Scientific objectivity-note:v
2026.05.17/plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/scientific-objectivity/ : "Measurement is often thought to epitomize scientific objectivity, most famously captured in Lord Kelvin’s dictum
when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind; it may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely, in your thoughts, advanced to the stage of science, whatever the 
matter may be. (Kelvin 1883, 73)",
"These days, the Bayesian approach is extremely influential in philosophy and rapidly gaining ground across all scientific disciplines. 
For quantifying evidence for a hypothesis, Bayesian statisticians almost uniformly use the Bayes factor, that is, the ratio of prior to posterior odds in favor of a hypothesis. The Bayes factor in favor of hypothesis 
H against its negation ¬H in the light of evidence E can be written as (3)  BF(E):=p(H∣E)p(¬H∣E),p(¬H)p(H)=p(E∣H)p(E∣¬H),or in other words, as the likelihood ratio between H and ¬H. The Bayes factor reduces to the 
likelihoodist conception of evidence (Royall 1997) for the case of two competing 
point hypotheses.",
"Unsurprisingly, the idea to measure scientific evidence in terms of subjective probability has met resistance. For example, the statistician Ronald A. Fisher (1935: 6–7) has argued that measuring psychological 
tendencies cannot be relevant for scientific inquiry and sustain claims to objectivity. Indeed, how should scientific objectivity square with subjective degree of belief? Bayesians have responded to this challenge in 
various ways:":3,
"Bayesian inductive logic provides rational rules for representing uncertainty and making inductive inferences. Choosing the premises (e.g., the prior distributions) “objectively” falls outside the scope of Bayesian 
analysis.
Convergence or merging-of-opinion theorems guarantee that under certain circumstances, agents with very different initial attitudes who observe the same evidence will obtain similar posterior degrees of belief in the 
long run. However, they are asymptotic results without direct implications for inference with real-life datasets (see also Earman 1992: ch. 6). In such cases, the choice of the prior matters, and it may be beset with 
idiosyncratic bias and manifest social values.
Adopting a more modest stance, Sprenger (2018) accepts that Bayesian inference does not achieve the goal of objectivity in the sense of intersubjective agreement (concordant objectivity), or being free of personal 
values, bias and subjective judgment. However, he argues that competing schools of inference such as frequentist inference face this problem to the same degree, perhaps even worse. Moreover, some features of Bayesian 
inference (e.g., the transparency about prior assumptions) fit recent, socially oriented conceptions of objectivity that we discuss in section 5.
A radical Bayesian solution to the problem of personal bias is to adopt a principle that radically constrains an agent’s rational degrees of belief, such as the Principle of Maximum Entropy (MaxEnt—Jaynes 1968; 
Williamson 2010). According to MaxEnt, degrees of belief must be probabilistic and in sync with empirical constraints, but conditional on these constraints, they must be equivocal, that is, as middling as possible. This 
latter constraint amounts to maximizing the entropy of the probability distribution in question. The MaxEnt approach eliminates various sources of subjective bias at the expense of narrowing down the range of rational 
degrees of belief. An alternative objective Bayesian solution consists in so-called “objective priors”: prior probabilities that do not represent an agent’s factual attitudes, but are determined by principles of 
symmetry, mathematical convenience or maximizing the influence of the data on the posterior (e.g., Jeffreys 1939 [1980]; Bernardo 2012).
Thus, Bayesian inference, which analyzes statistical evidence from the vantage point of rational belief, provides only a partial answer to securing scientific objectivity from personal idiosyncrasy.",
"Unlike Bayes factors, this concept of statistical evidence does not depend on personal degrees of belief. However, this does not necessarily mean that 
p-values are more objective. First, 
p-values are usually classified as “non-significant” (
p >.05), “significant” (p <.05), “highly significant”, and so on. Not only that these thresholds and labels are largely arbitrary, they also promote publication bias: non-significant findings are often classified as 
“failed studies” (i.e., the efficacy of the intervention could not be shown), rarely published and end up in the proverbial “file drawer”. Much valuable research is suppressed. Conversely, significant findings may often 
occur when the null 
hypothesis is actually true, especially when researchers have been “hunting for significance”. In fact, researchers have an incentive to keep their 
p-values low: the stronger the evidence, the more convincing the narrative, the greater the impact—and the higher the chance for a good publication and career-relevant rewards. Moving the goalpost by “p-hacking” outcome
—
for example by eliminating outliers, selective reporting or restricting the analysis to a subgroup—evidently biases the research results and compromises the objectivity of experimental research.
In particular, such questionable research practices (QRP) increase the type I error rate, which measures the rate at which false hypotheses are accepted, substantially over its nominal 5% level and contribute to 
publication bias (Bakker et al. 2012). Ioannidis (2005) concludes that “most published research findings are false”—they are the combined result of a low base rate of effective causal interventions, the file drawer 
effect and the widespread presence of questionable research practices. The frequentist logic of hypothesis testing aggravates the problem because it provides a framework where all these biases can easily enter (Ziliak 
and McCloskey 2008; Sprenger 2016). These radical conclusions are also confirmed by empirical findings: in many disciplines researchers fail to replicate findings by other scientific teams. See section 5.1 for more 
detail."...
