter, because it ought to be looked at very closely. If the whole concept of Australia's defence is that we should allow the MX missile-or some other missile, if you like-to be tested, we have a fairly limited view of what the real needs of the defence of Australia consist of. The next point is the maintenance of a strong defence relationship with New Zealand. I have already spoken about that. Senator Sheil —You do not think New Zealand has left us a bit naked on that side? Senator COONEY —I do not want to be emotional about this, but New Zealand has fought with us in two wars. New Zealand forms the central part of the word `Anzac'. In the end I think New Zealand will come to the fore. New Zealanders seem to love Australia; they come over here in such numbers. If we have a relationship with anybody it is certainly with New Zealand in terms of our culture, our emotional ties and our background. If a threat to Australia or New Zealand is realised, the maintenance of a strong defence relationship with New Zealand will pay great dividends. The next point is a furtherance of a favourable strategic situation in South East Asia and the South West Pacific. That is a quite central point. It is a pity we cannot put the map in Hansard. If I could tear it out of the book and incorporate it in Hansard; it would be a more elegant way of illustrating what is meant by the `furtherance of a favourable strategic situation in South East Asia and the South West Pacific' than the words themselves. I see Senator Collard looking at the map to see what is meant by `furtherance of a favourable strategic situation in South East Asia and the South West Pacific' being central to the national defence interest. The relationship we have with those nations is not as close as that which we have with New Zealand and America. That is implied in that statement. Nevertheless it is clearly in Australia's national interest to be very conscious of the Pacific islands, of the islands to our north in South East Asia, and of the Antarctic to the south, and to develop with those areas a rational close relationship dedicated to the maintenance of peace in the area. The next point mentioned in the paper is the promotion of a sense of strategic community between Australia and its neighbours in our areas of primary and strategic interest. I think that is just a development of the last point. What is often forgotten is the next point, the maintenance of the Antarctic Treaty, which ensures that the continent remains demilitarised. Again the map is illustrative of what is meant by that. We have the Antarctic to our south; if that can be kept free of weapons a threat that might otherwise be offered to the south coast of Australia should be avoided. If one looks at the map one will see that the north is the area where one would expect to be threatened. The south, although it contains such great cities as Melbourne, is not so threatened. I refer next to intelligence and the ability of Australia to know where a threat comes from. That concept raises the question of the Jindalee over the horizon radar. It deserves mentioning because it was developed in Australia, it is a very imaginative project, and it is one that will succeed. If one visits the facility and sets oneself amongst the various aerials and the wires that cover the ground and then goes inside to see the way in which the monitor can detect what comes across the coast to the north and west of Australia, one will be very impressed. First, it indicates the dedication that the defence forces have to the defence of Australia and, second, it indicates the ability that this country has to develop high technology. That ability must be not only maintained but also developed, and developed with accelerated interest. Australia has the potential to increase its ability to produce its own weapons. It needs technological advice and knowledge from overseas but, granted that, it at the same time needs to build and develop its own infrastructure. That can best be done in many areas through this project management concept, the concept which says that there ought to be specific task forces dedicated to the development of particular pieces of equipment and dedicated to particular structures. As I understand it, the Defence Force is moving towards that and is becoming more and more efficient in developing, building and constructing its own needs. This defence paper goes into that. Having defined the concept of evaluating the threat and working out what Australia has to fear, or may have to fear in the future, with cold precision-we do not want this done in an emotional way, saying: `There must be some vague threat; there must be some enemy somewhere, so let's have all sorts of equipment made and defence initiatives developed'-we have to define with precision, coldly, coolly and without emotion, where the threat comes from and develop the means of meeting that threat not only in terms of the equipment needed but in terms of the personnel needed to man that equipment-I use `man' in a non-sexist way. Some criticism was made about the Government's approach to personnel. Chapter 7 indicates the Government's concern in that area. It indicates the initiatives that it is taking. For example, it indicates initiatives taken on defence housing. I know that Senator Newman is always interested in this. She perhaps ought to read paragraph 7.27, which states: This Government will continue to rectify the poor living conditions many Defence Force families have had to face through neglect and underfunding in previous years. The 1986-87 Budget provided a real increase of 17 per cent for Defence housing and some $750m will be spent on new housing over the next 10 years. Criticism was made earlier that this Government is not interested in, not concerned about, and not dedicated to helping the defence personnel. That is not correct, and a reading of chapter 7 will illustrate just that. If I may reiterate what Senator Durack and Senator Mason have said so far, this paper is a much needed paper. It is very comprehensive and sets out a strategy which is apparently bipartisan. I think the Minister for Defence, Mr Beazley, deserves much credit for what has been produced. He, together with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Hayden, will continue to develop strategies, policies and programs which will keep this great country secure from any threat that may be made against it. Senator MacGIBBON(Queensland)(10.34) -The Opposition welcomes the Government's White Paper on the defence of Australia. We have some points of difference in detail, but those points of difference will be corrected when we come into office in a few months time. The paper represents a huge shift in the thinking of this Government from the Dibb Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities which was presented over a year ago. Given the magnitude of the shift that has taken place in writing this paper, even if by some strange quirk of fate this Government stayed in power and survived the next election, there would be a reasonable expectation that those minor blemishes would be corrected with the passage of time. The report accepts Opposition criticisms made since the Dibb report was presented. It accepts the criticisms I have made. More importantly many of the reports of the Senate Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee and the Joint Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee over the years that have not been acknowledged by the Minister for Defence, Mr Beazley, are dealt with or picked up in some way in this report. This report is a very good report. It incorporates orthodox professional thinking, and it is time we got back to that in the management of Australia's defence. Most of the points I addressed in my speech of 19 November 1986, which has come to be regarded by others as being the definitive critique of the Dibb report, have been addressed in this White Paper. I refer to the points I made about Fortress Australia, the inability to project power and keep peace in the region, the myth of the benign environment-although I must say that the curious ambivalence of the Minister for Defence is something to worry about. A few weeks ago he told us that there were no Soviets in the area who were any threat to us. He went part of the way to acknowledging their existence in his tabling speech when the report was presented in the other place yesterday, but it is a very grudging acknowledgment. I do not know why the Minister for Defence cannot see the obvious. Australia is not situated in a benign environment. It is a changed environment from what it was 10 years ago. It is a very unpredictable environment where the Soviets have declared that they will play an increasing part and will have increasing influence, if they can, in the years ahead. To return to the report, it gets away from that foolishness of Fortress Australia which characterised the Dibb report and it puts great strength on the value of alliances and defence in depth. I quote from a speech I made on 19 November 1986 when I said: Given our geography and population, Australia's first objective must be to avoid large land battles. That means that defence in depth and the development of mutual supporting pacts with nations in the region. If there is one theme in this report, it is the embodiment of that concept of defence in depth and the need for alliances with nations in our region. Enough of the irrelevant past. We support this report in its general direction because it is the Liberal-National Party 1976 White Paper re-written in 1987 terms. It is a restatement of the common-sense orthodoxies of professionals in the Australian defence field. My major concerns with the report are twofold. First of all, the funding demands on the Department are understated. Whether or not this is done intentionally, I do not know. But I have very grave doubts about whether this Government can fund the commitments, which I fully support, with respect to new equipment. Given the record of Labor governments in the past with their penchant for welfare taking precedence over the essential management of the nation, one must have very little confidence that the ideals and objectives of this report will be attained. The second problem-the conditions of service-is also related to finance. There are a lot of platitudes about what the Hamilton Review of Effect of Service Life on Spouses has done for housing, but very little has been spent and the Hamilton report was written 18 months ago. The conditions of service, the way servicemen live, the way they are rewarded for their service, are appalling. They have some of the worst standards of service and that is evidenced by the very high resignation rates the services are suffering from at present. Those points-the inability to fund the equipment programs listed and the ignorance or denial of the problems relating to conditions of service-are the two crippling defects of this report. I now go to the report in some detail. Chapter 1 relates to Australia's defence policy. The opening statement says that the policy of defence self-reliance must be pursued within a framework of alliances and agreements. It restates the value and fundamental importance of alliances to Australia. We are a small country amongst some of the most highly populated countries in the world. Our nearest neighbour has the fourth largest population in the world. China, the population of which cannot be measured, is within aircraft range of this country. It is very important that Australia, with its 15 million people, has alliances with nations which will support us in time of need. I suggest that all Labor senators and members should read this report and read the justification of the alliances with other countries. It will go some way to overcoming the latent xenophobia that characterises the Labor view of foreign affairs, because this is probably the most compelling argument ever put in print for the need for alliances. Chapter 1 also looks at alliances other than ANZUS. It reconfirms the value of the five-power defence agreement, which gets very little publicity these days. I am pleased to see that there is a reference to the Radford-Collins agreement. I have not seen any reference in print to the Radford-Collins agreement for many years, and that applies not only to this Government but to the previous Government. The Radford-Collins agreement is important because it relates to responsibilities we have entered into or obligations we have accepted to control shipping in the event of an emergency. Sea protection gets very little publicity in the Australian defence debate. Turning to chapter 2, which relates to Australia's strategic environment and defence interests, there is a minor point, after the discussion on joint defence facilities, on which the Government indicates: Accordingly, there is a need for the appropriate government bodies at various levels to undertake basic civil defence planning for the protection of the population in the areas concerned. That is talking about civil defence planning for the joint defence facilities. That is something that all governments have neglected in the past. I would like to see some civil defence planning extended to the whole of the Australian community. The defence of Australia turns on having a deterrent capability. We want to make it too expensive for anyone to attack this country. If we are to have a defence deterrent posture, we have to be seen to have the will to use the resources we have. We have to have resources and we have to be seen to have the will to use them. We will have the resources for a deterrent, but we have to develop the will in the community. The Australian community is totally unprepared psychologically for the sacrifices that are involved in an armed conflict. Without the support of the community, all the defence forces in the world are not worth anything. There is not a great need in Australia to build nuclear shelters and lay down food stores for all the population. That is quite impractical for us to do. But it is absolutely vital to develop the will in the community to protect our sovereignty if it is challenged. I hope that the statement that there will be some basic civil defence planning for populations around the joint defence facilities is a harbinger for wider actions for the whole Australian community. In chapter 2 there is a reference to the Treaty of Rarotonga. We agree to differ with the Government on that. It unnecessarily closes off options that the western alliance might need to use in the future. Chapter 3 deals with the priorities for force development. The opening part of it deals with the possible threats, which it calls `military pressure' against Australia and starts with low level conflict. The report states: Successful reviews of the strategic basis of Australian defence policy have noted the advantages an opponent might see in a campaign of sustained low level military pressure against Australia. The second paragraph states: The adversary could, if he wished, sustain low level activity virtually indefinitely. The Government is saying that a low level threat could come over a huge geographic area. It could be mounted at very little cost to the attacker, yet we could exhaust ourselves over time just meeting these attacks and feints over the huge geographic area involved in the Australian theatre. That statement is one of the flaws of the report because it is hopelessly defeatist. That analysis of that type of low level attack on Australia postulated in that section, is only true if we let it occur. It should be abundantly clear to any potential attacker that if we are faced with low level attacks we will take out the bases from which those attacks are originating. We must behave the way the Israelis behave. We have no other option. That point must be very clearly understood. Otherwise, we can stop paying money for the Australian defence forces. We can be beaten by low level threats and feints and theorised out of existence. It must be clearly understood by every other nation and power that Australia will defend its sovereignty and that we will go and take out the bases from which these attacks arise. The chapter also deals with the old 10-year no threat scenario, although this is done sotto voce in the report. The Opposition, ad nauseam, has on numerous occasions, made it clear that a threat based scenario is no basis for planning Australia's defence capabilities. When we turn to the latter part of the chapter on Australia's defence strategy, we come to the signal difference between this report and the Dibb report. It says that Australia's defence strategy is based on a concept of defence in depth-and that, to anyone who has had any interest in Australia's defence, is the only practical way it can be done. The report does go on to talk about the sea-air gap. There is no such thing as a sea-air gap around Australia. There are numerous islands in the so-called 1,000-mile sea-air gap of Mr Dibb, and those are areas where bases will be established by any adversary against Australia. The primary requirement is not to have an air and naval strike capability against ships approaching the Australian coast; it is to have an air strike capability against the bases from which those forces are operating. Chapter 4 really is the heart of the report. It deals with the Australian Defence Force and its development. It opens with an intelligence and surveillance section, and again the Government persists with its emphasis on Jindalee. Jindalee is an enormously useful asset for the Australian intelligence and surveillance capability, but it is still in its developmental stages and there is no justification at all for going ahead with another two, three or four Jindalee stations until we have worked up our present one. The requirement is for airborne early warning and control aircraft, and again, as in the past, this gets very low priority from the Department of Defence and the Government. Yet the ability to know precisely what is going on in the region around and over Australia is paramount to us, and the only way that can be provided in the short term is by the provision of AEWC aircraft. The section on anti-submarine warfare is extremely weak. Again, it carries on the low priority that the Department and the Government assign to anti-submarine capability. If we get into any sort of trouble, the ability to find submarines is going to be paramount. We have a very great need there, but I regret to say that there is very muddled thinking in the Navy and in the Department of Defence on the priorities required for anti-submarine warfare for Australia. There are an awful lot of submarines that can come from regional powers into our area. The next part of chapter 4 deals with electronic warfare. I want to pick this up and comment on the Defence Science and Technology Organisation which is mentioned later in the report. We spend very little money on DSTO. If we accept the argument, as I do, that Australia's defence relies very heavily on high technology, we cannot argue that the money we put towards the Defence Science and Technology Organisation is an adequate amount. In fact, in 10 years it has come down from 3.86 per cent of the Defence vote in 1976-77 to only 2.3 per cent in 1986-87. Australia spends only one-twentieth on research and development in the defence field of what the United Kingdom spends, and the United Kingdom in turn spends only one-tenth of what the United States of America spends. Electronic warfare is really the crux of modern combat. Because of our isolation, we in Australia give it very little attention. I think the amount of the budget of the DSTO which goes to electronic warfare-this is from a published figure-is probably about 6 per cent. In my book, it ought to be around 35 or 45 per cent, because we simply cannot survive over the battlefield or in defended airspace unless we have the latest electronic countermeasures. It is also very important for the Navy. It is important for the Army. But while there is some recognition of the need for electronic countermeasures capability in the Air Force there is very little in the Navy and almost none in the Army. We have very little in the way of training facilities. The Navy and the Air Force have some, but it is a very much understated and unrecognised need. The importance of it is that electronic warfare packs are mobile. They are transportable. They can be carried on aircraft in pod form, moved on trucks and placed on ships. Unless we have countermeasures for electronic warfare we will not survive. It is as simple as that. We have an example of this in the aircraft the Israelis lost in one of the wars with Egypt. Israel had enormous loss ratios because it did not have effective ECM capabilities in its aircraft, but that position was turned around within 24 hours when the Americans supplied Israel with them. Later on, with one of the conflicts with Syria-I forget what the kill ratio was, but it was something like 80 Syrian aircraft to nil Israeli aircraft-again there was a demonstration of the absolute necessity of an electronic warfare capability. It is one of the great defects that we have. The next part of the chapter deals with mapping, charting and infrastructure knowledge. We simply do not have adequate charts and maps of the Australian coastline. Evidence that has been given to Senate defence committees in the past, and which is still valid, is that at the rate we are going it will take us 50 years to get the charts up to date. This is a nonsense, because the civilian sector has the resources and the capability to improve this situation, as was demonstrated with the mapping of the pipeline for the North West Shelf, where the latest technology in the world was used. We have the resources in the civilian sector. We cannot do it through the hydrographic services of the Navy and the Army survey corps and the Air Force. We have to put it out to the civilian sector. We could get it all tied up in about five years, depending on how much money we put into it. The next section concerns nuclear, biological and chemical warfare. This is also one of the weaknesses. No one seems to think that we will ever be involved in biological and chemical warfare. I think it is a great reality, and to me it is much more a real threat than being involved in nuclear war. For a variety of reasons, I do not believe we will be involved in a nuclear war. But as the Iraq-Iran war has demonstrated it is the sort of thing that could well erupt in this region and to be unprepared, as we are, is not wise. Chapter 4.37 refers to the strike and interdiction capability of the Air Force. Again, it does not get the emphasis it deserves. As I said before, any threat to this country will emanate from bases and our first resort must be to eliminate those bases. We should therefore be looking at a ground strike capability, the ability to penetrate highly defended hostile targets, not at a priority for maritime attack, which is what this report suggests. In the maritime section considerable space is devoted to the new surface combatants. I would hope that we came up with a design there that had a universal platform, a hull and propulsion system somewhere between 2,500 to 3,000 tonnes, probably diesel powered, with a speed of about 27 to 30 knots, which platform could be fitted either in an anti-submarine warfare role or a gunfire support role-because we do need the ability of shore bombardment in this South Pacific region-and an air defence capability. I do not think it will be practical to be able to put kits on the ships and change them for different roles in the way that some of the discussion has gone. I think that the technology is probably not developed enough for that. But I do believe that there will be considerable savings if we can come up with a common successful platform on which to mount the various specialist weapons and sensors that the Navy needs. Clearly, all of those ships must have a helicopter capability, and I am sure that that will be dealt with in their design. The submarine force is mentioned. We in the Opposition have grave reservations about the way the whole of that program has been managed. While I do not wish to debate that today, there is no pressing need at all for the Oberons to be replaced at this time. We have at least five years in which to consider and refine the proposals that are before us, before we have to move to the replacement of those submarines. But that is not in any sense to downplay the importance of a submarine capability for Australia. The final point I make in relation to chapter 4 is that the amphibious force section is misleading. Australia now has no effective amphibious training capabilities, let alone any ability to practise the art. I am not talking about the ability to land against high opposition; just the ability to move over the shore and get Army units ashore in the Pacific region where we may need to do it. Part of the Navy section deals with the two-ocean Navy. I have no quarrel with the concept that both the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean are areas of our responsibility. It is common sense to have ships that are operating in that area based on the Indian Ocean side. But there is a bit more to it than the Minister for Defence (Mr Beazley) has acknowledged. First of all, there is a huge capital cost involved in building the base facilities and keeping them going on a