https://web.archive.org/20240428/https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325340093_Review_of_Shapiro_A_G_Todorovic_D_Eds_The_Oxford_Compendium_of_Visual_Illusions_Oxford_University_Press_2017 May 2018
https://megalodon.jp/2024-0429-0059-14/https://www.degruyter.com:443/document/doi/10.1515/mp-2014-0014/html / https://web.archive.org/20240428/https://www.researchgate.net/publication/360684818_George_Orwell_objectivity_and_the_reality_behind_illusions May 2022: Non-reductive physicalism has become the dominant view in the philosophy of mind. Some of its metaphysical underpinnings, however, have not been studied in detail yet.
https://web.archive.org/20240428/https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/36129073/ : "Illusions, objectivity, and non-reductive emergentism: Reply to Rose"
https://web.archive.org/20240428/https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/36129072/ : "More on realism, phenomenology, and causation, in reply to Cheng
David Rose"
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/363747807_More_on_realism_phenomenology_and_causation_in_reply_to_Cheng : 2022-04-28 : "First, I agree with Cheng that the argument from illusions to indirect realism is controversial, especially as to what is meant by “realism,” “veridical,” and “sense data” and the background assumptions underlying them. I provide a finer specification of some of the sub-movements that were the specific concerns of my previous article, particularly phenomenology as it currently sees itself in perception research, and the relevance of illusions. Perception has turned out to be far more complex than traditional philosophy realized, as has been revealed by recent research in neuroscience and psychophysics. Lastly, I answer Cheng’s question about the “causal exclusion argument” by suggesting it is obviated by the temporal substructure of metaphysical states, and I provide a detailed supporting case in Supplementary Material ."
https://web.archive.org/20240428/https://www.researchgate.net/publication/365892968_Causation_runs_horizontally_the_stream_of_thought_as_a_sequence_of_hierarchical_event-complexes_Supplementary_material_for_More_on_realism_phenomenology_and_causation_in_reply_to_Cheng_Perception_51_8 : December 2022 : "Causation occurs within a level of nature, not between levels. For example, mind-body relations are one-to-many in their event durations, which is not consistent with simple (efficient) causation between levels."

"https://web.archive.org/20240428/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00048409012340193":"Chalmers on unrepresentative realism and objectivism" restricted.

https://web.archive.org/20240428/https://research-methodology.net/research-philosophy/ontology/ : "Accordingly, objectivism (or positivism) and subjectivism can be specified as two important aspects of ontology.".
"Positivism	External, objective and independent of social actors,
Realism	Objective. Exists independently of human thoughts and beliefs or knowledge of their existence (realist), but is interpreted through social conditioning (critical realist)"
archived later yet query-action happened 1 minute earlier: https://web.archive.org/20240428184700/https://heliumtrades.com/balanced-news/?q=What+is+the+difference+between+objectivity+and+realism%3F : "Distinguishing Objectivity from Realism
The terms objectivity and realism are often used interchangeably in everyday discourse, yet they hold distinct meanings in philosophical and critical contexts.


Objectivity refers to the concept of perceiving and representing facts free from personal bias, emotions, or subjective interpretations. It is often discussed within the realm of knowledge and truth-finding processes, emphasizing an impartial standpoint that strives to see things as they are, not as one might wish them to be [Cambridge Dictionary].
Realism, in contrast, is a broader philosophical doctrine which posits that external reality exists independently of human thoughts or perceptions. Philosophical realism argues for the existence of an objective reality that human beings can know and understand [Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy].


Key Differences
Epistemological Focus: Objectivity primarily concerns methods of inquiry and the attitudinal stance of individuals towards facts, aiming for neutrality. Realism, however, is concerned with the nature of reality itself and the capacity of human knowledge to accurately reflect that reality.
Disciplinary Applications: Objectivity is commonly applied in sciences and journalism where methods and reporting strive to minimize bias [Nature]. Realism spans across various disciplines including art (depicting life accurately), literature (illusory reality in narrative forms), and sciences (the existence of phenomena independent of observation).


Conclusion
While objectivity and realism can interrelate—realism requiring a degree of objective analysis and objectivity often assuming a realist background—their cores diverge in philosophical significance. One deals with an ethical and methodological approach to information (objectivity), while the other tackles the foundational nature of existence and perception (realism).