"Summing up our findings, neither of the two major frameworks of statistical inference manages to eliminate all sources of personal bias 
and idiosyncrasy. The Bayesian considers subjective assumptions to be an irreducible part of scientific reasoning and sees no harm in making them explicit. The frequentist conception of evidence based on 
p
-values avoids these explicitly subjective elements, but at the price of a misleading impression of objectivity and frequent abuse in practice. A defense of frequentist inference should, in our opinion, stress that the 
relatively rigid rules for interpreting statistical evidence facilitate communication and assessment of research results in the scientific community—something that is harder to achieve for a Bayesian. We now turn from 
specific methods for stating and interpreting evidence to a radical criticism of the idea that there is a rational scientific method.",
"It has been argued, however, that pluralist approaches give up too quickly on the idea that the different senses of objectivity share one or several important common elements. As we have seen in section 4.1 and 5.1, 
scientific objectivity and trust in science are closely connected. Scientific objectivity is desirable because to the extent that science is objective we have reasons trust scientists, their results and recommendations 
(cf. Fine 1998: 18). Thus, perhaps what is unifying among the difference senses of objectivity is that each sense describes a feature of scientific practice that is able to inspire trust in science.
Building on this idea, Inkeri Koskinen has recently argued that it is in fact not trust but reliance that we are after (Koskinen forthcoming). Trust is something that can be betrayed, but only individuals can betray 
whereas objectivity pertains to institutions, practices, results, etc. We call scientific institutions, practices, results, etc. objective to the extent that we have reasons to rely on them. The analysis does not stop 
here, however. There is a distinct view about objectivity that is behind Daston and Galison’s historical epistemology of the concept and has been defended by Ian Hacking: that objectivity is not a—positive—virtue but 
rather the absence of this or that vice (Hacking 2015: 26). Speaking of objectivity in imaging, for instance, Daston and Galison write that the goal is to
let the specimen appear without that distortion characteristic of the observer’s personal tastes, commitments, or ambitions. (Daston and Galison 2007: 121)"... (Independence Requirement from Michael Pendlebury.),
"Koskinen picks up this idea of objectivity as absence of vice and argues that it is specifically the aversion of epistemic risks for which the term is reserved. Epistemic risks comprise “any risk of epistemic error 
that arises anywhere during knowledge practices’ (Biddle and Kukla 2017: 218)" (Correctness from non-arbitrary standard of correctness from Michael Pendlebury.),
"According to Hacking, “objectivity” is an “elevator” or second-level word, similar to “true” or “real”—“Instead of saying that the cat is on the mat, we move up one story and and say that it is true that the cat is on 
the mat” (2015: 20)." (Output Requirement from Michael Pendlebury. "Container" from alldimensions, beyond-universe and beyondcosmology...),
"strong point of this account is that none of the threats to a peculiar analysis puts scientific objectivity at risk. We can (and in fact, we do) rely on scientific practices that represent the world from a perspective 
and where non-epistemic values affect outcomes and decisions. What is left open by Koskinen’s account is the normative question of what a scientist who cares about her experiments and inferences being objective should 
actually do. That is, the philosophical ideas we have reviewed in this section stay mainly on the descriptive level and do not give an actual guideline for working scientists. Connecting the abstract philosophical 
analysis to day-to-day work in science remains an open problem."
; 2026.05.17/https://academic.oup.com/chicago-scholarship-online/book/22217/chapter-abstract/182388235?redirectedFrom=fulltext : "Yet modern Western scientific secularism turns out to be just one of many existing 
secularisms, each constituted within, and retaining distinctive features of, the religion with respect to which it is non-observant. After all, each religion marks the path of its own possible secularism(s) when it 
specifies what counts as being observant."..."Thus secularisms, too, are culturally specific and often positive forces on the growth of scientific knowledge. Even religious and spiritual experiences, beliefs, and 
interests need not be regarded as invariably damaging the reliability of the results of scientific research. This issue also has gender effects.";
2026.05.17/https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-68058-8_1 : "Baier writes: “What is the difference between trusting others and merely relying on them? It seems to be reliance on their good will toward 
one, as distinct from their dependable habits, or only on their dependably exhibited fear, anger, or other motives compatible with ill will toward one, or on motives not directed on one at all. […] Trust is often mixed 
with other species of reliance on persons. Trust which is reliance on another’s good will, perhaps minimal good will, contrasts with the forms of reliance on others’ reactions and attitudes” (Baier, 1986: 234)." (This 
reminds me of 2026.05.17/https://www.researchgate.net/publication/328218175_Deep_disagreement_and_hinge_epistemology / https://anotepad.com/notes/247rrrty : p.24:"This sort of case should beintelligible on Wright’s picture of entitlement as rational
trust. Wright himself maintains that entitlement to trust that p doesn’t entail entitlement
to believe that p. Ipso facto, you shouldn’t believe that p if you’re only entitled to
trust that p, for then you would be believing without any evidence or anything which
indicates that p is true. So, cases where you trust that p whilst disbelieving p should
be possible" as an attempt to answer Michael Pendlebury's question at p.19 in philpapers.org/archive/PENOVR.pdf with source:Startpage.com: ""distinguish between different kinds" "of commitments"" 2nd result.);
Scientific objectivity-note:a

