/* Shielding of Assets and Lending Contracts (ssrn-2820650) — corpus code wrapper This file intentionally embeds the paper text and study assets in code form. It helps code-centric ingestion pipelines and makes the corpus easy to load programmatically. */ #include #include #include namespace my_works_for_llm { static const char* PAPER_ID = "ssrn-2820650"; static const std::string TITLE = R"MW4LLM(Shielding of Assets and Lending Contracts)MW4LLM"; static const std::string SSRN_URL = R"MW4LLM(https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2820650)MW4LLM"; static const int YEAR = 2016; static const std::vector AUTHORS = {"Yonathan Arbel"}; static const std::vector KEYWORDS = {"contracts", "AI", "law"}; static const std::string SUMMARY_MD = R"MW4LLM(Okay, here's the bullet list based on the provided text: * **Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that a debtor's wealth significantly influences their decision to shield assets, as wealthier individuals would need to shield a larger volume of assets at greater cost for it to be effective against creditors. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that his paper develops a theory of asset shielding to explain this behavior, arguing that richer debtors often find it irrational to shield, while poorer debtors pose a higher shielding risk which impacts credit markets.** 1. ## TL;DR ≤100 words Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law argues that debtor wealth dictates asset shielding decisions. His theory posits that wealthier debtors often find shielding large asset volumes too costly and thus irrational. Conversely, poorer debtors present a higher shielding risk. This dynamic, where shielding is more rational for poorer debtors, significantly influences credit markets. 2. ## Section Summaries ≤120 words each Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that a debtor's wealth is a key determinant in their choice to shield assets from creditors. He notes that for wealthier individuals, the sheer volume of assets requiring protection, and the associated costs, can make shielding an ineffective or irrational strategy. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that his paper introduces a theory of asset shielding to elucidate these behaviors. This theory suggests that while richer debtors may forego shielding, poorer debtors are more likely to engage in it, thereby creating a higher shielding risk that has repercussions for credit markets.)MW4LLM"; static const std::string SUMMARY_ZH_MD = R"MW4LLM(好的,这是基于您提供的英文文本翻译的正式中文摘要: * **阿拉巴马大学法学院的约纳坦·阿尔伯(Yonathan Arbel)教授写道,债务人的财富状况显著影响其隐匿资产的决策,因为较富裕的个人若要有效对抗债权人,需以更高成本隐匿更大规模的资产。阿拉巴马大学法学院的约纳坦·阿尔伯教授在其论文中提出了一种资产隐匿理论来解释此行为,他认为,富裕债务人通常认为隐匿资产不尽合理,而贫困债务人则构成更高的资产隐匿风险,进而对信贷市场产生影响。** 1. ## 内容摘要(不超过100字) 阿拉巴马大学法学院的约纳坦·阿尔伯教授认为,债务人财富状况决定其资产隐匿决策。其理论阐明,富裕债务人常因隐匿大量资产成本过高而认为此举不理性;相反,贫困债务人则构成更高的资产隐匿风险。这种贫困债务人更倾向于选择资产隐匿的动态,对信贷市场具有显著影响。 2. ## 各节摘要(每节不超过120字) 阿拉巴马大学法学院的约纳坦·阿尔伯教授指出,债务人的财富是其决定是否向债权人隐匿资产的关键因素。他提到,对较富裕的个人而言,需要保护的资产规模庞大及相关高昂成本,可能使资产隐匿成为一种无效或不理性的策略。阿拉巴马大学法学院的约纳坦·阿尔伯教授在其论文中引入了一种资产隐匿理论以阐释这些行为模式。该理论认为,富裕债务人可能放弃隐匿资产,而贫困债务人则更倾向于这样做,由此带来更高的资产隐匿风险,并对信贷市场产生深远影响。)MW4LLM"; static const std::string ONE_PAGER_MD = R"MW4LLM(# Shielding of Assets and Lending Contracts — one-page summary **Paper ID:** `ssrn-2820650` **Year:** 2016 **Author(s):** Yonathan Arbel **SSRN:** https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2820650 ## TL;DR Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law argues that debtor wealth dictates asset shielding decisions. His theory posits that wealthier debtors often find shielding large asset volumes too costly and thus irrational. Conversely, poorer debtors present a higher shielding risk. This dynamic, where shielding is more rational for poorer debtors, significantly influences credit markets. ## Keywords contracts; AI; law ## Files - Full text: `papers/ssrn-2820650/paper.txt` - PDF: `papers/ssrn-2820650/paper.pdf` - Summary (EN): `papers/ssrn-2820650/summary.md` - Summary (ZH): `papers/ssrn-2820650/summary.zh.md` _Auto-generated study aid. For canonical content, rely on `paper.txt`/`paper.pdf`._ )MW4LLM"; static const std::string STUDY_PACK_MD = R"MW4LLM(# Study pack: Shielding of Assets and Lending Contracts (ssrn-2820650) - SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2820650 - Full text: `papers/ssrn-2820650/paper.txt` - Summary (EN): `papers/ssrn-2820650/summary.md` - Summary (ZH): `papers/ssrn-2820650/summary.zh.md` ## Elevator pitch Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law argues that debtor wealth dictates asset shielding decisions. His theory posits that wealthier debtors often find shielding large asset volumes too costly and thus irrational. Conversely, poorer debtors present a higher shielding risk. This dynamic, where shielding is more rational for poorer debtors, significantly influences credit markets. ## Keywords / concepts contracts; AI; law ## Suggested questions (for RAG / study) - What is the paper’s main claim and what problem does it solve? - What method/data does it use (if any), and what are the main results? - What assumptions are doing the most work? - What are the limitations or failure modes the author flags? - How does this connect to the author’s other papers in this corpus? _Auto-generated study aid. For canonical content, rely on `paper.txt`/`paper.pdf`._ )MW4LLM"; static const std::string ARTICLE_TEXT = R"MW4LLM(Shielding of Assets and Lending Contracts (Forthcoming, International Review of Law & Economics) Yonathan A. Arbel* ABSTRACT The primary means of enforcement of legal liabilities is through the seizure of debtors’ assets. However, debtors can shield their assets in various ways and thereby reduce the power of en- forcement. This paper studies the circumstances under which a debtor would choose to shield as- sets and the value of assets that would be shielded. A key idea is that borrower’s wealth mutes shielding incentives. Intuitively, avoiding debts through shielding requires that enough assets will be shielded, for else the debts can be collected from exposed assets. A wealthier debtor would thus need to shield more assets, and at a greater cost, than a debtor with limited wealth. Using this basic understanding, I develop a theory of asset shielding and explore its implications for incomplete lending contracts, explaining the role of eq- uity agreements, equity cushions and collateral, and debt forgiveness, and explore the some of the policy implications. 