Note: References to specific philosophical resources and articles were used for summarizing these definitions and differences.
April 28, 2024"

. Michael-Pendlebury-Notes: https://philarchive.org/archive/POLRUW mentioned him; http://web.archive.org/web/20240605071655/https://chass.ncsu.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2020/07/CV.Pendlebury.240131.pdf is curriculum; https://megalodon.jp/2024-0624-0725-59/https://www.transcript-verlag.de:443/shopMedia/openaccess/pdf/oa9783839462409.pdf; https://megalodon.jp/2024-0624-0726-56/https://wiredspace.wits.ac.za:443/server/api/core/bitstreams/28f1ae18-b929-41cc-8d56-73fb6035321d/content p.4: "I am deeply indebted to Professor Michael Pendlebury for both his philosophical
guidance and encouragement in the supervision of this Research Report. While I have
tried to indicate the ideas developed here at his suggestion, such footnotes cannot begin
to do justice";

https://archive.ph/RDg0g ; https://megalodon.jp/2024-0624-0449-38/https://www.connectedpapers.com:443/main/acc3501651d24fa5aeea95085a8b60cc13bafdec/Sense-experiences-and-their-contents%3A-A-defence-of-the-propositional-account/list & "graph".

 Pendlebury, M. J. 1990. Sense experiences and their contents: a defense of the propositional 
account. Inquiry 33: 215–30. : https://web.archive.org/web/20240623195212/https://philarchive.org/archive/SIEROT-6 ; https://www.researchgate.net/publication/30973426_Intentionalism_Defended : "Other philosophers with anti-intentionalist sympathies include  Baldwin  (1992);  Boghossian  andVelleman (1989, 1991); Burge (1997, forthcoming); Chalmers (1996); Levine (1997, 2001); Lowe(2000); Maund (1995); Pendlebury (1990);...";
https://megalodon.jp/2024-0624-0520-23/https://web.ics.purdue.edu:443/~mjacovid/Representation.pdf : "Pendlebury argues for the narrower thesis that
experiences represent propositions. If any of these arguments succeeded, it would follow that I
am mistaken and experiences are representational events. 
Pendlebury first argues (224-25) that sense experience must represent propositions on the
grounds that otherwise we could not make sense of sensible judgments such as “these sense
experiences support (or: do not support) this belief” and “these sense experiences are consistent
(or: inconsistent) with those beliefs.” If this were a good argument," , "Pendlebury (224) thinks that it is important that philosophers call experiences ‘veridical’
and ‘non-veridical’ and concludes that this means that experiences can be true or false. But
20
experiences cannot be true or false, not really.14
 If calling experiences ‘veridical’ and ‘nonveridical’ means anything, it means that they incline us to believe true propositions or false
propositions. The terminology is misleading insofar as it suggests that there is a single
proposition associated with each experience. " , "Later, Pendlebury (225) concludes that experiences represent propositions from the fact
that “Philosophers of Perception and Epistemologists take for granted . . . . that sense
experiences are the sorts of things which can be accepted and rejected.” This also seems to be a
misleading way of talking. Suppose I watch a magician appear to saw a woman in half. I don’t
want to reject my experience of watching the trick. I may have paid good money to see that
trick. Rather, I want to reject the belief that the experience inclines me to have, the belief that
the magician is actually sawing a woman in half. Experiences incline us to accept beliefs
without thereby representing those beliefs.",
"Experiences ordinarily so-called are the pieces into which we carve up our days. 
They are sources of memory, wisdom, and happiness. And they do not represent anything"
; https://philpapers.org/references/PENSEA?eId=PENSEA&onlineOnly=&url=&filterByAreas=off&page_size=50&sqc=off&total=9&proOnly=off&langFilter=off&showCategories=off&direction=references&offset=0
; https://archive.ph/wip/yIbUr showing Michael pendlebury being suggested in Inquiry An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy Journal.;

Pendlebury's understanding of "Sense Experience": https://megalodon.jp/2024-0624-0536-58/https://www.jstor.org:443/stable/4545057 : "Sense Experience" "Perception always involves representation, and in the standard case the vehicle of perceptual representation is a sense of experience. In normal perception in other words, a sense experience is what does the representing, it is not something that is represented. A sense experience, moreover, is not something that is represented. a sense experience, moreover, is not and does not involve a special kind of thing such as a sense datum to which we are related by some mysterious relation of 'having' or 'sensing'. It is, rather, an event which inheres in a perceiver"--"a happening in his sensuous and mental life. It may be complex"/duration/changing/other sense exp. as parts -- "as the total exp" "I now have includes visual, aural, and tactile exp" "and as the visual exp"