1750 being exeptional-note:v
2026.05.17/https://worldpopulationhistory.org/map/1750 : "A hub of textile manufacturing beginning in the 18th century, Manchester was considered the world’s first industrial city."
2026.05.17/https://anotepad.com/notes/webynd5t / 2026.05.17/https://wug.akwien.at/WUG_Archiv/2018_44_4/2018_44_4_0545.pdf : 
p.01: "Every step and every movement of the multitude, even in what are termed
enlightened ages, are made with equal blindness to the future.
(Adam Ferguson, 1782)",
p.05:"Fifth, and finally, many economic processes are subject to circular and cumulative causation. Foreshadowed in the writings of the classical economists, especially Adam Smith, the concept was developed by Gunnar Myrdal and further elaborated by Nicholas Kaldor. The basic idea is that
one change in the economic system will trigger other changes, where these changesarecircular andyield economically positive or negative out
comes– they are “virtuous” or “vicious”. The direction they take and the speed at which their effects can be discerned are frequently difficult to an
ticipate. This is in no small degree responsible for the complexity of the subject and can be expected to remain so or even gain in importance in the future. The reason is that in the digital economy, economies of scale and network effects are joined by new efficiency and productivity enhancing feedback loops due to robots and algorithms in data rich markets. This in
creases the complexity of the system as a whole. Paradoxically, they also lead to its rapid decrease in transparency, despite the growing mass of
data available. These phenomena can lead to unintended consequences of human action, a doctrine which was especially advocated by representatives of the Scottish Enlightenment who experienced the transition from a largely",
p.06:"static state of socio-economic affairs to a progressing one. Adam Smith coined the famous notion of the “invisible hand” to describe the fact that, while people typically act in accordance with their perceived 
interests, their actions often entail effects they neither intended nor foresaw; that they could in fact never have possibly foreseen. These effects may be benefi cial to society as a whole, or they 
maybe quite the opposite. It is the task of political economy, the “science of the legislator”, to suggest institutions and regulations that foster the wellbeing of its citizens and ward off dangers.",
p.12:"In Britain from the 16th century onwards the 2nd Ag ricultural Revolution took place, which brought new farming systems such as novel forms of crop rotation, a greater use of tools and equipment and a more 
effective drainage. These technological advances boosted agricul tural output and food production and brought an acceleration of population growth plus rapid productivity increases.25 While prior to the 2nd Agricul tural 
Revolution the pace at which novel technologies and other innova tions pervaded Europe’s societies was relatively modest, technological change since then picked up considerably, as did the rate of socio-eco nomic 
transformation that accompanied it.26 Significant medical progress contributed to lower infant mortality rates, positively affected population growth and markedly increased life expectancy",
p.13:"2nd Agricultural Revolution was a catalyst of the Industrial Revolu tion, which during 
the second half of the 18th century marked one of the most disruptive eras in economic history. The emergence of the steam en gine set off a series of K-waves, each reflecting a different technological paradigm. These 
technological revolutions did not only lead to a transfor mation of the prevailing technology base and system of production; it had also a significant and thorough impact on social, political and cultural life. The 
first K-wave (c. 1770-1840) saw an impressive rise of three sectors: coal, iron and textile (cotton cloth). By means of Watt’s condensing steam engine invented in Britain in 1769, iron could be produced more 
efficiently, boosting the exports of the sector and the economy as a whole.27 The steam engine also provided a greater flexibility in the choice of location andtherefore induced a more efficient (re)location of economic 
activity ac cording to the proximity of markets and input factors such as labour and coal. This in turn fostered industrialisation and urbanisation and stimulated economic growth.28 Further inventions led to the 
mechanisation of cotton cloth production and the rise of the British and fall of the Indian textile in dustry.29 This stimulated innovation in (iron) machine tools. It also left a strong mark on the structure of the 
work force: Depending on the specific work tasks, the utilisation of the steam engine in production increased or decreased the skill level of the labourer. In terms of its socio-economic consequences, population growth 
again accelerated remarkably through improved living conditions– Britain’s population on average became healthier, better fed and educated. Thesteamengineeventually also brought about a new mode of passen ger and 
freight transport: railways. After overcoming initial problems, rail wayconstruction, leveraged by a strong iron industry, experienced a take off in the 1840s, triggering the second K-wave (c. 1840-1890). Railways 
became the dominant means of public transport in Britain, but also in the U.S., Austria and France.30 The explosive population growth and the socio-economic changes dur ing and as a consequence of the Industrial 
Revolution also raised con cerns and triggered an occasionally heated debate amongst economists and social philosophers. Thomas R. Malthus in 1798 published the Essay on the Principle of Population.31 Disputing the 
ideas of the Enlightenment and of the Baconian programme, he outlined a theory of population that thwarted the promise of bettering the human lot by means of technological progress."
1750 being exeptional-note:a