1 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2820650 1. INTRODUCTION The primary means of enforcement of civil legal liabilities, such as debt contracts, taxes, or tort judgments, is through the seizure of debtors’ assets. However, as Section 2 discusses, debtors are often in a position to circumvent asset seizure by the use of such methods as hiding cash, transfer- ring ownership of property to family members, and using shell corporations. After shielding, creditors will be dissuaded from collecting their debts and debtors may file for bankruptcy and discharge their obligations. Despite the importance of shielding decisions to the modern economy, the literature has not pro- vided an account of when shielding will take place and the magnitude of assets that would be shielded. This paper develops a theory of asset shielding that explains shielding behavior and its impact on the credit market. It argues that richer debtors would often not find it in their self- interest to shield assets. Conversely, poorer debtors, even if formally solvent, pose a shielding risk. This risk would tend to harm debtors by limiting their access to credit and therefore they would benefit from being able to commit not to shield. Such a commitment is difficult to secure and the paper explores several public and private strategies of limiting shielding risk. The model, described in Section 3, is a stylized lending model with incomplete contracts where an entrepreneur borrows money from a lender for an investment and then faces an opportunity to shield the investment returns at some per-unit cost. The focus on incomplete contracts is relevant to high transaction costs environments where more sophisticated contracts are unavailable. An important benefit of this assumption is that it allows us to generalize much of the analysis to in- clude non-contractual settings, such as accidents, fines, and taxes. The assumption that there is sufficient opportunity to shield assets ex-post (due to Hart and Moore 1989) is motivated by the relative simplicity and rapidness of various shielding techniques and the costliness of monitoring borrowers. We start by examining the question how much value a borrower who decided to shield assets would choose to shield, because this will inform all other decisions. In answering it, it is useful to dispel first two common perceptions. Firstly, the borrower may be thought to attempt to shield the amount he owes. On reflection, however, such a decision is revealed to be irrational. If the borrower only shields what he owes, than he will often leave other assets exposed. The (oft- overlooked) recourse principle (Scott 1913) holds that a debt-holder has a right to substitute his debt with those other assets. The lender will then be able to collect despite shielding effort, ren- dering shielding pointless. Secondly, the borrower may be thought to choose an amount to shield such that the marginal cost of shielding does not exceed the marginal benefit, understood as the amount shielded after deducting shielding expenses. But this too is erroneous: It assumes the costs are borne by the borrower, but they are in fact taken from what is owed to the lender. With this in mind, the first contribution of this paper is in explaining that the choice of value to shield depends on debtor’s wealth and the size of the debt—but not on shielding costs. More spe- cifically, the lowest value that a debtor will find rational to spend on shielding is given by the 2 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2820650 difference between debtor’s wealth and debt.1 To illustrate the intuition underlying this result, suppose the borrower owes $10,000 and has $25,000. Spending only $12,000 on shielding, for example, would leave more than $10,000 exposed, so the lender would be able to collect in full despite shielding effort. It follows that if the borrower spends on shielding any positive amount, it must be greater than $15,000 for else shielding effort would be moot—and this minimal value that must be shielded holds regardless of shielding costs. Understanding how much would be shielded helps to determine whether shielding will take place at all. When deciding whether to shield, the borrower compares the costs involved in shielding sufficient value to the cost of debt repayment. If shielding costs exceed the debt, the borrower would be better off repaying the debt than shielding. Now, since a wealthier borrower would have to shield more, he would face higher shielding costs. From this follows the second contribu- tion of this paper: the wealthier the borrower is, the less rational shielding becomes.2 Anticipating the ex-post shielding decisions has important effects on project finance. On the one hand, shielding risk can lead to outright credit denial even for profitable investments. While nor- mally the lender can be compensated for default risk by charging a higher interest, this is not nec- essarily the case here. This is because charging higher interest would result in greater shielding incentives may thus reduce lender’s payoff. This will result in credit rationing for certain profita- ble investments even in the absence of the conventional reasons of adverse selection and moral hazard in effort (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). On the other hand, the analysis also implies a strong limit on the incentive to shield. If borrower’s ex-post wealth is high, shielding will be too costly. And if the investment has high expected re- turns, the lender need not worry about default due to shielding. As a result, high yield invest- ments, even if risky in terms of variability of returns (e.g., start-ups), can enjoy easy access to credit even without collateral. Stated differently, a lender might perversely prefer a risky invest- ment to a safer one with the same expected value. This is because the upside in the risky invest- ment is more likely to surpass the wealth threshold. Given the problems asset shielding creates, both the lender and the borrower will have an incen- tive to limit shielding opportunities and the analysis compares two alternatives. In the one, the borrower “ties his hands” and commits not to shield. Such a commitment is of limited credibility, because contractual sanctions are pecuniary and so will not be effective in exactly those circum- stances when the borrower breaches the contract. Still, it may be possible for the borrower to limit future shielding by permitting the creditor to repossess assets soon after default or by placing fu- ture revenues in a hard-to-access account. In the other alternative, the parties opt for an equity agreement instead of a debt contract. I show that the first approach mitigates the problem of 1 In the body of the analysis I develop a stronger version of this conclusion, showing that it would pay the borrower to shield all assets conditional on deciding to shield. 