Pendlebury's commonsense realism: https://philpapers.org/rec/PENPAO-6 ; https://megalodon.jp/2024-0624-0548-58/https://www.bu.edu:443/wcp/IntroV5.htm (2000) : "We do however enjoy unproblematic access to sense data. Hence our direct awareness of sense experience is the only genuinely relational awareness that "includes within itself one of its relata." This awareness eliminates the specter of an infinite regress in the process of justification. To this argument one might object that the notion of sense data seems to a hybrid concept that conflates descriptive and explanatory motifs. If we limit ourselves to description of our experience, it seems that we are in fact simply not aware of sense data. We are aware of pained bodily parts and red things but not of pain or red tout court. Michael Pendlebury contends that the development of a sophisticated common sense realism requires an account of how perceptions become perceptual judgments "to the extent that they are imbedded in and engaged with the high level patterns of consciousness and reasoning characteristic of judgments." He rightly points out that whatever may be the relations between concepts in a conceptual system the applicability of concepts must be "anchored" in the nonconceptual aspects of perceptual experience. Human perceptions always blend conceptual and nonconceptual aspects. To the extent that they include conceptual aspects perceptions are raised into what Wilfred Sellars called "the space of reasons" and thus become perceptual judgments. Pendlebury develops a convincing account of how perceptual discriminations both found and merge with conceptual articulations."
; https://megalodon.jp/2024-0624-0726-56/https://wiredspace.wits.ac.za:443/server/api/core/bitstreams/28f1ae18-b929-41cc-8d56-73fb6035321d/content : p.4: "Michael Pendlebury for both his philosophical
guidance and encouragement in the supervision of this Research Report."..."his input has influenced the direction that this Report has
taken"
p.6:"[A] 'COMMONSENSE REALISM'
The 'commonsense realism' which the Epistemological Realist is concerned to defend
involves a commitment to three general claims:
- we can (and do) have knowledge of the worid,
- the world exists independently of our minds, and
- we have access to the world in perception.
Importantly, these claims are to be taken together rather than separately. On the
realist view under consideration itis held that in perception we have access to the
mind-independent world, this access being a crucial ground of the possibility of
empirical knowledge. To put it in a slightly different way: the world of which we
have knowledge in virtue of our perceptual access to it is mind-independent. Or
again: our knowledge claims bear on the mind-independent world, this possibility
being secured by the perceptual access we have to the latter."

p.7: "What the Epistemological Realist is concerned to show, then, is that we can make
good on our 'commonsense realist' intuition that we can and (In have knowledge of
the mind-independent world. Importantly, however, ER acknowledges that there is
much work to be done in this regard. In particular the I:R theorist argues that the way
'commonsense realism' has traditionally been developed must be abandoned."
> p.8:"On the ER view, at
least partly responsible for this rise in the popularity of anti-realism has heen the
failure of Traditional Realism (TR) to cash out the details of the 'commonsense
realist' intuition in the right ways.
The ER theorist urges that there are at least three areas in which we must take issue
with the Traditional Realist if a 'commonsense realism' about the world is to be
secured:
(a) the TR account of how perception is able to make knowledge of the world
possible,
(b) the TR account of perception itself, and
(c) the TR account of how our knowledge claims bear on reality.
The ER project is centrally concerned to show that once we take issue with (a)-(c)
and replace them with the right kinds of accounts then there is nothing to prevent us
from being 'commonsense realists'." > "argue that
the ER project is made more secure by adopting the account advanced by Michael Pendlebury."
> p.11:"necessary if 'commonsense realism' is to be secured. This will lead us to something of
a dilemma, the solution to which, I will suggest, is to adopt the kind of account
proposed by Pendlebury (see e.g., Pendlebury, 1997, 1998a).
"
p.88: "In 'Defending Commonsense Realism'
Pendlebury outlines a way in which the ER theorist can retain a commitment to the
idea of a fact-proposition truth-making relation while doing justice to the insights
made by Dummett (Pendlebury, 1998b). The first point to note is that the truth of a
great number of our sentences on the ER account will not be verificationtranscendent. (Pendlebury refers to these as 'core sentences'.)
The second is that the
constituents and structures of these sentences occur in and are intimately related to
those sentences whose truth IS verification-transcendent. (Pendlebury refers to these
latter as 'non-core' sentences.) Now itis evident that according to Dummett there can
be no problem with how we could come to grasp the meaning of the group of core
sentences. Put then in light of what has been said above it will also be possible to
give an account of how we could come to grasp the meaning ofthe non-core
84
sentences. As Pendlebury argues, there are two things to which we can appeal in
explaining how a speaker could come to understand the group of non-core sentences:
(i) the speaker's presumed grasp of the meanings of the constituents and
structures of those sentences which also occur in core sentences, and
(ii) the speaker's grasp of the other relevant connections between the
constituents and structures of the non-core sentences and those which occur in core
Sl -ntences.
Pendlebury gives the following example. Consider a sentence the truth of which is
very clearly verification transcendent (from our perspective now at any rate) on the
ER account: 'There will be a large Eucalyptus tree on this spot at the start of the 25th
century' . As Pendlebury points out, we seem to have no problem in understanding
this sentence. The question is how the ER theorist can account for this fact given a
commitment to the idea that sentence-meaning is a matter of truth conditions.
"
pdf-p.90:"To be sure, ER does have something in common
with the TR picture arising from commitments (1)-(3) -like the Traditional Realist,
the Epistemological Realist is committed to the idea that the world upon which our
language bears is the real, mind-independent one. Where ER departs from TR is in
the avoidance of any 'metaphysical fantasy'.
"
p.91:"'Commonsense realism' is a holistic view involving a combination of ontological and
epistemological commitments. Simply stated, it involves a commitment to the
commonsense picture that we can (and do) have knowledge of the mind-independent
world, the possibility of such knowledge being in some sense secured by the access
we have to the world in perception."