Framing David Hume as an empirical and rational skeptic:v
2025.10.27/philarchive.org/archive/SLAHOT : p.1: "application of conditional 
probabilities in epistemic considerations", "Humeian"..."former position maintains that laws are records of universal 
generalizations which do not instantiate necessity.  The latter maintains that laws govern and  necessitate the behavior of objects.2";
2025.10.27/carneades.pomona.edu/1998-2006/2005-Hume/Notes/ModernPhil.shtml : "Hume argued that we have no idea of bodies without the secondary qualities, especially color.", "Hume, like Berkeley, thinks that we can’t have an idea of colorless extension — a length of something with no color.", "end of the section, Hume denied that we have sensory impressions of solidity that are different in kind from our sensory impressions of the putative secondary qualities. Just as perceived colors vary from person to person, so do perceptions of solidity.", p.4: "Hume’s ambition is to develop a science of human nature that is different from natural philosophy." maybe contradicts Jonathan Israel's notion that enlightened philsophers tried to unite science and philosophy, but I dont think so.
Framing David Hume as an empirical and rational skeptic:a

Empiricism and Rationalism in common:v
2025.11.03/philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/49624/what-is-common-between-the-rationalists-and-empiricists : "committed to the idea there is a sure foundation for knowledge in a particular source ... ergo they are both foundationalist epistemologies even if they disagree about whether reason or the senses supplies the foundation.", "Knowledge for these foundationalists is unassailable access to reality as it is.", "Direct perception and certainty", Certainty as "(epistemological)'immunity from error", "Individualism",
"Rationalism does not exclude the empirical totally", "Observation, sensation, and experiment - which clearly belong to the world of experience - are by no means excluded from the Cartesian search for knowledge. Descartes never says that we or he can build an adequate body of knowledge without any reference to the senses. It is just that the contribution of the senses is either unnecessary or highly unreliable at the deepest, foundational level of knowledge." Opposite: Contribution of the senses is either necessary or highly reliable at the highest, surface level of knowledge.",
"proves that these principles really work; that is to say, that they are sufficient to prove everything. That part is the same to both rationalists and empiricists. The key difference is how they account for where the principles or axioms came from.";
2025.11.17/duck.ai : What do empiricism and rationalism have in common?
GPT-4o mini: "Both empiricism and rationalism are foundational approaches in philosophy that explore the nature of knowledge. They share a commitment to the pursuit of truth but differ significantly in their methods and beliefs about the nature of knowledge.
Shared Characteristics
Quest for Knowledge: Both seek to understand the world and establish knowledge foundations.
Challenge of Skepticism: Each school addresses skepticism about how we know what we know, albeit from different angles.
Influence on Science and Philosophy: Both have significantly shaped modern scientific methods and philosophical inquiry.
Integration: Many philosophers integrate elements of both empiricism and rationalism in their theories, acknowledging that both experience and reasoning contribute to knowledge."
Empiricism and Rationalism in common:a

Empiricism and Rationalism-note:v
2025.10.11/intellectualmathematics .com/blog/rationalism-versus-empiricism :"Rationalism says mathematical knowledge comes from within, from pure thought; empiricism that it comes from without, from experience and observation. Rationalism led Kepler to look for divine design in the universe, and Descartes to reduce all mechanical phenomena to contact mechanics and all curves in geometry to instrumental generation. Empiricism led Newton to ignore the cause of gravity and dismiss the foundational importance of constructions in geometry.".."On the one hand, the internal, mental conviction that mathematics establishes absolute truths purely by reasoning. On the other hand, the external, physical fact that mathematics works in the real world.

What is the bridge between these two worlds? It is as if there is a natural harmony between our minds and the outer world. What is the cause of that harmony?

These two poles can be called rationalism and empiricism."..."God created the world based on mathematical ideas, and then created humans and sort of pre-programmed their minds with the same kinds of ideas that he had used to create the world.

So no wonder there’s a harmony between the mental and the physical worlds: they both stem from the same source, the Creator, who used the same principles when designing both. Descartes said basically this quite explicitly, as we recall. Plato pretty much hints at the same idea. God is a mathematician. That is a central belief in Platonist thought as well. And it is a necessary thesis for the rationalists to explain why mathematics works so well.", "challenge for the empiricists is instead to explain the mental experience of doing mathematics; our feeling that it brings absolute truth by pure thought in a way that no other subject does. From the empiricist point of view, this feeling is a mistake, a delusion. We think we are doing pure thought, but actually mathematical thought is generalized experience. We think we can sit in a closed room, an arm chair, and figure things out about an outside world that we have never even seen. But it only feels that way.", "The challenge for rationalism is to explain why mathematics applies to the physical world.", "shouldn’t science explain more things as it develops? Not fewer things. You would think that science should take things that are not explained and explain them. Instead of taking things that are already explained and attributing them to coincidence instead. And yet that is precisely what happened when Kepler’s theories were abandoned.",
"He divided cubic curves into “species” as he says."..."Taxonomising curves into “species” makes Newton sound like a pioneering explorer-scientist forging into unknown jungles and studying all the strange creatures.",
"That’s not how you learn things. You can’t start with observations, with the phenomena. Perception is unreliable. Aimless exploration unguided by the intellect is bound to be a waste of time leading nowhere.", Solar eclipse, predictability of cosmic phenomenas, and cubic curves were point of contention between empiricism and rationalism in 16th-17th century.", "Shouldn’t a proper rationalist hate physical instruments, like Plato did?

But there is no contradiction. Descartes cared about geometrical instruments for theoretical reasons. As I just emphasised, constructions in geometry go naturally with the general rationalist idea of the mind generating all knowledge from within itself. It’s a form of self-reliance. It doesn’t need anything from the outside world.", "how constructions are connected to the epistemological foundations of geometry. Maker’s knowledge. Constructions are the most knowable thing, and the most secure form of geometrical knowledge, protected against many threats of paradoxes and contradictions. So that’s another way in which constructions go well with rationalism, which is of course very much concerned with what are the most undoubtably knowable things.