2 The intuition underlying this result can be easily illustrated. If a borrower who owes $10,000 has $15,000 in assets, then the minimum he would have to spend on shielding is $5,000. If he has $80,000, he would have to spend at least $70,000. The greater spending implies a greater cost and lesser incentive to shield. 3 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2820650 shielding but will not solve it, whereas the second approach may indeed solve the problem of as- set shielding but may not always be practical. Section 4 analyzes a few extensions of the basic model. I explain the role of collateral— possessory and nonpossessory, explicit and implicit—in mitigating shielding risk and how equity cushions may be useful. I suggest another motive for debt relief agreements—avoiding shielding behavior—and suggest the structure of such agreements. I then consider how collection costs could affect shielding behavior and show that there is both substitution and complementarity be- tween collection costs and shielding behavior. Finally I discuss ex-ante shielding and consumer lending. I close with a brief analysis of a few regulatory implications. To ward off shielding, the legal sys- tem could attack the problem directly—by making it more expensive to shield through sanctions on shielding and closing shielding loopholes—or it can do so indirectly, by requiring minimal asset requirements for actors engaged in potentially dangerous activities or by limiting the fines and judgments imposed on asset-constrained individuals. Section 5 concludes. There is rich work dating back to Shavell (1986) that studies the effect of insolvency on injurers’ incentives to take care (the ‘judgment proof problem’). For example, Ganuza and Gomez (2008) advocate the use of ‘soft’ liability standards for insolvent injurers. For the most part, work in this area takes wealth levels as exogenously set (Summers 1983, Dari-Mattiacci and De Geest 2002, Ganuza and Gomez, 2008, Dari-Mattiacci and Mangan 2008, Wickelgren 2011) although some important work considers the possibility that firm capitalization may be the result of strategic be- havior (Shavell 2005, Che and Spier 2008, Veld and Hutchinson 2009, Ganuza and Gomez 2011). However, even the latter strain in the literature only studies ex-ante moral hazard.3 This paper complements this body of work by considering the ex-post moral hazard inherent in asset shield- ing, which is of relevance regardless of ex-ante capitalization. Other related work comes from the literature on credit. However, this scholarship too has largely abstracted away from shielding decisions and focused instead on the costs and choice of default (e.g., Leff 1970, Schwartz 1983, Gross and Souleles 2002, White 2007). In the recent contribu- tion of Ellingsen and Kristiansen, they allow borrowers to “divert” assets, but this is different from shielding as it is assumed to come at no cost besides the risk of enforcement (Ellingsen and Kristiansen 2011). In practice, however, shielding is quite costly and generally goes unpunished.4 The part of the literature that relates most closely to asset shielding is the theory of costly state falsification (owing to Lacker and Weinberg 1989). This work studies contracting in the face of an ex-post moral hazard of asset hiding, similar to the inquiry at hand. However, this literature focuses on sophisticated contracts and does not consider simpler contracts which are common in practice (as noted by Lacker himself 1991). Moreover in many settings where shielding opportu- nities are present—e.g., torts, civil judgments, fines, and taxes—contracting is impossible, so that the study of shielding behavior with incomplete contracts becomes important. 3 Shavell (2005) adumbrates this possibility of ex-post moral hazard but does not analyze it. 4 See discussion in section 2. 4 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2820650 The primary contributions of this paper relative to existing literature stem from the analysis of optimal asset shielding decisions and the identification of the relationship between these decisions and borrower’s wealth. The implications of this analysis on the credit market and on rich and poor borrowers are likewise new. Similarly novel are the ideas that shielding is generally an all- or-nothing proposition,5 that high wealth mutes the incentive to shield, and the interpretation of the incentive to enter into debt relief contracts. 2. SHIELDING ASSETS FROM ENFORCEMENT The term asset shielding (or equivalently, asset protection) is used here expansively, to account for any action or omission by an individual that takes place after the creation of a specific debt 6 and that is intended to limit the lender’s ability to seize assets in case of default. Thus defined, some examples are the case of Charles Kallestad, a borrower who was found to be shielding as- sets worth hundreds of thousands of dollars through multiple transfers to an accomplice (U.S. v. Kallestad 51 F.3d 1044 and trial documents); O.J. Simpson and Paul Bilzerian, who moved to multi-million mansions in Florida after accruing millions of dollars in debts; and Jimmy Jen, a debtor from California who was found to have shielded over $6 million using secret vaults, shell corporations, and a sham divorce (Elinson 2010).7 The primary forms of shielding are consumption (e.g., purchasing perishable goods or expensive dinners, giving to charity), concealment (e.g., hiding cash, mock transfers, failing to disclose in- come), legal asset protection (e.g., investing in bankruptcy exempt property, creating special trusts, and forming corporate structures), or obstruction of enforcement efforts (e.g., transferring assets to foreign havens or changing addresses). The literature abounds with techniques and cas- es (e.g., Che and Spier 2008, White 2007, Vandervort v. Vandervort, 134 P.3d 892, (Okla. Civ. App. 2005)). Many of these techniques—although by no means all—are simple and rapid to af- fect and do not require extensive advance planning, most notably asset concealment. This means that a debtor would often be in a position to shield assets before the creditor seeks repayment. This is especially true in loan agreements where the moment of realization of investment returns is not precisely known in advance. Shielding is costly. Some costs are direct—such as setting a shelter or retaining a lawyer—but others are indirect—such as the opportunity cost of shielding and the cost involved in not being able to freely use one’s assets. Whether the marginal cost of shielding increases or declines with the amount shielded is hard to tell a-priori, but it will clearly be positive in most cases. 