Related to "commonsense realism": https://web.archive.org/web/20240623205621/https://philarchive.org/archive/PENIRA
; https://megalodon.jp/2024-0624-0611-21/https://philpapers.org:443/archive/PENFAT.pdf : p.8: "I now want to go over to the dark side (or is it the light side?) by giving up on unrestricted realism."..."speaking informal philosophical English"..."satisfy these standards."..."e.g.,"..."elementary arithmetical propositions is provability rather than the satisfaction of conditions of existence abd non-existence"..."provable."...
"realism about propositions of a given type as the view that they are factual propositions that aim to describe a largely independent reality, and that they are true if and only of they do so. I take this to be equivalent to the claim that they are true if and only if they have realistic truth-makers."...
p.9: "Both choices call for justification based on a careful examination of thought and talk in the relevant domain and the kinds of resources that are available in that domainfor defending claims, answering questions, and settling disagreements."...
"while both realism and objectivism are sustainable with respect to everyday and scientific propositions about the macroscopic world around us, neither is at all obvious with respect to propositions about that is funny"...""cool.""...
"Again, it would seem that, while it is not so easy to settle the question of realism concerning logic and mathematics, there is good reason to favor objectivism over anti-objectivism about these domains."...
"The realism of the Truth-maker program is an uncritical article of faith that is simply taken for granted."..."call for more  careful reasoning"
; https://web.archive.org/web/20240623214450/https://books.google.at/books?id=z4Wt5F_hC3AC&pg=PA223&lpg=PA223&dq=%22michael+pendlebury%22+agnosticism+There+are+two+forms+of+agnosticism:+weak+and&source=bl&ots=rh9ZGF7vHI&sig=ACfU3U0oKvtivnjEDBETW4vyGM1QLZx0Kw&hl=de&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj3j9uU2fKGAxUVSvEDHbEjB1gQ6AF6BAgIEAM#v=onepage&q=%22michael%20pendlebury%22%20agnosticism%20There%20are%20two%20forms%20of%20agnosticism%3A%20weak%20and&f=false : pdf-p.359 p.159. "The seemingly relational structure of attributions of experience is a challenge dealt with below in cennection with the adverbial theory. Apparent reference to and quantification over objects of experience can be handled by analysing them as reference to experiences themselves and quantification over experiences tacitly typed according to content. (Thus "The after-image which John experience was green" becomes "John's after-image experience was an experience of green", and "Macbeth saw something which his wife did not see" becomes "Macbeth had a visual experience which his wife did not have".)"

Mentioned "commonsense realism": https://web.archive.org/web/20240623220754/https://philarchive.org/archive/PENTRO (May 1996): Michael Pendlebury prefers in certain issues "modest commonsense realism" and maybe as equal "commonsense fallibilism" ; 

Comments on Michael Pendlebury's Facts as truthmakers. (1986): https://megalodon.jp/2024-0624-0720-22/https://philarchive.org:443/archive/ASATTA : "While I think realism is best understood in terms of truthmakers, this is not because 
only realists are entitled to take a stand on truthmakers. Michael Pendlebury, critical of the 
thought that truthmaker theory is essentially realist, writes that the “realism of the Truthmaker Program is an uncritical article of faith that is simply taken for granted” (2010: 145)."