So these instruments like the ruler and compass and the generalisations of them that Descartes conceived are theoretical, not practical."
Empiricism and Rationalism-note:a

Connection between empiricism and continuum:v
2025.11.21/https://www.researchgate.net/post/Does-certainty-or-absolute-truth-exist : "senses observe a self-similar connection or continuum between the 'forest' or universe and its trees"
Connection between empricism and continuum:a

Realism being subjective:v
2025.11.21/https://maxpohlmann.github.io/and/AND_book_A5.pdf : p.3:"analytic nondualism as a true alternative to objective realism.", p.138: "But the availability of the alternative options does prove that such an
objective world is not necessary to account for experience. Therefore,
experiences can be seen as existing on their own; an objective world
might perhaps exist and mirror the events of experience, but since its
existence is not necessary, it cannot be said to cause the events of experience.",
p.26:"scepticism is committed to metaphysical realism but doubts (or even denies) that we can
know the world" Different definition.
p.139:"Within objective realism, the questions ‘But what if
you are actually a brain-in-a-vat?’ and ‘Are we living in a computer
simulation?’ are real questions that would have real (but likely unknowable) answers. In analytic nondualism, the world that you experience is
real and just the way it is, not illusory or actually some other way" Disagree, since absolute truth is beyond perception in definition, including this statement. Analytical non-dualism focuses too much on experience., "in analytic nondualism, there is no distinction between
the way the world is and how we experience it, since the world within
experience is the primary and relevant notion of the world. Nevertheless,
this does not imply that we always have full knowledge of the world or
reality in general.";
2025.11.21/https://philarchive.org/archive/DIERAA-2 : p.1:"Philosophers have been arguing the relative merits of realism and antirealism of all stripes – metaphysical, moral, scientific, etc. – for a very long
time – from at least Protagoras (see, e.g., Jenkins 2005). This longevity
alone is reason enough to consider that the two may form a dialetheic
pair: though contradictories, both may be true (and false).",
p.4:"ANTI-REALISM: There is nothing more to reality over and
above intersubjectivity.
REALISM: There is something more to reality over and above
intersubjectivity",
p.5:"Everyone agrees that reality exists. This is an analytic truth if ever
there was one. So wherein lies the disagreement? As Taylor (2006) puts
it, realists are urging that some objects have “gold-class existence”, and
anti-realists do not so urge. But this is just rough slang, and betrays
mostly sentiment. For example, the mathematical anti-Platonist will say
that the Platonist believes in some “spooky realm” of etherial objects.
But who would sign up for a “spooky” doctrine? The realist does not
claim that objects have gold-class existence; the realist merely claims
that objects exist. The anti-realist agrees. Since neither party at this
point feels very happy about the dialectic, though, there must be some
disagreement about wherein lies the meaning of existence."
; 2025.11.21/https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-98886-8_5 : "Double Stalemate of Objective Scientific Realism","objective scientific realism (OSR)", "My analyses of Chakravartty’s attempt to justify OSR as well as French’s attempt to overcome it provide reasons why both are able to raise legitimate objections to each other without being able to refute the arguments against their own position. This demonstrates the second stalemate"
Realism being subjective:a

Classical physics-note:v
2025.10.27/philarchive.org/archive/SLAHOT : p.3: "Today we 
can portray the dynamics of the 17th and 18th centuries in the form of four basic laws: 
Newton’s three laws of motion and his law of universal gravitation."..."Establishing the foundations of classical physics as we now know it took some hundreds of years. What the early moderns had at their hands was rather different as what we have today. 
Nowadays, when we open a physics textbook, we find a plethora of interconnected concepts: Force, impulse, momentum, energy, heat, power and work, to mention a few.5 There is a scarce number of definitions or laws from which these concepts can be derived from. Different dynamic notions have precise meanings, and they are clearly related to each other.
It would be a momentous task to figure out how exactly our present exposition of classical physics differs from (or agrees with) early modern natural philosophy. This is not my task in 
this article. Here it suffices to say that the list of propositions concerning physical laws in the early modern world was not the exact same list as we have today. There were still some  serious debates between the Cartesians and the Newtonians about how to organize such a list. This ambivalence is also apparent in Hume. It can be explained by his education. It included  the study of Newtonian natural philosophy with the texts of Newton’s disciples John Keill",
p.4:"and David Gregory, as well as Cartesian natural philosophy with Jacques Rohault’s textbook. In addition, Hume studied Boyle’s experimental mechanical philosophy.6 His overall position on LoD—and natural philosophy more broadly conceived—reflects both Cartesian and Newtonian elements."
Classical physics-note:a

https://web.archive.org/20240428/https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325340093_Review_of_Shapiro_A_G_Todorovic_D_Eds_The_Oxford_Compendium_of_Visual_Illusions_Oxford_University_Press_2017 May 2018
https://megalodon.jp/2024-0429-0059-14/https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1515/mp-2014-0014/html / https://web.archive.org/20240428/https://www.researchgate.net/publication/360684818_George_Orwell_objectivity_and_the_reality_behind_illusions May 2022: Non-reductive physicalism has become the dominant view in the philosophy of mind. Some of its metaphysical underpinnings, however, have not been studied in detail yet.
https://web.archive.org/20240428/https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/36129073/ : "Illusions, objectivity, and non-reductive emergentism: Reply to Rose"
https://web.archive.org/20240428/https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/36129072/ : "More on realism, phenomenology, and causation, in reply to Cheng
David Rose"
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/363747807_More_on_realism_phenomenology_and_causation_in_reply_to_Cheng : 2022-04-28 : "First, I agree with Cheng that the argument from illusions to indirect realism is controversial, especially as to what is meant by “realism,” “veridical,” and “sense data” and the background assumptions underlying them. I provide a finer specification of some of the sub-movements that were the specific concerns of my previous article, particularly phenomenology as it currently sees itself in perception research, and the relevance of illusions. Perception has turned out to be far more complex than traditional philosophy realized, as has been revealed by recent research in neuroscience and psychophysics. Lastly, I answer Cheng’s question about the “causal exclusion argument” by suggesting it is obviated by the temporal substructure of metaphysical states, and I provide a detailed supporting case in Supplementary Material ."
https://web.archive.org/20240428/https://www.researchgate.net/publication/365892968_Causation_runs_horizontally_the_stream_of_thought_as_a_sequence_of_hierarchical_event-complexes_Supplementary_material_for_More_on_realism_phenomenology_and_causation_in_reply_to_Cheng_Perception_51_8 : December 2022 : "Causation occurs within a level of nature, not between levels. For example, mind-body relations are one-to-many in their event durations, which is not consistent with simple (efficient) causation between levels."