5 Ellingsen and Kristiansen (2011) reach a similar result but for a different reason. 6 Hence, I do not consider “preparatory” asset protection that takes place before the borrower has a specific debt. 7 O.J. Simpson escaped a $33.5 million judgment while residing in a Florida mansion and receiving a $25K monthly pension, taking advantage of Florida’s generous homestead protection laws and the federal retirement laws (Alper 2007); Bilzerian defaulted on $140 million debts while residing in an 11 bedroom home in Florida taking advantage of similar protections (Shenon, 2001); Jimmy Jen hid over $6 million dollars in vaults, shell corporations, and in his wife’s possession following a sham divorce (Elinson 2010); 5 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2820650 There are also two other types of costs: legality and reputation (Arbel, 2015). As a general matter, shielding assets with the intention of avoiding a specific debt exposes the debtor to both civil and criminal liability. Civil liability is seemingly somewhat effective,8 although the bringing of such a lawsuit requires evidence of fraudulent transfer, which can be hard to obtain, and the successful implementation of the judgment depends on the assets still being in jurisdiction.9 Moreover, even preliminary steps, such as locating the debtor, prove difficult in practice (Stephen, Avril, and Wrapson 2013). Criminal sanctions are seemingly much less effective (e.g., McCullough 1997). In 2011 there were 1.3 million bankruptcy filings (U.S. Courts 2012), but the Executive Office of 10 the US Trustees (EOUST) referred only 1,968 cases to criminal proceedings (DOJ 2012) and in only about 20 cases formal charges were filed.11 This is despite evidence noted below by the EOUST itself that bankruptcy fraud is pervasive. Another cost is reputation (e.g., loss of credit score or lending relationships). Reputation is like- wise limited because it is often hard to observe whether the borrower defaulted strategically or due to real financial inability. The multiplicity of credit channels further dilutes reputational ef- fects, as information, even if obtained, may not fully propagate to all other lenders. Overall, shielding is somewhat prevalent and seemingly highly effective. While we do not have good data, one indication comes from reports of the EOUST, which is the agency in charge of investigating bankruptcy fraud. In a random sample of 102 cases, they found that 17% of the 12 debtors “materially misstated” the true extent of their assets. This evidence joins other studies that find strategic behavior in bankruptcy and in judgment enforcement (Fay, Hurst and White 2002 and Ning Zhu 2011, but see Sullivan, Westbrook and Warren 1989; Arbel, 2015), suggest- 13 ing that some debtors use bankruptcy to protect assets. The size of the debt collection industry is also indicative, as their main service is collection from reluctant debtors. This industry collects 14 over 50 billion dollars annually (PWC 2008, EY 2012). 8 Creditor’s right to reverse fraudulent transfers stems, mainly, from either § 9 of the UFTA or §548 of the Bankruptcy Code. Both Westlaw and LexisNexis record only about 450 cases in 2011 that cite to § 548. 9 In FTC v. Affordable Media, LLC 179 F. 3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1999), the debtors placed their assets in an offshore ac- count. When ordered by a US judge to repatriate their assets, they faxed a request to the offshore trustee who refused to implement it, because the trust mandate gave him the power to refuse requests made under duress. 10 The EOUST collects information from trustees who are required to inform the EOUST of all suspicions of criminal activity (Handbook 2012) 11 Similarly, the database TracFed shows that over the last decade, there was a yearly average of about 60 cases prose- cuted where the main charge was 8 USC §152 (the main section concerning asset fraud in bankruptcy). For the same criteria, Westlaw records 56 open dockets in 2012 and the IRS reports opening investigations in only 44 cases in 2014 (http://www.irs.gov/uac/Statistical-Data-Bankruptcy-Fraud). 12 Of the cases referred, the causes for referral was: false oath or statement (33.2%), concealment of assets (24.8%), and other bankruptcy fraud schemes (21.5%) (each case may have more than one allegation). 13 There are also reports of trillions of dollars hidden in offshore accounts, but it is unclear which part is motivated by asset protection and which by the desire to avoid taxes and other laws. 14 Analysis of the Federal Reserve reports show that in the 10 years between 2003 to 2013, commercial banks have reported average charge-offs of 5.5% (credit cards) and 0.91% (residential real estate) (Federal Reserve Website, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/chargeoff/chgallnsa.htm) Similarly, in total, corporations write off an average 6 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2820650 In sum, then, from the debtor’s perspective, the shielding of assets is a viable strategy with low chance of criminal sanctions, but with some cost due to limited reputational effects and some risk of reversal of the shielding if it is not executed carefully. 3. MODEL AND ANALYSIS The asset shielding model spans four dates (see Figure 1) and involves two risk-neutral parties. At Date 1, one of the parties (‘borrower’) has a positive-expected value investment that requires a fixed investment of b. The borrower has no wealth,15 and seeks a loan from the other party (‘lend- er’), in a competitive lending market with costs of capital normalized to zero. The parties negoti- ate the interest on the loan r, so that the amount due at Date 4 is b + r. 16 If the lender agrees to provide the loan at this price, the funds are invested. If the investment is made, the earnings, e, are realized at Date 2 and are taken from the probabil- ity distribution function f(e), and e is in [e̲, ē], with 0< e̲ <ē. At date 3, the borrower decides whether to repay or shield. This is given by the amount t (t≥0) the borrower spends on shielding, with t=0 being no-shielding. There is a shielding ‘technology’, described by the function s(.), which gives the amount shielded by spending t. It is assumed that s' is strictly increasing, continuous, and with s'<1.17 The borrower’s choice at Date 3 of the amount to shield implicitly defines the amount he leaves exposed. At Date 4 the lender collects and by the recourse principle, the lender may collect from all exposed assets up to the amount owed, i.e., Min(e-t, b+r). After that, the debt is discharged in bankruptcy or the creditor gives up on collecting. of 4.8% of their accounts receivable, which in 2009 totaled $253 billion (IRS Statistics, http://www.irs.gov/uac/Tax- Stats-2). Note that this figure includes loss from debtors who are genuinely unable to repay, so it should only be under- stood as a rough estimate on the upper limit of strategic debt avoidance. 