continual basis as opposed to having a bare base facility in the way that the Air Force has gone with Learmonth, Derby and various other airfields in the west. The other thing is that there is a very big human cost in moving families to areas such as Stirling, or Tindal for the Air Force. Most servicemen are married and their wives do not like living in isolated areas. They find that the schooling facilities for their children are not very good in some of these isolated areas. Even more importantly, there are no employment prospects for the kids when they get to 15 or 17 years of age and are leaving school. I think we will have real problems in Tindal and I can see some problems arising with the Navy's move to Western Australia. The other point about the two-ocean Navy is that the Navy is inherently a small force, as are all the Australian forces. If we split it in half, the concentration of units for essential training becomes so much more difficult or impossible. I would rather have seen the development of bare base facilities in the west and the porting of ships in the west as the need arose, while maintaining a central position somewhere on the east coast. In the air warfare section, the Government recognises the importance of the F18 to our needs. The strategic transport section is a bit weak. One has to recognise that the C130 aircraft, which provide the basic air lift capacity for the Air Force, are tactical transports. In Australia, with 3,000 miles from coast to coast, we really are looking at the need for a strategic air lift capability. Most of the land warfare section is quite acceptable. The one division training is weak on amphibious warfare because we do not have the facilities. One of two points I want to pick up in regard to the Army relate to the battlefield helicopter decision. This has been opposed by the Opposition and we will reverse it in government because it is quite the wrong thing to do. What the Army needs is a battlefield taxi. It wants the lift capacity to get troops from here to there and put them in place. It does not want to buy the airline. I have been buying aeroplanes for 20 years and I love them. But, despite all the time that I spend travelling on Ansett Airlines of Australia and Australian Airlines, I have not the slightest wish to invest in an airline. Putting it precisely, I want the convenience or the facility to be able to travel from here to there. That is precisely what the Army wants. The Army has not thought through what is involved in crew training and maintenance for the helicopters of the sophistication of the Black Hawk variety. It just wants to be able to have access to helicopters 24 hours a day. That could be done by saying to the members of 9 Squadron of the Air Force, who are going to operate these helicopters: `You go up north. You do not go to Garbutt. You go to Lavarack, wear khaki, live in the mess and talk to the soldiers. They are your friends. You develop doctrine, you develop operational procedures, and you develop tactics with the Army. You are responsible to the brigade commander. You are not responsible to the officer commanding Amberley'. If that happened, we would have the most cost effective scheme for battlefield helicopters. Of course, the Minister, like Mr Dibb, confuses battlefield mobility with tactical mobility. What we are really talking about here is tactical mobility, not movement on the battlefield itself. Battlefield mobility relates to the M113 armoured personnel carriers that the Government, in its stupidity, is to persist in retaining. There is no greater defect in surface warfare today for Australia than the inability to protect our soldiers under fire on the battlefield. That comes about because we are going to keep this first generation M113 which provides no defence for people in it. Light calibre armour piercing bullets will go through its armour. With its very poor power to weight ratio it is not mobile in the field. It has been a good APC. But it is a first generation one. It is 30 years old. We should be getting into something else. Moving through the rest of the report, we really have very little quarrel with chapters 6 and 7, except where the Government talks of getting 30 per cent of offsets. I am glad that the Minister for Industry, Technology and Commerce, Senator Button, has come into the chamber, because it now seems to be Government doctrine that 30 per cent of offsets will be provided for defence purposes. Last week Aviation Week and Space Technology noted that France ordered three Boeing E3 airborne early warning and control aircraft and took options on two more. At the same time, Britain signed a formal contract for six aircraft. The French order, like the British order, calls for 130 per cent of the contract value to be placed with French industry. In other words, the British and the French have negotiated 130 per cent offsets with the Boeing company. The best that Senator Button and Mr Beazley can do is a miserable 30 per cent, and I do not think that Australian industry is served by that. We support this report, apart from the details we have listed. It is a triumph of the professionals over the amateurs and we hope it signals a return to the bipartisan approach to defence that those of us on this side demonstrated when we were in government. Senator HARRADINE(Tasmania)(11.03) —I rise to offer the Government and the Defence Minister, Mr Beazley, conditional congratulations on the defence White Paper which is before us today. There are a number of things in this White Paper which I am glad to see. I note that, most importantly of all, the White Paper confirms the thrust of the Defence Minister's statement on defence initiatives in the South Pacific. The White Paper, on page 16, adverts to the strategic importance of Australia's sea lines of communication in the following terms: Although remote from areas of major contention, the South-West Pacific is important for Australian defence planning because of its geographic proximity to Australia. Important lines of communication with Australia's major trading partner, Japan, and with our major ally, the United States, run through the region. The countries in the region lie across important trade routes and approaches to Australia's east coast, where most of our major population centres are located. An unfriendly maritime power in the area could inhibit our freedom of movement through these approaches and could place in doubt the security of Australia's supply of military equipment and other strategic material from the United States. The Dibb Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities chose to dismiss the sea-lanes as unimportant to our nation's defence. On this major point of strategic principle, the White Paper represents a departure from the Dibb report. This divergence from the Dibb report appears to have taken a concrete form. I refer to the decision to tender for proposals for a frigate designed to meet specifications considerably superior in range, weight and weaponry to that proposed by Dibb. By so doing the Government has signalled its belief that Australia needs to have some capacity to deploy forces beyond Dibb's 1,000 nautical mile limit and into Australia's zone of primary strategic interest. The recognition by the Government of the need for strategic flexibility in dealing with threats to Australia and to our interests is a welcome development. As I argued in my several speeches last year on the defence question, Australia's security depends on the security of our sea-lanes. In so far as the Government has been prepared to admit that the security of the sea-lanes impinges at all on our national security, the White Paper represents an advance in the Government's thinking about national defence. Although the advance has not been deep enough-and I will say more about this later-any advance against the deeply entrenched political, bureaucratic and academic opposition to power projection into the area of our primary strategic interest must be counted a victory. There are many other points in this defence White Paper which are worthy of favourable mention. Closely connected with the question of the sea-lanes is the Government's recognition of the ANZUS Treaty as a Pacific area security treaty. This implies that Australia shares practical responsibility with the United States for preserving the security of the non-communist world's strategic interests in the Pacific. In particular, I draw attention to the fact that, contrary to the intention of the Dibb report, the White Paper accepts Australia's responsibilities under the Radford-Collins naval control agreement. I note also the Government's declaration of support for the five-power defence arrangements. Furthermore, the reconfirmation in this document of the Government's support for the joint United States-Australian defence facilities points to a belief by the Government that national security policy should enhance global security. I believe that a national security policy must be founded on the principle that local national security cannot be separated from regional and global security considerations. The Government also accepts this principle. Taken together, the White Paper's statements on the sea-lanes, the ANZUS Treaty, the five-power defence arrangements, and the joint defence bases have gone a long way toward dispelling, at least in theory, the incipient isolationism of the Dibb report. It is clear, then, that the Government has recoiled from the prospect of embracing the full implications of the Dibb strategy. However, the Government has not been willing to explore, let alone accept, the full strategic significance of Australia's sea-lanes. Instead, the Government has sought to compromise. While preserving as the centrepiece of its strategic policy Dibb's preoccupation with defence against direct threats to the Australian mainland, the Government wants to keep open the option of deploying military forces deep into our region. These forces could be used to defend our vital sea lines of communication in concert with our major allies, neighbours, and trading partners. It must be pointed out, however, that the Government has made this compromise, not primarily to give Australia some sea-lane defence capability. The reason why the White Paper takes a different position of the issue of power projection is that Dibb denied altogether the need for it. The Dibb strategy would have deprived the defence forces of the ability to respond offensively against a direct attack on Australia. To restore this necessary element to national defence planning, the Government had to depart from Dibb's purely defensive defence posture. Still, the Government has kept open the option of mounting a sea-lane defence, for which we must be thankful. It would have been a tragedy if the Government had sought to deprive the defence forces of the potential to defend our sea-lanes. But let us be clear about the Government's achievements in defence policy. Though the achievement is real, it is a strictly limited one. At best, the White Paper has stemmed the trend toward a doctrinaire, purely reactive, and isolationist national security policy. True, the White Paper rejects the Dibb view that the sea-lanes are irrelevant; however, the White Paper preserves Dibb's peculiar emphasis on defending this country from direct assault against the mainland. Of course, Australia must be able to defend itself against incursion or invasion, but the over-heavy accent which this White Paper puts on developing a mainland defence is strategically misconceived. This just goes to show how poorly the Government has understood the sea-lanes issue. As I have pointed out before, the preoccupation with threats to the Australian mainland does not address the strategic realities posed by our country's geographic isolation. Because of our isolation, Australia's links with the rest of the world are long and highly vulnerable sea and air routes. Australia stands or falls on the security of these. The most economical way of bringing military pressure to bear in Australia would be to attack these lines of communication. In comparison to these sorts of attacks, a direct attack on Australia would be absurdly complicated and costly for an enemy to undertake. Consequently, an attack on Australia in the form of a campaign waged against our lines of communications is the most likely threat with which Australia's armed forces will have to deal. A direct assault on Australia can only develop after an enemy has won control over our sea lines of communication. Therefore, the correct strategy for Australia is one designed to deter threats to and, if necessary, to defeat attacks on, the sea-lanes. A mainland defence strategy should serve as a fall back strategy to be employed should the defence of our lines of communication fail. Let me make it perfectly clear: I am pleased that the Government has formulated a strategy for the defence of the continent from direct attack. Such a strategy should form a permanent and integral part of our national security policy. My objection is that the last-ditch defence of this country should form the principal part of national security policy. This is to turn what ought to be our rear line of defence into our front line. I believe that this is a major strategic blunder. I note that on pages 27 and 28 the White Paper attempts to address some of the arguments which I put forward last year in favour of a sea-lane defence strategy. I am gratified that the Government felt the force of these arguments sufficiently to reply to them. But the attempt to answer my case shows how unsophisticated the strategic thinking of the Government and its advisers still is. The White Paper concedes my point that passage of the narrow waters to our north could be denied us even during levels of conflict short of all-out war. However, the White Paper claims that the cost to Australia only amounts to `reduced living standards and adverse economic impact on some regions of the country, rather than a threat to national survival'. What an extraordinary claim for realistic politicians to endorse. Here we have a government which is under such pressure from our economic crisis that, in some areas, it is exchanging traditional Labor policies for those of laissez-faire capitalism. Yet the same government tries to tell us that economic pressures have no political implications for a nation or its government. I repeat the arguments that I put forward on this precise issue in July last year: In time of all-out war and national mobilisation . . . trade losses would not be critical. However, under conditions of sustained but limited warfare, in which the community and the government would expect to deal with an enemy without putting the whole of national life on a war footing, the pressure generated by attacks on merchant shipping would pose a serious threat to the government's freedom of action. The limited war, moreover, is an option with a lot of appeal, especially for a totalitarian enemy. Controlled and circumscribed military action, taken to focus maximum force on an opponent without provoking a full-scale reaction, is a tempting strategy for a totalitarian regime. It offers an opportunity to use to advantage the political control which such governments ordinarily have over their human and material resources, but which democratic governments cannot exercise except in conditions of total war. Small wars waged to exploit the natural political divisions within a liberal democracy, can be an highly effective way for totalitarian governments to achieve their objectives. This is one of the great lessons of this century . . . Limited military action taken against our trade, which was calculated to energise the centripetal political tendencies of liberal democracy, but was not sufficiently potent clearly to threaten our national existence, would place the government in a serious dilemma. Given the direction taken by our current strategic thinking and military planning, Australia would be in no position to defend effectively with peace-time armed forces against this sort of attack. The government, therefore, would be faced with three alternatives, each of them untenable: to accept unchecked trade losses and a gradual erosion of living standards; to attempt, without full public support, to mobilise for a higher level of armed conflict; or to meet the demands of the enemy. As the Prime Minister (Mr Hawke) states, Australia is facing the worst economic crisis since World War II. The Treasurer (Mr Keating) says that the crisis has been brought about because of the collapse of our overseas trade. What are the defence implications of those two authoritative government statements for our sea-lanes of communication? Surely, if a potential enemy can interdict those sea-lanes of communication, it will place Australia in the worst economic crisis since World War II. I request that the Defence Minister, or his representative in this place, provide the Parliament with a considered response to this analysis. All members and honourable senators would be interested to know how to avoid the political consequences of an economic crisis. To return to the subject of indirect threats: It would not be sufficient for Australia merely to possess forces capable of defending the sea-lanes. Australia's chief objective should be to forestall the development of indirect threats. To achieve this, Australia needs an integrated foreign and defence policy designed to preserve our greatest strategic asset, which is that the lands adjacent to the sea-lanes should be controlled by powers friendly to Australia's interests. They are now. Our foreign-defence policies should be designed to ensure that they continue to be in control of powers friendly to Australia's interests. One of the ways Australia can achieve this deterrent effect is to have the capacity to deploy forces far forward of the Australian mainland and in positions which give those forces the capacity to deal with threats to our sea lines of communication. The most important of these is the shipping route through the Solomon and Bismarck seas. This route cannot be defended seriously from Australia. To do it Australia needs bases in Papua New Guinea. The White Paper makes much of the importance of Papua New Guinea. But I do not find in this document any recognition of the need for Australia to deny Papua New Guinea airfields and harbours to any foreign power. The only way we can achieve this goal is by a treaty with Papua New Guinea which will give us access to these bases and by a resolution to develop Papua New Guinea facilities, especially Manus Island, and to deploy forces there. The Deputy Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea, Sir Julius Chan, was in Australia recently. He called for a defence treaty with Australia. Discussions are taking place now. Mr Diro was in Australia only this week. An Australia-Papua New Guinea treaty should form part of a network of formal and informal arrangements between Australia and its Association of South East Asian Nations and South West Pacific neighbours for the mutual defence of the regional waterways from extra-regional threats. It is not, however, just a proper appreciation of the Papua New Guinea role in our defence which is lacking from this White Paper. There is a contradiction between foreign policy and defence strategy generally. The White Paper wants to have relations with our neighbours which will enhance regional security. But the Government does not really want to back up these regional connections with armed force. It prefers merely to have the option of so doing. The Government should face the problem that, unless it grasps opportunities that it has now, the options may dwindle into the distance. In reality, a strategy pitched exclusively at defending the Australian mainland must risk emptying our relations with regional friends and allies of any strategic value to Australia. The only way these friendships and agreements will enhance our security is by Australia being prepared to contribute to the defence of mutual strategic interests, and the most important of these is sea-lane security. While the sentiments of regional responsibility found in this document might be temporarily heartwarming, in the long run Australia's refusal to give military substance to these sentiments could easily turn our present friends into cynical, unco-operative and perhaps hostile neighbours. In addition to this conflict between foreign and defence policy, the White Paper reveals a rather unpenetrating grasp of strategic developments in both the Indian and Pacific oceans. How extraordinary that in this White Paper there is no assessment made of Mr Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech and of the strategic implications for Australia of the new Soviet activism in the Pacific. I suggest that one objective of increased Soviet activity in the Pacific would be to disconnect the Japanese economy from the Western alliance and to harness it to Soviet economic development. A communist regime in the Philippines friendly to the Soviet interest would provide an excellent means of putting the squeeze on Japan. Soviet access to naval and air facilities in the Philippines, combined with bases in Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, would give the Soviets control over the South China Sea and over the Japanese economy whose oil flows through these waters. All this could be achieved without the Soviets going to war with the United States. Control over the Japanese economy would in turn give the Soviets leverage over Australia's economy, unless Australia were to convert itself into a first class industrial economy and exporter of manufactured goods. Here is another form of the indirect threat to Australian interests-a threat to the sea-lanes, and hence to the economy, of a nation on which Australia depends for trade. Would Australia like to see Japan switch to Siberia as a source of raw materials? Surely then it would be in Australia's interests to help preserve the South China Sea from Soviet domination. Would this objective not in turn demand a firm and clear commitment to assisting the democratic Government of the Philippines defeat the New People's Army? The White Paper expresses concern over the future of the Philippines, but fails clearly to draw the connection between the fate of the Philippines, Soviet policy toward Japan, and their implications for Australia. But since the Government does not take sea-lanes or indirect threats seriously enough, this omission is not surprising. Moreover, the White Paper proposes no concrete action in support of democracy in the Philippines. This illustrates the continuing failure of Australia to develop a national security policy which integrates both foreign and defence policies. The Government has recently been making great play with its decision to develop a so-called two-ocean Navy, one half of which will be deployed into the east Indian Ocean. Despite this, there is nothing in the White Paper about developments in the Indian Ocean-not a word about the Indian Navy, its growth, its tremendous reach, its two-going on three-aircraft carriers, its bases in the Anderman Islands which cover the Malacca Straits, its evident capacity for sea-lane defence and interdiction. Perhaps it is significant that a White Paper which eschews a sea-lane defence strategy would refrain from mentioning India's vigorous endorsement of just such a policy in waters which lap Australian shores. Australia has had a long and friendly relationship with India and maintains that relationship. She is one of the most influential members of the Commonwealth of Nations. Surely it would not have been too much to expect the Australian Government to have sought information from India as to the basis for its Indian Ocean buildup, how it links in with our strategic interests, and then informed the Parliament in this White Paper. There is no time today to discuss in detail the great issues concerning the Soviets, Japan, India, and Australia. I mention them to indicate the practical, as distinct from theoretical, gaps in the White Paper's appreciation of our strategic environment-gaps which are there because the Government seems incapable of making a realistic commitment to co-operative regional security arrangements and of truly grasping the nature of the indirect approach in strategic policy which could be pursued by a potential enemy. Finally, this document should be welcomed. I believe that the Defence Minister has done a service to this country in developing documents over a period and finally the White Paper on defence. I think it is 11 years since the last occasion that this occurred. I welcome the document; it is, as I have said, a considerable advance on the Dibb report. However, Australia's defence plan will not mature until we realise that the fate of Australia hangs on those fragile and exposed threads which link us to Asia and to America. Senator COOK(Western Australia)(11.30) —The Senate this morning is debating the defence White Paper, a paper published by the Government setting out its defence planning for the future. Thus, we are not debating legislation which we will carry; we are expressing views about the Government's plans for defence organisation in this country. With that in mind I must say that I endorse heartily the remarks of my colleague Senator Barney Cooney who, in an earlier contribution to this debate, started by saying that