"https://web.archive.org/20240428/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00048409012340193":"Chalmers on unrepresentative realism and objectivism" restricted.

https://web.archive.org/20240428/https://research-methodology.net/research-philosophy/ontology/ : "Accordingly, objectivism (or positivism) and subjectivism can be specified as two important aspects of ontology.".
"Positivism	External, objective and independent of social actors,
Realism	Objective. Exists independently of human thoughts and beliefs or knowledge of their existence (realist), but is interpreted through social conditioning (critical realist)"
archived later yet query-action happened 1 minute earlier: https://web.archive.org/20240428184700/https://heliumtrades.com/balanced-news/?q=What+is+the+difference+between+objectivity+and+realism%3F : "Distinguishing Objectivity from Realism
The terms objectivity and realism are often used interchangeably in everyday discourse, yet they hold distinct meanings in philosophical and critical contexts.


Objectivity refers to the concept of perceiving and representing facts free from personal bias, emotions, or subjective interpretations. It is often discussed within the realm of knowledge and truth-finding processes, emphasizing an impartial standpoint that strives to see things as they are, not as one might wish them to be [Cambridge Dictionary].
Realism, in contrast, is a broader philosophical doctrine which posits that external reality exists independently of human thoughts or perceptions. Philosophical realism argues for the existence of an objective reality that human beings can know and understand [Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy].


Key Differences
Epistemological Focus: Objectivity primarily concerns methods of inquiry and the attitudinal stance of individuals towards facts, aiming for neutrality. Realism, however, is concerned with the nature of reality itself and the capacity of human knowledge to accurately reflect that reality.
Disciplinary Applications: Objectivity is commonly applied in sciences and journalism where methods and reporting strive to minimize bias [Nature]. Realism spans across various disciplines including art (depicting life accurately), literature (illusory reality in narrative forms), and sciences (the existence of phenomena independent of observation).


Conclusion
While objectivity and realism can interrelate—realism requiring a degree of objective analysis and objectivity often assuming a realist background—their cores diverge in philosophical significance. One deals with an ethical and methodological approach to information (objectivity), while the other tackles the foundational nature of existence and perception (realism).


Note: References to specific philosophical resources and articles were used for summarizing these definitions and differences.
April 28, 2024"

. Michael-Pendlebury-Notes: https://philarchive.org/archive/POLRUW mentioned him; http://web.archive.org/web/20240605071655/https://chass.ncsu.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2020/07/CV.Pendlebury.240131.pdf is curriculum; https://megalodon.jp/2024-0624-0725-59/https://www.transcript-verlag.de:443/shopMedia/openaccess/pdf/oa9783839462409.pdf; https://megalodon.jp/2024-0624-0726-56/https://wiredspace.wits.ac.za:443/server/api/core/bitstreams/28f1ae18-b929-41cc-8d56-73fb6035321d/content p.4: "I am deeply indebted to Professor Michael Pendlebury for both his philosophical
guidance and encouragement in the supervision of this Research Report. While I have
tried to indicate the ideas developed here at his suggestion, such footnotes cannot begin
to do justice";

https://archive.ph/RDg0g ; https://megalodon.jp/2024-0624-0449-38/https://www.connectedpapers.com:443/main/acc3501651d24fa5aeea95085a8b60cc13bafdec/Sense-experiences-and-their-contents%3A-A-defence-of-the-propositional-account/list & "graph".

 Pendlebury, M. J. 1990. Sense experiences and their contents: a defense of the propositional 
account. Inquiry 33: 215–30. : https://web.archive.org/web/20240623195212/https://philarchive.org/archive/SIEROT-6 ; https://www.researchgate.net/publication/30973426_Intentionalism_Defended : "Other philosophers with anti-intentionalist sympathies include  Baldwin  (1992);  Boghossian  andVelleman (1989, 1991); Burge (1997, forthcoming); Chalmers (1996); Levine (1997, 2001); Lowe(2000); Maund (1995); Pendlebury (1990);...";
https://megalodon.jp/2024-0624-0520-23/https://web.ics.purdue.edu:443/~mjacovid/Representation.pdf : "Pendlebury argues for the narrower thesis that
experiences represent propositions. If any of these arguments succeeded, it would follow that I
am mistaken and experiences are representational events. 
Pendlebury first argues (224-25) that sense experience must represent propositions on the
grounds that otherwise we could not make sense of sensible judgments such as “these sense
experiences support (or: do not support) this belief” and “these sense experiences are consistent
(or: inconsistent) with those beliefs.” If this were a good argument," , "Pendlebury (224) thinks that it is important that philosophers call experiences ‘veridical’
and ‘non-veridical’ and concludes that this means that experiences can be true or false. But
20
experiences cannot be true or false, not really.14
 If calling experiences ‘veridical’ and ‘nonveridical’ means anything, it means that they incline us to believe true propositions or false
propositions. The terminology is misleading insofar as it suggests that there is a single
proposition associated with each experience. " , "Later, Pendlebury (225) concludes that experiences represent propositions from the fact
that “Philosophers of Perception and Epistemologists take for granted . . . . that sense
experiences are the sorts of things which can be accepted and rejected.” This also seems to be a
misleading way of talking. Suppose I watch a magician appear to saw a woman in half. I don’t
want to reject my experience of watching the trick. I may have paid good money to see that
trick. Rather, I want to reject the belief that the experience inclines me to have, the belief that
the magician is actually sawing a woman in half. Experiences incline us to accept beliefs
without thereby representing those beliefs.",
"Experiences ordinarily so-called are the pieces into which we carve up our days. 
They are sources of memory, wisdom, and happiness. And they do not represent anything"
; https://philpapers.org/references/PENSEA?eId=PENSEA&onlineOnly=&url=&filterByAreas=off&page_size=50&sqc=off&total=9&proOnly=off&langFilter=off&showCategories=off&direction=references&offset=0
; https://archive.ph/wip/yIbUr showing Michael pendlebury being suggested in Inquiry An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy Journal.;