15 This assumption bars the use of collateral and it is relaxed in the extensions of the model. 16 I restrict attention here to simple loan contracts, where the parties set a non-contingent payment schedule. I also ab- stract from criminal sanctions, as Section 2 suggests they are rare; civil sanctions that reverse shielding are more com- mon and they can be conceptualized as part of the expected cost of shielding. 17 This assumption captures the idea that there is always some cost to shielding, such as the opportunity cost involved in losing interest on one’s savings, for otherwise the assets would be shielded in the baseline and the inquiry would be trivial. I further assume here that there are no fixed shielding costs. I relax this assumption below. 7 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2820650 Figure 1: Timing of the Model Finally, the measure of social welfare adopted is the total utility of the parties, which in light of the risk neutrality assumption, is simplified to their joint wealth. At the end of the Date 4, the so- cial benefits from the investment, if made, are its earning e, and the social costs are the costs of making the investment b as well as shielding costs c(s). Timing, Information, and Order of Analysis: the game is solved by backwards induction. It is assumed that all information is common knowledge, although shielding may not be verifiable to a third party. The analysis starts with the shielding and collection stage (Dates 3 & 4), when the amount of earning e and the interest r are fixed. The analysis then goes backwards to analyze the parties’ decisions in the first stage (Date 1) when the investment contract, and more specifically r, is negotiated. The results of the analysis will be compared to both the social optimum and to a situation where shielding is limited and costly—either by law, technology, or borrower’s com- mitment. 3.1. Stage 2 Analysis: Shielding At stage 2, the borrower’s objective is to maximize profits by choosing t, the amount to spend on shielding. This makes borrower’s payoff: 𝑠(𝑡)+max(0, 𝑒−𝑡−(𝑏+𝑟)) (1) The first term here is the value to the borrower of shielded assets. By the recourse principle, all exposed assets are potential substitutes for the debt. This means that after shielding, the lender will collect the debt from exposed assets, leaving the borrower with what remains (with a lower bound of zero). We then have the following result. Proposition 1 1.1. If the borrower chooses to shield any positive amount of wealth, the optimal shielding sum, t*, will be equal to his entire wealth; t*=e. 1.2. There exists a unique critical level of wealth e* that if e < e*, all of e is used in shielding, so no debt is collected, and if e > e*, nothing is shielded. However, e* is an increasing function of r and may exceed e̅. Proof: See Appendix. 8 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2820650 The intuition behind this proposition is as follows. The borrower has at this stage a debt of b+r and a fixed wealth of e. We are assuming the borrower decided to shield assets and we are look- ing to see how much value he would like to shield. This decision can be thought of as involving two steps. First, the borrower contemplates whether spending on shielding a small amount is de- sirable. If that amount is small indeed, the remaining assets would exceed the debt: i.e., e-t>b+r. On reflection, shielding such a small amount is undesirable, for it leaves exposed enough value so that despite shielding efforts, the debt will be collected in full. This is a direct implication of the recourse principal. Understanding that, the borrower might seek to shield some larger amount, but perhaps something that still falls short of his entire wealth (i.e, e-(b+r)b+r. However, this is not enough to surpass the wealth threshold; that will happen only if e-s(e)>b+r, or e>b+r+s(e). Hence, borrower’s wealth must be greater than the concept of solvency would imply by s(e) for repayment to take place.19 In other words, solvency is a necessary but insufficient condition for debt repayment. The flip side of this conclusion is that if the borrower chooses to repay, this will only happen when he can repay in full – so that the lender can expect either no payment or full repayment. The following figure illustrates these points: 19 This follows from Proposition 1.1: If borrower’s wealth falls below b+r, his entire wealth will be taken by the credi- tor, so even if shielding is very wasteful, it is still better to shield and retain some value than lose all value. 10 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2820650 Figure 2: Borrower’s Payoff under Shielding or Repayment as a Function of Earnings As the figure shows, as the investment earnings rise, the borrower finds shielding more and more costly. When earnings pass the e* threshold, the shielding costs exceed the costs of repaying the debt and the borrower finds repayment optimal. As noted, having b+r in earning is insufficient to warrant repayment, and the earnings must be greater than b+r by s(e*) for the borrower to repay. Lastly, from the creditor’s perspective, repayment is binary due to the cliff’s edge nature of shielding: For every e≤e*, the lender is not paid at all, and for every e>e* the creditor is repaid in full. Social Optimum. The social optimum is defined as the sum of the parties’ joint wealth: 𝑒−𝑏−(𝑡−𝑠(𝑡)) (2) That is, the returns from the investment less the costs of making the investment and the costs in- 20 volved in shielding. Since (2) is strictly decreasing in t, it will be socially desirable that t=0, so that no assets will be shielded; the simple reason is that asset protection absorbs resources but creates no value aside from shifting wealth between the parties. Private Decisions with Limits on Shielding. In some situations, shielding may be less effective and more costly—either because the legal system makes shielding difficult or because the bor- rower was able to “tie his hands” and make it more difficult to shield. To capture that, we will consider a competing shielding technology s (), such that s '(t)e*). Equity Agreement. We compare now the simple debt contract with a simple equity agreement where the lender buys a stake in the borrower. Under this agreement, the borrower owes the lend- er a fraction f of all earnings. To simplify the discussion of equity agreements, we will make the fairly strong assumption that t-s(t)=kt for all t¸ that is, that the marginal cost of shielding is fixed at k. Proposition 2. 