one great salutation in the world is the salutation, `May peace be with you'. That ought to be the starting point for a consideration of defence issues. I agree. The best defence is to achieve a situation in which we have universal and lasting peace in the world. That is the priority to which I believe this Government is dedicated and the end which this Government pursues through its diplomatic work abroad, through its trade contacts and regional cultural ties. Most properly, that is where the emphasis should be. However, it is true that we live in a world in which not all peoples are equally dedicated to those goals and, therefore, we have to look at the development within Australia of a viable and effective defence force. As a consequence, in the focus that I now draw, we should debate this White Paper. But in debating this White Paper we should not forget the context that I have referred to as being basically our primary defence context-diplomatic, trade and regional and cultural aspects-because the one thing about a defence force is that if we have to commit it to conflict, we are in serious trouble. The avoidance of conflict and the protection of regional imperatives are best pursued by other means. The Government proposes in this White Paper to guarantee the defence of Australia and its strategic interests by increasing reliance on ourselves to defend ourselves. That reliance should be sharply increased in the context of a series of formal alliances that we have with nations with which we are sympathetic. The emphasis on greater alliance in this White Paper also ought to be endorsed strongly; that emphasis occurs within the context of the formal alliances that we hold. I am reminded at this stage that Senator MacGibbon, who is one of the more-if I can use this term; I am sure it will not offend him because I think he would accept it as a proper description-right wing of our colleagues in the Senate in the Liberal Party, said that the White Paper ought to be read by every Australian Labor Party member and politician because it contains the best explanation of what our alliances are about that has ever been put in print. Hansard may prove that I got the wording of Senator MacGibbon marginally wrong, but I think the thrust is right. I know it is a trite point but I answer it only in passing. The Australian Labor Party, therefore, according to Senator MacGibbon, has published the best explanation of our alliances ever put in print. The Labor Party Government has written that and it represents a significant contribution to the defence debate. It is a pity that we have waited so long for such an explanation to be produced. In the many years that Senator MacGibbon's Party was in power there was a deafening silence, no explanation. However, as I said, it is trite to get into a nitpicking argument about this defence White Paper because there is substantial support from all parties here about the thrust of it. Senator Harradine, the previous speaker in this debate, said that he gave it an endorsement which was caveated in several ways but not in any significant way. The defence White Paper has significant support throughout the community and the innovations that it contains are equally supported. Even the critics who have argued about areas of weakness have conceded that those areas are not substantial. That in itself is quite an achievement for any government. This Government takes a particular pride because this is the first time in the peace-time history of Australia that a long range defence plan has been published. That defence plan has arisen because of the commissioning by the Government of the Dibb report on the Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities. It analysed for public debate and criticism our strategic and defence needs. The report was subjected to a period of public debate and we now see this White Paper which, as I have said, is the first long range peace-time defence plan. Previously, we have had uncertain responses to what often have been vaguely identified threats which empirically never materialised. So we have had debate of defence by invocation of a series of beliefs, fears and worries which have never been properly and intelligently articulated. This paper does the nation a great service because it brings those things together in an intelligent plan. It is a well-rounded paper too, because defence in Australia until now has been debated pretty much only on strategic interests or a fascination with the toys that make up the defence budget. This paper has focused on the industry implications of a defence effort by nations such as ours with an economy organised in the way in which ours is. It has looked in some detail too at the personnel needs of the defence forces. Thus housing, retention rates of military personnel and so on have come in for a degree of analysis that has not previously been available. Most speakers in this debate, however, have still concentrated on the military strategic threats or the lack of them and on the equipment details. In this debate I want to comment on the industry and procurement implications and the military personnel implications of the White Paper and on the economic effect of defence expenditure on our economy given the straitened economic circumstances that under this Government the nation is moving out of. If we committed an Australian defence force to the field, Australian clothed infantrymen firing Austrian rifles would be landed from United States made helicopters next to German manufactured tanks. They would have air cover from French Mirage fighters and United States FA18s, the pilots of which would have been trained in Italian trainers. Senator Watson —Yet you think it is a good report! Senator COOK —I am talking about what we have inherited. Paratroopers would be dropped from United States or Canadian made aircraft. Only the ships may have been made here. The submarines would have been manufactured under licence in Australia to Swedish design. In fact, an Australian defence force in the field is pretty much a multinational equipped force made up of Australian citizens. Senator Watson —But this is your vision for the future. Senator COOK —This is not my vision for the future. In terms of logical development of an argument, this is to state what is the case so that we can look at what should be the case. I am sure that Senator Siddons, a champion for Australian industry, would understand that what Senator Watson is saying is not what we want; it is what we have inherited and what, in terms of the industry implications of this defence White Paper, we wish to move away from. Senator Siddons —You have taken the words right out of my mouth. Senator COOK —I am sure that that is true. That is a theme we share in this chamber. The major aircraft in the Air Force fighter wing are the FA18s and F111s from the United States, and the Mirages from France, which are now being phased out. The Hercules comes from the United States and the Caribou from Canada. The Orions, the long range maritime surveillance aircraft, are of course from the United States. The Macchi jets in which our pilots train are Italian made. The FA18s and the Mirages were assembled and are maintained in Australia; nonetheless the technology is not our own. The weapons systems and the ammunition all come intact with the purchase of those aircraft and our maintenance is under licence. In the Army field, the Bell helicopters are of United States design, so are the Sikorsky and the Boeing. Our defence forces are now going to equip themselves with a rifle invented in Austria. Our Leopard tanks are designed and made in the Federal Republic of Germany. In the Navy, some of our FFG frigates were built here but on United States plans. Only the Fremantle patrol boats are designed and built in Australia. The submarines will be built here. As I have said, the history of industry input into the Australian defence effort is a history of our purchasing equipment off the shelf from foreign suppliers. In some cases we have made the equipment under licence in Australia to provide employment for Australians and to transfer skills. But by and large we have not developed until now an integrated and comprehensive defence industry plan, which is what this White Paper does. We have seen in recent times project Nulka, the development of a decoy missile system for the Navy. The system does not destroy or shoot down foreign missiles but decoys them away from their primary target so that they expend their warheads uselessly. The project has been developed by Australian scientists but it is such a major project that at the current development of our own industry, we do not have the ability to invest the hundreds of millions of dollars to perfect that technology. We will now move into joint development of that weapons system with the United States. Previously, we have distinguished ourselves in the field of military technology. The Jindivik target drone is a particular example. This White Paper also proposes that we perfect the technology of the Jindalee over the horizon radar system. Defence purchases amount to $2.8 billion in the 1985-86 Budget year. There is tremendous ability to encourage Australian industry to invest in developing the capacity to train the personnel to get the expertise to invent the technology and to take part in supplying the Australian defence effort. Where Australian industry is not a primary supplier there is scope to take advantage of our offsets program, some of the technology for which we have to purchase from overseas. We insist on 30 per cent of our total offsets, which are estimated in this Budget year to be of the value of $40m, being done in Australia. That is a major contribution. If one is looking for the incentives this paper provides for industry one has to go to chapter 6, headed `Defence and Australian industry'. Set out in those pages is quite a comprehensive analysis of our defence equipment needs. For the first time an Australian government will be notifying Australian industry of its forward plans for the acquisition of defence equipment so that Australian industry will know what we will be seeking to purchase from it and can gear its industrial production to bid for contracts to supply those needs. We will be providing thorough briefings to industry on an ongoing basis so that industry not only knows what the plans are but also knows what the details and intentions are so that in it can be key bidders for contracts in design and development programs at the private level. We will be providing a register of Australian organisations which are able to make proposals and which might be invited to tender. So we will be encouraging Australian industry in that sense. We will be providing a 20 per cent discount on Australian tenders so that if an Australian tenderer is in competition with a foreign tenderer a 20 per cent discount will be given to the Australian tenderer so the contract can be kept in Australia and our Defence Force can be an Australian-made defence force-not, as I have said, a foreign-supplied defence force. In particularly sensitive and strategic areas of our defence equipment acquisition the discount can be much higher. Because modern defence is a quite highly specialised, technological and sophisticated operation we will be concentrating on providing major encouragement to Australian manufacturers to adapt overseas equipment to Australian needs. The defence of Australia requires a defence of the continental base of the country. We have an environment, a climate and a series of terrains and circumstances which are different from those of most other countries. Australian industry is best equipped to adapt foreign-made equipment to meet these needs. Australian industry will be encouraged by this Government's program of 150 per cent tax write-offs for its research and development effort. So a major incentive to Australian industry is being provided in this area. We will also be encouraging the defence equipment manufacturing sector of Australian industry to collaborate in its export efforts and work together with powers within our alliance structure, where the economy of scale or the run of production is beyond local resources in the manufacture, maintenance and adaptation of equipment. The effort and encouragement we will be providing will be quite significant. If one looks at defence expenditure as a proportion of gross domestic product over the last 20 years one can see that there has been a rise in defence expenditure under this Government. Most of that increase has gone towards the purchase of capital items, which represents a major imbalance on our balance of trade. Purchasing huge capital items overseas-items such as aircraft, tanks and ships-biases our balance of trade in an undesirable way, given our balance of payments problems. Our incentives will have a major impact on righting what is a problem for our economy. They will have an impact, too, in that many of the items required as defence purchases have as their main priority commercial or civilian use. If Australian industry is given the capacity and incentive to participate in this area it will be able to exploit civilian and commercial adaptations of defence items and thus will be better able to compete in the local and export trade of goods and services associated with these items. I commend the White Paper as being a valuable contribution. I note that it has the major support of all the political parties, although there is some nitpicking criticism of some minor aspects of it. It is the first time in the history of peacetime Australia that a major defence plan has been promoted. The incentives it provides to our local manufacturing industry are quite significant and address one of the major problems in the whole defence debate over the last several decades, that is, that unless Australia can provide much of the technology, equipment and manufactured goods necessary for a viable, modern and sophisticated Defence Force we will not be able to defend ourselves adequately. While we rely on foreign technology, on off-the-shelf purchases, we are to some extent vulnerable. Even if the source of that technology and those purchases is from within our major alliances, nonetheless we are vulnerable. A viable industry sector is required as a prime commitment to a viable defence sector. The White Paper puts those things in an important and patriotic context. I commend the paper. Senator WATSON(Tasmania)(11.53) —The defence White Paper presented by the Minister for Defence, Mr Beazley, yesterday is a blend of platitudes and what we might call overdue steps forward. I say this because of the various contrasts in the document, which on the one hand, quite sensibly, emphasises the importance of a highly mobile force which is capable of rapid deployment-few people would argue with those sorts of major steps forward-but on the other hand continues with certain fictions. I refer to one such contrast. Paragraph 1.33 of the paper states: The ANZUS Treaty remains in place, and the mutual obligations under it between Australia and the United States and between Australia and New Zealand are preserved. This includes the security commitments embodied in the treaty. This is absolute hogwash. This hogwash is continually peddled by the Labor Government when all realistic people in Australia know that ANZUS is dead. It died because of the international irresponsibility of our friend across the water, New Zealand. I want to emphasise and examine the strategic importance of what is happening in the Pacific region. Since the mid-1960s the Pacific Basin has undergone a geo-political metamorphosis. Whereas there were a number of island colonies whose foreign affairs were managed either from Paris or from London, today we have as near neighbours many newly independent nations, each with its own foreign affairs policy, its own global aspirations and its own view of the world. The difference in the Pacific now is that whilst most of these states have very small populations they have huge areas of sovereign territory which they have to administer, so they have pretty expensive overheads because they have to maintain their parliaments, their executives, their public services and their social security systems. As a consequence the Pacific region is now becoming an area of great strategic importance to middle powers such as Australia as well as to the two major super-powers-that is the big difference. Both the major super-powers are very keen to establish influences for defence advantages rather than for commercial gain. The White Paper, in paragraph 2.43, coyly says that these mini-states are fundamentally affected in their ability to protect their interests. I believe that Australia has a rather special role in the South Pacific in several ways. First, we have an historic role, sharing, as we do, the British tradition-which is diminishing-of many of the former colonies. It is rather tragic that with the disappearance of the British and French influence a vacuum has been left which Australia and the United States, and some other powers, have failed to move into. Australia has this special economic role providing aid, specially for education and in what we might call the skills based development of these Pacific island people. We have what one could perhaps term a paternalistic role-a `stewardship' role-because of our great economic and political advantage over these sovereign mini-states. This last role has been neglected too much in the past. New Zealand has always had a very much higher profile in the Pacific than Australia has had. It was not until the 1970s that this country began to play a significant role at all. Let us look at the foothold that the Soviet Union is seeking to gain in the South Pacific. The White Paper says that certain of these strategic interests could be `inimical' to Australia's interests. I would go further and assert that the Soviet interest should be of great concern to the Government and that it should take steps to do something a little more concrete rather than produce a generally bland discussion paper with reference to the Soviet threat. Let us look at the prospects of this threat. In March last year at the Twenty-seventh Congress of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Communist Party the General Secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev, foreshadowed new Soviet initiatives, in his words, to `stabilise the situation' in the South Pacific. This was followed in July last year when Gorbachev put forward the Vladivostok initiative. In this speech, which forms the basis for recent Soviet moves in our neighbourhood, the Soviet leader supported the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. Paragraph 2.44 of this White Paper says that the Treaty is a gain for Australia, regional security, and that it will protect Western strategic interests in the region. I for one find it difficult to accept this assertion in the paper when it is coupled with Gorbachev's obvious glee about the Treaty. Gorbachev, in his speech, proposed extending ties with the independent members of the region with the youngest political life. He named Papua New Guinea, Western Samoa, Tonga, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Moscow, Gorbachev states, would lend dynamism to its bilateral relations with all countries in the Asia-Pacific region Let us go another step forward in this Soviet initiative. In early 1986 the Russians set up, for the first time, a Pacific branch in their Foreign Ministry to cover not only the mini-states, but also Australia and New Zealand. In August 1986 Moscow established diplomatic relations with probably the most left wing of the mini-states, Vanuatu. At the same time the Russians began negotiations with Father Walter Lini's Government for shore access to Port Vila and landing rights for Aeroflot, the Soviet airline. Lini in turn opened up relations with Soviet clients such as Vietnam, Nicaragua and Libya. In fact, he went so far as to defend Colonel Gaddafi, saying that the Libyans are not really a terrorist nation. At the same time, Cuba, on the other side of the world, offered to assist in the training of Vanuatu's police force. Kiribati, with a population of only 60,000, is strategically placed because the United States has a rocket splash-down zone in the atoll region; hence its strategic importance to the USSR. In fact, the USSR recently stepped up invitations to the Kiribati Government and its officials, especially to students and trade unionists, to visit Moscow and other Eastern bloc countries. The Soviet Union is also trying to raise its level of influence in Tonga. For a number of years it has been pressuring the tiny Tongan Government to allow the Soviet Union to establish an embassy in the state capital and so far, to the island's credit, without success. Colonel Gaddafi also made offers of an international airport and unlimited free oil if Tonga would change its foreign policy to an anti-Israel stance. The Russians have been trying to lure Tongan students and trade unionists with offers of study tours of the Soviet Union. Only recently did the threat of a Tonga-USSR fishing agreement fade when the United States at last signed a fishing treaty with the Tongans. New Caledonia remains very much a hot spot in the region. The Russians have been able to exploit the problems in this country, with some success because of the problems with the Kanaks and the French testing at Mururoa Atoll. The increasing resentment voiced by the South Pacific Forum about the French colonial presence has been fuelled by Moscow. In March last year Colonel Gaddafi hosted a summit in Tripoli for delegates from the New Caledonian FLNKS, the Irianese separatist organisation, the OPM, and the ruling party in Vanuatu. It maintained the Libyan commitment to military training for Kanak separatists. All this is happening in our Pacific region. Let us turn to our great friend and ally New Zealand. As I have said, New Zealand has an historical role of assistance and aid to many South Pacific nations. In the past it has disgraced Australia in this important role. As a consequence, the Government in Wellington has great influence with many of these young countries. The New Zealand abrogation of its responsibility to ANZUS has been of great concern to many nations in the Pacific basin area. Sir Thomas Davis, Prime Minister of the Cook Islands, whose defence is provided by New Zealand, has roundly condemned the Lange Government because of its policy on nuclear ships. Sir Thomas Davis shames this Hawke Labor Government by taking the stance that Mr Hawke and Mr Hayden have avoided taking and have vacillated on ever since 1984 when the ban was first announced. The United States has ceased providing military intelligence and assistance to New Zealand because of its policy and this has seriously worried the Polynesian states which depend on New Zealand for their protection. What did Mr Hawke do? He decided at the last minute not to attend the South Pacific Forum-a serious omission which can only increase the concern of Polynesian nation leaders, who are now more dependent than ever on Australia and New Zealand. The South Pacific is increasingly becoming an area of fragile stability. The Hawke and Hayden attitude of not doing anything because of the historically peaceful nature of the region is a head in the sand attitude and is dangerously unsatisfactory. The theme which runs through the Dibb Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities is an assumption that the only threat to Australia and her interests comes from direct invasion. I would assert that the protection of a nation's interest and security extends way beyond its territorial integrity. This White Paper at least goes a little away from the isolationist attitude that ran through the Dibb report. Our defence programs will have a major impact on the way in which smaller states view us and the way in which they will develop their own defence and foreign policies. Our role in the Pacific should be and remain significant and responsible. Around the corridors of power in Canberra there is an undervaluation of the traditional ANZUS arrangement. This attitude prevailed before Dibb and was reinforced by his report. One could well ask: What is the future of ANZUS? This Labor Government has a track record of devaluation. It has devalued standards and principles within government; it has devalued our currency; it has devalued our defence commitment to our neighbours; and it has devalued, in an irresponsible way, the traditional but fragile good relations we have maintained with our allies in the Pacific basin area. It is important that Australia maintains its influence in the South Pacific. The Russians and the Libyans have been making cunning and effective overtures to the various mini-states. Even that staunch friend of the West, Prime Minister, Sir Kamisese Mara of Fiji, has indicated that the Pacific is growing in importance and should not be ignored by either the United States or Australia. Deterrence should be the first priority in security matters. For this reason, it is important for Australia to take note of the Russian presence in our region. Let us look at the vital statistics. In 1986 the Soviet Pacific fleet had over 385 ships and 510 aircraft. The Soviet Foreign Minister has said that it is `only interested in the fishing'. Under the leadership of this Government, it is likely