Pendlebury's understanding of "Sense Experience": https://megalodon.jp/2024-0624-0536-58/https://www.jstor.org:443/stable/4545057 : "Sense Experience" "Perception always involves representation, and in the standard case the vehicle of perceptual representation is a sense of experience. In normal perception in other words, a sense experience is what does the representing, it is not something that is represented. A sense experience, moreover, is not something that is represented. a sense experience, moreover, is not and does not involve a special kind of thing such as a sense datum to which we are related by some mysterious relation of 'having' or 'sensing'. It is, rather, an event which inheres in a perceiver"--"a happening in his sensuous and mental life. It may be complex"/duration/changing/other sense exp. as parts -- "as the total exp" "I now have includes visual, aural, and tactile exp" "and as the visual exp"

Pendlebury's commonsense realism: https://philpapers.org/rec/PENPAO-6 ; https://megalodon.jp/2024-0624-0548-58/https://www.bu.edu:443/wcp/IntroV5.htm (2000) : "We do however enjoy unproblematic access to sense data. Hence our direct awareness of sense experience is the only genuinely relational awareness that "includes within itself one of its relata." This awareness eliminates the specter of an infinite regress in the process of justification. To this argument one might object that the notion of sense data seems to a hybrid concept that conflates descriptive and explanatory motifs. If we limit ourselves to description of our experience, it seems that we are in fact simply not aware of sense data. We are aware of pained bodily parts and red things but not of pain or red tout court. Michael Pendlebury contends that the development of a sophisticated common sense realism requires an account of how perceptions become perceptual judgments "to the extent that they are imbedded in and engaged with the high level patterns of consciousness and reasoning characteristic of judgments." He rightly points out that whatever may be the relations between concepts in a conceptual system the applicability of concepts must be "anchored" in the nonconceptual aspects of perceptual experience. Human perceptions always blend conceptual and nonconceptual aspects. To the extent that they include conceptual aspects perceptions are raised into what Wilfred Sellars called "the space of reasons" and thus become perceptual judgments. Pendlebury develops a convincing account of how perceptual discriminations both found and merge with conceptual articulations."
; https://megalodon.jp/2024-0624-0726-56/https://wiredspace.wits.ac.za:443/server/api/core/bitstreams/28f1ae18-b929-41cc-8d56-73fb6035321d/content : p.4: "Michael Pendlebury for both his philosophical
guidance and encouragement in the supervision of this Research Report."..."his input has influenced the direction that this Report has
taken"
p.6:"[A] 'COMMONSENSE REALISM'
The 'commonsense realism' which the Epistemological Realist is concerned to defend
involves a commitment to three general claims:
- we can (and do) have knowledge of the worid,
- the world exists independently of our minds, and
- we have access to the world in perception.
Importantly, these claims are to be taken together rather than separately. On the
realist view under consideration itis held that in perception we have access to the
mind-independent world, this access being a crucial ground of the possibility of
empirical knowledge. To put it in a slightly different way: the world of which we
have knowledge in virtue of our perceptual access to it is mind-independent. Or
again: our knowledge claims bear on the mind-independent world, this possibility
being secured by the perceptual access we have to the latter."