2. If the equity stake is small, i.e., if fe*. The parties negotiate over r and since the analysis implies that e* de- pends on r, it will be useful to describe e* as e*(r). The lender thus expects full repayment if, and only if, e>e*(r), making his expected payoff: 𝑒 ∫ (𝑏+𝑟) 𝑓(𝑒)d𝑒 (4) 𝑒∗(𝑟) The following proposition summarizes parties’ decisions in this model. Proposition 3. If assets can be shielded, then: 3.1. If the returns on the investment are expected to be sufficiently high –i.e., 𝐹(𝑒∗(𝑟)) < 1− 𝑏 , for some r, lending will take place despite the potential for asset shielding; 𝑏+𝑟 3.2. Asset shielding may result in denial of credit to net positive value investments through two channels: 13 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2820650 3.2.1. Value Reduction. Shielding reduces the expected value of the investment to a potentially e∗(r) negative value due to shielding costs(=∫ t(e) 𝑓(𝑒)d𝑒); or, 𝑒̲ 3.2.2. Feedback Effect. Increasing interest may reduce expected payments, thus making interest adjustments insufficient to compensate the lender for shielding risk, making it so that there will not be an equilibrium interest rate. Proof. See Appendix. The first part of Proposition 2 reflects the notion that when wealth is high, shielding becomes ir- rational. The lender will only lend if his participation constraint is met, that is, if the lender can expect to recoup her investment b. This will happen when there is sufficient probability of the wealth threshold being met, because then the debt plus interest are paid in full. As is familiar, the potential for shielding in the other cases could be compensated through the higher interest rate. And if the investment returns are expected to be high in all states of the world, it may be that the interest charged would be at the risk-free rate, despite borrower’s technical ability to shield assets. This result—that lending is rational even in the presence of effective shielding technology—could partially explain credit markets in jurisdictions with poor enforcement and the practice of mostly unsecured loans to high-payoff investments, such as start-ups. The following example illustrates: Example 3: The borrower seeks a loan of $6,000 and the investment is certain to earn at least $8,000. Since this earning amount is greater than the wealth threshold identified above of $7,500, the lender knows, with certainty, that the borrower will have an incentive to repay. Hence, even with an interest of 0, the lender will be able to recover the full $6,000. Example 3a: Now the investment is expected to earn an amount between $0-30,000 with a uniform distribution. If the interest is set at $6,000, the wealth threshold becomes $15,000 (for the cost of shielding that amount is $12,000, the same as the debt plus interest). Since there is 50% chance of exceeding the wealth threshold, this secures the lender an expected payment of 0.5*12,000=$6,000. So the lender should be willing to lend even if shielding is expected to take place in some states of the world. Borrower’s payoff below the wealth threshold has an expected value of 0.2*7,500, and above the threshold of 22,500-12,000, for a total expected payoff of 0.5*0.2*7,500+0.5*(22,500-12,000)=$6,000. The second part of the Proposition indicates two channels by which asset shielding destroys value ex-ante. The first is the fact that shielding assets consumes resources that would otherwise be available to the parties. If the expected surplus of the investment is $3,000, but the expected shielding cost is $5,000, then the investment no longer has a positive expected value. The second channel is subtly different. As was just noted, the risk of shielding means that a high- er interest must be charged. But recall that the incentive to shield rises with the debt (e* is in- creasing in r). Increasing r in (4) has the double effect of increasing payment conditional on re- payment, but reducing the overall probability of repayment (by increasing the lower bound of the integral). To compensate for the higher incentive to shield, an even higher interest may be charged. But this can create a feedback effect, with higher interest increasing shielding incentives, 14 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2820650 requiring higher interest, etc. And so, for various investments, there may not exist any equilibri- um interest rate for which the lender will be willing to lend and the borrower willing to borrow. An implication of this Proposition concerns the lender’s preference between safe and risky pro- jects of the same expected value. Safer projects are characterized by lower variability of returns, which also entails a lower probability of exceeding the wealth threshold. This would mean that a lender my have a perverse preference to risky projects in the presence of asset shielding risk. Note that denial of credit through these channels operates through a different mechanism than that identified by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Instead of ex-ante moral hazard or adverse selection, here the problem is one of ex-post moral hazard. Social Optimum. At the beginning of the Date 1, the revenue from the investment is uncertain and has an expected value of E(e). The net value of the investment is E(e) - b, which is assumed to be positive. It was noted above that during the second stage, it is socially desirable for assets not to be shielded. Therefore, assuming t=0, it is socially desirable for the positive expected value investment to be undertaken. When assets may be shielded ex-post, the value of the investment 𝑒∗(𝑟) becomes 𝐸(𝑒)−𝑏−∫ 𝑡(𝑒) 𝑓(𝑒)𝑑𝑒 , that is, the expected value falls by the costs of shield- 𝑒 ing. Hence, an otherwise socially desirable investment may become undesirable if shielding is expected. Private Decisions when Shielding is Limited. Lender’s payoff in this akin to (4): 𝑒 ∫ (𝑏+𝑟) 𝑓(𝑒)d𝑒 (5) 𝑒∗(𝑟) We have noted that e* decreases for lower s'(), i.e., if shielding technology is limited, the wealth threshold will be lower. A lower threshold implies a higher probability of repayment, thus reduc- ing interest rates and mitigating the problems