that he will be believed, but that attitude will not be in the long term defence and foreign policy interests of this country. In conclusion, I express my disappointment that this White Paper does not adequately examine the question raised by Senator Cook of increasing the defence capability by diverting more supplies and equipment production to Australian factories. We should take note of the Auditor-General's comments yesterday with regard to the Williamstown naval dockyard. One can understand why the Department of Defence is wary about giving contracts to some sectors of Australian industry, because Williamstown is a case where the unions, if they are not running the dockyard, are sabotaging it. They are doing as they please. I will tell the Senate what I saw at first hand recently. People were lifting steel without gloves; they were in the wells with cranes and jibs overhead without protective head gear; and they were walking around in sandshoes, rather than protective boots, carrying loads of steel. One man was assisting another cutting a piece of steel and he did not even wear protective goggles. All through the dockyard there were signs warning of the need for protective equipment to be worn. The unions were not insistent on enforcing these things and the management was not insistent on following them. It is a disgrace. One can understand why the Department of Defence is reluctant to commit orders to these areas. It is time that the Government took steps to ensure that work is directed to these dockyards and other such areas, but it is essential that they be run efficiently. While everybody attacks the inefficiency in the protection afforded to Australian manufacturing industry, there is a failure to focus on what is happening in some key areas where it is essential that we improve our management lines of communication and productivity. The management and reporting structures in factories and dockyards are absolutely atrocious. Local management is not given the opportunity to manage. Managers do not even have control over industrial relations; matters have to be referred to a committee in Canberra. That is no way to run industrial relations in a manufacturing operation. I had hoped that this White Paper would have given a major emphasis to producing a lot more, yet it has failed to do so. This Government should be putting a lot more emphasis on trying to improve efficiency so that more work can be directed to Australian companies and enterprises such as the dockyards, but that cannot be done while these inefficiencies and bad union work practices are allowed to continue. Australia is not self-sufficient in enough equipment. We have to make sure that this situation is changed around. In conclusion, I say that the White Paper at least offers some encouragement, but at the same time we have to acknowledge that it has major deficiencies and it is the responsible role of the Opposition to point out those deficiencies. I have highlighted two; the failure to address the increasing Soviet threat in the Pacific and the failure of this Government to encourage defence production or to lay down the law on unions standing over important defence establishments such as the Williamstown naval dockyard. I believe that at long last we have a document-it has resulted from the pressure of public opinion and pressure from within the defence forces-which more adequately realises the defence needs of this great Australian nation. Personal Explanation Senator SIDDONS(Victoria)(12.14) —In debating the White Paper on defence it is of some encouragement to me to hear that there is a measure of cross-party support for this paper. I congratulate the Government on its production of such a paper. I am particularly pleased that the paper has as its central theme a self-reliant defence policy. That is surely what we need and, presumably, that is what the Government's principal objective will be from now on. I do not want to spend a great deal of time talking about alliances or about how we can better co-operate with our neighbours, as I am sure that will be mentioned at great length before this debate is concluded. I particularly want to take up the point that was first raised by Senator Cook and then later by Senator Watson. If we are going to have a self-reliant defence objective, surely we have to start with the objective of greater self-reliance in the production of our defence equipment. This paper takes a broad, long view and takes us into the twenty-first century. But that is only 13 years away, so it is not as far into the future as we might think. The paper envisages that in the next 10 to 15 years we will be spending something like $25 billion on defence. That is an enormous amount and it is almost all going to be spent on equipment from overseas. As Senator Cook pointed out, the paper makes great play of the fact that we are an ally of the United States of America, and we therefore have preferential treatment in the buying of FA18 and F111 aircraft, FFG frigates and so on. I have to query whether some of this highly sophisticated imported defence equipment is what Australia needs if it is to be self-reliant. Let us discuss the FA18. It is encouraging to know that there is a measure of support on all sides of the Parliament for this piece of equipment on the basis that it is a very good fighter, it is the state of the art and so on. But does Australia need such a sophisticated aircraft? For a start, it has a range of only about 500 kilometres, so presumably it has not got the capability of flying from Melbourne to Sydney without in-flight refuelling and the equipment needed to carry out that in-flight refuelling is very complicated and extraordinarily expensive to acquire. If our links with the United States were cut off by some means, could we maintain these aircraft? We used to have an aircraft industry, but I am afraid the Government allowed it to wither away to the point where it can now play only a very minor role in providing our defence equipment. So our Air Force is completely dependent on the United States for the maintenance of its aircraft. I have to question whether this is wise policy. It would seem to me that a much better approach would be to have a light and highly mobile defence force very largely supplied from local resources. There is no reason why we could not have negotiated an arrangement with an overseas supplier for an aircraft which could be entirely made in this country. There is really no reason why we could not have set about the task of designing our own aircraft, particularly as Sweden, a country with only eight million people, was able to do so. Sweden has designed not only a fighter aircraft but also a bomber aircraft, a trainer aircraft and so on, and all are made in Sweden. If Sweden, a much smaller nation than Australia, can do that, there is no fundamental reason why we cannot do it. Senator Robertson —That is not really logical, Senator, is it? Sweden is a smaller country, with slightly different resources and slightly different problems from Australia, surely? Senator SIDDONS —Well, it is a very small country. It does have a manufacturing base. Senator Robertson —That is right, but it has different problems from what we have. Senator SIDDONS —We had a very efficient aircraft industry in this country up until a few years ago. Senator Robertson —Until they produced the Nomad? Senator SIDDONS —No, I am saying that for the first 10 or 20 years after the war it was a very efficient industry. It could have been deployed, but it was not, and it is a great pity. For instance, we are buying 75 F18s at a cost of $4.2 billion. I suggest that that is a very vulnerable position to be in. If even a percentage of that $4.2 billion had been invested in developing an aircraft manufacturing capability and in developing our skills to design and equip our aircraft, we would be in a very much safer position. All we get from spending $4.2 billion is 75 aircraft. We have no factory to maintain them and no capability to develop new aircraft for new needs. Some of the decisions that have been made in the past about our defence procurement have been abysmal. The F111 fiasco is well known to anybody who read the papers during the 1960s. Certainly there was a Liberal government in power at the time, but those planes were purchased without any contract being signed as to what the price was to be. The plane itself was inadequate because it was a compromise between an aircraft that could be used as a land based plane and as a naval plane too. We finished up with the worst of both worlds and with a plane that is no longer in production in the United States. So in the F111 we are stuck with a very unsatisfactory aircraft for Australia's needs. There is not much doubt about that. We are also stuck with a very complicated state of the art aircraft in the FA18, which we cannot maintain. Some four or five years ago there was talk of closing down our Government factories in Bendigo. I was a member of a committee that looked into that and I was particularly impressed with two things. First of all, the Bendigo Ordnance Factory was, in my view, efficient. It was staffed with a dedicated management, which had come to grips with some very complex problems. At that time we were considering purchasing the Panther tank from Germany and the factory set about manufacturing the gun that was to be used on that tank. It produced one and then tooled up to produce more, but for some unknown reason the German suppliers were able to convince the government of the day that it was better, more economical or whatever, for the whole of the tank to be imported and they said it was not necessary for us to manufacture at least a part of it. We had the capability to do so, but the Government factory was not allowed to do that. That was one of the major reasons why it was operating at a loss; it did not have sufficient throughput in the factory to cover overheads. A very similar fiasco occurred with the procurement of heavy artillery for the Army. The Ordnance Factory at Bendigo quoted and I think it was the lowest tenderer at the time, but the American supplier of the artillery said that it could produce it more quickly, and on that basis it got the order. Once it got the order and was committed, it transpired that there was an American law which said that American defence needs must take precedence over any other defence contracts, and there were delays and delays in acquiring field artillery for the Australian Army. If we had placed the order locally, that equipment would have been manufactured in Australia, supplying the Army well ahead of the time of its being produced in the United States. I raise these matters only as examples of what has gone on in the past and what presumably will go on in the future, because there is very little support in this paper for local procurement and manufacture, and that is very much to be regretted. If we were prepared to fly aircraft which were more flexible, cheaper and of lower technology, we could produce them at much less cost than those we presently fly and we could have a much more reliable defence capability. We need defence equipment that can be used in association with the United States, but we also have to have defence equipment that can be used in association with our allies in New Zealand, Malaysia and Papua New Guinea. Above all, I stress that there is this great need to have defence equipment that can be maintained and produced within the country. If just a small percentage of the total outlay of $25 billion to which the Government is committed were to be directed towards greater local procurement, to developing factories that can continue to supply our defence needs, Australia's defence position would be very much enhanced. Senator CHILDS(New South Wales)(12.26) —The White Paper `The Defence of Australia' establishes a defence framework that will protect Australia-a framework that is based on Australia's geography and conditions. The deployment of Australia's defence forces in the north and north-west of the country is long overdue. The emphasis on the development of our own defence capacity, with the development of our own submarines, light patrol frigates and over the horizon radar system, is a strategy that I strongly support. In the short time that I have today I would like to comment on what I consider is a deficiency of the paper. Although I support the basic thrust of the paper, there is an omission in it. It refers, properly, in a number of places to the importance of disarmament, the prevention of nuclear war and the avoidance of global conflict. Of course, the Australian Government has a proud record of activism in world forums, particularly the United Nations, in disarmament negotiations. This is personified by the excellent work of Ambassador Butler. However, in my view the paper does not address the problem that President Reagan is wrong in his pursuit of the star wars strategy. It is as simple as that. I believe that the star wars program, the escalation of the arms race into outer space, only increases the threat of world catastrophe in the next decade or so that this paper examines. As an ally of the United States of America we have an obligation to use our special relationship to voice our objections. The part of chapter 2 of the White Paper headed `Australia and the global balance', particularly paragraphs 2.4 and 2.6, is far too trite, in my view. The White Paper fails to reflect the criticism by the Australian Labor Party and the Labor Government of the star wars concept. We oppose any military bases in outer space. We condemn the testing, research and deployment of any anti-satellite weapons or any space based anti-ballistic missile weapons system in outer space. We support the regulation of all anti-ballistic missile systems in accordance with the anti-ballistic missile treaty. The document `Australia and Disarmament: A Step in the Right Direction' from the Department of Foreign Affairs states: The Government has consistently called for agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space. I am very critical of President Reagan's Administration. My view is shared by a whole range of commentators around the world, particularly a growing number of United States senators and congressmen. This is nothing to do with anti-Americanism. It is to do with one American President who is following a dangerous and destabilising strategy. I refer to a typical example of responsible criticism from the very respected Denis Healey, a former Chancellor of the Exchequer and the shadow Foreign Minister in the Labour Party in Great Britain. For 30 years Denis Healey has been a friend of the United States, particularly in the development of the Atlantic alliance. Yet Denis Healey, in a Fabian Society pamphlet, when referring to the history of the United States isolationism before the Second World War and subsequently in the post-war period, and referring to the developments that have occurred under President Reagan's Administration, stated: The danger today is not that the Americans will retire into pre-war normalcy, but that they will opt for a policy of global unilateralism under which they intervene all over the world without trying to win the consent or understanding of their allies or of the countries in which they operate. He went on to say: The Reagan Administration has been greatly influenced in its foreign and defence policies by anti-communist ideologues who reject the post-war settlement with the Soviet Union, want to overturn the agreements made at Yalta and Potsdam and believe that America can and should build up sufficient military superiority over the Soviet Union to compel it to make concessions to American hegemony. This trend in recent American policy has shown total indifference to world opinion in areas like Central America and the Caribbean. So that is how Denis Healey draws attention in this Fabian Society pamphlet to the rapid change from previous administrations to the Reagan Administration. That is the point I wish to make. James Ridgeway, writing in the Village Voice, put it this way: To achieve that objective (of rolling back communism) the tacticians of the New Right succeeded in creating a foreign policy which ignored or skirted the `pragmatists' in the State and Defence departments. Its aims were almost certainly approved by the President himself who has called the sacked Security Council aide (Oliver) North, its chief operative a `National hero'. As Garry Wills writes in a new book on President Reagan's America, of which I have seen a review: If Reagan is superb at making up things that did not happen, he is just as adept at forgetting things that did, particularly if they were unpleasant. As I have said before in the Senate, we now know that President Reagan's obsession is in active defence through the deployment of mechanisms to destroy enemy missiles before they reach American soil. This is called the star wars project. Let us have no doubts about it: Star wars is an escalation of the arms race. As a previous Under-Secretary of State, George Ball, noted: President Reagan has set in motion forces that seem almost certain to trigger a furious acceleration of the nuclear arms race, eliminate the last hope of controlling the weapons spiral by agreement and seriously jeopardise the confidence and support of our NATO allies. The reality is that, when President Reagan made his abrupt public announcement about the star wars project in 1983, it was against the advice of some of his most senior advisers, including his Secretary of Defence. If, as the defence White Paper states, one of Australia's principal national defence interests is the avoidance of global conflict, we must continue to point out that the strategic defence initiative violates the 1972 anti-ballistic missile treaty. Article 5, paragraph 1, of that treaty states: Each party undertakes not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, space-based, or mobile land based. It is the simplistic and aggressive world view that President Reagan and his followers possess that has prompted a retreat into the curious Disneyland-type fantasy of star wars. I believe very strongly that it is the greatest threat to the world at this moment. President Reagan's view is a quick fix solution that not even his most senior scientists are prepared to declare will work. On behalf of the Australian Government, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Bill Hayden, has expressed concern at the possibility of the arms race going into outer space. Certainly, Australia has declined to endorse the Reagan star wars program. As Bill Hayden has said: There should be no weapons in space, in our view. If there are such systems, and if those who propose the exclusively peaceful use of space have such systems already there, they should remove them. As reported in the International Herald Tribune in mid-January, the President's new security adviser, Frank Carlucci, and White House Chief of Staff, Donald Regan, privately criticised Mr Weinberger for his public campaign for the early deployment of star wars and for freelancing his views without the permission of the President. The other thing that is happening under the loose administration of President Reagan is that various people within the Reagan Administration are following different lines. I do not mind them having different views in the Administration but the danger is that this particular policy breaches the stability that the ABM treaty has given the world for some time. Since then, of course, Secretary of State George Shultz has been persuaded to Mr Weinberger's point of view that it may be advantageous to interpret the ABM treaty more widely. In the first week of February President Reagan expressed an interest in just such a wider interpretation of the ABM treaty. This revelation brought a warning of a constitutional crisis for the Administration if such a plan were implemented. The warning was delivered by Sam Nunn, a senior Democrat from Georgia who chairs the Senate Armed Services Committee. In America a very strong and powerful debate is taking place and many are critical of this attempt to alter the interpretation of the ABM treaty. The reinterpretation of the treaty and the early deployment of SDI has been criticised by a whole range of American allies. The point I am trying to make is that a number of very responsible people agree with me that there is a danger in this new interpretation. Lord Carrington of Britain, the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, is reported to have sent a letter to President Reagan asking that the Alliance be consulted before a decision is made on the early deployment of space weapons. Sir Anthony Acland, British Ambassador to the United States, maintained that the United States should not act on a broader interpretation of the ABM treaty. Conservative leaders such as Prime Minister Thatcher and Chancellor Helmut Kohl have said that the United States should keep to the traditional view of the 1972 treaty. Japanese diplomats are also reported to have expressed concern at the United States moves. Time does not allow me to develop and to describe the detailed criticism in the United States of President Reagan's star wars initiative. On another occasion when I have more time I would like to show the comprehensive disagreement that exists within the American Administration. Because of that I would have no hesitation in saying that, while I support many of the thrusts and policies of the paper, as I have indicated, I think it is gravely deficient in that the criticism that the Government has of the SDI deployment has not been reflected and, therefore, the paper is disappointing to that extent. Senator HAMER(Victoria)(12.39) —There is much that is good in this new White Paper produced by the Government. Many things in it reflect and echo things that I have been saying for many years. It is an improvement on what is really the discussion paper prepared by Mr Dibb following his review of Australia's defence capabilities. I think the improvements have been caused by the professional comments of people in the Defence Force and legitimate criticisms made by the Opposition. There are two great changes in this White Paper as compared to the Force composition recommended by Mr Dibb. Firstly, much more emphasis is given in the White Paper to the importance of our treaty responsibilities and our ability to operate with allies and, secondly, it is a recognition that the Force composition recommended by Mr Dibb appeared to be too defensive. It is important for a country such as Australia to be able to project its power, particularly its air power but I would suggest also its maritime power and in certain circumstances its land power, to the limits of its area of interest. We cannot wait for development to hit Australia. The Australian Labor Party always seems to be tending towards isolationism, of which the most extreme version was put forward by a former Labor Minister for Defence, Mr Lance Barnard, who gave vent to the strategic dictum that Australia's strategic frontier was its coastline. That must be the most absurd statement of strategic policy since the death of King Ethelred the Unready. We cannot operate like that. We must take action in our sphere of interest to protect our legitimate interests and we must have a Defence Force that can do this. The most important aspect of this new defence White Paper is its emphasis on defence self-reliance, or what I would prefer to describe as a Defence Force that is structured round being able to do the things that we might have to do on our own. But at the same time we must recognise that defence forces structured round one role inevitably have to do many other roles. One of the things about the Defence Force, structured though it might be to do the things we have to do on our own, is that it still must be organised, trained and equipped so that it can co-operate with allies in defence efforts outside of the tasks that we can cope with on our own. This development of our strategic doctrine is not new. I can remember in 1959 being a party to a drafting of the strategic basis of Australia's defence that made this very point that we must become more self-reliant and we must structure our Defence Force round the things that we might have to do on our own. That came as something of a shock to the then Government, which asked the perhaps fair question that, if this new strategic basis were accepted, what would be the effect on our Defence Force structure. This was done within the Department of Defence and the Services, and the Government then accepted the new Defence Force structure and rejected the strategic basis upon which it was founded, which shows some of the problems of getting people to address these sorts of problems. In 1976 a new and very important defence White Paper was produced by the Fraser Government. But that was not, at least in the short term, reflected in the force composition. This is the important point. If we have a strategic theory and a concept of operations, it must be reflected by the forces we provide. Any consideration in this country of what our Defence Force structure should be is inevitably constrained by the resources we are prepared to put to this purpose. I think the assumption in the defence White Paper is that our proportion of gross domestic product devoted to defence-running between about 2.6 per cent and 2.9 per cent over