# CONTRACT REMEDIES IN ACTION: SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE — one-page summary

**Paper ID:** `ssrn-1641438`
**Year:** 2015
**Author(s):** Yonathan Arbel
**SSRN:** https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1641438

## TL;DR

Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law argues that specific performance in contract law is often less effective and less frequently sought than theories suggest. His qualitative study in Israel reveals parties avoid it due to enforceability issues, lawyer agency problems, and changing preferences. When pursued, motivations include signaling or post-judgment renegotiation. Findings show practical enforcement difficulties, especially for unique goods, and challenge assumptions in both rights-based and economic theories, highlighting a gap between legal doctrine and real-world litigant behavior and outcomes, necessitating a re-evaluation of its role and efficacy.

## Files

- Full text: `papers/ssrn-1641438/paper.txt`
- PDF: `papers/ssrn-1641438/paper.pdf`
- Summary (EN): `papers/ssrn-1641438/summary.md`

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