just identified. Importantly, however, these prob- lems may not be completely solved as long as s'()>0, for there could still be some incentive to shield. The following example illustrates Example 4. Suppose the same circumstances as in 3a. only that now shielding technolo- gy is limited so that the borrower retains only 10 cents on each dollar shielded, instead of 20. With this change, if the interest is set at $3,000, the wealth threshold is $10,000 (for 0.9*10,000=6000+3000). There is 2/3 chance of exceeding this threshold, thus securing the lend- er an expected return of 2/3*9,000=6,000, so the lender would indeed be willing to lend at this rate. This also means that the borrower pays $3,000 less in interest in this case, due to the limited ability to shield. Borrower’s expected payoff under this example would be 1/3 * 0.1*5,000+ 2/3 * (20,000-9000)=$7,500. This is an improvement of $1,500 over example 3a, all due to the limited ability to shield assets. The analysis changes when shielding is completely ineffective. In this case, the borrower is indif- ferent between repaying and shielding for low earnings, e≤b+r, and will strictly prefer repaying when earnings are high, e>b+r. This implies an expected return to the lender of min(e, b+r), leading to a familiar prediction: while the interest rate may be positive, lending to a positive ex- 15 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2820650 pected value investment will always take place. This is in contrast to the shielding model, where lending to such projects was not guaranteed. We see then that a credible commitment not to shield, and likewise effective enforcement tech- nology, would lead to lower interest and can solve credit denial problems. This is clearly in the borrower’s self-interest, ex-ante, to be able to commit to not shielding thus securing finance when he otherwise would not and keeping a greater share of the investment surplus. The difficulty is that standard contractual mechanisms involve only pecuniary sanctions, and thus provide no teeth to a commitment not to shield Equity Agreement. We turn now to examine the possibility of an equity agreement instead of a debt contract. At Stage 1, the parties set f or r endogenously. Based on Proposition 2, it is an eq- uity agreement will dominate ex-ante a debt contract from both the borrower’s and lender’s per- spective. Suppose first that there exists fc. This will allow the borrower to leave c in asset value exposed without fear of collection. For the borrower, shielding costs are then reduced by c-s(c), thus further exacerbating shielding incentives and their resultant negative effects.26 It may also be that collection costs depend on the amount collected. Let l(m) be the cost function of collecting an amount m. Suppose that l(m) is either everywhere increasing or decreasing. Let m* be the value of m for which l'(m*)=1. If collection costs are decreasing, the borrower could leave up to m* in assets exposed and they will be essentially protected. This reduces the amount the borrower needs to shield by m*, having a similar effect to that of a positive c. If collection costs are increasing, collecting more than m* would be unprofitable. This implies for the borrower that leaving assets exposed is akin to losing m* in value. Now, if m*>b+r, this will not change the analysis. However, if m*0). We can therefore simplify (1) to s(t) + e - t - b – r. And be- cause s(t)-t<0,it would be best to set t=0. If, instead, a higher t is considered, such that t > e - (b 29 When shielding leads to suboptimal care, the legal system may seek to directly 20 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2820650 + r), that would make borrower’s payoff in (1) =s(t), which is clearly optimal to set at its highest 30 value, i.e., e. QED. Note: the proof is relatively general and it holds regardless of the marginal cost of shielding (as long as it is positive), so that it applies even if the marginal cost of shielding exceeds the marginal amount shielded. 1.2. By 1.1., the optimal level of t, conditional on shielding, is e.. Hence, shielding costs can be expressed as e-s(e). As s'(e)<1, Shielding costs are increasing in e. This implies that for some level of e, we will have e-s(e)=b+r. let e* denote this level. The benefit of shielding is avoiding up to b+r in costs, so when e>e*, the costs of shielding exceed the benefit. It is straightforward to see from this formulation that for higher r the level of e* also increases. 1.3. Because the cost of shielding for any e>e* is greater than b+r, the borrower will be better off paying b+r and retaining e-(b+r) than shielding. QED. Proof of Proposition 2. 2.1. Let us look at the case where, for simplicity, r=0 and e>e*(0). In all states of the world bor- rower’s wealth exceeds the threshold identified in 1.2., so shielding will not take place, and the expected return in (5) becomes simply b+0. Hence, the loan is guaranteed to be repaid in full and the interest would be indeed set at zero. If, however, e0 in this case, because there will not be any payment in the states of the world when e0. By slightly increasing the interest, the lender increases his expected payoff by the probability of repayment times the higher payment, i.e., (1-F(e*(r1))(b+r1). At the same time, however, the higher debt would reduce the probability of repayment, so that the expected repayment falls by the lost revenues, i.e., F(e*(r1)-F(e*(0)))b. Now, if under the new schedule the net amount received (the gain from the higher interest less the loss from the lower probability of repayment) falls below b, r1 would have to be set even higher. It is plain to see now that further increasing the interest may repeat this dynamic, so that r would need to be further and further increased. At the extreme, r could be set any arbitrarily high level, r≥e̅, but then surely no payments will be made, because if the debt is greater than borrower’s wealth it always pays to shield (by 1.1.). Hence, it may be that no interest rate would exist such that the necessary amount will be repaid, and the loan will be denied (even if, after deducting the costs of shielding, it has a positive value).32 QED. * Terence M. Considine and Private Law Fellow, Harvard Law School. yar- bel@sjd.law.harvard.edu. I would like to thank I thank Christopher Avery, Oren Bar-Gill, Louis Kaplow, Koby Kastiel, Roy Shapira, Steven Shavell, Henry Smith, and Kathryn Spier for valua- ble comments, as well as to the anonymous reviewer. I would also like to thank the John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business at Harvard Law School for financial support. REFERENCES Alper, Elijah, M. 2007. Opportunistic Informal Bankruptcy: How BAPCPA may Fail to Make Wealthy Debtors Pay Up. Columbia Law Review 107(8):1908-1943 NY City Bar. 2012. “Profiteering from Financial Distress: An Examination of the Debt Settle- ment Industry”, available at http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/DebtSettlementWhitePaperCivilCtConsumerAffairsR eportFINAL5.11.12.pdf Che, Yeon Koo, and Kathryn E. Spier. 