the years-is all that we are going to be able to spend. I think we should spend more, but I do not believe we would. If in Opposition we promised to spend more, we would not be believed, and if we were believed and we achieved government, we would not do it because confronted with the economic shambles that this Hawke Government is going to bequeath us, any immediate promise, or promise within the next few years, to spend substantially more on defence would not be a credible economic option. If we criticise the force structure and the balance of forces provided in this defence White Paper, if we want to put something in, it is up to us to show what we would take out to provide the resources for that new activity. That is what I propose to do when I continue my speech later this afternoon. Sitting suspended from 12.45 to 2 p.m Senator CHANEY —My question is addressed to the Minister representing the Minister Assisting the Treasurer on Prices. I refer him to the reported statements of the Chairman of Coles-Myer, Mr Bevan Bradbury, whose comments on prices are of some interest because Coles-Myer is the largest retailer in Australia, and to the fact that Mr Bradbury has said that the Government `should look in the mirror if they want to find the price rise culprits'. Mr Bradbury made reference to the fact that whilst the company's profits have gone up by 16.7 per cent the amount paid to the Government has risen by 40 per cent. Is the Minister Assisting the Treasurer on Prices, or indeed any other Minister, examining the extent to which government taxes and charges are responsible for rising prices? What action, if any, is the Government taking to reduce its contribution to rising prices? Senator BUTTON —I did see reports of the statement by Mr Bradbury. I thought he said `governments'-plural. Senator Chaney said `government' in his question. Senator Chaney —Yes, he did. I said `governments'. Senator BUTTON —No, the honourable senator said `government' in his question. He asked me: What has the Government done about it? He said that the Government should look in the mirror. Mr Bradbury said `governments'. There is a very important distinction and I draw it to Senator Chaney's attention straightaway. There are impositions from State governments as well as the Federal Government. If one asks representatives of the Queensland mining industry, with whom I had a meeting last week, about State government charges and the costs of production of coal, they will say that for one company alone it is a burden of $150m a year. Senator Chaney —The people burning their little coal fires in Melbourne are really feeling that. It has nothing to do with domestic prices. Senator BUTTON —In a rather roundabout way that is probably true. At this stage I do not wish to give Senator Chaney a lecture that he would not understand on the effects of the balance of trade on domestic prices and inflation. Perhaps I will at some other time. I saw what Mr Bevan Bradbury said. It was a very fair comment to make. There has been a lot of publicity about particular retail outlets, and so on. I think the important thing is that we would like to see overall attention to price restraint in the community on a voluntary basis. I hope that companies will pay attention to that issue, just as governments must. I will direct the last part of the question to the Minister Assisting the Treasurer on Prices and obtain an answer. Senator ELSTOB —Can the Minister for Resources and Energy advise what future energy exports are likely to be required by Korea from Australia? Is the Minister able to say how competitive Australia is compared with major suppliers? What other Asian countries have potential as future importers of Australian energy resources? Senator GARETH EVANS —Korea is clearly already one of our major trading partners-I think about fifth overall-and it is certainly our second largest customer for coal and our fourth largest buyer of iron ore. On the evidence of my recent discussions in Korea a few weeks ago with senior Ministers and industry officials, there is every reason to believe that it is likely that Korea will remain a very important and indeed expanding trading partner. I think there is particular ground for confidence, so far as energy exports to Korea are concerned, with growth rates still forecast in that country at around 7 per cent per annum under the new five-year economic plan. All of this suggests that the market will be an expanding rather than a contracting one. Specifically on the subject of energy exports, I think the situation can be summarised as follows: Regarding uranium, the Republic of Korea has nine nuclear powers plants with a total capacity of around 7.6 gigawatts presently in operation and under construction. Orders for a further two nuclear power plants to be completed in the mid-1990s have recently been awarded. Australia is already a major supplier of uranium to the ROK. We are regarded as a reliable supplier, able to compete effectively in the international market. We would expect, as a result, a share in any increased demand as new facilities come on stream. Australia is trying very hard to sell liquefied natural gas there, particularly gas from the project that is being contemplated in the Bonaparte Gulf involving Elf Aquitaine and its partners. A window of opportunity has been identified in the Korean market in the mid-1990s. To secure that market, Australia will have to be competitive with a number of other potential suppliers from Alaska, Canada, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and so on. Our coal exports, particularly for steaming coal, have grown rapidly. Our share of that market has increased from 5.4 per cent in 1980 to about 50 per cent in 1986-a very rapid increase over a very short period. We hope that we can get a significant share of the increasing demand for coking coal as well as steaming coal, although Korea is under very overt and conspicuous pressure from the United States of American and Canada. A lot more could be said about the detail of all this. As far as other Asian countries are concerned, which I think was the other part of the question, the Asian market elsewhere has obvious potential for Australian coal purchases by not only Japan but also Hong Kong and Taiwan and, to a lesser extent, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Senator Lewis —Come on, Gareth, incorporate it. Senator GARETH EVANS —I know that Senator Lewis regards that as boring, but he is the kind of person who is utterly uninterested in issues of great significance to the future of this country, and I think that speaks for itself. Senator REID —My question is addressed to the Minister representing the Minister for Territories. Given the current impasse between the Australian Capital Territory Health Authority and Canberra doctors, for how long can the Canberra public hospital system cope under the present situation, and what arrangements have been made to ensure that people who have placed their faith in the Government's Medicare system will be able to receive necessary medical treatment in Canberra hospitals while the disagreement continues? Senator GIETZELT —Having regard to the very sensitive nature of the discussions that are going on between the affected parties, I think it would be bad tactics by any Minister to make any comments which may be construed as creating a climate that would not resolve the difficult situation that exists. Individual Ministers and members may have a point of view. They are entitled to express that point of view; I have no quarrel with that. I represent the Minister who is actually charged with the responsibility of conducting negotiations and I do not intend to enter into the public arena in that respect, although my views would probably be well known. Senator CHILDS —My question, which is directed to the Minister for Veterans' Affairs, relates to the condition of Australian war graves in Lebanon. With the recent fighting, the two Beirut war cemeteries have been extensively damaged by bombs and gunfire. Can the Minister give assurances that all efforts are being taken to keep the situation in Lebanon under review and that, if current peace initiatives prove successful, the Office of Australian War Graves has a contingency plan and is prepared? Senator GIETZELT —Every senator would be aware that there has been considerable civil disturbance in Lebanon for a number of years-over the past decade, from memory. As a result, I have to advise Senator Childs that considerable damage has been done to war graves in that country. There has been perhaps more serious damage in recent times. My Department advises me that there are over 300 such graves in the area and that extensive damage has been caused to them, to such an extent that even members of the Lebanese community in Australia have offered to assist the Government and the Office of Australian War Graves to take steps to try to remedy the damage that has taken place. Until such time as there is a settlement between the parties-there are several parties in Lebanon-there is very little we can do except hope that there is a resolution of the conflict and that some normality returns to that somewhat war torn community which would enable us then to carry out our proper responsibilities in the care and maintenance of the war graves in Lebanon. Senator BOSWELL —I refer the Leader of the Government in the Senate to a joint statement released today by the Prime Minister, the Treasurer and the Minister for Arts, Heritage and Environment denying approval for a proposed silica sand mining project at Shelburne Bay in far north Queensland. Does the Minister realise that this project would have provided 80 jobs, $20m per year in export sales and investment in plant and equipment of $30m, most of which would have been manufactured in north Queensland? At a time when this nation is facing a balance of payments crisis, why has the Hawke Government made this decision to deny Australia $20m worth of export income every year to pander to a handful of vocal greenies and Democrat voters, bearing in mind this area is virtually inaccessible, being 377 miles from Cairns and 200 miles from the nearest Aboriginal settlement? Senator BUTTON —I was unaware of the announcement this morning. Senator Boswell —You should be aware of it. You are the Leader of the Government. Senator BUTTON —I, as Leader of the Government, am aware of most things, which is something I could scarcely say for the honour- able senator. I understand the area in question, Shelburne Bay, was the subject of an environmental impact statement and the Government's decision was made on that basis. Senator MAGUIRE —I refer the Minister for Finance, representing the Minister for Communications and also the Treasurer, to the `Joh for PM' bumper stickers which were inserted in the nation's Sunday newspapers on 8 March. Can the Commonwealth collect its wholesale sales tax on these stickers, even though the great majority have not been used and many apparently have been piling up in dead letter offices around the country? Has Australia Post any statutory obligation to return the many thousands of stickers that have been re-addressed to the Queensland National Party headquarters in unstamped envelopes and have subsequently ended up in Australia Post's dead letter offices? Senator WALSH —It has been reported that-- Senator Boswell —Get to the fundamental problems of this nation. Senator WALSH —The National Party and its predecessor, the Country Party, Senator Boswell, have certainly been the fundamental problems of this nation over a very long period. Indeed, the present structural imbalance of our economy and the non-competitiveness of Australian manufacturing industry is attributable more to John McEwen than to any other Australian, living or dead. Nobody made as big a contribution to developing the structural inefficiency of the Australian economy as John McEwen made in the 1950s and the 1960s. Insofar as this question relates to the National Party and its predecessor, the Country Party, Senator Boswell is absolutely correct; it does get to Australia's fundamental problems. It has been reported that the stickers in question cost some $120,000 to print. If that is so, and assuming that the National Party had not set up some sort of tax avoidance arrangement, there would have been a $24,000 sales tax payment due on those stickers. While the Government is grateful, I suppose, for that modest contribution to public revenues from the National Party of Queensland, unfortunately if one regards the Post Office as being part of the government sector in Australia, it may be a net loss for the Government because I understand that 2,500 envelopes have been received at the mail exchange in Brisbane addressed to the National Party in Queensland, envelopes which apparently contain these stickers but with no stamp on the envelope. The postal regulations under those circumstances require that the addressee is given the option of paying the postage on the article, plus a penalty-I think it amounts to 45c in total-to take delivery of the article. If the addressee refuses to do so, the dead letter office is required to open the envelopes to see whether there is a sender's address inside them. Presumably there will not be any sender's address, but if there is a sender's address the Post Office can then return the envelopes to the sender and require the sender to pay the postage plus I think also some modest penalty. But on the assumption that the senders' addresses will not be on them, the Post Office will have to open some 2,500 envelopes and make other attempts to deliver this mail in accordance with the postal regulations. That exercise might well cost more than the $24,000 sales tax which the Government collected if, indeed, it did collect it. Useful though that presumed donation from the Queensland National Party may have been, on balance, the public sector may lose from the exercise. There are, however, some beneficial side effects I suppose of the postal distribution exercise or sticker distribution exercise. I understand, for example, that the President of the Liberal Party in Queensland, Mr Moore, has added an `n' behind the `h' to make the sticker read `John for PM'. I assume he was alluding to John Howard when he did that and not to somebody else. I suppose it is pretty hard to change `Joh' into `Andrew'. Maybe that is the reason that he did it, although perhaps he too was acquiring delusions of grandeur and aspires to be Prime Minister himself. There have been a number of cases where the stickers have been cut up and re-arranged in the form of `Joh-ho-ho-ho for PM'. Senator NEWMAN —My question is directed to the Leader of the Government in the Senate. I ask: Is the Minister aware that the Australian Defence Force Food Specifications Committee, composed of members of the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation, the defence establishment and manufacturers, has indicated that in purchasing food for the Australian defence forces no preference is to be given to Australian products over foodstuffs from New Zealand. In the light of the Government's exhortation to the nation to buy Australian, the disasters being faced by Australian farmers, our frightening balance of trade figures and, finally, the emphasis in the defence White Paper on Australian industry participation, will the Government ensure that food grown and manufactured in Australia is given preference in supplying our Australian defence forces? Senator BUTTON —I have not heard of all that sort of spooky stuff which Senator Newman went on with. The decision to which the honourable senator refers is quite understandable under the terms of closer economic relations with New Zealand, which was something invented by the Fraser Government's Doug Anthony. That is an agreement which was entered into by the previous Government and it binds this Government. There is no preference for Australian food in respect of these matters. I suppose the honourable senator's husband was a Minister in the Government when that decision was made. Senator REYNOLDS —Has the attention of the Special Minister of State been drawn to a report in the Australian to the effect that Federal police have been conducting inquiries at the property of Gold Coast developer Mr Gore? I am sure everyone will recall that Mr Gore is the $25m fund raiser for the Queensland Premier's Canberra campaign and also a recipient of a special $10m Queensland Government loan. Are Federal police confident that any matters referred to the Queensland State police will be fully investigated? What steps can Federal police take to prevent the Queensland Government using political influence to protect this front man from having to comply with the law? Senator TATE —My attention has been drawn to a report in the Australian to the effect stated by Senator Reynolds. I think her description of Mr Gore as the $25m fund raiser for the Queensland Premier's Canberra campaign is probably not justified now in the light of several answers which I have given to very astute questions raised by Senator Black, which I am sure have indicated to political organisations and potential donors involved in that campaign that anonymity, either as to the amount of donation or the identity of donors, cannot be relied on if the terms of the Commonwealth Electoral Act are to be observed. In relation to the substance of Senator Reynolds's question, it was not the practice of my predecessor and it is not my practice to confirm or deny the existence of Australian Federal Police investigations. However, it is my understanding that in the course of a Customs investigation in August 1985 a firearm was found in Mr Gore's Southport home. Mr Gore was advised to surrender the firearm to the Queensland police, which I understand he did. The matter is one for the Queensland police. The Australian Federal Police were not involved in this matter. Senator MacGIBBON —Is the Minister for Industry, Technology and Commerce aware that the French Government has negotiated a 130 per cent offset agreement with the Boeing aircraft company for four Boeing 707 airborne warning and control aircraft, a contract valued at $US885m, about $A1.4 billion? Britain, with an order for six Boeing 707 AWACs, has also been awarded offsets to the value of 130 per cent of its contract. Can the Minister explain to the Senate why the best he and his Department can do is negotiate only 30 per cent offsets with Boeing? Senator BUTTON —The normal offset arrangements which the Government has in place are for 30 per cent. The sad fact, however, is that the Fraser Government caved in to pressure from Boeing and reduced even that level of offsets to 10 per cent. All other offsets are at a 30 per cent level. Since we came to government my Department, particularly in the last year, has spent a lot of time trying to renegotiate the Boeing level of offsets to the level of those applying to other companies which provide offset entitlements. We will have some success with that and an announcement will be made shortly. Senator JONES —Has the Minister for Resources and Energy seen an article published in the Melbourne Herald on 16 March, and similar articles in several other newspapers, claiming that Japan has revised downwards its forward projection of nuclear energy capacity? What effect, if any, will this have on Australian uranium suppliers? Senator GARETH EVANS —I am aware of the article referred to, which has been repeated in a number of newspapers in recent days, which asserts that Japan's projected nuclear energy capacity for the year 2000 has been revised downward from 90 million kilowatts to 53 million kilowatts by the Japan Atomic Energy Commission. In the article a number of resulting implications have been drawn about falling demand potential for Australian uranium. I am not aware, however, of any previous nuclear energy plan in Japan which targeted a 90 million kilowatt capacity for the turn of the century. Australian thinking at both industry and governmental level on the likely future size of the Japanese uranium market has been based on much lower, although still substantial, official forecasts. For example, the official Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry `Long Term Energy Supply and Demand Outlook' published in November 1983 contained a projection of 62 million kilowatts for the year 2000. This figure was also used in MITI's `Nuclear Energy Vision' published in Japan in July last year. More recently, in November 1986, the Japanese Institute of Energy Economics published forecasts of 51 million kilowatts for the year 2000 and 69 million kilowatts for the year 2010. It appears that the reported new forecast of 53 million kilowatts is more a case of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission bringing its official forecasts into line with current reality than a formal decision not to proceed with some proposed construction of nuclear generating plant by the turn of the century. This being the case, the implication in the newspaper articles that Australian uranium suppliers are unlikely to increase their sales to Japan is well astray of the truth. As the articles note, nuclear energy is already Japan's largest source of electricity and its slice of the power supply will continue to grow. Let me mention finally, even though I can see Senator Lewis getting twitchy because the answer it not entertaining enough for him-mercifully, Question Time does not exist for his edification-that in fact a capacity of 53 million kilowatts by the year 2000 would be more than double the existing Japanese capacity of about 24 1/2 million kilowatts. It is clear that an expansion of this magnitude would greatly increase Japanese demand for uranium, opening up significant new export opportunities for Australian uranium suppliers, in terms of both overall sales and market share. Senator CRICHTON-BROWNE —I refer the Minister representing the Minister for Social Security to the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in the case of Ho and the Secretary to the Department of Social Security of November 1986 which stated that an applicant who had children in Vietnam could have sufficient care and control of those children to be eligible to receive family allowance. Can the Minister inform the Senate how many other cases there are in which family allowance is paid for non-resident children and what is the annual cost to the Commonwealth of these payments? I also ask whether the Department has made any estimation of the likely applications for family allowance for families in these circumstances after this decision, and what is the anticipated cost to the Commonwealth. Senator TATE —No precise figures are available to respond to Senator Crichton-Browne's question but I can say that since April 1986 a total of 252 allowees residing in Australia have been recorded as being granted payments of family allowance for children living overseas. This would include payments for a small number of children who had previously lived in Australia but the majority of children involved would never have lived in Australia. Payment to 252 allowees would total approximately $180,000 a year. The precise number of persons living in Australia who would be able to receive family allowances in respect of children living in Vietnam and other countries, if the AAT's decision in Ho is adopted, is not known. However, it could be expected that the figure would be substantial. That is a prelude to the next point which I wish to emphasise, which is that because the Tribunal's decision in Ho conflicts with earlier decisions in similar cases which interpreted eligibility for family allowances as requiring responsibility for the day to day maintenance, training and advancement of the children involved, an appeal has been lodged with the Federal Court. No hearing date has yet been set down. Senator CROWLEY —My question is addressed to the Minister Assisting the Prime Minister on the Status of Women. The White Paper `Defence of Australia' released this week by the Minister for Defence contains new and higher figures on the employment of women in the Defence Force. Can the Minister confirm this apparent broadening of opportunities for women in the Defence Force and can she say what new areas have been opened to women? Senator RYAN —I am happy to say that I can confirm that the defence White Paper includes new figures on both the number of women employed in the Defence Force and the number of Defence Force positions open to women. These figures represent a significant increase on those previously released. When Labor came to office in 1983 only around 8 per cent of Defence Force jobs were open to women. Now, 35 per cent of all Defence Force jobs are open to women. The number of women actually serving in the Defence Force has also risen significantly. In July 1983 women comprised 6.2 per cent of the Defence Force personnel. The figure had risen to 8.4 per cent by 31 December 1986. The first women pilot trainees were recruited by the Air Force this year, in 1987. There has been a significant expansion in the number of trade-based positions and apprenticeships open to women. Opportunities now exist for women to serve at sea on Navy oceanographic, hydrographic and training ships. Women now undertake officer training at the Australian Defence Force Academy. I should emphasise that women compete on the basis of merit with their male colleagues for all