p.7: "What the Epistemological Realist is concerned to show, then, is that we can make
good on our 'commonsense realist' intuition that we can and (In have knowledge of
the mind-independent world. Importantly, however, ER acknowledges that there is
much work to be done in this regard. In particular the I:R theorist argues that the way
'commonsense realism' has traditionally been developed must be abandoned."
> p.8:"On the ER view, at
least partly responsible for this rise in the popularity of anti-realism has heen the
failure of Traditional Realism (TR) to cash out the details of the 'commonsense
realist' intuition in the right ways.
The ER theorist urges that there are at least three areas in which we must take issue
with the Traditional Realist if a 'commonsense realism' about the world is to be
secured:
(a) the TR account of how perception is able to make knowledge of the world
possible,
(b) the TR account of perception itself, and
(c) the TR account of how our knowledge claims bear on reality.
The ER project is centrally concerned to show that once we take issue with (a)-(c)
and replace them with the right kinds of accounts then there is nothing to prevent us
from being 'commonsense realists'." > "argue that
the ER project is made more secure by adopting the account advanced by Michael Pendlebury."
> p.11:"necessary if 'commonsense realism' is to be secured. This will lead us to something of
a dilemma, the solution to which, I will suggest, is to adopt the kind of account
proposed by Pendlebury (see e.g., Pendlebury, 1997, 1998a).
"
p.88: "In 'Defending Commonsense Realism'
Pendlebury outlines a way in which the ER theorist can retain a commitment to the
idea of a fact-proposition truth-making relation while doing justice to the insights
made by Dummett (Pendlebury, 1998b). The first point to note is that the truth of a
great number of our sentences on the ER account will not be verificationtranscendent. (Pendlebury refers to these as 'core sentences'.)
The second is that the
constituents and structures of these sentences occur in and are intimately related to
those sentences whose truth IS verification-transcendent. (Pendlebury refers to these
latter as 'non-core' sentences.) Now itis evident that according to Dummett there can
be no problem with how we could come to grasp the meaning of the group of core
sentences. Put then in light of what has been said above it will also be possible to
give an account of how we could come to grasp the meaning ofthe non-core
84
sentences. As Pendlebury argues, there are two things to which we can appeal in
explaining how a speaker could come to understand the group of non-core sentences:
(i) the speaker's presumed grasp of the meanings of the constituents and
structures of those sentences which also occur in core sentences, and
(ii) the speaker's grasp of the other relevant connections between the
constituents and structures of the non-core sentences and those which occur in core
Sl -ntences.
Pendlebury gives the following example. Consider a sentence the truth of which is
very clearly verification transcendent (from our perspective now at any rate) on the
ER account: 'There will be a large Eucalyptus tree on this spot at the start of the 25th
century' . As Pendlebury points out, we seem to have no problem in understanding
this sentence. The question is how the ER theorist can account for this fact given a
commitment to the idea that sentence-meaning is a matter of truth conditions.
"
pdf-p.90:"To be sure, ER does have something in common
with the TR picture arising from commitments (1)-(3) -like the Traditional Realist,
the Epistemological Realist is committed to the idea that the world upon which our
language bears is the real, mind-independent one. Where ER departs from TR is in
the avoidance of any 'metaphysical fantasy'.
"
p.91:"'Commonsense realism' is a holistic view involving a combination of ontological and
epistemological commitments. Simply stated, it involves a commitment to the
commonsense picture that we can (and do) have knowledge of the mind-independent
world, the possibility of such knowledge being in some sense secured by the access
we have to the world in perception."

Related to "commonsense realism": https://web.archive.org/web/20240623205621/https://philarchive.org/archive/PENIRA
; https://megalodon.jp/2024-0624-0611-21/https://philpapers.org:443/archive/PENFAT.pdf : p.8: "I now want to go over to the dark side (or is it the light side?) by giving up on unrestricted realism."..."speaking informal philosophical English"..."satisfy these standards."..."e.g.,"..."elementary arithmetical propositions is provability rather than the satisfaction of conditions of existence abd non-existence"..."provable."...
"realism about propositions of a given type as the view that they are factual propositions that aim to describe a largely independent reality, and that they are true if and only of they do so. I take this to be equivalent to the claim that they are true if and only if they have realistic truth-makers."...
p.9: "Both choices call for justification based on a careful examination of thought and talk in the relevant domain and the kinds of resources that are available in that domainfor defending claims, answering questions, and settling disagreements."...
"while both realism and objectivism are sustainable with respect to everyday and scientific propositions about the macroscopic world around us, neither is at all obvious with respect to propositions about that is funny"...""cool.""...
"Again, it would seem that, while it is not so easy to settle the question of realism concerning logic and mathematics, there is good reason to favor objectivism over anti-objectivism about these domains."...
"The realism of the Truth-maker program is an uncritical article of faith that is simply taken for granted."..."call for more  careful reasoning"
; https://web.archive.org/web/20240623214450/https://books.google.at/books?id=z4Wt5F_hC3AC&pg=PA223&lpg=PA223&dq=%22michael+pendlebury%22+agnosticism+There+are+two+forms+of+agnosticism:+weak+and&source=bl&ots=rh9ZGF7vHI&sig=ACfU3U0oKvtivnjEDBETW4vyGM1QLZx0Kw&hl=de&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj3j9uU2fKGAxUVSvEDHbEjB1gQ6AF6BAgIEAM#v=onepage&q=%22michael%20pendlebury%22%20agnosticism%20There%20are%20two%20forms%20of%20agnosticism%3A%20weak%20and&f=false : pdf-p.359 p.159. "The seemingly relational structure of attributions of experience is a challenge dealt with below in cennection with the adverbial theory. Apparent reference to and quantification over objects of experience can be handled by analysing them as reference to experiences themselves and quantification over experiences tacitly typed according to content. (Thus "The after-image which John experience was green" becomes "John's after-image experience was an experience of green", and "Macbeth saw something which his wife did not see" becomes "Macbeth had a visual experience which his wife did not have".)"

Mentioned "commonsense realism": https://web.archive.org/web/20240623220754/https://philarchive.org/archive/PENTRO (May 1996): Michael Pendlebury prefers in certain issues "modest commonsense realism" and maybe as equal "commonsense fallibilism" ; 

Comments on Michael Pendlebury's Facts as truthmakers. (1986): https://megalodon.jp/2024-0624-0720-22/https://philarchive.org:443/archive/ASATTA : "While I think realism is best understood in terms of truthmakers, this is not because 
only realists are entitled to take a stand on truthmakers. Michael Pendlebury, critical of the 
thought that truthmaker theory is essentially realist, writes that the “realism of the Truthmaker Program is an uncritical article of faith that is simply taken for granted” (2010: 145)."