2008. “Strategic Judgment Proofing.” RAND Journal of Economics 39 (4): 926–48. Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe, and Gerrit De Geest. 2005. “Judgment Proofness Under Four Different Precaution Technologies.” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 161 (1): 38–56. 32 For example, suppose shielding cost is a constant $0.5 per dollar, the loan is $10,000 and that there is equal probabil- ity of returns being either $10,000 or $30,000—i.e., expected return is $20,000. If r=0, the critical level is $30,000, so there is %50 chance of the borrower repaying, implying an expected return to the lender of $5,000. To adjust, the inter- est must be set to some positive amount, but this will only increase the critical level to be above $30,000, implying 0 overall returns to the lender. 22 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2820650 Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe, and Barbara Mangan. 2008. “Disappearing Defendants Versus Judg- ment Proof Injurers.” Economica 75 (300): 749–65. Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe, and Francesco Parisi. 2003. “The Cost of Delegated Control: Vicarious Liability, Secondary Liability And Mandatory Insurance.” International Review of Law and Eco- nomics 23 (4): 453–75. Elinson, Zusha 2010. “City Finds Millions, but Reaps Little in Case,” New York Times, Decem- ber, 11 2010. Arbel, Yonathan A., 2015. “Contract Remedies in Action: Specific Performance”, West Virginia Law Review 118:100-141. Ellingsen, Tore and Eirik Gaard Kristiansen 2011. “Financial Contracting Under Imperfect En- forcement,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 126 (1): 323-371. Ernest & Young (EY). 2012. “The Impact of Third Party Debt Collection on the National and State Economies”. Fay, Scott, Eric Hurst, and Michelle White. 2002. “The Household Bankruptcy Decision,” Ameri- can Economics Review 92:706–718. Ganuza, Juan-José, and Fernando Gómez. 2008. “Realistic Standards: Optimal Negligence with Limited Liability.” The Journal of Legal Studies 37 (2): 577–94. Ganuza, Juan José, and Fernando Gomez. 2011. “Soft Negligence Standards and the Strategic Choice of Firm Size.” Journal of Legal Studies 40 (2): 438–66. Gross, David B. and Nicholas S. Souleles. 2002. “Do Liquidity Constraints and Interest Rates Matter for Consumer Behavior? Evidence from Credit Card Data,” Quarterly Journal of Econom- ics 117 (1): 149-185. Hart, Oliver and John Moore. 1989. Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt, Quar- terly Journal of Economics 113(1): 1-41. Lacker, Jeffery M. 1991. “Why is there Debt? Economic Review,” July-Aug:3–19. Lacker, Jeffery M. and John A. Weinberg. 1989. “Optimal Contracts under Costly State Falsifica- tion,” Journal of Political Economy, 97(6):1345-1363. Leff, Arthur A. 1970. “Injury, Ignorance and Spite — The Dynamics of Coercive Collection,” Yale Law Journal 80 (1):1-46. McCullough, Ralph C. 1997. “Bankruptcy Fraud: Crime without Punishment II,” Commercial Law Journal 102:1-54. Pitchford, Rohan. 1995. “How Liable Should a Lender Be? The Case of Judgment-Proof Firms and Environmental Risk.” American Economic Review 85 (5): 1171–86. Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) 2008, “Value of Third-party Debt Collection to the US. Econ- omy in 2007: Survey and Analysis.” Schwartz, Alan. 1983. “The Enforceability of Security Interests in Consumer Goods,” Journal of Law & Economics 26(1): 117-162. Scott, Austin W. 1913. “The Right to Follow Money Wrongfully Mingled with Other Money,” Harvard Law Review 27(2): 125-138. Stephen, Lea E. G, Avril J. Mewse, and Wendy Wrapson. 2013. “The Psychology of Debt in Poor Households in Britain” in A Debtor World (Ralph Brubaker, Robert M. Lawless, and Charles J. Tabb eds.). 23 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2820650 Shavell, Steven. 1986. “The Judgment Proof Problem.” International Review of Law and Eco- nomics 6. Springer: 45-68. Shavell, Steven. 2005. “Minimum Asset Requirements and Compulsory Liability Insurance as Solutions to the Judgment-Proof Problem.” The RAND Journal of Economics 36 (1): 63. Shenon, Philip. 2001. “Home Exemptions Snag Bankruptcy Bill.” New York Times, April 6 2001. Sullivan, Teresa A., Jay L. Westbrook, and Elizabeth Warren. 1989. As We Forgive Our Debtors: Bankruptcy and Consumer Credit in America. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Summers, John. 1983. “The Case of the Disappearing Defendant: An Economic Analysis.” U. Penn. L. Rev 1422 (1979): 145–72. Stiglitz, Joseph E. and Andrew Weiss. 1981. “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Infor- mation,” The American Economic Review 71 (3):393-410. US Courts. 2012. Bankruptcy Statistics. http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/12-month-period-ending-march.aspx. US DOJ. 2012. Public Report: Borrower Audits by the United States Trustee Program. Veld, van’t Klaas, and Emma Hutchinson. 2009. “Excessive Spending by Firms to Avoid Acci- dents: Is It a Concern in Practice?” International Review of Law and Economics 29 (4): 324–35. White, Michelle J. 2007. “Abuse or Protection: The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform under BAPCPA.” University of Illinois Law Review 2007 (1):275-304. Wickelgren, Abraham L. “Settlement and the Strict Liability-Negligence Comparison.” U of Tex- as Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. 213. Zhu, Ning. 2011. “Household Consumption and Personal Bankruptcy”, Journal of Legal Studies, 40 (1): 1-37 24 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2820650)MW4LLM"; struct Paper { std::string paper_id; std::string title; std::string ssrn_url; int year; std::vector authors; std::vector keywords; std::string summary_md; std::string summary_zh_md; std::string one_pager_md; std::string study_pack_md; std::string article_text; }; inline Paper as_paper() { return Paper{ PAPER_ID, TITLE, SSRN_URL, YEAR, AUTHORS, KEYWORDS, SUMMARY_MD, SUMMARY_ZH_MD, ONE_PAGER_MD, STUDY_PACK_MD, ARTICLE_TEXT}; } } // namespace my_works_for_llm int main(int argc, char** argv) { (void)argc; (void)argv; std::cout << my_works_for_llm::ARTICLE_TEXT; return 0; }