Defence Force positions which are open to them. Our Government believes that young women have a great deal to contribute to Australia's Defence Force and, as is made clear in the White Paper, we will continue the process of opening the maximum number of positions to women consistent with maintaining operational effectiveness. I urge young women to investigate the opportunities now open to them in the Australian Defence Force. Senator VANSTONE —I refer the Minister for Education to the Sydney Morning Herald estimate that 30,000 students are still waiting for Austudy grants and to the Minister's answer to my question on this matter on 26 February in which she refused to say in what way, if any, the outstanding students had been notified of the availability of emergency relief and in which she indicated that the delays in payments were usually due to students giving inadequate or inaccurate information. I now ask the Minister: Have students not yet in receipt of Austudy grants been notified of the availability of emergency relief and, if so, how? Is there a problem with the computer system being used for Austudy and is it a flawed system purchased from the Department of Defence? Why did the Minister seek to leave the blame for this fiasco with the students and not admit the departmental problems involved? Was she aware of the departmental problems involved, or did she simply choose not to tell the Senate about them? Lastly, what has the Minister done to remedy this inept fiasco, which is draining dollars from the student loan resources around Australia? Senator RYAN —Senator Vanstone asks a number of questions, several of them based on false premises. The fact is that there have been some delays in the payment of Austudy to some students. However, those delays have not been caused by defects in the computer system. There were some settling in problems with the new system and the new nature of Austudy. Those two things together have meant a slower than usual start to the processing of applications. However, the system is working well and I am pleased to assure the Senate that there have been no hardware malfunctions. Almost 87,000 applications have been processed to date. There are no backlogs in processing by the computer. Around 2,750 applications are being processed daily and this rate is expected to continue. There is a bottleneck which arises from what I have described as a slower start, and this has been impossible to overcome in the short term because of the large number of applications. The Department is making every attempt to process applications at a similar rate to previous years. Most students should not face delays significantly worse than in past years, although, as I said before in answer to Senator Vanstone, there are long delays for forms which are not correctly filled in. I do not think Senator Vanstone is right in describing that answer as blaming the students. The fact of the matter is that if forms are filled in accurately they can be processed without any further checking. If there are gaps in the information they require extra checking. That is just the fact of the matter, without attributing the blame to anybody. As to emergency relief, I think I informed Senator Vanstone the last time she raised this matter that it is possible for students in very difficult circumstances to get emergency handling of their application. That means that their applications are taken out of the system and handled manually. A very large number of applications, over 3,000, have been handled manually to date. So it is quite a widespread practice. Students learn about that when they go and discuss their circumstances with Commonwealth education officers in State offices. There is no blanket informing of students of this, but obviously officers take every care to give students appropriate advice, and by and large I think students feel satisfied that Commonwealth education officers give them all the advice that is relevant to their case. If Commonwealth education officers judge that a student is in truly difficult circumstances they will let that student know that it is possible to have his or her application processed manually. As I said, over 3,000 students have had such emergency treatment. I should say, too, that there have been criticisms of Commonwealth education officers in this matter. I feel that by and large they are unjustified. There is enormous pressure on education officers at this time of year. Austudy is a form of payment which has a peak period. Extra casual staff have been employed to ease the burden but there are a huge number of applications which are not always adequately filled in at the outset. There are emergency provisions for students in dire circumstances and these applications are being processed. It should be the case that within another month most applications will be satisfactorily completed. Senator VANSTONE —Mr President, I ask a supplementary question. I thank the Minister for her answer. In response to the question of whether there has been a problem with the computer system I understood the Minister's answer to be that there were no hardware problems. Do I take it from that that the Minister says that there are no computer problems and therefore denies that there are software malfunctions, as indicated in recent Sydney Morning Herald articles? Senator RYAN —What I said in reply to Senator Vanstone's original question was that because the computer system and the student allowance system are completely new there have been settling-in problems. However, I am advised that the system is working well and that there are no hardware malfunctions now. Senator FOREMAN —My question is directed to the Minister representing the Minister for Transport and relates to yet another level crossing accident, this time between a semi-trailer and the northbound Ghan passenger train at Crystal Brook, north of Adelaide. Fortunately in this particular case no one was seriously injured, but the situation could have had tragic consequences. Will the Minister give assurances that appropriate investigations are now under way into the cause of the accident so that a similar one may be prevented in the future? Senator GIETZELT —The Senate will be aware that there are hundreds of level crossing accidents throughout Australia and that from time to time fatalities occur. As Senator Foreman has said, yesterday at 1.30 p.m. there was one such accident. The northbound Ghan train struck a semi-trailer at a level crossing in the town of Crystal Brook, north of Adelaide. It was one of those accidents which should and could have been avoided. Fortunately there were no deaths or serious injuries, although eight passengers and a guard were treated for minor injuries and later allowed to proceed home. An investigation has been ordered into the incident to see whether greater precautions can be taken, although I understand that the crossing was protected by flashing lights and bells which, according to preliminary investigations, were working at the time. The police are also currently investigating the crash. The Government and the Minister for Transport are determined that every safety precaution should be taken in these areas. Certainly some accidents occur because of carelessness on the part of road users or train operators. It is essential, therefore, that every publicity be given, particularly to drivers of vehicles, to make sure that they respond to the warning bells which operate for the purpose of stopping such accidents. Senator SHEIL —I remind the Leader of the Government in the Senate that the 1986 Budget doubled the sales tax on earthmoving equipment and company tax has risen from 46 to 49 per cent. The situation now is that some of these manufacturers are paying 75 per cent of the difference between their costs and their prices in taxes. How does the Minister reconcile this situation with the Government's campaign of encouraging local manufacturing and to buy Australian? Senator BUTTON —I thought that most earthmoving equipment was imported here. I think that all major earthmoving equipment is imported. Some of it may be put together when it arrives out of a pack or something and there may be smaller items of earthmoving equipment which are made in Australia. I raise that point only because the honourable senator related his question to the buy Australian campaign. I am not sure whether the sales tax on earthmoving equipment in fact doubled in the 1986 Budget, but I am quite clear that the company tax was not increased from 46 per cent to 49 per cent in the 1986 Budget. That is something which will happen at a later stage. I do not know what the point of the question was, except its relationship to the buy Australian campaign, and I do not think that is relevant. Senator BLACK —Can the Minister representing the Treasurer provide the Senate with an estimate of the cost to revenue if a system to provide for income splitting were implemented? Senator WALSH —I am not sure whether I heard the question properly but I think it was on income splitting. The Treasurer put out a statement earlier this year which said that the cost to revenue of income splitting would be of the order of $2.85 billion. It was, of course, the policy of the Opposition, as Senator Messner pointed out in a letter to the Australian Financial Review of 2 March. Senator Messner —Not the one you are talking about. Senator WALSH —I am referring to Senator Messner's letter in which he said that the policy put during the 1984 election campaign is still, up until this point, the policy of the Opposition and that that policy is for income splitting. Senator Chaney —I raise a point of order, Mr President. Senator Black's question was in order, but the Minister is now straying into areas where he is choosing to misquote the Opposition's policy. Instead of answering a perfectly sensible and straightforward question in a perfectly sensible and straightforward way, he is trying to politicise it. I am surprised that the Minister should stoop to such depths in this chamber. Mr President, you should ask the Minister to answer the question and not to enter into realms of speculation. I stress that it is speculation because he is misquoting the policy of the Opposition at the last election. The PRESIDENT —Senator Chaney is correct; the question was in order. However, I ask the Minister to answer the question within the areas of his own responsibility only. Senator WALSH —Certainly, Mr President. My responsibilities, of course, include representing the Treasurer in the Senate on taxation matters. Senator Messner raised the question by way of interjection, and I have here a copy of Senator Messner's letter. It says: It must be stated that the commitment we undertook before the 1984 election is current Liberal/National Parties' tax policy. It remains our commitment to introduce a system of income-splitting for tax purposes and also for the progressive introduction of tax rebates for child care expenses. The cost of income splitting, which is what Senator Black asked me about, is $2.85 billion or thereabouts. In other words, if income splitting were to be introduced and no other changes were made, the Budget deficit would blow out by another $3 billion. When one looks at the totality of ideas that have been floated by the Opposition, or the quasi policies or ideas advanced tentatively, pending veto by the National Party-- Senator Chaney —On a point of order, Mr President: The Minister is clearly debating the question. He has misquoted the Opposition policy, which was for the phased introduction of income splitting. There was never a policy before the 1984 election. However, my point of order is that the Minister is now debating the question. The PRESIDENT —I am listening to the Minister's answer carefully. It is a difficult area. I will allow him to continue his answer, but I would remind him again to limit his remarks to that area of his responsibility only. Senator WALSH —Certainly, Mr President. Since I have been accused by the Leader of the Opposition of misquoting Opposition tax policy-I think that was the term he used-I table a copy of the letter from the Australian Financial Review of 2 March from Senator Messner, shadow Minister for Finance and Taxation, Parliament House, Canberra. I have quoted verbatim the second and middle paragraph of that letter. If Senator Chaney does not like that, it is something he had better have out with Senator Messner and not with me. Senator Walters —Now you have said it all, sit down. Senator WALSH —I have not said it all; I could go on for ages if the honourable senator really wants me to. The central point, and much more important than whatever squabbles there may be between the Liberal Party and the National Party over what is policy, is the fact that income splitting would cost the revenue near $3 billion. In the absence of offsetting changes it would blow out the Budget deficit by $3 billion and, when it is put together in the totality of the idea that has been suggested, blow rates up to something like 30 or 40 per cent before the dollar crashed and hyper-inflation took over. Senator WALTERS —My question of the Minister for Education is in two parts. Is she aware that certain groups of students at the University of Tasmania who are undertaking a full year course on a financial year basis, that is from July 1986 to June 1987, are required to pay the $250 administration fee twice? These students include in-service teachers and honours degree students in botany, geography and zoology, who are required to undertake field work during the summer. Is the Minister also aware that one of the higher education institutions in my State has commenced to suspend students who have not paid the $250 administration charge? Will the Minister inform the House what action the Government proposes to take on that latter situation? Can the Minister give an assurance that the anomaly of being forced to pay twice will be rectified so that students enrolled for the financial year are placed on the same fee paying basis as those enrolled for the calendar year? Senator RYAN —My attention has been drawn to the circumstances facing students who are undertaking a course that goes from June to June. It certainly was the case that the administration charge was envisaged as applying to a calendar year, which is the normal, typical way in which students undertake a year of academic study. At this stage it appears that that situation may be anomalous, but the Government will be examining this circumstance, along with the results of the research project into the effect of the administration charge on particular groups, when the monitoring committee reports to the Government. We will have a look at it at that stage. With regard to the second part of Senator Walters's question, I am not aware that a Tasmanian institution has started turning students away. What we have put to the institutions is that they ought to be as liberal as possible in the final date by which they require the administration charge. Certainly we have asked that students who expect to be in receipt of Austudy and therefore get their $250 paid by the Commonwealth not be required to complete their payment until they have received Austudy. If other students know that they do not have the $250 themselves and have to seek a loan, I would have thought that by now they would have gone through those processes. In fact, I have had no particular representations from the Tasmanian institution and-- Senator Walters —You have now. Senator RYAN —Perhaps the honourable senator would like to tell me which institution it was. Senator ROBERTSON —My question is directed to the Minister for Finance. I draw his attention to the editorial in the Australian of 26 February, which states: . . . a big cut in the top income tax rates would actually increase Commonwealth revenues and help close the Budget deficit. Is it the case that income tax cuts of the dimensions currently being bandied about by Opposition parties could be expected to pay for themselves, thus absolving the proponents of those tax cuts from the need to specify expenditure cuts to pay the bill? Senator WALSH —A motley collection of feeble-minded scribblers and political charlatans have been running around for some time peddling that theory. It used to be known as the Laffer curve, or supply-side theory and ultimately became known as Reaganomics. The theory was that if tax rates were cut the revenue would increase because the tax base would expand by an amount which more than offset the decline in tax rates. It was always implausible, but it has been empirically tested by the President of the United States of America, whose name is now most closely associated with it, when it became known as Reaganomics. What happened as a result of this experiment with Reaganomics was that within two years the United States budget deficit blew out by about 250 per cent and its current account deficit blew out by something like the same amount-I do not remember precisely. Within about five years the United States was transformed from having been the largest creditor nation in the world to the largest debtor nation. There are two legs to the demonstrably false argument. The first is that tax cuts will eliminate the tax evasion industry and the second is the one to which I have already referred; that it will bring about an expansion of the tax base so great that it will more than offset the revenue loss from the reduced rates. Those arguments have been peddled by that motley collection of feeble-minded scribblers, which includes whoever wrote that Australian editorial-I notice that Katharine West was reported as saying the same thing today-and Sir Robert Sparkes, among others. Let me test the theory that tax evasion would disappear if the rate were lower. There has been in recent years a very large fall in the price of colour television sets but there is no evidence to suggest that the rate of theft of colour television sets has declined in accordance with their price. The simple reason is that people who have a disregard for the law and believe that the risk of being caught if they break it is acceptably low, will continue to do it even if the price of colour television sets has been reduced, or the rate of tax has been reduced. The ratbag Right in general-a classification which includes the Federal Opposition-has, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, also been peddling this Laffer curve, supply-side theory of Reaganomics. It has also said, in association with the argument, that because of high marginal tax rates nobody will work an extra hour of overtime. In most awards there is a 50 per cent penalty rate for overtime-the same penalty rate as the doctors union in New South Wales is trying to get for what is the equivalent of shift work. If one looks at the 40c tax rate, the after tax return in ordinary time is 60c and the after tax return for overtime is 90c, yet it is argued that the high marginal tax rates prevent people from working overtime. Even if the bracket were crossed between the 40c and 49c rates, the average rate per hour in ordinary time earnings retained is 60c and the overtime rate is 76c even if simultaneously a worker's income moves into a higher tax bracket. That is one of the many demonstrations which show how shoddy, both numerically and intellectually, are the nostrums of the ratbag Right. Senator TEAGUE —I ask the Minister for Education about the recently available Austudy application form for general secondary students. In particular I refer to her authorisation of the one-page insert, `Notice to parents'. Was the late preparation of this insert yet another reason for the delay in the availability of Austudy application forms? Is it intended that this notice to parents offers a real choice between Austudy payments being received by parents or by their dependent children? How is this lawful, given the Government's amendment last October to the Student Assistance Act requiring that Austudy be no longer directed to parents but to students? In this respect, does the Minister recall her rejection in the Senate of the Opposition's amendment to proposed section 11 of that legislation that would have provided for payments to parents? Senator RYAN —When the Government originally decided on the greatly increased and liberalised Austudy payment to 16-year-olds and 17-year-olds we considered whether the payment should be made directly to the student or, as in the case of the old students assistance scheme payments, to the parent. The initial advice we had from the Australian Taxation Office was that if the payment were made to the parent it would be taxable income in the hands of the parent. Given that the recipients of Austudy are those in the very low income bracket-pensioners and other low income earners-we were anxious not to increase the taxation burden on the parent in this way and decided to make the payment directly to the students. There were other reasons for this. Some 16-year-olds who have been in technical and further education institutions in the past and who were eligible for the tertiary education assistance scheme had had TEAS payments made directly to them and no problems had been reported with that arrangement. Also, 16-year-olds who seek employment and do not find it are entitled to unemployment benefit in their own right. As Senator Teague will be aware, what we were seeking to do with the new income supporting arrangements was to remove any financial incentive for students to go on the dole or to drop out of school and go into a TAFE course if they would be better served by staying in the system; so we were looking for the removal of differences between the forms of payment. For these reasons and for the reason that it appeared at that stage that it would be unavoidable to have the extra income taxed in the hands of the parent, we made the decision that the allowance would be paid directly to students. That was the state of our thinking at the time the legislation went through. However, following that we received a large number of representations from parents who said that they would be concerned to have the payments made directly to their teenage children and would like the option of receiving the payments themselves. We responded to that expression of concern and looked more closely at the possibility of making the payment available to the parent but taxable only as if it were paid to the student. This is a complicated procedure, but we finally negotiated a way of doing this with the Taxation Office. However, some time had elapsed since the original provision, which was only for payment to the student; so it was necessary to put that late notification to parents into the Austudy material. I am pleased to see that Senator Teague has come across it because we have made every effort to have the information circulated as widely as possible; both the general information about the availability of Austudy and the particular new information about the possibility of the parent nominating to receive the payment if that is the parent's wish. Our expectation is that most parents will continue to provide for the payment to be made directly to the young person, but there may be cases where the parent will opt to have the payment made to himself or herself and the provision is now available for that. Senator TEAGUE —I have a supplementary question. I am very glad to see that the Minister has accepted the Opposition's argument and the suggestion to change the tax arrangement. Is it necessary to have legislation to do that? Can the Minister address that part of my question as to how it is lawful to give this option to parents? Senator RYAN —The option will be available to parents for the second term. I will have to check to see whether we will need to introduce a legislative amendment to bring it into practice. Senator COOK —My question is addressed to the Minister representing the Minister for Employment and Industrial Relations. I refer him to comments made by the Leader of the Opposition, Mr John Howard, on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation's AM program this morning to the effect that the public wants a government that is prepared to barrack for `family values and one that is prepared to control militant unionism'. What is the Government doing to stand up to those militant unions whose activities put the security of families at risk? Senator WALSH —I think it should be said at the outset that the vast majority of unions in Australia over the last four years have behaved in a very responsible manner in co-operation with the Government and the Australian Council of Trade Unions in adhering to the accord. That accord has achieved what was essential to achieve at the time we came into government, and that is to correct the effects of the wages explosion engineered by John Howard in 1981 and 1982. Regretfully, not all unions have behaved with the degree of responsibility that the great majority have. Indeed this Government, in association with the governments of New South Wales and Victoria, has deregistered the Builders Labourers Federation, which was regarded by the Government, by the community generally and by other unions as an outlaw union. We are resisting and denouncing the current drive by the Plumbers and Gasfitters Employees Union of Australia-denounced most recently by Mr Willis, I think only two days ago-to break out of the agreement on wages contained in the accord. And-most recently-the Government is taking on the doctors union, the most rapacious union of the lot. The Australian Capital Territory branch of the doctors union is trying to extort from the taxpayers a $425 a week pay increase for a part time job, for a job that occupies about one-quarter of their working time. It is a union supported by the same people-the same individuals in many instances, and the same sort of people-who say: `Shock, horror; $10 a week is far too big an increase to give to people who are on $250 a week. $10 a week is far too much and cannot be afforded. There has to be a wages freeze'. Those same people are totally mute about the doctors union's attempt to extort $425 a week extra for a part time job that occupies about one-quarter of their working time. The Government has offered the doctors union an increase of 21 per cent-from a figure which, admittedly, had been fixed for two years. Who, other than executives in the private sector, has obtained a 21 per cent pay increase in the last two years? Indeed, the Government could be criticised for having made an offer to the doctors union which is too generous. But the 21 per cent, which is vastly in excess of the pay increases that anybody in the mainstream of the trade union movement has secured over the last two years, is not nearly enough for that most rapacious of all unions, the Australian Capital Territory branch of the doctors union, which says: `We demand an 85 per cent pay increase'. If this Government were to cave in to that rapacious demand by the doctors union and give the doctors an 85 per cent pay increase, what moral authority would it have left to deal with any other rapacious union or group of people that attempted to-- Senator Puplick —What moral authority does it have now? Senator WALSH —I am glad Senator Puplick asks about moral authority, because I would like to know something about the moral authority of the Opposition, and in particular, of its leader. When it comes to the question of really dealing with militant and greedy unions-in denouncing them, even, let alone disciplining them-the real John Howard is a cream puff. There is not a word from him about the doctors union's outrageous demand for an 85 per cent pay increase. Senator Chaney —Mr President, I raise a point of order. I do not know whether the Minister is being unparliamentary or just rude, but he is also certainly debating the question and I suggest that you bring him to order. The PRESIDENT —Senator Walsh, I would ask you to withdraw the reference which you made to the Leader of the Opposition in the House of Representatives. Senator WALSH —He is not a cream puff. I withdraw, Mr President. The PRESIDENT —I would ask you to withdraw, Senator Walsh. Senator WALSH —I withdraw. There is not a word from Mr Howard about the outrageous extortionate demands of the doctors union. I will give a bit of advice to the media which it should have had sufficient initiative not to need: Instead of recycling the rumours which the Press Gallery itself has generated, or every morning giving us the latest instalment on the civil war that is raging within the Liberal Party-it is fair enough to report the latter-it should go and ask Mr Howard how he thinks he would deal with that particular militant and greedy union which is threatening families throughout the country, threatening the wages policy and threatening the economic future of this country. Senator BUTTON —At Question Time yesterday Senator Mason asked me a question about the depletion of the world's ozone layer. The answer is somewhat lengthy and complex and I ask that it be incorporated in Hansard. Leave granted. The answer read as follows- Yes; I refer the honourable Senator to an answer to a question without notice on this subject to the Minister for Science on 11 November 1986 (Hansard pp. 2717-2718). I should point out that this startling depletion of the world's ozone layer, as he terms it, has been observed only over Antarctica, and that it occurs for a few weeks each year, during Spring. I understand Department of Health figures for deaths due to melanoma and development of skin cancers are far lower than those quoted by the honourable Senator. I also understand that the incidence of both fatal and non-fatal skin cancers is strongly associated with lifestyle, latitude and skin colouring (eg. the incidence is higher in Queensland than anywhere else in the world) and that any current depletion of the ozone layer is considered far less significant. Australia is active in international efforts to protect the ozone layer from damage by man made products such as chlorofluorocarbons. We are presently finalising our position prior to becoming a party to the Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer (the USA is already a party to the Convention). Australia is also active on a United Nations Environment Program ad hoc working group of legal and technical experts for the elaboration of a Protocol to the Convention on the control of chlorofluorocarbons. The working group met in February 1986 and will meet again in April. The Government gives a high priority to reaching an agreement on the Protocol. The honourable Senator may be aware that chlorofluorocarbons, which can break down ozone, are commonly used in many applications, notably in refrigeration, as blowing agents for plastic foams, and as propellants for spray cans. The significance of this has been recognised for many years and the Government has encouraged Australian Industry to reduce its use of chlorofluorocarbons in aerosol propellants, with a consequent reduction by about 70 per cent over a ten year period. Senator GIETZELT —On 5 December last year Senator Cooney asked me a question involving pilot licences, which I promised to refer to the Minister for Aviation. Mr Morris has now provided me with a fairly lengthy response which has certain legal implications, and I seek leave to incorporate it in Hansard. Leave granted. The response read as follows- Regional Directors of the Department of Aviation and other senior officers of the Department of Aviation authorised by the Secretary of the Department may, and do in appropriate circumstances, vary, suspend or cancel licences or certificates issued under the Air Navigation Regulations (ANRs) including pilot licences granted under ANR 50. ANR 258 confers upon the Secretary a power to vary, suspend or cancel a licence or certificate where he is satisfied that one or more of the following grounds exists: (a) that the holder of the licence or certificate has contravened, or failed to comply with, a provision of the Act or the Regulations, including Regulations as in force by virtue of a law of a State; (b) that the holder of the licence or certificate fails to satisfy, or to continue to satisfy, any requirement prescribed by, or specified under, the Regulations in relation to the obtaining or holding of such a licence or certificate; (c) that the holder of the licence or certificate has failed in his duty with respect to any matter affecting the safe or efficient navigation or operation of an aircraft; (d) that the holder of the licence or certificate is not a fit and proper person to have the responsibilities and exercise and perform the functions and duties of a holder of such a licence or certificate; or (e) that the holder of the licence or certificate has contravened, or failed to comply with, a direction or instruction with respect to a matter affecting the safe navigation and operation of an aircraft, being a direction or instruction that is contained in Air Navigation Orders. Pursuant to ANR 10 (2) the Secretary has delegated the full powers conferred upon him by ANR 258 to the two Deputy Secretaries and the First Assistant Secretary, Flight Standards Division. The five Regional Directors have the delegation under ANR 258 to vary or suspend licences but not to cancel them. Prior to varying, suspending or cancelling a licence or certificate pursuant to ANR 258 the Secretary (or his delegate) is required to advise the holder of the licence or certificate of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the proposed action and to allow that person reasonable time to show cause why such action should not be taken. A decision made under ANR 258 is reviewable by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. In an addition to the powers conferred by ANR 258 there is power under ANR 257 for the Secretary to suspend a licence or certificate for a period of up to 28 days pending an investigation of facts or circumstances which might justify the variation, suspension or cancellation of a licence or certificate under ANR 258. In this case there is no show cause procedure and the decision is not reviewable by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. Pursuant to ANR 10 (2) the Secretary of the Department of Aviation has delegated the powers conferred upon him by ANR 257 to Regional Directors and Assistant Regional Directors (Flight Standards) for all Regions and to the Superintendents Flying Operations of the New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria/Tasmania Regions. Finally ANR 256 enables the Secretary to suspend a licence pending the licence holder undergoing an examination under ANRs 38 (Licensed Aircraft Maintenance Engineer), 65 (Flight Crew), 97f (Air Traffic Controller) or 97r (Flight Service Officer), or pending the licence holder authorising the disclosure of information that may assist in determining whether the holder of the licence meets the relevant medical standards. In these circumstances also there is no show cause procedure and the decision is not reviewable by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The delegates of the Secretary under ANR 256 are the same as those detailed above in respect of ANR 257. Between 1 November 1984 and 5 December 1986 61 pilot licences were suspended pending examination pursuant to the provisions of ANR 256. In the same period, 57 pilot licences were suspended pending investigation pursuant to the provisions of ANR 257. Following the required examination or investigation 11 pilot licences were suspended after the procedures required by ANR 258 had been adhered to. Of those suspensions 9 resulted from breaches of ANR's, one resulted from two failures to pass the required examination after an ANR 256 suspension and one resulted from fraudulent conduct in respect of licence documents. There were no cancellations of licences during this period. Two of the licence holders whose licences were suspended applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for review of the decision to suspend. One applicant had the term of his suspension varied and the other applicant withdrew his application. The breaches of ANRs that resulted in the 9 suspensions mentioned above were: ANR 131-Low level aerobatics (1) ANR 133-Low flying (3) ANR 227-Overloading aircraft (2) ANR 247-Flying whilst under the influence of alcohol (3) In addition to the suspensions of licences detailed above there have been a number of instances where licences have either been suspended or cancelled on the basis of the licence holder's medical condition. As these cases are not considered to fall within the category of offences by the licence holder they have not been included in this summary. Yours sincerely PETER MORRIS Senator the Hon. A. T. Gietzelt, Minister for Veterans' Affairs, Parliament House, Canberra, A.C.T. 2600 Senator MESSNER(South Australia) —Mr President, I seek leave to make a personal explanation. Leave granted. Senator MESSNER —During Question Time Senator Walsh referred to a letter of mine which has recently appeared in the Australian Financial Review, drawing attention to the family tax policies of the Liberal Party and the National Party, which policies have remained in existence since 1984. The Minister sought to misrepresent the detail of those policies, which I would now like to correct. I have a copy of those policies and I will, in a moment, seek leave to have that copy incorporated in Hansard. I just wish to make the point, first of all, that the Liberal and National parties have a policy for implementing income splitting on a progressive and phased basis and that, of course, it will be provided on an optional basis so that people may choose to do so if they wish. Secondly, the Minister also misrepresented the policy in not drawing attention to a statement in the policy that this would incorporate the changes with regard to the dependent spouse rebate. Thirdly, the Minister missed the vital point, that a system of income splitting would be provided to families with dependent children, thus creating a bias in favour of single income families in that category. I seek leave, Mr President, to have incorporated in Hansard a copy of our policy in that regard. Leave granted. The statement read as follows- 5.3 Family Tax Reform (a) Income Splitting We propose from our first budget to make a start in giving personal tax relief to families with one or more dependent children. This will be done in two ways: (a) through the progressive introduction of income splitting; and (b) the progressive introduction of tax rebates for child care expenses. Under income splitting a husband and wife with one or more dependent children may if they wish submit a joint tax return. If they choose to do this they will be assessed for tax purposes as if each of them had received half of their aggregate taxable income. A limit will be placed on the aggregate amount of family income which can benefit from income splitting. The limit will be determined by budgetary conditions. The choice of income splitting will be available to both one and two income families. Thus, for example, in family (A) the husband works and earns $18,000 per year and his wife has no income. They will be assessed for tax purposes as if each had received $9,000 per year, with a benefit up to a certain limit determined by budgetary conditions. Likewise in the case of family (B) the husband earns $18,000 per year and his wife $6,000 per year from a part time job. They will be able to split the family income and receive the benefit of splitting up to a limit imposed. Couples who elect to split their aggregate income for tax purposes will lose entitlement they might have to the dependent spouse rebate. The joint return will be completely optional. If there is no personal tax advantage then couples will presumably opt to be assessed in the current manner. The greatest potential beneficiaries are one income families and some two income families where the partners have substantially unequal incomes. Income splitting will only be available to families with one or more dependent children. It will be phased in over time. The start will be made in the first Budget. The proposal will be introduced in a way which ensures that the greatest relative benefit goes to lower income families with children. One option to achieve this is to limit the dollar benefit to any taxpayer to the benefit provided to a single income family at say $18,000 (illustrative purposes only) and to an average two-income family at a lower dollar level. Income splitting will increase the freedom of families with children to choose to have one parent to stay at home to look after the children if that is the way they wish to organise their lives. Senator RYAN —Earlier in Question Time Senator Teague asked me whether the Government's decision to allow parents of 16-year-olds and 17-year-olds to opt to receive Austudy payments themselves rather than have the payment made directly to the students, would require a change to the legislation. The answer is that the present legislation says that the payment shall be to a person determined by the Minister. I have now determined that from the beginning of the second term it can be to the parent. However, to reinforce that decision we will be making an amendment to the legislation in time for the payment to be made to the parent who chooses at the time of the second term. Assent reported. Debate resumed. Senator HAMER(Victoria)(3.10) —When I was speaking before lunch, I said that I entirely agreed with the broad thrust of this defence White Paper. It is a line of approach that I have been advocating for many years-that is, that the Australian Defence Force should be structured around the tasks that we might have to do on our own, rather than, as happened in the past, being regarded as contributors to allied forces. That sort of allied force approach has all sorts of problems. I will give just one example. In 1974, when we were still responsible for the defence of Papua New Guinea, honourable senators might remember, there was a near revolt there over mining royalties. There was a suggestion that Bougainville might separate from Papua New Guinea. We could scarcely give independence to Papua New Guinea when it was in a state of disintegration. The chiefs of staff were asked whether, if the Government wanted them to, they could put a battalion or so into Bougainville. The answer was: `Well, we have no amphibious assault capability. We have no airborne assault capability. So, if you are to put a force into Bougainville'-in each case the chief of staff was assuming that it would be done by somebody else in the allied forces-`it can be done only if the airfield is firmly held in friendly hands'. That is obviously a great limitation on our being able to do the things that we might have to do on our own. From that point of view, I entirely accept the structure and the purpose of this defence White Paper. One thing that we must always keep in mind is that, although that is the way that our Defence Force should be structured, it is not necessarily the only way in which it will be used. It must be so trained, equipped and organised that it can co-operate with allies in appropriate operations, if called upon to do so. That aspect was badly under-emphasised in the Dibb report. The Minister for Defence (Mr Beazley), in the White Paper, has rectified that to some extent. It must always be an aim that we structure our force on what we must do on our own, but always keeping in mind that defence forces must be flexible and we might want to use them in co-operation with allies, so they must be organised, trained and equipped for that. The second point I was making before lunch was that the assessment is that about 2.9 per cent of gross domestic product is all that will be available for defence unless there is an obvious and urgent threat. We should be spending more. But I do not believe in the current economic situation that it would be realistic to plan on more. If we in opposition promised to provide a great deal more for defence, we would not be believed. If we went into office with such a promise, we would not deliver. We have to look at our defence planning in realistic terms, and that is the sort of limit that we have to look at. So, if we want to suggest that things not proposed in the White Paper to be done should be done, we have to say what in the White Paper we think should be left out or where savings could be made; otherwise we are not being realistic. In any case, I am very doubtful whether the capital program listed in the defence White Paper can be met within the resources available. It may be met; but it seems to me to be extremely doubtful, particularly as the White Paper, in quite a number of areas, is very vague about quantities and even acquisitions. For instance, it just states: `Some airborne warning and control aircraft will be provided'. How many and what sort is not even discussed. In that sense I am very doubtful whether the capital program can be met within the resources available. My great fear is that the Government will try to meet the capital program and, in order to make the resources available, will cut back on the running costs of the Defence Force. That is a way of getting quick reductions in defence expenditure, but it is a very unwise method. If we cut back on flying time or on steaming time for ships, or reduce the ammunition allowance for practice, what happens is what has been happening in recent years: We have an outflow of trained people who no longer get any professional satisfaction from sitting around doing second rate tasks. If we want to keep trained, efficient people interested in the Services, we must give them the chance to practice their profession. Regrettably, these days that costs a great deal of money. As I have said, if we want to suggest changes, we must suggest where savings could be made. I have a few suggestions which seem to me to involve no cost or which might even make some modest savings. I am delighted to see that a Vice-Chief of the Defence Force has been appointed, to centralise forward equipment programming in particular. The worst aspect of our defence planning has been the way in which delegates from each Service have gone along to committee meetings, each fighting for his own Service and for a bigger share of the available capital resources, knowing that, if somebody else gets something, it will mean less in the pool for him. The conflict has been very bad for proper forward planning for the Australian Defence Force. I give one example: Admirable though the FA18 aircraft is, I am quite sure that, if the capital requirements of the Defence Force had been looked at as a whole-what we want, how much capital we have and what sort of Defence Force we want overall-the FA18 would not have been purchased. That is the sort of difficult decision that has to be made and I hope that the Vice-Chief of the Defence Force will get together all the forward equipment planning people from the separate Services and tell the three Service chiefs to get on with running their Services with the equipment that they have. The forward planning must be done by the Defence Force as a whole. Incidentally, I think the name `chiefs of staff' is very old fashioned and inappropriate. The Minister is very pleased that he called the Chief of the Defence Force by that title because that is what he is. The three Service chiefs should be called `Commander, Navy', `Commander, Army' and `Commander, Air Force'. They are not chiefs of staff in any meaningful sense and it is an absurdly archaic title. That is the first thing that we must do: We must get our forward equipment program centralised and looked at from the point of view of a defence force as a whole and not separate, rival Services. The next thing that we should do, and I am sure that this would save money, is to re-organise the Department of Defence. It is an administrative shambles. The ancient Greeks had a saying: `Give mine enemy a golden sword'. A modern version might be: `Give mine enemy an organisation like the Australian Defence Department'. It is very, very unsatisfactory. It is grossly overmanned. There are more than 100 Second Division public servants in the Defence Department-and they are the expensive ones. The Department is structured very much on a sort of confrontation between the civil side and the professional side. I give just one instance, but there are many. We now have a Vice-Chief of the Defence Force charged with the forward planning of defence equipment and development. There is a division-a very appropriate one-called the Force Development and Analysis Division. One would think that that would come under the Vice-Chief of the Defence Force, but it does not. It quite separately reports to the civil chain so that that side will have some ammunition to shoot down, if it can, the professional proposals. It is a method of confrontation that does not make for efficient administration. The third no-cost reform that we could make would be to get our senior Service officers into a proper balance between operational appointments and administrative appointments, a very high proportion of which are in the Department of Defence Central Office. For instance, I am looking at commodores, so-called rear-admirals and vice-admirals, and the equivalent officers in the other Services. The Royal Australian Navy has 41, the Australian Army has 60 and the Royal Australian Air Force has 41. The Navy has one admiral, 13 rear-admirals and 27 commodores. There is one sea job for one rear-admiral. The thing is ludicrously out of balance. How that came about was that when the Defence Department was amalgamated-something with which I entirely agree, by the way-in the report the public servants gave themselves quasi-military ranks. A lowly assistant secretary is rated as a brigadier, a first assistant secretary is rated as a major-general, a deputy secretary is rated as a lieutenant-general, and the Secretary rates himself very highly indeed-he is prepared to accept the rank of general. That may be laughable but the problem is that it meant that whenever a lowly assistant secretary was put on a committee the representatives from the three Services had to be a brigadier, a commodore and an air commodore, which caused this explosion in the senior ranks. As I said earlier, the Royal Australian Navy now has one vice-admiral, 13 rear-admirals, 27 commodores and 15,000 men. It fought the Second World War with three admirals, four commodores and 45,000 men. We must get the senior ranks in the Services into balance in operational appointments and non-operational appointments, otherwise we will find ourselves with a very large number of people with no recent professional experience. To think that they are reserves for war time is so absurd that it is impossible to discuss because the last thing we would want in wartime would be senior officers who have not been to sea or who in the Army have not been operational for many years. Those are the modifications that we can make with no cost and perhaps with some modest cost savings. If the White Paper is implemented the Australian Defence Force will not be able, firstly, to project our Army power to the perimeter of our area of interest. We have no amphibious capability. We have no significant airborne capability and, in any case, the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence was told that no thought of the possibility of overseas deployment plays any part in the structure of our ready reaction force. I can imagine many circumstances where it would be very much in Australia's interests not to involve itself in a prolonged major war but to send a quick reactionary force-a battalion or two-to help a friendly government retain control. We are not trying to impose a government on anyone else, and we certainly would not send a force unless we were welcome, but I think that our interests would be greatly assisted if we had available the forces and the means of deploying them so that they could be available if the Government so decided. In my view it is a disaster that we are allowing our amphibious capability to be dissipated, run down and ultimately destroyed. This also rises a matter which is much more difficult and expensive-the ludicrous decision of the present Government to destroy the fixed wing Fleet Air Arm. It will make it very difficult for us to operate on the perimeter of our sphere of interest without fixed wing aircraft at sea. As far as I am concerned, there are only two rules of war. The first rule of war is do not march on Moscow, and the second rule of war is that a fleet that goes into an air attack area relying on shore-based aircraft is doomed. I think we should remember those as being important principles of war. The first principle does not have much to do with us but the second principle is very relevant to our present shortcomings. The second deficiency that I see in the present proposed structure is that it is assumed that logistic support of forces in the north of Australia will be entirely overland. That has certain advantages but, in terms of fuel, it is an extremely costly way of supporting a force. We must remember that in the next 10 years we will be down to about 40 per cent self-sufficiency in oil. We must look at economies. The obvious way to support a force on distant coastlines like our northern coastline is by sea. To suggest that we do not need to provide for that and that overland support can be provided ignores the future of our oil supplies. The third deficiency or criticism is that it seems to me that a great deal too much emphasis is being placed on the over the horizon radar. It may work and it may achieve the objectives and the claims that are being made about it, but it is still very much in the development stage. It has severe deficiencies, particularly with the detection of surface craft and aircraft moving at right angles to the beam. Although it may be very valuable, it is not a complete answer. We urgently need airborne early warning and control aircraft, and to put them in as merely possibles that might be provided gives them far too low a priority. The next point I would like to make relates not really to a deficiency but is a matter which has been much argued about-the question of the defence of our seaborne trade. I always have difficulty about this. Having been in the Navy I am very seized of the importance of our seaborne trade. The sort of war we are talking about is not a global non-nuclear war-to my mind such a war is totally inconceivable-but presumably a bilateral war between Australia and someone else in the region, and under those circumstances one has to think what could affect our seaborne trade. The first thing we have to consider is that nearly all ships operate under a foreign flag. There is absolutely no way in which foreign ships would come to Australia and place themselves in Australian convoys. They just would not do it. They would come here with flags flying and lights on saying `Sink me if you dare' or they would not come here at all. The last thing they would do would be to come here and place themselves in Australian convoys. The threat to our shipping seems to me to be three-fold. The first threat is surface interdiction. A great deal of our trade goes through the archipelago to our north and it would be very easy to block that by refusing passage to ships coming to Australia. As they would be neutral ships, it would be a very high risk policy for the country doing it but it would be a very easy way of blocking shipping coming to or leaving Australia. Rerouting out into the Pacific would be an extremely expensive way to go. Getting iron ore from the north west of Australia round to the south of Australia would be a very expensive business. That is the most obvious way in which our overseas shipping might be interdicted. If a country were prepared to be more aggressive than that, the obvious way of blocking shipping is mining. Mines are an impersonal weapon and if there is a dispute between two countries and it is announced by one country that a port has been mined, that would be a very strong deterrent to neutral ships going there unless we could persuade them that we had genuinely cleared all the mines. That is why I am glad to see that there is some development going on with our mine hunting and mine clearance capability. I think that threat is quite likely. Least likely is direct submarine attack on ships. It is personal. The ships sunk would inevitably be neutral and I think it would be an extremely high risk activity for any enemy of ours in a bilateral confrontation to engage in, and in any case the relevance of our forces stopping this is not very great. As I said, the ships are neutral and there is no conceivable way in which they would place themselves in the defence of Australian convoys. The example of the Persian Gulf-the Iran-Iraq war-has often been raised in recent months to show that neutral ships do get attacked. That is perfectly true, but those ships still go there because they get paid to do it. Costs and insurance have gone up but they go there because they are prepared to take the risk. The defensive measures of the Government of Iran are not in any way relevant. The ships are not going there in Iranian convoys or anything like that; they are going there and taking the risk of being sunk because they are being paid for it. If the risk became higher, they would not go there. We must not draw the wrong conclusions from what is going on in that area. The final deficiency concerns the submarine program. I have never been satisfied that sufficient consideration was given to the French nuclear powered Ruby class submarine which I think would have been appropriate to Australia. It is about the same size as the submarines we are planning to get and it seems to have the sort of characteristics we need. It has not been looked at seriously by the Navy for reasons that I think are at least partly political. However, I do not think this is a matter that we can change. Contracts are going to be let in the middle of this year and unless the Hawke Government is prepared to perform a major public service by committing hari-kari before then, the contracts will have been signed and we will be obliged to honour them. I am sorry that we will be committed for another 20 years to having non- nuclear powered submarines; nevertheless, I think that is a fact of life. If we are going to do these extra things that I am suggesting, the question is where might we save. As I said at the outset, we must suggest savings if we are to accept increased expenditure. The first saving could be in the area of fleet bases. I am prepared to accept a fleet base in Western Australia. However, I would say that if there is to be a fleet base there there must be a dry dock under naval control. One cannot afford to have an operational fleet at the whim of industrial disputes. In the same way, the operation of the dry dock at Garden Island should be run by the Navy. It would involve a relatively small number of people. We saw during the visit of HMS Invincible that lack of control made it impossible for the Invincible to use that dock. We could not have a situation where our operational fleet, wanting a brief docking, was held up by an industrial dispute in the dockyard. The control-not the work done-must be under uniformed management. I am not at all convinced that there is any merit in the proposed move to Jervis Bay. People in Sydney who are pressing for a move of the fleet to Jervis Bay think that the Garden Island dockyard will move. That would cost many billions of dollars and it would not be practical. All that will move will be the operational fleet base. As far as I can see, it will make no real difference to Sydney. The move will be a very expensive one, involving many hundreds of millions of dollars. One matter that is already in train-it is not part of the proposal-is to move the ammunition depot there. That is a good idea. I do not think that people understand why an ammunition depot is required. Ships are normally replenished from a supply ship. An ammunition depot is required so that the ammunition can be landed before a ship goes into dock for overhaul and then collected when the ship comes out of dock. It is a deposit place really rather than anything else. Obviously, it is most inappropriate to have that in a major built-up area as it currently is in Sydney. The second saving: We must tackle work practices and gross overmanning in our government factories and dockyards. The defence paper talks about doing something. Something has been done, but not nearly enough. We cannot afford the gross waste that is going on in these dockyards and government factories and accept that, because of this gross waste, we cannot have the proper equipment for our fighting forces that we very badly need. Finally, in order to make the necessary savings, we must consider whether we need the Army at the size it is. I have never been persuaded that the regular division would ever be committed to battle. The overheads of the Army have always seemed excessive to me. To make a more mobile, responsive and better equipped Army we must, at the same time, consider whether we can afford from within our resources to have the number of men we have. I believe that that would be a tough decision but one we probably have to take to balance out whether the Defence Force as a whole is properly equipped, properly organised and able to do effectively the things we might have to do on our own. I said at the outset that we support the broad thrust of the defence White Paper. Its development has been going on for many years-from 1976 when a defence White Paper was produced by the Fraser Government. I entirely agree that our Defence Force, which in efficiency terms is second to none, must be organised and equipped for the roles that it might have to perform on our own. Senator McINTOSH(Western Australia)(3.33) —The bringing down of the 1987 defence policy information paper signals to us the end of the Brisbane Line mentality which has pervaded defence thinking and practice in Australia for many long and weary years. It commits us to the defence of Australia, through the defence of the north, from a threat which can come to Australia only through the north. Although no such threat is envisaged at this time, it would be foolish not to acknowledge it as a future possibility. The paper recognises that the most positive aspect of our defence capabilities lies in our geographical position-the fact that our northern shores present a most inhospitable aspect to any potential future invader. But at the same time it recognises that a large and important part of our national assets is to be found in that region and is vulnerable to low or medium level attacks. Planning a defence strategy on this basis can only be described as sensible. The proposal to shift part of our naval capabilities from eastern Australia to the west and the north, an enhanced submarine capacity, the provision of greater battlefield mobility for the army, and the Jindalee over the horizon radar system are just part of the Government's commitment to defending the nation as a whole and not just the triangle which lies between Brisbane and Melbourne, and as such is to be commended. At this stage I prefer to reserve my judgment on the proposed satellite communications station in Western Australia. It could be that spying outside our own area of strategic interests could be carrying the new policy of `defence in depth' too far. This is not to say that I would not be pleased to get some real information, for a change, on the French activities on Kerguelen Island. Secondly, this White Paper nails down the lid of the coffin of forward defence strategy as a viable defence option for Australia. This strategy was delivered a death blow with the withdrawal of the Australian forces from Vietnam in the 1970s. May it rest in peace. This is not to say that there is no possibility that in future Australian defence forces will not be committed outside our immediate area, but this commitment will be only incidental to the major requirement of the paper-that first and foremost we will be capable of defending ourselves. It will be this capacity to be self-reliant which will have the first priority. The orientation is towards self-defence, not forward defence. From my reading of the paper it would appear that defence co-operation within the area is more of a diplomatic than a strategic initiative. The tabling statement of the Minister for Resources and Energy (Senator Gareth Evans) emphasises the Government's views on defence co-operation with New Zealand, the South Pacific island states and Papua New Guinea. It mentions also our older established relations with the nations of South East Asia. It is these latter defence relationships which still pose important moral and political questions for Australians. In the last years of President Marcos's rule, questions were raised in Australia about our military aid to the Philippines. Even though the actual amounts which were expended were small, the symbolism of our association with the Philippines military was powerful. The White Paper suggests that our major defence concerns in the Philippines today are the New People's Army insurgency and the future of the American bases at Clark and Subic Bay. This view clearly suggests that Australia intends to continue military aid to the Philippines in its present form. If so, the Government can expect to be further questioned about the wisdom of that course. On a much larger scale has been our military aid to Indonesia. The White Paper says that a stable Indonesia is important to our security and that Australia needs to maintain a constructive defence relationship with that country. This is not new. It repeats the long-standing conventional wisdom which has underpinned the policies of successive Australian governments for the last 20 years. What this has traditionally meant is that Australia has essentially defended and supported, through diplomatic silence or direct military and economic aid, repressive government practices in Indonesia. This has been done in the interests of `stability'. There is considerable sensitivity in Australia about Indonesia. Some of it is ill informed and some of it is a racist hangover from the officially sponsored anti-Sukarno campaigns of the early 1960s. The last thing we need in the ongoing discussion of our defence needs is a repeat of the Indonesia threat atmosphere of that time. The third area of the paper on which I wish to comment concerns the preservation of our part in the Western alliance. This preservation, I must state, is in accordance with the will of the majority of the people of Australia. Whether this is in their best interests is arguable. There has been a long history in this country of reliance on, and faith in, larger and more powerful allies. First it was the United Kingdom and then, since World War II, the United States. Irrational perceptions of threats and a misguided belief that great and powerful friends would unfailingly come to our aid in any circumstances continue to exist today in the Australian community. These ideas continue to be promoted by sections of the media, academia and the coalition parties and have been a very real barrier to an honest, informed and rational debate on how we can best defend ourselves. The Dibb Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities was clear on the limits to the support we can expect from outside. On page 46, the report says: . . . there are potential situations where we would not expect the United States to commit combat forces on our behalf and where we need a demonstrably independent combat capability. On the ANZUS Treaty itself, Mr Dibb was also quite explicit. He said: `The ANZUS Treaty provides for consultation in the first instance'. Mr Dibb says, and I emphasise this: `There are no guarantees inherent in it'. None of this is new. Anyone who has read the ANZUS Treaty knows that this is the case. Anyone who has watched developments in United States policy, particularly since the so-called Guam doctrine was declared in 1969, knows that the United States expects-I repeat, expects-its allies to be primarily responsible for their own defence. Paragraph 1.25 of the White Paper reinforces this aspect. I think that the paper brought down by the Minister for Defence (Mr Beazley) certainly shows that we intend to try to be capable of defending ourselves. It is the policy of self-reliance which is the main thrust of this White Paper and as such is in accordance with the requirements of the alliance. I commend this 1987 White Paper, as presented by the Minister of Defence, Kim Beazley. I believe that the Senate as a whole should adopt such a paper. Debate (on motion by Senator Reid) adjourned. Motion (by Senator Gietzelt) proposed: That the Senate do now adjourn. Senator ALSTON(Victoria)(3.42) —I want to speak briefly in the adjournment debate on the subject of Afghanistan because tomorrow is a day that is generally commemorated around the world as Afghanistan Day. It was initially proclaimed by President Reagan in 1983, being the first day of the Islamic spring, and since that time it has been a focal point for very many members of the Afghan community around the world. I think it is instructive that this country should take note of that fact because there are significant Afghan communities in both Melbourne and Sydney. Certainly in Melbourne since 1983 there has been an annual commemoration of the event and in Melbourne this evening there will be an occasion to mark the day. I did want to make a couple of remarks. One is in relation to the humanitarian aspect of the refugee intake. The figures for the last financial year show that only 276 refugees have been taken into this country. In view of the fact that very many of those already here have very high academic and commercial qualifications, it seems anomalous, to say the least, that the Government has been so niggardly about the size of the intake, especially in view of the fact that Afghanis represent the largest group of refugees in the world. There are 3 1/2 million to 4 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan and about 800,000 to one million in Iran out of a total population of around 15 million to 18 million. So in terms of the devastation of the population one can almost equate what has happened in Afghanistan with what happened in East Timor as a result of the Indonesian intervention. Rather than simply talk in terms of Afghanistan as the Soviet Union's Vietnam, I think we should look at it from the perspective of those who have been unfortunate enough either to reside there or who have been forced to exit from the country. I firstly urge the Australian Government to give much more compassionate consideration to a refugee intake in view of the fact that those already here have proved to be very reliable and worthwhile citizens who have a lot to contribute to this country. I have not come across very many of them who are unemployed and they certainly do not seem to shirk from working at more than one job. The other aspect which I think is of significance is the neglect by the Australian Government of the whole question of Afghanistan. It is clear that the Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr Hayden) has been taken in by the public relations propaganda of the Soviet leader, Mr Gorbachev, who claimed only in November last year that a withdrawal of Soviet troops was not far away. This year a visit by Mr Shevardnadze, the Foreign Minister, to Kabul resulted in his saying that he was very anxious to ensure a political settlement in this calendar year. Nothing really has happened apart from a unilateral ceasefire which then resulted in some 12,000 troops being deployed to the eastern border region. There was quite a degree of bloodshed and dispersion of residents in those areas which was obviously a result of an unwillingness on the part of the Mujahedeen, the resistance guerrilla fighters, to accept the bona fides of the Soviet regime. I think their judgment is probably better than that of the Australian Government. The Soviet Union has, I think, mastered a new technique very quickly. It is now a propaganda, public relations oriented government. No doubt it is much more conscious of world opinion in this area. I believe that the Australian Government has shamefully neglected its responsibilities in terms of moral persuasion. There are initiatives that could have been taken and have not yet been taken. The most that can be said by the Department or the Minister is that he has raised the question of Afghanistan with Mr Shevardnadze on his recent visit and in the event that there is a Soviet troop withdrawal, Australia would be prepared to offer its services as a member of an observer force. I do not regard that as good enough. I believe that there are initiatives that we could take, both in the General Assembly of the United Nations and elsewhere. I regard the formula that the Foreign Minister uses as utterly specious-that we do not recognise the Government of Afghanistan and, therefore, our communications should be directed through multilateral channels. It is quite clear that the Soviet Union pulls the strings and intends to continue to do so. There is, therefore, no reason why we could not be outspoken in our condemnation of the original invasion and the very slow progress that is being made towards the troop withdrawal. The estimates that I think are reliably accepted are that there are some 120,000 troops. The war has now entered its eighth year and it is clear that the Soviets realise they are quagmired in an unwinnable war. They will not withdraw unless forced to do so by the weight of international opinion. The cosmetic leadership changes announced last year should fool no one. The fact of the matter is that one brutal puppet has been replaced by another. The current leader, Major-General Naji Bullah, has impeccable credentials when it comes to having organised the secret police in Afghanistan, but offers no promise of any amelioration of the conditions in that country. To suggest that Karmal was forced to retire on the grounds of poor health is simply a sick joke of the highest order. I would have thought that it is not a basis on which we should rely. I therefore urge the Government and the Foreign Minister to take positive action in the field of international diplomacy. Mr Hayden is fond of saying that in the world of international affairs words are bullets. It is about time he discharged a few loud salvos in the direction of the Soviet Union. To date he has fired only blanks. In view of the fact that very little progress is being made and that the Geneva talks have been adjourned until May, I believe that one way of ensuring that they do not simply stall indefinitely is for countries in the Western region to take initiatives. I instance the deafening silence of the Minister on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the Soviet invasion on 27 December last. Australia said absolutely nothing and yet the Governments of the United States of America, Britain, France, West Germany and China all marked the occasion by issuing strong statements of condemnation. I therefore find it difficult to understand the Government's lack of concern. I do not know whether it is because the Afghan community is relatively small, whether it is because it does not have much electoral clout or whether Mr Hayden is simply interested in big nation power plays and is prepared to disregard the range of atrocities and physical intimidation that is constantly being perpetrated in that unfortunate country. I therefore would urge that this day not pass unnoted. There is an opportunity for those in this country who are concerned with human rights to show, by urging the Foreign Minister, that Australia is not prepared to remain silent in this important area. Question resolved in the affirmative. Senate adjourned at 3.50 p.m. The following papers were tabled: Customs Act-Notice 1987-No. 4-Specified rate in respect to the diesel fuel rebate, dated 12 March 1987. Excise Act-Notice 1987-No. 4-Specified rate in respect to the diesel fuel rebate, dated 12 March 1987. Public Service Act-Determinations 1987 Nos 11, 12.